G.R. No.
L-58494 July 5, 1989 (b) Petitioner is estopped from assailing the Labor
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY-ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,  terminate Ellelina's services; and
vs.
HON. VICENTE T. LEOGARDO, DEPUTY MINISTER
OF LABOR AND VICENTE D. ELLELINA, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Through this Petition for Certiorari, Philippine National Oil
Company-Energy Development Corporation (PNOC-
EDC) seeks to declare null and void, for lack of
jurisdiction, the Order of public respondent, the Deputy
Minister of Labor, sustaining his jurisdiction over the
instant controversy.
Petitioner PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of the Philippine
National Oil Company (PNOC). On 20 January 1978, it
filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment,
Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City (MOLE), a clearance
application to dismiss/ terminate the services of private
respondent, Vicente D. Ellelina, a contractual employee.
The application for clearance was premised on Ellelina's
alleged commission of a crime (Alarm or Public Scandal)
during a Christmas party on 19 December 1977 at
petitioner's camp in Uling, Cebu, when, because of the
refusal of the raffle committee to give him the prize
corresponding to his lost winning ticket, he tried to grab
the armalite rifle of the PC Officer outside the building
despite the warning shots fired by the latter.
Clearance to dismiss was initially granted by MOLE but
was subsequently revoked and petitioner was ordered to
reinstate Ellelina to his former position, without loss of
seniority rights, and with backwages from I February
1978 up to his actual reinstatement.
Petitioner appealed to the Minister of Labor who, acting
through public respondent, affirmed, on 14 August 1981,
the appealed Order. Hence, this Petition predicated
substantially on the following grounds:
1. Under Article 277 of the Labor Code, the Ministry of
Labor and Employment has no jurisdiction over petitioner
because it is a government-owned or controlled
corporation;
2. Ellelina's dismissal is valid and just because it is
based upon the commission of a crime.
On the other hand, public respondent contends:
(a) While the petitioner is a subsidiary of the PNOC, it is
still covered by the Labor Code and, therefore, within the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor inasmuch as
petitioner was organized as a private corporation under
the Corporation Law and registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission;
Department's jurisdiction, having subjected itself to the
latter when it filed the application for clearance to
(c) Dismissal is too harsh a penalty.
The issues that confront us, therefore, are (1) whether or
not public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that petitioner is governed by the
Labor Code; and (2) whether or not Ellelina's dismissal
was justified.
Under the laws then in force, employees of government-
owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by
the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Thus,
Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided:
The terms and conditions of employment of all
government employees, including employees of
government- owned and controlled corporations shall be
governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations
... .
In turn, the 1973 Constitution provided:
The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision and instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
In National Housing Corporation vs. Juco (L-64313,
January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 172), we laid down the
doctrine that employees of government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, whether created by special law
or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation
Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by
the Labor Code.
However, the above doctrine has been supplanted by the
present Constitution, which provides:
The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters. (Article IX-B, Section 2 [1])
Thus, under the present state of the law, the test in
determining whether a government-owned or controlled
corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the
manner of its creation such that government corporations
created by special charter are subject to its provisions
while those incorporated under the general Corporation
Law are not within its coverage.
In NASECO vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 69870, November 29,
1988), we had occasion to apply the present Constitution
in deciding whether or not the employees of NASECO (a
subsidiary of the NIDC, which is in turn a subsidiary
wholly-owned by the PNB, a government-owned
corporation) are covered by the Civil Service Law or the
Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the
time when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. We
held that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees
of NASECO "on the premise that it is the 1987
Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in
place at the time of decision;" and that being a
corporation
without an original charter, the employees of NASECO
are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.
We see no reason to depart from the ruling in the
aforesaid case.
We hold, therefore, that the PNOC-EDC having been
incorporated under the general Corporation Law, is a
government-owned or controlled corporation whose
employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor
Code. This is apparently the intendment in the NASECO
case notwithstanding the fact that the NASECO therein
was a subsidiary of the PNB, a government-owned
corporation.
In so far as Ellelina is concerned, we hold that the
reinstatement ordered by public respondent, without loss
of seniority rights, is proper. However, consistent with the
rulings of the Court, backwages should be limited to
three years from 1 February 1978. The dismissal ordered
by petitioner was a bit too harsh considering the nature
of the act which he had committed and that it was his
first offense.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED, and the
judgment of respondent public official is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92008 July 30, 1990

RAMON P. BINAMIRA, petitioner, 
vs.
PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR., respondent.

Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira

seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to
have been removed without just cause in violation of his
security of tenure.

The petitioner bases his claim on the following

communication addressed to him by the Minister of
Tourism on April 7, 1986:

MEMORANDUM TO: MR. RAMON P. BINAMIRA

You are hereby designated General Manager of the

Philippine Tourism Authority, effective immediately.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the

performance of the duties of the office.

(Sgd.) JOSE ANTONIO GONZALES Minister of Tourism

and Chairman, P.T.A. Board

Pursuant thereto, the petitioner assumed office on the

same date.

On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval

from President Aquino of the composition of the Board of
Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-
Chairman in his capacity as General Manager. This
approval was given by the President on the same date. 1

Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had

discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and Vice
-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had been
acknowledged as such by various government offices,
including the Office of the President.

He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990, his

resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as
the new Secretary of Tourism. Binamira's demurrer led
to an unpleasant exchange that led to his filing of a
complaint against the Secretary with the Commission on
Human Rights. But that is another matter that does not
concern us here.

What does is that on January 4, 1990, President Aquino

sent respondent Garrucho the following memorandum, 2
copy furnished Binamira:

4 January 1990
MEMORANDUM TO: Hon. Peter D. Garrucho, Jr..
Secretary of Tourism
It appearing from the records you have submitted to this
Office that the present General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority was designated not by the President,
as required by P.D. No. 564, as amended, but only by
the Secretary of Tourism, such designation is invalid.
Accordingly, you are hereby designated concurrently as
General Manager, effective immediately, until I can
appoint a person to serve in the said office in a
permanent capacity.
Please be guided accordingly.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
cc: Mr. Ramon P. Binamira Philippine Tourism Authority
Manila
Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the
PTA in accordance with this memorandum, the petitioner
filed this action against him to question his title.
Subsequently, while his original petition was pending,
Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on
April 6, 1990, the President of the Philippines appointed
Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as
additional respondent.
The issue presented in this case is starkly simple.
Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine
Tourism Authority, provides as follows:
SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and
Tenure. — The General Manager shall be appointed by
the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term
of six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause;
 Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall
serve as such until his successor shall have been
appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)
It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by
the President of the Philippines but only designated by
the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction
between appointment and designation that the petitioner
has failed to consider.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. 3 When
completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment
results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless
he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of
his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official, 4as where, in the case before us, the
Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or
where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the
Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit
in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. 5 It is said that appointment is
essentially executive while designation is legislative in
nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an
appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a
particular person to a specified public office. That is the
common understanding of the term. However, where the
person is merely designated and not appointed, the
implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment,
which does not confer security of tenure on the person
named.
Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the
designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that
he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the
decree clearly provides that the appointment of the
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority
shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by
any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of
discretion, which because of its nature cannot be
delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for
Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that
discretion as an alter ego of the President. The
appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a
merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly
performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in
this case to be a member of the Cabinet.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot
delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was
chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to
exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the
power to substitute another in his place has been given
to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. 6
In those cases in which the proper execution of the office
requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of
judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was
chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to
exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power
to substitute another in his place has been given to him,
he cannot delegate his duties to another. 7
Indeed, even on the assumption that the power
conferred on the President could be validly exercised by
the Secretary, we still cannot accept that the act of the
latter, as an extension or "projection" of the personality
of the President, made irreversible the petitioner's title to
the position in question. The petitioner's conclusion that
Minister Gonzales's act was in effect the act of President
Aquino is based only on half the doctrine he vigorously
invokes. Justice Laurel stated that doctrine clearly in the
landmark case of Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 8
 where he described the relationship of the President of
the Philippines and the members of the Cabinet as
follows:
... all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents
of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive.
The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head
to be the acts of the President of the Philippines when "
performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business," which was true of the designation made by
Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also
adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not '
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," as
also happened in the case at bar.
The argument that the designation made by Minister
Gonzales was approved by President Aquino through
her approval of the composition of the Board of Directors
of the PTA is not persuasive. It must be remembered
that Binamira was included therein as Vice- Chairman
only because of his designation as PTA General
Manager by Minister Gonzales. Such designation being
merely provisional, it could be recalled at will, as in fact it
was recalled by the President herself, through the
memorandum she addressed to Secretary Garrucho on
January 4, 1990.
With these rulings, the petitioner's claim of security of
tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His designation
being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential
prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to
the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it
could be and was authorized, the designation signified
merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be
legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for
a different reason).i•t•c-aüsl In either case, the petitioner'
s claim of security of tenure must be rejected.
The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who
apparently believed in good faith that he was being
extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of
Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the ostensible
authority to do so at the time the designation was made.
This belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino
later approved the composition of the PTA Board of
Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-
Chairman because of his position as General Manager
of the PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of
the categorical appointment required to be made by the
President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism, under
Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564. We must rule therefore that the
petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed
position and so has no right to be reinstated as General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-13932           December 24, 1959
JOSE V. DE LOS SANTOS, ET AL., petitioners,  with the conformity of plaintiffs' counsel) for
vs.
HON. NICASIO YATCO, ET AL., respondents.
Anacleto P. Bernardo for petitioners.
Talileo P. Brion for respondents.
On March 10, 1958, plaintiffs in the same case filed a
motion for execution, because defendant had allegedly
neglected to pay monthly installments since January
1958. Plaintiffs set the motion for hearing on March 15,
1958. However, on March 14, 1958, defendants moved (
postponement to March 22, 1958 "to give the parties
sufficient time to come to a more just, fair and equitable
agreement." (Annex "E") And the judge postponed, as
requested.

BENGZON, J.:

Petition for certiorari to revoke the order of the

respondent judge cancelling his previous order of
execution. For the reasons stated hereinafter, it should
be denied.

It appears that in civil Case No. Q-2664 of Quezon City

Court of First Instance, the parties submitted on
December 9, 1957, a compromise agreement whereby,
referring to the sale by installment of a parcel of land
made by plaintiffs Pacita V. De los Santos and Jose v.
de los Santos to defendant Francisco Mendoñez, they
asked the court to render a judgment subject t the
following conditions:

a. On or before December 26, 1957, defendant shall pay

to plaintiffs the amount of P1,000.00;

b. Defendant shall pay P300.00 monthly installment

within the first five days of every month beginning
January, 1958, until the balance shall have been paid in
full;

c. The balance shall bear interest at 10% per annum;

d. That balance of defendant to pay P1,000.00 on or

before December 26, 1957 and/or any two (2)
successive monthly installments shall be cause for
plaintiffs to demand of defendant to immediately vacate
the premises with forfeiture in plaintiffs favor of all
previous payments made; that if defendant will refuse to
voluntarily vacate, plaintiffs can ask for execution of
judgment against the defendant;

e. That plaintiffs shall execute the necessary ABSOLUTE

DEED OF SALE of the lot, Lot No. 4, Block No. 13 T. C.
T. No. 25094, Quezon City Registry, in favor of
defendant upon payment in full of the balance.lawphi1.
net

Wherefore, the court issued on December 10, 1957, a

decision approving the agreement, and saying "judgment
is hereby rendered in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth therein, for the parties to comply
therewith."
It is not clear happened at the hearing on March 22, defendant to her, and that she can not allow the P1,000.
1958. According to plaintiffs, Mendoñez admitted he 00 be deducted from the remaining balance of P14,563.
violated the agreement, asked for, and was granted, two 00."
days to settle with plaintiffs, but he failed to do so.
According to defendant there was a misunderstanding at
the hearing. The fact is, the court issued on March 25,
1958, an order of execution. However, defendant
Mendoñez filed on April 17, 1958, an urgent motion to
quash the writ of execution, asserting under oath that "
immediately after the execution of the compromise
agreement . . . plaintiff Pacita V. de los Santos and
defendant Francisco Mendoñez entered into a verbal
agreement whereby the former assured and led
defendant to believe that provided he could pay in full
and at one time the balance of his indebtedness to her
through a GSIS Government Service Insurance System)
loan which she is willing to facilitate for defendant, she
would execute the necessary deed of absolute sale in
favor of the defendant for Lot No. 4, Block No. 13-C, Pcs
-3312-AMD of T.C.T. No. 25094 of Quezon City and
would consider the terms and conditions favorable to her
in their compromise agreement unenforceable against
defendant. . . ."

Defendant further alleged, also under oath, among other

things, that he applied for and secured the necessary
loan from the GSIS; that plaintiffs had been so advised
on March 28, 1958; but plaintiff Pacita V. de los Santos "
arbitrarily and illegally demands and continuous
demanding of defendant that before she complies with
the content of said (verbal) agreement, defendant should
pay her P1,000.00 by way of attorney's fees plus the
balance of defendant's indebtedness computed by her in
the amount of P14,363.00, excluding interest yet, all to
be taken from defendant's GSIS loan as approved, and
that the P1,000.00 already paid by defendant to her as
stated in paragraph 4, supra, is considered by her
forfeited in her favor. . . ."

This urgent motion was taken up on April 19, 1958. After

listening to the parties, the judge in open court ordered; "
in view of the statement of counsel for plaintiffs that they
are still open to an amicable settlement, action on the
motion to quash writ of execution of the defendant is held
in abeyance for two (2) weeks during which period they
can settle the case amicably and report to the Court
whatever with agreement they may have reached."

On April 28, 1958, defendant manifested in writing that

he conferred with plaintiff Pacita V. de los Santos on
April 22, 1958, that he made known to her "that he is
ready to pay and is offering her the sum of P13,563, his
balance indebtedness to her, in accordance with their
verbal agreement on December 9, 1957 . . . Plaintiff
Pacita V. de los Santos brushed aside defendant's offer
of payment, and instead, stated that she will abide by
their said agreement only if she will be paid P14,500.00.
She added that she is demanding now, P14,500.00 after
she has forfeited the P1,000.00 already paid by
The judge called the parties to a pre-trial or conference
on June 2, 1958. Noting defendant's insistance on non-
violation of the compromises agreement, he set the case
for hearing on June 3, 1958. On said date according to
the Judge, Atty. Bernardo (for plaintiffs) refused to attend
the hearing, and defendant proved the material
allegations of his urgent motion as hereinabove set forth.

Wherefore, convinced that there was no justification or

the issuance of the writ of execution, the Hon. Nicasio
Yatco, Judge, quashed it by his order of June 4, 1958.
lawphi1.net

Hence this petition for certiorari to revoke that particular

order, which petition must necessarily be based on lack
of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion. 1

There is no question in this country that a judge has

jurisdiction to quash a writ of execution issued by him,
particularly where it was improvidently issued. (
Dimayuga vs. Raymundo, 76 Phil., 143, 42 Off. Gaz.,
2121). See also Garcia vs, Muñoz, 103 Phil., 628.

Was there abuse of discretion? We think not. In the first

place, there being opposition on the part of the
defendant, who alleged and proved a subsequent verbal
agreement amending the compromise, execution could
not validly be decreed without a hearing. As we said
in Co. vs. Lucero, 100 Phil., 160, 52 Off. Gaz., (17), 7255
, when under similar circumstances a breach of the
compromise agreement is alleged, "there arises a cause
of action which must be passed upon by the court
requiring a hearing to determine whether such breach
had really taken place." 2

In the second place, the allegations proved by

Mendoñez about their verbal agreement, his having
secured a loan from the GSIS and his consequent ability
to discharge his obligation seemingly justified the court's
refusal to eject defendant from the premises (on
execution) was the consequent forfeiture in favor of the
plaintiffs of more than P12,000.00 already paid by
defendant as previous installments of the purchase price,
 3not to mention the of defendants use of the house and
theatre erected that parcel of land. Upon the other hand,
the respondent judge's action caused no irreparable or
undue harm plaintiffs, because the latter still have the
judgment Mendoñez. Note particularly that their unpaid
continuous to earn 10% interest.

Wherefore, as the court had jurisdiction and has

committed not grave abuse of discretion, the writ
of certiorari may not be issued.

Petition denied, with costs against petitioners.

The foregoing disquisitions were also applied to the more
recent cases of De Jesus [Metro Cariaga Water District];[
17] Molen [Metro Iloilo Water District]; and Magno [
Mangaldan Water District].[18] The same reasoning and
conclusions of the Court were reiterated in de Jesus v.
CSC[19] and Cabili and de Vera v. CSC.[20] We find no
reason to depart from the rulings in these cases which
essentially involve the same issues as the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY

GRANTED. COA Decision No. 2000-133 dated May 16,
2000 and Resolution dated February 27, 2003 are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
petitioners need not refund the benefits and allowances
disallowed by the COA.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 compensation unless specifically authorized by law.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PER DIEM; INCLUDED. — Under the

[G.R. No. L-26608. March 31, 1971.] GSIS Act. petitioner is entitled as trustee "to a per diem
of P25.00 for each day of actual attendance in session."
PEDRO G. PERALTA, Petitioner, v. AUDITOR As in the case of government controlled corporations, the
GENERAL ISMAEL MATHAY, Respondent. term ‘’per diems" was

Pedro G. Peralta in his own behalf.

Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor

General Felicisimo R. Rosete and Solicitor Bernardo P.
Pardo for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS; PROHIBITION’ AGAINST DOUBLE
COMPENSATION. — It is expressly provided in the
Constitution: "No officer or employee of the government
shall receive additional or double compensation unless
specifically authorized by law." This is to manifest a
commitment to the fundamental principle that a public
office is a public trust. It is expected of a government
official or employee that he keeps uppermost in mind the
demands of public welfare. He is there to render public
service. He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the
performance of the functions entrusted to him, but that
should not be the overriding consideration.

The intrusion of the thought of private gain should be

unwelcome. The temptation to further personal ends,
public employment as a means for the acquisition of
wealth, is to be resisted. That at least is the ideal. There
is then to be an awareness on the part of an officer or
employee of the government that he is to receive only
such compensation as may be fixed by law. With such a
realization, he is expected not to avail himself of devious
or circuitous means to increase the remuneration
attached to his position. It is an entirely different matter if
the legislative body would itself determine for reasons
satisfactory to it that he should receive something more.
If it were to be thus though, there must be a law to that
effect. So the Constitution decrees.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION; GSIS OFFICERS. — As

is expressly declared in the Constitution, the Civil
Service is to embrace "all branches and subdivisions of
the Government * * *." Conformably to the above, the
Philippine Civil Service, by law, includes ‘’all branches,
subdivisions and instrumentalities of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations .
. . ." Petitioner has not disputed, nor can he dispute that
as a trustee, he was an officer of the government, the
GSIS having been established in order "to promote the
efficiency and welfare of the employees of the
Government of the Philippines and to replace the [then]
pension systems established in [previous acts].’’ As such
officer, petitioner cannot receive additional or double
used in the sense the compensation or remuneration additional compensation. Such a principle does not come
attached to the office of Trustee. Such is not the to the aid of petitioner though. He was unable to show
meaning usually attached to it. So it was noted in Lexal that the cost of living allowance received by him was in
Laboratories v. National Chemical Industries Workers the nature of a reimbursement. It did amount then to an
Union, (L-24632, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 668). A " additional compensation.
per diem" is commonly identified with the daily allowance
"for each day he (an officer or employee) was away from
his home base." Its usual signification is thus that a
reimbursement for expenses incurred in the performance
of one’s duties. If employ in a statute, as in this case, in
the concept of remuneration, however, there must be, to
justify an additional compensation, a specific law that so
provides. Otherwise, fidelity to the constitutional
command is lacking.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; COST OF LIVING ALLOWANCE,

INCLUDED.— A similar approach is called for in
determining the nature of a cost of living allowance. If it
could rightfully be considered as in the nature of a
reimbursement rather than additional emoluments or
perquisites, then the ruling of respondent Auditor
General cannot find support in the Constitution. What
was said in an American State decision has relevance. It
was therein categorically stated "that it is universally held
that an allowance for expenses incident to the discharge
of the duties of office is not an increase of salary, a
perquisite, nor an emolument of office." To the same
effect is this excerpt appearing later in the opinion: "A
careful and, we believe, exhaustive examination of the
decisions fails to disclose a single case in which it has
ever been held that a legislative act, providing for an
allowance, for expenses incurred in the discharge of
official duties, to a public officer, whose salary or
compensation was fixed at a stated sum, was in violation
of provisions such as are found in many state
Constitutions, forbidding an increase of salary during
official terms, or forbidding the granting of ‘fees,’
‘perquisites,’ or ‘emoluments’ to such officer. Legislative
acts which directly in terms, or as construed, attempted
to increase such salaries, have been held invalid. But no
decision has been found or, as we believe, can be found,
which holds a legislative act to be unconstitutional which
merely relieves an officer, who received a fixed salary or
compensation, from expending such salary for expenses
incident to the performance of his official duties." It is
worth noting that there are specific provisions in the
applicable statutes allowing trustees or directors,
traveling expenses which may be collected by the board
of directors of the Philippines Virginia Tobacco
Administration; traveling and subsistence expenses by
the members and board of directors of the Central Luzon
-Cagayan Valley Authority; and traveling and other
necessary expenses by the members of the Philippine
Medical Care Commission. Such provisions are
prompted by what may appear to be an excess of
caution, for the accepted doctrine is that an allowance to
take care of expenses incurred by an official to enable
him to fulfill his task cannot be looked upon as an
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; BONUS, INCLUDED. — It is quite
obvious that by its very nature, a bonus partakes of an
additional remuneration or compensation. The very
characterization of what was received by petitioner as
bonuses being intended by way of an incentive to spur
him possibly to more diligent efforts and to add to the
feeling of well-being traditionally associated with the
Christmas season would remove any doubt that the
Auditor General had no choice except to deduct from
petitioner’s gratuity such items.
law." 2 This is to manifest a commitment to the
fundamental principle that a public office is a public trust.
It is expected of a government official or employee that
he keeps uppermost in mind the demands of public
welfare. He is there to render public service. He is of
course entitled to be rewarded for the

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

There is need in this appeal from a decision of

respondent Auditor General Ismael Mathay for an inquiry
into the meaning and significance of the constitutional
inhibition against an officer or employee of the
government receiving additional or double compensation
unless specifically authorized by law, 1 the decisive legal
question being whether or not the cost of living
allowance as well as incentive and Christmas bonuses
paid to petitioner Pedro G. Peralta, a Trustee of the
Government Service Insurance System, hereinafter
called the GSIS, did fall within such a ban. The answer
given by respondent Auditor General was in the
affirmative. After a careful study of the matter, this Court
arrives at a similar conclusion. Hence this appeal cannot
prosper.

The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the brief of

petitioner, the GSIS, on May 17, 1966, in a resolution
duly passed, granted him an optional retirement gratuity
of P40,336.07. Of that amount, he was not able to collect
the sum of P7,032.26, covering P3,982.26 as cost of
living allowance, P1,275.00 as incentive bonus, and P1,
775.00 as Christmas bonus. Such items were not passed
in audit. the view of respondent Auditor General being
that they should be deducted from his gratuity, although
during petitioner’s incumbency as Trustee, no question
was raised when he was paid such allowance and
bonuses. Respondent Auditor General justified his action
on the ground that they "partake of the nature of
additional compensation," a trustee’s remuneration being
fixed by law in the form of a per diem of P25.00 for every
board meeting of the GSIS attended. Respondent so
ruled on June 28, 1966, and maintained such a stand on
September 1, 1966 when he denied a motion for
reconsideration. Hence this appeal for review filed on
September 29, 1966.

The ruling of respondent Auditor General, being in

accordance with what the Constitution requires, must be
upheld.

1. It is expressly provided in the Constitution: "No officer

or employee of the government shall receive additional
or double compensation unless specifically authorized by
performance of the functions entrusted to him, but that is not an increase of salary, a perquisite, nor an
should not be the overriding consideration. The intrusion emolument of office." 10 To the same effect is this
of the thought of private gain should be unwelcome. The excerpt appearing later in the opinion: "A careful and, we
temptation to further personal ends, public employment believe, exhaustive examination of the decisions fails to
as a means for the acquisition of wealth, is to be resisted. disclose a single case in which it has ever been held that
That at least is the ideal. There is then to be an a legislative act, providing for an allowance, for expenses
awareness on the part of an officer or employee of the incurred in the
government that he is to receive only such compensation
as may be fixed by law. With such a realization, he is
expected not to avail himself of devious or circuitous
means to increase the remuneration attached to his
position. It is an entirely different matter if the legislative
body would itself determine for reasons satisfactory to it
that he should receive something more. If it were to be
thus though, there must be a law to that effect. So the
Constitution decrees.

As is expressly declared in the Constitution, the Civil

Service is to embrace "all branches and subdivisions of
the Government . . .." 3 Conformably to the above, the
Philippine Civil Service, by law, includes "all branches,
subdivisions and instrumentalities of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations .
. .." 4 Petitioner has not disputed, nor can he dispute that
as a trustee, he was an officer of the government, the
GSIS having been established in order "to promote the
efficiency and welfare of the employees of the
Government of the Philippines and to replace the [then]
pension systems established in [previous acts.]" 5 As
such officer, petitioner cannot receive additional or
double compensation unless specifically authorized by
law. Under the GSIS Act, he is entitled as trustee "to a
per diem of P25.00 for each day of actual attendance in
session." 6 As in the case of government-controlled
corporations, the term "per diems" was used in the sense
of the compensation or remuneration attached to the
office of Trustee 7 Such is not the meaning usually
attached to it. So it was noted in Lexal Laboratories v.
National Chemical Industries Workers Union. 8 A "per
diem" is commonly identified with the daily allowance "for
each day he (an officer or employee) was away from his
home base." Its usual signification is thus that of a
reimbursement for expenses incurred in the performance
of one’s duties. If employed in a statute, as in this case,
in the concept of remuneration, however, there must be,
to justify an additional compensation, a specific law that
so provides. Otherwise, fidelity to the constitutional
command is lacking.

A similar approach is called for in determining the nature

of a cost of living allowance. If it could rightfully be
considered as in the nature of a reimbursement rather
than additional emoluments or perquisites, then the
ruling of respondent Auditor General cannot find support
in the Constitution. What was said in an American State
decision’ 9 has relevance. It was therein categorically
stated "that it is universally held that an allowance for
expenses incident to the discharge of the duties of office
discharge of official duties, to a public officer, whose General must be cognizant of the paramount character
salary or compensation was fixed at a stated sum, was in of the Constitution. Thus everyone in the public service is
violation of provisions such as are found in many state only the more strongly bound to submit to such
Constitutions, forbidding an increase of salary official supremacy and abide by the limitations which it imposes
terms, or forbidding the granting of `fees,’ `perquisites,’ upon every aspect of the authority thus conferred. 16 
or `emoluments’ to such officer. Legislative acts which
directly in terms, or as construed, attempted to increase
such salaries, have been held invalid. But no decision
has been found or, as we believe, can be found, which
holds a legislative act to be unconstitutional which
merely relieves an officer, who received a fixed salary or
compensation, from expending such salary for expenses
incident to the performance of his official duties." 11 It is
worth noting that there are specific provisions in the
applicable statutes allowing trustees or directors,
traveling expenses which may be collected by the board
of directors of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration; 12 traveling and subsistence expenses
by the members and board of directors of the Central
Luzon-Cagayan Valley Authority; 13 and traveling and
other necessary expenses by the members of the
Philippine Medical Care Commission. 14 Such
provisions are prompted by what may appear to be an
excess of caution, for the accepted doctrine is that an
allowance to take care of expenses incurred by an official
to enable him to fulfill his task cannot be looked upon as
an additional compensation. Such a principle does not
come to the aid of petitioner though. He was unable to
show that the cost of living allowance received by him
was in the nature of a reimbursement. It did amount then
to an additional compensation.

So it is in the case of the bonuses received by him. It is

quite obvious that by its very nature, a bonus partakes of
an additional remuneration or compensation. 15 The
very characterization of what was received by petitioner
as bonuses being intended by way of an incentive to
spur him possibly to more diligent efforts and to add to
the feeling of well-being traditionally associated with the
Christmas season would remove any doubt that the
Auditor General had no choice except to deduct from
petitioner’s gratuity such items.

2. It is apparent that respondent Auditor General

accorded respect and deference to a constitutional
command. To impute legal error to his actuation is to be
oblivious of the fundamental postulate that the
Constitution is supreme. Obedience is mandatory. It
cannot be disregarded. Every public official is sworn to
uphold it. There can be no justification for any other
course of action. To condone whether by intent or
inadvertence any deviation from what it prescribes is to
display less than full fealty to the cardinal precept of our
polity. A mistaken sympathy for the situation in which the
petitioner did find himself cannot suffice to confer
authority on respondent to grant what is asked of him in
view of the constitutional ban. Both petitioner, who was
himself once a public official, and respondent Auditor
 G.R. No. 95445               August 6, 1991
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Auditor General of
MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,
June 28, 1966, as reiterated in its order denying the
FIDEL FABABIER MERLIN ANONUEVO, MINDA
motion for reconsideration of September 1, 1966, is
GALANG and other teacher-members so numerous
affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
similarly situated, petitioners-appellants, 
vs.
THE HON. PERFECTO LAGUIO JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 18, HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports and the HON.
ERLINDA LOLARGA in her capacity as Manila City
Schools Superintendent, respondents-appellees.

G.R No. 95590               August 6, 1991

ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT),

ENRIQUE D. TORRES, RODRIGO G. NATIVIDAD,
FRANCISCO A. NERECINA, EVA V. FERIA, LUCIA R.
CARRASCO, LEO R. RAMBOYONG, ZENEIDA PEREZ,
MARIA ACEJO AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS TOO NUMEROUS TO
BE IMPLEADED, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO in his capacity as Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Free Legal Assistance Group, Movement of Attorneys for

Brotherhood Integrity & Nationalism and Union of
Lawyers and Advocates for petitioners in G.R. No. 95590
.
Gregorio Fabros for petitioners in G.R. No. 95445.

NARVASA, J.:

The series of events that touched off these cases started

with the so-called "mass action" undertaken by some
800 public school teachers, among them members of the
petitioning associations in both cases, on September 17,
1990 to "dramatize and highlight"1 the teachers' plight
resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities
to act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latter's attention.

The petition in G.R. No. 95590 alleges in great detail the

character and origins of those grievances as perceived
by the petitioners, and the attempts to negotiate their
correction;2 these are more briefly, but quite adequately
and with no sacrifice of relevant content, set forth in the
petition in G.R. No. 954451, portions of which are quoted
hereunder without necessarily affirming their objective
truth or correctness:

3. Together with other teachers embracing the Teachers

and Employees Consultative Council (TECC) and the
Alliance of Concerned Teachers, the petitioners, in
accordance with their Constitution and By-Laws, action to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal,
resolved to engage in mass concerted actions, after and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
peaceful dialogues with the heads of the Department of concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those
the Budget and Management, Senate and House of who did not comply and to hire their replacements.5
Representatives in public hearings as well as after  Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions
exhausting all administrative remedies, to press for, continued into the week, with more teachers joining in
among other things, the immediate payment of due chalk the days that followed. In its issue of September 19,
, clothing allowances, 13th month pay for 1989 arising 1990, the
from the implementation of the Salary Standardization
Law, the recall of DECS Order 39 s. 1990 directing the
oversizing of classes and overloading of teachers
pursuant to the cost-cutting measures of the government,
the hiring of 47,000 new teachers to ease the overload
of existing teachers, the return of the additional 1% real
property taxes collected by local government units to
education purposes to be administered by the Local
School Boards, and consequent recall of DBM Circulars
Nos. 904 and 9011 and local budget circular No. 47
consistent with RA 5447 and the new Constitution
mandating that education shall enjoy the highest
budgetary priority in the national budget, and other
equally important demands; The dialogues and
conferences initiated by the petitioners and other teacher
organizations were as early as March 14, 1989, March
14, 1990, April 23, 1990, May 28, 1990, June 5, 1990,
September 3, 1990 and September 14, 1990 with the
Civil Service Commission, the Senate and House of
Representatives, Department of Budget and
Management and the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, but all these did not result in the granting of
the demands of the petitioners, leaving them with no
other recourse but to take direct mass action such as the
one they engaged in three weeks ago.

4. On September 14, 1990, the petitioners and other

teachers in other cities and municipalities in Metro
Manila, staged a protest rally at the DECS premises
without disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of demands. No
response was made by the respondent Secretary of
Education, despite the demonstration, so the petitioners
began the ongoing protest mass actions on September,
17,1990. ...3

September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a

regular school day. There is no question that the some
800 teachers who joined the mass action did not conduct
their classes on that day; instead, as alleged in the
petition in G.R. No. 95590,4 they converged at the
Liwasang Bonifacio in the morning whence they
proceeded to the National Office of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sport (DECS) for a whole-day
assembly. At about 1:00 o'clock p.m., three
representatives of the group were allowed to see the
respondent Secretary of Education who "brushed aside
their grievances," warned them that they would lose their
jobs for going on illegal and unauthorized mass leave.
Upon leaving said respondent's presence, they were
handed an order directing all participants in the mass
newspaper Manila Standard reported that the day
previous, the respondent Secretary of Education had
relieved 292 teachers who did not return to their classes.
The next day, however, another daily, Newsday,
reported that the Secretary had revoked its dismissal
order and instead placed 56 of the 292 teachers under
preventive suspension, despite which the protesters'
numbers had swelled to 4,000.6
same state of facts and instituted for substantially the
same purpose i.e., the invalidation of the return-to-work
order of the respondent Secretary of Education and all
orders of suspension and/or dismissal thereafter issued
by said

On the record, what did happen was that, based on

reports submitted by the principals of the various public
schools in Metro Manila, the respondent Secretary of
Education had filed motu proprio administrative
complaints against the teachers who had taken part in
the mass actions and defied the return-to-work order on
assorted charges like grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law, absence
without official leave, etc., and placed them under 90-day
preventive suspension. The respondents were served
copies of the charge sheets and given five (5) days to
submit answer or explanation. Later, on October 8, 1990,
the respondent Secretary constituted an investigating
committee of four (4) to determine and take the
appropriate course of action on the formal charges and
designated the special prosecutors on detail with the
DECS to handle their prosecution during the formal
hearings.7

On October 11, 1990, the respondent Secretary of

Education rendered the first of his now questioned
decisions on the administrative complaints. In Case No.
DECS 90-002, he found twenty (20) respondent teachers
guilty of the charges preferred against them and
dismissed them from office, effective immediately.8 In
the other investigations that followed and as of
December 3, 1990, 658 teachers were dismissed, 40
were suspended for one (1) year, 33 for nine (9) months,
and 122 for six (6) months; 398 were exonerated.9

Earlier, on September 19, 1990, the petitioners in G.R.

No. 95445 had filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila Branch 18, a petition10 for prohibition,
declaratory relief and preliminary mandatory injunction to
restrain the implementation of the return-to-work order of
September 17, 1990 and the suspension or dismissal of
any teacher pursuant thereto and to declare said order
null and void. Issuance ex-parte of a temporary
restraining order was sought, but seeing no compelling
reason therefor, the Regional Trial Court instead set the
application for preliminary injunction for hearing, and
heard the same, on September 24, 1990. Thereafter and
following the submission of memorandums by the parties
, said Court rendered judgment declaring the assailed
return-to-work order valid and binding, and dismissing
the petition for lack of merit.11

Review of said judgment is sought in G. R. No. 95445.

G.R. No. 95590 is a parallel original proceeding for

prohibition, mandamus and certiorari grounded on the
respondent against the teachers who had taken part in facie lawful, the motion was either an attempt at forum-
the mass actions of September 17, 1990 and the days shopping or meant to avoid the "inevitable outcome" of
that followed. issues already pending final determination by the Court.

Both cases were ordered consolidated by Resolution

issued on October 25, 1990,12 and separate comments
were filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the public
respondents, in G.R. No. 95445 on October 31, 1990,
and in G.R. No. 95590 on December 5, 1990.13 On
November 20, 1990 the parties were heard in oral
argument on the petitioners' united pleas for a temporary
restraining order/mandatory injunction to restore
the status quo ante and enjoin the public respondents
from continuing with the issuance of suspension orders
and proceeding with the administrative cases against the
teachers involved in the mass actions.

Said pleas were denied by the Court in its Resolution of

December 18, 1990,14 and a motion for reconsideration
filed by the petitioners in G.R. No. 95590 was likewise
denied.

In two separate but identically-worded motions filed on

their behalf by Atty. Froilan M. Bacungan,15 the following
persons, to wit: Florita D. Guazon, Elisea G. Lazo,
Gonzala G. Sioson, Esperanza Valero, Nenita Pangilinan
, Ramon David, Aurora Bosi, Encarnita David, Socorro
Sentin, Crispulo Santos, Rodriguez Bagana, Rodolfo D.
Bacsal, Ruben Bersamina, Rodolfo Arroyo, Irene Gadil,
Rebecca Roldan, Rosita Samson, Priscilla Avendia,
Arturo Cabuhat, Rosalinda Caoili, Angelina Corpuz,
Purisima Lena, Elsie Somera, Dedaica Jusay, Teresita
Partoza, Gloria Salvador, Catherine San Agustin, Nestor
Aguirre, Lorenzo Real, Celia Ronquillo, Vicente Carranza
, Jessie Villanueva, Yolanda Alura, Clara Alvarez, Danilo
Llamas, Ladera Panita Myrna, Sena, Zenaida Ligon,
Daisy S. Conti, Danilo Caballes, Susan Maragat,
Roberto Manlangit and Elizabeth T. Aguirre, seek leave
to withdraw as parties in G.R. No. 95590. These
movants claim that they are such parties although not
individually so named in the petition in said case, being
among those referred to in its title as "other similarly
situated public school teachers too numerous to be
impleaded," who had been administratively charged,
then preventively suspended and/or dismissed in the
wake of the mass actions of September 1990. They
assert that since this Court is not a trier of facts, they
have opted to appeal the questioned decisions or
actuations of the respondent Secretary of Education to
the Civil Service Commission where they believe they
will have "... all the opportunity to introduce evidence on
how (Secretary) Cariño violated their constitutional rights
to due process of law ... security of tenure and ...
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances ...."

An opposition to the first motion was filed16 which,

briefly, contended that, as this Court had already found
that the petitioners had gone on an unlawful strike and
that public respondent Cariño's acts were prima
The Court's Resolution of December 18, 1990, supra,
denying the petitioners' plea for restoration of the status
quo ante and to restrain/enjoin further suspensions of,
and the initiation or continuation of, administrative
proceedings against the teachers involved, is based on
the following postulates:
evident from the pleadings that there was, and there
being no dispute about this. What therefore, is brought
before the Court is the question of whether or not any
rights of the petitioners under the due process clause of
the Constitution as it applies to

(1) the undenied indeed, the pleaded and admitted fact

that about 800 teachers, among them the individual
petitioners and other unnamed but "similarly situated"
members of the petitioning associations in both cases,
unauthorizedly absented themselves from their classes
on a regular schoolday, September 17, 1990, in order to
participate in a "mass action" to dramatize their
grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of
the public authorities, either to implement at all or to
implement in a just and correct manner, certain laws and
measures intended to benefit them materially;

(2) the fact, too, that in the days that followed, more
mass actions for the same purpose were undertaken,
notwithstanding a return-to-work order issued by the
respondent Secretary of Education; more teachers joined
the so-called "peaceful assemblies" on September 18,
1990 and the number rising to 4,000 on September 19,
1990;17

(3) that from the pleaded and admitted facts, these "
mass actions" were to all intents and purposes a strike;
they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage
of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty
to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons;

(4) that this court had already definitively ruled that

employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the
private sector, do not have the right to strike, although
guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition
Congress for the betterment of employment terms and
conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of such working conditions
as are not fixed by law;18

(5) that upon the foregoing premises, it was prima

facie lawful and within his statutory authority for the
respondent Secretary of Education to take the actions
complained of, to wit: issue a return-to-work order, prefer
administrative charges against, and place under
preventive suspension, those who failed to comply with
said order, and dismiss from the service those who failed
to answer or controvert the charges;19

The Court has not since been presented with any

consideration of law or established fact that would impair
the validity of these postulates or preclude continued
reliance thereon for the purpose of resolving the present
petitions on their merits.

The underlying issue here is due process; not whether

the petitioners have a right to strike, which it is clear they
do not, however justifiable their reasons, nor whether or
not there was in fact such a strike, it being equally
administrative proceedings were violated in the initiation,
conduct, or disposition of the investigations complained
of.
Indeed, what the petitioners in G.R. No. 95590 proclaim
about denial of due process being their "paramount
complaint" ... "central to their prayer for interlocutory
relief'20 could as well be said of the merits of their main
cause as of their plea for a restraining order pendente
lite or a preliminary injunction.
The striking teachers who did not heed the return-to-
work order were administratively charged and
preventively suspended for ninety days for grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, insubordination,
refusal to perform official duty, absence without leave
beginning September 17, 1990 and other violations of
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. All of striking
teachers were served with the suspension orders and
the change sheets notifying them of the

There are, however, insuperable obstacles to the Court's

taking up that issue and resolving it in these cases. Said
issue is not ripe for adjudication by this Court in the
exercise of its review jurisdiction; and this, for the
obvious reason that it is one of fact. The petitions and
subsequent pleadings of the petitioners allege facts and
circumstances which, it is claimed, show denial of due
process, citing as supposedly "representative samples"21
among others: (a) that teachers were dismissed on the
sole basis of unsworn reports of their principals and
without evidence of their alleged failure to obey the
return-to-work order; (b) that the charge sheets failed to
specify the particular charges or offenses allegedly
committed; (c) that some teachers were not furnished
sworn complaints, and others were suspended without
any formal charges; (d) that teachers who attempted to
return within a reasonable time after notice of the return-
to-work order were not accepted back; and similar
allegations.

These are however denied and disputed by the public

respondents, who set forth their own version, initially in
their separate Comments in both cases and, later and in
greater detail, in their Consolidated Memorandum of
December 3, 1990, supra, from which the following
passages are quoted:

(6) Petitioners in G.R. No. 95545 and G.R. No.

95590 admit engaging in a strike (referred by semantic
interplay as "concerted activity" or "mass action")
 directed against public respondent Cariño beginning
September 17, 1990, MPSTA Petition, pp. 3, 9; ACT
Petition, pp. 1516).

To avoid the disruption of classes, public respondent

Cariño, also on September 17, 1990, issued a 'return to
work order' reminding striking workers that in law, they
cannot engage in strike and warning them that dismissal
proceedings will be instituted against them if they do not
return to work with 24 hours from their walkout (MPSTA
Petition, p. 4; ACT Petition, p. 15) and a memorandum to
DECS officials instructing them to notify the striking
teachers to return to work within 24 hours from their
walkout and to initiate dismissal proceedings against
those who defy the return to work order as well as to hire
temporary replacements, MPSTA Petition, p. 4; ACT
Petition, pp. 15-16).
charges and giving them five (5) days from receipt of the Nevertheless, answers to the administrative complaints
charge sheets within which to file their respective started pouring in at the DECS, as prepared personally
answers. by the striking teachers or by their lawyers.

With the filing of the administrative complaints and the After initial assessments of the reports coming in from
receipt of the answers of some of the teachers involved, the principals of the schools concerned and the answers
public respondent Carino on October 8, 1990 issued a of the striking teachers, the DECS Special Task Force
Memorandum forming an Investigation Committee prepared on
composed of Atty, Reno Capinpin of DECS
Administrative Services as Chairman Dr. Alberto
Mendoza, representing the Division Supervisors, Atty.
Evangeline de Castro, representing the City
Superintendent of Schools of Manila, and Atty. Isaias
Meleto representing the National PPSTA Organization,
as members. Copy of the aforesaid Memorandum is
hereto attached as Annex "I."

The committee was authorized to meet everyday, even

as Special Prosecutors from the Department of justice on
detail with the DECS were designated to handle the
prosecution during the formal hearings. (Ibid.)

Petitioners in GR No. 95545' and 'G.R. No. 95590' admit

having received the charge sheets and notices of
preventive suspension wherein they were given five days
from receipt of the charges within which to file their
answers (MPSTA Petition, p. 4-1 ACT Petition, p. 16,
Annexes x , to , AA ).

x x x           x x x          x x x

... Many striking teachers received their preventive

suspension orders and the charge sheets from their
respective principals when they visited their schools.
Many refused to receive and sign receipt therefor; others
tore up the preventive suspension orders and charge
sheets in front of their principals. Instead, they took the
occasion to belittle and insult the substitute teachers who
took over their classrooms temporarily.

The striking teachers were given a period of five days to

file their Answers in line with Sec. 8, Rule III of Rules on
Administrative Disciplinary Cases in CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 46, s. 1989. The motion for extension of
time to file Answer was denied by DECS Task Force
because it was dilatory the alleged reason being that
Atty. Fabros is handling 2,000 cases of teachers. The
DECS was constrained by Sec. 38(d) of P.D. 807 and
Sec. 8 of the Memorandum Circular mentioned which
mandate that administrative cases must be decided
within 30 days from the filing of the charges. Another
reason was that many refused to receive the notice of
charges. Also, to delay the resolution of the cases was to
their disadvantage.

Moreover, another reason proferred was that the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila still had to act on
the petition before it. However, the Motion was filed
AFTER the RTC Manila had already dismissed the
Petition.
October 9, 1990 and submitted to respondent Secretary respondent Secretary Carino promulgated the decisions
Carino the Guidelines and Criteria as to the nature of the either for exoneration, suspension or dismissal. Copies
evidence to be assessed and the corresponding penalty of the DECS decisions of exoneration, suspension or
to be imposed against the striking teachers, which was dismissal were forwarded to the principals of the striking
approved by respondent Secretary Carino on the same teachers concerned. Those
day. A copy of the aforesaid Guidelines and Criteria is
hereto attached as Annex "2." Thereafter, the DECS
Special Task Force proceeded with its task of
investigating the cases against the striking teachers.

Those who refused to sign the DECS return-to-work

order, the preventive suspension orders and the charge
sheets, some even tearing up the documents presented
to them by their principals were considered by the DECS
Special Task Force as having waived their right to be
heard; their cases had to be resolved on the basis of the
records. Nevertheless, the DECS Special Task Force
summoned the principals concerned, who then testified
under oath confirming their reports on the absences of
the striking teachers. Some clarificatory questions were
asked of them on the manner of the service of the DECS
orders and the situation obtaining in their schools.

For those who answered the charge sheets, the DECS

Special Task Force set the administrative cases for
hearing. Many of the striking teachers refused to appear
at the hearings but preferred to submit their case on the
basis of their answers.

With regard to those who attended the hearings, each of

the absent or striking teachers was investigated and
asked questions under oath on their answers and the
reasons for their absences and/or joining the teachers'
strike. Some teachers reiterated their answers to the
charge sheets, either giving justifiable reasons for their
absences on the days mentioned or maintaining their
stubborn stand that they have all the right to absent
themselves from classes in the exercise of their
constitutional right to join mass action to demand from
the government what are supposedly due them. Still the
DECS Special Task Force was not satisfied with their
written answers and explanation during the hearings.
The principals of the striking teachers were summoned
and they confirmed under oath their reports of absences
and/or on teachers joining the strike.

After having conducted fully their investigations, the

DECS Special Task Force submitted in series their
investigation reports and recommendation for each
category of striking teachers to respondent Secretary
Carino. The investigation reports, together with their
supporting documents, submitted by the DECS Special
Task Force indicated clearly the manner and conduct of
the administrative hearings, the nature and weight of the
evidence adduced, and the correspondingly penalty or
exoneration recommended.

On the bases of the investigation reports and

recommendations of the DECS Special Task Force, and
after evaluating the reports and its documents attached,
exonerated were allowed to resume their duties and petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on
received their back salaries. Some of the teachers either the matters complained of. The motions to withdraw,
suspended or dismissed have already received the  supra, are
copies of the decisions, either personally or through mail.

x x x           x x x          x x x22

This copious citation is made, not to suggest that the

Court finds what is stated therein to be true and the
contrary averments of the petitions to be false, but
precisely to stress that the facts upon which the question
of alleged denial of due process would turn are still in
issue, actively controverted, hence not yet established.

It is not for the Court, which is not a trier of facts, as the

petitioners who would now withdraw correctly put it, to
make the crucial determination of what in truth transpired
concerning the disputed incidents. Even if that were
within its competence, it would be at best a monumental
task. At any rate, the petitioners cannot-as it seems they
have done lump together into what amounts to a class
action hundreds of individual cases, each with its own
peculiar set of facts, and expect a ruling that would justly
and correctly resolve each and everyone of those cases
upon little more than general allegations, frontally
disputed as already pointed out, of incidents supposedly
"representative" of each case or group of cases.

This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to

the Supreme Court, especially when numerous parties
desparately situated as far as the facts are concerned
gather under the umbrella of a common plea, and
generalization of what should be alleged with
particularity becomes unavoidable. The petitioners'
obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative
proceedings but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and
vindicate their rights therein, see those proceedings
through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the
Civil Service Commission; or if, pending said
proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority
was believed necessary because the respondent
Secretary or those acting under him or on his instructions
were acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, to apply, not directly to the
Supreme Court, but to the Regional Trial Court, where
there would be an opportunity to prove the relevant facts
warranting corrective relief.

Parties-litigant are duty bound to observe the proper

order of recourse through the judicial hierarchy; they by-
pass the rungs of the judicial ladder at the peril of their
own causes.23 This Court is a court of last resort. Its
review jurisdiction is limited to resolving questions of law
where there is no dispute of the facts or the facts have
already been determined by lower tribunals, except only
in criminal actions where capital penalties have been
imposed.

WHEREFORE, both petitioners are DISMISSED, without

prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual
merely NOTED, this disposition rendering any express
ruling thereon unnecessary. No pronouncement as to
costs. G.R. No. 160465             May 27, 2004

SO ORDERED. ROMEO M. ESTRELLA, petitioner, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.
COMMISSIONER RALPH C. LANTION and ROLANDO
F. SALVADOR,respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

From this Court’s Resolution of April 28, 2004, private

respondent Rolando F. Salvador seeks a reconsideration
.

In his petition for certiorari filed before this Court,

petitioner Romeo M. Estrella sought the nullification of
the November 5, 2003 Status Quo Ante Order1 issued
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En
Banc in EAC No. A-10-2002, "Romeo M. Estrella v.
Rolando F. Salvador," directing the "parties to maintain
the status quo ante order, which is the condition
prevailing before the issuance" by the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos of a writ of execution for the
enforcement of said court’s decision declaring petitioner
as the duly elected mayor of Baliwag, Bulacan.

In the issuance of the questioned COMELEC En

Banc Status Quo Ante Order, five (5) of the then
incumbent seven(7) members of the COMELEC
participated: Commissioners Benjamin Abalos, Sr.,
Luzviminda Tangcangco, Rufino S.B. Javier,
Ressureccion Z. Borra and Ralph C. Lantion.

Commissioners Abalos, Tangcangco, Javier and Lantion

voted for the issuance of said order, while Commissioner
Borra dissented.

Commissioner Lantion previously inhibited in SPR No. 21

-2002, a case pending before the COMELEC Second
Division involving the same parties, thus necessitating
the issuance of an order designating Commissioner
Borra as his substitute. The substitution order was
subsequently adopted in EAC No. A-10-2002.
Parenthetically, petitioner had previously filed a Motion
for Inhibition of Commissioner Lantion before the Second
Division in SPR No. 21-2002 which was denied, albeit on
Motion for Reconsideration the Second Division, in its
Resolution of May 7, 2002, noted that "Com[missioner]
Lantion indicated for the record that he is no longer
taking part in the proceedings in this case."

In the COMELEC En Banc Status Quo Ante Order,

Commissioner Lantion stated in his handwriting that "his
previous voluntary inhibition is only in the SPR cases
and not in the EAC" and that "as further agreed in the
Second Division, [he] will not participate in the Division
deliberations but will vote when the case is elevated [to
the] en banc."
In this Court’s Resolution2 of April 28, 2004 now the
subject of private respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration, it was held that:
Commissioner Lantion’s voluntary piecemeal inhibition
cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC
Rules
does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with
reservation. To allow him to participate in the En
Bancproceedings when he previously inhibited himself in
the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not
only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and
vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving
three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary
votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the
COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to
comply with the number of votes necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision or order, as required under
Rule 3, Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. – (a) When sitting
en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall
constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting
business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members
of the Commission shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003
issued by the COMELEC En Banc is hereby NULLIFIED.
This Resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. (
Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In seeking a reconsideration of the above-quoted
Resolution, private respondent cites Cua v. Commission
on Elections3 wherein this Court ruled:
After considering the issues and the arguments raised by
the parties, the Court holds that the 2-1 decision
rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under
Article IX-A, section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore,
the three members who voted to affirm the First Division
constituted a majority of the five members who
deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision
is also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision.
x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
Private respondent argues that "[f]ollowing the doctrine
laid out in Cua, three (3) votes would have been
sufficient to constitute a majority to carry the decision of
the COMELEC En Banc as provided by the Constitution
and the appropriate rules."4
Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was
lifted from Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution
which provides:
SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a
majority vote of all its members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. x x x (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be
the majority vote of all its members and not only those
who participated and took part in the deliberations.
Under the rules of statutory construction, it is to be
assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained.5 Since the above-quoted
constitutional provision states "all of its members,"
without any qualification, it should be interpreted as such.
In the case at bar, following the clear provision of the
Constitution, counting out Commissioner Lantion’s vote
from the questioned COMELEC En Banc resolution
would leave just three (3) votes out of "all" seven (7)
members of the COMELEC.
Even former Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, SJ, questions the Cua ruling in light of Section 7,
which says "majority of all the Members." He thus
concludes that "[t]hree is not the majority of seven."6
Had the framers intended that it should be the majority of
the members who participated or deliberated, it would
have clearly phrased it that way as it did with respect to
the Supreme Court in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the
Constitution:
SECTION 4(2) x x x all other cases which under the
Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, x x x
shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of
the members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
For the foregoing reasons then, this Court hereby
abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua and holds that
the COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case or matter
brought before it by a majority vote of "all its members,"
and NOT majority of the members who deliberated and
voted thereon.
WHEREFORE, private respondent’s motion for
reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 153945. February 4, 2003]

REYNATO BAYTAN, REYNALDO BAYTAN and

ADRIAN BAYTAN, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Challenged in this petition for certiorari[1] with prayer for

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is
the Resolution dated June 3, 2002[2] of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC for brevity) en banc in E.O.
Case No. 97-503. In its assailed Resolution, the
COMELEC en banc denied the motion to reconsider
Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 dated November 9, 2000
[3] ordering the Law Department to file criminal cases for
double registration against petitioners Reynato Baytan,
Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan (petitioners for
brevity).

The Antecedents

On June 15, 1997, petitioners were on their way to

register for the May 1998 elections when they met the
newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio (
Ignacio for brevity), in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite
City. Ignacio led petitioners to register in Precinct No. 83-
A of Barangay 18. Petitioners registered in this precinct
as evidenced by Voters Registration Records Nos.
41762473, 41762472 and 41762470.

When petitioners returned home, they wondered why the

registrants in this precinct looked unfamiliar to them. This
prompted petitioners to return to the registration center to
study the precinct map of Barangay 18. They then
realized that their residence is situated within the
jurisdiction of Barangay 28. Thus, petitioners proceeded
to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew
on June 22, 1997 as evidenced by Voters Registration
Records Nos. 42662969, 42662968 and 42662917.

Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter dated August 21,

1997 to former COMELEC Assistant Executive Director
Jose Pio O. Joson and furnished a copy thereof to
COMELEC Registrar Francisco Trias. In this letter,
petitioners requested for advice on how to cancel their
previous registration. They also explained the reason
and circumstances of their second registration and
expressed their intention to redress the error.

On September 16, 1997, the Election Officer of Cavite

City forwarded copies of petitioners Voters Registration
Records to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty.
Juanito V. Ravanzo (Ravanzo for brevity), for evaluation.
Ravanzo endorsed the matter to the Regional Director
for prosecution. Eventually, the Law Department
endorsed the case to Ravanzo for resolution.
On January 10, 1998, Ravanzo recommended filing an its Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 affirmed the
information for double registration against petitioners. In recommendation of Ravanzo. Petitioners moved for
an en banc meeting held on November 09, 2000, the reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc denied the
COMELEC in motion and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the En Banc

resolution dated November 9, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED
. The Law Department is hereby directed to file the
proper information against respondents for violation of
Art. XXII, Sec. 261, par. (y) sub-par. (5) of the Omnibus
Election Code.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

Petitioners contend that the COMELEC en

banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in

1. Recommending the prosecution of petitioners for

double registration despite clear and convincing
evidence on record that they had no intention of
committing said election offense;

2. Not considering the letter dated August 21, 1997

addressed to the COMELEC Assistant Director of Cavite
City as substantial compliance with the requirement of
the law for cancellation of previous registration; and

3. Taking cognizance of the case in the first instance in

violation of Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution.

In sum, petitioners insist they are innocent of any

wrongdoing in their act of registering twice on different
days in two different precincts. Petitioners argue that
they did not intend to perpetrate the act prohibited, and
therefore they should be exculpated. They claim honest
mistake and good faith in registering twice. Petitioners
claim they made the first registration because of the
intervention and instigation of Ignacio.

Petitioners theorize that their August 21, 1997 letter to

the election registrar of Cavite City informing him of the
lapse and asking how to rectify the same constitutes
substantial compliance with the Omnibus Election Codes
requirement of cancellation of prior registration. They
further implore a liberal construction of the laws on
election offenses since almost five years had lapsed from
the date of the commission of the offense on June 15,
1997. They claim the case is about to prescribe under
the Election Code.

Lastly, petitioners fault the COMELEC en banc for

assuming original jurisdiction over the case in
contravention of Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution. Petitioners argue that this constitutional
provision requires that election cases must first be heard
and decided by a Division before assumption of
jurisdiction by the COMELEC en banc.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit. for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in
support of the charge.[6]
First and Second Issues: Whether the criminal cases
should be dismissed on the ground of lack of intent and There is no question that petitioners registered twice on
substantial compliance with the requirement of different days and in different precincts without canceling
cancellation of previous registration. their previous registration. Aside from this, the
COMELEC found certain circumstances prevailing in the
In Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 dated November 9, case sufficient to
2000, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the
recommendation of the investigating officer. The
COMELEC thus directed its Law Department to file the
necessary information against petitioners for violation of
Article XXII, SEC. 261 (y) (5) of the Election Code which
reads:

SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty

of an election offense:

(y) On Registration of Voters:

(5) Any person who, being a registered voter, registers

anew without filing an application for cancellation of his
previous registration.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration to which the

COMELEC en banc issued the assailed Resolution
dated June 3, 2002 affirming the Minute Resolution.

The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC of the

power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is
intended to enable the COMELEC to assure the people
of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
 This grant is an adjunct to the COMELECs constitutional
duty to enforce and administer all election laws. Failure
by the COMELEC to exercise this power could result in
the frustration of the true will of the people and make an
idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every
qualified citizen to vote.[4]

Petitioners lose sight of the fact that the assailed

resolutions were issued in the preliminary investigation
stage. A preliminary investigation is essentially
inquisitorial and is only the means to discover who may
be charged with a crime, its function being merely to
determine probable cause.[5] All that is required in the
preliminary investigation is the determination of probable
cause to justify the holding of petitioners for trial. By
definition, probable cause is

x x x a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is

, or may be, well founded x x x such a state of facts in
the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term
does not mean `actual or positive cause nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial
warrant the finding of probable cause. The COMELEC and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be
noted that petitioners wrote down their address in provided by law.[10]
Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18 as No. 709 T. Gomez
Extension St., Barangay 18-Maya, Cavite City. However,
in Precinct No. 129-A of Barangay 28, petitioners
registered as residents of No. 709 Magcawas St.,
Barangay 28-Taurus, Caridad, Cavite City. The
COMELEC noted further that the affidavits submitted by
petitioners contained glaring inconsistencies. Petitioners
claimed that Ignacio led them to the wrong precinct to
register. However, Ignacios affidavit stated that while he
led them to the voting precinct of Barangay 18, he
immediately left the area not knowing that petitioners
registered in the wrong barangay. Contrary to petitioners
sworn statements, Aurora Baytan, mother of petitioners,
had another version. She claimed in her affidavit that on
June 15, 1997, Ignacio went to their house to inform
them about the redefinition of their barangays territorial
jurisdiction. Right then and there, Ignacio brought her
sons to Barangay 18 to register.

The COMELEC also pointed out that since double

registration is malum prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack
of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. Neither did
the COMELEC consider petitioners letter dated August
22, 1997 as an application to cancel their previous
registration. The COMELEC explained that this letter
was sent after their second registration was
accomplished and after the election officer of Cavite City
had already reported their act of double registration to a
higher official.

All told, a reasonably prudent man would readily

conclude that there exists probable cause to hold
petitioners for trial for the offense of double registration.

Moreover, petitioners claims of honest mistake, good

faith and substantial compliance with the Election Codes
requirement of cancellation of previous registration are
matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper
rather than at the preliminary investigation.[7] The
established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not
the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties evidence. It is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof.[8]

It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in

the prosecution of election offenses rests in the
COMELECs sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises
the constitutional authority to investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses and malpractices.[9]Generally, the
Court will not interfere with such finding of the
COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELECs
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of
all election offenses punishable under the election laws
We also cannot accept petitioners plea for a liberal
construction of the laws on the ground of prescription.
 Prescription of the crime or offense is the forfeiture or
loss of the right of the State to prosecute the offender
after the lapse of a certain time.[11]
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for

Section 267 of the Election Code provides that election

offenses shall prescribe after five years from the date of
their commission. In this case, the offense of double
registration allegedly occurred on June 22, 1997 when
petitioners registered for a second time in a different
precinct without canceling their previous registration. At
this point, the period of prescription for the alleged
offense started to run.

However, prescription is interrupted when proceedings

are instituted against the offender. Specifically, the
period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the
complaint even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation.[12]

The COMELEC initiated the complaint for double

registration against petitioners motu proprio under
Sections 3,[13] 4[14] and 5,[15] Rule 34 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. On September 16, 1997,
the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of
petitioners Voters Registration Records for evaluation to
Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo, Provincial Election Supervisor
of Cavite City, who was also tasked to investigate the
case. Ravanzo endorsed the matter to the Regional
Director for prosecution. The Regional Director
forwarded the case to the Law Department and the latter
re-endorsed the same to the office of Ravanzo for
resolution. A preliminary investigation hearing was
conducted on January 19, 1998 where petitioners were
instructed to submit their counter-affidavits. After the
preliminary investigation and based on the affidavits and
other evidence submitted in the case, Ravanzo
recommended the prosecution of petitioners for the
offense of double registration. Ineluctably, the
prescriptive period of the offense was interrupted upon
the COMELECs initiation of proceedings against
petitioners and remains tolled pending the termination of
the case.

The liberal construction of punitive laws in relation to the

prescription of offenses cannot be invoked to prejudice
the interest of the State to prosecute election offenses,
especially those which the COMELEC described as
ruffling the electoral system.[16]

Third Issue: Whether the COMELEC en bancs

assumption of original jurisdiction over the case violated
the Constitution.

Petitioners rely on Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987

Constitution which states:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or

in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
Petitioners assert that this constitutional provision serves
as basis to nullify the proceedings conducted and orders
issued by the COMELEC en banc in E.O. Case No. 97-
503.Petitioners cite Sarmiento v. Comelec[17] and  contests relating to the elections, returns, and
Zarate v. Comelec[18] to support their stand that the
COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion when it assumed original
jurisdiction over the case without first referring the same
to any of its divisions. In Sarmiento and Zarate, the Court
similarly held that election cases must first be heard and
decided by a Division of the Commission, and that the
Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority
to hear and decide the same at the first instance.
In its Comment for the COMELEC, the Solicitor General
points out that the rulings in Sarmiento and Zarate were
clarified in Canicosa v. COMELEC[19] to mean that
[I]t is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi
judicial powers that the COMELEC is mandated to hear
and decide cases first by division and then, upon motion
for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is
when it is jurisdictional.
The Solicitor General contends that the conduct of a
preliminary investigation before the filing of an
information in court does not in any way adjudicate with
finality the rights and liabilities of the parties investigated.
 A preliminary investigation does not make any
pronouncement as to the guilt or innocence of the party
involved. Hence, a preliminary investigation cannot be
considered a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding
required to be heard by the Division in the first instance.
On the other hand, petitioners countered that in Cruz v.
People,[20] the Court held that the conduct of a
preliminary investigation is a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding since there is opportunity to be heard and for
the production and weighing of evidence and a decision
is rendered thereon.
Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution,
the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-
judicial powers. The COMELECs administrative powers
are found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9
) of Article IX-C.[21] The 1987 Constitution does not
prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its
administrative powers, whether en banc or in division.
 The Constitution merely vests the COMELECs
administrative powers in the Commission on Elections,
while providing that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in
two divisions.Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act
directly on matters falling within its administrative powers.
 Indeed, this has been the practice of the COMELEC
both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.[22]
On the other hand, the COMELECs quasi-judicial powers
are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to wit:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise
the following powers and functions:
xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not
appealable.
The COMELECs exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is
subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly
requires that all election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the
COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration
shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows,
as held by the Court in Canicosa,[23] that the COMELEC
is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then
upon motion for reconsideration en banc, only when the
COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers.
The COMELEC is empowered in Section 2(6), Article IX-
C of the 1987 Constitution to prosecute cases of
violations of election laws. The prosecution of election
law violators involves the exercise of the COMELECs
administrative powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc can
directly approve the recommendation of its Law
Department to file the criminal information for double
registration against petitioners in the instant case. There
is no constitutional requirement that the filing of the
criminal information be first decided by any of the
divisions of the COMELEC.
In sum, the second sentence of Section 3, Article IX-C of
the 1987 Constitution is not applicable in administrative
cases, like the instant case where the COMELEC is
determining whether probable cause exists to charge
petitioners for violation of the provision of the Election
Code prohibiting double registration.
Indeed, the COMELEC acted in accordance with Section
9(b), Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure
governing the prosecution of election offenses in
meeting en banc in the first instance and acting on the
recommendation of Investigating Officer Ravanzo to file
charges against petitioners. The rule reads:
SEC. 9. Duty of the Law Department, State Prosecutor,
Provincial or City Fiscal Upon Receipt of Records. x x x
(b). In cases investigated by the lawyers or the field
personnel of the Commission, the Director of the Law
Department shall review and evaluate the
recommendation of said legal officer, prepare a report
and make a recommendation to the Commission
affirming, modifying or reversing the
same which shall be included in the agenda of the
succeeding meeting en banc of the Commission. If the
Commission approves the filing of an information against
the respondent/s, the Director of the Law Department
shall prepare and sign the information for immediate
filing with the appropriate court. (Emphasis supplied)
Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 was issued during the en
banc meeting held on November 9, 2000 to resolve the
recommendation of Ravanzo in the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207900               April 22, 2014
MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI, Petitioner,  On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSTAPHA J.
OMAR, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition1 under Rule 65, which petitioner Gamal S.
Hayudini (Hayudini) filed to set aside and annul the
assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (
COMELEC), dated June 20, 20132 and July 10, 2013,3
 which cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy for the
mayoralty seat in the 2013 local elections in South Ubian
, Tawi-Tawi, for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
The antecedent facts are:
On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of
Candidacy4 (CoC) for the position of Municipal Mayor of
South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National
and Local Elections held in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. Ten days after, or on October 15,
2012, Mustapha J. Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to Deny
Due Course or Cancel Hayudini’s CoC, entitled
Mustapha J. Omar v. Gamal S. Hayudini, docketed as
SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F).5Omar basically asserted that
Hayudini should be disqualified for making false
representation regarding his residence. He claimed that
Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the
Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in
Zamboanga City.
Thereafter, on November 30, 2012, Hayudini filed a
Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in
Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). Despite the opposition of
Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudini’s
petition on January 31, 2013.6 On that same day, the
COMELEC’s First Division dismissed7 Omar’s earlier
petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC in SPA No. 13-106(DC
)(F) for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini
committed false representation as to his residency.
Oppositor Baki, subsequently, elevated the case to the
Bongao Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5. The RTC,
on March 8, 2013, Reversed8 the MCTC ruling and
ordered the deletion of Hayudini’s name in Barangay
Bintawlan’s permanent list of voters. In view of said
decision, Omar filed before the COMELEC a Petition to
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S.
Hayudini by Virtue of a Supervening Event on March 26,
2013. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 13-249(DC
)(F).9 Hayudini appealed the March 8, 2013 RTC
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), but on April 17,
2013, in CA-G.R. SP No. 05426,10 the same was denied
.
South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was proclaimed and,
consequently, took his oath of office.
On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division
issued a Resolution11 granting Omar’s second petition
to cancel Hayudini’s CoC. The dispositive portion of the
COMELEC Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy filed by Gamal S. Hayudini as Mayor of South
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, in the 13 May 2013 elections, is
hereby CANCELLED.
The Office of the Deputy Executive Director for
Operations is hereby directed to constitute a Special
Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the
lawful winner for mayoralty position in South Ubian, Tawi
-Tawi during the 13 May 2013 elections.
SO ORDERED.12
Hayudini, thus, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
the COMELEC En Banc, arguing that its Second Division
committed grave error when it gave due course to a
belatedly filed petition and treated the March 8, 2013
RTC Decision as a supervening event.
On July 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc denied
Hayudini’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
The decretal portion of the En Banc’s assailed
Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY this
Motion for Reconsideration for LACK OF MERIT.
Consequently, the June 20, 2013 Resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) is hereby affirmed.
Corollary thereto, the proclamation of respondent
GAMAL S. HAYUDINI is hereby declared null and void
and without any legal force and effect. SALMA A. OMAR
is hereby proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor for South
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, being the qualified candidate
obtaining the highest number of votes, considering the
doctrine laid down by the case Aratea v. Comelec13 that
a cancelled CoC cannot give rise to a valid candidacy,
and much less, to a valid vote, to wit:
"Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a
candidate for the position of mayor [of] San Antonio,
Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered
stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who
remains as the sole candidate for the mayoralty post and
obtained the highest number of votes, should now be
proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled,
because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for
Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled
before or after elections is immaterial because the
cancellation on such ground means he was never a
candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one
qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections -
Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of
votes."
The Office of the Deputy Executive Director for
Operations is hereby directed to constitute a Special
Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming
SALMA OMAR as the winning candidate for mayoralty
position in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi during the May 13,
2013 elections.
SO ORDERED.14
Thus, Hayudini filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
Hayudini mainly advances the following arguments:
A.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT FAILED TO
OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS THE INSTANT PETITION TO
CANCEL CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY DUE TO
SUPERVENING EVENT (SPA. NO. 13-249(DC)(F),
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENT OMAR TO
COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS
OF SECTIONS 2 AND 4 OF THE COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 9532.
xxxx
C.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVISITED
AND MODIFIED THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY
RESOLUTION ISSUED BY THE FIRST DIVISION IN
THE SPA NO. 13-106(DC)(F).
III.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED
TO CANCEL PETITIONER HAYUDINI’S CERTIFICATE
OF CANDIDACY AND DECLARE HIS PROCLAMATION
AS NULL AND VOID.
xxxx
L.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECREED
THE PROCLAMATION OF SALMA A. OMAR AS THE
DULY-ELECTED MAYOR FOR SOUTH UBIAN, TAWI-
TAWI.15
The Court finds the petition to be without merit.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural missteps
independent action based on thespecific grounds and , the Court sustains the COMELEC’s liberal treatment of
available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, Omar’s petition.
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. It will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is
alleged and is actually proved to exist. Grave abuse of
discretion has been defined as the arbitrary exercise of
power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or
the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power
that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law. For an act to be condemned as
having been done with grave abuse of discretion, such
an abuse must be patent and gross.16 Here, Hayudini
miserably failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its
assailed Resolutions with grave abuse of discretion.

Hayudini contends that the COMELEC committed grave

abuse of discretion when it admitted, and later granted,
Omar’s petition despite failure to comply with Sections 2
and 4 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
as amended by Resolution No. 9523. The subject
sections read:

Section 2. Period to File Petition. — The Petition must be

filed within five (5) days from the last day for filing of
certificate of candidacy; but not later than twenty five (25)
days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy
subject of the Petition. In case of a substitute candidate,
the Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the
time the substitute candidate filed his certificate of
candidacy.

xxxx

Section 4. Procedure to be observed. — Both parties

shall observe the following procedure:

1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish

a copy of the Petition, through personal service to the
respondent. In cases where personal service is not
feasible, or the respondent refuses to receive the Petition
, or the respondents’ whereabouts cannot be ascertained
, the petitioner shall execute an affidavit stating the
reason or circumstances therefor and resort to registered
mail as a mode of service. The proof of service or the
affidavit shall be attached to the Petition to be filed;17

Here, Hayudini filed his CoC on October 5, 2012, which

was also the last day of filing of CoC for the May 13,
2013 elections. Omar, on the other hand, filed the
subject petition only on March 26, 2013. Under the
COMELEC Rules, a Petition to Deny Due Course or
Cancel CoC must be filed within five days from the last
day for filing a certificate of candidacy, but not later than
twenty-five days from the time of filing of the CoC subject
of the petition. Clearly, Omar’s petition was filed way
beyond the prescribed period. Likewise, he failed to
provide sufficient explanation as to why his petition was
not served personally to Hayudini.
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests who had been previously qualified under the law25 to run
are to be liberally construed in order that the will of the for an elective position, was then rendered ineligible.
people in the choice of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is
neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite
period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under
suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately
cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the
sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by
brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract
and delay the trial of an ordinary action. This principle
was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission
on Elections18 and De Castro v. Commission on
Elections,19 where the Court held that "in exercising its
powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to
protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not
be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election
disputes."20

Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure are subject to liberal construction.
1âwphi1 The COMELEC has the power to liberally
interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the
interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy
disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality
is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient
implementation of its objectives − ensuring the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as
well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an
ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with
public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of
private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but
also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty
which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the
tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all
means within its command, whom the people truly chose
as their rightful leader.21

Indeed, Omar had previously filed a Petition to Deny Due

Course or Cancel Hayudini’s CoC on October 15, 2012,
docketed as SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F). This was
dismissed on January 31, 2013, or the same day the
MCTC granted Hayudini’s petition to be included in the
list of voters. However, on March 8, 2013, the RTC
reversed the MCTC ruling and, consequently, ordered
the deletion of Hayudini’s name in Barangay Bintawlan’s
permanent list of voters. Said deletion was already final
and executory under the law.22 Hayudini, however, still
appealed the case to the CA, which was subsequently
denied. Notably, thereafter, he went to the CA again, this
time to file a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 05499.23 In a Resolution dated July 9, 2013, the
CA also denied said petition primarily because of
Hayudini’s act of engaging in the pernicious practice of
forum shopping by filing two modes of appeal before said
court.24 Hence, by virtue of the finality of said RTC
decision deleting his name from the voters’ list, Hayudini,
Given the finality of the RTC decision, the same should deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
be considered a valid supervening event. A supervening may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that
event refers to facts and events transpiring after the any material representation contained therein as
judgment or order had become executory. These required under Section 74
circumstances affect or change the substance of the
judgment and render its execution inequitable.26 Here,
the RTC’s March 8, 2013 decision, ordering the deletion
of Hayudini’s name in the list of voters, which came after
the dismissal of Omar’s first petition, is indubitably a
supervening event which would render the execution of
the ruling in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F) iniquitous and
unjust. As the COMELEC aptly ruled, the decision to
exclude Hayudini was still non-existent when the
COMELEC first promulgated the Resolution in SPA No.
13-106(DC)(F) on January 31, 2013, or when the issues
involved therein were passed upon.27 The First Division
even expressed that although the Election Registration
Board (ERB) denied Hayudini’s application for
registration, it could not adopt the same because it was
not yet final as Hayudini was still to file a Petition for
Inclusion before the MCTC.28 Thus, it is not far-fetched
to say that had this final RTC finding been existent
before, the COMELEC First Division could have taken
judicial notice of it and issued a substantially different
ruling in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F).29

The same ruling adequately equipped Omar with the

necessary ground to successfully have Hayudini’s CoC
struck down. Under the rules, a statement in a certificate
of candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to run
for public office when in truth he is not, is a false material
representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code.

Sections 74 and 78 read:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The

certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it
is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein
and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city or district or
sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence
; his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws,
legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are
true to the best of his knowledge.

xxxx

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a

certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election.
COMELEC to have declared his proclamation null and
void when no petition for annulment of his proclamation
was ever filed. What petitioner seems to miss, however,
is that the nullification of his proclamation as a winning
candidate is also

The false representation mentioned in these provisions

must pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous
mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot
run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases
, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election
laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification
for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and
residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a
registered voter falls under this classification as it is a
legal requirement which must be reflected in the CoC.
The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she
wins, will work for and represent the local government
under which he or she is running.30 Even the will of the
people, as expressed through the ballot, cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as in the instant case, that the candidate was qualified.31

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false

representation under Section 78 must consist of a "
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
Simply put, it must be made with a malicious intent to
deceive the electorate as to the potential candidate's
qualifications for public office.32

Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in

his CoC "that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is
eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a
candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a
registered voter in the municipality where he intends to
be elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate
of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office,
then the candidate clearly makes a false material
representation, a ground to support a petition under
Section 78.33 It is interesting to note that Hayudini was,
in fact, initially excluded by the ERB as a voter. On
November 30, 2012, the ERB issued a certificate
confirming the disapproval of Hayudini’s petition for
registration.34 This is precisely the reason why he
needed to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent
List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan before the MCTC.
Thus, when he stated in his CoC that "he is eligible for
said office," Hayudini made a clear and material
misrepresentation as to his eligibility, because he was
not, in fact, registered as a voter in Barangay Bintawlan.

Had the COMELEC not given due course to Omar’s

petition solely based on procedural deficiencies, South
Ubian would have a mayor who is not even a registered
voter in the locality he is supposed to govern, thereby
creating a ridiculously absurd and outrageous situation.
Hence, the COMELEC was accurate in cancelling
Hayudini’s certificate of candidacy. Hayudini likewise
protests that it was a grave error on the part of the
a legitimate outcome − a necessary legal consequence − We find the factual mileu of the Aratea case applicable in
of the cancellation of his CoC pursuant to Section 78. A the instant case, since this is also a case for a petition to
CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
nature of a disqualification case.35 The cancellation of a Since Hayudini
CoC essentially renders the votes cast for the candidate
whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled as
stray votes.36 If the disqualification or CoC cancellation
or denial case is not resolved before the election day, the
proceedings shall continue even after the election and
the proclamation of the winner. Meanwhile, the candidate
may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the winner,
but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and
cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule likewise
applies even if the candidate facing disqualification has
already taken his oath of office.37 The only exception to
this rule is in the case of congressional and senatorial
candidates where the COMELEC ipso jure loses
jurisdiction in favor of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the candidates
have been proclaimed, taken the proper oath, and also
assumed office.38

It bears stressing that one of the requirements for a

mayoralty candidate is that he must be a resident of the
city or municipality where he intends to be elected. Thus,
under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is
required that a candidate must certify under oath that he
is eligible for the public office he seeks election. In this
case, when petitioner stated in his CoC that he is a
resident of Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian, Tawi Tawi
and eligible for a public office, but it turned out that he
was declared to be a non-resident thereof in a petition
for his inclusion in the list of registered voters, he
therefore committed a false representation in his CoC
which pertained to a material fact which is a ground for
the cancellation of his CoC under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner's ineligibility for not
being a resident of the place he sought election is not a
ground for a petition for disqualification, since the
grounds enumerated under Section 6839 of the Omnibus
Election Code specifically refer to the commission of
prohibited acts, and possession of a permanent resident
status in a foreign country.

As held in Aratea v. COMELEC,40 which is a case for

cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, a cancelled certificate of candidacy void
ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much
less to valid votes. Whether a certificate of candidacy is
cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial,
because the cancellation on such ground means he was
never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate
of candidacy being void ab initio. We then found that
since the winning mayoralty candidate's certificate of
candidacy was void ab initio, he was never a candidate
at all and all his votes were considered stray votes, and
thus, proclaimed the second placer, the only qualified
candidate, who actually garnered the highest number of
votes, for the position of Mayor.
was never a valid candidate for the position of the
Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, the votes
cast for him should be considered stray votes,
Consequently, the COMELEC properly proclaimed
Salma Omar, who garnered the highest number of votes
in the remaining qualified candidates for the mayoralty
post, as the duly-elected Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi
Tawi.

Codilla v. De Venecia case has no application in this

case, since it dealt with a petition for disqualification
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and not
a petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of
candidacy under Section 78 which is the case at bar.

Finally, contrary to Hayudini's belief, the will of the

electorate is still actually respected even when the votes
for the ineligible candidate are disregarded. The votes
cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
considered at all in determining the winner of an election
for these do not constitute the sole and total expression
of the sovereign voice. On the other hand, those votes
for the eligible and legitimate candidates form an integral
part of said voice, which must equally be given due
respect , if not more.41

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The

COMELEC Resolutions dated June 20, 2013 and July 10
, 2013 are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.
 5. That in the said Statement of Votes by
City/Municipality or Precinct or C.E. Form No. 20-A, it is
reflected therein that the total number of votes garnered
G.R. No. 108886 May 5, 1995 by the petitioner is only 858 votes, when in fact and in
truth, after reviewing and correcting the computation of
AQUILES U. REYES, petitioner,  the actual votes garnered by the petitioner the total votes
vs. to be counted in his favor is 915 votes;
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO,
BRANCH XXXIX, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ADOLFO G. COMIA, AND THE SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO,
 respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition

and mandamus which seeks (1) the annulment of the
decision, dated June 23, 1992, of the Regional Trial
Court (Br. 39) of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, annuling the
proclamation of petitioner as the eighth member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro; (2) the
annulment of the decision of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), dated January 22, 1993,
dismissing petitioner's appeal from the trial court's
decision; (3) the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent Sangguniang Bayan to recognize
petitioner as the duly elected member thereof; and (4)
the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent
Adolfo G. Comia, enjoining him from continuing in office
as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo

Comia were candidates for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro in the
May 11, 1992 synchronized elections.

On May 13, 1992, during the proceedings of the

Municipal Board of Canvassers, private respondent
moved for the exclusion of certain election returns, on
the ground of serious irregularity in counting in favor of
petitioner Aquiles Reyes votes cast for "Reyes" only,
considering that there was another candidate (Epitacio
Reyes) bearing the same surname. However, without
resolving his petition, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed on the same day petitioner as the eighth
winning candidate with 7,205 votes. On May 25, 1992
petitioner took his oath of office.

On June 1, 1992, private respondent filed an election

protest before the trial court. He alleged that "a vital
mistake [had been] committed by the Board of
Canvassers in the mathematical computation of the total
number of votes garnered by petitioner [now private
respondent];" Private respondent alleged:
6. That the Municipal Board of Canvassers and the On the other hand, the COMELEC's First Division
Election Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, after dismissed on January 22, 1993 petitioner's appeal on the
having been informed of the said discrepancies, ground that he had failed to pay the appeal fee within the
manifested in the presence of Municipal Trial Court prescribed period.
Judge TOMAS C. LEYNES, that it was an honest
mistake committed in the computation and the addition
of the total number of votes appearing in C.E. Form No.
20-A.;

7. That after correcting the total number of votes

garnered by the petitioner, it appears now that the total
votes cast in his favor in all precincts is 7,233 votes
which is more than 28 votes over the total of 7,205 votes
garnered by respondent Aquiles U. Reyes, who was
proclaimed as Elected Sangguniang Bayan Member of
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro occupying the 8th position.

On June 4, 1992, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss

private respondent's petition on the ground that it was
filed beyond the reglementary period of ten days from
proclamation. On June 15, 1992, however, the trial court
denied his motion.

On the other hand, the Municipal Board of Canvassers

file its answer in which it admitted that it had made a
mistake in crediting private respondent with only 858
votes when he was entitled to 915 votes in the
Statement of Votes (C.E. Form No. 20-A).

On June 23, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision

annuling the proclamation of petitioner and declaring
private respondent as the eighth winning candidate for
the position of councilor of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. A copy of the decision was
served on petitioner on June 26, 1992.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC. In

addition, he filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition
in the Court of Appeals, to compel the Sangguniang
Bayan to recognize him as the duly proclaimed member
of that body and prohibit it from further recognizing
private respondent.

On August 26, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the

petition because of petitioner's pending appeal in the
COMELEC. The appellate court cited Supreme Court
Circular 28-91 which prohibits the filing of multiple
petitions involving the same issues.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but his

motion was denied. The appellate court's decision
became final and executory on December 10, 1992.

Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan met in inaugural

session on July 3, 1992, during which private respondent
was recognized as the eighth member of the body and
thereafter allowed to assume office and discharge its
functions. On July 13, 1992, it informed petitioner that it
had recognized the private respondent as its member.
Petitioner then brought the present action. Petitioner barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not
contends that both the trial court and the COMELEC's appealable.
First Division committed a grave abuse of discretion, the
first, by assuming jurisdiction over the election contest Id. §3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or
filed by private respondent despite the fact that the case in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
was filed more than ten days after petitioner's procedure in
proclamation, and the second i.e., the COMELEC's First
Division, by dismissing petitioner's appeal from the
decision of the trial court for late payment of the appeal
fee.

We find the petition to be without merit.

First. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the COMELEC,

raises a fundamental question. He contends that the
filing of the present petition, without petitioner first filing a
motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en
banc, violates Art. IX, A, §7 of the Constitution1 because
under this provision only decisions of the COMELEC en
banc may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

This is correct. It is now settled that in providing that the

decisions, orders and rulings of COMELEC "may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari" the
Constitution in its Art. IX, A, §7 means the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65, §1.2 Since a basic
condition for bringing such action is that the petitioner
first file a motion for reconsideration,3 it follows that
petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the First Division of the COMELEC is fatal
to his present action.

Petitioner argues that this requirement may be

dispensed with because the only question raised in his
petition is a question of law. This is not correct. The
questions raised by petitioner involve the interpretation
of constitutional and statutory provisions in light of the
facts of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore,
not pure questions of law.

Moreover, that a motion for reconsideration before the

COMELEC en banc is required for the filing of a petition
for certiorari is clear from the following provisions of the
Constitution:

Art. IX, C, §2. The Commission on Elections shall

exercise the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all

contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on

election contests involving elective municipal and
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided
by the Commission en banc.
Conformably to these provisions of the Constitution all
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies,
must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a
party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a
motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en
banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A,
§7, "may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari."
4 view of the joint-affidavit executed by the members of the
Second Even on the merits we think the First Division of
the COMELEC properly dismissed petitioner's appeal
from the decision of the trial court because of his failure
to pay the appeal fee within the time for perfecting an
appeal. Rule 22, §9 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure expressly provides:
Sec. 9. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — The appeal
may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the
instance of the Commission on any of the following
grounds:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the appeal fee; . . .
In accordance with §2(b) of COMELEC Resolution No.
2108-A, the appeal fee must be paid within the period to
perfect the appeal. Thus:
Sec. 2. When docket and other fees shall be paid. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The appeal fees prescribed in section 3 of Rule 22 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedures shall be paid within
the period to perfect the appeal. . . .
The period to perfect the appeal is understood to be the
period within which to file the notice of appeal.
On the other hand, Rule 22, §3 of the Rules of
Procedure of the COMELEC provides:
Notice of Appeal. Within five (5) days after promulgation
of the decision of the court, the aggrieved party may file
with said court a notice of appeal, and serve a copy
thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse party.
This resolution, which was promulgated on July 14, 1989,
superseded COMELEC Resolution No. 14565 on which
petitioner relies for his contention that the fee is to be
paid only upon the filing of the appeal brief.
The records show that petitioner received a copy of the
decision of the trial court on June 26, 1992. However, he
paid the appeal fee of P1,020.00 only on August 6, 1992.
In other words, petitioner allowed forty (40) days to lapse
when the appeal fee should have been paid within five (5
) days after promulgation of the trial court's decision.
Petitioner claims that he acted on advice, presumably of
COMELEC officials, to wait until the records of the
appealed case was received from the Regional Trial
Court, so that it could be docketed and given a case
number before paying the appeal fee. But there is
nothing in the record to show this or that petitioner
offered to pay the appeal fee within the appeal period.
He has not identified the person who allegedly gave him
the erroneous advice.
Petitioner also prays that a re-canvass be conducted in
all the electoral precincts of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro in
Municipal Board of Canvassers on October 12, 1993 in
which they stated:
That the respondent Board, per verification from the
Comelec records of Naujan, after receipt of the sworn
letter-complaint of Mr. Aquiles U. Reyes, aside from the
matters already alluded to above found that the "40"
votes he garnered in Precinct No. 37, and the "31" votes
in Precinct 41-A that should have been credited,
transcribed or recorded in complainant's favor in the
Statement of Votes (C.E. Form No. 22-A) on the basis of
the Election Returns (C.E. Form No. 9), thru honest
mistake was erroneously and inadvertently transcribed
or recorded in good faith and without malice due to
mental and physical fatigue and exhaustion by the Board
of Canvassers and its staff in favor of candidate
Jeremias Nacorda of Sangguniang Bayan Member of the
Municipality of Naujan in the Statement of Votes (C.E.
Form No. 22-A) of said precincts, and what should have
been credited and reflected as candidate Nacorda's vote
in the Statement of Votes (C.E. Form No. 22-A) on the
basis of the Election Returns (C.E. Form No. 9) are "9"
votes in Precinct 37 not "40" votes, and "8" votes in
Precinct No. 41-A and not "31" votes, certification is
hereto attached issued by the Election Officer of Naujan
that candidate Nacorda per Comelec records shown in
the Election Returns (C.E. Form No. 9) only garnered "9"
votes in Precinct 37, and "8" votes in Precinct 41-A and
marked as Annex "1" and made as integral part of his
joint-affidavit.
This issue was raised in the Addendum to Appellant's
Brief6 in the COMELEC Case EAC No. 9-92. With the
dismissal of that case by the COMELEC's First Division,
there is no basis for petitioner's present contention.
Third. Petitioner also assails the decision of the trial
court as having been rendered without jurisdiction. He
contends that the election protest of private respondent
was filed more than ten days after his (petitioner's)
proclamation.
Petitioner is, however, estopped to raise this question
now. He did not only appeal from the decision of the trial
court to the COMELEC raising this question, but he also
filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition in the Court SO ORDERED.
of Appeals. Having decided on this course of action, he
should not be allowed to file the present petition just
because he lost in those cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of

merit.
G.R. No. 162203             April 14, 2004 The Comelec denied the motion in its
questioned Resolution dated February 13, 2004, on
AKLAT-ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG three grounds, namely: the petition was filed beyond the
LIPUNAN AT ADHIKAIN PARA SA TAO, INC., petitioner, deadline
 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC),
 respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

For resolution is the Petition1 for certiorari and

mandamus filed by Aklat-Asosasyon Para Sa Kaunlaran
Ng Lipunan At Adhikain Para Sa Tao, Inc. (Aklat)
assailing the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
 Resolution2 dated January 8, 2004, which dismissed
its Petition3 for re-qualification as a party-list organization
, and the Resolution4 dated February 13, 2004, which
denied its Motion for Reconsideration.5

Briefly, the facts are as follows:

On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for

declaration of re-qualification as a party-list organization
for purposes of the May 2004 elections. It alleged in its
petition that it participated in the 2001 elections but was
disqualified by the Comelec as it was found not to have
complied with the guidelines set by the Court in the case
of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec (
Bagong Bayani case)6 for party-list organizations to
qualify and participate as such in the party-list elections.
Accordingly, Aklat "re-organized itself in order that it will
comply with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by the
Supreme Court"7 in the said case.

In its assailed Resolution dated January 8, 2004, the

Comelec dismissed the petition stating that Aklat cannot
be considered as an organization representing the
marginalized and underrepresented groups as identified
under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. 7941).
According to the Comelec, Aklat’s statement that it has
re-organized itself does not cure this defect as "there is
nothing in the petition which will help us identify what
particular marginalized and underrepresented group
AKLAT is now representing."8 Further, the Comelec held
that "AKLAT lumped all the sectoral groups imaginable
under the classification of regular members just to
convince us that it is now cured of its defect."9

On January 15, 2004, Aklat filed a Motion for

Reconsideration dated January 14, 2004, substantially
averring that it has reorganized itself and taken the
necessary steps to make it an organization of, by and for
the marginalized and underrepresented groups of
society, particularly the indigenous cultural communities
and the youth. To this end, it has allegedly effected a
fundamental change in its purposes as an organization,
nature of its membership and focus of its programs.10
set by the Comelec in Resolution No. 6320 for was not properly verified there being no showing that Mr.
registration of party-list organizations; the petition was Dominador Buhain, the signatory of the verification and
not one for re-qualification as Aklat was never a certification of non-forum shopping, was duly authorized
registered party-list organization having failed to meet by Aklat to verify or cause the preparation and filing of
the eight-point guidelines set by the Court in the Bagong the
Bayani case; and that its decision not to extend the
deadline for registration of party-list organizations is valid
, the Comelec being in the best position to make such a
determination.11

In the instant Petition, Aklat asserts that under Section 5

of R.A. 7941, petitions for registration as a party-list
organization may be filed not later than ninety (90) days
before the elections. It therefore had until February 10,
2004, the ninetieth (90th) day before the elections on
May 10, 2004, within which to file its petition. Hence, its
petition, which was filed on November 20, 2003, was
filed within the allowed period. Section 5 of Resolution
No. 632012 which requires the filing of such petitions not
later than September 30, 2003, is null and void as it
amends R.A. 7941.

It further maintains that it has complied with the eight-

point guidelines set in the Bagong Bayani case.
Allegedly, Aklat has a total membership of over 4,000
persons who belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented groups. It has established information
and coordination centers throughout the country for the
benefit and in representation of indigenous cultural
communities, farm and factory workers including
fisherfolk and the youth. Aklat also asserts that it is
different from Asosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran ng Industria
ng Aklat (A.K.L.A.T.) which was previously de-registered
by the Comelec. Because of all these, Aklat contends
that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it
denied its petition for re-qualification.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed

a Comment dated March 26, 2004, stating that the
Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed Resolutions. According to the OSG,
Resolution No. 6320 is not in conflict with and is, in fact,
germane to the purpose of R.A. 7941. It was within the
scope of the authority granted to the Comelec that it
issued Resolution No. 6320 setting the deadline for filing
petitions for registration under the party-list system on
September 30, 2003. In line with the purpose of R.A.
7941 to enable marginalized sectors to actively
participate in legislation, the Comelec must be given
sufficient time to evaluate all petitions for registration, at
the same time allowing oppositions to be filed to the end
that only those truly qualified may be accredited under
the party-list system. Besides, Republic Act No.
843613 allows the Comelec to change the periods and
dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts to
ensure their accomplishment.

The OSG further maintains that the petition for re-

qualification failed to comply with the provisions of
Resolution No. 6320. According to the OSG, the petition
petition on its behalf. Moreover, Aklat was registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission only on
October 20, 2003, a month before it filed its petition for re
-qualification. Hence, it has not existed for a period of at
least one (1) year prior to the filing of the petition as
required by Section 6 of Resolution No. 6320. The OSG
also points out that Aklat failed to support its petition with
the documents required under Section 7 of Resolution
No. 6320, namely: a list of its officers and members
particularly showing that the majority of its membership
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors it seeks to represent, and a track record or
summary showing that it represents and seeks to uplift
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society.
Moreover, the OSG notes that the incorporators and
directors of Aklat are invariably known as pillars of the
book publishing industry or authors. Hence, even as re-
organized, Aklat remains to be an association of authors,
book publishers, and publishing companies, rather than
the organization of indigenous cultural communities, farm
and factory workers, fisherfolk and youth it claims to be.
For its part, the Comelec filed a Comment dated March
29, 2004, stating that the period of ninety (90) days
prescribed in R.A. 7941 refers to the prohibitive period
beyond which petitions for registration may no longer be
filed. Furthermore, the documents submitted by Aklat do
not prove that its members belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors of society.
Aklat’s contention that Resolution No. 6320 is null and
void as it amends and amplifies R.A. 7941 deserves
scant consideration. R.A. 7941 provides:
Sec. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons
may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and
other relevant information as the COMELEC may require:
Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals…[Italics supplied.]
By its wording, R.A. 7941 itself supports the Comelec’s
position that the period stated therein refers to the
prohibitive period beyond which petitions for registration
should no longer be filed nor entertained. Put elsewise, it
is simply the minimum countback period which is not
subject to reduction since it is prescribed by law, but it is
susceptible of protraction on account of administrative
necessities and other exigencies perceived by the poll
body.
Verily, the Comelec has the power to promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to enforce and
administer election laws. This power includes the
determination, within the parameters fixed by law, of
appropriate periods for the accomplishment of certain
pre-election acts like filing petitions for registration under
the party-list system. This is exactly what the Comelec
did when it issued its Resolution No. 6320 declaring
September 30, 2003, as the deadline for filing petitions
for registration under the party-list system. Considering
these, as well as the multifarious pre-election activities
that the Comelec is mandated to undertake, the issuance
of its Resolution No. 6320 cannot be considered tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Neither is there grave abuse of discretion in the
Comelec’s denial of Aklat’s petition on the ground that it
failed to substantiate its claim that it represents the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. It
should be noted that it was Aklat which asserted in its
petition before the poll body that it has re-organized and
is now applying for re-qualification after its de-registration
for failure to comply with the guidelines set forth in
the Bagong Bayani case. Thus, the Comelec cannot be
faulted for relying on its earlier finding, absent any
evidence in Aklat’s petition to the contrary, that Aklat is
not an organization representing the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, but is actually a business
interest or economic lobby group which seeks the
promotion and protection of the book publishing industry.
Significantly, Aklat and A.K.L.A.T. have substantially the
same incorporators. In fact, four (4) of Aklat’s six (6)
incorporators14 are also incorporators of A.K.L.A.T.
15 This substantial similarity is hard to ignore and
bolsters the conclusion that the supposed re-organization
undertaken by Aklat is plain window-dressing as it has
not really changed its character as a business interest of
persons in the book publishing industry.
The Court observes that Aklat’s articles of incorporation
and document entitled The Facts About Aklat which were
attached to its petition for re-qualification contain general
averments that it supposedly represents marginalized
groups such as the youth, indigenous communities,
urban poor and farmers/fisherfolk. These general
statements do not measure up to the first guideline set
by the Bagong Bayani case for screening party-list
participants, i.e., that "the political party, sector,
organization or coalition must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of R.
A. 7941. In other words, it must show—through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
platform of government and track record—that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose
the interest of such sectors."16
In this regard, the Court notes with approval the OSG’s
contention that Aklat has no track record to speak of
concerning its representation of marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies considering that it has
been in existence for only a month prior to the filing of its
petition for re-qualification.
It should finally be emphasized that the findings of fact
by the Comelec, or any other administrative agency
exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are
binding on the Supreme Court.17
In view of the foregoing, the Comelec can, by no means,
be held to have committed grave abuse of discretion to
justify the setting aside of the assailed Resolutions.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 75959 August 31, 1992
VICTORIANO V. OROCIO, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, SOFRONIO B. URSAL,
MARCOS S. SEGARRA, LEON J. PILAR, JR., and
JOSE M. AGUSTIN, respondents.
Victoriano V. Orocio for and in his own behalf.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On 25 May 1982, an accident occurred at the Malaya
Thermal Plant of the National Power Corporation (NPC).
Based on the accident report of Robinson D. Mapili and
Ildefonso I. Barrera dated 27 May 1982, 1 tube leaks on
HPH 5B were confirmed at 2:30 o'clock in the morning of
25 May 1982. From the time of such confirmation until
8:00 o'clock that morning, the system was drained and
prepared for repair by mechanical maintenance
personnel. By 8:45 o'clock, the system was declared
safe for repair. Work thus progressed that same morning
until 11:10 o'clock, when the plug from the leaking tube
gave way, thereby releasing steam and hot water which
hit two (2) of the employees working on the tube leak.
Ernesto Pumaloy, an NPC employee, suffered 1st and
2nd degree burns on the lower part of his body while
Domingo Abodizo, a casual employee of O.P. Landrito's
General Services (OPLGS), a janitorial contractor of the
NPC, assigned to the Maintenance Section, suffered 1st
and 2nd degree burns on nearly seventy percent (70%)
of his body. The injured personnel were brought to the
Tanay General Hospital for treatment and were later
transferred to Meralco's J.F. Cotton Hospital. Total
hospitalization expenses for the treatment of Domingo
Abodizo reached P53,802.26.
The NPC initially advanced this amount by setting it up
as an account receivable from OPLGS deducted on a
staggered basis from the latter's billings against NPC
until the same was fully satisfied.
Subsequently, OPLGS, through its manager Ofelia
Landrito, in a letter to Mr. Larry S. Gaerlan, Vice-
President, Human Resources & General Services (VP-
HRGS) NPC, dated 30 August 1982, 2 requested for a
refund of the total amount deducted from their billings
representing payment of the advances made by the NPC
. This request was reiterated in a follow-up letter dated 6
September 1982. 3 In his Memorandum to the VP-HRGS
dated 14 September 1982, Atty. C.Q. Crucillo, Assistant
Chief Legal Counsel of the NPC, recommended
favorable action on the request of the contractor. 4 This
was forwarded to the Acting Manager, Metro Manila
Regional Center (MMRC) of the NPC. 5In turn, this
opinion was referred to the General Counsel of the NPC
for comment. 6 At that time, petitioner, then Legal
Services Chief D of the NPC, was designated by the
Manager of the Legal Counseling Division of the NPC,
who was to attend and participate in a Management
Convocation scheduled for 30 September to 2 October
1992, as officer-in-charge of the Office of the General
Counsel for that period. 7 In a memorandum dated 1
October 1982, petitioner, as officer-in-charge,
recommended favorable action on OPLGS' request, in
support whereof he stated:
disallowed, admits the non-existence of employer-
employee relationship between NPC and Mr. Abodizo,
employee of O.P. Landrito. However, the legal opinion
premises the legality of the request for payment on the
basis of quasi-delict, more particularly, the negligence
and/or want of care on the part of the MMRC crew

xxx xxx xxx

In brief, it is posited in the Memorandum that under

Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
pursuant to the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitor" (sic) (the
thing speaks for itself) and citing the case of Bernabe
Africa, et al. vs. Caltex, et al., L-12986, March 31, 1966,
it may be reasonably inferred that the incident causing
injuries to Mr. Abodizo happened for want of care on the
part of the Metro Manila Regional Center (MMRC) crew,
rendering NPC, as their employer and owner of the
Malaya Thermal Plant liable for damages sustained by
Mr. Abodizo. It is further contended that under Article
2179 of the New Civil Code, NPC may not be liable for
such damages only if Mr. Abodizo's own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, which is
certainly not so in the instant case.

After a review of the findings stated in the said

memorandum against the applicable laws and
jurisprudence on the matter, we find the request of
OPLGS legally in order and should, therefore, be given
due course. 8

x x x           x x x          x x x

Thereupon, the amount for the hospitalization expenses

was refunded to the contractor OPLGS. In Certificate of
Settlement and Balances (CSB) No. 01-04-83 prepared
by respondent Jose M. Agustin, Unit Auditor of the
Commission on Audit (COA) assigned to the NPC-
MRRC, on 30 July 1989, 9 the refund of the
hospitalization expenses for Domingo Abodizo was
disallowed for "[u]nder the NPC-O.P. Landrito contract,
there is no employer-employee relationship between the
Corporation and the latter's employees." Hence, the NPC
is not answerable for such expenses. The following
employees were made liable for the disallowances: Mr.
M.V. Villafuerte (Approving Authority) — primarily liable;
E. Camama and P. Gajasan (Management's examiners)
— secondarily and jointly liable; L. Hermosura (Chief
Accountant) — primarily liable.

General Counsel Marcelino C. Ilao of the NPC, in his

Memorandum of 6 September 1984, asked for a
reconsideration of the aforesaid disallowance, stressing
that:

xxx xxx xxx

A review of the legal opinion (Memorandum dated

October 1, 1982 of the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of
the General Counsel) for the Officer-in-Charge, MMRC,
which was the basis for the payment of the amount being
which resulted to the injuries sustained by Mr. Abodizo. reconsideration. In a third indorsement dated 24 April
Obligation arise (sic) not only from contracts but also 1985, 17 respondent Marcos Segarra, Corporate Auditor
from quasi-delicts, . . . 10 of COA, returned the second indorsement to respondent
Ursal informing the latter that he concurs with the
x x x           x x x          x x x comment/opinion
In his memorandum dated 9 January 1985, 11
 respondent Agustin informed General Counsel Ilao of
the NPC that he is adopting his stand contained in his
memorandum to the COA Regional Director dated 9
October 1984 as the answer to the request for
reconsideration. In the latter memorandum, he maintains
that:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . there being no pre-existing contractual relation

between the Corporation and the subject employee, the
former is not liable for the damages sustained by the
latter. We maintain that while quasi-delictscould be a
source of obligation, the fault or negligence of the party
from whom damages is being recovered must first be
proven. . . .

The opinion rendered by the NPC Legal Office clearly

concedes lack of proof of negligence on the part of the
NPC personnel undertaking the repair work or on the
part of the Corporation . . . Moreover, the negligence of
the crew does not make the Corporation automatically
and/or equally negligent.

We further contend that it is not for the NPC Legal Office

to declare the Corporation negligent and admit liability. It
could have been a better decision if the matter was left to
a competent court to determine. 12

x x x           x x x          x x x

The COA Regional Director, herein respondent Leon J.

Pilar, Jr., in a Memorandum dated 3 December 1984,
confirmed the disallowance and held that the persons
determined to be liable should be directed to
immediately refund the amount disallowed and/or the
proper official be directed to retain any money due them
in satisfaction thereof. 13

General Counsel Ilao submitted a second request for

reconsideration on 14 February 1985. 14 This request
justifies the legal opinion tendered based on Section 15-
A of R.A. No. 6395 (the NPC charter), as amended,
which provides that ". . . all legal matters shall be
handled by the General Counsel of the Corporation . . ."

In the first indorsement dated 22 March 1985, 15

 respondent Agustin submitted the request to the
Chairman of respondent COA with the claim that his
findings on the said disallowance have already been
confirmed by the Regional Director, NCR. In a second
indorsement dated 2 April 1985, 16 respondent Sofronio
B. Ursal, Manager of the Corporate Audit Office of
respondent COA, referred for comment and/or
recommendation to the Auditor, NPC, the request for
of respondent Agustin contained in the 1st indorsement he was the officer-in-charge of the NPC's Office of the
of 22 March 1985. In his 4th indorsement dated 30 May General Counsel. Section 15-A of its charter 24 provides
1985, 18 respondent Ursal, expressing his concurrence that all legal matters shall be handled by the General
with the disallowance, referred to the COA's General Counsel of the Corporation. As such, he provides legal
Counsel for an opinion the request for reconsideration. In advice and/or renders legal opinions on legal matters
his 5th indorsement dated 21 May 1986, 19 Ricardo G. involving the NPC. Since this
Nepomuceno, Jr., General Counsel of the COA, acting "
FOR THE COMMISSION", made a return to the Unit
Auditor, herein respondent Agustin; Nepomuceno
expressed his concurrence with the views of said unit
Auditor contained in the latter's 1st indorsement of 22
March 1985.

Thereupon, on 30 June 1986, respondent, now in his

capacity as Regional Auditor, transmitted to the General
Counsel of the NPC a copy of the aforesaid 5th
indorsement of COA's General Counsel, which the
former considers as the Commission's decision (
hereinafter designated as "5th Indorsement"), together
with the pertinent papers, on the appeal made relative to
the disallowance; 20 on the same date, he also sent a
memorandum to the VP-MMRC of the NPC wherein he
ordered that the subject disallowance "be booked" in the
petitioner's name, ''upon whose legal opinion the
payment of the aforesaid refund was made possible,
jointly and severally with Mr. M.V. Villafuerte (Approving
official on the voucher), Ms. P. Gajasan (Examiner), and
Ms. L.M. Hermosura (Chief Accountant)," thereby
amending previous findings as to the persons liable. 21
 On 22 July 1986, a Debit Memorandum 22 was issued
in petitioner's name debiting his account with the NPC
for the amount of the hospitalization expenses.

Petitioner, on 28 September 1986, filed the instant

petition seeking to annul and get aside the above-
mentioned:

a) Memorandum of respondent Agustin dated 9 January

1985;

b) Memorandum of respondent Pilar dated 3 December

1984;

c) lst indorsement of respondent Agustin, dated 22

March 1985, to the Chairman, COA;

d) 3rd indorsement of respondent Segarra dated 24 April

1985;

e) 4th indorsement of respondent Ursal, dated 30 May

1985, to the General Counsel of the COA, conforming to
the position of Jose M. Agustin; and

f) 5th indorsement of the COA General Counsel

Nepomuceno, Jr. dated 21 May 1986. 23

and praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin

respondents from enforcing the same.

In support thereof, petitioner alleges that he prepared the

questioned legal opinion in the performance of his official
functions as mandated by law. At the time he rendered it,
function is quasi-judicial in nature, the discretion
exercised in the discharge thereof is not subject to re-
examination or controversion by the respondents; when
the latter did what was proscribed, they in effect usurped
the statutory function of the General Counsel of the NPC.
There is no law which expressly authorizes the
respondents to re-examine or controvert the General
Counsel's opinion. Petitioner additionally stresses that he
is not personally liable for the amount disallowed as he
was merely performing his official functions. Besides, his
questioned opinion is not alleged to have been rendered
with malice and bad faith. 25
In the Resolution of 6 October 1986, this Court
dismissed the petition "for having been filed out of time . .
. and for late payment of the legal
fees . . ." 26
Acting on petitioner's motion for reconsideration, this
Court, on 22 June 1987, granted the motion, reinstated
the petition and required the respondents to comment on
the same. 27
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed their Comment on 9 October 1987. 28 They
maintain that the questioned disbursement on the basis
of the legal opinion of the petitioner is within the scope of
the auditing power of the COA. The Constitution grants
the COA the power, authority and duty to examine, audit
and settle all accounts pertaining to the expenditures or
uses of funds and property pertaining to the Government
or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.  He should be reminded — just as others in government
29 The matter of allowing in audit a disbursement
account is not a ministerial function, but one which
necessitates the exercise of discretion. Besides, the
OPLGS, Abodizo's employer, admitted that the incident
was purely accidental and that there is no showing
whatsoever in the accident report of any negligence on
the part of the NPC or its employees; this being the case,
the liability of the NPC for quasi-delict under Article 2176
of the New Civil Code cannot be sustained. Finally,
respondents assert that it was petitioner's legal opinion
which made possible the questioned disbursement;
accordingly, the 30 June 1986 request of respondent
Agustin to book the disallowance in the petitioner's name
, jointly and severally with the other officials found
responsible therefor, is in order as it was made pursuant
to Section 103 of the Government Auditing Code 30
 which provides:
Expenditures of government funds or uses of
government property in violation of law or regulations
shall be a personal liability of the official or employee
found to be directly responsible therefor.
On 18 April 1988, this Court resolved to give due course
to the petition and require both parties to submit their
simultaneous Memoranda, 31 which they subsequently
complied with.
The principal issues raised in this case are:
(1) Does the legal opinion of petitioner, which was relied
upon for the disbursement in question, preclude or bar
the COA from disallowing in post-audit such
disbursement?
(2) Has the General Counsel of the COA the authority to
decide a motion to reconsider the disallowance in
question?
(3) Is the petitioner personally liable for the disallowance
on the theory that the disbursement was made on the
basis thereof?
1. As to the first, We find petitioner's proposition to be a
bit outlandish; he overrates the power of the General
Counsel of the NPC and belittles the authority of the
COA. While it may be true that Section 15-A of R.A. No.
6395 (charter of the NPC) provides that all legal matters
shall be handled by the General Counsel of the
Corporation, it by no means follows that all legal opinions
of the General Counsel are ex-cathedra and binding
upon all. In short, said provision does not confer upon
him any degree of infallibility. It would have been
dangerous if it were otherwise for not only would he be
able to inextricably and unjustly bind the corporation or
compel it to abide by his legal opinion even if it were
wrong, he would also subordinate this Court to such
opinion even if this Court is the final authority on how the
law should be read. Petitioner's theory destroys the very
essence of the public trust character of a public office.
 
service — of Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution which reads:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.
The NPC, as a government-owned corporation, is under
the COA's audit power. Under the 1973 Constitution,
which was the Constitution in force at the time the
disallowance in question was made, the COA had the
power to, inter alia, examine, audit, and settle, in
accordance with law and regulations, all accounts
pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or
held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; 
32 and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations including those for the prevention of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or
uses of funds or property.
The 1987 Constitution preserves this power and function
and grants the COA:
. . . exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods required therefor,
and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, uses of government funds
and properties. 33
Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions conferred upon
the COA a more active role and invested it with broader
and more extensive powers. These were not meant to
make it a toothless tiger, but a dynamic, effective,
efficient and independent watchdog of the Government. 
34
In determining whether an expenditure of a Government
agency or instrumentality such as the NPC is irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable,
the COA should not be bound by the opinion of the legal
counsel of said agency or instrumentality which may
have been the basis for the questioned disbursement;
otherwise, it would indeed become a toothless tiger and
its auditing function would be a meaningless and futile
exercise. Its beacon lights then should be nothing more
than the pertinent laws and its rules and regulations.
In the instant case, on the basis of the pertinent
documents attached to the pleadings, the COA auditor
had every reason to believe that the disbursement of
P53,802.26 by the NPC as a refund to the OPLGS for
the hospitalization expenses of Abodizo, on the theory
that the NPC was actually liable under the law on quasi-
delict, as determined by the petitions, was irregular, if not
illegal. Other than the report of Mapili and Barrera dated
27 May 1982, 35 there is no competent evidence to
show that either the NPC or any of its employees were
responsible for the accident.
On the contrary, in its letter of 30 August 1982, 36 the
OPLGS admitted that the "incident was purely accidental
in nature," but that "considering that the accident took
place within the premises of the National Power
Corporation and the cause of which was the Tube leaks
of HPH 5B, which was still undergoing repair, it is but
proper that cost of hospital bills and other expenses
incurred by MR. DOMINGO ABODIZO be shouldered by
the National Power Corporation." It further admits that it
will not "press our contention that the National Power
Corporation should pay" the hospital expenses, but
appeals and requests that in the light of the "relationship"
between it and the NPC, and the services both render to
each other, the NPC nonetheless pay for the
hospitalization expenses.
It is not disputed that petitioner conducted no further
investigation into the causes of the accident to determine
for himself if indeed the NPC's or any of its employees'
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Neither is it disputed that petitioner was at that time
merely an officer-in-charge of the Office of the General
Counsel. He remained such only from 30 September to 2
October 1982. He rendered the questioned legal opinion
on 1 October 1982, 37 on the second day of his short
tenure and barely a day before it ended. There was
hardly any time for him to inquire further into the facts It must be recalled that in his Memorandum of 14
surrounding the incident, although he had all the time to February 1985, 41 General Counsel Ilao of the NPC
simply refer it to the regular General Counsel who was asked for a reconsideration of the disallowance and
expected to report back on 3 October 1982. requested that the same be forwarded to the Chairman
of the COA pursuant to Item III-7 of COA Circular 81-156
Finally, the OPLGS' claims for reimbursement was not dated 19 January 1981.
referred to the NPC's governing board or authorized
officer for approval in the light of the legal opinion. By
itself, the latter did not vest him with authority to approve
the claim. It was nothing but a recommendation in favor
of the claim.

Respondent Agustin then cannot be faulted when in his

Certificate of Settlement and Balances No. 01-04-83, 38
 he disallowed NPC's questioned disbursement.
However, in his notation as to the persons to be liable
therefor, he mentions only Mr. M.V. Villafuerte (the
Approving Authority) whose liabilities are primary; E.
Gamama and P. Gajasan (Management's Examiners)
whose liabilities are "secondary and Joint"; and H.L.
Hermosura (Chief Accountant) whose liability is primary.
Petitioner was not found to be liable. He was made
jointly and severally liable with Villafuerte, Gajasan and
Hermosura only in the Memorandum of respondent
Agustin dated 30 June 1986. 39 It may be noted that in
his Memorandum he excluded Gamama. Considering
that what was sustained up to the level of the General
Counsel of the COA was the disallowance made in the
aforementioned Certificate of Settlement and Balances
and necessarily, his ruling thereon as to who are the
parties liable therefor, Agustin acted arbitrarily and with
grave abuse of discretion when, without prior notice to
petitioner, he made the latter liable for the disallowance
and worse, he directed, in the guise of a request, the
Chief Accountant of the NPC, Metro Manila Regional
Center, to book the disallowance in the name of
petitioner. Petitioner was not made a party to the motion
for reconsideration which the General Counsel of the
COA acted upon. Respondent Agustin effectively denied
petitioner of his right to due process.

2. What is claimed in this case to be the decision of the

COA is actually the 5th Indorsement of Ricardo G.
Nepomuceno, Jr., General Counsel thereof, which reads:

xxx xxx xxx

5th Indorsement
May 21, 1986

Respectfully returned to the Auditor, National Power

Corporation, Quezon City, concurring with the views of
the Unit Auditor, as contained in the 1st Indorsement,
dated March 22, 1985, on the refund of hospitalization
expenses in favor of Domingo Abodizo.

FOR THE COMMISSION:

(S/T) RICARDO G. NEPOMUCENO, JR.
General Counsel 40
Clearly, therefore, the motion for reconsideration became
a matter for the COA to resolve or decide. Under the
provisions of the Constitution then in force, the COA was
bound to decide it within sixty (60) days from the date of
its submission for resolution. Section 2 of Article XII-D
thereof reads:
Respondent Agustin, therefore, acted prematurely and
with undue haste in implementing the disallowance
against the parties allegedly liable therefor on the basis
of the favorable

Sec. 2. The Commission on Audit shall have the

following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Decide any case brought before it within sixty days

from the date of its submission for resolution. Unless
otherwise provided by law, any decision, order, or ruling
of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from his receipt of a copy thereof.

Section 7, Article IX-A of the present Constitution also

provides:

Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote

of all its members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.

The COA, both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, is

a collegial body. It must resolve cases presented to it as
such. Its General Counsel cannot act for the Commission
for he is not even a Commissioner thereof. He can only
offer legal advice or render an opinion in order to aid the
COA in the resolution of a case or a legal question.

Thus, Nepomuceno's 5th indorsement cannot, by any

stretch of the imagination, be considered as a "decision"
of the COA. If the same were to be so considered, it
would be void ab initio for having been rendered by one
who is not possessed with any power or authority.
In Mison vs. Commission on 
Audit, 42 this Court held that a so-called decision,
 denominated as Decision No. 77-142 by the Manager of
the Technical Service Office of the COA, "by authority of
the acting chairman" is "substantively void ab initio,"
because it was rendered without jurisdiction. "It had an
essential inherent defect that could not be cured or
waived."

What Mr. Nepomuceno should have done was to render

the opinion precisely sought for in the preceding 4th
indorsement of respondent Ursal dated 30 May 1985, 43
 and submit the same to the Commission for the latter's
guidance in resolving the motion for reconsideration.
opinion of Mr. Nepomuceno who, incidentally, merely performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear
concurred with his (Agustin's) 22 March 1985 showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
indorsement.
x x x           x x x          x x x
3. Even if We are to assume that the disallowance was
proper, there would still be no basis for directly holding
petitioner liable therefor together with those earlier found
to be responsible by Agustin in his Certificate of
Settlement and Balances; moreover, there would be no
reason to debit immediately his account with the NPC. In
the first place, as earlier stated, up to the level of the
General Counsel of the COA who acted for the
Commission, it was never claimed that petitioner was
personally liable for the disallowed disbursement; only
the approving authority, the management examiners and
the Chief Accountant of the NPC were deemed liable
therefor. This seemed to be proper in the light of
Sections 103, 105(l) and 106 of P.D. No. 1445. Under
said Section 103, expenditures of government funds or
uses of governments property in violation of law or
regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or
employee found directly responsible therefor. In the
instant case, while it may perhaps be true that the
petitioner had rendered the opinion which was relied
upon for the disbursement, it cannot be said that he was
directly responsible therefor. His was only a legal opinion
which the governing board of the NPC or any of its
authorized officials could adopt or reject in the resolution
of the request of OPLGS for reimbursement. As earlier
indicated, there is no showing at all that such governing
board or any authorized official formally approved the
request and granted the authority to make the refund.
Respondent then was originally correct in excluding
petitioner from the Certificate of Settlement and
Balances.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that in no case

may the petitioner be liable for his legal opinion. As the
then officer-in-charge of the Office of the General
Counsel of NPC, he exercised quasi judicial functions.
He was empowered with discretion and authority to
render an opinion as to whether the claim for
reimbursement by the OPLGS was proper and ultimately,
to determine if the NPC or any of its employees was
responsible for the accident and, therefore, liable for the
injury suffered by Abodizo under the law on quasi-delict.
If he rendered the opinion in the just performance of his
official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks,
he would not be personally liable for any injury that may
result therefrom. 44 Otherwise stated, a public official
may be liable in his personal capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction. 45 Paragraph (1), Section 38,
Chapter 9, Book I, of the Administrative Code of 1987 46
 expressly provides:

Sec. 38. Liability of superior officers. — (1) A public

officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the
But whether petitioner acted with malice, bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction is a
matter respondent Agustin cannot dispose of unilaterally
and summarily without infringing on the petitioner's right
to due process.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

challenged 5th indorsement of the General Counsel of
the respondent Commission on Audit, dated 21 May
1986, Memorandum of respondent Agustin of 30 June
1986, insofar, as it holds petitioner personally liable for
the disallowed disbursement and the Debit Memo, dated
22 July 1986, of the Manager of the Accounting
Department of the National Power Corporation, are
hereby set aside for being null and void.

SO ORDERED.
 A comparison between the purchase price of the
Province and the findings of the Price Evaluation Division
G.R. No. 92279 June 18, 1992 is presented hereunder showing the difference:
EDMUNDO C. SAMBELI, doing business as ECS Purchase Price Price Hvs. Div.
ENTERPRISES, petitioners,  Item/Description Unit Price Total Unit Price Total
vs. Difference
PROVINCE OF ISABELA, PROVINCIAL TREASURER
OF ISABELA and COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
 respondents.

PARAS, J.:

The instant petition seeks to annul and set aside the

ruling of respondent Commission on Audit (COA)
affirming the action of respondent Provincial Auditor of
Isabela which:

(a) withheld the payment to petitioner of the amount of

P380,400.10, representing the unpaid balance of the
price of 300 units of wheelbarrow and 873 pieces of
shovel;

(b) required the refund of the amount of P195,893.10

representing the overpayment to petitioner for the same
items. (p. 35, Rollo)

The pertinent background facts are uncontroverted.

On October 2, 1987, an agreement was entered into by

and between the Province of Isabela and ECS
Enterprises, herein petitioner, for the purchase of 300
units of wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of shovels and 1 set
of radio communication equipment. Out of the items to
be delivered, a partial delivery of 150 units of
wheelbarrows and 419 pieces of shovels were made on
November 11, 1987 for the total price of P380,538.60.
The Provincial Auditor allowed the payment of only 50%
or P190,338.20 "pending receipt of the reply to the query
to the Price Evaluation Division, COA, Technical Staff
Office, Quezon City."(Annex "N" Petition, p. 25 Rollo)

A second delivery of 150 units of wheelbarrows and 418

pieces of shovels was made on December 1, 1987, and
payment of P190,200.00 or 50% of P380,400.00 was
allowed by the Provincial Auditor, bringing the total
payments made to P380,538.20 or 50% of P761,077.20 (
the total cost of 300 units of wheelbarrows and 837
pieces of shovels).

Based on the findings of the Price Evaluation Division,

COA Technical Service Office, Quezon City, the
Provincial Auditor advised the Provincial Treasurer in his
letter dated February 20, 1988 that an overprice in the
total amount of P619,042.20 exists out of the total price
of P761,077.20 offered by ECS Enterprises or an
overpayment of P195,893.10. The said findings of the
Price Evaluation Division are hereinbelow quoted as
follows:
1) 200 units P1,768.00 P530,400.00 P320.00 P96,000 Enterprises without the prior necessity of a public bidding
P434,400.00 to determine the most advantageous prices;
2) 837 pcs.
shovels 230.00 230,676.40 55.00 46,035 184,641.40
———— ———— —————
Total P761,076.40 P142,035 P619,041.40
========= ======= =========

Payment of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Five

Hundred Thirty Eight and 60/100 Pesos Only (P380,538.
60) was made on the strength of the certification issued
by the Bureau of Supply Coordination that the prices are
reasonable. A difference of Two Hundred Thirty Eight
Thousand Five Hundred Three and 60/100 PESOS Only
(P238,503,60) between the amount paid of Three
Hundred Eighty Thousand Five Hundred Thirty Eight and
60/100 Pesos Only (P380,538,60) and the total price due
if computed on the Price Evaluation Division canvass
Manila Price of One Hundred Forty Two Thousand Thirty
Five and 00/100 Pesos Only (P142,035.00)

If thirty percent (30%) equivalent to Forty Two Thousand

Six Hundred Ten and 50/100 (P42,610.50) of the Manila
Price total will be allowed for handling, and freight
expenses to be deducted from P238,503.60, still an
overpayment of One Hundred Ninety Five Thousand
Eight Hundred Ninety Three and 10/100 Pesos Only (
P195,893,10) still exists.

It is recommended that future claims of ECS Enterprises

be withheld and applied to the refund for overpayment. (
Annex J, Petition, pp. 122-124, Rollo)

The President/General Manager of ECS Enterprises in

his letter dated April 1, 1988 to the Provincial Treasurer
made no comment on the overpricing but instead
proposed 10% deduction on the unpaid balance.

The Provincial auditor forwarded the matter to the COA

Regional Director who formally endorsed the stand of the
Provincial Auditor, as follows:

In view of the foregoing, we favorably endorse the stand

of the Provincial Auditor in his letter to the Provincial
Treasurer Ilagan, Isabela that the total claim of ECS
Enterprises in the total amount of P761,077.20 is
overpriced by P619,041.40 or a refund of P195,893.10
must be made by the supplier out of the P380,538.60
total payments already made by the Province of Isabela
as presented by the Provincial Auditor in the preceding
indorsement. (Annex N, Petition; p. 125, Rollo)

The Regional Director further made the following

findings:

the submitted documents disclosed the following

deficiencies:

1. The contract for the purchase of 300 units of

wheelbarrows and 837 pieces of shovels was entered
into by and between the Province of Isabela and ECS
2. The following conditions among others, set in the Petitioner assails the ruling of the COA as not valid. It
2nd indorsement dated December 10, 1987 of Mr. David contends that the contract of sale has not only been
Rubio, Director, Supply Coordination Office to the perfected between the Province of Isabela and petitioner
Provincial Governor, Ilagan, Isabela were not adhered to: but delivery has

(a) the agency concerned shall negotiate further for

lower prices such terms and conditions advantageous to
the government; and

(b) substitute offer/s at lower prices shall be given due

consideration upon appreciation of their quality and
effectiveness. (p. 26, Rollo)

ECS Enterprises appealed to the respondent

Commission on Audit. In a letter dated December 12,
1989, the said Commission denied the appeal and
affirmed the position of the Provincial Auditor and the
COA Regional Director, as follows:

This has reference to your appeal in behalf of ECS

Enterprises from the action of the Provincial Auditor of
Isabela in withholding the payment of P380,400.60
representing the unpaid balance of the price of 300 units
of wheelbarrows and 837 pieces of shovels purchased
by the Province of Isabela from your company.

Relative thereto, we invite your attention to the letter of

this Commission to then Governor Melanio T. Singson of
Isabela, dated August 3, 1988, copy attached, confirming
the action taken by the Provincial Auditor in demanding
the refund of the excess payment made by the Provincial
Treasurer of Isabela to your Company for the reasons
stated therein.

Upon a circumspect evaluation of the grounds relied

upon, your within appeal, this Commission finds the
same to be devoid of any merit. The price quotation of
the Supply Coordination Office provides that the prices
set therein are authorized ceiling or purchasing prices. It
can be deduced therefrom that the prices to be agreed
upon shall not exceed said amount, thereby signifying
that negotiations for a lower price may be resorted to in
the best interest of the government. Moreover, the action
taken by the Provincial Auditor and the COA Regional
Director, as representatives of the Commission on Audit,
is in accordance with the law and in pursuance of the
mandate of the Constitution which vests in this
Commission the exclusive authority "to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and
properties." (Art, IX-D, Sec. 2(2) 1987 Constitution).

Accordingly, this Commission regrets to dismiss, as it

hereby dismisses, your herein appeal for lack of merit. (
Annex R, Petition, pp. 126-127, Rollo).

Hence, the present petition.

been made by it with the corresponding partial payment SCRA 782)
by the Province of Isabela. Thus, it is allegedly
incumbent upon COA to authorize the payment of the VIEWED in this light, the disallowance made by the
balance because to act otherwise will constitute an respondent Commission on Audit is not without any
impairment of contract. Constitutional and legal basis. We, therefore, affirm the
same.
We reject petitioner's contention.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is
In the exercises of the regulatory power vested upon it DISMISSED. No costs.
by the Constitution, the Commission on Audit adheres to
the policy that government funds and property should be SO ORDERED.
fully protected and conserved and that irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or
uses of such funds and property should be prevented.
On the proposition that improper or wasteful spending of
public funds or immoral use of government property, for
being highly irregular or unnecessary, or scandalously
excessive or extravagant, offends the sovereign people's
will, it behooves the Commission on Audit to put a stop
thereto. (Tantuico, State Audit Code Philippines, p. 235)

In the cases of Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on

Audit, 175 SCRA 701 (1989) and D.M. Consunji Inc. v.
Commission on Audit, 199 SCRA 549 (1991), We
defined the role of the COA in this wise:

. . . No less than the Constitution has ordained that the

COA shall have exclusive authority to define the scope
of its audit and examination, establish the techniques
and methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures or use of government funds and properties.
 (Art. IX D, Sec. 2 (2) 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
) (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, not only is the Commission on Audit (COA)

vested with the power and authority, but is also charged
with the duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to . . . the expenditure or uses of funds . . .
owned by or pertaining to, the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities (Article IX (D-1
) Section 2(1), 1987 Constitution). That authority extends
to the accounts of all persons respecting funds or
properties received or held by them in any accountable
capacity. (Section 26, P.D. No. 1445). In the exercise of
its jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal
responsibility that rests directly with the head of the
government agency has been properly and effectively
discharged (Section 25 (1) ibid), and whether or not
there has been loss or wastage of government resources
. It is also empowered to review and evaluate contracts. (
Section 18 (4), ibid.). And, after an audit has been made,
its auditors issue a certificate of settlement to each
officer whose account has been audited and settled in
whole or in part, stating the balances found due thereon
and certified, and the charges or differences arising from
the settlement by reason of disallowances, charges or
suspensions. (Sec. 82, ibid.) (Dingcong v. Guingona 162
[G.R. No. 120262. July 17, 1997]

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and LEOVIGILDO A. PANTEJO, respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

In this appeal by certiorari, petitioner Philippine Airlines,

Inc. (PAL) seeks to set aside the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals,[1] promulgated on December 29, 1994,
which affirmed the award for damages made by the trial
court in favor of herein private respondent Leovegildo A.
Pantejo.

On October 23, 1988, private respondent Pantejo, then

City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL plane in
Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was
supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City.
 However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting flight to
Surigao City was cancelled.

To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers,

PAL initially gave out cash assistance of P100.00 and,
the next day, P200.00, for their expected stay of two
days in Cebu.Respondent Pantejo requested instead
that he be billeted in a hotel at PALs expense because
he did not have cash with him at that time, but PAL
refused. Thus, respondent Pantejo was forced to seek
and accept the generosity of a co-passenger, an
engineer named Andoni Dumlao, and he shared a room
with the latter at Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay
his share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao.

On October 25, 1988 when the flight for Surigao was

resumed, respondent Pantejo came to know that the
hotel expenses of his co-passengers, one
Superintendent Ernesto Gonzales and a certain Mrs.
Gloria Rocha, an auditor of the Philippine National Bank,
were reimbursed by PAL. At this point, respondent
Pantejo informed Oscar Jereza, PALs Manager for
Departure Services at Mactan Airport and who was in
charge of cancelled flights, that he was going to sue the
airline for discriminating against him. It was only then
that Jereza offered to pay respondent Pantejo P300.00
which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone,
the latter declined.

On March 18, 199l, the Regional Trial Court of Surigao

City, Branch 30, rendered judgment in the action for
damages filed by respondent Pantejo against herein
petitioner, Philippine Airlines, Inc., ordering the latter to
pay Pantejo P300.00 for actual damages, P150,000.00
as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages,
 P15,000.00 as attorneys fees, and 6% interest from the
time of the filing of the complaint until said amounts shall
have been fully paid, plus costs of suit.[2] On appeal,
respondent court affirmed the decision of the court a quo,
but with the exclusion of the award of attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.
The main issue posed for resolution is whether petitioner
airlines acted in bad faith when it failed and refused to
provide hotel accommodations for respondent Pantejo or
to reimburse
him for hotel expenses incurred by reason of the
cancellation of its connecting flight to Surigao City due to
force majeure.
To begin with, it must be emphasized that a contract to
transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree
from any other contractual relation, and this is because
of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the
public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It
invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it
offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates
a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carriers employees naturally could
give ground for an action for damages.[3]
In ruling for respondent Pantejo, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals found that herein petitioner acted in
bad faith in refusing to provide hotel accommodations for
respondent Pantejo or to reimburse him for hotel
expenses incurred despite and in contrast to the fact that
other passengers were so favored.
In declaring that bad faith existed, respondent court took
into consideration the following factual circumstances:
1. Contrary to petitioners claim that cash assistance was
given instead because of non-availability of rooms in
hotels where petitioner had existing tie-ups, the evidence
shows that Sky View Hotel, where respondent Pantejo
was billeted, had plenty of rooms available.
2. It is not true that the P300.00 paid to Ernesto
Gonzales, a co-passenger of respondent, was a refund
for his plane ticket, the truth being that it was a
reimbursement for hotel and meal expenses.
3. It is likewise not denied that said Gonzales and herein
respondent came to know about the reimbursements
only because another passenger, Mrs. Rocha, informed
them that she was able to obtain the refund for her own
hotel expenses.
4. Petitioner offered to pay P300.00 to private
respondent only after he had confronted the airlines
manager about the discrimination committed against him,
which the latter realized was an actionable wrong.
5. Service Voucher No. 199351, presented by petitioner
to prove that it gave cash assistance to its passengers,
was based merely on the list of passengers already
given cash assistance and was purportedly prepared at
around 10:00 A.M. of October 23, 1988. This was two
hours before respondent came to know of the
cancellation of his flight to Surigao, hence private
respondent could not have possibly refused the same.[4]
It must be stressed that these factual findings, which are
supported by substantial evidence, are binding, final and
conclusive upon this Court absent any reason, and we
find none, why this settled evidential rule should not
apply.
Petitioner theorizes that the hotel accommodations or
cash assistance given in case a flight is cancelled is in
the nature of an amenity and is merely a privilege that
may be extended at
its own discretion, but never a right that may be
demanded by its passengers. Thus, when respondent
Pantejo was offered cash assistance and he refused it,
petitioner cannot be held liable for whatever befell
respondent Pantejo on that fateful day, because it was
merely exercising its discretion when it opted to just give
cash assistance to its passengers.
Assuming arguendo that the airline passengers have no
vested right to these amenities in case a flight is
cancelled due to force majeure, what makes petitioner
liable for damages in this particular case and under the
facts obtaining herein is its blatant refusal to accord the
so-called amenities equally to all its stranded passengers
who were bound for Surigao City. No compelling or
justifying reason was advanced for such discriminatory
and prejudicial conduct.
More importantly, it has been sufficiently established that
it is petitioners standard company policy, whenever a
flight has been cancelled, to extend to its hapless
passengers cash assistance or to provide them
accommodations in hotels with which it has existing tie-
ups. In fact, petitioners Mactan Airport Manager for
departure services, Oscar Jereza, admitted that PAL has
an existing arrangement with hotels to accommodate
stranded passengers,[5] and that the hotel bills of
Ernesto Gonzales were reimbursed[6] obviously
pursuant to that policy.
Also, two witnesses presented by respondent, Teresita
Azarcon and Nerie Bol, testified that sometime in
November, 1988, when their flight from Cebu to Surigao
was cancelled, they were billeted at Rajah Hotel for two
nights and three days at the expense of PAL.[7] This was
never denied by PAL.
Further, Ernesto Gonzales, the aforementioned co-
passenger of respondent on that fateful flight, testified
that based on his previous experience hotel
accommodations were extended by PAL to its stranded
passengers either in Magellan or Rajah Hotels, or even
in Cebu Plaza. Thus, we view as impressed with dubiety
PALs present attempt to represent such emergency
assistance as being merely ex gratia and not ex debito.
While petitioner now insists that the passengers were
duly informed that they would be reimbursed for their
hotel expenses, it miserably and significantly failed to
explain why the other passengers were given
reimbursements while private respondent was not.
 Although Gonzales was subsequently given a refund,
this was only so because he came to know about it by
accident through Mrs. Rocha, as earlier explained.
Petitioner could only offer the strained and flimsy pretext
that possibly the passengers were not listening when the
announcement was made. This is absurd because when
respondent Pantejo came to know that his flight had
been cancelled, he immediately proceeded to petitioners
office and requested for hotel accommodations. He was
not only refused accommodations, but he was not even
informed that he may later on be reimbursed for his hotel
expenses. This explains why his co-passenger, Andoni
Dumlao, offered to answer for respondents hotel bill and
the latter promised to pay him when
they arrive in Surigao. Had both known that they would
be reimbursed by the airline, such arrangement would
not have been necessary.
Respondent Court of Appeals thus correctly concluded
that the refund of hotel expenses was surreptitiously and
discriminatorily made by herein petitioner since the same
was not made known to everyone, except through word
of mouth to a handful of passengers. This is a sad
commentary on the quality of service and
professionalism of an airline company, which is the
countrys flag carrier at that.
On the bases of all the foregoing, the inescapable
conclusion is that petitioner acted in bad faith in
disregarding its duties as a common carrier to its
passengers and in discriminating against herein
respondent Pantejo. It was even oblivious to the fact that
this respondent was exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment especially because of his government
position and social prominence, which altogether
necessarily subjected him to ridicule, shame and anguish
. It remains uncontroverted that at the time of the
incident, herein respondent was then the City Prosecutor
of Surigao City, and that he is a member of the Philippine
Jaycee Senate, past Lt. Governor of the Kiwanis Club of
Surigao, a past Master of the Mount Diwata Lodge of
Free Masons of the Philippines, member of the
Philippine National Red Cross, Surigao Chapter, and
past Chairman of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines,
Surigao del Norte Chapter.[8]
It is likewise claimed that the moral and exemplary
damages awarded to respondent Pantejo are excessive
and unwarranted on the ground that respondent is not
totally blameless because of his refusal to accept
the P100.00 cash assistance which was inceptively
offered to him. It bears emphasis that respondent
Pantejo had every right to make such refusal since it
evidently could not meet his needs and that was all that
PAL claimed it could offer.
His refusal to accept the P300.00 proffered as an
afterthought when he threatened suit was justified by his
resentment when he belatedly found out that his co-
passengers were reimbursed for hotel expenses and he
was not. Worse, he would not even have known about it
were it not for a co-passenger who verbally told him that
she was reimbursed by the airline for hotel and meal
expenses. It may even be said that the amounts, the
time and the circumstances under which those amounts
were offered could not salve the moral wounds inflicted
by PAL on private respondent but even approximated
insult added to injury.
The discriminatory act of petitioner against respondent
ineludibly makes the former liable for moral damages
under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of the Civil
Code.[9] As held in Alitalia Airways vs. CA, et al.,[10]
 such inattention to and lack of care by petitioner airline
for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its
utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience
, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the
award of moral damages.
Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a
plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are
awarded only to allow the former to obtain means,
diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendants
culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the
suffering inflicted.[11] However, substantial damages do
not translate into excessive damages.[12] Except for
attorneys fees and costs of suit, it will be noted that the
Court of Appeals affirmed point by point the factual
findings of the lower court upon which the award of
damages had been based.[13] We, therefore, see no
reason to modify the award of damages made by the trial
court.
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are
convinced that the awards for actual, moral and
exemplary damages granted in the judgment of
respondent court, for the reasons meticulously analyzed
and thoroughly explained in its decision, are just and
equitable. It is high time that the travelling public is
afforded protection and that the duties of common
carriers, long detailed in our previous laws and
jurisprudence and thereafter collated and specifically
catalogued in our Civil Code in 1950, be enforced
through appropriate sanctions.
We agree, however, with the contention that the interest
of 6% imposed by respondent court should be computed
from the date of rendition of judgment and not from the
filing of the complaint. The rule has been laid down
in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al
.[14] that:
When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except when or until the demand can
be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly,
where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest
shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the
court is made (at which time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of
legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged.
This is because at the time of the filing of the complaint,
the amount of damages to which plaintiff may be entitled
remains unliquidated and not known, until it is definitely
ascertained, assessed and determined by the court, and
only after the presentation of proof thereon.[15]
WHEREFORE, the challenged judgment of respondent SO ORDERED.
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the
MODIFICATION regarding the computation of the 6%
legal rate of interest on the monetary awards granted
therein to private respondent.
G.R. No. 175349               June 22, 2010 Thereafter, the COA conducted another audit
examination of respondent’s cash and accounts covering
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), Petitioner,  the period November 17, 1998 to May 25, 2000. In the
vs. report of cash
RODOLFO ZALDARRIAGA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the

Decision1 dated October 27, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81392, which reversed
and set aside the Decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) dismissing respondent from
government service.

The procedural and factual antecedents are as follows:

Respondent Rodolfo Zaldarriaga was the Municipal

Treasurer of the Municipality of Lemery, Iloilo.

On November 16, 1998, the Commission on Audit (COA

), through State Auditors Sergia G. Garachico, Cresencia
H. Gulangayan, and Shelly H. Gorriceta, conducted an
audit examination of the accountabilities of respondent’s
cash and accounts covering the period November 30,
1997 to November 16, 1998. Based on the audit
conducted, the COA auditors prepared a report showing
a deficiency amounting to ₱4,711,463.82.2

Respondent was asked to restitute the deficiency but he

failed to do so. Instead, respondent sent letters to State
Auditor Garachico requesting for a bill of particulars on
his alleged accountability.3 The COA, however, failed to
clarify the basis of the shortage. Subsequently, on the
strength of the COA auditors’ report, the COA filed a
Letter-Complaint4 against the respondent before the
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas).

In his Counter-Affidavit, respondent contested the

findings of the COA auditors alleging that it was
inaccurate, incorrect, and devoid of merit. He stated that
during the audit examination, the COA team never
mentioned any discrepancy in the cashbook nor found
any accountability. Respondent claimed that during the
said audit examination, the COA team established that
the balance for the General Fund was only in the amount
of ₱998.00 and that all other accounts showed a zero
balance. Respondent also pointed out that the COA’s
failure to show a detailed "disbursements and cash items
validated and/or disallowed" placed doubt as to the
accuracy and reliability of the findings.

Meanwhile, the Office of the Provincial Treasurer also

conducted its own investigation on the alleged deficiency.
Its findings, however, did not indicate any shortage but,
instead, pointed out that had the municipal mayor,
municipal treasurer, and municipal accountant observed
the COA Rules and Regulations in the proper
disbursement of funds, the irregularity would not have
been committed.5
examination,6 State Auditor II Malvie Melocoton, Ombudsman erred (1) in ruling that the amount of ₱4,711
reported a zero balance during the last examination ,463.82 was lost, despite the absence of substantial
conducted on November 16, 1998.7 Respondent then evidence on how the COA
sought for the dismissal of the complaint filed against him
on the ground that the latest COA report dated May 25,
2000 indicated that there was no shortage.

After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the

Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) rendered a Decision
8dismissing respondent from government service for
dishonesty, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, finding substantial evidence to hold

respondent RODOLFO B. ZALDARRIAGA, Municipal
Treasurer of Lemery, Iloilo, administratively guilty of
Dishonesty, he is hereby meted the penalty of
DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with the
corresponding accessory penalties of perpetual
disqualification for re-employment in the government
service, and cancellation of eligibility and forfeiture of
retirement benefits.

This Office also WARNED the other responsible

Municipal Officials of the Municipal Government of
Lemery, Iloilo to be more discreet and circumspect in
their actions by properly observing existing COA and
Civil Service Rules and Regulations.

For complainant COA, it is hereby ADVISED to be more

vigilant in its duties and responsibilities. The said Office
must see to it that there should be proper observance of
its Rules and Regulations in every government agency,
particularly the Local Government Unit of Lemery, Iloilo.9

In ruling against the respondent, the Ombudsman opined

, among other things, that while it may be true that both
the Municipal Mayor and the respondent were
signatories of several Land Bank checks covering the
Municipality’s cash advances during the said period, it
was the respondent who encashed and received their
proceeds; thus, he should be the one responsible and
accountable for the same. Respondent never denied
having received these funds. His failure to account the
same when audited and his alleged lack of cooperation
with the Audit Team constitute substantial evidence of
dishonesty. Also, the Ombudsman did not give much
credence (1) to the second audit examination conducted
by State Auditor Melocoton, reasoning that it was
conducted two years from November 16, 1998; (2) that
of the three assigned state auditors, it was only State
Auditor Melocoton who signed the second report; and (3)
on conclusion that there was no shortage in the second
report may be due to the fact that petitioner had
restituted the missing funds after its discovery.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which

was denied in an Order10 dated July 1, 2003.

Aggrieved, respondent sought recourse before the CA

arguing, among other things, that the Office of the
Auditors reached the conclusion; (2) in failing to declare
that the audit conducted by the COA Auditors was
incomplete, inaccurate, replete with errors, and in
violation of the COA Rules and Regulations; and (3) in
dismissing him from the service notwithstanding the
absence of substantial evidence.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Basic is the rule that, in administrative cases, the
quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual
administratively

On October 27, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision11 in

favor of the respondent, the decretal portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for

Review is GRANTED. The Decision dated 27 January
2003 and the Order dated 1 July 2003 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) finding petitioner administratively
guilty of Dishonesty and dismissing him from service are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.12

Ruling in favor of the respondent, the CA opined that

since the shortage was not clearly and indubitably
established, the administrative case against respondent
should be dismissed.

Hence, the present petition assigning the following

errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

REVERSING THE OMBUDSMAN’S ORDER
DISMISSING RESPONDENT FROM THE SERVICE.

A. THE OMBUDSMAN’S ORDER DISMISSING

RESPONDENT [FROM] THE SERVICE IS BASED ON
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

B. THE ZERO-SHORTAGE FINDING OF STATE

AUDITOR M[ELO]COTON DOES NOT NEGATE THE
COA’S FINDING ON RESPONDENT’S CASH
SHORTAGE.13

Petitioner argues that the COA findings that respondent

failed to account for the shortage and his unjustified
release of cash advances constitute sufficient basis for
his dismissal. These findings were duly supported by
records from respondent’s own office, and, as such,
could not have been merely contrived in order to
implicate him. Petitioner insists that respondent was
given ample time and opportunity to refute and rebut the
charges against him and was provided documents
supporting the audit findings. Despite being fully
apprised of the details of the charges against him,
respondent failed to present countervailing evidence in
his favor; instead, respondent was content on simply
denying the adverse findings of the COA.

Petitioner maintains that the zero-balance reflected in

State Auditor Melocoton’s report, which was prepared
two years after the first COA audit, cannot negate the
latter’s finding of cash shortage, considering that
Melocoton’s report is defective.
liable is substantial evidence. Section 5, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court is explicit, to wit: ₱ 26,082. ₱ 4,685, ₱ 4,711,
Shortage
14 381.68 463.8216
Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. – In cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be However, in the succeeding audit examination of
deemed established if it is supported by substantial respondent’s accounts covering the period November 17,
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a 1998 to May 25, 2000, the report of cash examination
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a prepared by State Auditor Melocoton reflected that there
conclusion. 14ten.lihpwal was no balance during the last examination conducted
on November 16, 1998, viz.:
Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean
preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases,
but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind AC CA
NATUR
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or GEN. V. SH TOT
E OF TF
evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent FUND SE AD AL
FUNDS
men in the conduct of their affairs.15 F. V

In the present case, the evidence upon which 8-

respondent’s administrative liability would be anchored 8- 70
lacked that degree of certainty required in administrative 8-70- 8-70 8-70-
70- -
cases, because the entries found in the two separate 100 -100 500
500 10
audit conducted by the COA yielded conflicting results. 0
On November 16, 1998, the COA auditors conducted an
audit of respondent’s cash and accounts covering the BALAN -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- -0-
period November 30, 1997 to November 16, 1998. The CE, Last
alleged shortage is reflected in the corresponding report, Examina
as follows: tion 
11/16/98
Collection (date)
s Cash
Advances
Total ADD:
Debits to
Account-
Total Ability
Debits to ₱3,420, ₱11,341, ₱14,762,
Accounta 839.74 502.45 342.19
bility 85,
11/17/30 xx xxx
030. xxx xxx xxx
/98 x 17
00
Less:
Total These discrepancies cannot be ignored. Evidence of
3,309,680 6,656,120. 9,965,801.
Credits to shortage is imperative in order for the respondent to be
.50 77 27
Accounta held liable. In the case at bar, the evidence could not be
bility relied upon. The second audit report necessarily puts
into question the reliability of the initial audit findings.
Balance Whether the zero balance as appearing in the second
of audit report was correct or inadvertently indicated, the
Accounta 111,159. ₱ 4,685, ₱ 4,796, credibility and accuracy of the two audit reports were
bility As 24 381.68 540.92 already tarnished. As aptly held by the CA:
of Here, the balance on 16 November 1998 (zero) entered
11/16/98 in the cash examination report for a subsequent audit
substantially differs from the balance on 16 November
Inventory 1998 (shortage of ₱4,711,463.82) entered in the
of Cash previous cash examination report. This cannot be
and/or ignored nor overlooked. Such a significant disparity or
85,077.10 -0- 85,077.10
Valid inconsistency should have prompted COA to re-examine
Cash carefully and thoroughly "to the last detail" and "with
Items absolute certainty" its findings for the cash examination
conducted on 16 November 1998. Just as government
treasurers are held to strict accountability as regards
funds entrusted to them in a fiduciary capacity, so also
should examining COA auditors act with greater care
and caution in the audit of the accounts of such
accountable officers to avoid the perpetration of any
injustice. More so in this case when even the COA
records negate a showing of the care and caution
needed to be employed by the COA Auditors during
audit examinations.
The inconsistent "balance" entries for the last cash
examination on 16 November 1998 in the COA reports
has led this Court to doubt if there was indeed a
shortage of ₱4,711,463.82. In fact, the presumption that
the audit examination conducted is regular, accurate and
correct is now disputed in view of the inconsistencies in
the entries (balance on 16 November 1998) in the cash
examination reports prepared by COA. It is then possible
that the cash examination conducted lacked the
necessary thoroughness and completeness to ascertain
and establish the correct balance account. Under these
circumstances, the findings of the COA were susceptible
to errors and inaccuracies that consequently, the
shortage of funds attributed to petitioner could not be
considered as indubitably established.18
The Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors
and Other Guidelines provides:
Sec. 561. Prohibition of Incomplete examinations. –
Examinations shall be thorough and complete in every
case to the last detail. Mere count of cash and valid cash
items without verifying the stock of issued and unissued
accountable forms and various records of collections and
disbursements, as well as the entries in the cashbook is
not examination at all. x x x x
Clearly, accounts should be examined carefully and
thoroughly to the last detail and with absolute certainty in
strict compliance with the Manual of Instructions. Had the
Audit Team been more thorough and complete in its
examination by reconciling the two audit reports, the
reports would have been more credible and accurate. In
the audit of accounts of accountable officers, COA
auditors should act with great care and caution bearing in
mind that their conclusion constitutes sufficient basis for
the filing of appropriate charges against the erring
employee and any erroneous conclusion would cause
more than substantial hardships, whether financially or
emotionally, on the part of the accountable officer
concerned. As stated in Tinga v. People19 -
x x x [J]ust as government treasurers are held to strict
accountability as regards funds entrusted to them in a
fiduciary capacity, so also should examining COA
auditors act with greater care and caution in the audit of
the accounts of such accountable officers to avoid the
perpetration of any injustice. Accounts should be
examined carefully and thoroughly "to the last detail," "
with absolute certainty" in strict compliance with the
Manual of Instructions. x x x
Verily, the veracity of the two audit reports cannot be
relied upon, as they both cast clouds of doubt in their
respective conclusions. A separate and more thorough
audit would be
required to dispel any uncertainties and to arrive at
respondent’s true and correct accountability. The
shortage of funds was clearly not indubitably established.
Until such audit is conducted, the two audit reports
cannot be used to prove or disprove any shortage in
respondent’s cash and accounts.
Even in administrative cases, a degree of moral certainty
is necessary to support a finding of liability. In the instant
case, the evidence submitted to conclude that
respondent was administratively liable is sorely wanting.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 27, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 81392 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88435            January 16, 2002

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, JESUS

P. ESTANISLAO, DOLORES A. SANTIAGO, LYNN H.
CATUNCAN, NORMA O. TERREL, MA. ANTONIA G.
REBUENO, petitioners, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the letter-

decision of the Chairman of the Commission on Audit2 ("
COA" for brevity) and the letter-decision of the COA en
banc3 , prohibiting the Development Bank of the
Philippines ("DBP" for brevity) from hiring a private
external auditor. This petition raises a question of first
impression, whether or not the constitutional power of
the COA to examine and audit the DBP is exclusive and
precludes a concurrent audit of the DBP by a private
external auditor.

The Antecedent Facts

In 1986, the Philippine government, under the

administration of then President Corazon C. Aquino,
obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery
Loan ("ERL" for brevity) in the amount of US$310 million.
The ERL was intended to support the recovery of the
Philippine economy, at that time suffering severely from
the financial crisis that hit the country during the latter
part of the Marcos regime.

As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank

required the Philippine government to rehabilitate the
DBP which was then saddled with huge non-performing
loans. Accordingly, the government committed to
rehabilitate the DBP to make it a viable and self-
sustaining financial institution in recognition of its
developmental role in the economy. The DBP was
expected to continue "providing principally medium and
long-term financing to projects with risks higher than the
private sector may be willing to accept under reasonable
terms."4 The government's commitment was embodied
in the Policy Statement for the Development Bank of the
Philippines which stated in part:

"4. Furthermore, like all financial institutions under

Central Bank supervision, DBP will now be required to
have a private external audit, and its Board of Directors
will now be opened to adequate private sector
representation. It is hoped that with these commitments,
DBP can avoid the difficulties of the past and can
function as a competitive and viable financial institution
within the Philippine financial system."5 (Emphasis
supplied)
On November 28, 1986, the Monetary Board adopted
Resolution No. 1079 amending the Central Bank'
s Manual of Regulations for Banks and other Financial
Intermediaries, in line with the government's commitment
to the World Bank to require a private external auditor for
DBP. Thus, on December
5, 1986, the Central Bank Governor issued Central Bank
Circular No. 1124, providing that:
"SECTION 1. Subsection 1165.5 (Book I) is amended to
read as follows:
1165.5 Financial Audit. - Each Bank, whether
Government-owned or controlled or private, shall cause
an annual financial audit to be conducted by an external
independent auditor not later than thirty (30) days after
the close of the calendar year or the fiscal year adopted
by the bank. x x x.
x x x The Audit of a Government-owned or controlled
bank by an external independent auditor shall be in
addition to and without prejudice to that conducted by the
Commission on Audit in the discharge of its mandate
under existing law. x x x.
xxx
"SECTION 3. The requirement for an annual financial
audit by an external independent auditor shall extend to
specialized and unique government banks such as the
Land Bank of the Philippines and the Development Bank
of the Philippines."6
On December 12, 1986, pursuant to Central Bank
Circular No. 1124 and the government's commitment to
the World Bank, DBP Chairman Jesus Estanislao wrote
the COA seeking approval of the DBP's engagement of a
private external auditor in addition to the COA.7
On January 2, 1987, to formalize its request for the ERL,
the Philippine government sent the World Bank a letter
assuring the World Bank that pursuant to Central Bank
Circular No. 1124, "all Banks, including government
banks, shall be fully audited by external independent
auditors x x x in addition to that provided by the
Commission on Audit." The letter was signed by the
Central Bank Governor and the Ministers of Finance,
Trade and Industry, and Economic Planning of the
Philippine government.8
On January 8, 1987, the Philippine government and
World Bank negotiating panels reached final agreement
on the private audit of the DBP, as follows:
"13. With respect to the draft Policy Statement, it was
agreed that Sections 4, 7 and 11 would be amended as
follows:
x x x (iii) Section 11 should in line with the letter of
Development Policy, confirm that the external
independent audits would commence with a balance
sheet audit as of December 31, 1986 and a full financial
audit, including income statements, starting with the
period July 1 to December 31, 1986. A copy of COA's
letter (referred to in par. 1, a draft of which is attached as
Annex VIII) regarding DBP's appointment of a private
external auditor will be sent to the Bank before the
distribution of the loan documents to the Bank's Board,
along with a copy of the scope of audit as approved by
COA and satisfactory to the Bank.
With regard to the scope of the audit to be undertaken by
the private external auditors, the terms of reference
which will be issued to the selected auditors should be
generally consistent
with the attached model terms of reference for financial
audits (Annex IX). These general terms of reference
were discussed during negotiations and form a part of
the World Bank's guidelines for financial information on
financial institutions."9
On January 20, 1987, then COA Chairman Teofisto
Guingona, Jr. replied to the December 12, 1986 letter of
the DBP Chairman. The COA Chairman's reply stated
that:
"x x x the Commission on Audit (COA) will interpose no
objection to your engagement of a private external
auditor as required by the Economic Recovery Program
Loan Agreements of 1987 provided that the terms for
said audit are first reviewed and approved by the
Commission."10
The following day, the COA Chairman also informed the
Consultant of the Central Bank that the COA interposed
no objection to the proposed scope of audit services to
be undertaken by the private external auditors to be
engaged by the DBP.11
On February 18, 1987, the Board of Directors of the DBP
approved the hiring of Joaquin Cunanan & Co. as the
DBP's private external auditor for calendar year 1986 as
required by Central Bank Circular No. 1124 and the
World Bank. The DBP Board of Directors placed a ceiling
on the amount of reimbursable out-of-pocket expenses
that could be charged by the private auditor.12
On February 23, 1987, the World Bank President, in his
Report to the Bank's Executive Directors on the
Philippine government's application for the ERL, certified
that the Philippine government was complying with the
requirement of a private external auditor. The World
Bank President's certification stated that:
"74. Accounting and Auditing. All banks both government
and private are now subject to accounting and auditing
standards as established by the Central Bank. To ensure
full public accountability, the Monetary Board now
requires that all government banks be subject to annual
audits by independent private auditing firms, in addition
to those normally undertaken by the Government's
Commission on Audit. DBP and PNB have already
selected private auditors, and audited accounts for 1986
and 1987 will be a requirement for the releases of the
second and third tranches, respectively, of the ERL."13
However, a change in the leadership of the COA
suddenly reversed the course of events. On April 27,
1987, the new COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo, wrote
the Central Bank Governor protesting the Central Bank's
issuance of Circular No. 1124 which allegedly
encroached upon the COA's constitutional and statutory
power to audit government agencies. The COA
Chairman's letter informed the Governor that:
"This Commission hereby registers its strong objection to
that portion of the CBP Circular No. 1124 which requires
government banks to engage private auditors in addition
to
that conducted by the Commission on Audit, and urges
the immediate amendment thereof. It is the position of
this Commission that the said requirement: (a) infringes
on Article IX-D of the Philippine Constitution; (b) violates
Section 26 and 32 of the Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines; (c) exposes the financial programs and
strategies of the Philippine Government to high security
risks; (d) allows the unnecessary and unconscionable
expenditure of government funds; and (e) encourages
unethical encroachment among professionals."14
On May 13, 1987, after learning that the DBP had signed
a contract with a private auditing firm for calendar year
1986, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP Chairman
that the COA resident auditors were under instructions to
disallow any payment to the private auditor whose
services were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary.
15
On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the COA
Chairman a copy of the DBP's contract with Joaquin
Cunanan & Co., signed four months earlier on March 5,
1987. The DBP Chairman's covering handwritten note
sought the COA's concurrence to the contract.16
During the pendency of the DBP Chairman's note-
request for concurrence, the DBP paid the billings of the
private auditor in the total amount of P487,321.1417 
despite the objection of the COA. On October 30, 1987,
the COA Chairman issued a Memorandum disallowing
the payments, and holding the following persons
personally liable for such payment:
"SVP Fajardo who approved the voucher for payment;
VP Santiago who certified that the expenditure was
authorized, necessary and lawful; SM Terrel, Catuncan
and Rebueno who signed the checks; and the head of
office who signed the contract and who is immediately
and primarily responsible for the funds of the Bank."18
On January 19, 1988, the DBP Chairman wrote the COA
Chairman seeking reconsideration of the COA Chairman'
s Memorandum.19 However, the DBP received no
response until August 29, 1988 when the COA Chairman
issued a letter-decision denying petitioner's July 1, 1987
note-request for concurrence. The letter-decision, one of
the two COA decisions assailed in this petition, declared
in part as follows:
"(a) In the letter to the Central Bank Governor x x x, this
Commission clearly stated its non-negotiable stand on
the issue in the following terms:
' x x x the very essence of the Commission on Audit as
an independent constitutional commission in the total
scheme of Government, is its singular function to '[E]
xamine, audit, and settle x x x all accounts pertaining to
x x x the Government, or any of its subdivisions, x x x
including government-owned or controlled corporations.'
To allow private firms to interfere in this governmental
audit domain would be to derogate the Constitutional
supremacy of State audit as the Government's guardian xxx
of the people's treasury, and as the prime advocate of
economy in the use of government resources.' "(c) In the letter to the Secretary of Finance dated
January 28, 1988 x x x, this Commission maintains:

1. 'COA is in no way prepared to permit 'use of private

auditors' except insofar as the law allows, which is 'to
deputize and retain in the name of the Commission such
certified public accountants and other licensed
professionals not in the public service as it may deem
necessary to assist government auditors in undertaking
specialized audit engagements' (Sec. 31, PD No 1445).
Outside of this, the Commission does not consider the
matter of hiring private auditing firms a negotiable matter,
and this we want to emphasize to avoid future
embarrassment to the Government. The Commission on
Audit is a constitutionally-created independent and
separate body, and neither Congress nor the Executive
Department has the power to detract from its mandated
duties, functions, and powers.

2. 'Since the proceeds of the proposed loan accrue to

the Republic of the Philippines as borrower, it follows
that its accounting and audit must comply with the laws
of this country. To specify in the Loan Agreement that
the loan account, once released to the Government, shall
be 'audited by independent auditors acceptable to the
Bank' is not only to entirely by-pass this Commission but
to ignore as well the Constitution and the laws of this
country which vests in this Commission the 'power,
authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property x x x
pertaining to the Government.' (Sec. 2, Art. IX-D, Phil.
Const.).1âwphi1.nêt

'Such brazen disregard of the fundamental law of this

country cannot be countenanced by this Commission.'

"In view of all the foregoing, you are hereby advised:

"1. To desist from proceeding with the audit of Joaquin

Cunanan & Co. of the Bank's financial statements for the
year ending December 31, 1987.

"2. To refrain from making any payments out of the funds

of the Development Bank of the Philippines, in the event
that such audit services have already been rendered,
attention being invited to the following provisions of the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines:

'Sec. 108. General liability for unlawful expenditures –

Expenditures of government funds or uses of
government property in violation of law or regulations
shall be a personal liability of the official or employee
found to be directly responsible therefore.'

"3. To restitute, within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof

, the total amount of ₱513,549.24 under CV Nos. 9136,
5014, 6201 and 4082 for professional services rendered
in the audit of the 1986 financial operations of the Bank.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of law, such
unlawful expenditure is the personal liability of the official
directly responsible therefore.
"Please be guided accordingly."20
On September 26, 1988, the DBP Chairman appealed
the letter-decision to the COA en banc. On May 20, 1989
, the COA en banc, in a letter-decision, denied the DBP's
appeal. This letter-decision, now also assailed by the
DBP, held that:
"Upon a circumspect evaluation of the grounds upon
which your instant request is predicated, this
Commission finds the same to be devoid of merit. As
hereunder demonstrated, the justifications offered do not
inspire rational belief in the mind of this Commission.
"First, it bears stress that CB Circular No. 1124, series of
1986, which has earlier been shown to be
constitutionally and legally infirm, cannot by any means
possess any binding and conclusive effect upon this
Commission and, hence, may not be properly invoked in
support of the instant appeal.
"Secondly, it was not the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development which required the
audit of government banks by private auditing firm, but
the Central Bank itself.
"Thirdly, insofar as this Commission is concerned, PD
2029 is an anachronism of sorts if viewed in the light of
the present Constitution recognizing this Commission as
the supreme and exclusive audit institution of the
government. This is necessarily implicit from the bare
language of Section 2(1), Article IX-D thereof which,
despite the absence of the qualifying adjective "exclusive
" that anyway would be a surplusage, ought to be
reasonably construed as vesting in this Commission the "
power, authority, and duty" to audit all government
accounts to the exclusion of any other person or entity,
whether in the public or the private sector. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. A contrary interpretation, such
as that being pressed upon this Commission, would
reduce this constitutional ordinance to an absurdity (
reductio ad absurdum) as it thereby would give rise to
the rather confusing spectacle, as it were, of a
government agency or corporation being audited not
only by this Commission but also and in addition thereto
by one or two or several private accounting firms –
certainly a situation never intended by the framers of the
Constitution.
"Lastly, while this Commission has not lost sight of the
letter of then COA Chairman Guingona, Jr. to the DBP
Chairman, dated January 20, 1987, it has opted to be
guided and influenced by the more persuasive and
controlling COA Circular No. 860254 dated March 24,
1986, which in categorical and precise terms ordained
that:
'Accordingly, by way of reassertion and reaffirmation of
its primary audit jurisdiction, as herein above defined, the
Commission on Audit hereby issues the following
directives:
1. Any ongoing audit of a government-owned and/or
controlled corporation or any of its subsidiaries or
corporate offsprings being conducted by a private auditor
or accounting firm shall cease and terminate on April 15,
1986. Henceforth,
from and after said date, the audit of said corporate
entity shall be undertaken solely and exclusively by the
Commission on Audit. x x x.'
"Premises considered, it is regretted that your instant
request for reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby,
denied."21
Hence, on June 14, 1989 the DBP filed this petition for
review with prayer for a temporary restraining order,
assailing the two COA letter-decisions for being contrary
to the Constitution and existing laws. On June 15, 1989
this Court issued a temporary restraining order directing
the COA to cease and desist from enforcing its
challenged letter-decisions. The Office of the Solicitor
General, in a Manifestation dated October 18, 1989,
declined to appear on behalf of the COA on the ground
that the Solicitor General was "taking a position adverse
to that of the COA." Consequently, a private counsel
on pro bono basis represented the COA.
The Issues
The DBP's petition raises the following issues:
1. Does the Constitution vest in the COA the sole and
exclusive power to examine and audit government banks
so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external
auditors under any circumstance?
2. Is there an existing statute that prohibits government
banks from hiring private auditors in addition to the COA
? If there is none, is there an existing statute that
authorizes government banks to hire private auditors in
addition to the COA?
3. If there is no legal impediment to the hiring by
government banks of a private auditor, was the hiring by
the DBP of a private auditor in the case at bar necessary,
and were the fees paid by DBP to the private auditor
reasonable, under the circumstances?
The Court's Ruling
The DBP's petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Power of COA to Audit under the Constitution
The resolution of the primordial issue of whether or not
the COA has the sole and exclusive power to examine
and audit government banks involves an interpretation of
Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This
Section provides as follows:
"Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the
power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settleall
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned and
held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, x x x.
"(2) The Commission shall have the exclusive authority,
subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the
scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and
methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting
and auditing rules and regulations, including those for
the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and
properties." (Emphasis supplied)
The COA vigorously asserts that under the first
paragraph of Section 2, the COA enjoys the sole and
exclusivepower to examine and audit all government
agencies, including the DBP. The COA contends this is
similar to its sole and exclusive authority, under the
second paragraph of the same Section, to define the
scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and
regulations, including rules on the disallowance of
unnecessary expenditures of government agencies. The
bare language of Section 2, however, shows that the
COA's power under the first paragraph is not declared
exclusive, while its authority under the second paragraph
is expressly declared "exclusive." There is a significant
reason for this marked difference in language.
During the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, Commissioner Serafin Guingona proposed
the addition of the word "exclusive" in the first paragraph
of Section 2, thereby granting the COA the sole and
exclusive power to examine and audit all government
agencies. However, the Constitutional Commission
rejected the addition of the word "exclusive" in the first
paragraph of Section 2 and Guingona was forced to
withdraw his proposal. Commissioner Christian Monsod
explained the rejection in this manner:
"MR. MONSOD. Earlier Commissioner Guingona, in
withdrawing his amendment to add "EXCLUSIVE" made
a statement about the preponderant right of COA.
"For the record, we would like to clarify the reason for
not including the word. First, we do not want an Article
that would constitute a disincentive or an obstacle to
private investment. There are government institutions
with private investments in them, and some of these
investors - Filipinos, as well as in some cases, foreigners
- require the presence of private auditing firms, not
exclusively, but concurrently. So this does not take away
the power of the Commission on Audit. Second, there
are certain instances where private auditing may be
required, like the listing in the stock exchange. In other
words, we do not want this provision to be an
unnecessary obstacle to privatization of these
companies or attraction of investments."22 (Emphasis
supplied)
Shortly thereafter, Commissioner Guingona attempted to
resurrect his amendment by proposing the following
provision:
"Private auditing firms may not examine or audit
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or
held in trust by or pertaining to the Government or any of Guingona argued that a private audit in addition to the
its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities."23 COA audit would be a useless duplication and an
unnecessary expense on the part of government.

The Constitutional Commission also rejected this

proposed provision, after Commissioner Monsod made
the following explanation:

"MR. MONSOD. x x x But it is also a fact that even

government agencies, instrumentalities and subdivisions
sometimes borrow money from abroad. And if we are at
all going to preclude the possibility of any concurrent
auditing, if that is required, and insist that it is only
exclusively the government which can audit, we may be
unnecessarily tying their hands without really
accomplishing much more than what we want. As long
as the COA is there, and the COA's power cannot be
eliminated by law, by decree or anything of that sort, then
the government funds are protected.

As far as the question of fees is concerned, this is

always negotiable. Besides, if one talks about auditing
fees, these are governed by certain regulations within
the auditing profession, beyond which auditing firms
cannot go. Furthermore, the government can always
refuse to pay unconscionable fees. So, that matter really
is not that relevant. But I think what we want to insist on
is that there should be some flexibility so that a
procedural requirement does not impede a substantive
transaction as long as COA is there."24 (Emphasis
supplied)

The rejection of Guingona's second proposal put an end

to all efforts to grant the COA the sole and exclusive
power to examine and audit government agencies.

In sharp contrast, the Constitutional Commission placed

the word "exclusive" to qualify the authority of the COA
under the second paragraph of the same Section 2. The
word "exclusive" did not appear in the counterpart
provisions of Section 2 in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.25 There is no dispute that the COA's
authority under the second paragraph of Section 2 is
exclusive as the language of the Constitution admits of
no other meaning. Thus, the COA has the exclusive
authority to decide on disallowances of unnecessary
government expenditures. Other government agencies
and their officials, as well as private auditors engaged by
them, cannot in any way intrude into this exclusive
function of the COA.

The qualifying word "exclusive" in the second paragraph

of Section 2 cannot be applied to the first paragraph
which is another sub-section of Section 2. A qualifying
word is intended to refer only to the phrase to which it is
immediately associated, and not to a phrase distantly
located in another paragraph or sub-section.26 Thus, the
first paragraph of Section 2 must be read the way it
appears, without the word "exclusive", signifying that non
-COA auditors can also examine and audit government
agencies. Besides, the framers of the
Constitution intentionallyomitted the word "exclusive" in
the first paragraph of Section 2 precisely to
allow concurrent audit by private external auditors.
The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of
the entire Section 2 is that the COA's power to examine
and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COA's
authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate
auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary
expenditures is exclusive.
Moreover, as the constitutionally mandated auditor of all
government agencies, the COA's findings and
conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private
auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and
officials are concerned. The superiority or
preponderance of the COA audit over private audit can
be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional
Commission, as follows:
"MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, after consultation
with the honorable members of the Committee, I have
amended my proposed amendment by deleting the word
EXCLUSIVE because I was made to understand that the
Commission on Audit will still have
the preponderant power and authority to examine, audit
and settle."27 (Emphasis supplied)
The findings and conclusions of the private auditor may
guide private investors or creditors who require such
private audit. Government agencies and officials,
however, remain bound by the findings and conclusions
of the COA, whether the matter falls under the first or
second paragraph of Section 2, unless of course such
findings and conclusions are modified or reversed by the
courts.
The power of the COA to examine and audit government
agencies, while non-exclusive, cannot be taken away
from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution
mandates that:
"Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of
the Government or its subsidiary in any guise
whatsoever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit."
The mere fact that private auditors may audit
government agencies does not divest the COA of its
power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored
since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct
its usual examination and audit, and its findings and
conclusions will still bind government agencies and their
officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger
whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual
scrutiny of a COA audit.
Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and
the clear intent of its framers, point to only one
indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the
exclusive power to examine and audit government
agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully
aware of the need to allow independent private audit of
certain government agencies in addition to the COA
audit, as when there is a private investment in a
government-controlled corporation, or when a
government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or
as
in the case at bar when the government borrows money
from abroad.
In these instances the government enters the
marketplace and competes with the rest of the world in
attracting investments or loans. To succeed, the
government must abide with the reasonable business
practices of the marketplace. Otherwise no investor or
creditor will do business with the government, frustrating
government efforts to attract investments or secure loans
that may be critical to stimulate moribund industries or
resuscitate a badly shattered national economy as in the
case at bar. By design the Constitution is flexible enough
to meet these exigencies. Any attempt to nullify this
flexibility in the instances mentioned, or in similar
instances, will be ultra vires, in the absence of a statute
limiting or removing such flexibility.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
reveal eloquently the intent of Section 2, Article IX-D of
the Constitution. As this Court has ruled repeatedly, the
intent of the law is the controlling factor in the
interpretation of the law.28 If a law needs interpretation,
the most dominant influence is the intent of the law.29 
The intent of the law is that which is expressed in the
words of the law, which should be discovered within its
four corners aided, if necessary, by its legislative history.
30 In the case of Section 2, Article IX-D of the
Constitution, the intent of the framers of the Constitution
is evident from the bare language of Section 2 itself. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm
expressly and even elucidate further this intent beyond
any doubt whatsoever.
There is another constitutional barrier to the COA's
insistence of exclusive power to examine and audit all
government agencies. The COA's claim clashes directly
with the Central Bank's constitutional power of "
supervision" over banks under Section 20, Article XII of
the Constitution. This provision states as follows:
"Sec. 20. The Congress shall establish an independent
central monetary authority, the members of whose
governing board must be natural-born Filipino citizens, of
known probity, integrity, and patriotism, the majority of
whom shall come from the private sector. They shall also
be subject to such other qualifications and disabilities as
may be prescribed by law. The authority shall provide
policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and
credit. It shall have supervision over the operations of
banks and exercise such regulatory powers as may be
provided by law over the operations of finance
companies and other institutions performing similar
functions." (Emphasis supplied)
Historically, the Central Bank has been conducting
periodic and special examination and audit of banks to
determine the soundness of their operations and the
safety of the deposits of the public. Undeniably, the
Central Bank's power of "supervision" includes the power
to examine and audit banks, as the banking laws have audit government banks must be reconciled with the
always recognized this power of the Central Bank.31  Central Bank's power to supervise the same banks. The
Hence, the COA's power to examine and inevitable conclusion is that the COA and the Central
Bank have concurrent jurisdiction, under the Constitution,
to examine and audit government banks.

However, despite the Central Bank's concurrent

jurisdiction over government banks, the COA's audit still
prevails over that of the Central Bank since the COA is
the constitutionally mandated auditor of government
banks. And in matters falling under the second
paragraph of Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution,
the COA's jurisdiction is exclusive. Thus, the Central
Bank is devoid of authority to allow or disallow
expenditures of government banks since this function
belongs exclusively to the COA.

Second Issue: Statutes Prohibiting or Authorizing Private

Auditors

The COA argues that Sections 26, 31 and 32 of PD No.

1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines, prohibit the hiring of private
auditors by government agencies. Section 26 of PD No.
1445 provides that:

"Section 26. General Jurisdiction. The authority and

powers of the Commission shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures,
systems and controls, the keeping of the general
accounts of the Government, the preservation of
vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the
examination and inspection of the books, records, and
papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and
settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting
funds or property received or held by them in an
accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit,
and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due or
owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction
extends to all government-owned or controlled
corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-
governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the
Government, and as herein prescribed, including non-
governmental entities subsidized by the government,
those funded by donations through the government,
those required to pay levies or government share, and
those for which the government has put up a counterpart
fund or those partly funded by the government."

Section 26 defines the extent and scope of the powers of

the COA. Considering the comprehensive definition in
Section 26, the COA's jurisdiction covers all government
agencies, offices, bureaus and units, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and even
non-government entities enjoying subsidy from the
government. However, there is nothing in Section 26 that
states, expressly or impliedly, that the COA's power to
examine and audit government banks is exclusive,
thereby preventing private audit of government agencies
concurrently with the COA audit.
Section 26 is a definition of the COA's "general
jurisdiction." Jurisdiction may be exclusive or concurrent.
Section 26 of PD
No. 1445 does not state that the COA's jurisdiction is
exclusive, and there are other laws providing for
concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, Section 26 must be applied
in harmony with Section 5832 of the General Banking
Law of 2000 (RA No. 8791) which authorizes
unequivocally the Monetary Board to require banks to
hire independent auditors. Section 58 of the General
Banking Law of 2000 states as follows:
"Section 58. Independent Auditor. - The Monetary Board
may require a bank, quasi-bank or trust entity to engage
the services of an independent auditor to be chosen by
the bank, quasi-bank or trust entity concerned from a list
of certified public accountants acceptable to the
Monetary Board. The term of the engagement shall be
as prescribed by the Monetary Board which may either
be on a continuing basis where the auditor shall act as
resident examiner, or on the basis of special
engagements; but in any case, the independent auditor
shall be responsible to the bank's, quasi-bank's or trust
entity's board of directors. A copy of the report shall be
furnished to the Monetary Board. x x x." (Emphasis
supplied)
Moreover, Section 26 must also be applied in conformity
with Sections 25 and 2833 of the New Central Bank Act (
RA No. 7653) which authorize expressly the Monetary
Board to conduct periodic or special examination of all
banks. Sections 25 and 28 of the New Central Bank Act
state as follows:
"Sec. 25. Supervision and Examination. The Bangko
Sentral shall have supervision over, and conduct
periodic or special examinations of, banking institutions x
x x. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
"Sec. 28. Examination and Fees. The supervising and
examining department head, personally or by deputy,
shall examine the books of every banking institution once
in every twelve (12) months, and at such other time as
the Monetary Board by an affirmative vote of five (5)
members may deem expedient and to make a report on
the same to the Monetary Board: x x x." (Emphasis
supplied)
The power vested in the Monetary Board under Section
58 of the General Banking Law of 2000, and Sections 25
and 28 of the New Central Bank Act, emanates from the
Central Bank's explicit constitutional mandate to exercise
"supervision over the operations of banks." Under
Section 4 of the General Banking Law of 2000, the term "
supervision"34 is defined as follows:
"Section 4. Supervisory Powers. The operations and
activities of banks shall be subject to supervision of the
Bangko Sentral. "Supervision" shall include the following:
xxx
4.2. The conduct of examination to determine
compliance with laws and regulations if the
circumstances so warrant as determined by the
Monetary Board;
xxx
4.4. Regular investigation which shall not be oftener than
once a year from the last date of examinationto
determine whether an institution is conducting its
business on a safe or sound basis: Provided, That the
deficiencies/irregularities found by or discovered by
an audit shall immediately be addressed;
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, under existing laws, the COA does not have the
sole and exclusive power to examine and audit
government banks. The Central Bank has concurrent
jurisdiction to examine and audit, or cause the
examination and audit, of government banks.
Section 31 of PD No. 1445, another provision of law
claimed by the COA to prohibit the hiring of private
auditors by government agencies, provides as follows:
"Section 31. Deputization of private licensed
professionals to assist government auditors. - (1) The
Commission may, when the exigencies of the service so
require, deputize and retain in the name of the
Commission such certified public accountants and other
licensed professionals not in the public service as it may
deem necessary to assist government auditors in
undertaking specialized audit engagements.
"(2) The deputized professionals shall be entitled to such
compensation and allowances as may be stipulated,
subject to pertinent rules and regulations on
compensation and fees."
According to the COA, Section 31 is the maximum extent
that private auditors can participate in auditing
government agencies and anything beyond this is
without legal basis. Hence, the COA maintains that the
hiring of private auditors who act in their own name and
operate independently of the COA is unlawful.
Section 31 is bereft of any language that prohibits,
expressly or impliedly, the hiring of private auditors by
government agencies. This provision of law merely
grants authority to the COA to hire and deputize private
auditors to assist the COA in the auditing of government
agencies. Such private auditors operate under the
authority of the COA. By no stretch of statutory
construction can this provision be interpreted as an
absolute statutory ban on the hiring of private auditors by
government agencies. Evidently, the language of the law
does not support the COA's claim.
Moreover, the COA further contends that Section 32 of
PD No. 1445 is another provision of law that prohibits the
hiring of private auditors by government agencies.
Section 32 provides as follows:
"Section 32. Government contracts for auditing,
accounting, and related services. (1) No government
agency shall enter into any contract with any private
person or firm for services to undertake studies and
services relating to government auditing, including
services to conduct, for a fee, seminars or workshops for
government personnel on these topics, unless the
proposed contract is first submitted to the Commission to
enable it to determine if it has the resources to undertake
such
studies or services. The Commission may engage the
services of experts from the public or private sector in
the conduct of these studies.
"(2) Should the Commission decide not to undertake the
study or service, it shall nonetheless have the power to
review the contract in order to determine the
reasonableness of its costs." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 32 refers to contracts for studies and services "
relating to government auditing" which the COA may or
may not want to undertake itself for a government
agency. Stated another way, Section 32 speaks of
studies and services that the COA may choose not to
render to a government agency. Obviously, the subject
of these contracts is not the audit itself of a government
agency because the COA is compelled to undertake
such audit and cannot choose not to conduct such audit.
The Constitution and existing law mandate the COA to
audit all government agencies. Section 2, Article IX-D of
the Constitution commands that the COA "shall have the
x x x duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts" of
government agencies (Emphasis supplied). Similarly, the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987 directs that the "
Commission on Audit shall have the x x x duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts"35 of government
agencies (Emphasis supplied). Hence, the COA cannot
refuse to audit government agencies under any
circumstance.
The subject of the contracts referred to in Section 32 is
necessarily limited to studies, seminars, workshops,
researches and other services on government auditing
which the COA may or may not undertake at its
discretion, thereby excluding the audit itself of
government agencies. Since the COA personnel have
the experience on government auditing and are in fact
the experts on this subject, it is only proper for the COA
to be granted the right of first refusal to undertake such
services if required by government agencies. This is
what Section 32 is all about and nothing more. Plainly,
there is nothing in Section 32 which prohibits the hiring
of private auditors to audit government agencies
concurrently with the COA audit.1âwphi1.nêt
On the other hand, the DBP cites Central Bank Circular
No. 112436 as legal basis for hiring a private auditor.
This Circular amended Subsection 1165.5 (Book I) of
the Manual of Regulations for Banks and other Financial
Intermediaries to require "[E]ach bank, whether
government-owned or controlled or private, x x x (to)
cause an annual financial audit to be conducted by an
external auditor x x x." Moreover, the Circular states that
the "audit of a government-owned or controlled bank by
an external independent auditor shall be in addition to
and without prejudice to that conducted by the
Commission on Audit in the discharge of its mandate
under existing law." Furthermore, the Circular provides
that the "requirement for an annual audit by an external
independent auditor shall extend to specialized and
unique government banks such as the Land Bank of the
Philippines and the Development Bank of the Philippines
."
The Central Bank promulgated Circular No. 1124 on
December 5, 1986 pursuant to its power under the
Freedom Constitution, the fundamental law then in force,
as well as pursuant to its general rule making authority
under the General Banking Act (RA No. 337), the
banking law in effect at that time. Under the Freedom
Constitution, the Central Bank exercised supervisory
authority over the banking system. Section 14, Article XV
of the 1973 Constitution, which was re-adopted in the
Freedom Constitution, provided as follows:
"SEC. 14. The Batasang Pambansa shall establish a
central monetary authority which shall provide policy
direction in the areas of money, banking and credit. It
shall have supervisory authority over the operations of
banks and exercise such regulatory authority as may be
provided by law over the operations of finance
companies and other institutions performing similar
functions. Until the Batasang Pambansa shall otherwise
provide, the Central Bank of the Philippines, operating
under existing laws, shall function as the central
monetary authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6-D of the General Banking Act (RA No. 337)
vested the Monetary Board with the specific power to "
require a bank to engage the services of an independent
auditor to be chosen by the bank concerned from a list of
certified public accountants acceptable to the Monetary
Board."
The 1987 Constitution created an independent central
monetary authority with substantially the same powers
as the Central Bank under the 1973 Constitution and the
Freedom Constitution. Section 20, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution provides that the Monetary Board "shall
have supervision over the operations of banks". The
specific power of the Central Bank under the General
Banking Act (RA No. 337) to require an independent
audit of banks was re-enacted in Section 58 of the
General Banking Law of 2000 (RA No. 8791).
Indubitably, the Central Bank had the express
constitutional and statutory power to promulgate Circular
No. 1124 on December 5, 1986. The power granted to
the Central Bank to issue Circular No. 1124 with respect
to the independent audit of banks is direct, unambiguous,
and beyond dispute. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
which succeeded the Central Bank, retained under the
1987 Constitution and the General Banking Law of 2000
(RA No. 8791) the same constitutional and statutory
power the Central Bank had under the Freedom
Constitution and the General Banking Act (RA No. 337)
with respect to the independent audit of banks.
Circular No. 1124 has the force and effect of law. In a
long line of decisions,37 this Court has held consistently
that the rules and regulations issued by the Central Bank
pursuant to its supervisory and regulatory powers have
the force and effect of law. The DBP, being a bank under
the constitutional and statutory supervision of the Central
Bank, was under a clear legal obligation to comply with
the requirement of Circular No. 1124 on the private audit
of banks. Refusal by the DBP to comply with the Circular
would have rendered the DBP and its officers liable to
the penal provisions of the General
Banking Act,38 as well as the administrative and penal
sanctions under the Central Bank Act.39
The DBP also relies on Section 8 of PD No. 2029 as its
statutory basis for hiring a private auditor. This Section
states in part as follows:
"The audit of government corporations by the
Commission on Audit shall not preclude government
corporations from engaging the services of private
auditing firms: Provided, however, that even if the
services of the latter are availed of, the audit report of the
Commission on Audit shall serve as the report for
purposes of compliance with audit requirements as
required of government corporations under applicable
law."
Section 8 of PD No. 2029, however, also provides that
the "policy of withdrawal of resident auditors shall be
fully implemented x x x." Section 2 of the same decree
also excludes from the term "government-owned or
controlled corporation" two classes of corporations. The
first are originally private corporations the majority of the
shares of stock of which are acquired by government
financial institutions through foreclosure or dacion en
pago. The second are subsidiary corporations of
government corporations, which subsidiaries are
organized exclusively to own, manage or lease physical
assets acquired by government financial institutions
through foreclosure or dacion en pago. Claiming that PD
No. 2029 operates to exempt certain government-owned
corporations from the COA's jurisdiction in violation of
Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA is
questioning the constitutionality of PD No. 2029.
There is, however, no compelling need to pass upon the
constitutionality of PD No. 2029 because the Constitution
and existing banking laws allow such hiring. The issues
raised in this case can be resolved adequately without
resolving the constitutionality of PD No. 2029. This Court
will leave the issue of the constitutionality of PD No.
2029 to be settled in another case where its resolution is
an absolute necessity.40
Third Issue: Necessity of Private Auditor and
Reasonableness of the Fees
The remaining issue to be resolved is whether or not the
DBP's hiring of a private auditor was necessary and the
fees it paid reasonable under the circumstances. The
hiring by the DBP of a private auditor was a condition
imposed by the World Bank for the grant to the Philippine
government in early 1987 of a US$310 million Economic
Recovery Loan, at a time when the government
desperately needed funds to revive a badly battered
economy. One of the salient objectives of the US$310
million loan was the rehabilitation of the DBP which was
then burdened with enormous bad loans. The
rehabilitation of the DBP was important in the overall
recovery of the national economy.
On February 23, 1986, the World Bank President
reported to the Bank's Executive Directors that the
privately audited accounts of the DBP for 1986 and 1987
"will be a requirement for the releases of the second and
third tranches,
respectively, of the ERL" (Emphasis supplied). Moreover,
the Agreed Minutes of Negotiations on the Philippine
Economic Recovery Program41 signed by the Philippine
government and World Bank negotiating panels on
January 8, 1987, required that "a copy of COA's letter x x
x regarding DBP's appointment of a private external
auditor will be sent to the (World) Bank before the
distribution of the loan documents to the Bank's Board,
along with a copy of the scope of audit as approved by
COA and satisfactory to the Bank" (Emphasis supplied).
As a creditor, the World Bank needed the private audit
for its own information to monitor the progress of the
DBP's rehabilitation. This is apparent from the
said Agreed Minutes which provided that the "general
terms of reference (for the hiring of private external audit)
were discussed during the negotiations and form part of
the World Bank's guidelines for financial information on
financial institutions"42 (Emphasis supplied).
The hiring of a private auditor being an express condition
for the grant of the US$310 million Economic Recovery
Loan, a major objective of which was the DBP's
rehabilitation, the same was a necessary corporate act
on the part of the DBP. The national government,
represented by the Central Bank Governor, as well as
the Ministers of Finance, Trade, and Economic Planning,
had already committed to the hiring by all government
banks of private auditors in addition to the COA. For the
DBP to refuse to hire a private auditor would have
aborted the vital loan and derailed the national economic
recovery, resulting in grave consequences to the entire
nation. The hiring of a private auditor was not only
necessary based on the government's loan covenant
with the World Bank, it was also necessary because it
was mandated by Central Bank Circular No. 1124 under
pain of administrative and penal sanctions.
The last matter to determine is the reasonableness of the
fees charged by Joaquin C. Cunanan & Co., the private
auditor hired by the DBP. The COA describes the private
auditor's fees as an "excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditure" of government funds. For
the audit of the DBP's financial statements in 1986, the
private auditor billed the DBP the amount of ₱487,321.
14.43 In 1987, the private auditor billed the DBP the
amount of ₱529,947.00.44 In comparison, the COA
billed the DBP an audit fee of ₱27,015,963.0045 in 1988,
and ₱15,421,662.0046 in 1989. Even granting that the
COA's scope of audit services was broader,47 still it
could not be said that the private auditor's fees are
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable compared to
the COA's billings.
The hiring of a private auditor by the DBP being a
condition of the US$310 million World Bank loan to the
Philippine government, the fees of such private auditor
are in reality part of the government's cost of borrowing
from the World Bank. The audit report of the private
auditor is primarily intended for the World Bank's
information48 on the financial status of the DBP whose
rehabilitation was one of the objectives of the loan. An
annual private audit fee of about half a million pesos
added to the interest on a US$310 million loan would
hardly make the cost of borrowing excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable. Besides, the condition
imposed by a lender, whose money is at risk, requiring
the borrower or its majority-owned subsidiaries to submit
to audit by an independent public accountant, is a
reasonable and normal business practice. 1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

letter-decision of the Chairman of the Commission on
Audit dated August 29, 1988, and the letter-decision
promulgated by the Commission on Audit en banc dated
May 20, 1989, are hereby SET ASIDE, and the
temporary restraining order issued by the court enjoining
respondent Commission on Audit from enforcing the said
decisions is hereby made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.
 Commission on Appointments. Accordingly, in the Mison
case, the appointment of therein respondent Salvador M.
G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989 Mison as head of the Bureau of Customs, without the
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, petitioner,  confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, was
vs. held valid and in accordance with the Constitution.
SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE,
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
AND HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, respondents.

Mary Concepcion Bautista for and in her own behalf.

Christine A.Tomas Espinosa for private respondent

Hesiquio R. Mallillin

PADILLA, J.:

The Court had hoped that its decision in Sarmiento III vs.
Mison, 1 would have settled the question of which
appointments by the President, under the 1987
Constitution, are to be made with and without the review
of the Commission on Appointments. The Mison case
was the first major case under the 1987 Constitution and
in construing Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution
which provides:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of

the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

The President shall have the power to make

appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.

this Court, drawing extensively from the proceedings of

the 1986 Constitutional Commission and the country's
experience under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, held
that only those appointments expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII are to be reviewed by
the Commission on Appointments, namely, "the heads of
the executive department, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution." All other appointments by the President
are to be made without the participation of the
The Mison case doctrine did not foreclose contrary of certain elements — absent in the Mison case —
opinions. So with the very provisions of Sec. 16, Art. VII makes necessary a closer scrutiny. The facts are
as designed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution. But therefore essential.
the Constitution, as construed by this Court in
appropriate cases, is the supreme law of the land. And it
cannot be over-stressed that the strength of the
Constitution, with all its imperfections, lies in the respect
and obedience accorded to it by the people, especially
the officials of government, who are the subjects of its
commands.

Barely a year after Mison, the Court is again confronted

with a similar question, this time, whether or not the
appointment by the President of the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an "independent
office" created by the 1987 Constitution, is to be made
with or without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments (CA, for brevity). Once more, as in Mison,
the Court will resolve the issue irrespective of the parties
involved in the litigation, mindful that what really matters
are the principles that will guide this Administration and
others in the years to come.

Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on

Human Rights is not among the positions mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it
follows that the appointment by the President of the
Chairman of the (CHR), is to be made without the review
or participation of the Commission on Appointments.

To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman

and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is
not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself,
unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, whose appointments are
expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. 2

The President appoints the Chairman and Members of

the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the
second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
because they are among the officers of government "
whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to
appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5
May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights. It provides:

(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission

on Human Rights shall be appointed by the President for
a term of seven years without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor.

The above conclusions appear to be plainly evident and,

therefore, irresistible. However, the presence in this case
On 27 August 1987, the President of the On 22 December 1988, before the Chief Justice of this
Philippines designated herein petitioner Mary Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan, petitioner Bautista took
Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman, Commission her oath of office by virtue of her appointment as
on Human Rights." The letter of designation reads: Chairman of the

27 August 1987

M a d a m:

You are hereby designated ACTING CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, to succeed the late
Senator Jose W. Diokno and Justice J. B. L. Reyes.

Very truly yours,

CORAZON C. AQUINO

HON. MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA 3

Realizing perhaps the need for a permanent chairman

and members of the Commission on Human Rights,
befitting an independent office, as mandated by the
Constitution, 4 the President of the Philippines on 17
December 1988 extended to petitioner Bautista a
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission.
The appointment letter is as follows:

17 December 1988

The Honorable 
The Chairman 
Commission on Human Rights 
Pasig, Metro Manila

M a d a m:

Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, the following

are hereby appointed to the positions indicated opposite
their respective names in the Commission on Human
Rights:

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA — Chairman 

ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR — Member 
SAMUEL SORIANO — Member 
HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN — Member
NARCISO C. MONTEIRO — Member

By virtue hereof, they may qualify and enter upon the

performance of the duties of the office furnishing this
Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of
their oath of office.

Very truly yours,

CORAZON C. AQUINO 5

It is to be noted that by virtue of such appointment,

petitioner Bautista was advised by the President that she
could qualify and enter upon the performance of the
duties of the office of Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights, requiring her to furnish the office of the
President and the Civil Service Commission with copies
of her oath of office.
Commission on Human Rights. The full text of the oath Commission on Appointments 
of office is as follows: Senate, Manila

OATH OF OFFICE

I, MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA of 3026 General G.

del Pilar Street, Bangkal, Makati, Metro Manila having
been appointed to the position of CHAIRMAN of the
Commission on Human Rights, do solemnly swear that I
will discharge to the best of my ability all the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which I have been
appointed; uphold the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, and obey all the laws of the land without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD.

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 22nd

day of December in the year of Our Lord, 1988 in Manila.

MARCELO B. FERNAN

Chief Justice 
Supreme Court of the Philippines 6

Immediately, after taking her oath of office as Chairman

of the Commission on Human Rights, petitioner Bautista
discharged the functions and duties of the Office of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights which,
as previously stated, she had originally held merely in an
acting capacity beginning 27 August 1987.

On 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter

from the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
requesting her to submit to the Commission certain
information and documents as required by its rules in
connection with the confirmation of her appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. 7 On 10
January 1989, the Commission on Appointments'
Secretary again wrote petitioner Bautista requesting her
presence at a meeting of the Commission on
Appointments Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar
Council and Human Rights set for 19 January 1989 at 9
A.M. at the Conference Room, 8th Floor, Kanlaon Tower
I, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City that would deliberate on
her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights. 8

On 13 January 1989, petitioner Bautista wrote to the

Chairman of the Commission on Appointments stating,
for the reasons therein given, why she considered the
Commission on Appointments as having no jurisdiction
to review her appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights. The petitioner's letter to
the Commission on Appointments' Chairman reads:

January 13, 1 989

SENATE PRESIDENT JOVITO R. SALONGA 

Chairman 
S i r:
We acknowledge receipt of the communication from the
Commission on Appointments requesting our
appearance on January 19, 1989 for deliberation on our
appointments.
We respectfully submit that the appointments of the
Commission commissioners of the Human Rights
Commission are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
The Constitution, in Article VII Section 16 which
expressly vested on the President the appointing power,
has expressly mentioned the government officials whose
appointments are subject to the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments of Congress. The
Commissioners of the Commission on Human Rights are
not included among those.
Where the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments is required, as in the case of the
Constitutional Commissions such as the Commission on
Audit, Civil Service Commission and the Commission on
Elections, it was expressly provided that the nominations
will be subject to confirmation of Commission on
Appointments. The exclusion again of the Commission
on Human Rights, a constitutional office, from this
enumeration is a clear denial of authority to the
Commission on Appointments to review our
appointments to the Commission on Human Rights.
Furthermore, the Constitution specifically provides that
this Commission is an independent office which:
a. must investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
b. shall monitor the government's compliance in all our
treaty obligations on human rights. We submit that, the
monitoring of all agencies of government, includes even
Congress itself, in the performance of its functions which
may affect human rights;
c. may call on all agencies of government for the
implementation of its mandate.
The powers of the Commission on Appointments is in
fact a derogation of the Chief Executive's appointing
power and therefore the grant of that authority to review
a valid exercise of the executive power can never be
presumed. It must be expressly granted.
The Commission on Appointments has no jurisdiction
under the Constitution to review appointments by the
President of Commissioners of the Commission on
Human Rights.
In view of the foregoing considerations, as Chairman of
an independent constitutional office. I cannot submit
myself to the Commission on Appointments for the
purpose of confirming or rejecting my appointment.
Very truly yours,
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA
Chairman9
In respondent Commission's comment (in this case),
dated 3 February 1989, there is attached as Annex 1 a
letter of the Commission on Appointments' Secretary to
the Executive Secretary, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr.
making reference to the "ad interim appointment which
Her Excellency extended to Atty. Mary Concepcion
Bautista on 14 January 1989 as Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights" 10 and informing
Secretary Macaraig that, as previously conveyed to him
in a letter of 25 January 1989, the Commission on
Appointments disapproved petitioner Bautista's "ad
interim appointment' as Chairperson of the Commission
on Human Rights in view of her refusal to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments. The
letter reads:
1 February 1989
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Executive Secretary 
Malacanang, Manila
S i r:
This refers to the ad interim appointment which Her
Excellency extended to Atty. Mary Concepcion Bautista
on 14 January 1989 as Chairperson of the Commission
on Human Rights.
As we conveyed to you in our letter of 25 January 1989,
the Commission on Appointments, assembled in plenary
(session) on the same day, disapproved Atty. Bautista'
s ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights in view of her refusal to
submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Appointments.
This is to inform you that the Commission on
Appointments, likewise assembled in plenary (session)
earlier today, denied Senator Mamintal A. J. Tamano's
motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of Atty.
Bautista's ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights.
Very truly yours,
RAOUL V. VICTORINO 
Secretary 11
On the same date (1 February 1989), the Commission on
Appointments' Secretary informed petitioner Bautista
that the motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of
her "ad interim appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights" was denied by the
Commission on Appointments. The letter reads as
follows:
1 February 1989 Dear Atty. Bautista:

ATTY. MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA  Pursuant to Sec. 6 (a), Chapter II of the Rules of the
Commission on Human Rights  Commission on Appointments, the denial by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines  Commission on Appointments, assembled in plenary (
Bldg. Pasig, Metro Manila session) earlier today, of Senator Mamintal A.J. Tamano'
s motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of your ad
interim appointment as Chairperson of the Commission
on Human Rights is respectfully conveyed.

Thank you for your attention.

Very truly yours,

RAOUL V. VICTORINO
Secretary 12

In Annex 3 of respondent Commission's same comment,

dated 3 February 1989, is a news item appearing in the 3
February 1989 issue of the "Manila Standard" reporting
that the President had designated PCHR Commissioner
Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the
Commission" pending the resolution of Bautista's case
which had been elevated to the Supreme Court. The
news item is here quoted in full, thus —

Aquino names replacement for MaryCon

President Aquino has named replacement for

Presidential Commission on Human Rights Chairman
Mary Concepcion Bautista whose appointment was
rejected anew by the Congressional commission on
appointments.

The President designated PCHR commissioner Hesiquio

R. Mallillin as acting chairman of the Commission
pending the resolution of Bautista's case which had been
elevated to the Supreme Court.

The President's action followed after Congressional

Commission on Appointments Chairman, Senate
President Jovito Salonga declared Bautista can no
longer hold on to her position after her appointment was
not confirmed for the second time.

For all practical purposes, Salonga said Bautista can be

accused of usurpation of authority if she insists to stay on
her office.

In effect, the President had asked Bautista to vacate her

office and give way to Mallillin (Mari Villa) 13

On 20 January 1989, or even before the respondent

Commission on Appointments had acted on her "ad
interimappointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights" petitioner Bautista filed with this Court
the present petition for certiorari with a prayer for the
immediate issuance of a restraining order, to declare "as
unlawful and unconstitutional and without any legal force
and effect any action of the Commission on
Appointments as well as of the Committee on Justice,
Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, on the
lawfully extended appointment of the petitioner as appointment on 17 December 1988 is an appointment
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, on the that was for the President solely to make, i.e., not an
ground that they have no lawful and constitutional appointment to be submitted for review and confirmation
authority to confirm and to review her appointment." 14 (or rejection) by the Commission on Appointments. This
is in accordance with Sec. 16, Art. VII of
The prayer for temporary restraining order was "to enjoin
the respondent Commission on Appointments not to
proceed further with their deliberation and/or
proceedings on the appointment of the petitioner ... nor
to enforce, implement or act on any order, resolution, etc.
issued in the course of their deliberations." 15

Respondents were required to file comment within ten (

10) days. 16 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an
amended petition, with urgent motion for restraining
order, impleading Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin the
designated acting chairman as party respondent and
praying for the nullification of his appointment. The
succeeding day, a supplemental urgent ex-parte motion
was filed by petitioner seeking to restrain respondent
Mallillin from continuing to exercise the functions of
chairman and to refrain from demanding courtesy
resignations from officers or separating or dismissing
employees of the Commission.

Acting on petitioner's amended petition and

supplemental urgent ex-parte motion, the Court resolved
to issue a temporary restraining order directing
respondent Mallillin to cease and desist from effecting
the dismissal, courtesy resignation, i removal and
reorganization and other similar personnel actions. 17
 Respondents were likewise required to comment on
said amended petition with allowance for petitioner to file
a reply within two (2) days from receipt of a copy thereof.

Respondents Senator Salonga, the Commission on

Appointments the Committee on J & BC and Human
Rights filed a comment to the amended petition on 21
February 1989. 18 Petitioner filed her reply. 19 On 24
February 1989, respondent Mallillin filed a separate
comment. 20 The Court required petitioner to reply to
respondent Mallillin's comment . 21 Petitioner filed her
reply. 22

In deference to the Commission on Appointments, an

instrumentality of a co-ordinate and co-equal branch of
government, the Court did not issue a temporary
restraining order directed against it. However, this does
not mean that the issues raised by the petition, as met
by the respondents' comments, will not be resolved in
this case. The Court will not shirk from its duty as the
final arbiter of constitutional issues, in the same way that
it did not in Mison.

As disclosed by the records, and as previously adverted

to, it is clear that petitioner Bautista was extended by Her
Excellency, the President a permanent appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 17
December 1988. Before this date, she was merely the "
Acting Chairman" of the Commission. Bautista's
the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine in Mison which is The right to the office is then in the person appointed,
here reiterated. and he has the absolute, unconditional power of
accepting or rejecting it.
The threshold question that has really come to the fore is
whether the President, subsequent to her act of 17
December 1988, and after petitioner Bautista had
qualified for the office to which she had been appointed,
by taking the oath of office and actually assuming and
discharging the functions and duties thereof, could
extend another appointment to the petitioner on 14
January 1989, an "ad interim appointment" as termed by
the respondent Commission on Appointments or any
other kind of appointment to the same office of Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights that called for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

The Court, with all due respect to both the Executive and
Legislative Departments of government, and after careful
deliberation, is constrained to hold and rule in the
negative. When Her Excellency, the President converted
petitioner Bautista's designation as Acting Chairman to a
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights on 17 December 1988, significantly
she advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter)
that, by virtue of such appointment, she could qualify and
enter upon the performance of the duties of the office (of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights). All that
remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the
appointment. Obviously, she accepted the appointment
by taking her oath of office before the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and assuming
immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Bautista'
s appointment therefore on 17 December 1988 as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights was a
completed act on the part of the President. To
paraphrase the great jurist, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in
the celebrated case of Marbury vs. Madison. 23

xxx xxx xxx

The answer to this question seems an obvious one. The

appointment being the sole act of the President, must be
completely evidenced, when it is shown that he has done
everything to be performed by him.

xxx xxx xxx

Some point of time must be taken when the power of the

executive over an officer, not removable at his will must
cease. That point of time must be when the constitutional
power of appointment has been exercised. And this
power has been exercised when the last act, required
from the person possessing the power, has been
performed. ....

xxx xxx xxx

But having once made the appointment, his (the

President's) power over the office is terminated in all
cases, where by law the officer is not removable by him.
xxx xxx xxx the President to make without the participation of the
Commission on Appointments, the executive's voluntary
THE "APPOINTMENT" OF PETITIONER BAUTISTA ON act of submitting such appointment to the Commission
14 JANUARY 1989 on Appointments and the latter's act of
It is respondent Commission's submission that the
President, after the appointment of 17 December 1988
extended to petitioner Bautista, decided to extend
another appointment (14 January 1989) to petitioner
Bautista, this time, submitting such appointment (more
accurately, nomination) to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. And yet, it seems obvious
enough, both in logic and in fact, that no new or further
appointment could be made to a position already filled by
a previously completed appointment which had been
accepted by the appointee, through a valid qualification
and assumption of its duties.

Respondent Commission vigorously contends that,

granting that petitioner's appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is one that, under Sec. 16
, Art. VII of the Constitution, as interpreted in the Mison
case, is solely for the President to make, yet, it is within
the president's prerogative to voluntarily submit such
appointment to the Commission on Appointment for
confirmation. The mischief in this contention, as the
Court perceives it, lies in the suggestion that the
President (with Congress agreeing) may, from time to
time move power boundaries, in the Constitution
differently from where they are placed by the Constitution
.

The Court really finds the above contention difficult of

acceptance. Constitutional Law, to begin with, is
concerned with power not political convenience, wisdom,
exigency, or even necessity. Neither the Executive nor
the Legislative (Commission on Appointments) can
create power where the Constitution confers none. The
evident constitutional intent is to strike a careful and
delicate balance, in the matter of appointments to public
office, between the President and Congress (the latter
acting through the Commission on Appointments). To tilt
one side or the other of the scale is to disrupt or alter
such balance of power. In other words, to the extent that
the Constitution has blocked off certain appointments for
the President to make with the participation of the
Commission on Appointments, so also has the
Constitution mandated that the President can confer no
power of participation in the Commission on
Appointments over other appointments exclusively
reserved for her by the Constitution. The exercise of
political options that finds no support in the Constitution
cannot be sustained.

Nor can the Commission on Appointments, by the actual

exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review
presidential appointments, create power to confirm
appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the
President alone. Stated differently, when the
appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for
confirming or rejecting the same, are done without or in Respondent Mallillin contends that with or without
excess of jurisdiction. confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
petitioner Bautista, as Chairman of the Commission on
EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY Human Rights, can be removed from said office at
SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS anytime, at the pleasure of
AN APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER, STILL,
THERE WAS NO VACANCY TO WHICH AN
APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY
1989

Under this heading, we will assume, ex gratia argumenti,

that the Executive may voluntarily allow the Commission
on Appointments to exercise the power of review over an
appointment otherwise solely vested by the Constitution
in the President. Yet, as already noted, when the
President appointed petitioner Bautista on 17 December
1988 to the position of Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights with the advice to her that by virtue of
such appointment (not, until confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments), she could qualify and
enter upon the performance of her duties after taking her
oath of office, the presidential act of appointment to the
subject position which, under the Constitution, is to be
made, in the first place, without the participation of the
Commission on Appointments, was then and there a
complete and finished act, which, upon the acceptance
by Bautista, as shown by her taking of the oath of office
and actual assumption of the duties of said office,
installed her, indubitably and unequivocally, as the lawful
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights for a
term of seven (7) years. There was thus no vacancy in
the subject office on 14 January 1989 to which an
appointment could be validly made. In fact, there is no
vacancy in said office to this day.

Nor can respondents impressively contend that the new

appointment or re-appointment on 14 January 1989 was
an ad interim appointment, because, under the
Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not
apply to appointments solely for the President to make, i.
e., without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their very
nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to
appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad
interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for
the President solely to make, that is, without the
participation of the Commission on Appointments, can
not be ad interim appointments.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 163-A, 30 JUNE 1987,

PROVIDING THAT THE TENURE OF THE CHAIRMAN
AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS SHALL BE AT THE PLEASURE OF THE
PRESIDENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
the President; and that with the disapproval of Bautista's the Chairman and Members of the Commission on
appointment (nomination) by the Commission on Human Rights, which is "at the pleasure of the President
Appointments, there was greater reason for her removal ."
by the President and her replacement with respondent
Mallillin Thus, according to respondent Mallillin the
petition at bar has become moot and academic.

We do not agree that the petition has become moot and

academic. To insist on such a posture is akin to deluding
oneself that day is night just because the drapes are
drawn and the lights are on. For, aside from the
substantive questions of constitutional law raised by
petitioner, the records clearly show that petitioner came
to this Court in timely manner and has not shown any
indication of abandoning her petition.

Reliance is placed by respondent Mallillin on Executive

Order No. 163-A, 30 June 1987, full text of which is as
follows:

WHEREAS, the Constitution does not prescribe the term

of office of the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights unlike those of other
Constitutional Commissions;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO,

President of the Philippines, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Section 2, sub-paragraph (c) of Executive

Order No. 163 is hereby amended to read as follows:

The Chairman and Members of the Commission on

Human Rights shall be appointed by the President. Their
tenure in office shall be at the pleasure of the President.

SEC. 2. This Executive Order shall take effect

immediately. DONE in the City of Manila, this 30th day of
June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty-seven.

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

President of the Philippines

By the President:

(Sgd.) JOKER P. ARROYO 

Executive Secretary 24

Previous to Executive Order No. 163-A, or on 5 May

1987, Executive Order No. 163 25 was issued by the
President, Sec. 2(c) of which provides:

Sec. 2(c). The Chairman and the Members of the

Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by the
President for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Appointments to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.

It is to be noted that, while the earlier executive order (

No. 163) speaks of a term of office of the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights — which
is seven (7) years without reappointment — the later
executive order (163-A) speaks of the tenure in office of
Tenure in office should not be confused with term of destruction. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional
office. As Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Concepcion in Commission clearly point to its being plainly at war with
his concurring opinion in Alba vs. Evangelista, 26 stated: the constitutional intent of independence for the
Commission. Thus —
The distinction between "term" and "tenure" is important,
for, pursuant to the Constitution, "no officer or employee
in the Civil Service may be removed or suspended
except for cause, as provided by law" (Art. XII, section 4),
and this fundamental principle would be defeated if
Congress could legally make the tenure of some officials
dependent upon the pleasure of the President, by
clothing the latter with blanket authority to replace a
public officer before the expiration of his term. 27

When Executive Order No. 163 was issued, the evident

purpose was to comply with the constitutional provision
that "the term of office and other qualifications and
disabilities of the Members of the Commission (on
Human Rights) shall be provided by law" (Sec. 17(2), Art.
XIII, 1987 Constitution).

As the term of office of the Chairman (and Members) of

the Commission on Human Rights, is seven (7) years,
without reappointment, as provided by Executive Order
No. 163, and consistent with the constitutional design to
give the Commission the needed independence to
perform and accomplish its functions and duties,
the tenure in office of said Chairman (and Members)
cannot be later made dependent on the pleasure of the
President.

Nor can respondent Mallillin find support in the majority

opinion in the Alba case, supra, because the power of
the President, sustained therein, to replace a previously
appointed vice-mayor of Roxas City given the express
provision in Sec. 8, Rep. Act No. 603 (creating the City
of Roxas) stating that the vice-mayor shall serve at the
pleasure of the President, can find no application to the
Chairman of an INDEPENDENT OFFICE, created not by
statute but by the Constitution itself. Besides, unlike in
the Alba case, here the Constitution has decreed that the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights shall have a "term of office."

Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult to

conceptualize how an office conceived and created by
the Constitution to be independent as the Commission
on Human Rights-and vested with the delicate and vital
functions of investigating violations of human rights,
pinpointing responsibility and recommending sanctions
as well as remedial measures therefor, can truly function
with independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in
office of its Chairman and Members is made dependent
on the pleasure of the President. Executive Order No.
163-A, being antithetical to the constitutional mandate of
independence for the Commission on Human Rights has
to be declared unconstitutional.

The Court is not alone in viewing Executive Order No.

163-A as containing the seeds of its constitutional
MR. GARCIA (sponsor). Precisely, one of the reasons principally committed by members of the military, by the
why it is important for this body to be constitutionalized is Armed Forces of the Philippines. 31
the fact that regardless of who is the President or who
holds the executive power, the human rights issue is of xxx xxx xxx
such importance that it should be safeguarded and it
should be independent of political parties or powers that
are actually holding the reins of government. Our
experience during the martial law period made us realize
how precious those rights are and, therefore, these must
be safeguarded at all times.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. GARCIA. I would like to state this fact: Precisely we

do not want the term or the power of the Commission on
Human Rights to be coterminous with the president,
because the President's power is such that if he appoints
a certain commissioner and that commissioner is subject
to the President, therefore, any human rights violations
committed under the person's administration will be
subject to presidential pressure. That is what we would
like to avoid — to make the protection of human rights go
beyond the fortunes of different political parties or
administrations in power. 28

xxx xxx xxx

MR. SARMIENTO (sponsor). Yes, Madam President. I

conferred with the honorable Chief Justice Concepcion
and retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes and they believe that
there should be an independent Commission on Human
Rights free from executive influence because many of
the irregularities on human rights violations are
committed by members of the armed forces and
members of the executive branch of the government. So
as to insulate this body from political interference, there
is a need to constitutionalize it. 29

xxx xxx xxx

MR. SARMIENTO: On the inquiry on whether there is a

need for this to be constitutionalized, I would refer to a
previous inquiry that there is still a need for making this a
constitutional body free or insulated from interference. I
conferred with former Chief Justice Concepcion and the
acting chairman of the Presidential Committee on Human
Rights, retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, and they are one in
saying that this body should be constitutionalized so that
it will be free from executive control or interferences,
since many of the abuses are committed by the
members of the military or the armed forces. 30

xxx xxx xxx

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Congress can create this body,

but as I have said, if we leave it to Congress, this
commission will be within the reach of politicians and of
public officers and that to me is dangerous. We should
insulate this body from political control and political
interference because of the nature of its functions to
investigate all forms of human rights violations which are
MR. GARCIA. The critical factor here is political control, If there are charges against Bautista for misfeasance or
and normally, when a body is appointed by Presidents malfeasance in office, charges may be filed against her
who may change, the commission must remain above with the Ombudsman. If he finds a prima facie case
these changes in political control. Secondly, the other against her, the
important factor to consider are the armed forces, the
police forces which have tremendous power at their
command and, therefore, we would need a commission
composed of men who also are beyond the reach of
these forces and the changes in political administration. 
32

xxx xxx xxx

MR MONSOD. Yes, It is the committee's position that

this proposed special body, in order to function
effectively, must be invested with an independence that
is necessary not only for its credibility but also for the
effectiveness of its work. However, we want to make a
distinction in this Constitution. May be what happened
was that it was referred to the wrong committee. In the
opinion of the committee, this need not be a commission
that is similar to the three constitutional commissions like
the COA, the COMELEC, and the Civil Service. It need
not be in that article. 33

xxx xxx xxx

MR. COLAYCO. The Commissioners earlier objection

was that the Office of the President is not involved in the
project. How sure are we that the next President of the
Philippines will be somebody we can trust? Remember,
even now there is a growing concern about some of the
bodies, agencies and commission created by President
Aquino. 34

xxx xxx xxx

.... Leaving to Congress the creation of the Commission

on Human Rights is giving less importance to a truly
fundamental need to set up a body that will effectively
enforce the rules designed to uphold human rights. 35

PETITIONER BAUTISTA MAY OF COURSE BE

REMOVED BUT ONLY FOR CAUSE

To hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the

lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her
appointment, as such, by the President on 17 December
1988, and her acceptance thereof, is not to say that she
cannot be removed from office before the expiration of
her seven (7) year term. She certainly can be removed
but her removal must be for cause and with her right to
due process properly safeguarded. In the case
of NASECO vs. NLRC, 36 this Court held that before a
rank-and-file employee of the NASECO, a government-
owned corporation, could be dismissed, she was entitled
to a hearing and due process. How much more, in the
case of the Chairman of a constitutionally mandated
INDEPENDENT OFFICE, like the Commission on
Human Rights.
corresponding information or informations can be filed
with the Sandiganbayan which may in turn order her
suspension from office while the case or cases against
her are pending before said court. 37 This is due process
in action. This is the way of a government of laws and
not of men.
A FINAL WORD
It is to the credit of the President that, in deference to the
rule of law, after petitioner Bautista had elevated her
case to this Tribunal, Her Excellency merely designated
an Acting Chairman for the Commission on Human
Rights (pending decision in this case) instead of
appointing another permanent Chairman. The latter
course would have added only more legal difficulties to
an already difficult situation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner
Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and the
lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits,
privileges and emoluments of said office. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued by the Court against
respondent Mallillin enjoining him from dismissing or
terminating personnel of the Commission on Human
Rights is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR.
ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent
of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, 
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, et al,
 respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
The issue raised in the special civil action
of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the
Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where
the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights
by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal
or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of
justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-
judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance
of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise,
where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within
the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or
official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the
Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the
same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing
and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the
respondents and are hence taken as substantially
correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions
posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with
others involved in related cases recently resolved by this
Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are
hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day,
some 800 public school teachers, among them members
of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (
MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT)
undertook what they described as "mass concerted
actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting
from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act
upon grievances that had time and again been brought
to the latter's attention. According to them they had
decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after
the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on
September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last
call for the government to negotiate the granting of
demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away
from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their
representatives, the teachers participating in the mass
actions were served with an order of the Secretary of
Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal,
and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those
who did not comply and to hire their replacements.
Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions
continued into the week, with more teachers joining in
the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass
actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein,
teachers at the
Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had
agreed to support the non-political demands of the
MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR
complainants (private respondents) were administratively
charged on the basis of the principal's report and given
five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to
Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (
unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An
investigation committee was consequently formed to
hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No.
DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano
Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario
Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the
latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal
investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the
administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the
Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an
injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when
their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated
November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which
later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally
made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the
respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout
signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 
7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary
Cariño dated December 17, 1990, rendered after
evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers,
affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents,
decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber
and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran,
Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition
for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (
unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA
went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to
nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation
of the striking teachers" right to due process and
peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra.
The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme
Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions
in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher
associations, a few named individuals, and "other
teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "
other similarly situated public school teachers too
numerous to be impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers
submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990
to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that
while they were participating in peaceful mass actions,
they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers,
allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "
ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering
forty-
two (42) — were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR
Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the
Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11,
1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring
his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "
not certain whether he (Sec. Cariño) received the
subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the)
Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and
Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C.
Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the
complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had
been "denied due process and suspended without formal
notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass
leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "
the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and)
with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize
." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13
reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and
be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution
of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers
are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which
they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda
Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the
Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are
hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission
en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring
with them any and all documents relevant to the
allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission
in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve
the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.
x x x           x x x          x x x
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary
Cariño sought and was granted leave to file a motion to
dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted
on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "
that the complaint states no cause of action and that the
CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the
motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking
teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as
aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education
Secretary Cariño in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing
dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and
del Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991
in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "
without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the
individual
petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on
the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that
it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue
return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against
recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue
decision on those charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent
Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion to dismiss and
required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their
counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which)
the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the
case on the merits with or without respondents counter
affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were
denied due process of law; . . . they should not have
been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;" there had been a violation of
their civil and political rights which the Commission was
empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "
utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before
. . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by
the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to
this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R.
Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December
28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner
Cariño, has commenced the present action
of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its
position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint
Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has
also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the
case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on
the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide
or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the
following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due
process, and just cause exists for the imposition of
administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their
superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause
of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which
causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify
their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate,
that is to say, determine with character of finality and
definiteness, the same issues which have been passed
upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture
& Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission, this Court having in fact, as
aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may
take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said
matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission
on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution
to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and
even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged
adjudicatory powers human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to

have no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over
the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in

the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.
e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 
21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not
have. 22

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional

provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on
Human Rights.

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution

as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it
succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee
on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of
the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the
following 25

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,

all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of

procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection

of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated
or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or
detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research,
education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
promote human rights and to provide for compensation
to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with
international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance
with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be
provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the
enumerated powers and functions bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can
exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint
of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to
such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance
with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant
immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the
truth. It may also request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in
extending such remedy as may be required by its
findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and
determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-
judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense,
these terms have well understood and quite distinct
meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine,
explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on,
study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to
search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . .
.: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to
learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated
is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by
application of the law to the facts established by the
inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the
same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a
legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "
investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily
does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . .
. an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and
collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters
." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means
to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve,
rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to
settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a
court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass
judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "
adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or
with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or
grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the
exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "
adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle
or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights,
having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and
should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate)
the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No.
90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the
DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission
has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (
a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in
by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or
otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the
failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and
return to their classes despite the order to this effect by
the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of
relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative
disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular
acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions,
if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or
omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the
original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the
under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case
No. 90-775) on the merits."

SO ORDERED.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above
narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and
resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been
seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil
Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had
occasion to pass upon said issues. 34

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the

conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in
disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based
on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings
themselves are void or defective in not having accorded
the respondents due process; and whether or not the
Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human
rights violations involving civil and political rights," are
matters which may be passed upon and determined
through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the
Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an
adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service
Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place

in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into
the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary
or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business
going over the same ground traversed by the latter and
making its own judgment on the questions involved. This
would accord success to what may well have been the
complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or
negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the
administrative cases against them which they anticipated
would be adverse to them.

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on

Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its
investigation should result in conclusions contrary to
those reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no
power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions.
Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service
Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the
Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño
was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate
Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would
be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate
unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of

December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and
G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992 On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction
commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from
  committing
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA
VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA and PEDRO ORDONEZ,
 respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and

designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and
General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Processing
Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the area
was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV
was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation, formerly Filoil
Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was later sold by
Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).

Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several

individuals had entered the premises and planted
agricultural products therein without permission from
EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To convince the intruders
to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-
financial-assistance to those who accepted the same
and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles
and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia.

Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita

Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoñez filed in the
respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint
complaint (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for "justice
and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan at iba pang
tulong"). The CHR conducted an investigation of the
complaint.

According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are

farmers, filed in the Commission on May 10, 1991 a
verified complaint for violation of their human rights.
They alleged that on March 20, 1991, at 10:00 o'clock in
the morning. Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA
Project Engineer, accompanied by his subordinates and
members of the 215th PNP Company, brought a
bulldozer and a crane to level the area occupied by the
private respondents who tried to stop them by showing a
copy of a letter from the Office of the President of the
Philippines ordering postponement of the bulldozing.
However, the letter was crumpled and thrown to the
ground by a member of Damondamon's group who
proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is Governor
Remulla!"

On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been invited by the

private respondents to cover the happenings in the area
were beaten up and their cameras were snatched from
them by members of the Philippine National Police and
some government officials and their civilian followers.
further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary
further orders from the Commission and to appeal before restraining order, ordering the CHR to cease and desist
the Commission on May 27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a from
dialogue (Annex A).

On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group

accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again
bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private
respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the
other respondents, and fired a shot in the air.

On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion

Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her
order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it to include the
Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors
, and their subordinates. The order reads as follows:

Considering the sworn statements of the farmers whose

farmlands are being bulldozed and the wanton
destruction of their irrigation canals which prevent
cultivation at the farmlands as well as the claim of
ownership of the lands by some farmers-complainants,
and their possession and cultivation thereof spanning
decades, including the failure of the officials concerned
to comply with the Constitutional provision on the eviction
of rural "squatters", the Commission reiterates its Order
of May 17, 1991, andfurther orders the Secretary of
Public Works and Highways, their Contractors and
representatives to refrain and desist from bulldozing the
farmlands of the complainants-farmers who have come
to the Commission for relief, during the pendency of this
investigation and to refrain from further destruction of the
irrigation canals in the area until further orders of the
Commission.

This dialogue is reset to June 10, 1991 at 9 00 a.m. and

the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways or his representative is requested to appear. (
p. 20, Rollo; emphasis supplied)

On July 1, 1991, EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift

the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue
injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders.

On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied the motion.

On September 11, 1991, the petitioner, through the

Government Corporate Counsel, filed in this Court a
special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the restraining order and injunctive
writ; that the private respondents have no clear, positive
right to be protected by an injunction; that the CHR
abused its discretion in entertaining the private
respondent's complaint because the issue raised therein
had been decided by this Court, hence, it is barred by
prior judgment.
enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction
orders.
In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the
immediate lifting of this Court's restraining order, and for
an order restraining petitioner EPZA from doing further
acts of destruction and harassment. The CHR contends
that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the
1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation"
because it is mandated, among others, to:
a. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
b. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure
, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
c. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection
of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the under
privileged whose human rights have been violated or
need protection;
d. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with
international treaty obligations on human rights. (
Emphasis supplied.) (p. 45, Rollo)
On November 14, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion praying that he be excused
from filing a Comment for the CHR on the ground that
the Comment filed by the latter "fully traversed and
squarely met all the issues raised and discussed in the
main Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition" (p. 83, Rollo).
Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction or restraining order against supposed violators
of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist
from continuing the acts complained of?
In Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs. Commission on Human
Rights, et al., G.R No. 96681, December 2, 1991, we
held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a
quasi-judicial body.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in
the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.
e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to thejudicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights,
having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and
should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate)
the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No.
90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the
DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission
has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (
a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in
by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or
otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the
failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and
return to their classes despite the order to this effect by
the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of
relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative
disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what were the particular
acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions,
if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or
omissions. (pp. 5 & 8.)
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to
the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection" may not be construed to
confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the
intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law" (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-
32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-
22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never
derived by implication (Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al.,
G.R. No. 88158; Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election,
et al.. G.R. Nos. 97108-09, March 4, 1992).
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid
services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a
preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek
from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human
rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR
itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge
of any court in which the action is pending [within his
district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the
Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a
Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any
action pending in an inferior court within his district." (
Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary
injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation or
protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto,
and for no other purpose
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition
is GRANTED. The orders of injunction dated May 17 and
28, 1991 issued by the respondent Commission on
Human Right are here by ANNULLED and SET ASIDE
and the temporary restraining order which this Court
issued on September 19, 1991, is hereby made
PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO

ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO,
AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.

The City Attorney for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission

on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in
this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining
order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us
to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing
and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "
Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9

July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the
Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council
under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and
received by, the private respondents (being the officers
and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given
a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990)
within which to vacate the questioned premises of North
EDSA.1Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the
private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo
that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "
People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their
President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-
samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against
the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary
Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then
Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-
sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The
complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On
23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission"
and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the

private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's
own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July
1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the
CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than
P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to
purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the
petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the
warning that violation of said order would lead to a A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990,
citation for contempt and arrest."6 questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred,
among other things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by

the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of
Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a
moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor
dwellers in Metro-Manila;

xxx xxx xxx

3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that

the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in
the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;

4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor

dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even
this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1
August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;

5. that the complainants (were) occupying government

land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North
Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and

6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and
exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a
certain business establishment (should) be allowed to
operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke
or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds
clearly specified by law and ordinance.8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners

moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to
dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be
resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they
would bring the case to the courts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to

dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being
confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and
political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in
this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their
privilege to engage in business."9

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard

and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt
charge that had meantime been filed by the private
respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (
on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then
unresolved).10

In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited

the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition
of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "
order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on
each of them.

On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying

petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion
to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its
constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained
of the gross
violations of their human and constitutional rights. The
motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (
Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger
limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it
(should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the
power to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right
to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly
and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents
with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of
women and children, and their health, safety and welfare.
Their actions have psychologically scarred and
traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed
to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to
man.
In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of
25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however,
in our resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also
issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR
to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No.
90-1580."17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business
rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were
demolished by the petitioners at the instance and
authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners;
and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid
to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor
-General was excused from filing his comment for public
respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment,
18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its
Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense
with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo,
who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated
18 July 1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the
1987 
Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then
President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163,
20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her
legislative power at the time.
It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights.21
The powers and functions22 of the Commission are
defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection
of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated
or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or
detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research,
education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
promote human rights and to provide for compensation
to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with
international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance
with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be
provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion
to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the
members of the Constitutional Commission is to make
CHR a quasi-judicial body.23 This view, however, has
not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v.
Commission on Human Rights,24 the Court, through
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres
Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the
enumerated powers and functions that bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that
resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the
adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over
the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in
the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.
e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we
now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and,
its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative
power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights"
is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit
not a few have tried, could at best be described as
inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human
rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of
the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has
been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "
human rights?" The participants, representing different
sectors of the society, have given the following varied
answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by
virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of
the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or
the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or
Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life,
liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of
religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the
accused to due process of law; political rights, such as
the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public
office, and to form political associations and engage in
politics; and social rights, such as the right to an
education, employment, and social services.25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the
individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . .
Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted
by the State but can only be recognized and protected
by it.26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic,
social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the
because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and
right, innate and inalienable.28 subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a
wide territory in area, we might diffuse its
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as,
or more specifically, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the
scope of human rights can be understood to include
those that relate to an individual's social, economic,
cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to
closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits
and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable
rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated

by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in
adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in
creating an independent commission to safeguard these
rights? It may of value to look back at the country's
experience under the martial law regime which may have
, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among
those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the
sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil
liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of
Human Rights in the Philippines,"29 observes:

But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973

enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights
expressed in the International Covenant, these rights
became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial
Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then
became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became
subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and
held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without
charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-
Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the
redress of grievances became useless, since group
actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other
mass media were subjected to censorship and short term
licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence
and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme
Court. They were required to submit letters of resignation
and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof.
Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared
by international bodies like Amnesty International and
the International Commission of Jurists.

Converging our attention to the records of the

Constitutional Commission, we can see the following
discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:

MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be

made clear in view of the importance of human rights
and also because civil and political rights have been
determined by many international covenants and human
impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its
effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks
so that the commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because
civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the
Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single
right of an individual involves his civil right or his political
right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights
have been made clear in the language of human rights
advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on
the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair
and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific
rights that are considered enshrined in many
international documents and legal instruments as
constituting civil and political rights, and these are
precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil
and political rights as defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other
rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will
encompass social and economic rights, and there are
other violations of rights of citizens which can be
addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to
define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the
commission will be authorized to take under its wings
cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are
under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and
prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier
that we would like to define the specific parameters
which cover civil and political rights as covered by the
international standards governing the behavior of
governments regarding the particular political and civil
rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or
prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced
during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I
had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is,
perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those
rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights
that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the
Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts
of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that
all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human
rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and
political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the
scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the
past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human
rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that
, as a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of
people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life
consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human
rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the
committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also
to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on
Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights
of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases
of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6)
other crimes committed against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is
recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with
Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make
the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as
much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion.
 The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of
the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this
morning when the reference was made without
qualification to the rights embodied in the universal
Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was
qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained
therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President,
Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or
linked the concept of human right with other human
rights specified in other convention which I do not
remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to
the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner
mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of
which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that,
although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other
covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are
rights specified in that other convention which may not
be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be
wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms
like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained
in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
concerned, the Committee, before the period of
amendments, could specify to us which of these articles
in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and
political rights, not for the purpose of including these in
the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense
of the Commission as to what human rights would be
included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the
need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to
the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether
the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social
right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the
various specific civil and political rights that we felt must
be envisioned initially by this provision — freedom from
political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right
to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving
disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective
violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes
precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a
specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not
opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record,
the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the
concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-
called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an
international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to
each and every specific article therein, but only to those
that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we
understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear
as to the distinction between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the
International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment
different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen
education, housing, shelter, et cetera. has specified.

MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the

victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how
much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .

. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They

cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who
do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and
oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are
very delicate — torture, salvaging, picking up without any
warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons who are
allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men
in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human
Rights Commission must be independent.

I would like very much to emphasize how much we need

this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little
individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it.
 And I think we should concentrate only on civil and
political violations because if we open this to land,
housing and health, we will have no place to go again
and we will not receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis
supplied)

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII,

of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the
Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own
or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring

—

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state

or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and
are not connected with the organization or administration
of the government. They include the rights of property,
marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of
contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are
rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship
in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its
general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or
redressed in a civil action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against

involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment
for debt.32

Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to

the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right
of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights
that would focus its attention to the more severe cases
of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of
political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases
of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6
) other crimes committed against the religious." While the
enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement
of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has
set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take
comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation
of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They
have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress
may provide for other cases of violations of human rights
that should fall within the authority of the Commission,
taking into account its recommendation."35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what
are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,
erected by private respondents on a land which is
planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More
than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon
City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a
busy national highway. The consequent danger to life
and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is
indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have
been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even
be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may,
looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-
vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are
not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition
of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human
rights violations involving civil and political rights"
intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally
authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules
of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof
in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised
rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate
penalties in accordance with the procedure and
sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power
to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to
apply only to violations of its adopted operational
guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out
its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite
for contempt could be exercised against persons who
refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly
withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor
summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a
restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on
not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an Human Rights,36 the Court, speaking through Madame
adjudicative power that it does not possess. Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "

provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to
the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection" may not be construed to
confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the
intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law". It is never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid

services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of
preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from
proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has
no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court
in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court.
. . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy.
It is available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a
party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes
omitted).

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for

appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to
any appropriate agency of government.37

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount

of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors
affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in
the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus
standi on the part of the petitioners to question the
disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with
the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to
initially consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for

prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and
academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-
1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter
is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of
an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a
remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here,
however, said Commission admittedly has yet to
promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The
instant petition has been intended, among other things,
to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is

GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is
hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR
Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00
fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209283
CECILIA RACHEL V. QUISUMBING, Petitioner, 
vs.
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MA. VICTORIA V.
CARDONA and NORBERTO DELA CRUZ, in their
capacities as Chairperson and Members, respectively, of
the COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the petition for certiorari and
prohibition1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Commissioner Cecilia Rachel V. Quisumbing (
petitioner) to annul and set aside the Show Cause Order
dated September 18, 2013 issued by the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR), through its Chairperson Loretta
Ann P. Rosales (Chairperson Rosales).
The Antecedents
In a meeting of the CHR held on September 18, 2013,
several complaints of former employees of the petitioner,
namely: Ma. Regina D. Eugenio (Eugenio), Elizabeth
Diego-Buizon (Buizon), Alexander B. Fernandez (
Fernandez), and Jesse Ayuste (Ayuste) were taken up
by the CHR. Only respondents Chairperson Rosales,
Commissioner Ma. Victoria V. Cardona and
Commissioner Norberto dela Cruz (Commissioner dela
Cruz) were present during the meeting; the petitioner
was on sick leave while Commissioner Jose Manuel S.
Mamauag (Commissioner Mamauag) was away on
official business.
In their affidavits, Eugenio, Buizon, Fernandez and
Ayuste accused the petitioner of: (1) seriously
maltreating and inflicting upon them mental abuse
through her unreasonable behavior and demands on
how they should work in or out of the office; (2) taking a
cut from some of her employees’ salaries to form an
office fund under her sole control; (3) repeatedly
misplacing and taking no action on official documents
requiring her action;
(4) forging another commissioner’s signature; (5) hiring
employees who do not come to work; and (6) contracting
consultancy work for another government agency.
On the bases of these affidavits, the CHR issued on the
same day Resolution CHR (IV) No. A2013-148 (CHR
Resolution), through Chairperson Rosales, a Show
Cause Order (dated September 18, 2013), requesting
the petitioner to submit within five (5) days from receipt,
a written explanation as to why she should not be held
liable for any administrative disciplinary actions, and to
transmit the written explanation together with her
supporting documents to the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Show Cause Order specified allegations of the
petitioner’s involvement in the commission of certain acts
of malfeasance or misfeasance constituting misconduct,
dishonesty, oppression, grave abuse of authority and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, all in
violation of the Civil Service Laws and Rules and the
Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
The Show Cause Order was served at the petitioner’s
office on September 19, 2013.
On September 26, 2013, Commissioner Mamauag
issued a Memorandum stating his concurrence with the
September 18, 2013 CHR Resolution.
On September 27, 2013, Chairperson Rosales sent
letters to the President of the Republic of the Philippines
and the Office of the Ombudsman regarding the
complaints and allegations against the petitioner.
Attached to the letters were copies of the Show Cause
Order and the CHR Resolution. Chairperson Rosales
brought attention to the serious allegations against the
petitioner and prayed for the Offices’ appropriate action.
Chairperson Rosales also requested the Office of the
Ombudsman to act on the complaint in accordance with
the established investigation and prosecutorial
procedures.
On October 4, 2013, the petitioner filed with the CHR
Secretariat a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the
Show Cause Order. The petitioner assailed the validity
of the Show Cause Order, claiming that its issuance is
null and void because it denied her due process.
Without waiting for the CHR to act on her motion, the
petitioner filed on October 16, 2013, the present Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court.
On October 23, 2013, the CHR through Chairperson
Rosales and Commissioners dela Cruz and Mamauag
issued an Order stating that it could no longer act on
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss since the case had been
forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman by virtue of
its letter dated September 27, 2013.
The Petition
The petitioner imputes the following errors committed by
the respondents:
I. The respondents acted without jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in ordering the petitioner to show cause why
she should not be held liable for administrative
disciplinary actions on the bases of the allegations stated
in the Show Cause Order, in violation of the petitioner’s
right to due process of law.
II. The respondents acted without jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in filing charges with the President of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Office of the
Ombudsman against the petitioner without due process
of law.
The petitioner argues that the respondents gravely
abused their discretion when they issued the Show
Cause Order and the CHR Resolution during the
meeting held on September 18, 2013, knowing fully well
that the petitioner would not be able to attend the same.
The petitioner claims that the respondents acted in bad
faith and with malice when they brought up at this
meeting, during her absence, the complaints of her
former
employees, thereby depriving her of the opportunity to
refute the allegations and to participate as a member of
the CHR.
The petitioner also questions the validity of the Show
Cause Order as it appears to have been issued by
Chairperson Rosales alone. She points out that
Chairperson Rosales, without reference to the other
members of the CHR, solely signed and issued the
Show Cause Order. Citing GMCR, Inc. v. Bell
Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.,2 the petitioner
contends that the act of a single member, though he may
be its head, done without the participation of others,
cannot be considered the act of the collegial body itself.
Since the CHR is a collegial body requiring the
concurrence of majority of its members in order to validly
arrive at a decision, the act of Chairperson Rosales in
issuing the Show Cause Order amounted to usurpation
of the authority and prerogative of the CHR.
The petitioner further maintains that the Show Cause
Order is insufficient to enable her to respond to the
allegations made because it does not specifically state: (1
) the "acts of malfeasance or misfeasance by way of
misconduct, grave abuse of authority and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service" that she
allegedly committed; and (2) the "civil service laws and
rules, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees" that she allegedly
violated. Thus, the petitioner claims that she was denied
due process of law.1âwphi1
The petitioner lastly alleged that the respondents gravely
abused their discretion when they referred the affidavits
of her former employees to the President of the Republic
of the Philippines and the Office of the Ombudsman. She
claims that since the CHR, as a body, was not
empowered by law to act on disciplinary complaints
against its own members, the respondents have no
authority to issue the Show Cause Order.
The Office of the Solicitor General’s Comment
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its
Comment3 dated January 13, 2014, on behalf of the
respondents, arguing that the petitioner availed of the
wrong remedy when she filed the special civil action for
certiorari to assail the Show Cause Order. The OSG
points out that a special civil action for certiorari is
available only when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess or its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Since the respondents, acting in their official
capacities as Chairperson and Members of the CHR,
were not engaged in judicial or quasi-judicial functions
when they issued the assailed Show Cause Order, the
petition for certiorari should be dismissed for being an
improper remedy.
The OSG also asserts that the petitioner failed to show
that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the Show Cause Order. The OSG emphasizes
that aside from petitioner’s bare allegations of malice and
bad faith, she did not offer any convincing evidence
proving that the
respondents exercised their power in an arbitrary or
despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal
hostility.
The OSG lastly submits that the petitioner failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies available to her
before instituting the present petition. Since the petitioner
had an ample administrative remedy under the law to
protect her right, it was premature for her to commence
the present petition before the Court.
The Issue
The ultimate issue to be resolved is whether the
petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writs of
certiorari and prohibition.
The Court’s Ruling
We dismiss the petition.
We stress, at the outset, that the subsequent referral of
the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate
prosecutorial action rendered the issues raised in the
present petition moot and academic insofar as the CHR
is concerned.
Records disclose that the CHR, through Chairperson
Rosales and Commissioners Dela Cruz and Mamauag,
issued an Order stating that it could no longer act on the
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss since the case had been
forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, no
practical relief can be granted to the petitioner by
resolving the present petition since the proceedings
before the CHR – the initiation of an investigation
through the issuance of the assailed Show Cause Order
– had been terminated.
The petition likewise fails for plain lack of merit. The
OSG correctly argued that the respondents, in their
official capacities as Chairperson and Members of the
CHR, did not engage in judicial or quasi-judicial functions
; they did not adjudicate the rights and obligations of the
contending parties but simply undertook to initiate the
investigation of the allegations against the petitioner. The
inquiry was not a quasi-judicial proceeding, where
offenses were charged, parties were heard and penalties
were imposed. It was at most, an exercise of fact-finding
investigation, which is entirely distinct and different from
the concept of adjudication.4 The power to initiate an
investigation and to refer the matter to the Office of the
Ombudsman is within the power of the CHR as an entity
with its own distinct personality and is recognized by no
less than the Constitution.5 Thus, the CHR did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in its actions.
The petition also fails with respect to the petitioner's
claim of denial of due process. There can be no denial of
due process where a party was afforded an opportunity
to present his case.6 In the present case, the petitioner
was given ample opportunity to air her side on the
allegations against her after being sufficiently apprised of
the allegations against her; she was afforded the chance
to submit her written explanation. Unfortunately, the
petitioner failed to avail of that right, and chose to directly
seek the intervention of this Court. These
circumstances, by themselves, point the prematurity of
the petition.
Jurisprudence tells us that the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is the chance to explain one's
side, or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before any definitive action is
taken, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.7
In sum, we find that the petition for certiorari and
prohibition should be dismissed for mootness and for
lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby
DISMISS the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211362               February 24, 2015

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the

Philippine Military Academy, represented by his father
RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own behalf,
and BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners, 
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR
COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC
MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS
BOARD (CRAB),Respondents.

x-----------------------x

FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS

ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA, and on her own behalf,
Petitioner-Intervenor.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The true test of a cadet's character as a leader rests on

his personal commitment to uphold what is morally and
ethically righteous at the most critical and trying times,
and at the most challenging circumstances. When a
cadet must face a dilemma between what is true and
right as against his security, well-being, pleasures and
comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his honor and
those that [define] his values. A man of an honorable
character does not think twice and chooses the fore. This
is the essence of and. the Spirit of the Honor Code - it is
championing truth and righteousness even if it may mean
the surrender of one's basic rights and privileges.1

The Procedural Antecedents

Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation

ceremonies of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA),
petitioners Renato P. Cudia, acting for himself and in
behalf of his son, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia (
Cadet JCL Cudia), and Berteni Catalufta Causing filed
this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
application for extremely urgent temporary restraining
order (TRO).2

In a Resolution dated March 1 7, 2014, the Court denied

the prayer for TRO and instead, required respondents to
file their comment on the petition.3

On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself

and in behalf of her son Cadet 1 CL Cudia, filed a motion
for leave to intervene, attaching thereto the petition-in-
intervention.4 Per Resolution dated March 31, 2014, the
Court granted the motion and resolved to await
respondents' comment on the petition.5

A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3,

2014, recommending the admission of the petition-in-
intervention and adopting it as an integral part of their
petition.6 On May 20, 2014, petitioner-intervenor filed a
manifestation with motion for leave to admit the Final
Investigation Report of the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) dated April 25,
2014.7 The Report8 was relative to CHR-CAR Case No.
2014-0029 filed by the spouses Renato and Filipina
Cudia (Spouses Cudia), for themselves and in behalf of
their son, against the PMA Honor Committee (HC)
members and Major Vladimir P. Gracilla (Maj. Gracilla)9
for violation of Cadet lCL Cudia's rights to due process,
education, and privacy of communication. Subsequently,
on June 3, 2014, petitioners filed a motion for leave to
adopt the submission of the CHR Report.10 The
manifestation was granted and the motion was noted by
the Court in its Resolution dated July 7, 2014.
After filing three motions for extension of time,11
 respondents filed their Consolidated Comment12 on
June 19, 2014. In a motion, petitioner-intervenor filed a
Reply, which was later adopted by petitioners.13
 Submitted as Annex "A" of the Reply was a copy of the
CHR Resolution dated May 22, 2014 regarding CHR-
CAR Case No. 2014-0029.14 We noted and granted the
same on August 11, 2014 and October 13, 2014.
Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with
motion to submit the case for early resolution,15 which
the Court noted in a Resolution dated August 11, 2014
and October 3, 2014.16
The Facts
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class
of 2014 of the PMA, the country's premiere military
academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City
. He belonged to the "A" Company and was the Deputy
Baron of his class. As claimed by petitioners and
petitioner-intervenor (hereinafter collectively called "
petitioners," unless otherwise indicated), he was
supposed to graduate with honors as the class
salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the
top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an
ensign of the Philippine Navy.
On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the
Navy and Air Force 1 CL cadets had a lesson
examination (LE) on Operations Research (OR432)
under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales) at the
PMAFI Room. Per published schedule from the
Headquarters Academic Group, the 4th period class in
OR432 was from 1 :30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while
the 5th period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05 p.m.
(1505H-1605H).
Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong)
of the 5th period class issued a Delinquency Report (DR)
against Cadet 1 CL Cudia because he was "[/]ate for two
(2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x. "17 Cadets 1 CL
Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and
Dela Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.18
On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department
of Tactical Officers. They were logged and transmitted to
the Company Tactical Officers ( CTO) for explanation of
the concerned cadets. Two days later, Cadet lCL Cudia
received his DR. On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages
to Cadet lCL Cudia, conveying:
In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013,
Cadet lCL Cudia reasoned out that: "I came directly from
OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our
instructor Sir."19

On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang

(Maj. Hindang), the CTO of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, meted out
to him the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.
Immediately, Cadet lCL Cudia clarified with Maj. Hindang
his alleged violation. The latter told him that the basis of
the punishment was the result of his conversation with
Dr. Costales, who responded that she never dismissed
her class late, and the protocol to dismiss the class 10-
15 minutes earlier than scheduled. When he expressed
his intention to appeal and seek reconsideration of the
punishment, he was · advised to put the request in
writing. Hence, that same day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
addressed his Request for Reconsideration of Meted
Punishment to Maj. Benjamin L. Leander, Senior Tactical
Officer (STO), asserting:

I strongly believe that I am not in control of the

circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and
our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H
also. Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my next
class without any intention of being late Sir.20

A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give

his comments on the request of Cadet 1 CL Cudia and to
indicate if there were other cadets belonging to the same
section who were also late.

On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his

reply to Maj. Leander pointing out that, based on his
investigation, the 4th period class was not dismissed late.
As a result, Maj. Leander sustained the penalty imposed.
Petitioners alleged that Cadet 1 CL Cudia came to know
of the denial of his request only on January 24, 2014
upon inquiry with Maj. Leander.

Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet

lCL Cudia was informed that Maj. Hindang reported him
to the HC21 for violation of the Honor Code. The Honor
Report stated:

Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his

written appeal, stating that his 4th period class ended at l
500H that made him late in the succeeding class.22

Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1 CL Mike

Anthony P. Mogol (Cadet 1 CL Mogol), as to what Maj.
Hindang meant in his Report, Cadet lCL Cudia learned
that it was based on Maj. Hindang's conversations with
their instructors and classmates as well as his statement
in the request for reconsideration to Maj. Leander. He
then verbally applied for and was granted an extension
of time to answer the charge against him because Dr.
Costales, who could shed light on the matter, was on
emergency leave.
Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na CLASS. Her transaction and communication with our
. She told me its a report dated november. When maj other classmates may have already ended but ours
hindang ask me, no time referens. (04:25:11 P.M.) extended for a little bit.

All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last

day last december. Whc i told, i wud presume they wil
finish early bee its grp work. (04:29:21 P.M.)23

The next day, Cadets lCL Cudia and Arcangel

approached Dr. Costales, who reaffirmed that she and
Maj. Hindang were not in the same time reference when
the latter asked her.

Later, Cadet 1 CL Cudia submitted his letter of

explanation on the Honor Report. He averred:

Sir, We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in

OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I stood up,
reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms.
Costales. After which, I and Cadet lcl Arcangel asked for
some query with regards (sic) to the deductions of our
previous LE. Our instructor gladly answered our question
. She then told me that she will give the copy of our
section grade, so I waited at the hallway outside the
ACAD5 office, and then she came out of the room and
gave me a copy of the grades. Cadet Arcangel, Cadet
Narciso and I immediately went to our 5ti period class
which is ENG412.

With these statements, I would like to clarify the

following:

1. How could this be lying?

2. What is wrong with the side of Maj. Hindang (why did

he come up to that honor report)?

3. What are his assumptions?

I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that

my case be reopened and carefully reviewed for I did not
violate the honor code/system, I can answer NO to both
questions (Did I intend to deceive? Did I intend to take
undue advantage?) and for the following reasons:

1. The honor report of Maj. Hindang was already settled

and finalized given the fact that no face-to-face personal
conversation with Ms. Costales was conducted to clarify
what and when exactly was the issue at hand.

2. Statements of the respondents support my explanation

.

3. My explanation to my appeal to my DR (Request for

reconsideration of meted punishment) further supports
my explanation in my delinquency report.

4. My understanding of the duration of the "CLASS"

covers not just a lecture in a typical classroom instruction
but includes every transaction and communication a
teacher does with her students, especially that in our
case some cadets asked for queries, and I am given
instruction by which (sic) were directly related to our
I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is
under my instruction to wait, and the other cadets still
have business with me, it is reasonable enough for him
to say that "Our class was dismissed a bit late" (dealing
with matter of seconds or a minute particularly 45
seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds)
also testified under oath via phone on a loudspeaker.
Deliberation among the HC voting members followed.
After that, the ballot sheets were distributed. The
members cast their

And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it

ended on time (1500H).

(signed)
M COSTALES

w/ attached certification

5. I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2-

minute delay and did not attempt to conceal anything
that happened or I did.

6. Furthermore, CPT DULA WAN PA, the Tactical Officer

of Hawk Company[,] and I had a conversation with
regards (sic) to the same matter for which he can give
important points of my case.

7. Cadet lcl DIAZ "D" Co can also stand as a witness

that I waited for Ms. Costales. 24

On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to

conduct a preliminary investigation on the reported honor
violation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. The Foxtrot Company was
designated as the investigating team and was composed
of Cadet 1 CL Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets
1 CL Mogol, lCL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua,
3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as members.25 Soon
after, the team submitted its Preliminary Investigation
Report recommending that the case be formalized.

The formal investigation against Cadet 1 CL Cu di a then

ensued. The Presiding Officer was Cadet 1 CL Rhona K.
Salvacion, while the nine (9) voting members were
Cadets lCL Jairus 0. Fantin, lCL Bryan Sonny S. Arlegui,
1 CL Kim Adrian R. Martal, 1 CL J eanelyn P. Cabrido, 1
CL ShuAydan G. Ayada, 1 CL Dalton John G. Lagura,
2CL Renato A. Carifio, Jr., 2CL Arwi C. Martinez, and
2CL Niko Angelo C. Tarayao.26 Acting as recorders
tasked to document the entire proceedings were 4CL
Jennifer A. Cuarteron and 3CL Leoncio Nico A. de Jesus
11.27 Those who observed the trial were Cadets 1 CL
Balmeo, Dag-uman, Hasigan, Raguindin, Paulino,
Arcangel, and Narciso; Cadets 2CL Jocson and Saldua,
Jr.; and Cadet 3CL Umaguing.28

The first formal hearing started late evening of January

20, 2014 and lasted until early morning the next day.
Cadet lCL Cudia was informed of the charge against him,
as to which he pleaded "Not Guilty." Among those who
testified were Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and
Cadets 1 CL Arcangel and Narciso. On the second night
of the hearing held on January 21, 2014, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia again appeared and was called to the witness
stand along with Cadets Brit and Barrawed. Dr. Costales
votes through secret balloting and submitted their 1500H). I waited for her for about 45 seconds to 1 minute
accomplished ballot sheets together with their written and 30 seconds, that made me to decide to write "a little
justification. The result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. bit late" in my explanation. Truly, the class ENDED
Cadet lCL Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet lCL Lagura) 1500H but due to official purpose (instruction by Ms.
was the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order ofHC Costales to wait) and the
Chairman Cadet 1 CL Mogol, the Presiding Officer and
voting members went inside a chamber adjoining the
court room for further deliberation. After several minutes,
they went out and the Presiding Officer announced the 9-
0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1 CL Cudia, who already served
nine (9) touring hours, was then informed of the
unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor
Code. He was immediately placed in the PMA Holding
Center until the resolution of his appeal.

On January 24, 2014, Cadet ICL Cudia filed a written

appeal addressed to the HC Chairman, the full text of
which stated:

WRITTEN APPEAL

14 NOVEMBER 2013

This is when I was reported for "Late for two (2) minutes
in Eng412 class", my explanation on this delinquency
report when I received it, is that "Our class was
dismissed a (little) bit late and I came directly from 4th
period class ... etc". Knowing the fact that in my
delinquency report, it is stated that ENG412 classes
started 1500H and I am late for two minutes, it is logical
enough for I (sic) to interpret it as "I came 1502H during
that class". This is the explanation that came into my
mind that time. (I just cannot recall the exact words I
used in explaining that delinquency report, but what I
want to say is that I have no intention to be late). In my
statements, I convey my message as "since I was not
the only one left in that class, and the instructor is with us
, I used the term "CLASS", I used the word "DISMISSED
" because I was under instruction (to wait for her to give
the section grade) by the instructor, Ms. Costales. The
other cadets (lCL MIRANDA, lCL ARCANGEL) still have
queries and business with her that made me decide to
use the word "CLASS", while the others who don't have
queries and business with her (ex: lCL NARCISO and 1
CL DIAZ) were also around.

Note:

The four named cadets were also reported late.

Reference: Para 171. 0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to

Dismissal Time)(Sec XVII, CCAFPR s2008)

It is stated in this reference that "Cadets shall not linger

in the place of instruction after the section has been
dismissed. EXCEPT when told or allowed to do so by the
instructor or by any competent authority for official
purposes. "

The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before

the two bells rang (indicating the end of class hour,
conflict in academic schedule (to which I am not in
control of the circumstances, 4th PD class 1330H-1500H
and 5th PD class 1500H-1 600H), and since Ms.
Costales, my other classmates, and I were there, I used
the word "CLASS".
grades. The two cadets said that they verified something
with me after the OR432 class and they were with Cadet
CUD IA. That the

19 December 2013

I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded,

11 Demerits and 13 Touring hours. Not because I don't
want to serve punishment, but because I know I did
nothing wrong, I obeyed instruction, and believing that
my reason is justifiable and valid, that is why I
approached our tactical officer, MAJ HINDANG PAF, to
clarify and ask why it was awarded that day.

In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to

my instructor and he even added that they have a
protocol to dismiss the class, 15 minutes or 10 minutes
before 1500H. I explained:

Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of the

circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and
our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H
also. Immediately after 4th period class, I went to my
next class without any intention of being late Sir.

These statements are supplementary to my explanation

in my delinquency report, in here, I specified the conflict
in the schedule and again, I have no intention to be late.
After explaining it further with these statements, my
tactical officer said that since I was reported in a written
form, I should make an appeal in a written form. Thinking
that he already understood what I want to say, I
immediately made an appeal that day stating the words
that I used in having conversation with him.29

Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated

January 24, 2014, wherein Dr. Costales attested:

1. That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and] NARCISO

was (sic) with Cadet CUDIA in making query about their
latest grades in OR432 and/or results of UEl outside the
ACADS office. The following facts may explain their
queries on 14 November 2013:

a. That I held my class in the PMAFI room instead of

room 104.

b. That OR432 releases grades every Wednesday and

cadets are informed during Thursday, either in class or
posted grades in the bulletin board (grades released was
[sic J based on the previous LEs: latest LE before UE
was Decision Trees).

c. That UE papers were already checked but not yet

recorded due to (sic) other cadets have not taken the UE.
Cadets were allowed to verify scores but not to look at
the papers.

d. Last 23 January 2014, Captain Dulawan clarified if

indeed Cadet NARCISO and ARCANGEL verified
statements of the three (3) cadets are all the same and letter to Major General Oscar Lopez (Maj. Gen. Lopez),
consistent, thus[,] I honor that as true. the new PMA Superintendent, asking to recognize the 8-
1 voting of the HC.35 Copies of which were furnished to
2. As to the aspect of dismissing late, I could not really the AFP Chief of
account for the specific time that I dismissed the class.
To this date, I [cannot] really recall an account that is
more than two (2) months earlier. According to my
records, there was a lecture followed by an LE during (
sic) on 14 November 2013. To determine the time of my
dismissal, maybe it can be verified with the other
members of class I was handling on that said date.30

Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the

same day, January · 24, as it found no reason to conduct
a re-trial based on the arguments and evidence
presented.31 Petitioners, however, claim that the written
appeal was not acted upon until the filing of the petition-
in-intervention.32

From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents

allege that the Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG)
conducted an informal review to check the findings of the
HC. During the course of the investigation, Prof. Berong
was said to have confirmed with the Officer-in-Charge of
the HC that classes started as scheduled (i.e., 3:05 p.m.
or 1505H), and that Cadet lCL Barrawed, the acting
class marcher of ENG412, verified before the
Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and STO that the
class started not earlier than scheduled.

Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC

forwarded the Formal Investigation Report to the Staff
Judge Advocate (SJA) for review. The next day, the SJA
found the report to be legally in order.

On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col.

Briguez), the Commandant of Cadets, affirmed the HC
findings and recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar
Abogado, then PMA Superintendent, the separation from
the PMA of Cadet lCL Cudia for violation of the First
Tenet of the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to Sec. VII.12.
b of the CCAFPR S-2008). On the same date, Special
Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA Headquarters
placing Cadet 1 CL Cudia on indefinite leave of absence
without pay and allowances effective February 10, 2014
pending approval of his separation by the AFPGHQ,
barring him from future appointment and/or admission as
cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for any entrance
requirements to the PMA. 33

Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the

recommendation to dismiss Cadet 1 CL Cudia.

On February 13, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia submitted a

letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets
requesting for reinstatement by the PMA of his status as
a cadet.34

Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee ), the

sister of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, posted his plight in her Face
book account. The day after, the Spouses Cudia gave a
Staff and other concerned military officials. Subsequently Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-
, Maj. Gen. Lopez was directed to review Cadet lCL complaint before the CHR-Cordillera Administrative
Cudia's case. The latter, in turn, referred the matter to Region (CAR) Office against the HC members and Maj.
the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB). Gracilla for alleged violation of the human rights of Cadet
lCL Cudia, particularly
On February 19, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia made his
personal appeal letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez. On even date,
the AFP Chief of Staff ordered a reinvestigation following
the viral Facebook post of Annavee demanding the
intervention of the military leadership.

Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014, Special

Order No. 1 was issued directing all PMA cadets to
ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia by not talking to him and by
separating him from all activities/functions of the cadets.
It is said that any violation shall be a "Class 1" offense
entailing 45 demerits, 90 hours touring, and 90 hours
confinement. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not given a copy of
the order and learned about it only from the media.36
 According to an alleged news report, PMA
Spokesperson Major Agnes Lynette Flores (Maj. Flores)
confirmed the HC order to ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
Among his offenses were: breach of confidentiality by
putting documents in the social media, violation of the
PMA Honor Code, lack of initiative to resign, and
smearing the name of the PMA.37

On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia requested the

CRAB for additional time, until March 4, 2014, to file an
appeal on the ground that his intended witnesses are in
on-the-job training ( OJT).38 As additional evidence to
support his appeal, he also requested for copies of the
Minutes of the HC proceedings, relevant documents
pertaining to the case, and video footages and
recordings of the HC hearings.

The next day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia and his family engaged

the services of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in
Baguio City.

The CRAB conducted a review of the case based on the

following: (a) letter of appeal of the Spouses Cudia dated
February 18, 2014; (b) directive from the AFP-GHQ to
reinvestigate the case; and ( c) guidance from Maj. Gen.
Lopez.

On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M.

Costales, Jr. (Brig. Gen. Costales, Jr.), the CRAB
Chairman, informed Cadet lCL Cudia that, pending
approval of the latter's request for extension, the CRAB
would continue to review the case and submit its
recommendations based on whatever evidence and
testimonies received, and that it could not favorably
consider his request for copies of the HC minutes,
relevant documents, and video footages and recordings
of the HC hearings since it was neither the appropriate
nor the authorized body to take action thereon.39
Subsequently, upon verbal advice, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
wrote a letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez reiterating his request.
40
his rights to due process, education, and privacy of d. For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the
communication.41 investigation of Cudia's Case.50

On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, through the PAO,

moved for additional time, until March 19, 2014, to file his
appeal and submit evidence. PAO also wrote a letter to
AFP Chief of Staff General Emmanuel T. Bautista (Gen.
Bautista) seeking for immediate directive to the PMA to
expeditiously and favorably act on Cadet 1CL Cudia's
requests.42

Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of

Siklab Diwa Class, the following events transpired:

On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of

PAO Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta.43
 On the other hand, the CRAB submitted a report to the
AFP-GHQ upholding the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
44

On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen

. Lopez stating the denial of Cadet 1CL Cudia's requests
for extension of time to file an Appeal Memorandum in
view of the ample time already given, and to be furnished
with a copy of relevant documents because of
confidentiality and presumption of regularity of the HC
proceedings.45Cadet 1CL Cudia, through PAO, then
filed an Appeal Memorandum46 before the CRAB.

On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to

President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Pres. Aquino),
who is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, attaching
thereto the Appeal Memorandum.47 On the same day,
Special Orders No. 48 was issued by the PMA
constituting a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body
composed of the CRAB members and PMA senior
officers to conduct a deliberate investigation pertaining to
Cadet 1CL Cudia's Appeal Memorandum.48 The focus
of the inquiry was not just to find out whether the appeal
has merit or may be considered but also to investigate
possible involvement of other cadets and members of
the command related to the incident and to establish
specific violation of policy or regulations that had been
violated by other cadets and members of the HC.49

On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the Chief

Public Attorney had a dialogue with Maj. Gen. Lopez. On
March 14, 2014, the CHR-CAR came out with its
preliminary findings, which recommended the following:

a. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect and

uphold the 8 Guilty - 1 Not guilty vote;

b. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially

pronounce Cdt Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed
against him before the Honor Committee;

c. For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and

entitlements as a full-fledge graduating cadet and allow
him to graduate on Sunday, 16 March 2014;
On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
a meeting with Pres. Aquino and Department of National VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of the
Defense (DND) Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin. The PMA Honor Committee and .. certain PMA officials,
President recommended that they put in writing their specifically for violations of the rights of
appeal, requests, and other concerns. According to
respondents, the parties agreed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia
would not join the graduation but it was without prejudice
to the result of the appeal, which was elevated to the
AFP Chief of Staff. The President then tasked Gen.
Bautista to handle the reinvestigation of the case, with
Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez supervising the group conducting
the review.

Four days after Siklab Diwa Class' graduation day,

petitioner Renato S. Cudia received a letter dated March
11, 2014 from the Office of the AFP Adjutant General
and signed by Brig. Gen. Ronald N. Albano for the AFP
Chief of Staff, affirming the CRAB' s denial of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia' s appeal. It held:

After review, The Judge Advocate General, APP finds

that the action of the PMA CRAB in denying the appeal
for reinvestigation is legally in order. There was enough
evidence to sustain the finding of guilt and the
proprietary (sic) of the punishment imposed. Also, your
son was afforded sufficient time to file his appeal from
the date he was informed of the final verdict on January
21, 2014, when the decision of the Honor Committee
was read to him in person, until the time the PMA CRAB
conducted its review on the case. Moreover, the
continued stay of your son at the Academy was
voluntary. As such, he remained subject to the Academy'
s policy regarding visitation. Further, there was no
violation of his right to due process considering that the
procedure undertaken by the Honor Committee and
PMA CRAB was consistent with existing policy. Thus,
the previous finding and recommendation of the Honor
Committee finding your son, subject Cadet guilty of "
Lying" and recommending his separation from the
Academy is sustained.

In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to

deny your appeal for lack of merit.51 Thereafter, the Fact
-Finding Board/Investigating Body issued its Final
Investigation Report on March 23, 2014 denying Cadet 1
CL Cudia's appeal.52 Subsequently, on April 28, 2014,
the special investigation board tasked to probe the case
submitted its final report to the President.53 Pursuant to
the administrative appeals process, the DND issued a
Memorandum dated May 23, 2014, directing the Office
of AFP Chief of Staff to submit the complete records of
the case for purposes of DND review and
recommendation for disposition by the President.54

Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its

Resolution with respect to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-
0029, concluding and recommending as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the

Commission on Human Rights-CAR Office finds
CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due process, 3.9 Cdt lCL BRYAN SONNY S. ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt.
education, privacy/privacy of communication, and good of the AFP
life.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office

RESOLVED to indorse to competent authorities for their
immediate appropriate action on the following
recommendations:

1. The Philippine Military Academy must set aside the "9-

Guilty, 0-Not Guilty" verdict against Cadet Aldrin Jeff P.
Cudia, for being null and void; to uphold and respect the
"8-Guilty, 1-Not Guilty" voting result and make an official
pronouncement of NOT GUILTY in favor of Cadet Cudia;

2. The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the President in

whose hands rest the ends of justice and fate of Cadet
Cudia, to:

2.1 officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and

alumnus of the Philippine Military Academy;

2.2 issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding Diploma for

the degree of Bachelors of Science; and

2.3 Issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding official

transcript 'of his academic records for his BS degree,
without conditions therein as to his status as a PMA
cadet.

3. The Public Attorneys' Office to provide legal services

to Cadet Cudia in pursuing administrative, criminal and
civil suits against the officers and members of the Honor
Committee named hereunder, for violation of the Honor
Code and System and the Procedure in Formal
Investigation, dishonesty, violation of the secrecy of the
ballot, tampering the true result of the voting, perjury,
intentional omission in the Minutes of substantive part of
the formal trial proceedings which are prejudicial to the
interest of justice and Cadet Cudia's fundamental rights
to dignity, non-discrimination and due process, which led
to the infringement of his right to education and even
transgressing his right to a good life.

3.1 Cdt lCL MIKE ANTHONY MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of

the AFP

3.2 Cdt lCL RHONA K. SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the

AFP

3.3 Cdt 2CL ARWI C. MARTINEZ

3.4 Cdt 2CL RENATO A. CARINO, JR.

3.5 Cdt 2CL NIKOANGELOC. TARAYAO

3.6 Cdt lCL JEANEL YN P. CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the

AFP

3.7 Cdt lCL KIM ADRIAN R. MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the
AFP

3.8 Cdt lCL JAIRUS 0. FANTIN, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.10 Cdt lCL DALTON JOHN G. LAGURA, now 2nd Lt.
of the AFP
3.11 Cdt 1 CL BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA, now 2nd Lt.
of the AFP
3.12 Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A. CUARTERON (recorder)
3.13 Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO A. DE JESUS II (record)
4. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA
competent authorities should investigate and file
appropriate charges against Maj. VLADIMIR P.
GRACILLA, for violation of the right to privacy of Cadet
Cudia and/or failure, as intelligence officer, to ensure the
protection of the right to privacy of Cudia who was then
billeted at the PMA Holding Center;
5. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and PMA
competent authorities should investigate Maj. DENNIS
ROMMEL HINDANG for his failure and ineptness to
exercise his responsibility as a competent Tactical
Officer and a good father of his cadets, in this case, to
Cadet Cudia; for failure to respect exhaustion of
administrative remedies;
6. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philppines, the PMA
Superintendent, to immediately cause the
comprehensive review of all rules of procedures,
regulations, policies, including the so-called practices in
the implementation of the Honor Code; and, thereafter,
adopt new policies, rules of procedures and relevant
regulations which are human-rights based and
consistent with the Constitution and other applicable
laws;
7. The Congress of the Philippines to consider the
enactment of a law defining and penalizing ostracism
and discrimination, which is apparently being practiced in
the PMA, as a criminal offense in this jurisdiction;
8. His Excellency The President of the Philippines to
certify as priority, the passage of an anti-ostracism
and/or anti-discrimination law; and
9. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA
authorities to ensure respect and protection of the rights
of those who testified for the cause of justice and truth as
well as human rights of Cadet Cudia.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the
competent authorities on the foregoing CHR
recommendations.
Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service
or by substituted service to the complainants (the
spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia; and Aldrin Jeff P.
Cudia), and all the respondents. Also, to the PMA
Superintendent, the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of
National Defense, His Excellency The President of the
Philippines, The Public Attorneys' Office.
SO RESOLVED.55
On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained
the findings of the AFP Chief of Staff and the CRAB. The
letter, which was addressed to the Spouses Cudia and
signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
stated in whole:
This refers to your letters to the President dated 12
March 2014 and 26 March 2014 appealing for a
reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) Honor Committee on the case of your
son, Cadet 1 CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia.
After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet
Cudia, the decision of the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Honor Code
System of the AFP Cadet Corps, this Office has found no
substantial basis to disturb the findings of the AFP and
the PMA Cadet Review Appeals Board (CRAB). There is
no competent evidence to support the claim that the
decision of the Honor Committee members was initially
at 8 "Guilty" votes and 1 "Not Guilty" vote. The lone
affidavit of an officer, based on his purported
conversation with one Honor Committee member, lacks
personal knowledge on the deliberations of the said
Committee and is hearsay at best.
Similarly, the initial recommendations of the Commission
on Human Rights cannot be adopted as basis that Cadet
Cudia's due process rights were violated. Apart from
being explicitly preliminary in nature, such
recommendations are anchored on a finding that there
was an 8-1 vote which, as discussed above, is not
supported by competent evidence.
In the evaluation of Cadet Cudia's case, this Office has
been guided by the precept that military law is regarded
to be in a class of its own, "applicable only to military
personnel because the military constitutes an armed
organization requiring a system of discipline separate
from that of civilians" (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No.
164007, 10 August 2005 citing Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.
2d 184 [1975] and Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 US 83 [1953
]). Thus, this Office regarded the findings of the AFP
Chief, particularly his conclusion that there was nothing
irregular in the proceedings that ensued, as carrying
great weight.
Accordingly, please be informed that the President has
sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the PMA
CRAB.56
The Issues
To petitioners, the issues for resolution are:
I.
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY,
THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW
AND APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING CADET FIRST
CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA FROM THE
ACADEMY IN UTTER DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS CONSIDERING THAT:
A. Despite repeated requests for relevant documents
regarding his case, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia
was deprived of his right to have access to evidence
which would have proven his defense, would have totally
belied the charge against him, and more importantly,
would have shown the irregularity in the Honor
Committee's hearing and rendition of decision
B. Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was vaguely
informed of the decisions arrived at by the Honor
Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and
the Philippine Military Academy
C. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy have
afforded Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia nothing but a
sham trial
D. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy
violated their own rules and principles as embodied in
the Honor Code
E. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy, in
deciding Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia's case,
grossly and in bad faith, misapplied the Honor Code so
as to defy the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the
unquestionable fact that the former should yield to the
latter.
II
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY,
THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW
AND APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT CADET FIRST
CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA LIED, THEREBY
VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE
III
WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING
INVESTIGATION INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED BY
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF SUCH
GREAT WEIGHT AND PERSUASIVE NATURE THAT
THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY HONOR, UPHOLD
AND RESPECT57
On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss
the petition, respondents presented the issues below:
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
I.
THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT CADET
CUDIA BE INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF GRADUATES
OF SIKLAB DIWA CLASS OF 2014 AND BE ALLOWED
TO TAKE PART IN THE COMMENCEMENT
EXERCISES HAS ALREADY BEEN RENDERED MOOT
.
II. SCOPE OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE
ACTUALLY FACTUAL WHICH ARE BEYOND THE III.

MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL

RESPONDENTS TO GRANT THE RELIEFS PRAYED
FOR. IV. IT IS PREMATURE TO INVOKE JUDICIAL
REDRESS PENDING THE DECISION OF THE
PRESIDENT ON CADET CUDIA'S APPEAL.

V.

WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE

COURT MUST EXERCISE CAREFUL RESTRAINT AND
REFRAIN FROM UNDULY OR PREMATURELY
INTERFERING WITH LEGITIMATE MILITARY
MATTERS.

SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS

VI.

CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND

VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED CERTAIN CIVIL
LIBERTIES BY VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE
PMA.

VII.

THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM

WHICH AUTHORIZES IT TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY
MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT
AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR NEEDS OF
THE ACADEMY.

VIII.

CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively

terminate cadets despite the absence of statutory
authority.

Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative

dismissal of a guilty cadet.

Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by

providing untruthful statements in the explanation for his
tardiness.

The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt

the findings of the Honor Committee.

The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case

were properly accorded to Cadet Cudia.

The subtle evolution in the voting process of the Honor

Committee, by incorporating executive
session/chambering, was adopted to further strengthen
the voting procedure of the Honor Committee. Cadet
Lagura voluntarily changed his vote without any pressure
from the other voting members of the Honor Committee.
Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the PMA. other is entitled.

The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are
not binding on the Honorable Court, and are, at best,
recommendatory.
Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future
when he was dismissed from the PMA.58
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must
be a ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act
should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a
legal authority,

The Ruling of the Court

PROCEDURAL GROUNDS

Propriety of a petition for mandamus

Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the

petition praying that Cadet 1 CL Cudia be included in the
list of graduating cadets and for him to take part in the
commencement exercises was already rendered moot
and academic when the graduation ceremonies of the
PMA Siklab Diwa Class took place on March 16, 2014.
Also, a petition for mandamus is improper since it does
not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.
Invoking Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee,
Loyola School of Theology,59 respondents assert that a
mandamus petition could not be availed of to compel an
academic institution to allow a student to continue
studying therein because it is merely a privilege and not
a right. In this case, there is a clear failure on petitioners'
part to establish that the PMA has the, ministerial duty to
include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list, much less award
him with academic honors and commission him to the
Philippine Navy. Similar to the case of University of San
Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60 it is submitted that
the PMA may rightfully exercise its discretionary power
on who may be admitted to study pursuant to its
academic freedom.

In response, petitioners contend that while the plea to

allow Cadet 1 CL Cudia to participate in the PMA 2014
commencement exercises could no longer be had, the
Court may still grant the other reliefs prayed for. They
add that Garcia enunciated that a respondent can be
ordered to act in a particular manner when there is a
violation of a constitutional right, and that the certiorari
aspect of the petition must still be considered because it
is within the province of the Court to determine whether a
branch of the government or any of its officials has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess thereof.

We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,

a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.
It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or b.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to officially
corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or pronounce Cadet Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed
impropriety of the act done." The tribunal, corporation, against him before the Honor Committee;
board, officer, or person must have no choice but to
perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is
opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has
the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty.61

In this case, petitioners pray for, among others: Also,

after due notice and hearing, it is prayed of the Court to
issue a Writ of Mandamus to:

1. direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the list of

graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA,
including inclusion in the yearbook;

2. direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia to take part in the

commencement exercises if he completed all the
requirements for his baccalaureate degree;

3. direct the PMA to award unto Cadet Cudia the

academic honors he deserves, and the commission as a
new Philippine Navy ensign;

4. direct the Honor Committee to submit to the CRAB of

the PMA all its records of the proceedings taken against
Cadet Cudia, including the video footage and audio
recordings of the deliberations and voting, for the
purpose of allowing the CRAB to conduct intelligent
review of the case of Cadet Cudia;

5. direct the PMA's CRAB to conduct a review de nova

of all the records without requiring Cadet Cudia to submit
new evidence if it was physically impossible to do so;

6. direct the PMA's CRAB to take into account the

certification signed by Dr. Costales, the new evidence
consisting of the affidavit of a military officer declaring
under oath that the cadet who voted "not guilty" revealed
to this officer that this cadet was coerced into changing
his vote, and other new evidence if there is any;

7. direct the PMA's CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right

to a counsel who is allowed to participate actively in the
proceedings as well as in the cross-examinations during
the exercise of the right to confront witnesses against
him; and

8. direct the Honor Committee in case of remand of the

case by the CRAB to allow Cadet Cudia a representation
of a counsel.62

Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following

reliefs:

A. xxx

B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding:

a.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to respect

and uphold the 8 Guilty -1 Not Guilty vote;
c.) The PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and Factual nature of the issues
entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including
his diploma and awards.63 According to respondents, the petition raises issues that
actually require the Court to make findings of fact
Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1 CL because it
Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of
2014 and to allow him to take part in the commencement
exercises, the same was rendered moot and academic
when the graduation ceremonies pushed through on
March 16, 2014 without including Cadet 1 CL Cudia in
the roll of graduates.

With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore

Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-
fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma, awards,
and commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign, the
same cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus on
the basis of academic freedom, which We shall discuss
in more detail below. Suffice it to say at this point that
these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by
the right of academic freedom; therefore, beyond the
province of the Court to decide.64 The powers to confer
degrees at the PMA, grant awards, and commission
officers in the military service are discretionary acts on
the part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-
Chief. Borrowing the words of Garcia:

There are standards that must be met. There are policies

to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence.
In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the
position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than
a right. She [in this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia] cannot
therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of
a mandamus proceeding.65

Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases.

It cannot be availed against an official or government
agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or
judgment.66 For a writ to issue, petitioners should have
a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there
should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents
to perform the act sought to be mandated.67

The same reasons can be said as regards the other

reliefs being sought by petitioners, which pertain to the
HC and the CRAB proceedings. In the absence of a
clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus
petition does not lie to require anyone to a specific
course of conduct or to control or review the exercise of
discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty
not to do or give to the applicant anything to which he is
not entitled by law.68

The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case

must proceed since, as argued by petitioners, the Court
is empowered to settle via petition for certiorari whether
there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents in dismissing Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the
PMA.
sets forth several factual disputes which include, among
others: the tardiness of Cadet 1 CL Cudia in , his
ENG412 class and his explanation thereto, the
circumstances that transpired in the investigation of his
Honor Code violation, the proceedings before the HC,
and the allegation that Cadet 1 CL Lagura was forced to
change his vote during the executive session/"
chambering."
underwent the review procedures of his guilty verdict at
the Academy level - the determination by the SJA of
whether the HC acted according to the established
procedures of the Honor System, the assessment by the
Commandant of Cadets of the procedural and legal
correctness of the guilty

In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant

controversy presents legal issues. Rather than
determining which between the two conflicting versions
of the parties is true, the case allegedly centers on the
application, appreciation, and interpretation of a person's
rights to due process, to education, and to property; the
interpretation of the PMA Honor Code and Honor System
; and the conclusion on whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
explanation constitutes lying. Even if the instant case
involves questions of fact, petitioners still hold that the
Court is empowered to settle mixed questions of fact and
law. Petitioners are correct.

There is a question of law when the issue does not call

for an examination of the probative value of evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted
and the doubt concerns the correct application of law
and jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand,
there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When
there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or
not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a
question of law.69 The petition does not exclusively
present factual matters for the Court to decide. As
pointed out, the all-encompassing issue of more
importance is the determination of whether a PMA cadet
has rights to due process, to education, and to property
in the context of the Honor Code and the Honor System,
and, if in the affirmative, the extent or limit thereof.
Notably, even respondents themselves raise substantive
grounds that We have to resolve. In support of their
contention that the Court must exercise careful restraint
and should refrain from unduly or prematurely interfering
in legitimate military matters, they argue that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily relinquished
certain civil liberties by virtue of his entry into the PMA,
and that the Academy enjoys academic freedom
authorizing the imposition of disciplinary measures and
punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the
peculiar needs of the PMA. These issues, aside from
being purely legal being purely legal questions, are of
first impression; hence, the Court must not hesitate to
make a categorical ruling.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Respondents assert that the Court must decline

jurisdiction over the petition pending President Aquino’s
resolution of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' appeal. They say that
there is an obvious non-exhaustion of the full
administrative process. While Cadet 1 CL Cudia
verdict, the evaluation of the PMA Superintendent to
warrant the administrative separation of the guilty cadet,
and the appellate review proceedings before the CRAB -
he still appealed to the President, who has the utmost
latitude in making decisions affecting the military. It is
contended that the President's power over the persons
and actions of the members of the armed forces is
recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.) Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga70
 and in Section 3171 of Commonwealth Act (CA.) No. 1 (
also known as "The National Defense Act''). As such, the
President could still overturn the decision of the PMA. In
respondents' view, the filing of this petition while the
case is pending resolution of the President is an
irresponsible defiance, if not a personal affront. For them,
comity dictates that courts of justice should shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed.
From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however,
consider that President Aquino effectively denied the
appeal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They claim that his family
exerted insurmountable efforts to seek reconsideration
of the HC recommendation from the APP officials and
the President, but was in vain. The circumstances prior
to, during, and after the PMA 2014 graduation rites,
which was attended by President Aquino after he talked
to Cadet lCL Cudia's family the night before, foreclose
the possibility that the challenged findings would still be
overturned. In any case, petitioners insist that the· rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute
based on the Corsiga v. Defensor72 and Verceles v.
BLR-DOLE73 rulings.
We rule for petitioners.
In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a
supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted. The
rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is that "courts, for reasons of
law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits
unless the available administrative remedies have first
been resorted to and the proper authorities, who are
competent to act upon the matter complained of, have
been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct
their alleged errors, if any, committed in the
administrative forum."74 In the U.S. case of Ringgold v.
United States,75 which was cited by respondents, it was
specifically held that in a typical case involving a decision
by military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his
remedies within the military before appealing to the court,
the doctrine being designed both to preserve the balance
between military and civilian authorities and to conserve
judicial resources.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this
jurisdiction, a party may directly resort to judicial
remedies if any of the following is present:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied
and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention.76
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in
the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA. Thus,
it may be a ground to give due course to the petition
despite the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Yet more significant is the fact that during the pendency
of this case, particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of
the President finally issued its ruling, which sustained the
findings of the AFP Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the
occurrence of this supervening event bars any objection
to the petition based on failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Court's interference within military affairs
Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh77 and
Schlesinger v. Councilman78 to support their contention
that judicial intervention would pose substantial threat to
military discipline and that there should be a deferential
review of military statutes and regulations since political
branches have particular expertise and competence in
assessing military needs. Likewise, in Orloff v.
Willoughby79 and Parker v. Levy,80 it was allegedly
opined by the U.S. Supreme Court that the military
constitutes a specialized community governed by a
separate discipline from that of the civilian. According to
respondents, the U.S. courts' respect to the military
recognizes that constitutional rights may apply differently
in the military context than in civilian society as a whole.
Such military deference is exercised either by refusing to
apply due process and equal protection doctrines in
military cases or applying them but with leniency.
In respondents' view, although Philippine courts have the
power of judicial review in cases attended with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, policy considerations call for the widest
latitude of deference to military affairs. Such respect is
exercised by the court where the issues to be resolved
entail a substantial consideration of
legitimate governmental interest. They suppose that
allowing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case to prosper will set an
institutionally dangerous precedent, opening a Pandora's
box of other challenges against the specialized system
of discipline of the PMA. They state that with the PMA's
mandate to train cadets for permanent commission in the
AFP, its disciplinary rules and procedure necessarily
must impose h different standard of conduct compared
with civilian institutions.
Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is
part of the State's check-and-balance machinery,
specifically mandated by Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution to ensure that no branch of the government
or any of its officials acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of, discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They assert that judicial
non-interference in military affairs is not deemed as
absolute even in the U.S. They cite Schlesinger and
Parker, which were invoked by respondents, as well as
Burns v. Wilson81 and Harmon v. Brucker,82 wherein
the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings of
military tribunals on account of issues posed concerning
due process and violations of constitutional rights. Also,
in Magno v. De Villa83 decided by this Court, petitioners
note that We, in fact, exercised the judicial power to
determine whether the APP and the members of the
court martial acted with grave abuse o.f discretion in
their military investigation.
Petitioners' contentions are tenable.
Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political
branches of the government, not the courts, with
superintendence and control over the military because
the courts generally lack the competence and expertise
necessary to evaluate military decisions and they are ill-
equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that
any particular intrusion upon military authority might have
.84 Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, We rule that the
facts as well as the legal issues in the U.S. cases cited
by respondents are not on all fours with the case of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Instead, what applies is the 1975 U.S.
case of Andrews v. Knowlton,85 which similarly involved
cadets who were separated from the United States
Military Academy due to Honor Code violations.
Following Wasson v. Trowbridge86 and Hagopian v.
Knowlton,87 Andrews re-affirmed the power of the
district courts to review procedures used at the service
academies in the separation or dismissal of cadets and
midshipmen. While it recognized the "constitutional
permissibility of the military to set and enforce
uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics," it
said that the courts "have expanded at an accelerated
pace the scope of judicial access for review of military
determinations." Later, in Kolesa v. Lehman,88 it was
opined that it has been well settled that federal courts
have jurisdiction "where there is a substantial claim that
prescribed military procedures violates one's
constitutional rights." By 1983, the U.S. Congress
eventually made major revisions to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) by expressly providing, among
others; for a direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court of
decisions by the military's highest appellate authority.89
Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of
petitioners is still formidable. In this jurisdiction, Section 1
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope
of judicial power by mandating that the duty of the courts
of justice includes not only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government" even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions
.90 Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.91
The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee can, for
purposes of the Due Process Clause, be considered a
governmental activity. As ruled in Andrews:
The relationship between the Cadet Honor Committee
and the separation process at the Academy has been
sufficiently formalized, and is sufficiently interdependent,
so as to bring that committee's activities within the
definition of governmental activity for the purposes of our
review. While the Academy has long had the informal
practice of referring all alleged violations to the Cadet
Honor Committee, the relationship between that
committee and the separation process has to a degree
been formalized. x x x
Regardless of whether the relationship be deemed
formal or informal, the Honor Committee under its own
procedures provides that a single "not guilty" vote by a
member ends the matter, while a "guilty" finding
confronts a cadet with the hard choice of either resigning
or electing to go before a Board of Officers. An adverse
finding there results not only in formal separation from
the Academy but also in a damaging record that will
follow the cadet through life. Accordingly, we conclude
that the Cadet Honor Committee, acting not unlike a
grand jury, is clearly part of the process whereby a cadet
can ultimately be adjudged to have violated the Cadet
Honor Code and be separated from the Academy.
Therefore, the effect of the committee's procedures and
determinations on the separation process is sufficiently
intertwined with the formal governmental activity which
may follow as to bring it properly under judicial review92
No one is above the law, including the military. In fact,
the present Constitution declares it as a matter of
principle that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme
over the military.93 Consistent with the republican
system of checks and balances, the Court has been
entrusted, expressly or by necessary implication, with
both the duty and the obligation of determining, in
appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
or executive action.94
Cadet's relinquishment of certain civil liberties

Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable

to a cadet is not the same as that of a civilian because
the former' s rights have already been recalibrated to
best serve the military purpose and necessity. They
claim that both Gudani and Lt. Col. Kapunan, Jr. v. Gen.
De Villa95 recognized that, to a certain degree, individual
rights of persons in the military service may be curtailed
by the rules of military discipline in order to ensure its
effectiveness in fulfilling the duties required to be
discharged under the law. Respondents remind that, as
a military student aspiring to a commissioned post in the
military service, Cadet 1 CL Cudia voluntarily gave up
certain civil and political rights which the rest of the
civilian population enjoys. The deliberate surrender of
certain freedoms on his part is embodied in the cadets'
Honor Code Handbook. It is noted that at the beginning
of their academic life in the PMA, Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
along with the rest of Cadet Corps, took an oath and
undertaking to stand by the Honor Code and the Honor
System.

To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental

human rights, including the right to due process, is, for
petitioners, contrary to the provisions of Section 3, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution,96 Executive Order (E.O.) No.
17897 (as amended by E.O. No. 100598), AFP Code of
Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the
Honor System, military professionalism, and, in general,
military culture. They maintain that the HC, the CRAB,
and the PMA, grossly and in bad faith misapplied the
Honor Code and the Honor System in deciding Cadet
lCL Cudia's case considering that these should not be
implemented at the expense of human rights, due
process, and fair play. Further, under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, they can never overpower or
defy the 1987 Constitution since the former should yield
to the latter. Petitioners stress that the statement that "a
cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights
and liberties in order for the Code and System to be
implemented" simply pertains to what cadets have to
sacrifice in order to prove that they are men or women of
integrity and honor, such as the right to entertain vices
and the right to freely choose what they want to say or
do. In the context of disciplinary investigation, it does not
contemplate a surrender of the right to due process but,
at most, refers to the cadets' rights to privacy and to
remain silent.

We concur with the stand of petitioners.

Of course, a student at a military academy must be

prepared to subordinate his private interests for the
proper functioning of the educational institution he
attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a
student at a civilian public school.99 In fact, the Honor
Code and Honor System Handbook of the PMA
expresses that, "[as] a training environment, the Cadet
Corps is a society which has its own norms. Each
member binds himself to what is good for him, his
subordinates, and his peers. To be part of the Cadet
Corps requires the surrender
of some basic rights and liberties for the good of the
group."100
It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and
Hagopian, which were adopted by Andrews, that a cadet
facing dismissal from the military academy for
misconduct has constitutionally protected private
interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary
proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural
due process is a must.101For that reason, the PMA is
not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him,
the minimal requirements of the due process clause
must be satisfied.102 Likewise, the cadet faces far more
severe sanctions of being expelled from a course of
college instruction which he or she has pursued with a
view to becoming a career officer and of probably
being forever denied that career.103
The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable
as they do not specifically pertain to dismissal
proceedings of a cadet in a military academy due to
honor violation. In Gudani, the Court denied the petition
that sought to annul the directive from then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which' enjoined petitioners
from testifying before the Congress without her consent.
We ruled that petitioners may be subjected to military
discipline for their defiance of a direct order of the AFP
Chief of Staff. On the other hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this
Court upheld the restriction imposed on petitioner since
the conditions for his "house arrest" (particularly, that he
may not issue any press statements or give any press
conference during the period of his detention) are
justified by the requirements of military discipline. In
these two cases, the constitutional rights to information,
transparency in matters of public concern, and to free
speech - not to due process clause - were restricted to
better serve the greater military purpose. Academic
freedom of the PMA
Petitioners posit that there is no law providing that a
guilty finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to
dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the
PMA. They argue that Honor Code violation is not
among those listed as justifications for the attrition of
cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor
System do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically
terminated or dismissed from service. To them, the
Honor Code and Honor System are "gentleman's
agreement" that cannot take precedence over public
interest - in the defense of the nation and in view of the
taxpayer's money spent for each cadet. Petitioners
contend that, based on the Civil Code, all written or
verbal agreements are null and void if they violate the
law, good morals, good customs, public policy, and
public safety.
In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA may
impose disciplinary measures and punishment as it
deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the
Academy. Even without express provision of a law, the
PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss
erring cadets since it is
deemed reasonably written into C.A. No. 1. Moreover,
although said law grants to the President the authority of
terminating a cadet's appointment, such power may be
delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise
direct supervision and control over the cadets.
Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic
institution, the PMA has the inherent right to promulgate
reasonable norms, rules and regulations that it may
deem necessary for the maintenance of school discipline,
which is specifically mandated by Section 3 (2),104
 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. As the premiere
military educational institution of the AFP in accordance
with Section 30,105 Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections
58 and 59,106 Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of
E.O. No. 292 ("Administrative Code of 1987"), the PMA
is an institution that enjoys academic freedom
guaranteed by Section 5 (2),107 Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,108 it was held that concomitant with such
freedom is the right and duty to instill and impose
discipline upon its students. Also, consistent with lsabelo,
Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.109 and
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,110 the PMA
has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely, to
expel) given the high degree of discipline and honor
expected from its students who are to form part of the
AFP.
For respondents, Cadet 1 CL Cudia cannot, therefore,
belatedly assail the Honor Code as basis of the HC' s
decision to recommend his dismissal from the PMA.
When he enlisted for enrolment and studied in the PMA
for four years, he knew or should have been fully aware
of the standards of discipline imposed on all cadets and
the corresponding penalty for failing to abide by these
standards.
In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in
lsabelo, Jr. and Ateneo, academic freedom is not
absolute and cannot be exercised in blatant disregard of
the right to due process and the 1987 Constitution.
Although schools have the prerogative to choose what to
teach, how to teach, and who to teach, the same does
not go so far as to deprive a student of the right to
graduate when there is clear evidence that he is entitled
to the same since, in such a case, the right to graduate
becomes a vested right which takes precedence over the
limited and restricted right of the educational institution.
While both parties have valid points to consider, the
arguments of respondents are more in line with the facts
of this case. We have ruled that the school-student
relationship is contractual in nature. Once admitted, a
student's enrolment is not only semestral in duration but
for the entire period he or she is expected to complete it.
111 An institution of learning has an obligation to afford
its students a fair opportunity to complete the course
they seek to pursue.112 Such contract is imbued with
public interest because of the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over a educational
institutions.113
The school-student relationship has also been held as
reciprocal. "[It] has consequences appurtenant to and
inherent in all contracts of such kind -it gives rise to
bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school
undertakes to provide students with education sufficient
to enable them to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the students agree to
abide by the academic requirements of the school and to
observe its rules and regulations."114
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional
autonomy of universities and institutions of higher
learning,115has been enshrined in our Constitutions of
1935, 1973, and 1987.116 In Garcia, this Court
espoused the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
117 which enumerated "the four essential freedoms" of a
university: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1
) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall
be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to study.118 An
educational institution has the power to adopt and
enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its
government, this being incident to the very object of
incorporation, and indispensable to the successful
management of the college.119 It can decide for itself its
aims and objectives and how best to attain them, free
from outside coercion or interference except when there
is an overriding public welfare which would call for some
restraint.120 Indeed, "academic freedom has never been
meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that
assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An
equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so
well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every '
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith."'121
The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is
subsumed in their academic freedom and that "the
establishment of rules governing university-student
relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the
smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its
very survival."122 As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A
school without discipline is like a mill without water."
Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school's
disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue
operating.123 In this regard, the Court has always
recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary
sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel,
on students who violate disciplinary rules.124 In Miriam
College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,125 this
Court elucidated:
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once
apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught
." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of
anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an
educational institution requires rules and regulations
necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational
program and the creation of an educational environment
conducive to learning.
Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the
protection of the students, faculty, and property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the
student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable,
value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the
school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to
discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom
"what to teach." Incidentally, the school not only has the
right but the duty to develop discipline in its students.
The Constitution no less imposes such duty.
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and
nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human
rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the
historical development of the country, teach the rights
and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual
values, develop moral character and personal discipline,
encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden
scientific and technological knowledge, and promote
vocational efficiency.
In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a
means for the school to carry out its responsibility to help
its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible,
effective and worthy citizens of the community."
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to
discipline more evident than in "who may be admitted to
study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to
admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine
whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to
impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the
withholding of graduation privileges.126
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures
extends even after graduation for any act done by the
student prior thereto. In University of the Phils. Board of
Regents v. Court of Appeals,127 We upheld the
university's withdrawal of a doctorate degree already
conferred on a student who was found to have
committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation.
Thus:
Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]
cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of
higher learning." This is nothing new. The 1935
Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided
for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the
institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of
higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia v.
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher
learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority
certainly extending to the choice of students." If such
institution of higher learning can decide who can and
who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on
whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its
graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or
distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has
the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it
has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not
terminate
upon the "graduation" of a student, .as the Court of
Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such
a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the
investigation of private respondent's case began before
her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation
ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too
many investigations conducted before the Board of
Regents finally decided she should not have been
allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to
institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant
of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v.
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, "is not to be construed in a niggardly manner
or in a grudging fashion."
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the
highest governing body of the University of the
Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the
recommendation of the University Council. It follows that
if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud
, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the
observance of due process, to withdraw what it has
granted without violating a student's rights. An institution
of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that
an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully
deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than
bestowing a university's highest academic degree upon
an individual who has obtained the same through fraud
or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the
university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act
of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from
serious threats to its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to
pursue their education, the USC as an educational
institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom
and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it
that this freedom is not jeopardized.128
It must be borne in mind that schools are established,
not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the
studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and
attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will,
of the total man.129Essentially, education must
ultimately be religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty
and reverence.130 Under the rubric of "right to education
," students have a concomitant duty to learn under the
rules laid down by the school.131 Every citizen has a
right to select a profession or, course of study, subject to
fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements.132 The PMA is not different. As the
primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it
certainly has the right to invoke academic freedom in the
enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which
are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental
ethical and moral principle. It is the minimum standard
for cadet behavior and serves as the guiding spirit
behind each cadet's action. It is the cadet's responsibility
to maintain the highest standard of honor. Throughout a
cadet's stay in the PMA, he or she is
absolutely bound thereto. It binds as well the members
of the Cadet Corps from its alumni or the member of the
so-called "Long Gray Line."
Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for
the cadets' character development. It defines the
desirable values they must possess to remain part of the
Corps; it develops the atmosphere of trust so essential in
a military organization; and it makes them professional
military soldiers.133 As it is for character building, it
should not only be kept within the society of cadets. It is
best adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of
applying it outside as an officer of the AFP and as a
product of the PMA.134
The Honor Code and System could be justified as the
primary means of achieving the cadets' character
development and as ways by which the Academy has
chosen to identify those who are deficient in conduct.135
 Upon the Code rests the ethical standards of the Cadet
Corps and it is also an institutional goal, ensuring that
graduates have strong character, unimpeachable
integrity, and moral standards of the highest order.136
 To emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary system as a
whole is characterized as "correctional and educational
in nature rather than being legalistic and punitive." Its
purpose is to teach the cadets "to be prepared to accept
full responsibility for all that they do or fail to do and to
place loyalty to the service above self-interest or loyalty
to friends or associates. "137Procedural safeguards in a
student disciplinary case
Respondents stress that Guzman v. National University
138 is more appropriate in determining the minimum
standards for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in
academic institutions. Similarly, with the guideposts set
in Andrews, they believe that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was
accorded due process.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC, the
CRAB and the PMA fell short in observing the important
safeguards laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR139 and Non v.
Judge Dames II,140 which set the minimum standards to
satisfy the demands of procedural due process in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions. For them, Guzman
did not entirely do away with the due process
requirements outlined in Ang Tibay as the Court merely
stated that the minimum requirements in the Guzman
case are more apropos.
Respondents rightly argued.
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong141 already
settled the issue as it held that although both Ang Tibay
and Guzman essentially deal with the requirements of
due process, the latter case is more apropos since it
specifically deals with the minimum standards to be
satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in
academic institutions. That Guzman is the authority on
the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases
was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly recent case of
Go v. Colegio De San Juan De Letran.142
In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum
standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process, to wit:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall
have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; ( 4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.143
We have been consistent in reminding that due process
in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in courts of justice;144 that the
proceedings may be summary;145 that cross-
examination is not an essential part of the investigation
or hearing;146and that the required proof in a student
disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is
neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor
preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence
or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."147
What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum
standards of fairness to the individual, which generally
encompass the right of adequate notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.148 As held in De La
Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:149
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due
process, the right to which is among the primary rights
that must be respected even in administrative
proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. So long as the party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest
in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of
due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all
instances, essential to due process - it is enough that the
parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and to
present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can
be based. "To be heard" does not only mean
presentation of testimonial evidence in court - one may
also be heard through pleadings and where the
opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded,
there is no denial of due process.150
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an
administrative proceeding conducted to investigate a
cadet's honor violation need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. It articulates that –
The Spirit of the Honor Code guides the Corps in
identifying and assessing misconduct. While cadets are
interested in legal precedents in cases involving Honor
violations, those who hold the Spirit of the Honor Code
dare not look into these precedents for loopholes to
justify questionable acts and they are not to interpret the
system to their own advantage.
The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to
internalize Honor in a substantive way. Technical and
procedural misgivings of the legal systems may avert the
true essence of imparting the Spirit of the Code for the
reason that it can be used to make unlawful attempt to
get into the truth of matters especially when a cadet can
be compelled to surrender some civil rights and liberties
in order for the Code and System to be implemented. By
virtue of being a cadet, a member of the CCAFP
becomes a subject of the Honor Code and System.
Cadet's actions are bound by the existing norms that are
logically applied through the Code and System in order
to realize the Academy's mission to produce leaders of
character - men of integrity and honor.151
One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System
also states:
2. The Honor System correlates with legal procedures of
the state's Justice System but it does not demean its
Spirit by reducing the Code to a systematic list of
externally observed rules. Where misinterpretations and
loopholes arise through legalism and its technicalities,
the objective of building the character of the cadets
becomes futile. While, generally, Public Law penalizes
only the faulty acts, the Honor System tries to examine
both the action and the intention.152
Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is
aversion towards undue judicialization of an
administrative hearing in the military academy. It has
been said that the mission of the military is unique in the
sense that its primary business is to fight or be ready to
fight wars should the occasion arise, and that over-
proceduralizing military determinations necessarily gives
soldiers less time to accomplish this task.153 Extensive
cadet investigations and complex due process hearing
could sacrifice simplicity, practicality, and timeliness.
Investigations that last for several days or weeks,
sessions that become increasingly involved with legal
and procedural' points, and legal motions and
evidentiary objections that are irrelevant and
inconsequential tend to disrupt, delay, and confuse the
dismissal proceedings and make them unmanageable.
Excessive delays cannot be tolerated since it is unfair to
the accused, to his or her fellow cadets, to the Academy,
and, generally, to the Armed Forces. A good balance
should, therefore, be struck to achieve fairness,
thoroughness, and efficiency.154 Considering that the
case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia is one of first impression in the
sense that this Court has not previously dealt with the
particular issue of a dismissed cadet's right to due
process, it is necessary for Us to refer to U.S.
jurisprudence for some guidance. Notably, our armed
forces have been patterned after the U.S. Army and the
U.S. military code produced a salutary effect in the
military justice system of the Philippines.155 Hence,
pertinent case laws interpreting the U.S. military code
and practices have persuasive, if not the same, effect in
this jurisdiction.
We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly
viewed that "due process" is a flexible concept, requiring
consideration in each case of a variety of circumstances
and
calling for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.156 Hagopian opined:
In approaching the question of what process is due
before governmental action adversely affecting private
interests may properly be taken, it must be recognized
that due process is not a rigid formula or simple rule of
thumb to be applied undeviatingly to any given set of
facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible concept which
depends upon the balancing of various factors, including
the nature of the private right or interest that is
threatened, the extent to which the proceeding is
adversarial in character, the severity and consequences
of any action that might be taken, the burden that would
be imposed by requiring use of all or part of the full
panoply of trial-type procedures, and the existence of
other overriding interests, such as the necessity for
prompt action in the conduct of crucial military operations
. The full context must therefore be considered in each
case.157 (Emphasis supplied)
Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly outlined
the minimum standards of due process required in the
dismissal of a cadet. Thus:
[W]hen the government affects the private interests of
individuals, it may not proceed arbitrarily but must
observe due process of law. x x x Nevertheless, the
flexibility which is inherent in the concept of due process
of law precludes the dogmatic application of specific
rules developed in one context to entirely distinct forms
of government action. "For, though 'due process of law'
generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular
allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according
to some settled course of judicial proceedings, * * * yet,
this is not universally true." x x x Thus, to determine in
any given case what procedures due process requires,
the court must carefully determine and balance the
nature of the private interest affected and of the
government interest involved, taking account of history
and the precise circumstances surrounding the case at
hand.
While the government must always have a legitimate
concern with the subject matter before it may validly
affect private interests, in particularly vital and sensitive
areas of government concern such as national security
and military affairs, the private interest must yield to a
greater degree to the governmental. x x x Few decisions
properly rest so exclusively within the discretion of the
appropriate government officials than the selection,
training, discipline and dismissal of the future officers of
the military and Merchant Marine. Instilling and
maintaining discipline and morale in these young men
who will be required to bear weighty responsibility in the
face of adversity -- at times extreme -- is a matter of
substantial national importance scarcely within the
competence of the judiciary. And it cannot be doubted
that because of these factors historically the military has
been permitted greater freedom to fashion its disciplinary
procedures than the civilian authorities.
We conclude, therefore, that due process only requires
for the dismissal of a Cadet from the Merchant Marine
Academy that
he be given a fair hearing at which he is apprised of the
charges against him and permitted a defense. x x x For
the guidance of the parties x x x the rudiments of a fair
hearing in broad outline are plain. The Cadet must be
apprised of the specific charges against him. He must be
given an adequate opportunity to present his defense
both from the point of view of time and the use of
witnesses and other evidence. We do not suggest,
however, that the Cadet must be given this opportunity
both when demerits are awarded and when dismissal is
considered. The hearing may be procedurally informal
and need not be adversarial.158 (Emphasis supplied)
In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson
and Hagopian are equally controlling in cases where
cadets were separated from the military academy for
violation of the Honor Code. Following the two previous
cases, it was ruled that in order to be proper and immune
from constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be
dismissed or separated from the academy must be
afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges
against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to
present his or her defense both from the point of view of
time and the use of witnesses and other evidence.159
 Conspicuously, these vital conditions are not too far
from what We have already set in Guzman and the
subsequent rulings in Alcuaz v. Philippine School of
Business Administration160 and De La Salle University,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals.161
In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s
Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure
and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the
Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the
opportunity to explain the report against him. He was
informed about his options and the entire process that
the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation
immediately followed after he replied and submitted a
written explanation. Upon its completion, the
investigating team submitted a written report together
with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC
thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations.
When the honor case was submitted for formal
investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the
hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was
informed of the charge against him and given the right to
enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side,
confront the witnesses against him, and present
evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the
HC voting members, he was found to have violated the '
Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the
review process at the Academy level - from the OIC of
the HC, to the SJA, to the Commandant of Cadets, and
to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was
also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of
the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was
conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB
members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to
conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he
had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for
him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.
It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge
and expertise gained from the handling of specific
matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the
factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily
accorded respect if not finality by the Court, unless such
findings are not supported by evidence or vitiated by
fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which
led to the findings is irregular; when palpable errors are
committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.162 In the
case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, We find no reason to deviate
from the general rule. The grounds therefor are
discussed below seriatim:
As to the right to be represented by a counsel –
For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give
Cadet 1 CL Cudia the right to be represented by a
counsel who could actively participate in the proceedings
like in the cross-examination of the witnesses against
him before the CRAB or HC, if remanded. This is
because while the CRAB allowed him to be represented
by a PAO lawyer, the counsel was only made an
observer without any right to intervene and demand
respect of Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights.163 According to
them, he was not sufficiently given the opportunity to
seek a counsel and was not even asked if he would like
to have one. He was only properly represented when it
was already nearing graduation day after his family
sought the assistance of the PAO. Petitioners assert that
Guzman is specific in stating that the erring student has
the right to answer the charges against him or her with
the assistance of counsel, if desired.
On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v.
Exevea164 and Nera v. The Auditor General165 in
asserting that the right to a counsel is not imperative in
administrative investigations or non-criminal proceedings.
Also, based on Cadet lCL Cudia's academic standing, he
is said to be obviously not untutored to fully understand
his rights and express himself. Moreover, the
confidentiality of the HC proceedings worked against his
right to be represented by a counsel. In any event,
respondents claim that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not
precluded from seeking a counsel's advice in preparing
his defense prior to the HC hearing.
Essentially, petitioners claim .. that Cadet lCL Cudia is
guaranteed the right to have his counsel not just in
assisting him in the preparation for the investigative
hearing before the HC and the CRAB but in participating
fully in said hearings. The Court disagrees.
Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in
the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a non-
litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by
counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is
not indispensable. Further, in Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission,166 the Court held that "a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no
duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel." Hence, the administrative
body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel
because assistance of counsel is not an absolute
requirement.
More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt.
Thus:
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness
is a function of all of the other aspects of the hearing.
Where the proceeding is non-criminal in nature, where
the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the
government does not proceed through counsel, where
the individual concerned is mature and educated, where
his knowledge of the events x x x should enable him to
develop the facts adequately through available sources,
and where the other aspects of the hearing taken as a
whole are fair, due process does not require
representation by counsel.167
To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to
recognize a right to representation by counsel, as a
function of due process, in military academy disciplinary
proceedings.168 This rule is principally motivated by the
policy of "treading lightly on the military domain, with
scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the
military establishment to govern its own affairs within the
broad confines of constitutional due process" and the
courts' views that disciplinary proceedings are not judicial
in nature and should be kept informal, and that literate
and educated cadets should be able to defend
themselves.169 In Hagopian, it was ruled that the
importance of informality in the proceeding militates
against a requirement that the cadet be accorded the
right to representation by counsel before the Academic
Board and that unlike the welfare recipient who lacks the
training and education needed to understand his rights
and express himself, the cadet should be capable of
doing so.170 In the subsequent case of Wimmer v.
Lehman,171 the issue was not access to counsel but the
opportunity to have counsel, instead of oneself, examine
and cross-examine witnesses, make objections, and
argue the case during the hearing. Disposing of the case,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was not
persuaded by the argument that an individual of a
midshipman's presumed intelligence, selected because
he is expected to be able to care for himself and others,
often under difficult circumstances, and who has full
awareness of what he is facing, with counsel's advice,
was deprived of due process by being required to
present his defense in person at an investigatory hearing.
In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of
evidence that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was given the option or
was able to seek legal advice prior to and/or during the
HC hearing, it is indubitable that he was assisted by a
counsel, a PAO lawyer to be exact, when the CRAB
reviewed and reinvestigated the case. The requirement
of due process is already satisfied since, at the very
least, the counsel aided him in the drafting and filing of
the Appeal Memorandum and even acted as an observer
who had no right to actively participate in the
proceedings (such as conducting the cross-examination).
Moreover, not to be missed out are the facts that the
offense committed by Cadet 1 CL Cudia is not criminal in
nature; that
the hearings before the HC and the CRAB were
investigative and not adversarial; and that Cadet lCL
Cudia's excellent-academic standing puts him in the best
position to look after his own vested interest in the
Academy.
As to the confidentiality of records of the proceedings –
Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez denied in
his March 11, 2014 letter Cadet lCL Cudia's request for
documents, footages, and recordings relevant to the HC
hearings, the vital evidence negating the regularity of the
HC trial and supporting his defense have been surely
overlooked by the CRAB in its case review. Indeed, for
them, the answers on whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia was
deprived of due process and whether he lied could easily
be unearthed from the video and other records of the HC
investigation. Respondents did not deny their existence
but they refused to present them for the parties and the
Court to peruse. In particular, they note that the Minutes
of the HC dated January 21, 2014 and the HC Formal
Investigation Report dated January 20, 2014 were
considered by the CRAB but were not furnished to
petitioners and the Court; hence, there is no way to
confirm the truth of the alleged statements therein. In
their view, failure to furnish these documents could only
mean that it would be adverse if produced pursuant to
Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.172
For lack of legal basis on PMA' s claim of confidentiality
of records, petitioners contend that it is the ministerial
duty of the HC to submit to the CRAB, for the conduct of
intelligent review of the case, all its records of the
proceedings, including video footages of the
deliberations and voting. They likewise argue that PMA'
s refusal to release relevant documents to Cadet 1 CL
Cudia under the guise of confidentiality reveals another
misapplication of the Honor Code, which merely
provides: "A cadet who becomes part of any
investigation is subject to the existing regulations
pertaining to rules of confidentiality and, therefore, must
abide to the creed of secrecy. Nothing shall be disclosed
without proper guidance from those with authority" (IV.
The Honor System, Honor Committee, Cadet Observer).
This provision, they say, does not deprive Cadet 1 CL
Cudia of his right to obtain copies and examine relevant
documents pertaining to his case.
Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the
documents, footages, and recordings relevant to the HC
hearings are favorable to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's cause, and
, consequently, to rule that respondents' refusal to
produce and have them examined is tantamount to the
denial of his right to procedural due process. They are
mistaken.
In this case, petitioners have not particularly identified
any documents, witness testimony, or oral or written
presentation of facts submitted at the hearing that would
support Cadet 1 CL Cudia's defense. The Court may
require that an administrative record be supplemented,
but only "where there is a 'strong showing or bad faith or
improper behavior' on the part of the agency,"173 both
of which are not present here. Petitioners have not
specifically indicated the nature of the
concealed evidence, if any, and the reason for
withholding it. What they did was simply supposing that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia's guilty verdict would be overturned
with the production and examination of such documents,
footages, and recordings. As will be further shown in the
discussions below, the requested matters, even if denied,
would not relieve Cadet 1 CL Cudia's predicament. If at
all, such denial was a harmless procedural error since he
was not seriously prejudiced thereby.
As to the ostracism in the PMA –
To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased
testimonies and evidence because Special Order No. 1
issued on February 21, 2014, which directed the
ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, left him without any
opportunity, to secure statements of his own witnesses.
He could not have access to or approach the cadets who
were present during the trial and who saw the 8-1 voting
result. It is argued that the Order directing Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's ostracism is of doubtful legal validity because the
Honor Code unequivocally announced: "x x x But by
wholeheartedly dismissing the cruel method of
ostracizing Honor Code violators, PMA will not have to
resort to other humiliating means and shall only have the
option to make known among its alumni the names of
those who have not sincerely felt remorse for violating
the Honor Code."
On their part, respondents assert that neither the petition
nor the petition-in-intervention attached a full text copy of
the alleged Special Order No. 1. In any case, attributing
its issuance to PMA is improper and misplaced because
of petitioners' admission that ostracism has been
absolutely dismissed as an Academy-sanctioned activity
consistent with the trend in International Humanitarian
Law that the PMA has included in its curriculum.
Assuming that said Order was issued, respondents
contend that it purely originated from the cadets
themselves, the sole purpose of which was to give a
strong voice to the Cadet Corps by declaring that they
did not tolerate Cadet 1 CL Cudia's honor violation and
breach of confindentiality of the HC proceedings.
More importantly, respondents add that it is highly
improbable and unlikely that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was
ostracized by his fellow cadets. They manifest that as
early as January 22, 2014, he was already transferred to
the Holding Center. The practice of billeting an accused
cadet at the Holding Center is provided for in the Honor
Code Handbook. Although within the PMA compound,
the Holding Center is off-limits to cadets who do not have
any business to conduct therein. The cadets could not
also ostracize him during mess times since Cadet 1 CL
Cudia opted to take his meals at the Holding Center. The
circumstances obtaining when Special Order No. 1 was
issued clearly foreclose the possibility that he was
ostracized in common areas accessible to other cadets.
He remained in the Holding Center until March 16, 2014
when he voluntarily left the PMA. Contrary to his claim,
guests were also free to visit him in the Holding Center.
However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1 CL Cudia
suffered from ostracism in the PMA. The practice was
somehow
recognized by respondents in their Consolidated
Comment and by PMA Spokesperson Maj. Flores in a
news report. The CHR likewise confirmed the same in its
Resolution dated May 22, 2014. For them, it does not
matter where the ostracism order originated from
because the PMA appeared to sanction it even if it came
from the cadets themselves. There was a tacit approval
of an illegal act. If not, those cadets responsible for
ostracism would have been charged by the PMA officials.
Finally, it is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not
choose to take his meals at the Holding Center as he
was not allowed to leave the place. Petitioners opine that
placing the accused cadet in the Holding Center is
inconsistent with his or her presumed innocence and
certainly gives the implication of ostracism.
We agree with respondents. Neither the petition nor the
petition-inintervention attached a full text copy or even a
pertinent portion of the alleged Special Order No. 1,
which authorized the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
Being hearsay, its existence and contents are of doubtful
veracity. Hence, a definite ruling on the matter can never
be granted in this case.
The Court cannot close its eyes though on what appears
to be an admission of Cadet 1 CL Mogol during the CHR
hearing that, upon consultation with the entire class, the
baron, and the Cadet Conduct Policy Board, they issued
an ostracism order against Cadet 1 CL Cudia.174 While
not something new in a military academy,175 ostracism's
continued existence in the modem times should no
longer be countenanced. There are those who argue that
the "silence" is a punishment resulting in the loss of
private interests, primarily that of reputation, and that
such penalty may render illusory the possibility of
vindication by the reviewing body once found guilty by
the HC.176 Furthermore, in Our mind, ostracism
practically denies the accused cadet's protected rights to
present witnesses or evidence in his or her behalf and to
be presumed innocent until finally proven otherwise in a
proper proceeding.
As to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's stay in the Holding Center, the
Court upholds the same. The Honor Code and Honor
System Handbook provides that, in case a cadet has
been found guilty by the HC of violating the Honor Code
and has opted not to resign, he or she may stay and wait
for the disposition of the case. In such event, the cadet is
not on full-duty status and shall be billeted at the HTG
Holding Center.177 Similarly, in the U.S., the purpose of
"Boarders Ward" is to quarter those cadets who are
undergoing separation actions. Permitted to attend
classes, the cadet is sequestered , therein until final
disposition of the case. In Andrews, it was opined that
the segregation of cadets in the Ward was a proper
exercise of the discretionary authority of Academy
officials. It relied on the traditional doctrine that "with
respect to decisions made by Army authorities, 'orderly
government requires us to tread lightly on the military
domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and
authority of the military establishment to govern its own
affairs within the broad confines of constitutional due
process.'" Also, in Birdwell v. Schlesinger,178 the "
administrative segregation" was held to be a reasonable
exercise of military discipline and could not be
considered an
invasion of the rights to freedom of speech and freedom
of association.
Late and vague decisions –
It is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was kept in the dark
as to the charge against him and the decisions arrived at
by the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA. No written decision
was furnished to him, and if any, the information was
unjustly belated and the justifications for the decisions
were vague. He had to constantly seek clarification and
queries just to be apprised of what he was confronted
with.
Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the "guilty"
verdict, Cadet 1 CL Cudia immediately inquired as to the
grounds therefor, but Cadet 1 CL Mogol answered that it
is confidential since he would still appeal the same. By
March 11, 2014, Maj. Gen. Lopez informed Cadet 1 CL
Cudia that the CRAB already forwarded their
recommendation for his dismissal to the General
Headquarters sometime in February-March 2014. Even
then, he received no decision/recommendation on his
case, verbally or in writing. The PMA commencement
exercises pushed through with no written decision from
the CRAB or the PMA on his appeal. The letter from the
Office of the Adjutant General of the AFP was
suspiciously delayed when the Cudia family received the
same only on March 20, 2014. Moreover, it fell short in
laying down with specificity the factual and legal bases
used by the CRAB and even by the Office of the Adjutant
General. There remains no proof that the CRAB and the
PMA considered the evidence presented by Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, it being uncertain as to what evidence was
weighed by the CRAB, whether the same is substantial,
and whether the new evidence submitted by him was
ever taken into account.
In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMA's·
practice of orally declaring the HC finding, not putting it in
a written document so as to protect the integrity of the
erring cadet and guard the confidentiality of the HC
proceedings pursuant to the Honor System. Further, they
aver that a copy of the report of the CRAB, dated March
10, 2014, was not furnished to Cadet 1 CL Cudia
because it was his parents who filed the appeal, hence,
were the ones who were given a copy thereof.
Petitioners' contentions have no leg to stand on. While
there is a constitutional mandate stating that "[no]
decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based,"179 such provision does not
apply in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case. Neither Guzman nor
Andrews require a specific form and content of a
decision issued in disciplinary proceedings. The Honor
Code and Honor System Handbook also has no written
rule on the matter. Even if the provision applies, nowhere
does it demand that a point-by-point consideration and
resolution of the issues raised by the parties are
necessary.180 What counts is that, albeit furnished to assuring that it went through the processes of legal
him late, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was informed of how it was reasoning. He was not left in the dark as to how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reached and he knows exactly the reasons why he lost,
reasons that led to the conclusions of the reviewing body, and is able to pinpoint the possible errors for review.

As to the blind adoption of the HC findings –

Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and

31 of C.A. No. 1, only President Aquino as the
Commander-in-Chief has the power to appoint and
remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives no
authority to the HC as the sole body to determine the
guilt or innocence of a cadet. It also does not empower
the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis
for recommending the cadet's dismissal. In the case of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly
followed the HC's finding of guilt in terminating his
military service.

Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct

a review de nova of all records without requiring Cadet 1
CL Cudia to submit new evidence if it is physically
impossible for him to do so. In their minds, respondents
cannot claim that the CRAB and the PMA thoroughly
reviewed the HC recommendation and heard Cadet lCL
Cudia's side. As clearly stated in the letter from the
Office of the AFP Adjutant General, "[in] its report dated
March 10, 2014, PMA CRAB sustained the findings and
recommendations of the Honor Committee x x x It also
resolved the appeal filed by the subject Cadet." However,
the Final Investigation Report of the CRAB was dated
March 23, 2014. While such report states that a report
was submitted to the AFP General Headquarters on
March 10, 2014 and that it was only on March 12, 2014
that it was designated as a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body, it is unusual that the CRAB
would do the same things twice. This raised a valid and
well-grounded suspicion that the CRAB never undertook
an in-depth investigation/review the first time it came out
with its report, and the Final Investigation Report was
drafted merely as an afterthought when the lack of
written decision was pointed out by petitioners so as to
remedy the apparent lack of due process during the
CRAB investigation and review.

Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there

was a proper assessment of the procedural and legal
correctness of the guilty verdict against Cadet 1 CL
Cudia. They assert that the higher authorities of the PMA
did not merely rely on the findings of the HC, noting that
there was also a separate investigation conducted by the
HTG from January 25 to February 7, 2014. Likewise,
contrary to the contention of petitioners that the CRAB
continued with the review of the case despite the
absence of necessary documents, the CRAB conducted
its own review of the case and even conducted another
investigation by constituting the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body. For respondents, petitioners
failed to discharge the burden of proof in showing bad
faith on the part of the PMA. In the absence of evidence
to the contrary and considering further that petitioners'
allegations are merely self-serving and baseless, good
faith on the part of the PMA' s higher authorities is
presumed and should, therefore, prevail.
We agree with respondents.
The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet
Corps, has a limited role of investigating and determining
whether or not the alleged offender has actually violated
the Honor Code.181 It is given the responsibility of
administering the Honor Code and, in case of breach, its
task is entirely investigative, examining in the first
instance a suspected violation. As a means of
encouraging self-discipline, without ceding to it any
authority to make final adjudications, the Academy has
assigned it the function of identifying suspected violators.
182 Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the HC does not
have the authority to order the separation of a cadet from
the Academy. The results of its proceedings are purely
recommendatory and have no binding effect. The HC
determination is somewhat like an indictment, an
allegation, which, in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case, the PMA-
CRAB investigated de novo.183 In the U.S., it was even
opined that due process safeguards do not actually
apply at the Honor Committee level because it is only a "
charging body whose decisions had no effect other than
to initiate de nova proceedings before a Board of Officers
."184
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC is covered by
the due process clause and that irregularities in its
proceedings were in fact committed, still, We cannot rule
for petitioners. It is not required that procedural due
process be afforded at every stage of developing
disciplinary action. What is required is that an adequate
hearing be held before the final act of dismissing a cadet
from the military academy.185 In the case of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, the OIC of HC, the SJA, the Commandant of
Cadets, and the PMA Superintendent reviewed the HC
findings. A separate investigation was also conducted by
the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to
reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the
CRAB. Finally, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body
composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior
officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate
investigation of the case. The Board/Body actually held
hearings on March 12, 13, 14 and 20, 2014. Instead of
commendation, petitioners find it "unusual" that the
CRAB would do the same things twice and suspect that
it never undertook an in-depth investigation/review the
first time it came out with its report. Such assertion is
mere conjecture that deserves scant consideration.
As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial –
According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC
were a sham. The people behind Cadet ICL Cudia's
charge, investigation, and conviction were actually the
ones who had the intent to deceive and who took
advantage of the situation. Cadet 1 CL Raguindin, who
was a senior HC member and was the second in rank to
Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the Navy cadet 1 CL, was part of
the team which conducted the preliminary investigation.
Also, Cadet I CL Mogol, the HC Chairman, previously
charged Cadet 1 CL Cudia with honor violation allegedly
for cheating (particularly, conniving with and tutoring his
fellow cadets on a difficult topic by giving
solutions to a retake exam) but the charge was
dismissed for lack of merit. Even if he was a non-voting
member, he was in a position of influence and authority.
Thus, it would be a futile exercise for Cadet 1 CL Cudia
to resort to the procedure for the removal of HC
members.186
Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB
hearing was given to Cadet I CL Cudia, his family, or his
PAO counsel. During one of her visits to him in the
Holding Center, petitioner-intervenor was advised to
convince his son to resign and immediately leave the
PMA. Brig. Gen. Costales, who later became the CRAB
Head, also categorically uttered to Annavee: "Your
brother, he lied!" The CRAB conferences were merely
used to formalize his dismissal and the PMA never really
intended to hear his side. For petitioners, these are
manifestations of PMA's clear resolve to dismiss him no
matter what.
For their part, respondents contend that the CllR's
allegation that Maj. Hindang acted in obvious bad faith
and that he failed to discharge his duty to be a good
father of cadets when he "paved the road to [Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's] sham trial by the Honor Committee" is an
unfounded accusation. They note that when Maj.
Hindang was given the DR of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, he
revoked the penalty awarded because of his explanation.
However, all revocations of awarded penalties are
subject to the review of the STO. Therefore, it was at the
instance of Maj. Leander and the established procedure
followed at the PMA that Maj. Hindang was prompted to
investigate the circumstances surrounding Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's tardiness. Respondents add that bad faith
cannot likewise be imputed against Maj. Hindang by
referring to the actions taken by Maj. Jekyll Dulawan, the
CTO of Cadets 1 CL Narciso and Arcangel who also
arrived late for their next class. Unlike the other cadets,
Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not admit his being late and
effectively evaded responsibility by ascribing his
tardiness to Dr. Costales.
As to the CHR' s finding that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was
likewise "in bad faith and determined to destroy [Cadet 1
CL] Cudia, for reasons of his own" because the former
previously reported the latter for an honor violation in
November 2013, respondents argue that the bias
ascribed against him is groundless as there is failure to
note that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was a non-voting member of
the HC. Further, he cannot be faulted for reporting a
possible honor violation since he is the HC Chairman
and nothing less is expected of him. Respondents
emphasize that the representatives of the HC are elected
from each company, while the HC Chairman is elected
by secret ballot from the incoming first class
representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1 CL Cu'dia believed that
there was bias against him, he should have resorted to
the procedure for the removal of HC members provided
for in the Honor Code Handbook.
Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-
motive on the part of the PMA to prevent Cadet 1 CL
Cudia from graduating because the Academy does not
stand to gain anything from his dismissal. On the
contrary, in view of his academic standing, the
separation militates against PMA' s
mission to produce outstanding, honorable, and
exceptional cadets.
The Court differs with petitioners.
Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed.
Absent some showing of actual bias, petitioners'
allegations do not hold water. The mere imputation of ill-
motive without proof is speculative at best. Kolesa
teaches us that to sustain the challenge, specific
evidence must be presented to overcome
a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving
as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weaknesses, conferring investigative and
adjudicative powers on the same individual poses such a
risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must
be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
implemented.187
Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether
demerits are to be awarded, he is not an adversary of
the cadet but an educator who shares an identity of
interest with the cadet, whom he counsels from time to
time as a future leader.188 When the occasion calls for it
, cadets may be questioned as to the accuracy or
completeness of a submitted work. A particular point or
issue may be clarified. In this case, the question asked
of Cadet 1 CL Cudia concerning his being late in class is
proper, since there is evidence indicating that a breach
of regulation may have occurred and there is reasonable
cause to believe that he was involved in the breach of
regulations.189
For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the
Court shall rely on the non-toleration clause of the Honor
Code, i.e., "We do not tolerate those who violate the
Code." Cadets are reminded that they are charged with a
tremendous duty far more superior to their personal
feeling or friendship.190 They must learn to help others
by guiding them to accept the truth and do what is right,
rather than tolerating actions against truth and justice.191
 Likewise, cadets are presumed to be characteristically
honorable; they cannot overlook or arbitrarily ignore the
dishonorable action of their peers, seniors, or
subordinates.192 These are what Cadet 1 CL Mogol
exactly did, although he was later proven to have erred in
his accusation. Note that even the Honor Code and
Honor System Handbook recognizes that interpretation
of one's honor is generally subjective.193
Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that
Cadets 1 CL' Raguindin and Mogol as well as Brig. Gen.
Costales have an axe to grind against Cadet 1 CL Cudia
and were bent on causing, no matter what, the latter's
downfall, their nefarious conduct would still be
insignificant. This is so since the HC (both the
preliminary and formal investigation), the CRAB, and the
Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body are collegial
bodies. Hence, the claim that the proceedings/hearings
conducted were merely a farce because the three
personalities participated therein is tantamount to
implying the existence of a conspiracy, distrusting the
competence, independence, and
integrity of the other members who constituted the
majority. Again, in the absence of specifics and
substantial evidence, the Court cannot easily give
credence to this baseless insinuation.
As to the HC executive session/chambering –
Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular
administrative hearing in the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia
because two voting rounds took place. After the result of
the secret balloting, Cadet 1 CL Mogol ordered the
voting members to go to a room without the cadet
recorders. Therein, the lone dissenter, Cadet lCL Lagura,
was asked to explain his "not guilty" vote. Pressured to
change his vote, he was made to cast a new one finding
Cadet 1 CL Cudia guilty. The original ballot was
discarded and replaced. There was no record of the
change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0 that was mentioned in the
HC formal report.
The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada executed
on March 6, 2014 was submitted by petitioners since he
purportedly recalled Cadet 1 CL Lagura telling him that
he was pressured to change his "not guilty" vote after the
voting members were "chambered." In the sworn
statement, Commander Tabuada said:
1. That after CDT lCL CUDIA [was] convicted for honor
violation, I [cannot] remember exactly the date but
sometime in the morning of 23rd or 24th of January 2014
, I was in my office filling up forms for the renewal of my
passport, CDT 1CL LAGURA entered and had business
with my staff;
2. When he was about to leave I called him. "Lags,
halika muna dito," and he approached me and I let him
sit down on the chair in front of my table. I told and asked
him, "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah ... ano ha ang
nangyari? Mag-Tagalog or mag-Bisaya ka." He replied, "
Talagang NOT GUILTY ang vote ko sa kanya sir", and I
asked him, "Oh, bakit naging guilty di ha pag may isang
nag NOT GUILTY, abswelto na? He replied "Chinamber
ako sir, bale pinapa-justify kung bakit NOT GUILTY vote
ko, at na-pressure din ako sir kaya binago ko, sir." So, I
told him, "Sayang sya, matalino at mabait pa naman"
and he replied "oo nga sir". After that conversation, I let
him go.194
It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion
when it committed voting manipulation since, under the
rules, it is required to have a unanimous nine (9) votes
finding an accused cadet guilty. There is nothing in the
procedure that permits the HC Chairman to order the "
chambering" of a member who voted contrary to the
majority and subjects him or her to reconsider in order to
reflect a unanimous vote. Neither is there an order from
the Chief of Staff or the President sanctioning the HC
procedure or approving any change therein pursuant to
Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1. The HC, the CRAB,
and the PMA violated their own rules and principles as
embodied in the Honor Code. Being a clear deviation
from the established procedures, the second deliberation
should be considered null and void.
Petitioners further contend that the requirement of
unanimous vote involves a substantive right which
cannot be unceremoniously changed without a
corresponding amendment/revision in the Honor Code
and Honor System Handbook. In their view, "chambering
" totally defeats the purpose of voting by secret ballot as
it glaringly destroys the very essence and philosophy
behind the provisions of the Honor System, which is to
ensure that the voting member is free to vote what is in
his or her heart and mind and that no one can pressure
or persuade another to change his or her vote. They
suggest that if one voting member acquits an accused
cadet who is obviously guilty of the offense, the solution
is to remove him or her from the HC through the vote of
non-confidence as provided for in the Honor Code.195
 Anent the above arguments, respondents contend that a
distinction must be made between the concepts of the
Honor Code and the Honor System. According to them,
the former sets the standard for a cadet's, minimum
ethical and moral behavior and does not change, while
the latter is a set of rules for the conduct of the
observance and implementation of the· Honor Code and
may undergo necessary adjustments as may be
warranted by the incumbent members of the HC in order
to be more responsive to the moral training and
character development of the cadets. The HC may
provide guidelines when the Honor System can be used
to supplement regulations. This being so, the voting
process is continuously subject to change.
Respondents note that, historically, a non-unanimous
guilty verdict automatically acquits a cadet from the
charge of Honor violation. The voting members only write
either "guilty" or "not guilty" in the voting sheets without
stating their name or their justification. However, this
situation drew criticisms since there were instances
where a reported cadet already admitted his honor
violation but was acquitted due to the lone vote of a
sympathetic voting member.
In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the HC adopted an
existing practice that should the voting result in 7-2 or 8-1
the HC would automatically sanction a jury type of
discussion called "executive session" or "chambering,"
which is intended to elicit the explanation and insights of
the voting member/s. This prevents the tyranny of the
minority or lone dissenter from prevailing over the
manifest proof of guilt. The assailed voting practice has
been adopted and widely accepted by the PMA Siklab
Diwa Class of 2014 since their first year in the Academy.
The allegations of conspiracy and sham trial are,
therefore, negated by the fact that such practice was in
place and applied to all cases of honor violations, not
solely to the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia.
It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to
change vote rests solely on the personal conviction of
the dissenter/s, without any compulsion from the other
voting members. There can also be no pressuring to
change one's vote to speak of since a vote may only be
considered as final when the Presiding Officer has
affixed his signature.
To debunk Commander Tabuada's statements,
respondents raise the argument that the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body summoned Cadet 1 CL Lagura
for inquiry. Aside from his oral testimony made under
oath, he submitted to the Board/Body an affidavit
explaining that:
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to
the Department of Naval Warfare to ask permission if it is
possible not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I
will be attending our baseball game outside the
Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and
when I was about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE
B T ABU ADA PN, our Head Department Naval Warfare
Officer, called my attention. I approached him and he
said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang
nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer because of
the confidentiality of the Honor Committee proceedings.
He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito,
alam ko naman na bawal magsabi." Then I answered: "
Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding
Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber.
Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote
ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila
Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan ako.
Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir."
He replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga
sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino."196
Cadet 1 CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-
Affidavit executed on March 12, 2014, which he
submitted before the CHR wherein he attested to the
following:
3. I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor
Committee for Honor Code violation committed by Cadet
Cudia, for "lying". As a voting member, we are the one
who assess or investigate the case whether the reported
Cadet is Guilty for his actions or not.
4. I was the only one who INITIALLY voted "NOT
GUILTY" among the nine (9) voting members of the
Honor Committee in the case of Cdt Cudia for Lying.
5. I initially voted "NOT GUILTY" for the reason that after
the proceedings and before the presiding Officer told the
members to vote, I was confused of the case of Cadet
Cudia. I have gathered some facts from the investigation
to make my decision but for me it is not yet enough to
give my verdict of guilty to Cdt Cudia so I decided to vote
"NOT GUILTY" with a reservation in my mind that we will
still be discussing our verdicts if we will arrive at 8-1 or 7-
2. Thus, I can still change my vote if I may be
enlightened with the other's justifications.
6. After the votes were collected, the Presiding Officer
told us that the vote is 8 for guilty and 1 for not guilty. By
way of practice and as I predicted, we were told to go
inside the anteroom for executive meeting and to discuss
our respective justifications. I have been a member for
two (2) years and the voting committee will always go for
executive meeting whenever it will meet 8-1 or 7-2 votes.
7. I listened to them and they listened to me, then I saw
things that enlightened my confusions that time. I gave a
thumbs-up sign and asked for another sheet of voting
paper. I then changed my vote from "NOT GUILTY" to "
GUILTY" and the voting members of the Honor
Committee came up with the final vote of nine (9) votes
for guilty and zero (0) votes for not guilty.
9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told
that the verdict was GUILTY of LYING. After that, all
persons inside the courtroom went back to barracks.
10. Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was
approached by Cdt Jocson and Cdt Cudia, inquiring and
said: "Bakit ka naman nagpalit ng boto? ., I answered: "
Nasa process yan, may mali talaga sa rason mo." They
also asked who were inside the Chamber and I
mentioned only Cdt Arlegui and Cdt Mogol. That was the
last time that Cdt Cudia and Cdt Jocson talked to me.
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to
the Department of Naval Warfare to asked (sic)
permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy duty for
the reason that I will be attending our baseball game
outside the Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and
when I was about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE
B TABUADA PN, our Head Department Naval Warfare
Officer, called my attention. I approached him and he
said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang
nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer because of
the confidentiality of the Honor Committee proceedings.
He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito,
alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. " Then I answered: "
Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung} Presiding
Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamher.
Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote
ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila
Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan aka.
Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir. "
He replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga
sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino. "197
Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very
fact that Cadet 1 CL Lagura, as the lone dissenter, was
made to explain in the presence of other HC members,
who were in disagreement with him, gives a semblance
of intimidation, force, or pressure. For them, the records
of the HC proceedings, which were not presented
assuming they actually exist, could have been the best
way to ensure that he was free to express his views,
reject the opinion of the majority, and stick to his decision
. Also, it was pointed out that Cadet 1 CL Lagura failed to
clearly explain in his affidavit why he initially found Cadet
1 CL Cudia "not guilty" and what made him change his
mind. His use of general statements like he "was
confused of the case " and "saw things that enlightened
my confusions " could hardly suffice to establish why he
changed his vote. Finally, petitioners note the admission
of ·Cadet 1 CL Lagura during the CHR investigation that
he was the only one who was given another ballot sheet
while in the chamber
and that he accomplished it in the barracks which he
only submitted the following day. However, as the CHR
found, the announcement of the 9-0 vote was done
immediately after the HC came out from the chamber
and before Cadet 1 CL Lagura submitted his
accomplished ballot sheet.
We rule for respondents.
As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the
Honor Code tersely provides:
After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the
presiding member of the Board will call for the members
to vote whether the accused is GUILTY or NOT GUILTY.
A unanimous vote (9 votes) of GUILTY decides that a
cadet is found guilty of violating the Honor Code.198
From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that
the HC practice of conducting "executive session" or "
chambering" is not at all prohibited. The HC is given
leeway on the voting procedures in' actual cases taking
into account the exigency of the times. What is important
is that, in the end, there must be a unanimous nine votes
in order to hold a cadet guilty of violating the Honor Code
.
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC violated its
written procedure,199 We still rule that there is nothing
inherently wrong with the practice of "chambering"
considering that the presence of intimidation or force
cannot automatically be inferred therefrom. The essence
of secret balloting and the freedom to vote based on
what is in the heart and mind of the voting member is not
necessarily diluted by the fact that a second/final voting
was conducted. As explained by Cadet 1CL Mogol
before the CRAB:
13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his
side and insights regarding the case at hand. The other
members, on the other hand, would be given the chance
to explain their votes as well as their insights to the
dissenting voter. The decision to change the vote of the
dissenting voter rests solely on his personal conviction.
Thus, if he [or she] opted not to change his/her vote
despite the discussion, his [or her] vote is accorded
respect by the Honor Committee.200
It is elementary that intimidation or force is never
presumed. Mere allegation is definitely not evidence.
1âwphi1 It must be substantiated and proved because a
person is presumed to be innocent of a crime or wrong
and that official duty has been regularly performed.201
The oral and written statements of Cadet 1 CL Lagura
should settle the issue. Before the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body and the CHR, he consistently
denied that he was pressured by the other voting
members of the HC. His representation must be
accepted as it is regardless of whether he has
satisfactorily elaborated his decision to change his vote.
Being the one who was "chambered," he is more
credible to clarify the issue. In case of doubt, We have to
rely on the faith that Cadet 1 CL Lagura observed the
Honor Code, which clearly states that every cadet must
be his or her own Final'
Authority in honor; that he or she should not let other
cadets dictate on him or her their sense of honor.202
 Moreover, the Code implies that any person can have
confidence that a cadet and any graduate of the PMA will
be fair and just in dealing with him; that his actions,
words and ways are sincere and true.203
As to the other alleged "irregularities" committed such as
not putting on record the initial/first voting and Cadet 1CL
Lagura's bringing of his ballot sheet to and
accomplishing it in the barracks, the Court shall no
longer dwell on the same for being harmless procedural
errors that do not materially affect the validity of the HC
proceedings.
Cadet 1 CL Cudia 's alleged untruthful statements
Petitioners insist that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not lie.
According to them, there is no clear time reference as to
when was the actual dismissal or what was the exact
time of dismissal - whether it should be the dismissal
inside the room or the dismissal after the section grade
was given by Dr. Costales -in the minds of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and the HC investigators and
voting members. They claim that during long
examinations, the time of dismissal was usually five
minutes before the class was set to end and the protocol
of dismissing the class 15 minutes earlier was not
observed. When Maj. Hindang stated in accusatory
language that Cadet 1 CL Cudia perverted the truth by
stating that OR432 class ended at 1500H, he did not
state what was the true time of dismissal. He did not
mention whether the truth he was relying on was 5 or 15
minutes before the scheduled end of class.
It is also averred that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's only business
was to ask Dr. Costales a query such that his business
was already finished as soon as she gave an answer.
However, a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales,
which is, Cadet 1 CL Cudia must stay and wait for the
section grade. At that point in time, he was no longer in
control of the circumstances. Petitioners claim that Dr.
Costales never categorically stated that Cadet lCL Cudia
was lying. She recognized the confusion. Her text
messages to him clarified his alleged violation. Also, the
CHR noted during its investigation that she could not
exactly recall what happened in her class on November
14, 2013.
Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when
respondents stated that ENG412 class started at 3:05 p.
m., it proves that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously not
late. If, as indicated in his Delinquency Report, he was
late two (2) minutes in his 1500-1600H class in ENG 412
, he must have arrived 3:02 p.m. Respondents, however,
claim that the class started at 3:05 p.m. Thus, Cadet 1
CL Cudia was not late.
Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report,
petitioners were of the view that what appears to have
caused confusion in the minds of respondents is just a
matter of semantics; that the entire incident was a
product of inaccuracy, not lying. It is malicious for them
to insinuate that Cadet 1 CL Cudia purposely used
incorrect language to hide the truth. Citing Merriam
Webster's Dictionary, petitioners argue that
"dismiss" means to permit or cause to leave, while "class
" refers to a body of students meeting regularly to study
the same subject. According to them, these two words
do not have definite and precise meanings but are
generic terms. Other than the words "class" and "dismiss
" used by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, which may actually be used
in their generic sense, there is nothing deceiving about
what he said. Thus, the answer he chose might be wrong
or not correct, but it is not false or not true.
For petitioners, Cadet lCL Cudia's explanations are
evidently truthful and with no intent to deceive or mislead.
He did not manipulate any fact and was truthful of his
explanation. His .. statements were clear and
unambiguous but were given a narrow-minded
interpretation. Even the Honor Code acknowledges that
"[e]xperience demonstrates that human communication
is imperfect at best, and some actions are often
misinterpreted."
Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
transcript of records reflects not only his outstanding
academic performance but proves his good conduct
during his four-year stay in the Academy. He has above-
average grades in Conduct, with grades ranging from 96
to 100 in Conduct I to XI. His propensity to lie is,
therefore, far from the truth.
On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to
contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously quibbling,
which, in the military parlance, is tantamount to lying. He
fell short in telling a simple truth. He lied by making
untruthful statements in his written explanation.
Respondents want Us to consider the following:
First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During
the formal investigation, Dr. Costales testified that a
class is dismissed as long as the instructor is not there
and the bell has rung. In cases of lesson examinations (
LE), cadets are dismissed from the time they have
answered their respective LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia
stated in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted
Punishment, "We had an LE that day (14 November
2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I
stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my
instructor, Ms. Costales. xxx" Clearly, at the time Cadet
Cudia submitted his papers, he was already considered
dismissed. Thus, he cannot claim that his [OR432] class
ended at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H) or "a bit late."
Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the
circumstances leading to his tardiness. After submitting
his paper, Cadet Cudia is free to leave and attend his
next class. However, he initiated a conversation with Dr.
Costales regarding their grades. He was not under
instruction by Dr. Costales to stay beyond the period of
her class.
Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body, Dr. Costales clarified her
statements in her written explanation. She explained that
the "instruction to wait" is a response to Cadet Cudia' s
request and that it was not her initiated instruction.
Clearly, there was no directive from Dr. Costales for
Cadet Cudia and the other
cadets to stay. On the contrary, it was them who wanted
to meet with the instructor. Third, contrary to Cadet
Cudia's explanation, his subsequent class, ENG412, did
not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H). In the
informal review conducted by the HTG to check the
findings of the HC, Professor Berong confirmed that her
English class started as scheduled (3:05 in the afternoon,
or 1505H) and not earlier. Cadet 1 CL Barrawed, the
acting class marcher of ENG412 also testified that their
class started as scheduled (3 :05 in the afternoon, or
1505) and not earlier.204
Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia had no intention to mislead or deceive
but merely used wrong and unfitting words in his
explanations. For them, considering his academic
standing, it is highly improbable that he used incorrect
language to justify his mistake. Respondents' arguments
are tenable.
The issue of whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed lying
is an issue of fact. Unfortunately for petitioners, the Court
, not being a trier of facts, cannot pass upon factual
matters as it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh
again the evidence considered in the proceedings below.
Moreover, We reiterate the long standing rule that factual
findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily
accorded respect if not finality by the Court. In this case,
as shown in the previous discussions, there is no
evidence that the findings of the investigating and
reviewing bodies below are not supported by evidence or
vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; that the
procedure which led to the findings is irregular; that
palpable errors were committed; or that a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.
With respect to the core issue of whether lying is present
in this case, all investigating and reviewing bodies are in
consonance in holding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth
and in fact lied.
For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement
some points.
As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet
Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines (CCAFP) states: "
We, the Cadets, do not lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate
among us those who do. "
The First Tenet of the Honor-Code is "We do not lie. "
Cadets violate the Honor Code by lying if they make an
oral or written statement which is contrary to what is true
or use doubtful information with the intent to deceive or
mislead.205 It is expected that every cadet's word is
accepted without challenge on its truthfulness; that it is
true without qualification; and that the cadets must
answer directly, completely and truthfully even though
the answer may result in punitive action under the CCPB
and CCAFPR.206
To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December
8, 2013, Cadet 1 CL Cudia justified that: "I came directly
from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our
instructor Sir." Subsequently, in his Request for
Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Leander,
he reasoned out as follows:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the
circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and
our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H
also. Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my next
class without any intention of being late Sir.207
In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed quibbling; hence, he lied in
violation of the Honor Code.
Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "
Quibbling" has been defined in one U.S. case as follows:
A person can easily create a false impression in the mind
of his listener by cleverly wording what he says, omitting
relevant facts, or telling a partial truth. When he
knowingly does so with the intent to deceive or mislead,
he is quibbling. Because it is an intentional deception,
quibbling is a form of lying.208
The above definition can be applied in the instant case.
Here, instead of directly and completely telling the cause
of his being late in the ENG412 class of Prof. Berong,
Cadet 1 CL Cudia chose to omit relevant facts, thereby,
telling a half-truth.
The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to
have committed an honor violation are:
1. The act and/or omission, and
2. The intent pertinent to it.
Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the
Honor Code, but intent to commit or omit the act itself.
209
The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer
unequivocally are:
1. Do I intend to deceive?
2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?
If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she
is doing the honorable thing.210
Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of
direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts,
and therefore, can only be proved by unguarded
expressions, conduct and circumstances generally.211
 In this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia's intent to deceive is
manifested from the very act of capitalizing on the use of
the words "dismiss" and "class." The truth of the matter
is that the ordinary usage of these two terms, in the
context of an educational institution, does not correspond
to what Cadet 1 CL Cudia is trying to make it appear. In
that sense, the words are not generic and have definite
and precise meaning.
By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1 CL Cudia,
Miranda, Arcangel, and Narciso already constitute a "
class." The Court cannot agree that such term includes "
every transaction and communication a teacher does
with her students." Clearly, it does not take too much
intelligence to conclude that Cadet 1 CL Cudia should
have been accurate by
pinpointing who were with him when he was late in the
next class. His deceptive explanation is made more
obvious when compared with what Cadets 1 CL
Archangel and Narciso wrote in their DR explanation,
which was: "We approached our instructor after our class
."212
Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal
on November 14, 2013 was five or fifteen minutes ahead
of the scheduled end of class. Worth noting is that even
Dr. Costales, who stood as a witness for Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, consistently admitted before the HC, the Fact-
Finding Board/Investigating Body, and the CHR that he
was already dismissed when he passed his LE paper.
213 During the hearing of the Board/Body, she also
declared that she merely responded to his request to see
the results of the UE 1 and that she had reservations on
the phrases "under my instruction" and "dismissed a bit
late" used in his letter of explanation to the HC. In
addition, Dr. Costales manifested her view before the
CHR that the act of Cadet 1 CL Cudia of inquiring about
his grade outside their classroom after he submitted his
LE paper is not part of the class time because the
consultation, being cadet-initiated, is voluntary.214
 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a new
business was initiated by Dr. Costales when Cadet 1 CL
Cudia was asked to stay and wait for the section grade,
still, this does not acquit him. Given such situation, a
responsible cadet who is fully aware of the time
constraint has the last say, that is, to politely decline the
invitation and immediately go to the next class. This was
not done by Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Thus, it cannot be said
that he already lost control over the circumstances.
It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1 CL Cudia
cunningly chose words which led to confusion in the
minds of respondents and eventually commenced the
HC inquiry. His case is not just a matter of semantics
and a product of plain and simple inaccuracy. There is
manipulation of facts and presentation of untruthful
explanation constitutive of Honor Code violation.
Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1 CL
Cudia .. While his Transcript of Records (TOR) may
reflect not only his outstanding academic performance
but his excellent grade in subjects on Conduct during his
four-year stay in the PMA,215 it does not necessarily
follow that he is innocent of the offense charged. It is
enough to say that "evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that
he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another
time."216 While the TOR may be received to prove his
identity or habit as an exceptional PMA student, it does
not show his specific intent, plan, or scheme as cadet
accused of committing a specific Honor Code violation.
Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment
Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code
warrants separation of the guilty cadet from the cadet
corps. Under the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the
Philippines Regulation (CCAFPR), a violation of the
Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave (Class 1)
delinquency which merits a recommendation
for a cadet's dismissal from the PMA Superintendent.
The same is likewise clear from the Honor Code and
Honor System Handbook. Cadet 1 CL Cudia is, therefore
, presumed to know that the Honor Code does not
accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses. There
is no difference between a little lie and a huge falsehood.
Respondents emphasize that the Honor Code has
always been considered as an absolute yardstick against
which cadets have measured themselves ever since the
PMA began and that the Honor Code and System seek
to assure that only those who are able to meet the high
standards of integrity and honor are produced by the
PMA. As held in Andrews, it is constitutionally
permissible for the military "to set and enforce
uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics. "
Thus, in violating the Honor Code, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
forfeits his privilege to graduate from the PMA.
On their part, petitioners concede that if it is proven that
a cadet breached the Honor Code, the offense warrants
his or her dismissal since such a policy may be the only
means to maintain and uphold the spirit of integrity in the
military.217 They maintain though that in Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's case there is no need to distinguish between a "
little lie" and a "huge falsehood" since he did not lie at all.
Absent any intent to deceive and to take undue
advantage, the penalty imposed on him is considered as
unjust and cruel. Under the circumstances obtaining in
this case, the penalty of dismissal is not commensurate
to the fact that he is a graduating cadet with honors and
what he allegedly committed does not amount to an
academic deficiency or an intentional and flagrant
violation of the PMA non-academic rules and regulations.
Citing Non, petitioners argue that the penalty imposed
must be proportionate to the offense. Further, lsabelo, Jr.
is squarely applicable to the facts of the case. Cadet 1
CL Cudia was deprived of his right to education, the only
means by which he may have a secure life and future.
Considering Our finding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth
and in fact lied and his acceptance that violation of the
Honor Code warrants the ultimate penalty of dismissal
from the PMA, there is actually no more dispute to
resolve. Indeed, the sanction is clearly set forth and
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, by contract, risked this when he
entered the Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in
Andrews219 wherein it was held that, while the penalty is
severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary,
and, therefore, not in violation of due process. It quoted
the disposition of the district court, thus:
The fact that a cadet will be separated from the
Academy upon a finding that he has violated the Honor
Code is known to all cadets even prior to the beginning
of their careers there. The finding of a Code violation by
hypothesis includes a finding of scienter on the part of
the offender. While separation is admittedly a drastic and
tragic consequence of a cadet's transgression, it is not
an unconstitutionally arbitrary one, but rather a
reasonable albeit severe method of preventing men who
have suffered ethical lapses from becoming career
officers. That a policy of admonitions or lesser penalties
for single violations might be more compassionate --or
even more
effective in achieving the intended result --is quite
immaterial to the question of whether the harsher penalty
violates due process.220
Nature of the CHR Findings
Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on
the CHR's recommendations. The CHR, they note, is a
constitutional body mandated by the 1987 Constitution to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights, and to conduct investigative
monitoring of economic, social, and cultural rights,
particularly of vulnerable sectors of society. Further, it
was contended that the results of CHR's investigation
and recommendations are so persuasive that this Court,
on several occasions like in the cases of Cruz v. Sec. of
Environment & Natural Resources221 and Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections,222 gave its
findings serious consideration. It is not, therefore, too
late for the Court to hear what an independent and
unbiased fact-finding body has to say on the case.
In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr. v.
Commission on Human Rights223 ruled that the CHR is
merely a recommendatory body that is not empowered to
arrive at a conclusive determination of any controversy.
We are in accord with respondents.
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the
CHR are merely recommendatory and, therefore, not
binding to this Court. The reason is that the CHR's
constitutional mandate extends only to the investigation
of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights.224 As held in Cariño v. Commission on
Human Rights225and a number of subsequent cases,
226 the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of
justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not empowered to
adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or
controversies. The power to investigate is not the same
as adjudication:
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in
the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.
e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
xxxx
[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine AFP Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on the
causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies enlistment and reenlistment in the APP Regular Force,
do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. provides under Section 14 (b) thereof that priority shall
Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these be given to, among others, the ex-PMA or PAFFFS
terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. cadets.227 If the positions open does not appeal to his
interest for being way below the rank he could
"Investigate, "commonly understood, means to examine,
explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on,
study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to
search or inquire into: x x x to subject to an official probe
x x x: to conduct an official inquiry;" The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to
learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated
is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by
application of the law to the facts established by the
inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the

same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a
legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "
investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily
does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257;
xx x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery
and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or
matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means

to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve,
rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to
settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a
court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass
judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge." And "
adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or
with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant
judicially in a case of controversy x x x."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the

exercise of judicial authority.1âwphi1 To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"
and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. xx Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment. "226

All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and

exemplary damages in accordance with Articles 19, 2217
, 2219 and 2229 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA did not effectively
deprive him of a future. Cliche though it may sound,
being a PMA graduate is not the "be-all and end-all" of
his existence. A cadet separated from the PMA may still
continue to pursue military or civilian career elsewhere
without suffering the stigma attached to his or her
dismissal. For one, as suggested by respondents, DND-
have achieved as a PMA graduate, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
could still practice other equally noble profession or
calling that is best suited to his credentials, competence,
and potential. Definitely, nobody can deprive him of that
choice.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of

Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the Philippine
Military Academy is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.