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CONTRACT farming (CF) is central to the ‘linking farmers with
markets’ policy thrust in developing world agriculture/agribusiness as it
brings private corporate agribusiness entities in direct contact with the
primary producers. In simple terms, CF is a system for production and
supply of agricultural products by farmers to a buyer under advance
contracts. There is a commitment by the farmer to produce and provide
the specified commodity, at a specified time and location, price, and in
specified quantity to a known committed buyer. The contracts could be
only procurement agreements, input supply and purchase contracts or
could control the entire production process on the farm. But, the exact
nature of CF varies depending on the nature and type of contracting
agency, technology, nature of crop/produce, and the local/national
context. Also, different types of production contracts allocate
production and market risks differently between the producer and the
buyer.
The government has been promoting CF at various levels (Union and
state) with recent policy changes (amendment of the Agricultural
Produce Marketing Committee – APMC – Act) and fiscal incentives.
But, it is known from experience elsewhere that CF has implications
for larger developmental goals like equity, environment, gender, and
labour, both positive and negative, depending on the context.
CF gives access to additional sources of capital (credit), and a more
certain price to farmers by shifting a part of the risk of adverse price
movement to the buyer. Farmers also get access to new technology and
inputs. In fact, CF is seen as an institutional innovation for agricultural
development. For agribusiness, CF is also an alternative to corporate
farming which may be costly, risky, nonavailable, difficult to manage,
and not viable in competitive markets. Contract farming lowers
transaction costs for the farmers as well as the buyers as many of the
transactions are internalized.
inclusion is rather an exception. The factors which result in CF
excluding small producers are: enforcement of contracts, high
transaction costs, quality standards, business attitudes and ethics like
non/delayed/reduced payment and high rate of product rejection, and
weak bargaining power of the small growers. On the other hand, the
organizers of CF find it costly to work with them due to their scattered
location and smaller volumes.
Contract farming has various models/variants being practiced in India
at present like bipartite model, tripartite model involving a bank or a
facilitator or a subcontractor, quadpartite model involving bank,
processor, CF organizer, and the farmer and even a multipartite model
involving franchisees besides the above said players. Various studies
have shown that contract production of tomato gave much higher gross
returns compared with that from the traditional crops of wheat, paddy
and potato in Punjab as well as net higher returns compared with those
under noncontract situations. The cases of cucumber CF in Andhra
Pradesh and cotton CF in Tamil Nadu were similar. This was due to
higher yield and assured price under contracts. However, the cost of
production is generally higher under the contract system.
A study on poultry CF revealed that the cost of production of contract
growers was higher and the net income of contract growers not much
different from that of noncontract growers because processors chose
only those contract growers whose skills, experience and access to
credit were relatively poor and the processors captured most of the
surplus from contract production. The contracting agencies also
manipulated provisions of the contracts in practice like picking up birds
before due date or delaying it which meant losses for contract growers.
But, growers were locked into these contracts due to the buyer specific
fixed investments they had made.
Across crops and regions, studies have shown that most firms worked
with large and medium farmers with the exception of firms in
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh where small and marginal
farmers were also included due the nature of the crops
(cucumber/gherkin, and broiler chicken). Even a state sponsored
cooperative (Markfed) in Punjab did not entertain farmers who could
not spare at least three acres for its basmati paddy CF programme. In
mint CF in Punjab, contract farmers were found to own holdings
ranging from 5 to 30 acres with the average being over 17 acres and
operated land holding, including leased in land, around 57 acres. This
bias in favour of large/medium farmers is perpetuating the practice of
reverse tenancy in regions like Punjab where these farmers lease in land
from marginal and small farmers for contract production.
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Breach of contracts by farmers as well as firms has also been reported.
Even the state sponsored programme of CF did not deliver in Punjab.
Further, most of the contracts protected company interest passing all
costs to the farmer and did not cover farmer’s production risk, e.g. crop
failure, and generally offered open market price based contract prices.
Even organic produce buyers offered conventional produce market
price based prices to their growers. This is a serious issue as even a
significant premium over market price may not help a farmer if open
market prices go down significantly, which is not uncommon in India.
CF can also hurt the interests of nonCF growers as it can result in
lower buyer competition in spot markets for a (contract) crop where
noncontract growers sell.
By determining the crop to be grown and the husbandry practices, the
contracting agency influences the impact CF will have on the
environment. The environmental implications of CF include depletion
of soil quality, exploitation of groundwater, salination of soils, decline
in soil fertility, pollution of soil and water due to excessive use of
chemical inputs and their impact on environment, humans and animals.
CF tends to aggravate the environmental crisis as contracts are short
term and the firms tend to move on to new growers/lands after
exhausting the natural potential of the local resources, particularly land
and water. In Punjab, the contract farmers were practicing more
intensive agriculture than the noncontract farmers and were growing
basmati and maize (new crops promoted under CF for diversification)
more water intensively than that by noncontract farmers across all
crops. The contracting agencies do not pay any heed as such cost
effects are externalised for them.
However, it is not that CF always leads to negative impacts on the
local resource base. A Canadian MNC subsidiary into potato CF with
growers in Gujarat made it compulsory for the contract growers to go
in for micro irrigation, given the low groundwater table in the area.
This condition about microirrigation was not even mentioned in the
contract, but all the contract farmers had sprinkler systems. Most of the
organic production takes place under CF and promotes more
ecofriendly and sustainable practices. What comes out from the above
analysis is that environmental concerns are increasingly dictated by
market demand, e.g. in the case of chemical residues or organic
practices.
But, markets may not signal the importance of ecological concerns in
all situations and at all times due to various imperfections in the market
and externalities in the presence of weak monitoring. For example, in
Kenya, soil erosion was not attended to by the contracting agencies as
that was not reflected in the product quality and was an externality of
contract production. Similarly, price premiums for environment
friendly food may not encourage genuineness due to incentive to cheat
and mislabel because of information asymmetry. Therefore, it is
important to proactively provide mechanisms in CF policies to ensure
environmental compliance. This can be done by way of land use
planning based on soil depth, soil quality, land slope, land use pattern
and water availability.
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Though it may not be possible to police contracts, but the
state/government can still play both a regulatory and an
enabling/developmental role in CF. Legal protection to contract
growers as a group must be considered to protect them from the ill
effects of CF. There are cases of legal protection given to
subcontracting industries in Japan in their relations with large firms and
in some provinces of the USA for contract growers. If CF is nothing
but a flexible production system prevalent in industry applied to farm
production, then it is only logical to extend such legal provisions with
necessary modifications to CF.
The model CF agreement under the amended APMC Act leaves out
many aspects of farmer interest protection like delayed payments and
deliveries, contract cancellation damages if producer made buyer
specific heavy investments, inducement/force/intimidation to enter a
contract, disclosure of material risks, competitive performance based
payments, and sharing production risks, though it provides the producer
asset indemnity in case of default by contract grower.
The amended Companies Act in India provides for registering producer
companies since 2003 and many such companies have already been set
up. Contracting agencies should encourage such initiatives. Giving
farmers equity shares can make them feel that they are a part of the
arrangement and realise that failing the firm would be failing
themselves. In fact, in Karnataka, a public limited sugar company had
mobilized 30 per cent of its equity from more than 9,000 sugarcane
contract growers as its shareholders. Earning the farmer’s trust is
fundamental to success. This comes from mutuality of benefits.
Finally, there is no need to look for permanence in CF, though short or
medium term sustainability is desirable to ensure its beneficial effects
on growers and local economy. CF is only an instrument/means to
agricultural development, not an end in itself. CF can wither away as a
commodity market becomes efficient because it is only a response to a
situation of market failure and depends on commodity/crop/sector
dynamics which are liable to change, especially in a globalized and
liberalized world. But, there are many indications that CF can continue
even in the presence of competitive markets as in the developed
countries or even developing countries like Thailand.
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