The Chernobyl disaster was nuclear accident that occurred at Chernobyl

Nuclear Power Plant on April 26, 1986. A nuclear meltdown in one of the
reactors caused a fire that sent a plume of radioactive fallout that eventually
spread all over Europe.

Chernobyl nuclear reactor plant, built at the banks of Pripyat river

of Ukraine, had four reactors, each capable of producing 1,000 MWs of
electric power.

On the evening of April 25th 1986, a group of engineers, planned an

electrical engineering experiment on the Number 4 Reactor. With their little
knowledge on Nuclear physics, they thought of experimenting how long
turbines would spin and supply power to the main circulating pumps following
a loss of main electrical power supply.

Following is an image of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

What Led to the Disaster?

Let us now see what led to the disaster.

The reactor unit 4 was to be shut down for routine maintenance on 25 April
1986. But, it was decided to take advantage of this shutdown to determine
whether, in the event of a loss of station power, the slowing turbine could
provide enough electrical power to operate the main core cooling water
circulating pumps, until the diesel emergency power supply became
operative. The aim of this test was to determine whether cooling of the
core could continue in the event of a loss of power.

Due to the misconception that this experiment belongs to the non-nuclear

part of the power plant, it was carried out without a proper exchange of
information between the testing department and the safety department.
Hence the test started with inadequate safety precautions and the operating
personnel were not alerted to the nuclear safety implications of the electrical
test and its potential danger.

The Experiment
According to the test planned, the Emergency Core Cooling
System (ECCS) of the reactor, which provides water for cooling the reactor
core, was shut down deliberately.

For the test to be conducted, the reactor has to be stabilized at about 700-
1000 MW prior to shut down, but it fell down to 5000 MW due to some
operational phenomenon. Later, the operator working in the night shift
committed an error, by inserting the reactor control rods so far. This caused
the reactor to go into a near-shutdown state, dropping the power output to
around 30 MW.

Since this low power was not sufficient to make the test and will make the
reactor unstable, it was decided to restore the power by extracting the control
rods, which made the power stabilize at 200 MW. This was actually a violation
to safety law, due to the positive void co-efficiency of the reactor. Positive
void coefficient is the increasing number of reactivity in a reactor that
changes into steam. The test was decided to be carried out at this power
level.

Actually, the reactors were highly unstable at the low power level, primarily
owing to the control rod design and the positive void coefficient factors that
accelerated nuclear chain reaction and the power output if the reactors lost
cooling water.

The following image shows the reactor 4 where the experiment was
conducted. This picture was taken after everything was restored.
At 1:23, on April 26th 1986, the engineers continued with their experiment
and shut down the turbine engine to see if its inertial spinning would power
the reactor’s water pumps. In fact, it did not adequately power the water
pumps and without the cooling water the power level in the reactor got
surged.

The water pumps started pumping water at a slower rate and they together
with the entry to the core of slightly warmer feed water, may have caused
boiling (void formation) at the bottom of the core. This, along with xenon
burn out, might have increased the power level at the core. The power level
was then increased to 530 MW and continued to rise. The fuel elements were
ruptured and lead to steam generation, which increased the positive void
coefficient resulting in high power output.

The high power output alarmed the engineers who tried to insert all the 200
control rods, which is a conventional procedure done in order to control the
core temperature. But these rods got blocked half the way, because of their
graphite tip design. So, before the control rods with their five-meter
absorbent material, could penetrate the core, 200 graphite tips
simultaneously entered the core which facilitated the reaction to increase,
causing an explosion that blew off the 1,000-ton heavy steel and concrete lid
of the reactor, consequently jamming the control rods, which were halfway
down the reactor. As the channel pipes begin to rupture, mass steam
generation occurred as a result of depressurization of the reactor cooling
circuit.

As a result, two explosions were reported. The first one was the initial steam
explosion. Eventually, after two to three seconds, a second explosion took
place, which could be possibly from the build-up of hydrogen due to
zirconium-steam reactions.

All the materials such as Fuel, Moderator and Structural materials were
ejected, starting a number of fires and the destroyed core was exposed to
the atmosphere. In the explosion and ensuing fire, more than 50 tons of
radioactive material were released into the atmosphere, where it was carried
by air currents. This was 400 times to the amount of radioactive materials
released at the time of Hiroshima bombing.
Fatal Effects of the Disaster
The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant disaster in Ukraine, is the only accident
in the history of commercial nuclear power to cause fatalities from radiation.

There were many fatal effects due to the radiation released. A few of the
effects are listed below −

 Two workers had died. One immediately got burnt to ashes after the accident,
while the other was declared dead at the hospital within few hours of admission.

 28 emergency workers and staff died within 4 months of the accident due to the
thermal burns and the radiation effect on their bodies.

 This accident created 7,000 cases of thyroid cancer.

 Acute radiation syndrome (ARS) was diagnosed in 237 people, who were on-site
and involved in cleaning up

 The land, air and ground water were all contaminated to a great extent.

 The direct and indirect exposure to radiation led to many severe health problems
such as Downs Syndrome, Chromosomal Aberrations, Mutations, Leukemia,
Thyroid Cancer and Congenital Malfunctions, etc.

 A number of plants and animal faced destruction as after-effect.

Cultural Secrecy Lack of Openness

The Soviet Union lacked a rigorous, cohesive nuclear safety policy because it developed its nuclear
technology during the Cold War. Chernobyl illustrates the risks of engaging with dangerous
technology in times of war, competition, and isolation. Due to these factors, its nuclear technology
and design were closely guarded and avoided scrutiny internationally - due to the fierce sense of
competition with its western rivals, especially the United States - and internally, for raising a concern
about design or safety was considered a direct criticism of the state and Communist Party, which
was not allowed under Soviet totalitarianism. As this case shows, a political culture where concerns
cannot be voiced prevents engineers, scientists, and government leaders from developing adequate
safety policy[5].

Reactor Design and Safety Protocol[edit]

The Soviet reactor designs lacked the thorough safety features of their western counterparts; as a
result, they were very unforgiving to operator mistakes[6], which were frequent to to inadequate
operator training. Nuclear operators were not fully educated on the power station or process. When
institutions fail to train employees operating powerful and dangerous equipment and processes, they
tend to engage in riskier behavior because they are unaware of the dangers. In the case of
Chernobyl, the operators did not understand that an explosion could occur during the safety test.
Chernobyl's lack of proper safety transcended its operators and further manifested itself in design,
construction, manufacturing, and regulation. Unlike two other plants where nuclear accidents
occurred,Three Mile Island and Fukushima, Chernobyl's design did not include a containment
structure in case a meltdown occurred[7]. Designs without safeguards leave very small margin for
error.

Failure to Follow Chain of Command[edit]

Post hoc analysis of engineering failures reveals lower level employees often realize risks but fail to
prevent disaster because they are unwilling to move their concerns up the chain of command if
managers are initially unresponsive. Chernobyl offers a counterexample to this finding. When
engineers sought approval for the test, they failed to gain the approval of the proper officials. Instead
of coordinating the test with the chief reactor designer, scientific manager, or Soviet nuclear
oversight regulator, as protocol stipulated, approval was only obtained from the plant director. By
failing to engage with the proper experts, the Chernobyl engineers missed three opportunities for an
expert to step in[8]. Following protocol and engaging the correct people adds layers of protection
when conducting dangerous tests and experiments; in the case of Chernobyl, it could have
prevented the catastrophe.

Pressure to Succeed[edit]
After witnessing the plants response to their commands, Chernobyl nuclear operators ignored
several opportunities to cancel the test. Had the test been cancelled, the nuclear operators would
not have been rewarded for averting disaster; rather, they would have faced severe punishment for
delaying the test and questioning the judgment of the superior who issued the order. Anatoly
Dyatlov, the chief engineer on the night of the accident, had a reputation as an irritable task master.
Documents report that he had been especially impatient leading up to the accident[9]. Even though
Soviet workers did not face pressure from management seeking to maximize financial profit, they
faced constant pressure from a communist system that encouraged workers to maximize production
for the greater benefit of the state. Any failures, perceived weakness, or disloyalty in a worker
invoked quick and severe punishments and demotions. When employees feel threatened to produce
at all cost, they become less risk averse. The pressure to succeed felt by the Chernobyl operators
caused them to be complicit with a flawed and unsafe plan, even though they did not understand
what was happening.
ETHICS
The factors leading up to the explosion can not be pinned to just one factor. The failure was a
culmination of miscommunication, lack of safety culture, Soviet cultural problems, negligence, and
unqualified staff that combined to produce deadly consequences. Some claim management,
operators, and engineers are to blame. Some of the questionable ethics at the time of the accident
and shortly after can be found in turning off the safety system to perform the test, the fact that the
firemen initially tasked with the disaster were never taught how to cope with the situation, the Soviet
cover-up, and the haphazard construction of the sarcophagus built in response. Following the
catastrophe, many changes in policy and procedures were formed; a leading group in the effort,
the World Association of Nuclear Operators(WANO), an international organization focusing on safety
through open information sharing[11], was founded in 1989. In the aftermath, the Soviet Union made
alterations to the RBMK design - the design of the Chernobyl reactor - and gained a heightened
sense of appreciation and caution for nuclear power[12].