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Fichte’s idealism

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (b. Rammenau, Saxony, 1762-1814 (typhus) in Berlin

(founded in 1810)

Philosophy ought to be a science (hence Fichte had little in common with the Romantics);
philosophy ought to be a system of propositions where each proposition had a logical
order and these propositions are prioritized – i.e., having a fundamental proposition (on
risk that otherwise it would not be one science) and this proposition must be self-
evidently true. Evidently, this notion of science was inspired by mathematics (geometry)
as one science, and philosophy is the science of science: or the doctrine of knowledge
(Wissenschaftslehre). The question is what is the fundamental proposition?

Philosophy is called upon to clarify the ground (basis of) of all experience, and
experience (the contents of acts of consciousness) is of two kinds: (1) presentation
accompanied by feelings of freedom and (2) presentations accompanied by feelings of
necessity. Hence, the question is what is the ground of these two presentations of
consciousness? Since consciousness is always consciousness of an object (intelligence),
philosophy is called on to abstract from this relation of consciousness in order to isolate
intelligence-in-itself (S) and the thing-in-itself (O). Therefore in order to answer the
question what grounds these two presentations of consciousness we can (1) try to explain
experience in terms of the thing-in-itself (dogmatism, materialism, and determinism) or
(2) we can try to explain experience in terms of intelligence-in-itself (idealism). If we
choose the former, then the latter will eventually be considered an epiphenomenon (as is
evident in the new science and in our contemporary world, also of psychology).

Kant tried to find some compromise between these two options (idealism and
dogmatism/materialism), and he did by presupposing the thing-in-itself (which could not
be “known” but belonged to the noumenal world) but had to function as an apriori
condition of the possibility of phenomenal knowledge (i.e., in how it affected the mind).
However, Fichte is uncompromising and he held that our choice of either option is
dependent on “inclination and interest” (presumably of the philosopher, scientists, etc.).
That is, the choice is made on the basis of the kind of “man” (human being) one is (and
needless to say Fichte was the kind of man who favored idealism). On the other hand
neither system has yet been worked out completely and there is no principle on which to
choose one over the other.

Fichte held that the philosopher who is maturely aware of his freedom as revealed in
practical moral experience will always be inclined to idealism, while the philosopher less
mature in moral consciousness is inclined to dogmatism/materialism. Thus, the
“inclination and interest” is a question of the self and it was the self that was Fichte’s
highest interest. In other words, Fichte was convinced of the primacy of human beings’
practical free moral activity. In that sense he continues Kant’s insistence on the primacy
of the practical reason or the moral will (in Kant’s 2nd Critique), but Fichte insisted that
this position would have to follow the path of pure idealism. The reason is that Fichte
detected behind Kant’s thing-in-itself (which could not be known but was deemed to be
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noumenal) lurking the specter of Spinoza’s exaltation of nature (monism) and therefore
the disappearance of freedom. Hence, if we are to exorcise this lurking specter of
Spinoza we must reject Kant’s compromise (and his distinction between the phenomenal
and noumenal).

[Of course, one can detach Fichte’s focus on the philosopher’s inclination and interest by
understanding this choice and merely focus on “philosophy’s options” and this in fact
happened when in the late 19th c. Wilhelm Dilthey and later Karl Jaspers, considered
“inclination and interest” under the heading of (the psychology of) “world-views” but
world-view itself would then become an “object” for consideration of the same two
options.]

If we choose as Fichte did idealism, then the first principle of idealism must turn to the
question of what is intelligence-in-itself, or as Fichte would ask it, “what is the ego?”
Hence the origin of experience begins on the side of the ego – consciousness is derived
from the ego. But of course the idealist immediately finds that there is also a
natural/material world which affects us in various ways – always, we are contingent
beings. Hence, idealism must also account for this material world.

Before looking at this problem of the world, let me first ask “what is the ego such that it
can serve as the first principle of idealism? Obviously to answer this question we must
go behind the objectifiable (empirical) self (as a phenomenon of perception or as of
introspection to the pure ego. Fichte once said: “gentlemen think of the wall”, now
“think him who thinks the wall” (clearly we can proceed in this way in infinite fashion).
In other words, no matter how we try to objectify the self, it is always possible to ask
about the self that transcends the objectification of the self. Hence, the ego transcends
objectification and so the ego must be the condition of possibility of the unity of
consciousness (very Kantian). It is presumably the latter, pure consciousness,
deprived of its objectification, which is the first principle of philosophy of idealism.

Obviously if one were to ask Fichte but where is this pure ego Fichte would answer that
the pure ego cannot be found by asking “where is it?” since it is always a necessary
condition of possibility of our being able to ask this question or make the necessary
observations. But note that this reply also is also one that takes Fichte away from his own
methodological starting point in experience or in consciousness. Having repudiated
Kant’s view of theoretical knowledge (and bifurcation of the phenomenal and noumenal),
Fichte now seems to have fallen into the same trap.

But Fichte insists that is not so. For Fichte maintains that the pure ego (intelligence-in-
itself) has intellectual intuition about the world of experience (intellectual intuition is
something that Kant’s attributes solely to God – we cannot have intellectual intuition
about “reality”, hence the thing-in-itself cannot be known strictly speaking). However, it
is important to note also that for Fichte this intellectual intuition attributed to the pure ego
is not some mystical force/thing existing behind consciousness; rather, Fichte claims that
the ego is the activity of consciousness, and it is through intellectual intuition that I am
always conscious that my actions, all my activities, are mine. Consciousness is an activity
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aware of itself as activity and in this sense consciousness as activity is the foundation of
life (and, writes Fihcte, this principle is without death). In other words, anyone who is
conscious of an action as his own is aware of himself acting, and in this sense he has an
intuition of the self as activity. Fichte writes: if you are not convinced of this, then reflect
on your consciousness (there is no logical proof and there is no observation that will
convince you of its existence). Just reflect on your own consciousness and you will be
convinced that the ego is not a thing (being) but an activity. [Note how different this is
from the empiricists who held consciousness to be an accompaniment of passive
impressions/ideas.]

A word here is necessary about the meaning of “activity”. In psychology we think of

activity as “behavior” - this is obviously the result of psychology buying into scientific
materialism – but “activity” is much broader than this for Fichte. Activity includes
thinking, feeling, willing, acting as in conduct; in other words, it includes what we might
call “mental” and “physical” activity, doing, performing, behaving, believing, and
touching, etc. etc. Incidentally, that is also how Russian activity theory psychology (e.g.,
Vygotsky) thinks of activity; it is also how Marxist oriented thinkers, following Hegel,
think of activity.

It does not follow of course that in reflecting on consciousness I am reflective aware of

this intellectual intuition as a component element of consciousness. It is only the
philosopher who is reflectively aware of it and this for the simple reason that
transcendental reflection (in which reflection is directed at the pure ego) is a
philosophical act abstraction from ordinary conscious relations to objects in the world.
Hence, the philosopher who wishes to convince anyone or the reality of his intuition can
only draw attention to consciousness and invite others to reflect for themselves. One
cannot show another that intuition exists in a pure state unmixed with other functions for
it never exists that way. Nor can we convince others by some abstract proof. We can only
invite others to reflect on their own consciousness – better self-consciousness in that it is
directed towards the “subject” – to see that it includes an intuition of the pure ego, not a
thing, but an activity. That is, the power of intellectual intuition cannot be demonstrated
through concepts nor can it be developed through concepts - everyone must find it
immediately in him/herself, or else one will never know it.

Thus, the pure ego cannot be turned into an object for/of consciousness in the way say
that a desire can become objectified, say, as a “drive” (in psychology). In fact, it is absurd
to say that through introspection I can see a desire, an image, or a pure ego. The reason is
that every act of objectification already assumes/presupposes a pure ego, and for this
reason it can be called the transcendental or pure ego. But it does not follow from this
that the pure ego is an inferred occult entity, for it manifest itself in the activity of
objectification. When I say, for example, ‘I am walking”, I objectify my action in the
sense that I make it (my walking) an object for a subject (walking is what I am doing).
Now it is the pure ego (“I”) that reveals itself in reflection as engaged in this activity of
objectifying my activity of “walking”. Hence, consciousness or pure ego (intelligence) is
simple the activity of doing. For idealism, intelligence (ego) is activity and not a
(objectified) thing.
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Note that this position as first sight appears to contradict Kant’s claim that the
transcendental ego cannot be known but is simply a transcendental condition of the
possibility of the unity of consciousness and can neither be sensibly intuited (sensed) nor
proven. But Fichte disagrees and claims that his position is not contrary to Kant’s.
Fichte’s claims his position is the same as Kant’s namely that we cannot know the ego as
a thing (since we cannot know supersensible realities as Kant rightly noted) but then it
was not Fichte’s claim that we can know the ego as some entity, material or spiritual;
rather, his claim is that we know the pure ego as activity and we do this in reflection on
consciousness. In fact, Fichte claims that Kant should have seen this (given that Kant also
always begins in experience/consciousness) since obviously Kant spoke of practical
reason as having priority over theoretical reason; Kant spoke of the “moral imperative”,
and consciousness of the moral imperative involves the intellectual intuition of the pure
ego as activity. That is Fichte claims that Kant should have seen that the moral imperative
(of the 2nd C) is the pure ego’s activity in freedom; that is, it is only through the moral
law that I apprehend my-self; that is, I apprehend my-self in the pure ego’s activity of
freedom. [We once again see Fichte’s strong moral bend.]

We might remind ourselves that Hume whose assumption was that human beings were to
be investigated empirically (through sense impressions, i.e., the “new science”), and who
then quite naturally assumed that the ego or self was empirically nothing but a bundle of
perceptions, ignored that the all-important psychical phenomena precisely become
psychical phenomena (i.e., appearing to a subject) only through the objectifying activity
of the subject which, however, itself transcends such objectification. At the same time, it
should be obvious that it is not Fichte’s intent to reduce the world to a transcendental
ego, and the relation between the self as pure subject and the other aspects of the self is
also essential to a phenomenology of consciousness. In this regard Fichte clearly shows
insight which was totally lacking in Hume.

Fichte was also not just concerned with consciousness and its description (his
phenomenological method), he also aspires to formulate a system of idealist metaphysics
(what is real). This point is important, especially for all those who reject idealism because
Fichte’s talk about the transcendental ego as activity no more commits him to talk about
only one such ego than say an internist talking about the stomach commits him only to
the one such stomach (the one which he happens to be examining). Nevertheless, if we
propose to derive the whole sphere of nature and all selves insofar as they are to be
objects for a subject, from a transcendental (pure) ego, then we either (1) must embrace
solipsism or else (2) we have to interpret the transcendental ego (pure ego) as a super-
individual productive activity – or an supra-individual absolute ego.

Thus, when Fichte speaks about the ego he is not speaking about an individual finite self;
rather, in defending his Wissenschaftslehre, he is claiming that the ego is not the
individual ego but the one immediate spiritual “Life” which is the creator of all
phenomena including phenomenal individual selves. Note the transition here between
ego and “Life”. Starting from Kant’s position in experience and wanting to transform
Kant’s critical philosophy into idealism, Fichte naturally begins with the pure or absolute
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ego but he quickly saw that this Kantian absolute ego cannot be the finite self (subject),
and hence ego became Life as infinite activity, and this shift from absolute ego to Life is
Fichte’s metaphysics of idealism.

We see that Fichte presents us with both (1) a phenomenology of consciousness; and (2)
the metaphysics of idealism. In a way one can separate these two endeavors. Thus, we
can embrace Fichte phenomenology of consciousness (of the ego) without having to
embrace his metaphysical idealism (absolute ego). Although it would be difficult, to say
the least, to combine a phenomenology of consciousness with a materialist
metaphysics…..

Now by itself the ego whatever else it may be is not yet a fundamental principle of
philosophy. We therefore must distinguish between the spontaneous activity of the pure
ego and the philosopher’s reconstruction of this activity. Thus, importantly, the
spontaneously activity of the pure ego in grounding consciousness does not exists for
itself. Rather the pure ego comes to exist only in the transcendental intuition (reflection)
of the philosopher. That is, it is only in reflection (“activity directed towards an activity”)
that the ego comes to be originally for-itself. In intellectual intuition the pure ego may be
said to posit itself, and hence, the first fundamental proposition of philosophy is that in
philosophical reflection: (1) the ego simply posits in an original way its own being.
This assertion is not open to logical proof; rather, in the activity of affirming itself it
exists. To posit and to exists (to be) are the same.

So that while ordinarily we are aware of ourselves only in relation to the world, in
reflecting on ordinary consciousness wherein we are always as selves opposed to what is
not ourselves (world), we not only affirm to pure ego but we also affirm the non-ego (i.e.,
other than ego, or the world). This is the second proposition of philosophy then: (2) the
non-ego is simply opposed to the ego. This opposition is of course done by the ego
(subjectivity) itself otherwise we would have to abandon idealism.

The non-ego is infinite (unlimited) in the sense that objectivity is objectivity in general
and not some particular other object. Thus, this infinite non-ego is opposed to the ego
within the ego – and the reason is that Fichte is trying to reconstruct consciousness and
consciousness comprises both ego and non-ego. Hence, the unlimited activity of the
absolute go must posit the non-ego within itself. But if both ego and non-ego are
unlimited (infinite) each will try to fill all reality to the exclusion of the other (they will
try to annihilate the other and consciousness will be impossible). Therefore if
consciousness is to arise there must be some reciprocal limitation of ego and non-ego.
That is each must cancel each other out but only in part. In this sense both the ego and
non-ego must be divisible. Hence, the third proposition in philosophy is (3) “I posit in
the ego a divisible non-ego opposed to the divisible ego”. Thus, there can be no
consciousness unless the absolute ego considered as unlimited activity produces within
itself the finite ego and the finite non-ego each reciprocally limiting and determining each
other (a plurality of selves and a plurality of non-selves).
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Now if we mean by consciousness, above, human individual consciousness, the assertion

that the non-ego is a necessary condition of consciousness is not difficult to understand.
To be sure the finite ego can reflect on itself, but this reflection is possible only by
bending the ego back from the non-self and hence the non-ego is a necessary condition of
consciousness. But of course we may very well ask why there should be consciousness?
Or how can we deduce the second proposition from the first?

Since there is no pure theoretical deduction for Fichte (as there was for Kant wherein he
accounts for knowledge of the phenomenal world), we must have recourse to practical
consciousness (deduction). That is, we must see the pure or absolute ego as an unlimited
activity striving towards consciousness of its own freedom through moral self-
realization. And what is necessary to attain this end is that the non-ego be posited. Of
course, the absolute ego in its spontaneous activity does not consciously act for any end
at all, but the philosopher in reflecting on (consciously re-thinking) this activity sees the
total movement as directed toward a certain goal. That is, he sees that self-consciousness
demands the non-ego from which the ego can recoil onto itself. The philosopher also sees
that moral activity requires an objective field (world) in which moral actions can be
performed.

So we see that the first and second proposition stand in relation of thesis to antithesis and
this gives rise to their synthesis in the third proposition. As we have seen, the ego and
non-ego tend to cancel each other out if both are unlimited. If consciousness is to arise at
all, the activity that grounds this consciousness must produce a situation in which the ego
and non-ego can limit each other. Therefore, from one perspective, this dialectic of thesis,
antithesis, and synthesis takes the form of the progressive determination of the meaning
of the initial propositions, and the contradiction which arise between proposition one and
two are resolved, in that they are shown to be only apparent. For example, the claim that
the ego posits itself as infinite and that it posits itself as finite would be contradictory if it
were posited as both infinite and finite in one and the same sense. But as Fichte points out
the contradiction is resolved when we realize that the infinite activity expresses itself in
and through finite selves.

Yet as Hegel points out Fichte’s philosophy is insufficiently speculative (rational) and it
does not allow for strict theoretical deduction (e.g., Fichte introduces ideas which cannot
simply be obtained through and analysis of the initial proposition. Thus, to proceed from
the second to the third proposition Fichte postulates a limiting activity on the part of the
ego but such an idea of “limitation” cannot be obtained simply from an analysis of the
first and second proposition. Hence, Hegel accuses Fichte of introducing, like a deus ex
machine, activities of the ego that allow for the deduction of one proposition to another.

(1) The ego posits in an original way its own being (A=A, principle of identity)
(2) The non-ego is simply opposed to the ego (Not -A not = A, positing Not -A
presupposes positing A and is thus opposed to A)
(3) I posit in the ego a divisible non-ego opposed to a divisible ego (A in part = -A
and conversely)
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Obviously, Fichte procedure does not square well with his claim that natural philosophy
is a deductive science. Yet we should remember that the philosopher is engaged in
consciously reconstructing the active process of grounding consciousness to be a process
which takes place unconsciously (i.e., we have no awareness of it). In doing so the
philosopher has as his point of departure the self-positing of the absolute ego, and his
point of arrival is human consciousness as we know it empirically. If his requires that the
ego has to be given a certain mode of functioning, so be it. Thus even if the concept of
limitation is not obtained through strict logical analysis of the first two propositions, this
concept of limit is required simply to clarify their meaning. In this sense, Fichte
maintains that logic is dependent on Wissenschaftslehre.

Now it is the idea of reciprocal limitation (of ego and non-ego) that is the basis for the
two-fold deduction of consciousness that Fichte deems necessary. For consider the claim
that the absolute ego posits within itself the finite ego and the finite non-ego as
reciprocally limiting one another. This implies (1) that the absolute ego posits itself as
limited by the non-ego, and (2) that the absolute posits within itself the non-ego as
limited (determined) by the finite ego. These two implications are the basic claims of
theoretical and practical deduction of consciousness. Thus, if we consider the ego as
affected by the non-ego we have the theoretical deduction of consciousness which Fichte
calls the “real” acts (determined by the non-ego, e.g., sensation) but if we consider the
ego as affecting the non-ego, we proceed with the practical deduction of consciousness
which Fichte calls the “ideal” acts e.g., desire, free action). Of course these two
deductions of consciousness are complementary, together comprising the reconstruction
(deduction) of consciousness. At the same time the practical ideal deduction is primary
since, presumably the absolute ego is an infinite striving towards self-realization through
free moral activity, and the non-ego (nature/world) is its means (or, instrument) for doing
so (i.e., attaining this self-realization). It is therefore the practical deduction which gives
us the reason why the absolute ego posits the non-ego as limiting and affecting the finite
ego - and this leads us to ethics (which is Fichte’s philosophy, namely “ethical idealism”).

In Fichte’s metaphysical idealism all activity is that of the absolute ego and the non-ego
exists only for consciousness. Let’s be clear about this. The idea that the non-ego exists
independently of all consciousness (a reality out there in the sense of “scientific
materialism”) would simply reintroduce Kant’s thing-in-itself and hence it would be to
abandon idealism. Yet from the perspective of ordinary consciousness there is a
distinction between presentation (Vorstellung) and thing (i.e., we do have the immediate
sense that there is a world independently of me). Hence, Fichte must show how this
ordinary consciousness (about an independent world/nature) comes to be (since idealism
claims to explain - and not deny - the facts of consciousness on idealist principles).

Obviously, Fichte must demonstrate this without falling into the solipsism of Berkeley
how the non-ego finds its origin in the ego – that is, the absolute ego, and the absolute
ego must posit the non-ego in a way that is not detectable by consciousness. That is,
when we are ordinarily conscious of the world, the work of the absolute ego must already
have been accomplished as it takes place below the level of consciousness (otherwise we
could not explain that nature appears to exist independently of ourselves, namely as
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simply “given” or “out there”). As we have seen, it is only in philosophical

(transcendental) reflection that we can retrace the productive activity of the absolute ego.
Now Fichte claims that transcendental intellectual reflection relies on the power of the
imagination (which Kant restricted to unifying sensibility and understanding to yield
theoretical knowledge). But for Fichte the productive power of the imagination is all
important for grounding empirical consciousness. It is the activity of the absolute ego
itself.

In what he calls the pragmatic history of consciousness, Fichte pictures the ego as
spontaneously limiting its activity (and making itself passive) in being affected by
sensation. But then the ego re-asserts itself and objectifies sensation by referring
sensation to that which is other than itself (world, non-ego). Thus, we have a distinction
between representation (image) and thing. In empirical ordinary consciousness the finite
self regards this distinction between image and thing as the distinction between
subjective and objective and that is because ordinary consciousness is ignorant of the
work of “projection” – which is the work of the productive imagination operating below
the level of consciousness to posit an independent world.

Obviously consciousness requires more than an indeterminate non-ego it actually requires

particular things/objects. But to have distinct objects there must be a sphere of objects
(space) which is also the power of the imagination. Similarly, there must be an
irreversible time series such that successive acts of intuition are possible and this too is
the productive work of the imagination. Hence, both space and time are the spontaneous
activity of the absolute ego. Moreover, empirical consciousness requires that objects in
space and time be rendered even more determinate –and this is accomplished by the
powers of judgment and understanding. The understanding fixes presentations of
objects as concepts while the power of judgment turns these concepts into extended
thoughts. “If we have no concepts we can have no judgments and if we have no
judgments we have no understanding.”

Note that if we remain at the concrete level of presentations (perception) we can have no
abstraction and hence no understanding or judgment. However, here in the pragmatic
history of consciousness we find the ego rising “above” the unconscious activity of the
productive imagination in acquiring a certain freedom. Freedom relies on
conceptualization and judgment.

However, self-consciousness requires more than the power to abstract (distance itself)
from particular object in favor of the universal. It presupposes the power to abstract from
the object in general in order to achieve reflection on the subject. This power of absolute
abstraction is what Fichte calls Reason (Vernunft). When reason abstracts from the
sphere of the non-ego (the world) the ego remains, and we attain self-consciousness. Yet
we can never have perfect self-consciousness (self-transparency) (i.e., we can never
abstract fully from the non-ego or world); it is ever only an approximation. The more I
can think myself (as object) away, the closer my empirical self-consciousness
approximates pure self-consciousness. It is precisely the power of reason which enables
the philosopher to apprehend the pure ego and to retrace in transcendental reflection its
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productive activity in the movement towards self-consciousness. But as I noted above the
intellectual intuition of the absolute ego is never unmixed with other elements and, hence,
not even the philosopher can achieve the ideal of pure self-consciousness.

In summary, the practical deduction of consciousness goes behind the work of the
productive imagination and reveals its grounding in the absolute ego’s as infinite striving.
To say “striving” here assumes that it strives towards something (presupposing the
existence of a non-ego or world). But if we now start with the absolute ego as infinite
striving then we need not presuppose the existence of a non-ego (on risk that otherwise
we return to Kant’s thing-in-itself). Nevertheless, striving commands a counter-
movement since otherwise all striving would stop; hence, by its very nature the absolute
ego must posit a non-ego (productive imagination) in its “real” activity. Or, we can say
that the absolute ego is conceived as activity which is infinite striving in overcoming the
non-ego (nature/world). Hence, the absolute ego must posit the non-ego as necessary
(Nature is necessary) to the absolute ego’s own self-realization – or we can say that
nature becomes the field for absolute ego’s activity.

Fichte takes this striving (impulse/drive/Trieb) by the absolute ego in the empirical ego as
a form of feeling of constraint. Hence for ordinary consciousness, it is feeling that is
fundamental to the belief in reality. Feeling and hindrance go together – this is our sense
of the “real”. Here Fichte maintains that feeling is already an elementary form of
reflection – the ego is itself the impulse which is felt – feeling is always self-feeling. In
the progression of the practical deduction, we see this feeling (striving or impulse)
becoming more determinate in form as distinct impulses, drives, or desires. But because
the ego is infinite striving it can never remain satisfied with the satisfaction of any
desire/interest/hope/aspiration – that is, can never be satisfied (by finding satisfaction for
any of its desires, instincts, wants, needs) in its ideal goal through its free activity. Even
so this goal always recedes and must do so if the ego is infinite and endlessly striving. In
the end then we have action for the sake of action (endless restlessness).

However, in his ethical theory, Fichte suggests that this striving approximates its goal in
the moral vocation of human beings in freedom and self-consciousness. Regrettably this
process of the practical deduction of consciousness is notoriously difficult to follow in
Fichte, and it is enough to note that the absolute ego is from the beginning a moral ego
and it is this moral ego which takes precedence over the theoretical deduction of
consciousness (world). Moral consciousness (philosophy) while complementary to
theoretical consciousness nevertheless takes precedence over epistemology, science, or
theoretical knowledge.

I should note that this claim that the absolute ego as activity is a moral ego is not as
arbitrary as it first appears. Consider that in ordinary consciousness activity is always
activity which is inter-personal (all that we do/think is always related to other people).
This is what is so problematic about called activity “behavior” (or “cognition”) as both
these words imply complete moral/ethical neutrality; these words also imply that
behavior or cognition are function of individual “organisms”. But as we have seen for
Fichte the absolute ego is not individual but supra-individual or absolute ego and, as
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such, that is as endless striving or activity it embraces all finite individuals. In other
words, in Fichte’s idealism individuals are never mere individual “organisms” but
conscious and self-conscious selves whose freedom and activity (in relation to other
selves) is grounded in the absolute ego. Consciousness is then always moral
consciousness and all individual activity is embedded or situated in this moral conception
of free activity. On this view psychology is not only necessarily “social” (meaning
“historical”) but is it necessarily moral, meaning that it is “normative” (not morally or
ethically neutral) but always cognizant of its relationship to others and the world. In this
sense Fichte speaks of Life as a moral “vocation” (see below).

We can also say that Fichte in giving priority to practical deduction of consciousness
overcomes, or tries to, Kant’s distinction between human beings lower nature
(inclinations/instincts/drives) and higher nature (moral ethics). For Fichte it is the self-
same striving that grounds both inclination (desire) and morality. In fact, Fichte sees the
categorical imperative (Reason) as prefiguring in desire/longing (even as he recognizes
that there may be conflict between instinct/desire and duty/obligation) – cf. Plato and
contra Freud - and he does so by appeal to the unified view of the absolute ego’s activity.

From the perspective of the phenomenology of consciousness, Fichte deductions of

consciousness might appear simply as stages in arriving at the conditions of
consciousness as we know it (his method of phenomenology then becomes an archeology
of consciousness). If we see it that way then the question of temporal or historical
relations between the different conditions are irrelevant. For example, Fichte takes the
subject-object relation as essential to consciousness, and if this is so then there must be
both subject and object, both ego and non-ego at least if there is to be consciousness, and
the historical conditions then appear irrelevant.

But as we have seen the deductions of consciousness is also idealist metaphysics, and the
pure ego has to be understood as the supra-individual ego, and as transfinite activity, and
we can ask Fichte does the absolute ego first posits the sensible world and only afterward
(or simultaneously) the finite ego? At first sight this may appear a silly question if the
historical viewpoint is presupposed in the constitution of the empirical consciousness.
Hence, the transcendental deduction of empirical consciousness necessarily transcends
the historical order since after all time is itself deduced. Fichte has no intention of
denying empirical consciousness in which nature precedes the finite self; rather, he is
concerned to find the grounds for this empirical consciousness.

Bu the matter is not quite so simple. For Kant it was the human mind’s activity that by
way of the apriori forms constituted the phenomenal world. True for Kant this activity of
the transcendental ego worked unconsciously and it acts “as if” and therefore was not any
particular (individual) mind (simply reason giving itself conditions of possibility). If we
now, as Fichte does, eliminate the thing-in-itself and we hypothesize the transcendental
ego as the absolute ego, it is quite natural to ask whether the absolute ego posits nature
immediately or mediately through the infra-conscious levels of human beings. Obviously,
if mediately then the ego determines the non-ego and hence must be independent of it but
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as we have seen the ego needs the non-ego to become conscious and this leads to a
contradiction.

Fichte resolves this contradiction in his claim that the absolute ego immediately
posits/determines the non-ego whereas it posits/determines the finite ego mediately by
way of the non-ego. In other words, the absolute ego does not posit the world through the
finite ego (many egos) but rather does so immediately. Fichte confirms this when he
writes that the material world is deduced as an absolute limitation of the productive
power of the imagination – that is as a self-manifestation of the one Life.

Now this position demands that Fichte move away from Kant’s point of departure and
that the pure ego, arrived at through human conscious reflection, should become an
absolute Being which manifests itself in the world. The latter is Fichte’s claim but
obviously in order to get there (at this position of metaphysical idealism) he never quite
succeeds in kicking away the (methodological) ladder he climbed to get there. That is,
while he maintains that the absolute posits the World as a filed of moral activity, he also
maintains that the world exists only in and for consciousness. For although consciousness
is said to be Absolute’s consciousness, the Absolute is also said to be conscious only
through finite egos and that it cannot be considered apart from human beings.

Upshot: reflection on consciousness (phenomenology of consciousness) leads to the

absolute (metaphysical idealism) even as the absolute is itself a deduction from
consciousness (phenomenology). Fichte is caught in trying to bridge between
consciousness and matter/nature.
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Fichte’s moral theory

We can have knowledge of our moral nature (subjection to the moral imperative) in two
ways: (1) at the level of common (ordinary) moral consciousness (conscience) and this
immediate knowledge is quite sufficient for knowing one’s duties and moral behavior; (2)
we can assume ordinary common moral consciousness as something “given” and then
inquire into its grounds or bases. A systematic deduction of moral consciousness from its
roots in the ego is the science of ethics and provides “learned knowledge”. The latter does
not give us a moral nature or new morals rather it enables to understand our ordinary
common morality as given in conscience.

What is meant by human being’s moral nature? It is our natural impulsion to act for the
sake of acting or not to act for the sake of not acting. As I noted above, in case of human
beings this “striving” (the ego’s activity) or impulsion is necessarily “moral or ethical” in
nature. To understand the grounds of our moral nature is the task of ethics. As we have
seen the ego is striving (infra-conscious) and from the point of view of human beings this
striving is to ascribe to the system as a whole self-preservation (and as such people are an
organized product of nature). Hence in reflecting on myself I can say that I am (posit
myself as an object) an organized product of nature (impulses/strivings).

But of course, I am also intelligence, a subject of consciousness and as such the ego is
necessarily intent on determining itself through itself alone (in freedom and
independence). Hence, we have an organized system of impulses derivative from nature
and, in opposition, we have the subject or the spiritual impulse of ego as intelligence (as
completely self-determining). We have here lower (necessity) and higher (freedom)
spheres and hence we have a dichotomy within human nature. Hence we can look on
“man” from two points of view – and to this extent Kant’s distinction between
phenomenal and noumenal is justified. Yet Fichte maintains that this distinction is not
ultimate – thus natural impulses aiming at satisfaction and spiritual impulses aiming at
freedom are from a transcendental viewpoint one impulse. Thus, it is a great mistake to
suppose that man as an organized product of nature is in the sphere of mechanism alone.
It is the organism that strives – and this same striving leads me to satisfy my instincts and
it leads me to reach out to infinity. Of course, the latter is only possible because of
consciousness – and so consciousness becomes the dividing line between man as product
of nature and man as rational ego, as spirit. Yet philosophical reflection sees only one
impulse – man is both subject and object at once. If I regard myself solely as object
whether determined through sense perception or through cognition then what is one
impulse suddenly becomes a natural impulse since I view myself from the perspective of
nature. If I regard myself solely as subject, the impulse becomes spiritual and self-
determining. But the ego is always both these in reciprocity – one and the same impulse
in relation to itself.

Now this oneness (unity of self) has important implications for ethics. Thus, Fichte
maintains we can distinguish between formal and material freedom. Formal freedom
only requires the presence of consciousness. Even if we always followed our natural
impulses directed at pleasure (satisfaction) we do so freely when we are conscious and
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deliberately pursued the satisfaction of these impulses. In contrast, material freedom is

expressed in a series of acts that tend toward the realization of the ego’s complete
independence – and these are moral acts. Note that we have here a distinction between (1)
natural acts that are rendered determinate by reference to a particular object (even if we
are freely conscious of them), and (2) acts which exclude all determination by particular
objects and performed solely in accordance with freedom. The question is “How to bring
these two together?”

Obviously we cannot stop acting from natural impulse (e.g., eating/drinking/sexuality)

but what Fichte demands is that we not act simply for immediate satisfaction. Rather our
acting for the sake of impulses should be such that these acts are members of a series of
converging acts towards an ideal end which we set before ourselves as a spiritual subject
– in realizing our moral nature. But this resolution suggests that we substitute spiritual
ideals for natural pleasures (which may be at variance with Fichte’s picture of morality as
demanding action for action sake or non-action for non-action sake); at any rate, the
spiritual ideal is for Fichte self-activity (action determined by the ego alone). Such action
must take the form of determinate action in the world which at the same time must be
determined by the ego itself and hence express freedom rather than subjection to the
world. This means that action should be performed for the sake of performing them (and
not pleasure or any other satisfaction).

We see here that Fichte makes a resolute attempt to exhibit the unity of human nature and
to show that there is continuity between man as natural animal and man as spiritual
subject of consciousness. Yet it also shows continuity with Kant in making morality the
supreme principle.

The essential character of the ego (by which it is distinguished from everything external
to it) consist in the tendency to self-activity for the sake of self-activity and it is this
tendency which the ego thinks when the thinks in and for itself (without relation to
anything outside of it) and then it thinks itself as free and self-determined. But the ego
cannot think itself in this way without conceiving of itself as subject to law: the law
according to which it thinks itself in accordance with the concept of self-determination.
Thus, if I conceive my objective essence as the power of self-determination, the power to
realize absolute self-activity, I must also conceive myself as obliged to actualize this
essence of self-determination. We therefore have two sides of freedom and law.

But just as the ego as subject and the ego as object are distinguishable in consciousness
and yet inseparable and ultimately one, so the ideas of freedom and of law are inseparable
and ultimately one. When you think of yourself as free, you are compelled to think of
your freedom as freedom as falling under law, and when you think this law, you are
compelled to think of yourself as free. Freedom no more follows from law than law
follows from freedom. They are two ideas which must be thought together, as dependent
on each other, yet they are one and the same; they are a complete synthesis.

It is by way of this tortuous route that Fichte deduces some fundamental principle of
morality. The free human being ought to bring his freedom under law, namely the law of
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complete self-determination (absence of external determination of the object). This law

should not admit of exceptions because it expresses the very nature of freedom. But the
rational being cannot ascribe freedom to itself without conceiving the possibility of a
series of determinate free actions caused by the will which is capable of exercising free
causal activity. But the realization of this possibility demands an objective world in which
a rational being can strive towards a goal through a series of particular actions. The
natural world can therefore be regarded as the material or instrument for the fulfillment of
duty, sensible things appearing as so many occasions for pure ought. Since we have
already seen that for Fichte the absolute ego posits the world as an obstacle which renders
possible the recoil of the ego onto itself in self-consciousness, we now see this posited
world in an ethical context. The world or non-ego is the necessary condition of a rational
being’s fulfillment of its moral vocation – without the world there can be no content of
free moral action.

However to be a moral action each of these actions must fulfill certain formal conditions:
act according to your best conviction of duty, or act according to your conscience. The
will which acts according to conscience is the good will (this is Kant’s influence). It is
clear that Fichte wants to find an absolute criterion of right and wrong. He also like Kant
wants to avoid heteronomy. Hence no external authority can fulfill this criterion.
Furthermore this criterion must be available to all (whether the person is learned or not).
Fichte therefore focuses on conscience and describes this as immediate feeling –
practical power does not judge and hence conscience must be feeling.

Of course, Fichte’s appeal to conscience is how ordinarily we act morally. I feel this is
the right thing to do, yet feeling is hardly unerring. Yet Fichte claims that it is feeling that
harmonizes empirical and pure ego and it is the latter which is true and hence feeling is
not erroneous or deceptive.

This does not mean that theoretical thought is excluded from morality. The ego’s
fundamental tendency to complete freedom and independence stimulates thought to look
for determinate content of duty. After all, we can and do reflect about what we ought to
do in particular circumstances. But of course any theoretical judgment we do make can
be mistaken. Hence, Fichte argument is intended to attend to different circumstances such
that we can attune the empirical ego to the pure ego. This attunement expresses itself in
feeling – immediate consciousness of one’s duty. This immediate consciousness of one’s
duty immediate stops theoretical reflection which would otherwise be prolonged
indefinitely….thinking does not lead to action, feeling does.

Fichte rejects the possibility that anyone whose immediate consciousness of duty can also
resolve not to do his duty. This would be self-contradictory and yet at the same time no
finite being is confirmed in the good. Conscience cannot err but it can be obscured (i.e., I
may not give my empirical ego a chance to click with the pure ego), or vanish (I may act
in accord with my own advantage or blind impulse to assert our lawless will).

According to Fichte then the ordinary person if he chooses has available an infallible
criterion for assessing his duties (namely, conscience) which does not depend on
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knowledge of the science of ethics). But of course the philosopher can inquire into the
grounds or bases of conscience and Fichte offers a metaphysical explanation as we have
seen.

Conscience is thus the supreme judge in practical moral life. But the dictates of
conscience are not arbitrary and the reason is that our feeling is the expression of our
implicit awareness that a particular action falls inside or outside a series of actions which
fulfills the fundamental impulse of the pure ego. Therefore the philosopher ought to be
able to show that theoretically any action belongs or not to the class of actions that leads
to the ego’s moral goal. Thus while he cannot deduce the particular obligation for a
particular individual which is always a matter of conscience, a philosophical application
of the fundamental principle is possible within the general principles or rules.

For example, I am under obligation to act for only through action can I fulfill the moral
law. And the body is the necessary instrument for action. Therefore, on the one hand, I
ought to treat my body as if it were itself a final end, on the other hand, I ought to
preserve and foster the body as a necessary instrument for action. Thus, self-mutilation or
suicide would be wrong. However whether this particular act of self-mutilation is wrong
is a matter of conscience/feeling.

Similarly I can formulate general rules in regard to the use of cognitive powers. We need
to bring together complete freedom of thought and research in the conviction that
“knowledge of my duty must be the final end of all my knowledge, all my thought, and
all my research”. The synthesizing rule is that the researcher/scholar should pursue his
researches in a spirit of devotion to duty and not merely out of curiosity (or some other
satisfaction such as power, fame, or money).

The philosopher therefore can lay down certain general rules of conduct as applications
of the fundamental principle of morality. But an individual’s moral vocation is made up
of countless obligations in regard to which only conscience is the unerring guide. Thus
each individual has his/her own real moral vocation, and his/her own personal
contribution to make to converging series of actions which tend to realize a moral world
order - which is the perfect rule of reason in the world. The attainment of this ideal goal
requires as it were a division of moral labor and, hence we can state the fundamental
principle of morality as “always fulfill your moral vocation”.

We can now say what Fichte’s vision of reality is. From our (human) point of view,
ultimate reality is the absolute ego or the infinite Will which strives spontaneously
towards perfect consciousness of itself as free, towards perfect self-possession
(transparency). As we have seen in Fichte’s view, self-consciousness must take the
form of infinite self-consciousness, and the infinite Will’s self-realization can occur
only through the self-realization of finite wills (human beings). Hence, infinite
activity spontaneously expresses itself in a multiplicity of finite selves or rational, free
human beings. As we have also seen, self-consciousness is not possible without a non-
ego from which the ego can recoil (draw back) onto itself. Moreover, the realization
of the finite free will through action requires a world in and through which action is
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possible. Hence the absolute ego or infinite Will must posit a world, Nature, if the
infinite Will is to become conscious of its own freedom through finite selves. The
moral vocations of finite selves are a common goal and hence can be seen as the way
in which the absolute ego or infinite Will moves towards its goal. Nature is then
simply a condition, though a necessary condition, for the expression of the moral
will. What is the really significant feature in the empirical world is the moral activity
of human being (finite selves) which is itself the expression of the infinite Will as an
activity of doing (not being), which acts spontaneously and necessarily.
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