prisoners of war, acts of wholesale pillage and the
IN RE YAMASHITA
Facts:
General Tomoyuki Yamashita is the Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Army. When he
surrendered in 1945, an American military commission
tried him on charges that he permitted atrocities against
both civilians and prisoners of war, in violation of the law
of war.
The bills of particulars, filed by the prosecution by order
of the commission, allege a series of 123 acts, committed
by members of the forces under petitioner's command.
The first item specifies the execution of a 'a
deliberate plan and purpose to massacre and
exterminate a large part of the civilian population
of Batangas Province, and to devastate and
destroy public, private and religious property
therein, as a result of which more than 25,000
men, women and children, all unarmed
noncombatant civilians, were brutally mistreated
and killed, without cause or trial, and entire
settlements were devastated and destroyed
wantonly and without military necessity.' Other
items specify acts of violence, cruelty and
homicide inflicted upon the civilian population and
wanton destruction of religious monuments.
It is not denied that such acts directed against the civilian
population of an occupied country and against prisoners
of war are recognized in international law as violations of
the law of war under Fourth Hague Convention. But it is
urged that the charge does not allege that petitioner has
either committed or directed the commission of such
acts, and consequently that no violation is charged as
against him. But this overlooks the fact that the gist of the
charge is an unlawful breach of duty by petitioner as an
army commander to control the operations of the
members of his command by 'permitting them to commit'
the extensive and widespread atrocities specified.
The question then is whether the law of war imposes on
an army commander a duty to take such appropriate
measures as are within his power to control the troops
under his command for the prevention of the specified
acts which are violations of the law of war and which are
likely to attend the occupation of hostile territory by an
uncontrolled soldiery, and whether he may be charged
with personal responsibility for his failure to take such
measures when violations result. That this was the
precise issue to be tried was made clear by the
statement of the prosecution at the opening of the trial.
Issue:
W/N the commission had jurisdiction.
Held:
The writs were DENIED.
The court found that Congress had legally authorized the
commission's establishment under the war powers, and
that the charge was adequate to state a violation of the
law of war.
It is evident that the conduct of military operations by
troops whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders or
efforts of their commander would almost certainly result
in violations which it is the purpose of the law of war to
prevent. Its purpose to protect civilian populations and
prisoners of war from brutality would largely be defeated
if the commander of an invading army could with impunity
neglect to take reasonable measures for their protection.
Hence the law of war presupposes that its violation is to
be avoided through the control of the operations of war
by commanders who are to some extent responsible for
their subordinates.
Command responsibility, sometimes referred to as
the Yamashita standard or the Medina standard, is
the doctrine of hierarchical accountability in cases of
war crimes. The doctrine was established by the
Hague Conventions IV (1907) and X (1907).
The "Yamashita standard" is based upon the
precedent set by the United States Supreme Court in
the case of Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita.
He was prosecuted, in a still controversial trial, for
atrocities committed by troops under his command
in the Philippines. Yamashita was charged with
"unlawfully disregarding and failing to discharge his
duty as a commander to control the acts of members
of his command by permitting them to commit war
crimes."
The "Medina standard" is based upon the
prosecution of US Army Captain Ernest Medina in
connection with the My Lai Massacre during the
Vietnam War. It holds that a commanding officer,
being aware of a human rights violation or a war
crime, will be held criminally liable when he does not
take action. (Medina was, however, acquitted of all
charges.)
RUFFY V CHIEF OF STAFF
FACTS:
During the Japanese occupation, Ramon Ruffy, et
al., petitioner, a provincial commander of the Philippine
Constabulary, retreated in the mountains instead of
surrendering to the Japanese. He then led a guerrilla
outfit known as bolo combat team of bolo area. The said
Bolo area was a contingent of the 6th military district,
which has been recognized and placed under the
operational control of the US army in the South pacific.
 Sometime later, Col. Jurado effected a change of
command in the bolo area. Major ruffy who was then
acting as commanding officer for the Bolo area was
relieved of his position. Later on or on Oct 19, 1944.
Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners. It
was this murder which gave rise to petitioners’ trial.
The trial court convicted petitioner and he now
filled this instant petition with the contention that he was
not subject to military law at the time of the offense for
which he had been placed on trial was committed.
Petitioners contended that by the enemy occupation of
the Philippines, the national defese act and all laws and
regulations creation the existence of the Philippine Army
including the articles of war were suspended during such
occupation.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner was subject to military law at the
time the alleged offense was committed.
HELD:
YES, petitioners were subject to military law at the
time the alleged offense was committed. The rule that
laws of political in nature or affecting relations are
considered superseded or in abeyance during the military
occupation, is intended for governing of the civil
inhabitants of occupied territory. It is not intended for and
does not bind the enemies in arms (such as Philippine
army) It is our opinion that the petitioners come within the
general application of the clause in sub-paragraph (a);
"and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered
into, or to duty for training in, the said service, from the
dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or
order to obey the same." By their acceptance of
appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the
General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they
became members of the Philippine Army amendable to
the Articles of War.
COMFORT WOMEN (VINUYA ET AL)
FACTS
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a
non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the
SEC for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of
rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during
the WWII. They claim that they were “comfort women” at
that time and have greatly suffered because of that. In
1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG and requested
assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials
and military officers who ordered the establishment of the
“comfort women” stations in the Philippines. However, the
officials declined on that ground that the individual claims
had already been satisfied by Japan’s compliance with
the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956 between Japan and the
Philippines. The petitioners argue that the general waiver
of claims made by the Philippine government in the
Treaty of Peace with Japan is void because the comfort
women system constituted a crime against humanity,
sexual slavery, and torture. The same was prohibited
under the jus cogens norms from which no derogation is
possible. Thus, such waiver was a breach against the
government’s obligation not to afford impunity for crimes
against humanity. In addition, they claim that the
Philippine government’s acceptance of the apologies
made by Japan as well as funds for the AWF were
contrary to international law.
ISSUE
Was the refusal of the Executive Department to espouse
petitioners’ claims against Japan valid?
RULING
Yes, it was valid. It has the exclusive prerogative for such
determination. So much so, the Philippines is not under
any international obligation to espouse petitioner’s claim.
Given the extraordinary length of time that has lapsed
between the treaty’s conclusion, the Executive
Department had the ample time to assess the foreign
policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan,
from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners
and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if
apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are
appropriate or necessary.
Under international law, the only means available for
individuals to bring a claim within the international legal
system has been when the individual is able to persuade
a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf.
When this happens, in the eye of the international
tribunal, the State is the sole claimant.
Therefore, the State is the sole judge to decide whether
its protection in favor of those petitioners will be granted,
to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It is a
discretionary power and the exercise of which may be
determined by consideration of a political or other nature.
Moreover, in the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga
omnes obligation of the Philippines, the petitioners failed
to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army
violated jis cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of
Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes in an erga omnes
obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
DISPOSITION
Petition is dismissed.
Eremes Kookooritchkin v. Solicitor General,
G.R. No. L-1812, August 27, 1948
FACTS:
In August 1941, appellee-petitioner Kookooritchkin filed
with the CFI of Camarines Sur a petition for
naturalization, supported by (a) the affidavits of ex-Judge
Jaime M. Reyes and Dr. Salvador Mariano, residents of
Camarines Sur, (b) his declaration of intention which was
sworn in July 1940, and (c) notice of hearing. The
petition was filed in August 1941 but was not heard until
August 28 and Sept. 30, 1947 when appellee-petitioner
presented his evidence, since the province was invaded
by the Japanese forces during WWI and the case records
had to be reconstituted after being destroyed during the
war. Appellant SolGen cross-examined appellee-
petitioner’s witnesses but did not file any opposition and
did not present any evidence to controvert the petition.
The CFI granted the petition for naturalization, finding
that appellee-petitioner was a native-born Russian who
grew up as a citizen of and was part of the military of the
defunct Imperial Russian Government under the Czars.
He had several stints while in military service before he
joined the White Russian Army at Vladivostok and fought
against the Bolsheviks until 1922 when the latter force
defeated the former. Refusing to join the Bolshevik
regime, he fled by sea to Shanghai, and eventually went
to Manila as part of the group of White Russians under
Admiral Stark in March 1923. He finally permanently
resided in Iriga, Camarines Sur except during his stint in
the guerrilla force in Caramoan from 1942 to July 1945.
The lower court also made findings of the establishment
of his family, employment, social life, his ability to speak
and write English and Bicol, his good moral character,
adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine
Constitution, and being a stateless refugee belonging to
no State.
ISSUES:
W/N (1) appellee-petitioner’s declaration of intention to
become a Filipino citizen was valid and sufficient basis
for his petition for naturalization, (2) appellee-petitioner
sufficiently established legal residence in the Philippines
and could speak and write any of the principal Philippine
languages, and (3) appellee-petitioner was stateless
refugee.
HELD:
(1) Section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law applies
and provides that “[n]o declaration shall be valid until
entry for permanent residence has been established and
a certificate showing the date, place and manner of his
arrival has been issued.” While appellee-petitioner’s
declaration was reconstituted, the attached certificate
referred to in the declaration was not reconstituted. The
SC ruled that the law does not state that the certificate is
essential to the validity of the declaration as the only
requirement is for the said certificate to be issued. There
is the uncontroverted fact of appellee-petitioner’s
peaceful and continuous residence in the Philippines for
25 years and statement in his declaration that a
certificate had been attached to the said declaration.
Hence, appellee-petitioner’s declaration was valid under
law in view of other competent evidence showing the
facts sought to be established under the certificate that
was not reconstituted.
(2) Appellee-petitioner has sufficiently shown legal
residence in the Philippines for a continuous period of not
less than 10 years as required by Section 2 of the
Revised Naturalization Law. In addition, appellee-
petitioner had good command of both English and Bicol.
While there may be many standards out there, none was
set in the law on the required ability to speak and write
any of the principal Philippine languages. Appellee-
petitioner got along well with his comrades during his
hazardous days in the guerrilla movement thus showing
that he satisfied the requirement of the law. There was
also circumstantial evidence that appellee-petitioner also
ought to know how to write Bicol, which uses the same
alphabet used in English and so widely used in the
Philippines. Given his good command of English as
shown in his testimony, appellee-petitioner could easily
make use of the same alphabet in the place where he
had been residing for 25 years.
(3) Appellant SolGen asserted that appellee-petitioner
failed to show that he lost his citizenship under the laws
of Russia and that Russia granted to Filipinos the same
right to be naturalized citizens. However, the SC still
found that lower court did not err in finding appellee-
petitioner as a stateless refugee. Appellee-petitioner’s
testimony that he is not a Russian citizen and that he has
no citizenship is uncontroverted. There is also the well-
known ruthlessness of modern dictatorships giving rise to
a great number of stateless refugees or displaced
persons, without country or flag. The tyrannical
intolerance of dictatorships to opposition translates into
beastly oppression, concentration camps and bloody
purges, such that it is only natural that those who flee to
other countries to escape such a situation, such as
appellee-petitioner, lose all bonds of attachments to their
former fatherlands.
MIJARES V. RANADA (RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS)
FACTS:
Ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered
human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture
and rape in the hands of police or military forces during
the Marcos regime, filed with the US District Court,
Hawaii, against the Estate Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a Final
Judgment and an award of compensatory and exemplary
damages in favor of the plaintiff class with an award of a
total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five
Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety
Cents ($1,964,005,859.90)
The present petitioners filed Complaint with the Makati
RTC for the enforcement of the Final Judgment.
Respondent Judge Ranada of the Makati RTC issued the
subject Orderdismissing the complaint without prejudice.
He opined that the subject matter of the complaint was
capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a
judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the
payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy
determination of the value of the foreign judgment.
The RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was
approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos,
which obviously had not been paid.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is
the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action
for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of
damages. They also point out that to require the class
plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos
(P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render
inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of
Court, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every
action.
ISSUE:
What provision, if any, then should apply in determining
the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign
judgment?
RULING:
Respondent judge was in clear and serious error when
he concluded that the filing fees should be computed on
the basis of the schematic table of Section 7(a), as the
action involved pertains to a claim against an estate
based on judgment.
A proper understanding is required on the nature and
effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction.
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations
have established a usage among civilized states by
which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in
different countries.
The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition
and enforcement of a foreign judgment has remained
unchanged.
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign
judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For
an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed
conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action
inpersonam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and
not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is
entitled to defend against the enforcement of such
decision in the local forum. It is essential that there
should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has
the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
Petition is GRANTED.
MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND
AGAINST NICARAGUA
FACTS. The United States (D) challenged the jurisdiction
of the I.C.J when it was held responsible for illegal
military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua (P) in the suit the plaintiff brought against the
defendant in 1984. Though a declaration accepting the
mandatory jurisdiction of the Court was deposited by the
United States (D) in a 1946, it tried to justify the
declaration in a 1984 notification by referring to the 1946
declaration and stating in part that the declaration “shall
not apply to disputes with any Central American State”
Apart from maintaining the ground that the I.C.J lacked
jurisdiction, the States (D) also argued that Nicaragua (P)
failed to deposit a similar declaration to the Court. On the
other hand, Nicaragua (P) based its argument on its
reliance on the 1946 declaration made by the United
states (D) due to the fact that it was a “state accepting
the same obligation” as the United States (D) when it
filed charges in the I.C.J. against the United States (D).
Also, the plaintiff intent to submit to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the I.C.J. was pointed out by the valid
declaration it made in 1929 with the I.C.J’s predecessor,
which was the Permanent Court of International Justice,
even though Nicaragua had failed to deposit it with that
court. The admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application to
the I.C.J. was also challenged by the United States (D).
ISSUE. (1) Is the jurisdiction to entertain a dispute
between two states, if they both accept the Court’s
jurisdiction, within the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice?
(2) Where no grounds exist to exclude the application of
a state, is the application of such a state to the
International Court of Justice admissible?
HELD. (1) YES. The jurisdiction of the Court to entertain
a dispute between two states if each of the States
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction is within the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice. Even though
Nicaragua (P) declaration of 1929 was not deposited with
the Permanent Court, because of the potential effect it
had that it would last for many years, it was valid.
Thus, it maintained its effect when Nicaragua became a
party to the Statute of the I.C.J because the declaration
was made unconditionally and was valid for an unlimited
period. The intention of the current drafters of the current
Statute was to maintain the greatest possible continuity
between it and the Permanent Court. Thus, when
Nicaragua (P) accepted the Statute, this would have
been deemed that the plaintiff had given its consent to
the transfer of its declaration to the I.C.J.
(2) YES. When no grounds exist to exclude the
application of a state, the application of such a state to
the International Court of Justice is admissible. The five
grounds upon which the United States (D) challenged the
admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application were that the
plaintiff failed because there is no “indispensable parties”
rule when it could not bring forth necessary parties,
Nicaragua’s (P) request of the Court to consider the
possibility of a threat to peace which is the exclusive
province of the Security Council, failed due to the fact
that I.C.J. can exercise jurisdiction which is concurrent
with that of the Security Council, that the I.C.J. is unable
to deal with situations involving ongoing armed conflict
and that there is nothing compelling the I.C.J. to decline
to consider one aspect of a dispute just because the
dispute has other aspects due to the fact that the case is
incompatible with the Contadora process to which
Nicaragua (P) is a party.
MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES VS COMELEC
ET AL
FACTS:
Grace Poe (Poe) was found abandoned in a church in
Jaro Iloilo sometime 1968. Parental care was passed to
the relatives of Edgardo Militar, the person who found the
child. The relatives then reported and registered the child
as a founding with the Civil Registrar of Iloilo. The child
was then named Mary Grace Militar. The child was
subsequently adopted by Fernando Poe, Jr and Susan
Roces sometime in 1974. Necessary annotations were
placed in the child’s foundling certificate but it was only in
2005 that Susan Roces discovered that their lawyer
failed to secure a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
Poe’s new name as well as the name of the adoptive
parents. Roces then submitted an affidavit and in 2006, a
Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Poe
was released by the Civil Registry of Iloilo. At the age of
18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan. In 1988,
she was issued a Philippine passport. In 1991, Poe
married Teodoro Llamanzares and flew to the US right
after the wedding. She then gave birth to her eldest child
in the US. In 2001, Poe became a naturalized American
Citizen and she obtained a US Passport that same year.
In April 2004, Poe came back to the Philippines in order
to support her father’s candidacy. It was at this time that
she gave birth to her youngest daughter. She then
returned to the US in July 2004 with her two daughters.
Poe returned in December 2004 after learning of her
father’s deteriorating condition. The latter died and Poe
stayed until February 2005 to take care of the funeral
arrangements. Poe stated that she wanted to be with her
grieving mother hence, she and her husband decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines
sometime first quarter of 2005. They prepared for
resettlement including notification of their children’s
schools, coordination with property movers and inquiry
with Philippine authorities as to how they can bring their
pet dog. According to Poe, as early as 2004, she already
quit her job in the US. Poe came home on May 24, 2005
and immediately secured a TIN while her husband stayed
in the US. She and her family stayed with her mother
until she and husband was able to purchase a
condominium in San Juan sometime February 2006. On
February 14, 2006, Poe returned to the US to dispose the
other family belongings. She travelled back in March
2006. In early 2006, Poe and husband acquired a
property in Corinthian Hills in Quezon City where they
built their familyhome.
On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 9225. On
July 10, 2006, she filed a sworn petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three children. The Bureau of
Immigration acted in favor of the petition on July 18,
2006. She and her children were then considered dual
citizens. Poe then registered as voter in August 2006 and
secured a Philippine passport thereafter. On October 6,
2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of the MTRCB.
Before assuming her post, she executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the US before a notary
public in Pasig City on October 20, 2010. The following
day, she submitted the Affidavit to the Bureau of
Immigration and took her oath as MTRCB Chairperson.
According to Poe, she stopped using her American
passport from then on. On July 12, 2011, Poe executed
an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
US before the Vice Consul of the US Embassy in Manila.
On December 9, 2011, the US Vice Consul issued a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US effective
October 21, 2010. On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with
COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator
stating that she was a resident of the Philippines for a
period of 6 years and 6 months before May 13, 2013.
She was then proclaimed a Senator on May 16, 2013.
Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
elections. She declared that she is a natural born and her
residence in the Philippine up to the day before election
would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24,
2005. Several petitions were filed against Poe alleging
that
1) she committed material misrepresentation in her COC
when she stated that she is a resident of the Philippines
for at least 10 years 11 months up to the day before May
9, 2016 Elections,
(2) she is not natural born considering that Poe is a
foundling. It was argued that international law does not
confer natural born status and Filipino citizenship to
foundlings hence, she is not qualified to apply for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A.9225 as
she is not a natural citizen to begin with. Assuming that
Poe was a natural born citizen, she lost it when she
became a US Citizen. In addition, one of the
petitioners, Francisco Tatad, theorized that:
1. Philippines adhere to the principle of jus sanguinis
and hence persons of unknown parentage, particularly
foundlings, are not natural born Filipino citizens.
2. Using statutory construction, considering that
foundlings were not expressly included in
3. International conventions are not self-executory hence,
local legislations are necessary to give effect to
obligations assumed by the Philippines.
4. There is no standard practice that automatically
confers natural born status to foundlings.
Petitioner Valdez alleged that Poe’s repatriation under
R.A 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural
born citizen as those who repatriates only acquires
Philippine citizenship and not their original status as
natural born citizens Poe countered these petitions by
alleging that:
1. The grounds invoked by the petitioners were not
proper grounds for a disqualification case as enumerated
under Section 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2. What the petitioners filed focus on establishing her
ineligibility, hence, they fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, not the
COMELEC.
3. The July 18, 2006 Order of the Bureau of Immigration
declaring her as natural born, her appointment as
MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption
reinforced her position as a natural born citizen
4. As early as first quarter of 2005, she started to
reestablish her domicile in the Philippines and that she
can reestablish her domicile of choice even before she
renounced her American citizenship.
5. The period of residency as stated in her COC for
senator was a mistake in good faith. COMELEC ruled
against the petitioner resolving that she is not a natural
born citizen and that she failed to complete the 10 year
residency requirement. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES AND RATIO:
1) Whether it can be concluded that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos.
Presumption regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unacceptable in Philippine Law. There is more than
sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino parents and is
therefore a natural-born Filipino. Hence, the burden of
proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner
is not a Filipinocitizen.
Private respondents should show that Poe’s parents were
aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift
the burden to her because such status did not exclude
the possibility that her parents were Filipinos. In fact,
there is a high probability that her parents are Filipinos.
The Solicitor General offered official Statistics from the
Philippine Statistics office that from 1965 to 1975, the
total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was
15,985. While the Filipinos born in the country were more
than 10 Million. On this basis, there is a 99% chance that
the child born in the Philippines would be a Filipino which
in turn, would indicate more than ample probability that
Poe’s parents are Filipinos.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poe’s
parents are the fact that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in
Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features
There are disputable presumptions that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature. On
this basis, it is safer to assume that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos. To assume otherwiseis to accept the absurd.
2) Whether as a foundling, Poe is a natural born
Citizen
Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens. While
the 1935 Constitution is silent as to foundlings, there is
no restrictive language that would exclude them either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration,
there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. The
amendment to the Constitution proposed by
constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as natural
born citizens was not carried out, not because there was
any objection to the notion that persons of unknown
parentage are not citizens, but only because their
number was not enough to merit specific mention. There
was no intent or language that would permit
discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all
three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws. Likewise, domestic laws on
adoption support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the adoptee must
be Filipino in the first place to be adopted. Recent
legislation all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and
include foundlings as among Filipino children who may
be adopted.
The argument that the process to determine that the child
is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling
certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship is without merit.
Hence, the argument that as a foundling, Poe underwent
a process in order to acquire or perfect her Philippine
citizenship, is untenable.
“Having to perform an act” means that the act must
be personally done by the citizen. In this case, the
determination of foundling status was done by
authorities, not by Poe. Second, the object of the
process is to determine the whereabouts of the
parents, not the citizenship of the child and lastly, the
process is not analogous to naturalization
proceedings.
Under international law, foundlings are citizens. Generally
accepted principles of international law which include
international customs form part of the laws of the land.
The common thread of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and the International Convent on Civil and Political Rights
obligates the Philippines to grant nationality from birth
and to ensure that no child is stateless. The principles
stated in the:
for the Protection of Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, we (the Supreme Court) ruled that the
proscription against enforced disappearance was
nonetheless binding as a generally accepted principle of
international law.
Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia,
North and South America and Europe have passed
legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizens. 166 out
of 189 countries accept that foundlings are recognized as
citizens. Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been
born and a national of the country in which it is found.

1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to Hence, as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Filipino
the Conflict of Nationality laws (that a foundling is citizen.
presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth)

2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness

(foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found)bind the Philippines although we are
not signatory to these conventions.

Although we are not a signatory to the Hague

Convention, we are a signatory to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which affirms
Article 14 of the Hague Convention. Likewise, the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness affirms
Article 15 of the UDHR. By analogy, although the
Philippines has not signed the International Convention
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE V. MANALO
Petitioner: Secretary of National Defense; Chief of staff,
AFP
Respondent: Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
G.R. No. 180906 / 7 October 2008
Facts:
CA Decision being appealed
1. The Manalo brothers filed, on 23 August 2007, a
Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) against petitioners and
their officers from depriving them of their right to
liberty and other basic rights.
 The Writ of Amparo was approved on Aug
24, 2007 and petitioners filed Motion to
Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition.
2. The CA rendered a decision in favor of the Manalo
brothers and ordered the current petitioners to:
 To furnish the Manalos and CA of all official
and unofficial reports of the investigation
undertaken in connection with their case,
except those already on file.
 To confirm in writing the present places of
official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas
 To cause to be produced to this Court all
medical reports, records and charts, reports
of any treatment given or recommended
and medicines prescribed, if any, to the
petitioners, to include a list of medical and
(sic) personnel (military and civilian) who
attended to them from February 14, 2006
until August 12, 2007 within five days from
notice of this decision.
Ito na talaga
 Feb. 14, 2006 - Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo, brothers and herein respondents,
were abducted by elements of the military
(AFP and Citizen Armed Force
Geographical Unit or CAFGU) from their
house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan.
o The abductors were looking for a certain “Bestre”.
Manalo brothers were suspected of being
members of the NPA
o The white L300 van was driven by M/Sgt. Rizal
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo
o The brothers were repeatedly beaten and tortured
and questioned about their knowledge of the NPA.
 Sometime in the third week of detention,
Raymond attempted to escape. He
discovered that they were in Fort
Magsaysay (Palayan, Nueva Ecija). He
 was however recaptured and tortured.
Detention in Fort Magsaysay lasted for 3
and a half months.
 One day, Rizal Hilario took the Manalo
brothers to Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
and then beaten up. They remained there
for one or two weeks.
 Then brought to Sapang, San Miguel,
Bulacan to meet Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan,
Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division.
o Gen. Palparan told the Manalo
brother to tell their parents to not go
to rallies and hearings regarding
their disappearance. Instead, they
should help in the capture of
“Bestre”.
o Respondents were then brought to
their parents’ house to deliver
Palparan’s message. Their parents
agreed out of fear.
 Manalo brothers were given medicine named
“Alive”. Gen. Palparan said that this would make
them feel better, but the real effect was drowsiness
and a heavy feeling after waking up.
 After 3 months in Sapang, Raymond was brought
to Camp Tecson. He was ordered to clean outside
the barracks of the Army Rangers.
o Met Sherlyn Cadapan, a UP student who
was also abducted, tortured and raped by
the military.
 Reynaldo was brought to Camp Tecson a week
later. Other captives (Karen Empeño and Manuel
Merino) also arrived.
o All the captives were chained every night.
They were told that their families would be
killed if they escaped.
o Cadapan, Empeño and Merino would later
on be killed. Merino would even be burned.
o November 22, 2006 – the captives were
transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry
Battalion in Limay, Bataan. They were
continually beaten and made to do chores.
o Here, respondents witnessed how soldiers
killed an old man suspected of harboring
the NPA and also of an Aeta who was
subsequently burned.
 The captives were then brought to Zambales, in a
safehouse near the sea. They were brought back
to Limay on June 2007 by Caigas, the commander
of the 24th Infantry Battalion.
 June 13, 2007 – Respondents were brought to
Pangasinan to farm the land of Caigas. Here, they
started to save their earnings to aid in their
escape. When they saved 1000 pesos, they were
able to acquire a cellphone.
 August 13, 2007 – Reynaldo and Raymond
Manalo were able to escape and board a bus
bound for Manila.
 The respondents were able to corroborate each ISSUE:
other’s affidavits.
 Dr. Benito Molino also corroborated the accounts WON the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly
of the Manalo brothers. He specializes in forensic given (YES)
medicine. He conducted a medical exam on the
respondents Dispositive: Petition dismissed. CA decision
 After their escape. The scars and wounds of reaffirmed.
respondents were consistent with their account of
physical injuries inflicted on them. He followed the
Istanbul Protocol in the medical exam. HELD:
 Petitioners also submitted affidavits
 Gen. Palparan and M/Sgt. Hilario filed their History of the Amparo Rule
affidavits late.
 Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall and  The adoption of the Amparo Rule is a result of the
witness for the petitioner, conducted an two-day National Consultative Summit on
investigation on May 29, 2006, from 8am to 10pm. Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced
Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July
 All 6 persons (CAFGU members) implicated in the
16-17, 2007.
abduction denied the allegation. They had alibis
o It was an exercise for the first time of the
(some were building a chapel, some were just at
home) Court’s expanded power to promulgate
rules to protect our people’s constitutional
 Discovered that “Ka Bestre” is actually
rights
Rolando Manalo, elder brother of the
respondents.
 “Amparo” literally means “protection” in Spanish
 Recommendation was for the dismissal of the
o Amparo thus combines the principles of
case.
judicial review derived from the U.S. with
the limitations on judicial power
 characteristic of the civil law tradition which
prevails in Mexico.
o It enables courts to enforce the constitution
by protecting individual rights in particular
cases, but prevents them from using this
power to make law for the entire nation
 This concept evolved into the (1) amparo libertad
for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent
to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes
for the judicial review of the constitutionality of
statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the judicial
review of the constitutionality and legality of a
judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the
judicial review of administrative actions; and (5)
amparo agrario for the protection of peasants’
rights derived from the agrarian reform process
 In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ
of amparo has been constitutionally adopted to
protect against human rights abuses especially
committed in countries under military juntas.
 In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution
does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo,
several of the above amparo protections are
guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph
of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial
power “to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The
Clause accords a similar general protection to
human rights extended by the amparo contra
leyes, amparo casacion, and amparo
administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to
the remedy of habeas corpus found in several
provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
Was the grant proper? YES
 Promulgated in October 24, 2007. First time that
the Supreme Court exercised its expanded power
in the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules to
protect the people’s constitutional rights (life,
liberty, property)
 Coverage of which is confined to:
o Extralegal killings – killings committed
without due process of the law
o Enforced disappearances – an arrest,
detention or abduction by the government;
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts places him outside the
protection of the law
 “Amparo” literally means protection in Spanish.
Writ of Amparo originated in Mexico (Yucatan
State). Eventually incorporated into the Mexican
Constitution in 1847. Spread across the Western
hemisphere and eventually to the Philippines.
 Provides for swift relief because of the summary
nature of its proceedings. Only substantial
evidence is required.
 There is still a threat to the life, liberty, and a
violation of their right to security of the Manalo
brothers because their captors, whom they
escaped from, still remain at large.
o Right to security is in Art. III, Sec. 2 of the
1987 Constitution.
o It is the right to enjoyment of life.
 Three ways of exercising right to security:
o Freedom from fear.
 Enunciated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) Article 3
 Everyone has the right to life,
liberty and security of
person.
 It is the “right to security of
person” as the word “security”
itself means “freedom from
fear.
 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), Art. 9 (1)
 Everyone has the right to
liberty and security of
person.
 “Freedom from fear” is the right
and any threat to the rights to
life, liberty or security is the
actionable wrong. Fear is a
state of mind, a reaction; threat
is a stimulus, a cause of action.
(PH is a signatory to both
conventions)
o Guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity or security.
 Article III, Section II of the 1987
Constitution guarantees against
search without warrant
 ELKs and EDs involve Physical
torture, force, and violence are a
severe invasion of bodily integrity.
 It constitutes an invasion of both
bodily and psychological integrity as
the dignity of the human person
includes the exercise of free will
 Note: The consti also guarantees
against torture
o Guarantee of protection of one’s right by the
Government
 The writ of amparo, this right is built
into the guarantees of the right to
life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
and the right to security of person
under Article III, Section 2.
 Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization
of the government apparatus to
extend protection to victims of ELKs
and EDs as well as their families
 Right to security of persons can exist
 independently of the right to liberty.
(the court cited several cases here,
Delgado Paez v. Colombia; Bwaya v.
Zambia; Bahamonde v. Equatorial
Guinea)
 They have a positive duty to protect
right to liberty and not just a
prohibition for arbitrary deprivation of
such rights. (ECHR in Kurt v. Turkey)
 The continuing threat on the life of the Manalo
brothers is apparent. This threat vitiates their free
will because they are forced to limit their
movements and activities. Threats to liberty,
security, and life are actionable through a
petition for a writ of amparo.
 The military failed to provide protection for the
respondents. They were even the ones who
actually tortured them. The one-day investigation
conducted by Jimenez was limited, superficial and
one-sided.
 “In sum, we conclude that respondents’ right to
security as “freedom from threat” is violated by the
apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of
person. Their right to security as a guarantee of
protection by the government is likewise violated
by the ineffective investigation and protection on
the part of the military.”
REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 104768
FACTS:
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the
successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (“EO No. 1”)
creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (“PCGG”). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the
PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. Accordingly, the
PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga,
created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”) tasked to
investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service
or retired. Based on its mandate, the AFP Board
investigated various reports of alleged unexplained
wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
(“Ramas”). Later, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on
its findings and recommendation on the reported
unexplained wealth of Ramas.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served
at Dimaano’s residence a search warrant captioned
“Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.” The
raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items not included in the
search warrant. The raiding team seized firearms,
jewelry, and land titles.
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for
forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (“RA No.
1379”) against Ramas. The complaint was amended to
include Elizabeth Dimaano, the alleged mistress of
Ramas, as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas
“acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other
income from legitimately acquired property by taking
undue advantage of his public office and/or using his
power, authority and influence as such officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate
and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand
Marcos.” The Amended Complaint prayed for, among
others, the forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds
and equipment in favor of the State.
Trial ensured. However, the Sandiganbayan
subsequently dismissed the complaint because there
was an illegal search and seizure of the items
confiscated, among others.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the
raiding team conducted the search and seizure “on
March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA
revolution.” Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
government was operative at that time by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino
and Vice President Laurel were “taking power in the
name and by the will of the Filipino people.” Petitioner
asserts that the revolutionary government effectively
withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which
guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right
arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2
February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the
Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage
at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may
confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano
and use the same in evidence against her since at the
time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy
any constitutional right.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search of Dimaano’s home was legal
HELD:
The search and seizure of Dimaano’s home were NOT
legal.
The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was
not operative during the interregnum.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February
1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA
Revolution was “done in defiance of the provisions of the
1973 Constitution.“ The resulting government was
indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations
that the revolutionary government, as the de jure
government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government were the supreme law because
no constitution limited the extent and scope of such
directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973
Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum,
a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a
Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor
a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution
remained operative during the interregnum would render
void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine
Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”) before the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration
orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over
of private property by mere executive issuance without
judicial action, would violate the due process and search
and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was
concededly a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution. No one could validly question the
sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum.
The protection accorded to individuals under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) remained in effect during the
interregnum.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino
people continued to enjoy, under the ICCPR and the
UDHR, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights
of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the
de jure government, assumed responsibility for the
State’s good faith compliance with the ICCPR to which
the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR
requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present ICCPR.”
Under Article 17(1) of the ICCPR, the revolutionary
government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence.”
The UDHR, to which the Philippines is also a signatory,
provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the
signatories to the UDHR did not intend it as a legally
binding document, being only a UDHR, the Court has
interpreted the UDHR as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law and binding on the State.
Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated
under international law to observe the rights of individuals
under the UDHR.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the
ICCPR or the UDHR during the interregnum. Whether the
revolutionary government could have repudiated all its
obligations under the ICCPR or the UDHR is another
matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the
Court considers the UDHR as part of customary
international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are
proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down
in the ICCPR. The fact is the revolutionary government
did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR in the same
way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure
government, the revolutionary government could not
escape responsibility for the State’s good faith
compliance with its treaty obligations under international
law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional
Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government became subject
to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered
such directives and orders void. The Provisional
Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution. The Provisional Constitution served as
a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid
abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the
people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of
Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers
did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. The directives and orders
should not have also violated the ICCPR or the UDHR. In
this case, the revolutionary government presumptively
sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary
government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a
judge upon proper application, specified the items to be
searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with
respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that
the warrant did not include the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team
confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly
describe these items and the raiding team confiscated
them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal
basis to seize these items without showing that these
items could be the subject of warrantless search and
seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority
when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and
unless these items are contraband per se, and they are
not, they must be returned to the person from whom the
raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that
such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely
that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as
basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be
returned immediately to Dimaano.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DUQUE III
(Austria-Martinez, October 9, 2007)
Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari
Petitioner: Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association
of the Philippines
Respondents: DOH Sec. Francisco Duque III, DOH
Undersecretaries Dr. Ethelyn Nieto, Dr. Margarita Galon,
Atty. Alexander Padilla and Dr. Jade Del Mundo; and
Asst. Secretaries Dr. Mario Villaverde, Dr. David Lozada
and Dr. Nemesio Gako
Facts:
- Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was
issued by Pres. Aquino on Oct. 28, 1986 by virtue of
the legislative powers granted to her under the
Freedom Constitution.
(1) One of the preambular clauses of TMC – the law
seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substituttes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the
WHA (World Health Assembly) in 1981.
- In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of the
instrument mandates that States should take
measure to diminish infant mortality and should
ensure that all segments of society are informed of
the advantages of breastfeeding.
- From 1982 – 2006, the WHA adopted several
resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should
be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
- May 15, 2006 – DOH issues the assailed RIRR
(Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of
E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to take
effect on July 7, 2006. – The RIRR imposes a ban on
all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes
 - June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the present Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction.
- August 15, 2006 – the Court issued a Resolution
granting the TRO, enjoining the respondents from
implementing the assailed RIRR.
- Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the
provisions of TMC thereby amending and expanding
the coverage of the said law.
- DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements
not only TMC but also various international
instruments regarding infant and young child
nutrition. They posit that the said international
instruments are deemed part of the law of the land
and therefore may be implemented by the DOH in
the RIRR.
Issue: W/n the RIRR is unconstitutional?
Sub-issue(s): W/n the RIRR is in accord with TMC? W/n
pertinent international agreements entered into by the
Philippines are part of the law of the land and may thus
be implemented through an RIRR, if so, is the RIRR in
accord with such international agreements?
Note: I focused on the parts on international law. The
other matters (in case ma’am asks) are at the bottom of
the digest.
Held: No. However what may be implemented is the
RIRR based on the Milk Code which in turn is based on
the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law of the land.
The other WHA Resolutions however cannot be imposed
as they are not deemed part of the law of the land.
Ratio:
1. Are the international instruments referred to by the
respondents part of the law of the land?
- The various international instruments invoked by
respondents are:
(1) The UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child
(2) The International Convenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights
(3) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
- These instruments only provide general terms of the
steps that States must take to prevent child mortality.
Hence, they do not have anything about the use and
marketing of breastmilk substitutes
- The ICMBS and other WHA Resolutions however,
are the international instruments which have specific
provisions on breastmilk substitutes
- Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can
become part of domestic law in 2 ways:
(1) Transformation – an international law is
transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation
 Treaties become part of law of the land
through this method, pursuant to Art 7, Sec 21
– wherein “no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid.. unless concurred
by at least 2/3 of Senate”
 The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are NOT
treaties as they haven’t been concurred in by
the required 2/3 vote.
 HOWEVER, the ICMBS has been transformed
into domestic law through local legislation that
is TMC.
 Therefore, it is not the ICMBS per se
that has the force of law but it’s TMC.
 o While TMC is almost a verbatim
reproduction of the ICMBS, it did not
adopt the latter’s provision on the
absolute prohibition on advertising of
products within the scope of the
ICMBS. Instead the MC provides that
advertising promotion or other
marketing materials may be allowed if
such materials are approved by a
committee.
(2) Incorporation – by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law
 This is found under Art 2, Sec 2 – The
Philippines… adopts generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the
law of the land
 In Mihares v. Ranada: International law
becomes customary rules accepted as binding
as a result of two elements:
1.) Established, widespread, and consistent
practice on part of the state
2.) Opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as
to law or necessity.
 Generally accepted principles of international
law refer to norms of general or customary
international law which are binding on all
states, valid through all kinds of human
societies, and basic to legal systems generally
 Fr. Bernas has a definition similar to the one
above. Customary international law has two
factors:
1.) Material factor – how states behave
 The consistency and the generality of
the practice
2.) Psychological or subjective factor – why
they behave the way they do
 Once state practice has been
established, now determine why they
behave they do. Is it ouor of courtesy or
opinio juris (the belief that a certain type
of behavior is obligatory)
 When a law satisfies the two factors it
becomes part of customary international law
which is then incorporated into our domestic
system
2. Since the WHA Resolutions have not been embodied
in any local legislation, have they attained the status
of customary law and hence part of our law of the
land?
- The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the
international specialized agencies of the UN.
- According to the WHO Constitution, it’s the WHA
which determines the policies of the WHO, the
former also has the power to “adopt regulations
concerning advertising and labeling of
pharmaceutical and similar products” and “to make
recommendations to members on any matter within
the Organization’s competence”
- Note that the legal effect of a regulation as opposed
to recommendation is quite different
(1) Regulations which are duly adopted by the WHA
are binding on member states
(2) On the other hand, recommendations of the WHA
do not come into force for its members unlike
regulations. Rather, they carry moral and political
weight as they constitute the judgment on a
health issue of the collective membership of the
highest body in the field of health.
- The WHA resolution adopting the ICMBS and the
subsequent WHA resolutions urging states to
implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory
and legally non-binding.
- Hence, unlike the ICMBS which has become TMC
through legislative enactment, the subsequent WHA
Resolutions, which provide for exclusive
breastfeeding and prohibition on advertisements and
promotions of breastmilk have not been adopted as
domestic law.
- WHA Resolutions have been viewed to constitute
“soft law” or non-binding norms, which influence
state behavior. Soft law has been noted to be a rapid
means of norm creation, in order to reflect and
respond to the changing needs and demands of
constituents (of the UN.)
- As previously discussed, for an international rule to
be considered customary law, it must be established
that such rule is followed by states because it is
considered obligatory (opinio juris).
- In the case at bar, respondents have not presented
any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions are
in fact enforced or practice by member states.
Further, they failed to establish that provisions of
pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary
international law that may be deemed part of law of
the land.
- Hence, legislation is necessary to transform the
WHA resolutions into domestic law. They cannot thus
be implemented by executive agencies without the
need of a law to be enacted by legislature.
On other issues:
W/n the petitioner is the real party in interest? Yes.
- An association has standing to file suit for its workers
despite its lack of direct interest of its members are
affected by the action. An organization has standing
to assert the concerns of its constituents. (Exec Sec
vs CA)
- The Court has rules that an association has the legal
personality to represent its members because the
results of the case will affect their vital interests.
(Purok Bagong Silang Association Inc. vs. Yuipco)
- In the petitioner’s Amended Articles of Incorporation, it
states that the association is formed “to represent
directly or through approved representatives the
pharmaceutical and health care industry before the
Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the
medical professions and the general public.”
- Therefore, the petitioner, as an organization, has an
interest in fulfilling its avowed purpose of
representing members who are part of the
pharmaceutical and health care industry. Petitioner
is duly authorized to bring to the attention of the
government agencies and courts any grievance
suffered by its members which are directly affected
by the assailed RIRR.
- The petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused
with its members, should be considered as a legal
party-in-interest which stands to be benefited or
injured by any judgment in the case.
W/n the DOH has the power to implement the WHA
Resolutions under the Revised Administrative Code
even in the absence of a domestic law? Only the
provisions of the Milk Code. (as per the discussion
above)
- Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the RAC of 1987
provides that the DOH shall define the national
health policy and can issue orders and regulations
 concerning the implementation of established health
policies.
- A.O. No 2005 -0014 which provides the national
policy on infant and young child feeding, does not
declare that as part of its policy, the advertisement or
promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be
absolutely prohibited.
- Only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of
the subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly
implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.
W/n the provisions of the RIRR being in accordance with
the Milk Code? Not all of them
- Assailed provisions: [1] extending the coverage to
young children; [2] imposing exclusive breastfeeding
for infants from 0-6 months; [3] imposes an absolute
ban on advertising and promotion for breastmilk
substitutes; [4] requiring additional labeling
requirements; [5] prohibits the dissemination of
information on infant formula; [6] forbids milk
manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance
in research and continuing education Although the
DOH has the power under the Milk Code to control
information regarding breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk
substitutes, this power is not absolute because it has
no power to impose an absolute prohibition in the
marketing, promotion and advertising of breastmilk
substitutes. Several provisions of the Milk Code
attest to the fact that such power to control
information is not absolute.
- Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative
of the Milk Code because such provisions impose an
absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion and
marketing of breastmilk substitutes, which is not
provided for in the Milk Code. Section 46 is violative
of the Milk Code because the DOH has exceeded its
authority in imposing such fines or sanctions when
the Milk Code does not do so. Other assailed
provisions are in accordance with the Milk Code.
W/n Section 13 of the RIRR providing a sufficient
standard? Yes.
- Questioned provision, in addition to Section 26 of
Rule VII provide labeling requirements for breastmilk
substitutes  found to be in consonance with the
Milk Code
- The provisions in question provide reasonable
means of enforcing related provisions in the Milk
Code.
W/n Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws?
- Section in question only repeals orders, issuances
and rules and regulations, not laws. The provision is
valid as it is within the DOH’s rule-making power.
- An administrative agency has quasi-legislative or
rule-making power. However, such power is limited
to making rules and regulation subjected to the
boundaries set by the granting statute and the
Constitution. The power is also subject to the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers. The power, which includes amending,
revising, altering or repealing, is granted to allow for
flexibility in the implementation of the laws.
W/n On Section 4, 5(w), 11, 22, 32, 47 and 52 violates
the due process clause of the Constitution (Article III
Section 1)?
- Despite the fact that the present Constitution
enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless
reserves to the government the power to intervene
whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare… free enterprise does not call for the
 removal of protective regulations. It must be clearly
explained and proven by competent evidence just
exactly how such protective regulation would result
in the restraint of trade.
- Section 4 – proscription of milk manufacturers’
participation in any policymaking body; Section 22 –
classes and seminars for women and children;
Section 32 – giving of assistance, support and
logistics or training; Section 52 – giving of donations
- In the instant case, petitioner failed to show how the
aforementioned sections hamper the trade of
breastmilk substitutes. They also failed to establish
that these activities are essential and indispensable
to their trade.

Disposition: The Petition is Partially Granted. Only

sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of A.O. 2006-0014 are
declared null and void for being ultra vires. The TRO
is lifted insofar as the rest of the provisions of A.O.
2006-0012 is concerned.