This

is a compilation of doctrines directly quoted from the

decisions of the Supreme Court for the purposes of midterms
review for the ALS Batch 2022 Constitutional Law I exams.
This is only effective after reading all original copies of the cases
and understanding the commentary of Fr. Bernas.
May the force be with you!
–M.

Magallona v Ermita (Article I) accordance with customary international law without
• UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or risking retaliatory measures from the international
loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, community
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e.,
the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the In the Matter of South China Sea Arbitration (Article I)
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the • Article 121 of the Convention: islands generate an
baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles entitlement to an exclusive economic zone of 200
from the baselines]), and continental shelves that nautical miles and to a continental shelf, but rocks
UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of which cannot sustain human habitation or economic
decades-long negotiations among United Nations life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of or continental shelf — closely linked to the expansion
States in the world's oceans and submarine areas, of coastal State jurisdiction and intended to prevent
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States' graduated insignificant features from generating large
authority over a limited span of waters and submarine entitlements to maritime zones that would infringe on
lands along their coasts. On the other hand, baselines entitlements of inhabited territory or on high seas and
laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States the area of the seabed reserved for the common
parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their heritage of mankind. Entitlements of a feature depend
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight on the a) objective capacity of a feature, b) its natural
or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to conditions to sustain either c) a stable community of
measure the breadth of the maritime zones and people or d) economic activity that is neither
continental shelf. In the absence of municipal dependent on outside resources nor purely extractive
legislation, international law norms, now codified in in nature. Even if many of the features are currently
UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights controlled by one or other of the littoral States, which
over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject have constructed installations and maintained
to the treaty's limitations and conditions for their personnel there and have been modified to improve
exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is their habitability (by land reclamation and construction
a customary international law, thus automatically of infrastructure), the current presence of official
incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No personnel on many of the features does not establish
modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to their capacity, in their natural condition, to sustain a
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in stable community of people and considered that

 historical evidence of habitation or economic life was the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
more relevant to the objective capacity of the features. guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review,
Temporary of use of features (as in by small groups of and by the legislature in its enactment of laws
Chinese fishermen and from other states in the Spratly
Islands and Japanese fishing and guano mining BCDA v COA (Article II)
enterprises) did not amount to inhabitation by a stable • Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of
community and that all historical economic activity had Principles and State Policies. By its very title, Article II is
been extractive in nature. All high-tide features in the a statement of general ideological principles and
Spratly Islands are legally “rocks” that do not generate policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights.
an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. The
Convention does not provide for a group of islands Ocampo v Enriquez (Article II)
(such as the Spratly Islands) to generate maritime • As the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) logically
zones collectively as a unit. reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of
our collective history as a people, its entirety should
Kilosbayan v Morato & MR (Article II) not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to
• These (Art. II provisions) are not, however, self just about anything remotely related to the Martial
executing provisions, the disregard of which can give Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the
rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not LNMB.
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation. They are merely statements ACCFA v CUGCO (Sec. 1, Art. II)
of principles and policies. To give them effect, • The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in
legislative enactment is required. They do not embody governmental, not proprietary functions. These
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but functions may not be strictly what President Wilson
guidelines for legislation. described as "constituent" (as distinguished from
"ministrant"), such as those relating to the
Tondo Medical v CA (Article II) maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime,
• By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a those regulating property and property rights, those
declaration of principles and state policies. These relating to the administration of justice and the
principles in Article II are not intended to be self- determination of political duties of citizens, and those
executing principles ready for enforcement through relating to national defense and foreign relations.

 Under this traditional classification, such constituent sentiments and love of country. “..The areas which
functions are exercised by the State as attributes of used to be left to private enterprise and initiative...
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to
progress and prosperity of the people — these letter be absorbed within activities that the government
functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is must undertake in its sovereign capacity...”
optional on the part of the government. The growing
complexities of modern society, however, have Ramiscal v Sandiganbayan (Sec. 1, Art. II)
rendered this traditional classification of the functions • The anti-graft court correctly ruled that it has
of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. jurisdiction over the crimes charged. In People v.
The areas which used to be left to private enterprise Sandiganbayan and Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, this
and initiative and which the government was called Court ruled that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned
upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was and controlled corporation, and that its funds are in
better equipped to administer for the public welfare the nature of public funds. Under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of
than is any private individual or group of individuals" R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to jurisdiction over offenses committed by presidents,
be absorbed within activities that the government directors, trustees or managers of government owned
must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet or controlled corporations. Under Section 4(b) of R.A.
the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction
almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly over offenses committed by public officers and
towards a greater socialization of economic forces. employees in relation to their office, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes.
VFP v Reyes (Sec. 1, Art. II)
• A public character can be understood as that of Javier v Sandiganbayan (Sec. 1, Art. II)
exercising a sovereign function. In several cases, we • A public office is the right, authority and duty, created
have dealt with the issue of whether certain specific and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
activities can be classified as sovereign functions. either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
These cases, which deal with activities not immediately creating power, an individual is invested with some
apparent to be sovereign functions, upheld the public portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
sovereign nature of operations needed either to to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
promote social justice or to stimulate patriotic

 The individual so invested is a public officer. enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter”. When the law vests in a government
MIAA v CA (Sec. 1, Art. II) instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality
• There is no dispute that a government-owned or does not become a corporation. Unless the
controlled corporation is not exempt from real estate government instrumentality is organized as a stock or
tax. However, MIAA is not a government-owned or non-stock corporation, it remains a government
controlled corporation. A government-owned or instrumentality exercising not only governmental but
controlled corporation must be "organized as a stock also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the
or non-stock corporation." MIAA is not organized as a governmental powers of eminent domain, police
stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the
corporation because it has no capital stock divided into same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a
shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as
MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions
no members. A non-stock corporation must have of this Executive Order."
members. Even if we assume that the Government is
considered as the sole member of MIAA, this will not
make MIAA a non-stock corporation. Non-stock BSP v COA (Sec. 1, Art. II)
corporations cannot distribute any part of their income • Not all corporations, which are not government owned
to their members. MIAA is a government or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private
instrumentality vested with corporate powers to corporations as there exists another distinct class of
perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is corporations or chartered institutions which are
like any other government instrumentality, the only otherwise known as "public corporations." These
difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate corporations are treated by law as agencies or
powers. Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of instrumentalities of the government which are not
the Administrative Code defines a government subject to the tests of ownership or control and
"instrumentality" “as any agency of the National economic viability but to different criteria relating to
Government, not integrated within the department their public purposes/interests. An instrumentality
framework, vested with special functions or refers to any agency of the National Government, not
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all integrated within the department framework, vested
corporate powers, administering special funds, and with special functions or jurisdiction by law,endowed

 with some if not all corporate powers, administering it is clear that the MECO is uniquely situated as
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy compared with other private corporations. From its
usually through a charter. over-reaching corporate objectives, its special duty and
authority to exercise certain consular functions, up to
Funa v MECO (Sec. 1, Art. II) the oversight by the executive department over its
• The MECO is not a GOCC or government operations — all the while maintaining its legal status
instrumentality. Government instrumentalities are as a non-governmental entity — the MECO is, for all
agencies of the national government that, by reason of intents and purposes, sui generis.
some "special function or jurisdiction" they perform or
exercise, are allotted"operational autonomy" and are Phil Society v COA (Sec. 1, Art. II)
"not integrated within the department framework." • Charter test is the test to determine whether a
Subsumed under the rubric "government corporation is government owned or controlled, or
instrumentality" are the following entities: 1. private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own
regulatory agencies; 2. chartered institutions; 3. charter for the exercise of a public function, or by
government corporate entities or government incorporation under the general corporation law? The
instrumentalities with corporate powers (GCE/GICP); 4. true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a
GOCCs (Government-owned or controlled corporation corporation is public or private is found in the totality
refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the
corporation, vested with functions relating to public corporation is created by the State as the latter's own
needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its
and owned by the Government directly or through its governmental functions, then that corporation is
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as considered public; otherwise, it is private.
in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at
least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock). MECO Serana v Sandiganbayan (Sec. 1, Art. II)
performs functions with a public aspect. Despite its • Section 4 (A) (1) (g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested
private origins, and perhaps deliberately so, the MECO the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
was "entrusted" by the government with the "delicate directors or trustees, or managers of government-
and precarious"responsibility of pursuing "unofficial" owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
relations with the people of a foreign land whose educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
government the Philippines is bound not to recognize. under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed

 out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto
board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. government, and can at his pleasure either change the
existing laws or make new ones.”
Co Kim Cham v Valdez Tan Keh (Sec. 1, Art. II)
• Political and international law recognizes that all acts Letter of Associate Justice Puno (Sec. 1, Art. II)
and proceedings of a de facto government are good • A revolution has been defined as "the complete
and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and overthrow of the established government in any
the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese country or state by those who were previously subject
occupation may be considered de facto governments, to it" or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change
supported by the military force and deriving their in the government or political system, usually effected
authority from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this with violence or at least some acts of violence."
subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on
International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one Republic v Sandiganbayan (Sec. 1, Art. II)
belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the • During the interregnum the directives and orders of
enemy while in its military possession, is one of the the revolutionary government were the supreme law—
incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to there was no municipal law higher than these. Thus,
conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there
for authority to establish a government for the was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights then.
territory of the enemy in his possession, during its Nevertheless, the Filipino people continued to enjoy,
military occupation, nor for the rules by which the under the Covenant and Declaration, almost the same
powers of such government are regulated and limited. rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Such authority and such rules are derived directly from Constitution.
the laws war, as established by the usage of the world,
and confirmed by the writings of publicists and Peple v Gozo (Sec. 1, Art. II)
decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . • The Philippine Government retains not only
. . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded
laws which regulate private rights, continue in force rights as the United State Military authorities for
during military occupation, excepts so far as they are reasons of their own decline to make use of. However,
suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . subject to this rule is the exception of the principle of

 auto-limitation which was also presented in Reagan. our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Under this principle, any state may, by its consent,
express or implied, submit to a restriction of its Tanada v Angara (Sec. 2, Art. II)
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of • By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound
what otherwise is a power plenary in character. The by generally accepted principles of international law,
property of a state-force due to which it has the which are considered to be automatically part of our
exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self- own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental
restriction. A state is not precluded from allowing rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda –
another power to participate in the exercise of international agreements must be performed in good
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral
The bases under lease to the American armed forces obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on
are still part of the native soil and cannot be the parties. Second part of Section 2 accepts doctrine
considered foreign territory. Municipal Ordinance No. of incorporation. The provision makes the Philippines
14 applies to Gozo. one of the states which make a specific declaration
that international law has the force also of domestic
Kuroda v Jalandoni (Sec. 2, Art. II) law. International law, therefore can be used by
• It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of Philippine courts to settle domestic disputes in much
the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and the same way they would use the Civil Code or the
are wholly based on the generally accepted principles Penal Code and other laws passed by Congress.
of international law. In fact, these rules and principles Principle of incorporation applies only to customary
were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the law and to treaties which have become part of
United States and Japan, who were signatories to the customary law since treaties become part of Philippine
two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, law only by ratification.
form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions BAYAN v Zamora (Sec. 2, Art. II)
embodying them, for our Constitution has been • As long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is agreement under international law, the said
not confined to the recognition of rules and principles agreement is said to be taken equally as a treaty. In
of international law as contained in treaties to which our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the
President and not, as commonly believed, in the

 legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to enter into agreements with other states, including the
giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to prerogative to conclude binding executive agreements
the ratification. With the ratification of the VFA, which that do not require further Senate concurrence.
is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the Executive Agreements need not be concurred by
exchange of notes between the Philippines and the Senate. The President can enter into executive
USA, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our agreements on foreign military bases troops or
part, under the principles of international law, to be facilities: 1. If such agreement is not the instrument
bound by the terms of the agreement. Under the that allows entry of such; 2. If it merely aims to
principle of pacta sunt servanda, every treaty in force implement an existing law or treaty
is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith Bayan Muna v Romulo (Sec. 2, Art. II)
• By their nature, treaties and international agreements
Saguisag v Exec Sec. (Sec. 2, Art. II) actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise
• The power of the President to enter into binding encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By
executive agreements without Senate concurrence is their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or
already well-established in this jurisdiction. As the sole waive some aspects of their state power or agree to
organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and
assigned chief architect of our foreign policy, the absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying
President is vested with the exclusive power to consideration in this partial surrender may be the
conduct and manage the country's interface with other greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal
states and governments. Being the principal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same
representative of the Philippines, the Chief Executive privileges or immunities to the other. On the rationale
speaks and listens for the nation; initiates, maintains, that the Philippines has adopted the generally
and develops diplomatic relations with other states accepted principles of international law as part of the
and governments; negotiates and enters into law of the land, a portion of sovereignty may be
international agreements; promotes trade, waived without violating the Constitution. Such waiver
investments, tourism and other economic relations; does not amount to an unconstitutional diminution or
and settles international disputes with other states. As deprivation of jurisdiction of Philippine courts. In the
previously discussed, this constitutional mandate instant case, it bears stressing that the Philippines is
emanates from the inherent power of the President to only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-

 Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is The denial of the availment of tax relief for the failure
only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat of a taxpayer to apply within the prescribed period
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any under the administrative issuance would impair the
argument obliging the Philippines to follow any value of the tax treaty. At most, the application for a
provision in the treaty would be premature. tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to
confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief.
Deutsche Bank v CIR (Sec. 2, Art. II)
• Tax treaties are entered into “to reconcile the national CBK Power v CIR (Sec. 2, Art. II)
fiscal legislations of the contracting parties and, in • The Philippine Constitution provides for adherence to
turn, help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxations in the general principles of international law as part of
two different jurisdictions. Simply put, tax treaties are the law of the land. The time-honored international
entered into to minimize, if not eliminate the principle ofpacta sunt servanda demands the
harshness of international juridical double taxation, performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the
which is why they are also known as double tax treaty part of the states that enter into the agreement. In this
or double tax agreements. Likewise, it must be jurisdiction, treaties have the force and effect of law.
stressed that there is nothing in RMO No. 1-2000 The issue of whether the failure to strictly comply with
which would indicate a deprivation of entitlement to a RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive persons or corporations
tax treaty relief for failure to comply with the 15-day of the benefit of a tax treaty was squarely addressed in
period. We recognize the clear intention of the BIR in the recent case of Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v.
implementing RMO No. 1-2000, but the CTA’s outright Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Deutsche Bank),
denial of a tax treaty relief for failure to strictly comply where the Court emphasized that the obligation to
with the prescribed period is not in harmony with the comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over
objectives of the contracting state to ensure that the the objective of RMO No. 1-2000.
benefits granted under tax treaties are enjoyed by duly
entitled persons or corporations. Bearing in mind the Lim v Exec Sec. (Sec. 2, Art. II)
rationale of tax treaties, the period of application for • From the perspective of public international law, a
the availment of tax treaty relief as required by RMO treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the
No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement to principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty
the relief as it would constitute a violation of the duty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
required by good faith in complying with a tax treaty. performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a

 treaty is not allowed to invoke provisions of its internal considered as part of the law of the land but as a soft
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. law that is an expression of non-binding norms,
However, it must be taken into account that provisions principles and practices that influence state behavior.
of a treaty are always subject to qualification or While “soft law” does not fall into any of the categories
amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III
to the police power of the state. of the 1946 Statute of International Court of Justice, it
is an expression of non-binding norms, principles and
Mijares v Ranada (Sec. 2, Art. II) practices that influence state behavior. The provisions
• There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or of the WHA Resolution cannot be considered as part of
conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize the law of the land that can be implemented by
foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the executive agencies without the need of a law enacted
enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted by legislature.
principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of Knights of Rizal v DMCI (Sec. 2, Art. II)
the laws of the land even if they do not derive from • The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does
treaty obligations. The classical formulation in not become enforceable as law. The Philippines is not
international law sees those customary rules accepted legally bound to follow its directive, as in fact, these
as binding result from the combination two elements: are not directives but mere guidelines — a set of the
the established, widespread, and consistent practice best practices and techniques that have been proven
on the part of States; and a psychological element over the years to be the most effective in preserving
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as and restoring historical monuments, sites and
to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a buildings. The Venice Charter is merely a codification
belief that the practice in question is rendered of guiding principles for the preservation and
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. restoration of ancient monuments, sites, and buildings.
It brings together principles in the field of historical
Pharmaceutical v DOH (Sec. 2, Art. II) conservation and restoration that have been
• The subsequent WHA resolutions absolutely developed, agreed upon, and laid down by experts
prohibiting advertisements and promotions of breast- over the years. Each country, however, remains
milk substitutes have not been adopted as domestic "responsible for applying the plan within the
law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be

 framework of its own culture and traditions." broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The
IBP v Zamora (Sec. 3, Art. II) detriment that the State would impose upon the
• The deployment of the Marines does not violate the pregnant woman by deny- ing this choice altogether is
civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the apparent. We, therefore, conclude that the right of
civilian character of the police force. The deployment personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but
of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the that this right is not unqualified and must be
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in considered against important state interests in
this case constitutes permissible use of military assets regulation. The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in
for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is one accepts the medical definitions of the developing
appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation young in the human uterus. The pregnant woman
of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an
itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical
bounds of the Marines' authority. It is noteworthy that definitions of the developing young in the human
the local police forces are the ones in charge of the uterus. The situation therefore is inherently different
visibility patrols at all times, the real authority from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of
belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or
Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine education.. As we have intimated above, it is
Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that
police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers at some point in time another interest, that of health
on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes
direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. significantly involved. The woman's privacy is no longer
sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be
Roe v Wade (Sec. 12, Art. II) measured accordingly. States however, do have an
• This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the interest in regulating abortions. While acknowledging
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty that the right to abortion was not unlimited, Justice
and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, Blackmun, speaking for the Court, created a trimester
as the District Court determined, in the Ninth framework to balance the fundamental right to
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is abortion with the government's two legitimate

 interests: protecting the mother's health and from enacting measures that would allow it determine
protecting the "potentiality of human life." The when life begins. Equally apparent, however, is that
trimester framework addressed when a woman's the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban
fundamental right to abortion would be absolute, and all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. From the
when the state's interests would become compelling. discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy
In the first trimester, when it was believed that the the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and
procedure was safer than childbirth, the Court left the thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that
decision to abort completely to the woman and her actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the
physician. From approximately the end of the first female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior
trimester until fetal viability, the state's interest in to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and
protecting the health of the mother would become thus, constitutionally permissible. In all, whether it be
"compelling." At that time, the state could regulate the taken from a plain meaning, or understood under
abortion procedure if the regulation "reasonably medical parlance, and more importantly, following the
relate[d] to the "preservation and protection of intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the
maternal health." At the point of viability, which the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human
Court believed to be in the third trimester, the state's organism and that the life of a new human being
interest in "potential life" would become compelling, commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of
and the state could regulate abortion to protect conception, that is,upon fertilization. A reading of the
"potential life." At that point, the state could even RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent
forbid abortion so long as it made an exception to and actually proscribes abortion.
preserve the life or health of the mother.
Wisconsin v Yoder (Sec. 12, Art. II)
Imbong v Ochoa (Sec. 12, Art. II) • The State has the power to impose reasonable
• It is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution regulations for the control and duration of basic
emphasized that the State shall provide equal education. Previous precedent has held that this power
protection to both the mother and the unborn child must yield to the right of parents to provide an
from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon equivalent education in a privately operated system.
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and The State’s power is subject to a balancing test when it
the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers impinges on fundamental rights such as those
of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First

 Amendment and the traditional interest of parents purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
with respect to the religious upbringing of their existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally
children. In order for Wisconsin to compel such to each member of the class.
attendance, it must follow that either the State does
not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its Oposa v Factoran (Sec. 16, Art. II)
requirement or that there is a state interest of • Every generation has a responsibility to the next to
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
protection under the Free Exercise Clause. This Court enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. A
determines that the Amish objection to the attendance minor’s assertion of their right to a sound
is rooted in religious beliefs that directly conflict with environment, at the same time, is the performance of
the compulsory school attendance law. their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come. While the right to a
Garcia v Drilon (Sec. 14, Art. II) balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
• The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a important than any of the civil and political rights
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman different category of rights altogether for it concerns
and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality nothing less than self-preservation and self-
of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons petitioners — the advancement of which may even be
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It said to predate all governments and constitutions.
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The very
idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes Arigo v Swift (Sec. 16, Art. II)
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no • During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice
manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of
that is required of a valid classification is that it be the US in this case, when its warship entered a
reasonable, which means that the classification should restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and
be based on substantial distinctions which make for caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the
real differences; that it must be germane to the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United

 Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). even if filed by a representative. It had been suggested
He explained that while historically, warships enjoy by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their not only natural and juridical persons should be given
flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception legal standing because of the difficulty for persons,
to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the who cannot show that they by themselves are real
rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation
passage through the latter's internal waters and the of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason,
territorial sea. Insofar as the internal waters and many environmental cases have been dismissed for
territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be
sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case.
international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in
space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and environmental cases has been given a more liberalized
subsoil. We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that approach. While developments in Philippine legal
non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as
the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Justice Douglas’s paradigm of legal standing for
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards
sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international simplification of procedures and facilitating court
responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the access in environmental cases.
USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Paje v Casino (Sec. 16, Art. II)
• Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites
Resident Marine Mammals v Secretary Reyes (Sec. 16, Art. II) must be present to avail of this extraordinary remedy:
• The primary reason animal rights advocates and (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the
environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
objects standing is due to the need to comply with the ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises
strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the
either natural or juridical persons, or entities actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to
authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to
be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in

 two or more cities or provinces. applying the precautionary principle, the court may
construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial
West Tower v PIC (Sec. 16, Art. II) action or inaction, with the goal of preserving and
• The precautionary principle only applies when the link protecting the environment. This may be further
between the cause, that is the human activity sought evinced from the second paragraph where bias is
to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to created in favor of the constitutional right of the
the environment, cannot be established with full people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In effect,
scientific certainty. Here, however, such absence of a the precautionary principle shifts the burden of
link is not an issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or evidence of harm away from those likely to suffer
the presence of defects in the WOPL, which is the issue harm and onto those desiring to change the status
in the case at bar, is different from determining quo. An application of the precautionary principle to
whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the the rules on evidence will enable courts to tackle
surroundings will cause environmental damage or will future environmental problems before ironclad
harm human health or that of other organisms. As a scientific consensus emerges.
matter of fact, the petroleum leak and the harm that it
caused to the environment and to the residents of the LNL Archipelago v Agham Partylist (Sec. 16, Art. II)
affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC. • The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan
petitioner has the burden to prove the (1)
International Service v Greenpeace (Sec. 16, Art. II) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or
• The precautionary principle originated in Germany in threatened to be violated; (2) act or omission
the 1960s, expressing the normative idea that complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of
governments are obligated to "foresee and forestall" such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
harm to the environment. In the following decades, property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
the precautionary principle has served as the provinces. Even the Annotation to the Rules of
normative guideline for policymaking by many national Procedure for Environmental Cases states that the
governments. Under this Rule, the precautionary magnitude of environmental damage is a condition
principle finds direct application in the evaluation of sine qua non in a petition for the issuance of a Writ of
evidence in cases before the courts. The precautionary Kalikasan and must be contained in the verified
principle bridges the gap in cases where scientific petition.
certainty in factual findings cannot be achieved. By

Garcia v BOI (Sec. 19, Art. II) searches and seizures. A standard of reasonableness
• Every provision of the Constitution on the national will neither unduly burden the efforts of government
economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit of employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation
national interest. The non-alienation of natural of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions
resources, the State's full control over the upon the privacy of public employees. We hold,
development and utilization of our scarce resources, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the
agreements with foreigners being based on real constitutionally protected privacy interests of
contributions to the economic growth and general government employees for noninvestigatory, work-
welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-
investments in accordance with national goals and related misconduct, should be judged by the standard
priorities are too explicit not to be noticed and of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under
understood. A petrochemical industry is not an this reasonableness standard, both the inception and
ordinary investment opportunity. It should not be the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
treated like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe- "Determining the reasonableness of any search
making venture, or even an assembler of cars or involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider
manufacturer of computer chips, where the BOI 'whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,' . .
reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The .; second, one must determine whether the search as
petrochemical industry is essential to the national actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to
interest the circumstances which justified the interference in
Pamatong v COMELEC (Sec. 26, Art. II) the first place,'"
• The Constitution guarantees that only bona fide
candidates for public office shall be free from any form Philippine Savings Bank v Senate Impeachment Court (Sec. 28,
of harassment and discrimination. The determination Art. II)
of bona fide candidates is governed by the statutes, • The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a
and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined waiver of the depositor's right to privacy in relation to
in the Omnibus Election Code. such deposit. In the present case, neither the
prosecution nor the Impeachment Court has presented
Pollo v Constantino-David (Sec. 28, Art. II) any such written waiver by the alleged depositor, Chief
• The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all Justice Renato C. Corona. Also, while impeachment
searches and seizures but only of "unreasonable" may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits

 under RA 1405, it is not an exemption to the absolute instance. An exception to the general rule, sanctioned
confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under RA by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative
6426. body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority
In Re: Production of Court Records (Sec. 28, Art. II) upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the
• The deliberative process privilege protects from provincial governor and the provincial board.
disclosure documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations that are SEC v Interport (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
component parts of the process for formulating • In the absence of any constitutional or statutory
governmental decisions and policies. To qualify for infirmity, which may concern Sections 30 and 36 of the
protection under the deliberative process privilege, the Revised Securities Act, this Court upholds these
agency must show that the document is both (1) provisions as legal and binding. It is well settled that
predecisional and (2) deliberative. A document is every law has in its favor the presumption of validity.
"predecisional" under the deliberative process Unless and until a specific provision of the law is
privilege if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid
decision to which it relates. In other words, and binding for all intents and purposes. The mere
communications are considered predecisional if they absence of implementing rules cannot effectively
were made in the attempt to reach a final conclusion. invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable
A material is "deliberative," on the other hand, if it construction that will support the law may be given.
reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process.
The key question in determining whether the material Agustin v Edu (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
is deliberative in nature is whether disclosure of the • To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must
information would discourage candid discussion within be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
the agency. legislature itself determines matters of principle and
lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge
Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro (Sec. 1, Art. VI) of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
• That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
delegation of legislative power should be zealously maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, agency to apply it. Thereafter, the executive or
however, disclose that it has not been violated in this administrative office designated may in pursuance of

 the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules how often, under what conditions, and where the drug
and regulations. The standard may be either express or tests shall be conducted. The validity of delegating
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is legislative power is now a quiet area in the
easily met. The standard though does not have to be constitutional landscape. 39 In the face of the
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the increasing complexity of the task of the government
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its
Araneta v Gatmaitan (Sec. 1, Art. VI) attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting
• As already held by this Court, the true distinction to administrative agencies the power of subordinate
between delegation of the power to legislate and the legislation, has become imperative, as here.
conferring of authority or discretion as to the
execution of the law consists in that the former Disini v Secretary of Justice (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
necessarily involves a discretion as to what the law • Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies,
shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion risk management approaches, actions, training, best
as to its execution has to be exercised under and in practices, assurance and technologies that can be used
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the to protect cyber environment and organization and
latter no valid objection can be made user's assets. This definition serves as the parameters
within which CICC should work in formulating the
Social Justice Secretary v Dangerous Drug Board (Sec. 1, Art. cybersecurity plan. In order to determine whether
VI) there is undue delegation of legislative power, the
• d Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test
DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH, and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
Department of the Interior and Local Government, the law must be complete in all its terms and
Department of Education, and Department of Labor conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and and prevent the delegation from running riot.
employers have unchecked discretion to determine

Quezon City PTCA v Department of Education (Sec. 1, Art. VI) • We are of the opinion that the Act furnishes a
• The three powers of government — executive, sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow
legislative, and judicial — have been generally viewed in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or
as non-delegable. However, in recognition of the cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or
exigencies that contemporary governance must permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the
address, our legal system has recognized the validity of person, partnership, association or corporation
"subordinate legislation," or the rule-making power of applying therefor "has complied with the provisions of
agencies tasked with the administration of this Act", and this requirement, construed in relation
government. To many of the problems attendant upon to the other provisions of the law, means that a
present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular
the competence to provide the required direct and Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These been complied with. Upon the other hand, the
solutions may, however, be expected from its authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate
delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that
particular fields assigned to them. The reasons given such cancellation "is in the public interest." In view of
above for the delegation of legislative powers in the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 — to
general are particularly applicable to administrative protect the public against "speculative schemes which
bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky" and
and their attendant peculiar problems, the national against the "sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns,
legislature has found it more and more necessary to visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to fraudulent exploitations", — we incline to hold that
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the "public interest" in this case is a sufficient standard to
statute. This is called the "power of subordinate guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a
legislation." With this power, administrative bodies matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of
may implement the broad policies laid down in a certificates or permits.
statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress
may not have the opportunity or competence to Eastern Shipping Lines (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
provide. • What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall
People v Rosenthal (Sec. 1, Art. VI) be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a

 prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot • With the growing complexities of modern life, the
be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
delegate. Two tests to Determine Whether There is a regulation, and the increased difficulty of
Valid Delegation of Legislative Power (1) Completeness administering the laws, there is a constantly growing
Test - the law must be complete in all its terms and tendency toward the delegation of greater power by
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that the legislature, and toward the approval and the
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will practice of the courts. So long as the tests of
have to do is enforce it; Sufficient Standard Test - there completeness and sufficient standards are met, there
must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to is valid delegation of legislative power.
map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both Viola v Alunan (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
tests are intended to prevent a total transference of • Congress can delegate the power to create positions.
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not There is no undue delegation of power by Congress.
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and This has been settled by several SC decisions upholding
exercise a power essentially legislative. This led to the the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the
observation that the delegation of legislative power President of the Philippines to create, abolish or
has become the rule and its non-delegation the merge offices in the executive department. In making a
exception. This is for the reason that increasing delegation of this power to the board of directors of
complexity of the task of government and the growing each chapter of the Liga ng Mga Barangay, Congress
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the should provide a sufficient standard so that
problems demanding its attention. Many of the administrative discretion may be “canalized within
problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, proper banks that keep it from overflowing.” Some
the legislature may not have the competence to examples of “sufficient standards” for the purpose of
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, valid delegation are Statutory provisions authorizing
specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be the President of the Philippines to make reforms and
expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be changes in GOCCs for the purpose of promoting
experts in the particular fields assigned to them. These “simplicity, economy and efficiency” in their
reasons are applicable to administrative bodies. operations o Empowering the Secretary of Education
to prescribe minimum standards of “adequate and
Tablarin v Gutierrez (Sec. 1, Art. VI) efficient instruction” in private schools and colleges.

 Judged by these cases, SC held that Sec. 493 of the regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive
LGC, in directing the board of directors of the liga to officers and administrative boards, an act of the
“create such other positions as may be deemed Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence
necessary for the management of the chapters, invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
embodies a fairly intelligible standard. standard by which the administrative board may be
Abakada v Ermita (Sec. 1, Art. VI) guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
• What is thus left to the administrative official is not the delegated to it.
legislative determination of what public policy
demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the Abakada v Purisima (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
facts of the case require to be done according to the • Two tests determine the validity of delegation of
terms of the law by which he is governed. The legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets
must, of course, come from Congress, but the forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient
shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
designate. The legislature, then, may provide that a limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
law shall take effect upon the happening of future delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
specified contingencies leaving to some other person running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must
or body the power to determine when the specified specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce
contingency has arisen. the legislative policy and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented. RA 9335 adequately
Beltran v Sec. of Health (Sec. 1, Art. VI) states the policy and standards to guide the President
• In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue in fixing revenue targets and the implementing
delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its
terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Fernandez v Sto. Tomas (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of • To the contrary, the legislative authority had expressly
the administrative body or any other appointee or authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in
delegate of the Legislature. Except as to matters of the organization," "as the need [for such changes]
detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and arises." Assuming, for purposes of argument merely,

 that legislative authority was necessary to carry out President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
the kinds of changes contemplated in Resolution No. general supervision over local governments [see Art. X,
94-3710 (and the Court is not saying that such Sec. 4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves
authority is necessary), such legislative authority was are not territorial and political divisions like provinces,
validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17 cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere
earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
observed and respected in the exercise of such purposes." The power conferred on the President is
delegated authority are set out not only in Section 17 similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries
itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General
Declaration of Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle as "administrative in nature.” There is, therefore, no
A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code abdication by Congress of its legislative power in
which required the Civil Service Commission as the conferring on the President the power to merge
central personnel agency of the Government [to] administrative regions. The question is whether
establish a career service, adopt measures to promote Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which
— efficiency — [and] responsiveness . . . in the civil the President is to be guided in the exercise of the
service . . . and that personnel functions shall be power granted and whether in any event the grant of
decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority power to him is included in the subject expressed in
to the departments, offices and agencies where such the title of the law.
functions can be effectively performed.
Pichay v Office of the Deputive Executive Secretary (Sec. 1,
Chiongbian v Orbos (Sec. 1, Art. VI) Art. VI)
• The choice of the President as delegate is logical • In the chief executive dwell the powers to run
because the division of the country into regions is government. Placed upon him is the power to
intended to facilitate not only the administration of recommend the budget necessary for the operation of
local governments but also the direction of executive the Government, which implies that he has the
departments which the law requires should have necessary authority to evaluate and determine the
regional offices. As this Court observed in Abbas, structure that each government agency in the
"while the power to merge administrative regions is executive department would need to operate in the
not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a most economical and efficient manner. Hence, the
power which has traditionally been lodged with the express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or

 the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the La Suerte v CA (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
President's authority to "direct changes in the • To be valid, a revenue regulation must be within the
organizational units or key positions in any department scope of statutory authority or standard granted by the
or agency." The aforecited provision, often and legislature. Specifically, the regulation must (1) be
consistently included in the general appropriations germane to the object and purpose of the law; (2) not
laws, recognizes the extent of the President's power to contradict, but conform to, the standards the law
reorganize the executive offices and agencies under prescribes; and (3) be issued for the sole purpose of
him, which is, "even to the extent of modifying and carrying into effect the general provisions of our tax
realigning appropriations for that purpose." And to laws.
further enable the President to run the affairs of the
executive department, he is likewise given People v Vera (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
constitutional authority to augment any item in the • For the purposes of the Probation Act, the provincial
General Appropriations Law using the savings in other boards may be regarded as administrative bodies
items of the appropriation for his office. In fact, he is endowed with power to determine when the Act
explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund should take effect in their respective provinces. They
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this
offices and agencies of the Executive Department respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative
which is included in the General Appropriations Act, to power to administrative and executive officers are
any program, project or activity of any department, applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which
bureau or office included in the General should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies
Arroyo v DOJ (Sec. 1, Art. VI) will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it
• The power of both the COMELEC as well as the DOJ to can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves
engage in a preliminary investigation is well found in around the presence or absence of a standard or rule
the Constitution, existing statutes, and the Rules of of action — or the sufficiency thereof — in the statute,
Court. With such power already preexisting prior the to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion.
creation of the said joint team, there can be no basis As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and
when claiming that a new office vested with new hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or
powers is created. definite standard by which the administrative officer or
board may be guided in the exercise of the

 discretionary powers delegated to it. By section 11 of statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a
the Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof
the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a
the various provincial boards to determine. In other violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
words, the provincial boards of the various provinces made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in
are to determine for themselves, whether the any way therein. We would not permit an accused to
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at be convicted under one Act when he is charged with
all. The applicability and application of the Probation the violation of another, if the change from one statute
Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial to another involved a change of the theory of the trial
boards. If a provincial board does not wish to have the or required of the defendant a different defense or
Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to surprised him in any other way. The allegations
decline to appropriate the needed amount for the required under Act No. 1760 include those required
salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the under article 581. The accused could have defended
Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, himself in no different manner if he had been expressly
to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power charged with a violation of article 581.
to the provincial boards.
People v Maceren (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
US v Barrias (Sec. 1, Art. VI) • Administrative regulations adopted under legislative
• The necessity of confiding to some local authority the authority by a particular department must be in
framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor regulations harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be
is. recognized throughout the world, as each region for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
and each harbor requires peculiar rules more minute provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
than could be enacted by the central lawmaking cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot
power, and which, when kept within their proper amend an act of Congress. The rule-making power
scope, are in their nature police regulations not must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
involving an undue grant of legislative power. proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been
US v Panlilio (Sec. 1, Art. VI) enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending
• The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they or expanding the statutory requirements or to
may possibly be said to have the force of law, are not embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules

 that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. can supply the answer, they and they alone may
choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own
People v Dacuycuy (Sec. 1, Art. VI) exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving
• In the case under consideration, the respondent judge commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is
erroneously assumed that since the penalty of not "canalized within banks that keep it from
imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
the term or period of imprisonment. We cannot agree
with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the Pharmaceutical v DOH (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
term of imprisonment where no points of reference • Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of
have been provided by the legislature. What valid the Milk Code. However, although it is the IAC which is
delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the
discretion to fix the length of service of a term of approval or rejection of advertising, promotional, or
imprisonment which must be encompassed within other marketing materials under Section 12(a) of the
specific or designated limits provided by law, the Milk Code, said provision must be related to Section 6
absence of which designated limits will constitute such thereof which in turn provides that the rules and
exercise as an undue delegation, if not an outright regulations must be pursuant to the applicable
intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power. standards provided for in this Code. Section 12(b) of
the Milk Code designates the DOH as the principal
Ynot v IAC (Sec. 1, Art. VI) implementing agency for the enforcement of the
• The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and provisions of the Code. Thus, the DOH has the
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with significant responsibility to translate into operational
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and terms the standards set forth in Sections 5, 8, and 10 of
even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual the Milk Code, by which the IAC shall screen
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials.
the limitations that the said officers must observe Such standards bind the IAC in formulating its rules and
when they make their distribution. There is none. Their regulations on advertising, promotion, and marketing.
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the Through that single provision, the DOH exercises
fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what control over the information content of advertising,
criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named promotional and marketing materials on breastmilk

 vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplements and other continuing and informed awareness on the part of a
related products. It also sets a viable standard against congressional committee regarding executive
which the IAC may screen such materials before they operations in a given administrative area. While both
are made public. [T]his Court had, in the past, accepted congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry
as sufficient standards the following: public interest, into past executive branch actions in order to influence
justice and equity, public convenience and welfare, future executive branch performance, congressional
and simplicity, economy and welfare. In this case, supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise
correct information as to infant feeding and nutrition is of delegated law-making authority, and permits
infused with public interest and welfare. Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive
Abakada v Purisima (Sec. 1, Art. VI) agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes
• There are three categories of congressional oversight veto provisions when granting the President or an
functions: (1) Scrutiny - Congressional scrutiny implies executive agency the power to promulgate regulations
a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to with the force of law. These provisions require the
administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to President or an agency to present the proposed
determine economy and efficiency of the operation of regulations to Congress, which retains a right to
government activities. In the exercise of legislative approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes
scrutiny, Congress may request information and report effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide
from the other branches of government. It can give that a proposed regulation will become a law after the
recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress
of the agency involved; (2) Congressional Investigation does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in
- While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive the meantime
process of looking at the facts that are readily
available, congressional investigation involves a more Phil. Coconut v Republic (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to • To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must
conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
Constitution under section 21, Article VI; (3) Legislative legislature itself determines matters of principle and
Supervision - The third and most encompassing form lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge
by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
legislative supervision. Supervision connotes a standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits,

 maps out its boundaries and specifies the public benefits granted under tax treaties are enjoyed by duly
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under entitled persons or corporations.
which the legislative command is to be effected. It is
the criterion by which legislative purpose may be Belgica v Ochoa (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative • The power of appropriation is constitutionally
office designated may in pursuance of the above delegated to the Congress and exercising this power in
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and an individual capacity is not conferred by fundamental
regulations. law. Legislative power is vested in the Congress alone,
except for exceptions of having it delegated to: local
Deutche Bank v CIR (Sec. 1, Art. VI) governments, who are allowed to legislate on purely
• “A state that has contracted valid international local matters; and the President, in times of war or
obligations is bound to make in its legislations those other national emergency.
modifications that may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. “Thus, laws Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI)
and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted • The 20% requirement is merely a ceiling, and that it
under tax treaties are accorded to the parties entitled was not required to be filled. If there is no sufficient
thereto. The BIR must not impose additional number of participating parties, organizations, or
requirements that would negate the availment of the coalitions that could garner the 2% vote threshold and
reliefs provided for under international agreements. fill up the 20% party-list allocation in the House, then
More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not such allocation cannot be filled up completely. There
provide for any pre-requisite for the availment of the are at least 4 inviolable parameters with regard the
benefits under said agreement. Likewise, it must be election of the party-list: FIRST, the 20% allocation –
stressed that there is nothing in RMO No. 1-2000 the combined number of all party-list congressmen
which would indicate a deprivation of entitlement to a shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the
tax treaty relief for failure to comply with the 15-day House, including those elected under the party list;
period. We recognize the clear intention of the BIR in SECOND, the 2% threshold – only those parties
implementing RMO No. 1-2000, but the CTA’s outright garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast
denial of a tax treaty relief for failure to strictly comply for the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat
with the prescribed period is not in harmony with the in the House; THIRD, the 3-seat limit – each qualified
objectives of the contracting state to ensure that the party, regardless of the number of votes it actually

 obtained, is entitled to a maximum of 3 seats (1 entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
qualifying and 2 additional seats); FOURTH, number of votes until all the additional seats are
proportional representation – the additional seats that allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition
a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in shall be entitled to not more than three seats. The 2%
proportion to their total number of votes.” threshold is valid for the first seat but NOT for the
additional seat. In short, you don’t need 2% to add
Phil. Guardians v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI) another seat. The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.
• Based on the Senate deliberations for RA 7941, there A. 7941 “those garnering more than two percent (2%)
are actually two separate grounds to delist: The first of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
ground: The party list failed to participate in the last proportion to their total number of votes” is
two (2) preceding elections; the second is, failure to unconstitutional. The continued operation of the two
obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast under the percent threshold for the distribution of the additional
party-list system in either of the last two preceding seats makes it mathematically impossible to achieve
elections. Section 6(8) of RA 7941 uses the disjunctive the maximum number of available party list seats
word “or”, thus, there is plain, clear and unmistakable when the number of available party list seats exceeds
language of the law which provides for two (2) 50. This prevents the attainment of "the broadest
separate reasons for delisting. possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives."
BANAT v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI)
• In determining the allocation of seats for party-list Ang Ladlad v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI)
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the • It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
following procedure shall be observed: (1) The parties, for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Our Constitution
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes provides in Article III, Section 5 that "no law shall be
they garnered during the elections. (2) The parties, made respecting an establishment of religion, or
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two prohibiting the free exercise thereof”. COMELEC’s
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. laws is flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst moral
(3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be governmental interest to justify exclusion of

 homosexuals from participation in the party-list 3. A foreign party or organization
system. as specifically ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani, he 4. Receiving support from any foreign
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented government, political entity, whether directly
sectors is not exclusive crucial element is not whether or indirectly through any of its officers or
a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a members or indirectly through third parties for
particular organization complies with the requirements partisan election purposes
of the Constitution and RA 7941 5. Violates or fails to comply with laws, rules, or
regulations relating to elections
Magdalo v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI) 6. Declares untruthful statements in its petition
• To join electoral contests, a party or organization must 7. Has ceased to exist for at least a year
undergo the two-step process of registration and 8. Fails to participate in the last 2 preceding
accreditation (Liberal Party v. COMELEC). Registration elections OR fails to obtain at least 2% of the
is the act that bestows juridical personality for votes cast under the party-list system in the 2
purposes of our election laws. Accreditation relates to preceding elections for the constituency in
the privileged participation that our election laws grant which it has registered
to qualified registered parties. Accreditation can only
be granted to a registered political party, organization Atong Paglaum v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI)
or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first • New guidelines for the new parameters of the party-
take place before a request for accreditation can be list system:
made. Once registration has been carried out, 1. Three different groups may participate in the
accreditation is the next step to follow. party-list system
(national parties, regional parties, and sectoral
Dayao v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI) parties)
• Sec. 6 of RA 7941 states that COMELEC may, upon 2. National and regional parties or
verified complaint, refuse or cancel the registration of organizations do not need to organize along
a party on any of the following grounds: sectoral lines and do not need to represent the
1. It is a religious sect/denomination, org, or marginalized or underrepresented
association, organized for religious purposes 3. Political parties can participate in the party-
2. Advocates violence or unlawful means to list elections provided that they register under
seek its goal the party-list system and do not field

 candidates in legislative district elections. A their respective sector. The nominees of
political party, whether major or not, that fields national and regional must be bona fide
candidates in the legislative district elections members of the said parties or organizations.
can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately Abang Lingkod v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI)
register under the party-list system. Such wing • There was no mention that sectoral organizations
is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is intending to participate in the party-list elections
linked to a political party through a coalition are still required to present a track record since
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either Sectoral parties may either be marginalized, or
be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is
lacking in well-defined constituencies. What is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
important is that their political advocacy special interests and concerns of their sector. Track
pertains to the special interest and concerns of record is only relevant if the party is representing a
their sector. The sectors that are marginalized sector they do not factually belong. There is no
and underrepresented include labor, peasant, logic in treating sectoral organizations differently
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural from national and regional parties as regards their
communities, handicapped, veterans, and bid for registration.
overseas workers. The sectors that lack well- Definition: national-constituency is spread over the
defined constituencies include professionals, geographical territory of at least a majority of the
the elderly, women, and the youth.
regions; regional: constituency is spread over the
5. A majority number of sectoral parties or
geographical territory of at least a majority of the
organizations that represent the marginalized
cities and provinces; sectoral: organized group
and underrepresented must belong to the
belonging to any of the sectors whose principal
marginalized or underrepresented sector they
advocacy pertains to special interest
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized
and underrepresented or that represent those Lico v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI)
who lack well defined political constituencies • Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows
either must belong to their respective sectors the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the
or must have a track record of advocacy for qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of

 party-list representatives, the HRET acquires passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of
jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon the law. To hold that reapportionment can only be
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of made through a general apportionment law, with a
the nominee, and assumption of office as member of review of all the legislative districts allotted to each
the House of Representatives. In this case, the local government unit nationwide, would create an
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party- inequitable situation where a new city or province
list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he created by Congress will be denied legislative
assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, representation for an indeterminate period of time.
it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has Such would deprive the sovereignty granted to the
jurisdiction over the disqualification case. people by depriving them or suspending their creation
pending the determination
Tobias v Albios (Sec. 5, Art. VI)
• The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Sema v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI)
Representatives shall be composed of not more than • When a province is created, a legislative district is
250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The created by operation of the Constitution because the
number of the members of the House may be Constitution provides that each province shall have at
increased via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the least one representative. This does not detract from
increase in congressional representation is not the constitutional principle that the power to create
unconstitutional. Thus, in the absence of proof that legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress.
Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have Only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a
separate legislative districts, the assailed Section must legislative district by operation of the Constitution.
be allowed to stand

Mariano v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI) Montejo v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI)
• In Tobias v. Abalos, the Court ruled that • On the basis of their extensive debate, the
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new major power of legislative apportionment as it itself
city. The Constitution clearly provides the “unless exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only
otherwise fixed by law” clause, thus, it did not empowered the COMELEC "to make minor
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by adjustments of the reapportionment herein made."

 The meaning of the phrase "minor adjustments" was • The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is
again clarified in the debates of the Commission. That based on demographic projections, is without legal
consistent with the limits of its power to make minor effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis
adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also and no authority to issue the Certification. The
give the respondent COMELEC any authority to Certification is also void on its face because based on
transfer municipalities from one legislative district to its own growth rate assumption, the population of
another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In
respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot
members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose
province out of which such new province was created. population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have
. . ." a legislative district only in the "immediately following
election" 7 after the attainment of the 250,000
Herrera v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI) population.
• Under R.A. 7166 and Comelec Resolution No. 2313, the
basis for division into districts shall be the number of Aquino v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI)
inhabitants of the province concerned and not the • The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
number of listed or registered voters as theorized upon Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
by petitioners. population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative."
Samson v Aguirre (Sec. 5, Art. VI) The provision draws a plain and clear distinction
• Every statute is presumed valid. Every law is presumed between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
to have passed through regular congressional hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on
processes. A person asserting the contrary has the the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a
burden of proving his allegations clearly and representative, with nothing mentioned about
unmistakably. Allegations, without more, cannot population, a city must first meet a population
substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
law passed by Congress, based on the bill of Cong. The use by the subject provision of a comma to
Liban, had complied with all the requisites therefor. separate the phrase "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or
Aldaba v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI) each province" point to no other conclusion than that

 the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a affected". In 1961, the Charter of the City of Caloocan
city, but not for a province. (R.A. No. 3278) carried this further by requiring that
the "Act shall take effect after a majority of voters of
Navarro v Ermita (Sec. 5, Art. VI) the Municipality of Caloocan vote in favor of the
• It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited conversion of their municipality into a city in a
provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays, plebiscite." This was followed up to 1972 by other
land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. legislative enactments requiring a plebiscite as a
However, with respect to the creation of condition for the creation and conversion of local
municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the government units as well as the transfer of sitios from
three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity one legislative unit to another. In 1973, the plebiscite
to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land requirement was accorded constitutional status. Under
area, are provided for. But it must be pointed out that these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the
when the local government unit to be created consists holding of a plebiscite was never a requirement in
of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land legislative apportionment or reapportionment. After it
area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 became constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was
and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit also always identified with the creation, division,
to be created is a municipality or a component city, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries of local
respectively. This exemption is absent in the government units, never with the concept of legislative
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a apportionment.
province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR. Bengson III v HRET (Sec. 6, Art. VI)
• Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
Bagabuyo v COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art. VI) however reacquire the same in the manner provided
• The need for a plebiscite in the creation, division, by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA No. 63),
merger, or abolition of local government units was not enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
constitutionally enshrined until the 1973 Constitution. citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1)
However, as early as 1959, R.A. No. 2264 33 required, by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct
in the creation of barrios by Provincial Boards, that the act of Congress. Repatriation, on the other hand, may
creation and definition of boundaries be "upon be had under various statutes by those who lost their
petition of a majority of the voters in the areas citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;

 (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in be found at any given time, eventually intends to
World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which
United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for
Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of
economic necessity. As distinguished from the lengthy this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency
process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera, (73 Phil. 453
of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of [1941]) is "to exclude strangers or newcomers
the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned community" from taking advantage of favorable
resides or last resided. Moreover, repatriation results circumstances existing in that community for electoral
in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his establishing residence in a given area for meeting
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he the essence of representation, which is to place
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his through the assent of voters those most cognizant and
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a
status as a natural-born Filipino. candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose
Aquino v COMELEC (Sec. 6, Art. VI) could be obviously best met by individuals who have
• We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order either had actual residence in the area for a given
that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for period or who have been domiciled in the same area
Representative of the Second District of Makati City either by origin or by choice.
the latter "must prove that he has established not just
residence but domicile of choice." The Constitution Marcos v COMELEC (Sec. 6, Art. VI)
requires that a person seeking election to the House of • First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. As
Representatives should be a resident of the district in domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is
which he seeks election for a period of not less than gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's
one (1) year prior to the elections. Clearly, the place being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile
"where a party actually or constructively has his of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
permanent home," where he, no matter where he may established only when she reached the age of eight

 years old, when her father brought his family back to said statement becomes material only when there is or
Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments. appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must render a candidate ineligible
demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of Domino v COMELEC (Sec. 6, Art. VI)
domicile; • A person's "domicile" once established is considered to
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
former place of residence and establishing a established. To successfully effect a change of domicile
new one; and one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose. change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that abandoning the former place of residence and
petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of establishing a new one and definite acts which
law as a result of her marriage to the late President correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1954. For there is a clearly must basically be animus manendi coupled with
established distinction between the Civil Code animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at
concepts of "domicile" and "residence." ARTICLE 110. the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period
The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;
the court may exempt the wife from living with the and the residence at the place chosen for the new
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service domicile must be actual. While this may be so, actual
of the Republic. A survey of jurisprudence relating to and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from
Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence said date he had transferred his residence in that
as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal
nothing which would suggest that the female spouse presence in the place must be coupled with conduct
automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of indicative of that intention. While "residence" simply
the husband's choice of residence upon marriage. It is requires bodily presence in a given place, "domicile"
the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of requires not only such bodily presence in that place
candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining but also a declared and probable intent to make it
whether or not an individual has satisfied the one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's
constitution's residency qualification requirement. The home. As a general rule, the principal elements of

 domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and district where he seeks to run but only that he resides
intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in in that district for at least a year prior to election day.
order to establish a new domicile. No change of To use ownership of property in the district as the
domicile will result if either of these elements is determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or
absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence implies that only the landed can establish
residence in the locality does not result in acquisition compliance with the residency requirement. This Court
of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement
without intention. to the right to hold public office, which property
requirement would be unconstitutional.
Perez v COMELEC (Sec. 6, Art. VI)
• The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one Tagolino v HRET (Sec. 6, Art. VI)
district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another • Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of
district. Thus, in Faypon v. Quirino, 17 this Court held the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate's
that the registration of a voter in a place other than his possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign
residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to country; or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of
have abandoned or lost his residence. disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts
under Section 68 refer to election offenses under the
Fernandez v HRET (Sec. 6, Art. VI) OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws. In
• Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not particular, these are: (1) giving money or other
necessarily the domicile of choice of a candidate, there material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt
is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws the voters or public officials performing electoral
which require a congressional candidate to sell a functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance
previously acquired home in one district and buy a new one's candidacy; (3) spending in one's election
one in the place where he seeks to run in order to campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the
qualify for a congressional seat in that other district. OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution
Neither do we see the fact that petitioner was only prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the
leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of his OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80, 26 83, 27 85, 28 86
candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district. 29 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
Certainly, the Constitution does not require a paragraph 6 of the OEC. It must be stressed that one
congressional candidate to be a property owner in the who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically

 considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac,
to continue as such only because of supervening Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial
infractions which do not, however, deny his or her Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to
statutory eligibility. On the other hand, a denial of due July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not sufficient to
course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding prove her one-year residency. For, [petitioner] has
under Section 78 of the OEC is premised on a person's never regained her domicile in Marinduque as she
misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her
required for the elective office aspired for. It is not stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she
enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA
he or she must have also made a false representation
of the same in the CoC. Pertinently, while a disqualified Lucero v COMELEC (Sec. 9, Art. VI)
candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have People v Jalosjos (Sec. 11, Art. VI)
been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the • There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public
other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due mind that election or appointment to high government
course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed office, by itself, frees the official from the common
to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by
that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact,
thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of
necessarily, to valid votes. obedience rather than exemption. The immunity from
arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
Reyes v COMELEC (Sec. 6, Art. VI) House of Representatives, the latter customarily
• Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of
elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. the Constitution. The history of the provision shows
Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to that the privilege has always been granted in a
RA 9225, he must still show that he chose to establish restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption
his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
and the period of his residency shall be counted from ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended
the time he made it his domicile of choice. The only by intendment, implication or equitable
proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has considerations. A person charged with crime is taken
met the one-year residency requirement of the law into custody for purposes of the administration of

 justice. functions, such as speeches delivered, statements
made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
Trillanes v Pimentel (Sec. 11, Art. VI) same is in session, as well as bills introduced in
• The trial court thus correctly concluded that the Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and
presumption of innocence does not carry with it the other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
full enjoyment of civil and political rights. The assertion Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in
is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not the official discharge of their duties as members of
administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" Congress and of Congressional Committees duly
to speak of. In a plethora of cases, 43 the Court authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time
categorically held that the doctrine of condonation of the performance of the acts in question. In this case,
does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more the publication was not done in performance of his
precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a official duty, either as a member of Congress or as an
criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only officer of any of its Committee.
signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him
to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the Pobre v Defensor-Santiago (Sec. 11, Art. VI)
limitations on his freedom of action [and] . . . with the • Parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the
results which he could accomplish within the confines reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as
of prison." armor for personal wrath and disgust. Parliamentary
immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the
Jimenez v Cabangbang (Sec. 11, Art. VI) individual members of the Parliament or Congress for
• Under the Constitution: The Senators and Members of their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the
the House of Representatives shall in all cases except benefit of the people and the institution that
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged represents them.
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
the Congress, and in going to and returning from the Dante Liban v Richard Gordon (Sec. 13, Art. VI)
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall • The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices
not be questioned in any other place. “any speech or or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
debate therein” refers to utterances made by Constitution must not, however, be construed as
Congressmen in the performance of their official applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials

 specified therein without additional compensation in then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the
an ex officio capacity as provided by law and as Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by
required by the primary functions of said officials' indirection or by a general legislative act which is
office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise intended to accomplish the objects specifically or
"any other office" within the contemplation of the impliedly prohibited.
constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said Baguilat v Alvarez (Sec. 16, Art. VI)
officials. In the instant case, therefore, we must decide Avelino v Cuenco (Sec. 16, Art. VI)
whether the respondent holds the chairmanship of Datu Michael Abas Kida v Senate (Sec. 16, Art. VI)
PNRC in an ex officio capacity. Presidential Decree Arroyo v De Venecia (Sec. 16, Art. VI)
(P.D.) No. 1264, amending R.A. No. 95, provides for the Osmena v Pendatun (Sec. 16, Art. VI)
composition of the governing authority of the PNRC Santiago v Sandiganbayan (Sec. 16, Art. VI)
and the manner of their appointment or election.
US v Pons
Puyat v De Guzman (Sec. 14, Art. VI) • Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the
• We are constrained to find that there has been an Commission shall perform the duties which would
indirect "appearance as counsel before . . . any properly be required of the Recorder of the
administrative body and, in our opinion, that is a Commission under the existing law. And rules 15 and
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine
"intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to Commission provides, among other things, "that the
appear actively in the proceedings in some other proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and
capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to accurately stated on the journal." and that it shall be
enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as the duty of the Secretary "to keep a correct journal of
Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the the proceedings of the Commission. Section 275 of the
SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of
as counsel indirectly. A ruling upholding the the "official acts of the legislative, executive, and
"intervention" would make the constitutional provision judicial departments of the United States and of the
ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to Philippine Islands . . . shall be judicially recognized by
influence an administrative body is to acquire a the court without the introduction of proof; but the
minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in

 this section stated, when it shall find it necessary for its or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
own information, and may resort for its aid to certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their
appropriate books, documents, or evidence." order; provided, that in the case of acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature,
Casco Phil. Commercial v Gimenez when there is in existence a copy signed by the
• Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill — presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall
which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and
"urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the of the due enactment thereof." As far as Congress
courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely
Paredes, 61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 a mode of authentication. The law-making process in
Phil., 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, Congress ends when the bill is approved by both
September 14, 1961 ). If there has been any mistake in Houses, and the certification does not add to the
the printing of the bill before it was certified by the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by
on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
the principle of separation of powers and undermining officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution
one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — says that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall,
the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, before it becomes law, be presented to the President."
not by judicial decree. The journal of the proceedings of each House of
Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
Astorga v Villegas requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
• This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text
rests. It reads: of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive
"The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress.
any legislative body that may be provided for in the Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case,
Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal
the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial

 and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to
and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing
in the printed text sent to the President and signed by provisions.
him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such Angara v EleComm
amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is • The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to
a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their remained originally in the legislature. The express
signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
committed and subsequently rectified by the President implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction
to perpetuate that error by disregarding such upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has the Constitution. If we concede the power claimed in
become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and behalf of the National Assembly that said body may
bring about mischievous consequences not intended regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission
by the law-making body. and cut off the power of the commission to lay down
the period within which protests should be filed, the
Abakada v Ermita grant of power to the commission would be
• Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case
Representatives and Senate Rules, the Bicameral would be invested with the power to determine
Conference Committee is mandated to settle the contested cases involving the election, returns and
differences between the disagreeing provisions in the qualifications of the members of the National
House bill and the Senate bill. The term "settle" is Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative
synonymous to "reconcile" and "harmonize." To power of the National Assembly. Not only would the
reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally
Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a) adopt transferring this authority from the legislative body be
the specific provisions of either the House bill or frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with
Senate bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in the the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to
House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would be time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the

 Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of
taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality Vera v Avelino
without the necessary means to render that authority • As used in constitutional provisions", election contest
effective whenever and wherever the National "relates only to statutory contests in which the
Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also
that intended to be remedied by the framers of our to have himself inducted into the office." It must be
Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the observed that when a member of the House raises a
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably question as to the qualifications of another, an
lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the "election contest" does not thereby ensue, because
entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, the former does not seek to be substituted for their
by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the latter. So that, if not all the powers regarding the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should election, returns, and qualifications of members was
not be permitted. The creation of the Electoral withdrawn by the Constitution from the Congress; and
Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power if, as admitted by petitioners themselves at the oral
regulative in character to limit the time within which argument, the power to defer the oath-taking, until the
protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed contest is adjudged, does not belong to the
corresponding Electoral Tribunal, then it must be held
Reyes v Comelec that the House or Senate still retains such authority,
• it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the for it has not been transferred to, nor assumed by, the
House of Representatives, there must be a Electoral Tribunal. If, as admitted by petitioners
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid themselves at the oral argument, the power to defer
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of the oath-taking, until the contests is adjudged, does
office. Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a not belong to the corresponding Electoral Tribunal,
Member of the House of Representatives because, then it must be held that the House or Senate still
primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat retains such authority, for it has not been transferred
what has earlier been said, the term of office of a to, nor assumed by, the Electoral Tribunal.
Member of the House of Representatives begins only
"at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following Guerrero v COMELEC
their election." Thus, until such time, the COMELEC • While the COMELEC is vested with the power to
retains jurisdiction. declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its

 refusal to exercise that power following the organization of the party-list nominee has been
proclamation and assumption of the position by proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
Fariñas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries assumed office as member of the House of
separating the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
the House of Representatives (HRET). Under Article VI, election contests relating to his qualifications ends and
Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Abbas v SET
House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning • It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme
assumed office as a member of the House of Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution
Representatives, COMELEC's jurisdiction over election intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative"
contests relating to his election, returns, and components commonly share the duty and authority of
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction deciding all contests relating to the election, returns
begins. 13 Thus, the COMELEC's decision to and qualifications of Senators. Said intent is even more
discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of
justifiable, in deference to the HRET's own jurisdiction Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of
and functions. the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1 — an
unmistakable indication that the "legislative
Abayon v HRET component" cannot be totally excluded from
• What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the participation in the resolution of senatorial election
Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole contests, without doing violence to the spirit and
judge of all contests relating to, among other things, intent of the Constitution. The proposed mass
the qualifications of the members of the House of disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that
nominees are "elected members" of the House of no other court or body can perform, but which it
Representatives no less than the district cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear of its entire membership of Senators. To our mind, this
and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be
cases of district representatives, once the party or not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone

 has the power to perform, the performance of which is them, without any legislative interference." To be able
in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear
law. Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, and decide congressional election contests is not to be
absent its entire membership of Senators and that no shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three "The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and
Justices-Members alone the power of valid independent of the legislature and though not a power
adjudication of a senatorial election contest. in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all
intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of
Bondoc v Pineda its authority, an independent organ; while composed
• The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body
court although two-thirds of its members are separate from and independent of the legislature. As
politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-
politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the partisan. They must discharge their functions with
Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral complete detachment, impartiality, and independence
tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives: — even independence from the political party to which
"The purpose of the constitutional convention creating they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach
the Electoral Commission was to provide an of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the
independent and impartial tribunal for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
determination of contests to legislative office, devoid Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast
of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly
tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the on the result of the examination and appreciation of
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
of its members. "The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a
and the House were created by the Constitution as grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation
special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
relating to election returns and qualifications of Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are
independent bodies which must be permitted to select Lerias v HRET
their own employees, and to supervise and control Daza v Singson (Sec. 18, Art. VI)

 • The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition
party must still pass the test of time to prove its party in the House. There is no doubt that this
permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a apportionment of the House membership in the
registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis
the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would of proportional representation of the political parties
still not be entitled to representation in the therein." The other political parties or groups in the
Commission on Appointments as long as it was House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably
organized only recently and has not yet "aged." It is a member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound
true that there have been, and there still are, some by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to be
internal disagreements among its [LDP] members, but considered as an opposition party, its lone member
these are to be expected in any political organization, (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than
especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact, even 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not
the monolithic Communist Party in a number of entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the
socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim
even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still proportional membership in the Commission on
temporary because of such discord Appointments, a political party should represent at
least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should
Coseteng v Mitra (Sec. 18, Art. VI) have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or
• The composition of the House membership in the congresswomen. The indorsements of the nine (9)
Commission on Appointments was based on congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the
proportional representation of the political parties in petitioner's election to the Commission are
the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the inconsequential because they are not members of her
House. They represent 79% of the House membership party and they signed identical indorsements in favor
(which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.
(80%) of 12 members in the Commission on
Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may Guingona v Gonzales (Sec. 18, Art. VI)
be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The • To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the
remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP political parties in the Commission on Appointments by
(respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest adding together two halves to make a whole is a
party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL breach of the rule on proportional representation

 because it will give the LDP an added member in the implementing these provisions, the Rules of the
Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of Commission on Appointments provide that the
the minority political party, who is deprived of half a presence of at least thirteen (13) members is necessary
representation. To allow it to elect more than its to constitute a quorum, "Provided however, that at
proportional share of members is to confer upon such least four (4) of the members constituting the quorum
a party a greater share in the membership in the should come from either house". Even if the
Commission on Appointments and more power to composition of the Commission is fixed by the
impose its will on the minority, who by the same Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not
token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership fully constituted, so long as it has the required
in the Commission. We lay down the following quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed
guidelines accordingly: 1) In the Senate, a political by the Constitution. And the Commission can validly
party or coalition must have at least two duly elected perform its functions and transact its business even if
senators for every seat in the Commission on only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto.
Appointments; 2) Where there are more than two
political parties represented in the Senate, a political
party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate
cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission.

Guingona v Gonzales MR (Sec. 18, Art. VI)
• The Constitution does not require the election and
presence of twelve Senators and twelve
Representatives in order that the Commission may
function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the
Commission on Appointments, provides that "the
Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the
members", and in Section 19 of the same Article, it is
provided that the Commission "shall meet only while
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a
majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers
and functions as are herein conferred upon it". In