roundtable  •  india and china at sea

China’s Emerging Indo-Pacific Naval Strategy

You Ji

A lthough China has not formally put forward an Indo-Pacific naval

strategy, the new national defense strategy of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA), Fighting Regional Informatized War, has changed the strategy
of the PLA Navy (PLAN) from focusing on one ocean (the Pacific) to
focusing on two oceans (the Pacific and Indian). As part of its mission in the
far seas, the PLAN will require new blue water capabilities in the medium
to long term. In short, the Indian Ocean is becoming a linchpin for China’s
new global naval reach. This essay argues that China is developing its
military strategy for the Indian Ocean to protect and defend its economic
and security interests in those waters. As a result, China’s maritime presence
there will only increase over time.

The Indian Ocean and the Nexus of PLA and PLAN Strategies
China’s national defense strategy assists the navy in setting service
missions, development goals, and combat engagement rules. This paper
includes just one conceptual guideline to shed light on PLAN activities in
the Indian Ocean.1
China’s sixth national defense strategy, first adopted in 2004 and
updated in 2015, introduced a new concept of “frontier defense, which
enriched the original strategy and has immediate relevance to PLAN
expansion.” This does not refer merely to defense of China’s geographic
boundaries but also to protection of its new open-ended frontiers of
national and economic security interests. It heavily factors in potential
hostile scenarios against China’s sea lines of communication (SLOC)
through the Indian Ocean. Frontier defense entails efforts to both establish
a forward naval presence and develop the long-range power-projection
capabilities to sustain such a presence. This concept departs from the
PLA’s time-honored continental mentality in war planning that had
dominated previous defense strategies and favored the role of the army

you ji is a Professor and Head of the Department of Government and Public Administration at the
University of Macau. He can be reached at <jiyou@umac.mo>.

1 Strategic Research Department of the PLA Academy of Military Science, Zhanluexu [The Science
of Military Strategy] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 2013), 206.

[ 11 ]
 asia policy

in the overall force structure. Although the PLA continues to maintain

its homeland-based defense posture, frontier defense requires it to extend
warfighting into the global commons as a way to enlarge China’s strategic
space. This requires the projection of new “play Go” posturing and the
establishment of multidimensional war zones, including outer space and
cyberspace. 2 A primary pillar for frontier defense involves the PLAN’s
capabilities for far-sea operations against a major sea power, and increasing
the PLAN’s effective combat reach into the Indian Ocean has been set as
a capability criterion and medium-term objective. This is a consequence
of Xi Jinping’s One Belt, One Road initiative to increase connectivity to
Europe through a northern land route and to Africa through a southern
maritime corridor connecting China with the Middle East, which places a
greater onus on the PLAN to protect China’s SLOCs.
Another important nexus between China’s national defense strategy
and naval strategy is the PLA’s two “1.5 war” doctrines. With the prospect of
a land war disappearing, the country’s security gravity has shifted from the
western and northern land borders to the eastern coastal flank. If the PLA
is dragged into a full maritime conflict in the East and South China Seas
with the United States and Japan, India may take advantage by encroaching
farther across the disputed Sino-Indian land borders. This is the first 1.5 war
scenario.3 The second scenario also involves India. If a sizeable maritime
war erupts in East Asia, the Indian Navy may be called on to disrupt China’s
SLOCs in the Indian Ocean in order to both strengthen India’s position in
the Sino-Indian border dispute and help U.S. operations in the Pacific. Both
scenarios regard India as a potential threat. In response, the PLA’s frontier
defense would inevitably require the PLAN to expand its one-ocean strategy
into a two-ocean strategy (the western Pacific Ocean plus the northern
Indian Ocean) and thus extend its naval combat reach into the Indian
Ocean rim.

The Indian Ocean in the PLAN’s Naval War Scenario

The PLAN’s doctrinal evolution has seen several major adjustments since
1987, each expanding its range of activities toward the far seas. Chinese naval
strategy originally focused on Taiwan and waters around the island. The first

2 Go is a traditional Chinese board game played by two people. The winner is the player who
acquires the largest area on the board. Placing stones in favorable places at the beginning of the
game maximizes one’s posture.
3 You Ji, “The Chinese Navy, Its Regional Power and Global Reach,” Strategic Analysis 36, no. 3
(2012): 477–88.

[ 12 ]
 roundtable  •  india and china at sea

revision in the early 2000s added the “line” (SLOCs) of ten thousand nautical
miles to the “point” (Taiwan) to prepare for naval warfare. A further revision
was the emphasis on naval operations to deal with maritime territorial
conflicts, especially in the South China Sea. The 1,500-kilometer distance from
the PLAN’s home bases to the Spratly Islands poses a substantial challenge
to its expansion of capabilities. When General Liu Huaqing, considered to
be the father of the modern Chinese navy, first raised his blue water strategy
in the early 1980s, the Spratlys dispute was subdued. Now, however, a naval
confrontation in the East and South China Seas rates as the most likely among
the four war scenarios envisaged by the PLA.4
These revisions have provided new doctrinal and equipment guidance
that extends the PLAN’s combat reach on a long SLOC line. To put it
another way, the PLAN’s war preparation radiates from the near seas (the
western Pacific) to the intermediate seas (the South China Sea) to the far
seas (the Indian Ocean). Each area requires particular combat tactics, arms,
and diplomatic endeavors. The near seas are of paramount importance
because they are the doorsteps to China’s most dynamic political and
economic centers. The concept of the far seas injects a new element into
the PLAN strategy—namely, protection of China’s commercial and energy
transportation. If the concept of the near seas is about the PLAN’s defensive
depth and maneuvering space, the far seas refer to China’s eighteen
thousand nautical miles of SLOCs from Western Africa through the Indian
Ocean, the Malacca Strait, and the South China Sea to the Chinese ports
in Guangzhou and Shanghai. Between the near seas and the far seas is
another “war zone,” namely, the intermediate seas (zhongjian haiyu). This
area incorporates the Spratlys in the south and large areas between the first
and second island chains in the west. The intermediate seas are an evolving
concept. For a long time, the area around the Spratlys was regarded as the
remote seas, as one thousand nautical miles was far beyond the PLAN’s
effective range of air cover. With the rapid growth of expeditionary power,
however, the PLAN may now have the confidence to launch sustained
sea-control campaigns in the South China Sea vis-a-vis other claimants.
The consolidation of the PLAN’s presence in the South China Sea is also
a stepping stone for its expansion into the Indian Ocean and is closely

4 Strategic Research Department of the PLA Academy of Military Science, Zhanluexu, 62.

[ 13 ]
 asia policy

linked to SLOC warfare within that region. The emergence of China’s own
Indo-Pacific doctrine is inevitable.5
Xi’s One Belt, One Road initiative is geostrategic in nature, as
economic security is at the core of this new national security concept. 6 If
realized, it would reshape a significant portion of the global geoeconomic
order. Military aspects of the initiative address China’s economic security
challenges, such as the need to secure stable oil supplies and the safety of
SLOCs. China’s ambitions are being implemented in phases: economics first,
to be supplemented by a naval presence or access. At this stage, such efforts
involve safeguarding China’s commercial interests. PLA strategists have
urged the leadership to lay down an effective SLOC strategy as a response
to U.S. president Barack Obama’s criticism of China for free riding on U.S.
efforts to safeguard global waterways.7 When China provides public goods
to assist in regional economic development, it also needs to contribute to the
protection of global trade routes. 8 This is a reverse of the Mahanist idea of
commercial ships following the warships.
Xi’s One Belt, One Road blueprint has set the geostrategic scope of the
PLAN’s mission in the Indo-Pacific and is thus being structured into the
navy’s two-ocean strategy. The idea has renewed discussion among PLA
analysts about the necessity of erecting a “pearl chain” toward the Indian
Ocean and beyond. This concept is different from the so-called string of
pearls strategy. The former is mainly about securing logistical support
points for increasingly larger numbers of PLAN vessels passing through
the region, whereas the latter is more combat-oriented with strategic naval
and air force deployed for sizeable blue water operations. Certainly the
line between the two concepts is thin, and the PLA could transcend the
former into the latter in the future, but this is not an easy change given
the factors against China’s military presence in the Indian Ocean rim. So
far, no PLAN bases have been found in the places that are supposed to
constitute the pearls.9 Yet with the One Belt, One Road initiative, Beijing

5 You Ji, China’s Military Transformation: Politics and War Preparation (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2016), 186.
6 You Ji, “China’s National Security Commission: Theory, Evolution, and Operations,” Journal of
Contemporary China 25, no. 98 (2016): 178–96.
7 Bree Feng, “President Obama’s ‘Free Rider’ Comments Draws Chinese Criticism,” New York
Times, Sinosphere, August 13, 2014 u http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/
obamas-free-rider-comment-draws-chinese-criticism.
8 Yin Gang, televised interview, New Horizon, Yunnan TV, November 16, 2014.
9 Ashley Townshend, “Unraveling China’s ‘String of Pearls,’ ” YaleGlobal, September 16, 2011.

[ 14 ]
 roundtable  •  india and china at sea

has finally revised its long-term policy of having no overseas bases and has
begun seeking overseas footholds.

An Emerging Sino-U.S. Naval Battlefield in the Indo-Pacific

As China rises and the PLAN takes on more responsibilities in the far
seas beyond its traditional zones, advocacy of the “Indo-Pacific” by some
Australian strategists has gained greater currency.10 The U.S. pivot to Asia
aligns operational guidance on the air-sea battle (ASB) doctrine with
war planning in the Indo-Pacific battlefield. The enhanced U.S. challenge
to China’s claims in the South China Sea raises the possibility of a direct
confrontation between the two nuclear powers. This has been the biggest
danger of South China Sea militarization, and both sides are preparing for
this worst-case scenario. The Indian Ocean rim will be the next zone where
Sino-U.S. geostrategic interaction steps up.
In the PLA’s map, the United States rebalance has reshaped the
traditional first and second island chains into Indo-Pacific island chains.
The first chain begins on the Korean Peninsula and extends through Japan,
Taiwan, and the Philippines, all the way to Southeast Asia and the Indian
Ocean, and eventually ends in West Africa. Centered in Guam, the second
Indo-Pacific chain extends northward and southward in a horizontal
S-shape encirclement from Alaska in the east to the outer edge of the
western Pacific to meet China’s first island chain via the South China Sea
before expanding to the Indian Ocean.11 The U.S. pivot is being carried out
through hard-power initiatives to redress the power imbalance between
the Philippines, Vietnam, and China and through U.S. naval and air force
access to Singapore and the Philippines.12
The Pentagon’s rekindling of the island-chain strategy is partially a
response to the increase in PLAN sailings through Indo-Pacific chokepoints.
To the PLAN, however, the strategy is seen as an offensive move, translating
the ASB doctrine into war planning.13 ASB is conceptualized as an effective
way for the United States to maintain its military edge against the PLA, but

10 Rory Medcalf, “Pivoting the Map: Australia’s Indo-Pacific System,” Strategic and Defence Studies
Centre, Australian National University, November 2012; and Chengxin Pan, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’
and Geopolitical Anxieties about China’s Rise in the Asian Regional Order,” Australian Journal of
International Affairs 68, no. 4 (2014): 453–69.
11 Li Li, televised interview, New Defense Watch, CCTV-7 Military Channel, August 31, 2013.
12 Michael McDevitt, “Options for U.S. Policy toward the South China Sea,” Pacific Forum CSIS,
PacNet, no. 81, November 20, 2014.
13 Andrew Krepinevich, “Why AirSea Battle?” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
February 2010.

[ 15 ]
 asia policy

the strategy’s effectiveness depends on new posturing, new basing facilities,

and new troop deployment. Matching forward deployment with geographic
convenience is indeed a cost-effective way to hedge against China’s naval
expansion. The new U.S. naval posture along the Indo-Pacific island chains
translates the island-chain concept into a combat doctrine.
U.S. SLOC operations around global waterways that are crucial to
Chinese trade may choke off China’s economic lifeline, as prescribed
by ASB guidance. A U.S. naval blockade of China has been projected not
only to cover narrow straits such as the Malacca Strait that connect the
two oceans around the South China Sea but also to extend farther south
to the important Chinese SLOC route to northern Australia. This new
U.S. posture is reflected in the strengthened U.S. force deployment along
the Indo-Pacific island chains. In July 2013, General Herbert Carlisle, chief
of the U.S. Air Force in the Pacific, revealed a plan to enhance the U.S.
forward presence in the Indo-Pacific, including the reopening of suspended
military bases, such as Saipan; regular troop visits to allies and partners
to secure semi-permanent basing facilities; and transfers of strategic and
tactical capabilities to locations close to Asian hot spots. In addition to the
U.S. Marine deployment in Darwin, the U.S. Air Force will send jets to
Changi in Singapore, Korat in Thailand, Trivandrum in India, bases at Cubi
Point and Puerto Princesa in the Philippines, and airfields in Indonesia
and Malaysia.14 PLA commanders see the United States as translating
geographically convenient island chains into air and naval containment
belts against China’s SLOCs and the PLAN’s westward and southward
movements.15 Indeed, they see this offensive pivot as reigniting a Cold War
island-chain strategy and mentality against China.

PLA Counterbalancing and Indo-Pacific Maneuvering

The United States’ efforts to militarize the island chains through its
own string of pearls strategy poses a grave threat to China. Once connected,
the strings will constitute oceanic frontiers that prohibit PLAN expansion,
erode the space the PLAN needs to maneuver beyond its inshore waters,
and put the safety of Chinese SLOCs at greater risk. Fully implemented,
the U.S. force deployment in the Indo-Pacific could thus strangle Chinese
economic lifelines in times of war. It confirms a long-held PLA concern that

14 John Reed, “U.S. Deploying Jets around Asia to Keep China Surrounded,” Foreign Policy, July 29, 2013.
15 Li Li, televised interview, New Defense Watch.

[ 16 ]
 roundtable  •  india and china at sea

U.S. forward basing along the islands chains worsens a natural geographic
constraint on the PLAN’s combat reach.16
The PLAN’s two-ocean strategy is a response to the rising pressure
of the U.S. military rebalance in Asia. The South China Sea is crucial for
China’s Indo-Pacific blueprint—not only because of the importance of
the oceanic straits for Chinese commercial and combat ships to reach
the Indian Ocean but also because maritime disputes may place China’s
westbound shipments at risk. The PLAN is reclaiming the Spratly Islands
to extend China’s strategic front-line defense 1,500 kilometers southward
to obtain precious early-warning time, defense depth, and enhanced
sovereignty positions. Moreover, a foothold in the Spratlys allows task
groups to stop over and resupply for long cross-ocean trips. Although a
foothold that is only 1,500 kilometers away from home bases may not be
qualitatively very helpful, it is better than not having any such position.
For instance, China is consolidating the airstrip at Woody Island in the
Paracel Islands to allow both cargo planes and J-11s to take off and land.
The island can also store supplies for future PLAN task groups passing
though the region. The Yongshu Reef (Fiery Cross Reef) and two other
islands in the Spratlys have been reclaimed for similar purposes, albeit
with the limitation of being accessible only to medium-sized transports
and helicopters. More strategically, the South China Sea is a designated
place where nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines will
conduct combat patrols.
Breaking the U.S. stranglehold on the Indo-Pacific has been identified
as the top goal of China’s own Indo-Pacific strategy, reflected by the frequent
passes through the eastward island chains. Westward combat training has
been mainly conducted within the South China Sea and not much beyond.
Since 2008, the PLAN has routinely sent ships to the Indian Ocean region
to participate in international counterpiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden
(having contributed to 24 missions so far), but it still rarely dispatches
warships to the Indian Ocean for independent missions (with only two or
three deployments a year). Yet the nature of these tasks has changed. The
sailings are now combat-geared, and shows of the flag have shifted from
sending individual or isolated ships to flotilla formations.

16 Jin Yinan, “National Reunification and National Sustainable Development,” Journal of the PLA
National Defence University, no. 12 (2002): 24.

[ 17 ]
 asia policy

Ultimately, China’s island-chain drills will assist its future carrier battle
group’s expeditionary missions, especially in the Indian Ocean rim.17 The
PLAN already has a medium-term sea-control strategy in the South China
Sea. From the very beginning, its Indian Ocean strategy has been oriented
toward selective sea denial through submarine warfare to disrupt SLOCs.
However, this strategy will shift over time to one that prioritizes selective
sea control in parts of the Indian Ocean that are vital to China’s SLOCs
when the PLAN’s carrier battle groups are capable of conducting sizeable
operations there. The nexus of China’s Indo-Pacific strategy and carrier
doctrine reflects the navy’s changed mindset on sea power, capability
improvement, and policy choices. The PLAN’s profound transition is most
vividly crystalized by its search for extended expeditionary capabilities.
A carrier-centric transformation captures a crucial change in PLAN
thinking—from “from the land” to “from the sea.”

The PLAN’s Indo-Pacific Expansion and Sino-Indian Relations

China’s Indo-Pacific strategy does not challenge India’s special
interests in the Indian Ocean, but it does reject the idea of the Indian Ocean
belonging to India. The PLAN’s two-ocean guidance only includes the
northern Indian Ocean, which the PLA believes to be necessary to protect
China’s key waterways.18 Civilian analysts draw an east-west line in the
middle of the ocean to express the Chinese understanding of India’s defense
concerns regarding the ocean. These analysts argue that China should not
be shy about projecting its SLOC activities in the eastern Indian Ocean but
should exercise caution in moving westward, especially for naval power
projection, as India will have greater sensitivities in the west. On the other
hand, in China’s view, India must be reminded that areas around Gwadar,
Chittagong, Hambantota, and Sittwe are not within India’s traditional
sphere of influence.19
While recognizing India’s special concerns in the Indian Ocean, PLA
analysts believe that the PLAN must share the responsibility of protecting
Indian Ocean SLOCs, given that New Delhi is not able to provide this public
good alone. This is not to challenge India, and perhaps there may even be
opportunities for China and India to share responsibilities on antipiracy,
prevention of human trafficking, and environmental protection. But in any

17 Zhang Zhaozhong, televised remarks, New Defense Observation, CCTV-7, December 20, 2014.
18 Strategic Research Department of the PLA Academy of Military Science, Zhanluexu, 16.
19 Yin Gang, televised interview, New Horizon.

[ 18 ]
 roundtable  •  india and china at sea

event, India gradually must get used to the PLAN’s expanding footprint in
the region. China regards it as inevitable that PLAN vessels will enter the
Indian Ocean regularly, and India will need to accept this new norm.
The PLA (not just the PLAN) has a long-term goal of acquiring overseas
bases to supply its naval expeditionary fleets to reach the Indian Ocean and
the South Pacific.20 This will not happen soon. Djibouti is merely a logistical
point, far from being a naval base, and geographically is still far away
from prescribed PLAN activities in the Indian Ocean. In the long term,
Djibouti will not be adequate, and the PLAN will require other facilities.
The PLA is making long-term preparations in a number of places. China
went to additional lengths to provide water aid to Maldives in November
2014. Pakistan has made Gwadar available as a naval logistical base, but
Beijing so far has not accepted the offer for diplomatic reasons. Now with
Xi’s One Belt, One Road policy in full swing, it is just a matter of time
before the PLAN opts to turn the port into a foothold in the Indian Ocean.
After Pakistan begins receiving the eight S-20 submarines it has on order
from China, it is inevitable that PLA staff will be in Pakistani ports to train
Pakistan’s submariners and help maintain the ports for military purposes.
Xi’s visit to Pakistan in April 2015 facilitated such an effort for the PLAN.
Xi also invited eight leaders of South Pacific states to Fiji in November 2014
and offered them aid worth 2 billion yuan, a huge sum in per capita terms.21
Moreover, the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific both could be alternative
launching sites for China’s ballistic missile submarines, potentially
targeting India or U.S. facilities in Australia if a major war ever were to
erupt between China and the United States. As Senior Colonel Yang Yujun,
the PLA’s spokesperson, commented in January 2015, tours of PLAN surface
combatants and submarines to the Indian Ocean will become normal. Their
frequency will only increase in the years to come.22 

20 In the medium term, the objective is to create a forward naval presence. In the longer term, this goal
perhaps reflects a rationale similar to Mahan’s strategic thinking on sea power and the imperatives of
major maritime and continental states to control strategic space beyond national borders.
21 “Xi Jinping’s Visit to States in the South Pacific,” People’s Daily, November 23, 2014.
22 “PLA Spokesman Yang Yujun’s News Briefing,” Xinhua, January 29, 2015.

[ 19 ]
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.