Strikes and Concerted Actions .............................................................................................................................................

2
Great Pacific Life Employees Union v. Great Pacific Life .............................................................................................. 2
MSF Tire and Rubber v. CA............................................................................................................................................. 2
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Moldex Products, Inc. v. NLRC..................................................................................... 3
San Juan de Dios Educational Employees v. San Juan de Dios Educational Hospital ............................................... 3
Piñero vs. National Labor Relations Commission .......................................................................................................... 3
University of the Immaculate Conception vs Sec of Labor ............................................................................................ 4
Capitol Medical Center vs. NLRC .................................................................................................................................... 5
Biflex Philippines Labor Union vs Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing ......................................................................... 6
Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. CA .......................................................................................... 8
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) vs. NLRC ......................................................................................................... 10
PhilTread Workers Union (PTWU), et al. v. Secretary Nieves R. Confesor, et al. ..................................................... 10
Santa Rosa Coca Cola Plant Employee Union v. Coca Cola Bottlers Phil ................................................................. 11
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org. vs. PBM .................................................................................................... 12
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) v. Philnabank Employees Association ...................................... 13
Master Iron Labor Union v. NLRC ................................................................................................................................. 13
Unfair Labor Practices ........................................................................................................................................................ 14
Wise and Co. Inc. v. Wise and Co. Employees Union-NATU ...................................................................................... 14
ShoeMart Inc. v. NLRC .................................................................................................................................................. 15
De Leon vs. NLRC .......................................................................................................................................................... 16
ME-SHURN CORPORATION AND SAMMY CHOU, petitioners, vs. ME-SHURN WORKERS UNION-FSM ......... 17
St. John Colleges v. St. John Academy Faculty & Employees Union ......................................................................... 19
Mariano v. Royal Interocean Lines ................................................................................................................................ 21
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association – NATU v. The Insular Life Assurance ................... 21
REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK vs. CIR ............................................................................................................................ 22
HSBC Employees Union vs. NLRC ............................................................................................................................... 23
PhilCom Employees Union vs. PhilCom ....................................................................................................................... 25
G. Aronson Co., Inc vs. ALU .......................................................................................................................................... 27
People’s Industrial and Commercial Employees Union v. PICC ................................................................................. 27
Lapanday Workers' Union vs. NLRC. ............................................................................................................................ 27
Shell Oil Workers’ Union v. Shell Company & CIR ....................................................................................................... 29
Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc (INPORT) vs. NLRC ........................................................................................ 30
De Ocampo v. NLRC ...................................................................................................................................................... 31
Ferrer v. CIR ................................................................................................................................................................... 32
Jacinto v. CA ................................................................................................................................................................... 34
Bangalisan v. CA, CSC & Secretary of DECS .............................................................................................................. 34
Republic Flour Mills Workers’ Association v. Reyes .................................................................................................... 35

Page 1 of 37
 Liwayway Publications Inc. v. Permanent Concrete Workers’ Union .......................................................................... 36
Strikes and Concerted Actions
___________________________________________
Great Pacific Life Employees Union v. Great Pacific
Life
(G.R. No. 126717, February 11, 1999)
Facts: Prior to the expiration of the CBA, the Parties
submitted their respective proposals for its projected
renewal. However, it ended to a deadlock. Thus, the
Union proceeded to stage a strike employing some
violence and blocking all points of ingress and egress of
the Company’s premises. In view thereof, the
GREPALIFE directed the Union to explain why no
disciplinary action, including possible dismissal from
employment, should be taken against them for
committing illegal acts against the company in the
course of the strike. In response, the Union asserted that
they were just exercising their right to strike, while the
other striking employees ignored the same. The
GREPALIFE found Union’s explanations unacceptable,
thus terminating its officers and employees. Eventually,
the Parties entered into a MOA, where GREPALIFE
requested, among others, for the voluntary resignation of
President and Vice-President of the Union, Mr. Domingo
and Mr. Dela Rosa, respectively, in exchange for the
reinstatement of all other strikers. Thus, prompting Mr.
Dela Rosa to file a complaint against GREPALIFE for
illegal dismissal and ULP. The Labor Arbiter sided for
the Union’s Officers, while the NLRC reversed the
former’s decision, contending that a just cause for
dismissal had been sufficiently established. However, it
agreed that GREPALIFE failed to comply strictly with the
requirements of due process prior to termination, thus
awarding the Union‘s Officers its monetary benefits.
Hence, Mr. Dela Rosa’s Petition.
Issue: Whether the NLRC erred in its decision.
Held: No. The NLRC did not err and GREPALIFE is not
guilty of the acts charged.
Ratio: The Supreme Court holds that the NLRC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion. The right to strike,
while constitutionally recognized, is not without legal
constrictions. The Labor Code is emphatic against the
use of violence, coercion and intimidation during a strike
and to this end prohibits the obstruction of free passage
to and from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes.
The sanction provided in par. (a) of Art. 264 thereof is so
severe that “any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status. GREPALIFE submitted before the Labor Arbiter
several affidavits of its employees which de la Rosa did
not refute. With these documents, two (2) specifically
described the incidents that transpired during the strike
that the Union’s Officers and Employees had
participated and employed such illegal acts. Thus,
declaring the staged strike illegal and from that will not
constitute ULP.
Fallo: The petition is DISMISSED. The decision of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
14 May 1996 (a) finding that petitioner Rodel P. de la
Rosa was legally dismissed, and, (b) ordering
respondent Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation to
pay petitioner his one (1) month salary for its failure to
comply strictly with due process prior to the latter’s
termination and his one (1) month salary per year of
service based on the new CBA rates as separation pay,
as well as its Resolution dated 16 August 1996 denying
reconsideration, is AFFIRMED.
___________________________________________
MSF Tire and Rubber v. CA
(G.R. No. 128632, August 5, 1999)
Facts: Respondent Union filed a notice of strike in the
NCMB charging (Phildtread) with unfair labor practice.
Thereafter, they picketed and assembled outside the
gate of Philtread’s plant. Philtread, on the other hand,
filed a notice of lockout. Subsequently, the Secretary of
Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and
certified it for compulsory arbitration. During the
pendency of the labor dispute, Philtread entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre whereby its
plant and equipment would be sold to a new company,
herein petitioner, 80% of which would be owned by Siam
Tyre and 20% by Philtread, while the land on which the
plant was located would be sold to another company,
60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by
Siam Tyre. Petitioner then asked respondent Union to
desist from picketing outside its plant. As the respondent
Union refused petitioner’s request, petitioner filed a
complaint for injunction with damages before the RTC.
Page 2 of 37
Respondent Union moved to dismiss the complaint
alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Petitioner asserts that its status as an “innocent
bystander” with respect to the labor dispute between
Philtread and the Union entitles it to a writ of injunction
from the civil courts.
Issue: WON petitioner has shown a clear legal right to
the issuance of a writ of injunction under the “innocent
bystander” rule.
Held: In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU) v. Cloribel, this Court, through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, stated the “innocent bystander” rule as follows:
The right to picket as a means of
communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of
the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If
peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the
absence of employer-employee relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one.
While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an
exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not
without power to confine or localize the sphere of
communication or the demonstration to the parties to the
labor dispute, including those with related interest, and
to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial
connection or having interest totally foreign to the
context of the dispute. Thus the right may be regulated
at the instance of third parties or “innocent bystanders” if
it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to
create an impression that a labor dispute with which they
have no connection or interest exists between them and
the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their
rights.
Thus, an “innocent bystander,” who seeks to
enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court it is entirely
different from, without any connection whatsoever to,
either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are
totally foreign to the context thereof.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not
to have such connection to the dispute. We find that the
“negotiation, contract of sale, and the post transaction”
between Philtread, as vendor, and Siam Tyre, as
vendee, reveals a legal relation between them which, in
the interest of petitioner, we cannot ignore. To be sure,
the transaction between Philtread and Siam Tyre, was
not a simple sale whereby Philtread ceased to have any
proprietary rights over its sold assets. On the contrary,
Philtread remains as 20% owner of private respondent
and 60% owner of Sucat Land Corporation which was
likewise incorporated in accordance with the terms of the
Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre, and which
now owns the land were subject plant is located. This,
together with the fact that private respondent uses the
same plant or factory; similar or substantially the same
working conditions; same machinery, tools, and
equipment; and manufacture the same products as
Philtread, lead us to safely conclude that private
respondent’s personality is so closely linked to Philtread
as to bar its entitlement to an injunctive writ. Petition
denied.
___________________________________________
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Moldex Products, Inc.
v. NLRC
(G.R. No. 119467, February 1, 2000)
FACTS: After the negotiations for the renewal of
collective bargaining agreement between petitioner
Union and private respondent Moldex Products, Inc.
ended with a deadlock, petitioner filed a notice of strike
before the NCMB. A strike vote was conducted, but the
results thereof were never submitted to NCMB.
Petitioner went on strike. On private respondent’s
petition, it was declared as illegal by the Labor Arbiter.
On appeal to the NLCR, the case was remanded to the
Labor Arbiter for reception of additional evidence, thus
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike staged by the
petitioner was illegal.
HELD: Yes, the strike was illegal. Art. 264 of the Labor
Code provides in part that no strike shall be conducted
without having first filed a notice of strike, or without the
necessary strike or lockout vote first having been
obtained and reported to the Ministry. In this case, the
result of the strike vote was not submitted to the NCMB
making the strike staged illegal. Also, they committed
acts of violence, threats, coercion and intimidation
during the strike. The employment of the members and
of the officers who committed prohibited acts in the
course of the strike were declared forfeited. The NLRC
resolution was set aside.
___________________________________________
San Juan de Dios Educational Employees v. San
Juan de Dios Educational Hospital
(G.R. No. 143341, May 28, 2004)
___________________________________________
Piñero vs. National Labor Relations Commission
(G.R. No. 149610, August 20, 2004)
DOCTRINE: An employee who is dismissed for cause is
generally not entitled to any financial assistance. Equity
considerations, however, provide an exception. Equity
has been defined as justice outside law, being ethical
rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals
Page 3 of 37
than of law. It is grounded on the precepts of conscience
and not on any sanction of positive law, for equity finds
no room for application where there is law.
FACTS: Private respondent Dumaguete Cathedral
College, Inc., an educational institution, is the employer
of the faculty and staff members comprising the labor
union DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU. On December 19, 1986,
DUCACOFSA (then affiliated with the National Alliance
of Teachers and Allied Workers – NATAW) and private
respondent entered into a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) effective for 3 years. Upon the
expiration of their CBA in 1989, the parties failed to
conclude another CBA which led DUCACOFSA (now
affiliated with NAFTEU) to file a notice of strike with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on the
ground of refusal to bargain. On November 4, 1991,
DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU conducted a strike in the
premises of private respondent without submitting to the
DOLE the required results of the strike vote obtained
from the members of the union. Private respondent filed
a complaint to declare the strike illegal and dismiss the
union officers including herein petitioner who was the
president of the union.
LA rendered a decision in favor of private
respondent declaring the strike illegal and the union
officers to have lost their employment status effective
October 28,1994 (the date of the decision).
Pending the NLRC appeal, the officers were allowed to
return to work by virtue of a memorandum of agreement
entered into between the union and private respondent
without prejudice to the outcome of the appeal.
NLRC affirmed the LA decision and added that
the union had no personality to hold a strike because it
was not a legitimate labor organization.
CA affirmed the decision. Piñero brought the petition
before the SC.
ISSUES: WON the strike was illegal; If yes, should
Piñero be dismissed?
HELD: YES, The union is a legitimate labor organization
as settled by the NLRC decision in Case No. V-0432-93,
however the union failed to hold a strike vote and submit
its result to the DOLE prior to the holding of a strike. In
the case at bar, DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU failed to prove
that it obtained the required strike-vote among its
members and that the results thereof were submitted to
the DOLE.
The strike was therefore correctly declared
illegal, for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of Article 263 of the Labor Code, and
Piñero properly dismissed from service. Pursuant to
Article 264 of the Labor Code, any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker
or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status.
The Court notes that petitioner Piñero turned
60 years old and retired on March 1, 1996 after 29 years
of service, rendering his dismissal from service moot
and academic. However, in view of the propriety of his
termination as a consequence of the illegal strike, he is
no longer entitled to payment of retirement benefits
because he lost his employment status effective as of
the date of the decision of the Labor Arbiter – October
28, 1994. Although meriting termination of employment,
Piñero’s infraction is not so reprehensible nor
unscrupulous as to warrant complete disregard of his
long years of service. Moreover, he has no previous
derogatory records. Weighed on the scales of justice,
conscience and reason tip in favor of granting financial
assistance to support him in the twilight of his life after
long years of service.
Under the circumstances, social and
compassionate justice dictate that petitioner Piñero be
awarded financial assistance equivalent to one-half (1/2)
month’s pay for every year of service computed from his
date of employment up to October 28, 1994 when he
was declared to have lost his employment status.
Indeed, equities of this case should be accorded due
weight because labor law determinations are not only
secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem.
___________________________________________
University of the Immaculate Conception vs Sec of
Labor
(G.R. No. 151379, January 14, 2005)
Facts: This case stemmed from the collective
bargaining negotiations between petitioner University of
Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. (UNIVERSITY) and
respondent The UIC Teaching and Non- Teaching
Personnel and Employees Union (UNION). The UNION,
as the certified bargaining
agent of all rank and file employees of the UNIVERSITY,
submitted its collective bargaining proposals to the latter
on February 16, 1994. However, one item was left
unresolved and this was the inclusion or exclusion of
some positions in the scope of the bargaining unit.
The UNION it filed a notice of strike on the
grounds of bargaining deadlock and ULP. During the
thirty (30) day cooling-off period, two union members
were dismissed by petitioner. Consequently, the UNION
went on strike.
On January 23, 1995, the then Secretary of
Labor, Ma. Nieves R. Confessor, issued an Order
assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
Page 4 of 37
 On March 10, 1995, the UNION filed another
notice of strike, this time citing as a reason the
UNIVERSITY’s termination of the individual
respondents. The UNION alleged that the
UNIVERSITY’s act of terminating the individual
respondents is in violation of the Order of the Secretary
of Labor.
On March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor
issued another Order reiterating the directives contained
in the January 23, 1995 Order. Hence, the UNIVERSITY
was directed to reinstate the individual respondents
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to
the labor dispute.
The UNIVERSITY filed a MR. In the Order
dated August 18, 1995, then Acting Secretary Jose S.
Brilliantes denied the MR, but modified the two previous
Orders by adding:
Anent the Union’s Motion, we find that
superseding circumstances would not warrant the
physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated
employees.
Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under
payroll reinstatement until thevalidity of their termination
is finally resolved.
Issue: WON payroll reinstatement, instead of actual
reinstatement, is proper.
Held: With respect to the Secretary’s Order allowing
payroll reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement for
the individual respondents herein, an amendment to the
previous Orders issued by her office, the same is usually
not allowed. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code
aforementioned states that all workers must immediately
return to work and all employers must readmit all of
them under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike or lockout. The phrase “under the same
terms and conditions” makes it clear that the norm is
actual reinstatement. This is consistent with the idea that
any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular
industry can be detrimental to the national interest.
In ordering payroll reinstatement in lieu of
actual reinstatement, then Acting Secretary of Labor
Jose S. Brillantes said:
Anent the Union’s Motion, we find that
superseding circumstances would not warrant the
physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated
employees. Hence, they are hereby ordered placed
under payroll reinstatement until the validity of their
termination is finally resolved.
As an exception to the rule, payroll
reinstatement must rest on special circumstances that
render actual reinstatement impracticable or otherwise
not conducive to attaining the purposes of the law.
The “superseding circumstances” mentioned by
the Acting Secretary of Labor no doubt refer to the final
decision of the panel of arbitrators as to the confidential
nature of the positions of the twelve private respondents,
thereby rendering their actual and physical
reinstatement impracticable and more likely to
exacerbate the situation. The payroll reinstatement in
lieu of actual reinstatement ordered in these cases,
therefore, appears justified as an exception to the rule
until the validity of their termination is finally resolved.
This Court sees no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Acting Secretary of Labor in ordering the same.
Furthermore, the issue has not been raised by any party
in this case. Petition denied.
___________________________________________
Capitol Medical Center vs. NLRC
(G.R. No. 147080, April 26, 2005)
FACTS: The petitioner’s refusal to negotiate for a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) resulted in a
union-led strike. The Sec. of Labor and Employment
rendered a decision Directing the management of the
Capitol Medical Center to negotiate a CBA with the
Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance
of Filipino Workers, the certified bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees. Pursuant thereto, the Union
requested for a meeting to discuss matters pertaining to
a negotiation for a CBA but was refused.
Instead of filing a motion with the SOLE for the
enforcement of the resolutions of Undersecretary
Laguesma as affirmed by this Court, the Union filed a
Notice of Strike on October 29, 1997 with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), serving a
copy thereof to the petitioner. The Union alleged as
grounds for the projected strike the following acts of the
petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on
employees; and (c) interference/ restraint to self-
organization.
Petitioner asserted that the strike was illegal
that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997;
moreover, no notice of such voting was furnished to the
NCMB at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the
intended holding of the strike vote.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike was valid.
RULING: No. A union is mandated to notify the NCMB of
an impending dispute in a particular bargaining unit via a
notice of strike. Thereafter, the NCMB, through its
conciliator-mediators, shall call the parties to a
conference at the soonest possible time in order to
actively assist them in exploring all possibilities for
amicable settlement. In the event of the failure in the
Page 5 of 37
conciliation/mediation proceedings, the parties shall be
encouraged to submit their dispute for voluntary
arbitration. However, if the parties refuse, the union may
hold a strike vote, and if the requisite number of votes is
obtained, a strike may ensue. The purpose of the strike
vote is to ensure that the decision to strike broadly rests
with the majority of the union members in general and
not with a mere minority, and at the same time,
discourage wildcat strikes, union bossism and even
corruption. A strike vote report submitted to the NCMB at
least seven days prior to the intended date of strike
ensures that a strike vote was, indeed, taken. In the
event that the report is false, the seven-day period
affords the members an opportunity to take the
appropriate remedy before it is too late. The 15 to 30
day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties
the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with the
assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the
seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an
opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really
carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union
members.
The requirement of giving notice of the conduct
of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours before the
meeting for the said purpose is designed to (a) inform
the NCMB of the intent of the union to conduct a strike
vote; (b) give the NCMB ample time to decide on
whether or not there is a need to supervise the conduct
of the strike vote to prevent any acts of violence and/or
irregularities attendant thereto; and (c) should the NCMB
decide on its own initiative or upon the request of an
interested party including the employer, to supervise the
strike vote, to give it ample time to prepare for the
deployment of the requisite personnel, including peace
officers if need be. Unless and until the NCMB is
notified at least 24 hours of the union’s decision to
conduct a strike vote, and the date, place, and time
thereof, the NCMB cannot determine for itself whether to
supervise a strike vote meeting or not and insure its
peaceful and regular conduct. The failure of a union to
comply with the requirement of the giving of notice to the
NCMB at least 24 hours prior to the holding of a strike
vote meeting will render the subsequent strike staged by
the union illegal.
In this case, the respondent Union failed to comply with
the 24-hour prior notice requirement to the NCMB before
it conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on
November 10, 1997. As a result, no strike vote meeting
ever took place and the strike staged by the respondent
union was illegal.
___________________________________________
Biflex Philippines Labor Union vs Filflex Industrial
and Manufacturing
Facts: Petitioners are officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor
Union and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Labor
Union. Unions are respective collective bargaining
agents of Biflex and Filflex. Companies are sister
companies in one big compound with a common
entrance.
On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a
welga ng bayan to protest the accelerating prices of oil.
On even date, petitioner-unions staged a work stoppage,
lasted for several days, prompting respondents to file on
October 31, 1990 a petition to declare the work
stoppage illegal for failure to comply with procedural
requirements.
On November 13, 1990, respondents resumed
their operations. Petitioners, claiming that they were
illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside
from the fact that the welga ng bayan rendered it difficult
to get a ride and the apprehension that violence would
erupt between those participating in the welga and the
authorities, respondents’ workers were prevented from
reporting for work.
Petitioners further assert that respondents were
“slighted” by the workers’ no-show, and as a
punishment, the workers as well as petitioners were
barred from entering the company premises.
On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in
front of the main gate of respondents’ premises,
petitioners, who claim that they filed a notice of strike on
October 31, 1990, explain that those were for the
convenience of union members who reported every
morning to check if the management would allow them
to report for work.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that
the work stoppage was illegal since the following
requirements for the staging of a valid strike were not
complied with: (1) filing of notice of strike; (2) securing a
strike vote, and (3) submission of a report of the strike
vote to the Department of Labor and Employment.
LArbiter: strike illegal, petitioners-officers were
declared to have lost employment status
NLRC: Reverse. No strike as no labor dispute
between parties.
CA: Reverse. Re-instated LA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the work stoppage/strike is legal.
SC: Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the
nature of a general strike, an extended sympathy strike.
It affects numerous employers including those who do
not have a dispute with their employees regarding their
terms and conditions of employment.
Page 6 of 37
 Employees who have no labor dispute with
their employer but who, on a day they are scheduled to
work, refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan
commit an illegal work stoppage.
There being no showing that petitioners notified
respondents of their intention, or that they were allowed
by respondents, to join the welga ng bayan on October
24, 1990, their work stoppage is beyond legal protection.
Even assuming arguendo that in staging the
strike, petitioners had complied with legal formalities, the
strike would just the same be illegal, for by blocking the
free ingress to and egress from the company premises
(tents, tables chairs at main gate), they violated Article
264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that “[n]o
person engaged in picketing shall … obstruct the free
ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises for
lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.”
Even the NLRC, which ordered their
reinstatement, took note of petitioners’ act of “physically
blocking and preventing the entry of complainant’s
customers, supplies and even other employees who
were not on strike.”
In fine, the legality of a strike is determined not
only by compliance with its legal formalities but also by
the means by which it is carried out.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is illegal lockout.
SC: None. If there was illegal lockout, why, indeed, did
not petitioners file a protest with the management or a
complaint therefor against respondents? As the Labor
Arbiter observed, “[t]he inaction of [petitioners] betrays
the weakness of their contention for normally a locked-
out union will immediately bring management before the
bar of justice.”
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal is legal.
SC: Petitioners, being union officers, should thus bear
the consequences of their acts of knowingly participating
in an illegal strike, conformably with the third paragraph
of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code.
Petition Denied.
___________________________________________
Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc.
v. NLRC
(G.R. No. 105090, September 16, 1993)
Facts:
1. 6 Apr 1992 The union picketed several (6) premises
of their employer (Bagumbayan and Longos in Q.C.;
Angono and Antipolo in Rizal; San Fernando,
Pampanga; and San Pedro Laguna.)
a. The union was protesting : ULP and Union
Busting.
2. 8 Apr Employer FILED : Injunction to stop the
illegal strike, with the NLRC alleging among others:
a. The April 6 strike was a Wild-cat strike, in that
there was no notice of strike, it did not comply
with the cooling off period, and there was a
pending mediation proceeding scheduled on 10
Apr.
b. That during the strike the union impeded the
ingress and egress to the premises by setting
up makeshifts, tents, banners, streamers, and
other man-made obstructions.
c. That the union had (and still is) doing other
illegal acts such as threats, intimidation, and
coercions against persons with lawful business
with the employer.
3. 13 Apr NLRC heard the petition ex parte, for failure
of the union to appear, NLRC issued a TRO
a. Apparently the union was not notified of the
petition, the company misrepresented its
address
b. Neither did the union get a copy of the TRO, it
only learned of it when it was posted on 15Apr
in the premises of the company
4. 24 Apr the Union in turn FILED: Injunction, to
enjoin the company from asking the aid of police
and military to escort scabs (Case really said scabs,
but it should probably have been people and
vehicles) from entering the establishment.
5. 30 Apr the employer filed a Motion for the
Immediate Issuance of Preliminary Injunction
alleging: that the union was still committing illegal
acts complained of despite the TRO.
6. 4 Mar : Union was notified of the motion.
a. Next day (5 Mar) the union opposed the motion
on the ground that they were never furnished a
copy of the petition for injunction.
7. NLRC (Same day that union opposed, just one day
after the union was notified): issued the disputed
order, GRANTED Employer’s Preliminary Injunction
against the union, based on testimonies, that:
a. Despite TRO strike continued
b. By forming a human blockade, the union
prevented vehicles from entering the premises
c. By force and intimidation prevented the non
striking employees from going to work
d. “Wala kaming pakielem sa TRO
ninyo…Bubugbugin namin kayo pag kayo
nagpilit”
e. Ramon Bana, Union President: “sisimentuhin
naming ang gates ng Concrete Aggregate na
kahit ipis as hindi makakpasok”
8. Union filed the instant petition for certiorari
Page 7 of 37
Issue: W/N the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction
against the union was proper? NO. It violated their right
to strike, and it did not comply with the LC’s
requirements for the issuance of an injunction.
Held:
1. Phil. History of the right to Strike
a. Justice Puno’s opening statement at the start of
the case: The restoration of the right to strike is
the most valuable gain of labor after the EDSA
revolution. It is the employee’s sole weapon. In
recognition of its importance, our Consti has
accorded this right a distinct status while our
laws have assured that its rightful exercise will
not be negated by the issuance of unnecessary
injunctions.
b. Industrial Peace Act: congress have statutory
recognition to the right to strike.
c. Martial Law: prohibited the right to strike for
14years
d. 1987 Consti: treated labor with a favored eye.
For the first time in our history the consti
mandated: Par.2, §9, Art XIII to guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-org, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike
in accordance with law.
e. Labor Code, implementing law of the consti
provision, provided §218(e) giving specific
requisites for issuance of injunctions. (see LC
for full provision)
2. NLRC’s Preliminary injunction was improper.
Non-compliance with §218(3) subpar 4 and 5
a. Affidavits used by the company in proving the
continued strike despite the TRO was
controverted upon presentation to the labor
abiter.
b. No less than the company’s operations
manager, Mr.Mercado, further testified that
after the issuance of the TRO, the barricades
were removed.
c. Mr. Mercado and Atty. Jolo(personnel
manager) also testified that public authorities
charged to protect the company’s properties
were neither unwilling nor unable to furnish
adequate protection. As a matter of fact, police
assistance was never requested.
3. Records reveal continuing misuse of unfair
strategies by the company to secure the ex-parte
TRO.
a. The union was never furnished a copy of the
petition for injunction
b. They were denied the right to attend the 13Apr
hearing where the TRO was issued
4. Issuance of ex-parte TRO is not per se
prohibited BUT it must be clearly justified by
considerations of extreme necessity.
a. Because imprudently issues TRO’s can break
the back of employees engaged in a legal
strike.
b. The deleterious effects of such a TRO on the
rights of striking employees can no longer be
repaired for they defy simple monetization.
c. As such it behooves officers receiving evidence
to support ex-parte evidence to take a more
active stance seeing to it that the right to social
justice is in no way violated.
5. Nor does the court find baseless the allegation by
the union that NLRC had neglected to resolves their
injunction.
a. The company’s prayer for ex-parte TRO was
heard and granted on the same day.
b. The company’s petition for preliminary
injunction was filed april 30 and was granted
less than a week after May5.
c. On the other hand, the union’s petition has not
yet been heard nor decided.
d. The disparate treatment is inexplicable
considering the subject matters of their petition
are of similar importance to the parties and to
the public.
WHEREFORE GRANTED: PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION (against striking workers)ANNULED &
SET ASIDE
Further: NLRC is ordered to hear and resolve with
deliberate speed union’s petition for injunction filed on
30 April 1992.
___________________________________________
Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW
v. CA
(G.R. Nos. 143013-14, December 18, 2000)
FACTS: The Company and the Union reached a
deadlock in their negotiations for a new collective
bargaining agreement. The Union then filed a Notice of
Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB). Acting Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment, Jose S. Brillantes, intervened
and assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Thus, the
Order of the said Acting Secretary enjoined any strike or
lockout, whether actual or intended, between the parties.
Despite the assumption Order, the Union struck
on September 14, 1995. Two (2) days later, Notice of
the Return-to-Work Order was sent to the striking Union
members but still some of them refused to heed the
order and continued with their picket. On September 23,
1995, violence erupted in the picket lines. The service
Page 8 of 37
bus ferrying non-striking workers was stoned, causing
injuries to its passengers. Thereafter, complaints for
threats, defamation, illegal detention and physical
injuries were filed against the strikers.
The Company thereafter issued letters of
termination for cause to the workers who did not report
back to work despite the Notice of Assumption and
Return-to-Work Orders.
On October 27, 1995, the Acting Secretary of
Labor issued another Order directing the Company to
reinstate all striking workers "except the Union Officers,
shop stewards, and those with pending criminal charges,
x x x" while the resolution of the legality of the strike was
pending.
The Union filed a petition for certiorari,
questioning the exclusions made in the aforesaid
Orders, which the Court granted and as a result of which
ordered the reinstatement of all striking workers without
exception.
In compliance with the Court’s order to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment "to determine with
dispatch the legality of the strike," marathon hearings
were conducted at the DOLE Office.
On May 28, 1999, the Secretary declared the
strike as illegal for having been waged in open, willful
and knowing defiance of the assumption order and the
subsequent return-to-work order. Consequently, the
striking workers are declared to have lost their
employment status.
Dissatisfied, both the Company and the Union filed
motions for reconsideration which were denied. So, they
both filed their respective petitions for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals that REVERSED and SET ASIDE the
Secretary’s Decision in so far as it directs the company
to pay backwages and grant financial assistance to the
striking workers.
Only the Union sought reconsideration.
However, it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition.
The Union argue that for an officer to lose his
employment status, it must be proved that he knowingly
participated in an illegal strike; and that in the case of an
ordinary member, it must not only be demonstrated that
he actually participated in the illegal strike but also that
he has committed illegal acts during the strike and which
respondent Company allegedly failed to prove.
ISSUE: Whether or not the striking workers lost their
employment status and entitlement to backwages and
financial assistance grant on the ground that the strike
was illegal for having been waged in open, willful and
knowing defiance of the assumption order and the
subsequent return-to-work order
HELD: Yes. Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the
moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction
over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to
national interest, such assumption shall have the effect
of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of
Labor to issue another order directing them to return to
work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the
Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-
to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is
not expressly stated in the assumption order.
In this connection, Article 264(a) clearly
provides that no strike or lockout shall be declared after
the assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the
Secretary or after certification or submission of the
dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during
the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for
the strike or lockout. Any union officer who knowingly
participates in illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status.
In this case, the strike of the Union cannot be viewed as
anything but illegal for having been staged in open and
knowing defiance of the assumption and return-to-work
orders. The necessary consequence thereof is that
workers forfeited their right to be readmitted to work,
having abandoned their employment, and so could be
validly replaced.
With respect to petitioners' claim of backwages,
it is only when there is a finding of illegal dismissal that
backwages are granted. Since the strikers were not
illegally dismissed, the Company is under no obligation
to pay backwages to them, especially when the record
shows that the striking workers did not comply with
lawful orders for them to return to work. The same view
holds with respect to the award of financial assistance or
separation pay, which is allowed only in those instances
where the employee is validly dismissed for causes
other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his
moral character. Here, the strikers' open and willful
defiance of the assumption order constitute serious
misconduct as well as reflective of their moral character,
hence, granting financial assistance to them is not and
cannot be justified.
RESOLUTION: The petition is DISMISSED. The
appealed Decision dated December 23, 1999 and the
Resolution dated April 19, 2000 of public respondent
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.
For reference:
Page 9 of 37
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
xxxxxxxxx
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely
to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same
to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption per
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the
assumption or certification order. If one had already taken place at
the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and re-admit all workers under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
xxxxxxxxx
___________________________________________
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) vs. NLRC
(G.R. No. 91980, June 27, 1991)
Facts: The union known as Ilaw at Buklod Ng
Manggagawa (IBM) said to represent 4,500 employees
of San Miguel Corporation, more or less, working at the
various plants, offices, and warehouses located at the
National Capital Region presented to the company a
"demand" for correction of the significant distortion in the
workers' wages.
In that demand, the Union explicitly invoked Section 4
(d) of RA 6727 which reads as follows: Where the
application of the increases in the wage rates under this
Section results in distortions as defined under existing
laws in the wage structure within an establishment and
gives rise to a dispute therein, such dispute shall first be
settled voluntarily between the parties and in the event
of a deadlock, the same shall be finally resolved through
compulsory arbitration by the regional branches of the
National Labor Relations Commission having jurisdiction
over the workplace. It shall be mandatory for the NLRC
to conduct continuous hearings and decide any dispute
arising under this Section within twenty (20) calendar
days from the time said dispute is formally submitted to it
for arbitration. The pendency of a dispute arising from a
wage distortion shall not in any way delay the
applicability of the increase in the wage rates prescribed
under this Section.
Issue: Whether or not the strike is legal in the resolution
of wage distortion.
Ruling: The strike involving the issue of wage distortion
is illegal as a means of resolving it. The legality of these
activities is usually dependent on the legality of the
purposes sought to be attained and the means
employed therefore. It goes without saying that these
joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or
restricted by law or contract. In the instance of
"distortions of the wage structure within an
establishment" resulting from "the application of any
prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or wage
order," Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a
specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the
correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or
lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of
settlement of the issue.
The provision states that the employer and the
union shall negotiate to correct the distortions. Any
dispute arising from wage distortions shall be resolved
through the grievance procedure under their collective
bargaining agreement and, if it remains unresolved,
through voluntary arbitration. Unless otherwise agreed
by the parties in writing, such dispute shall be decided
by the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators within ten (10) calendar days from the time
said dispute was referred to voluntary arbitration. In
cases where there are no collective agreements or
recognized labor unions, the employers and workers
shall endeavor to correct such distortions. Any dispute
arising there from shall be settled through the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board and, if it remains
unresolved after ten (10) calendar days of conciliation,
shall be referred to the appropriate branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It shall
be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct continuous
hearings and decide the dispute within twenty (20)
calendar days from the time said dispute is submitted for
compulsory arbitration. The pendency of a dispute
arising from a wage distortion shall not in any way delay
the applicability of any increase in prescribed wage rates
pursuant to the provisions of law or Wage Order.
The legislative intent that solution of the
problem of wage distortions shall be sought by voluntary
negotiation or arbitration, and not by strikes, lockouts, or
other concerted activities of the employees or
management, is made clear in the rules implementing
RA 6727 issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment pursuant to the authority granted by
Section 13 of the Act. Section 16, Chapter I of these
implementing rules, after reiterating the policy that wage
distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties and
eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that, "Any
issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for
a strike/lockout."
___________________________________________
PhilTread Workers Union (PTWU), et al. v. Secretary
Nieves R. Confesor, et al.
(G.R. No. 117169, March 12, 1997)
Page 10 of 37
Facts: Petitioner PTWU filed a notice of strike on
grounds of unfair labor practice, more specifically union
busting and violation of CBA. On the other hand, private
respondent Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation filed
a notice of lockout. It also filed a petition to declare
illegal the work slowdowns staged by the petitioner
Union. Both cases were then consolidated. Several
conciliation meetings were conducted but the parties
failed to settle their dispute.
At some time, the National Labor Relations
Commission declared the slowdowns illegal. Thereafter,
private respondent corporation requested the Secretary
of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
Secretary Confesor then issued an order, which, among
other things, certified the dispute for compulsory
arbitration. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order but the same was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code on the ground that the
Secretary of Labor’s intervention violates the workers’
constitutional right to strike, and alleged that he acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order since
his power to certify a dispute for compulsory arbitration
is strictly restricted to cases involving industries that are
indispensable to national interest.
Issues: 1) Whether or not Article 263 (g) of the Labor
Code is unconstitutional; and 2) Whether or not public
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the questioned order.
Ruling: No. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code does not
interfere with the workers’ right to strike but merely
regulates it, when in the exercise of such right, national
interests will be affected. The rights granted by the
Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to
control and limitation to ensure that they are not
exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers
and employees are intended to be protected and not one
of them is given undue preference. The assumption of
the Secretary of Labor of jurisdiction is in the nature of
police power measure. This is done for the promotion of
the common good considering that a prolonged strike or
lockout can be inimical to the national economy. The
Secretary of Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. As
articulated in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Labor, it is fundamental that a statute is to
be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather
than defeat it.
No. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment. The respondent
company is indispensable to national interest
considering that the tire industry has already been
liberalized. Philtread supplies 22% of the tire products in
the country. As observed by the Secretary of Labor, “the
Company is one of the tire manufacturers in the country
employing more or less 700 workers. Any work
disruption thereat, as a result of a labor dispute will
certainly prejudice the employment and livelihood of its
workers and their dependents. Furthermore, the labor
dispute may lead to the possible closure of the Company
and loss of employment to hundreds of its workers. This
will definitely aggravate the already worsening
unemployment situation in the country and discourage
foreign and domestic investors from further investing in
the country.”
___________________________________________
Santa Rosa Coca Cola Plant Employee Union v.
Coca Cola Bottlers Phil
(G.R. No. 164302-03, January 24, 2007)
Facts: The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees
Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the regular daily paid workers and the
monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its
Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant.
Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union
informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its
terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999,
where the Union and the Company discussed the
ground rules of the negotiations. The Union insisted that
representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa
Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the
CBA meetings. The Union officers and members also
insisted that their wages be based on their work shift
rates. For its part, the Company was of the view that the
members of the Alyansa were not members of the
bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of
employees of the Company in its various plants; and is
not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse
ensued.
On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers,
directors and six shop stewards filed a “Notice of Strike”
with the NCMB.
The Union decided to participate in a mass
action organized by the Alyansa in front of the
Company’s premises. Thus, the Union officers and
members held a picket along the front perimeter of the
plant on September 21, 1999. As a result, all of the 14
personnel of the Engineering Section of the Company
did not report for work, and 71 production personnel
were also absent. As a result, only one of the three
bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the three
lines were operated during the night shift with cumulative
downtime of five (5) hours due
Page 11 of 37
to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement.
The volume of production for the day was short by
60,000 physical cases versus budget.
On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a
“Petition to Declare Strike Illegal”
Issue: WON the strike, dubbed by petitioner as
picketing, is illegal.
Held: Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as
a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In
Bangalisan v. CA, the Court ruled that “the fact that the
conventional term ‘strike’ was not used by the striking
employees to describe their common course of action is
inconsequential, since the substance of the situation,
and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling.”
Picketing involves merely the marching to and
fro at the premises of the employer, usually
accompanied by the display of placards and other signs
making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. As
applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing
of one or more persons to observe and attempt to
observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of
peaceable persuasion.
The basic elements of a strike are present in
this case. They marched to and fro in front of the
company’s premises during working hours. Thus,
petitioners engaged in a concerted activity which already
affected the company’s operations. The mass concerted
activity constituted a
strike.
For a strike to be valid, the following procedural
requisites provided by Art 263 of the Labor Code must
be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30
days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in
case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by
a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the
DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days
before the intended strike. These requirements are
mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith
renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that
petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements and
embarked on their illegal strike. Petition denied.
___________________________________________
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org. vs. PBM
(G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973)
Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization
(PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in
front of Malacañang to express their grievances against
the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass
demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for
a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the
meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by
the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration
was not a strike against the company but was in fact an
exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to
freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom
for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the
demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of
their business which may result in the loss of revenue.
This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that
the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through
with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the
company reiterated their appeal that while the workers
may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and
regular shifts should not absent themselves to
participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it
was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and
the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for
a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of
their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the
company and the officers of the PBMEO were found
guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court
of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike
violated the CBA?
Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights
is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate
and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the
hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position
as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as
well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances are absolute when directed against public
Page 12 of 37
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed.”
___________________________________________
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) v.
Philnabank Employees Association
(G.R. No. L-29630 dated July 2, 1981)
Facts: There is an action for Libel against Philnabank
Employees Association filed by PCIB as a result of
placard and signboard along PNB Building, containing
the following: “PCIB BAD ACCOUNTS TRANSFERRED
TO PNB-NIDC?”
PCIB considered the above “defamatory and
libelous per se” (for at the very least it amounts to an act
tending to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of a
juridical person).
The libelous character of those placards were
denied by defendants on the ground that those said
placards were displayed during the strike which is a fair,
legal labor strategy denouncing the lack of business
foresight, incompetence, mismanagement, arbitrary and
disputing acts of Management to heed the legal and
legitimate demands of Philnabank Employees
association, as striking Union. Also such strike was only
move with good intention and justifiable motives and did
not intend to injure any party not connected with the
strike.
The lower court ruled in favour of the
Philnabank Union, having the judge not able to discern
any libelous imputation in the allege offending words.
Issue: W/ N the words in the placards (as quoted above)
used by the Philnabank Union during their strike against
employer PNB is libelous.
Ruling: No. If the matter were viewed solely from what
appeared in the placards, there is an element of
plausibility in the assertion that while it was aimed at the
PNB, the way it was worded could reflect on a stranger
to the controversy, that is the PCIB.What could at first
glance be for the most fastidious hurtful to its prestige,
could if viewed with calmness and objectivity be
considered as “lacking in libelous imputation”.
Peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of
speech guaranteed by Constitution. Labor disputes give
rise to strong emotional response. It is a fact of industrial
life, that in continuing confrontation esteem Labor and
management, it is far from likely that the language
employed would be both courteous and polite.
___________________________________________
Master Iron Labor Union v. NLRC
(GR No. 92009 February 17, 1993)
FACTS:
1. The Master Iron Works Construction Corporation
(Corporation for brevity) is a duly organized corporate
entity engaged in steel fabrication and other related
business activities. Sometime in February 1987, the
Master Iron Labor Union (MILU) entered into a collective
barganing agreement (CBA) with the Corporation for the
three-year period. Right after the signing of the CBA, the
Corporation subcontracted outside workers to do the
usual jobs done by its regular workers including those
done outside of the company plant. As a result, the
regular workers were scheduled by the management to
work on a rotation basis allegedly to prevent financial
losses thereby allowing the workers only ten (10)
working days a month. Thus, MILU requested
implementation of the grievance procedure which had
also been agreed upon in the CBA, but the Corporation
ignored the request.
2. MILU filed a notice of strike with the Department of
Labor and Employment. The Corporation and MILU
reached an agreement whereby the Corporation
acceded to give back the usual work to its regular
employees who are members of MILU.
3. Notwithstanding said agreement, the Corporation
continued the practice of hiring outside workers. When
the MILU president, Wilfredo Abulencia, insisted in doing
his regular work of cutting steel bars which was being
done by casual workers, a supervisor reprimanded him,
charged him with insubordination and suspended him for
three (3) days. Upon the request of MILU, Francisco
Jose of the DOLE called for conciliation conferences.
The
Corporation, however, insisted that the hiring of casual
workers was a management prerogative. It later ignored
subsequent scheduled conciliation conferences.
4. MILU filed a notice of strike on the following grounds:
(a) violation of CBA; (b) discrimination; (c) unreasonable
suspension of union officials; and (d) unreasonable
refusal to entertain grievance.
5. MILU staged the strike, maintaining picket lines on the
road leading to the Corporation's plant entrance and
premises. Then, in the morning of July 28, 1987,
CAPCOM soldiers, who had been summoned by the
Corporation's counsel, came and arrested the picketers.
Consequently, the Corporation filed a petition for
injunction before the NLRC which, on September 24,
1987, issued an order directing the workers to remove
the barricades and other obstructions which prevented
ingress to and egress from the company premises.
6. MILU filed a position paper with counter-complaint
before the NLRC. In said counter-complaint, the workers
charged the Corporation with unfair labor practice for
subcontracting work that was normally done by its
Page 13 of 37
regular workers thereby causing the reduction of the
latter's workdays; illegal suspension of Abulencia without
any investigation; discrimination for hiring casual
workers in violation of the CBA, and illegal dispersal of
the picket lines by CAPCOM agents.
7. LA declared strike illegal. NLRC affirmed.
8. Petitioners contend that notwithstanding the non-
strike provision in the CBA, the strike they staged was
legal because the reasons therefor are non-economic in
nature. They assert that the NLRC abused its discretion
in holding that there was "failure to exhaust the provision
on grievance procedure" in view of the fact that they
themselves sought grievance meetings but the
Corporation ignored such requests.
ISSUE/S: WON the strike was illegal because of the no-
strike clause
RULING: No, it is non-economic in nature. Much more
than an economic issue, the said practice of the
Corporation was a blatant violation of the CBA — and
unfair labor practice on the part of the employer under
Article 248(i) of the Labor Code. Although the end result,
should the Corporation be required to observe the CBA,
may be economic in nature because the workers would
then be given their regular working hours and therefore
their just pay, not one of the said grounds is an
economic demand within the meaning of the law on
labor strikes. Professor Perfecto Fernandez, in his book
Law on Strikes, Picketing and
Lockouts, states that an economic strike involves issues
relating to demands for higher wages, higher pension or
overtime rates, pensions, profit sharing, shorter working
hours, fewer work days for the same pay, elimination of
night work, lower retirement age, more healthful working
conditions, better health services, better sanitation and
more safety appliances. The demands of the petitioners,
being covered by the CBA, are definitely within the
power of the Corporation to grant and therefore the
strike was not an economic strike.
The other grounds, i.e., discrimination,
unreasonable suspension of union officials and
unreasonable refusal to entertain grievance, had been
ventilated before the Labor Arbiter. They are clearly
unfair labor practices as defined in Article 248 of the
Labor Code. The subsequent withdrawal of petitioners'
complaint for unfair labor practice which was granted by
Labor Arbiter Ceferina Diosana who also considered the
case closed and terminated may not, therefore, be
considered as having converted their other grievance
into economic demands.
DISPOSITIVE: The strike being legal, the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in terminating the employment of
the individual petitioners, who, by operation of law, are
entitled to reinstatement with three years backwages.
DOCTRINE: See Ruling
(For the topic of Good Faith)
All told, the strike staged by the petitioners was a legal
one even though it may have been called to offset what
the strikers believed in good faith to be unfair labor
practices on the part of the employer (Ferrer, et al. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 17 SCRA 352
[1966]). Verily, such presumption of legality prevails
even if the allegations of unfair labor practices are
subsequently found out to be untrue (People's Industrial
and Commercial Employees and Workers Org. [FFW]
vs. People's Industrial and Commercial Corporation).
Consonant with these jurisprudential pronouncements is
Article 263 of the Labor Code which clearly states "the
policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and
free collective bargaining". Paragraph (b) of the same
article guarantees the workers' "right to engage in
concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining
or for their mutual benefit and protection" and
recognizes the "right of legitimate labor organizations to
strike and picket and of employers to lockout" so long as
these actions are "consistent with the national interest"
and the grounds therefor do not involve inter-union and
intra-union disputes.
Unfair Labor Practices
___________________________________________
Wise and Co. Inc. v. Wise and Co. Employees Union-
NATU
(G.R. No. L-87672, October 13, 1989)
FACTS: The management issued a memorandum
circular introducing a profit sharing scheme for its
managers and supervisors the initial distribution. The
respondent union wrote petitioner asking for participation
in this scheme but it was denied by petitioner on the
ground that it had to adhere strictly to the CBA.
Petitioner distributed the profit sharing benefit not only to
managers and supervisors but also to all other rank and
file employees not covered by the CBA. This caused the
respondent union to file a notice of strike alleging that
petitioner was guilty of ULP because the union members
were discriminated against in the grant of the profit
sharing benefits. Management refused to proceed with
the CBA negotiations unless the last notice of strike was
first resolved. The union agreed to postpone discussions
on the profit sharing demand until a new CBA was
concluded. After a series of conciliation conferences, the
parties agreed to settle the dispute through voluntary
arbitration. The voluntary arbitrator issued an award
Page 14 of 37
ordering petitioner to likewise extend the benefits of the
1987 profit sharing scheme to the members of
respondent union. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the grant by management of profit
sharing benefits to its non-union member employees is
discriminatory against its workers who are union
members.
HELD: NO. Under the CBA between the parties, there is
a clause where the employees are classified into those
who are members of the union and those who are not.
The grant by petitioner of profit sharing benefits to the
employees outside the “bargaining unit” falls under the
ambit of its managerial prerogative. It appears to have
been done in good faith and without ulterior motive. In
the case of the union members, they derive their
benefits from the terms and conditions of the CBA
contract which constitute the law between the
contracting parties. Both the employer and the union
members are bound by such agreement. There can be
no discrimination committed by petitioner thereby as the
situation of the union employees are different and
distinct from the non-union employees. Indeed,
discrimination per se is not unlawful. There can be no
discrimination where the employees concerned are not
similarly situated.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED reversed the
decision of voluntary arbitrator.
___________________________________________
ShoeMart Inc. v. NLRC
G.R. Nos. 90795-96 August 13, 1993
FACTS: Moris Industries, Inc. is engaged in the
manufacture of leather products, such as bags, belts,
etc. It had in its employ seventy-three (73) workers, fifty-
six (56) of whom are members of a labor organization
known as Moris Industries Workers Union. It affiliated
itself with the Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions (PAFLU). The UNION, through PAFLU, invited
Moris to enter into negotiations for a CBA but within two
days, the company suddenly closed shop and ceased
operations, claiming that such a closure had become
inevitable because of business reverses.
The UNION filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice against MORIS. A week later, it commenced
another case against MORIS, this time for recovery of
wage differentials and other monetary benefits
(emergency cost of living allowance [ECOLA], sick
leave, vacation leave benefits, etc.).
Shoemart, Inc., the other corporation involved
in these cases, was impleaded by the UNION in both
cases, together with the former’s president, Mr. Henry
Sy, on the theory that SM and MORIS were one and the
same juridical entity.
During the pendency of the two cases, the
UNION disaffiliated itself from PAFLU and registered
itself as an independent labor organization. The two
cases were consolidated on motion of the UNION.
SHOEMART’s set up the claim inter alia that its
corporate personality was separate and distinct from that
of MORIS, and there was no employer-employee
relationship between it and the UNION’s members.
The first LA who handled the cases allowed
cross-examination of a witness. However, this was not
completed by counsel for MORIS. The cases were
postponed a number of times and transferred from one
labor arbiter to the other on account of the
reorganization of the Department of Labor and
Employment in the aftermath of the 1986 Revolution.
SHOEMART and Henry Sy, Sr. moved to
dismiss the complaint against them on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, there being no employment
relationship between SHOEMART and the UNION
members, MORIS’ employees.
MORIS moved that trial continue for cross-
examination and further presentation of evidence but the
LA denied the same and instead ordered the parties to
file their last pleadings after which the case shall be
considered submitted already for resolution.
SHOEMART (and Henry Sy, Sr.) filed in with
the SC a special action of certiorari to annul the Order of
Labor Arbiter. At this time however, the LA had already
rendered a decision in favor of the UNION, holding both
MORIS and SHOEMART “equally liable” to the
complaining UNION for being guilty of unfair labor
practice as charged. It declared “that indeed Moris
Industries was but a conduit of SM it appearing that the
“payrolls used by the former bear the letterhead of the
latter,” and that “Moris Industries is a family corporation
of the Sy’s, the same family that owns and controls SM
Shoe Mart, Inc.
Both SHOEMART (and Henry Sy, Sr.) and
MORIS appealed to the NLRC. Subsequently,
SHOEMART’s (and Henry Sy’s) certiorari action was
dismissed by this Court.
The respondent NLRC rendered its decision on
the consolidated cases, affirming the decision of the
Labor Arbiter.
SHOEMART and the UNION respectively
moved for reconsideration and clarification but was
dismissed for lack of merit.
Two petitions seeking, on different bases,
modification of the NLRC decision were filed by
SHOEMART and MORIS UNION were filed before the
SC. The cases were consolidated.
Page 15 of 37

ISSUE: Whether a corporation may be held liable for
acts of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal of
employees of a “sister corporation,” engaged in a
different line of business, on the theory that the latter is
the former’s alter ego or business conduit.
HELD: Yes. An examination of the Incorporation papers
of SM Shoe Mart and Moris Manufacturing show (sic)
that except for Elizabeth Sy — all other five (5)
incorporators and directors of Morris Industries are
major stockholders of SM Shoe Mart as of July 20, 1985.
That SM Shoe Mart is the exclusive buyer of all of Moris’
products;
Both companies are housed in one building and
Moris for many years has been using the payrolls of SM
Shoe Mart.
NLRC did not whimsically or capriciously
rendered a decision. In truth, it was shown to have
considered and analyzed the pertinent proofs of the
complainant UNION in relation to the defenses set up by
the private respondents.
The employees of MORIS however, cannot be
reinstated or absorbed into the pool of employees of
SHOEMART.
No claim is made that SHOEMART is other
than a marketing company, or has ever engaged in
manufacturing leather goods or products, or any other
commodities. It seems undisputed, too, that MORIS has
not been in operation for several years, its business is
non-existent; it is dead company, to all intents and
purposes. It is a defunct company at this time, whether
might have been the operations. Its stockholders and
officers have caused its extinguishment: a reality that
cannot but be acknowledged. Under the circumstances,
reinstatement of the employees to MORIS is no longer
possible. Compulsion of the stockholders and officers to
reopen for business is not a rational option. Some other
sanction must be found.
Neither may SHOEMART be compelled to
open a manufacturing company to engage in the same
line of business as MORIS in order to accommodate the
latter’s former employees, numbering some seventy or
so, or to absorb these seventy workers latter into its own
business, considering the obvious difference and
diversity in skills, experience and orientation, etc.
between its employees and those of MORIS.
No reasonable alternative thus present itself
except to required the payment of separation pay in lieu
of the reinstatement decreed by the judgment of the
respondent Commission. That liability may in the
premises properly and justly be imposed on
SHOEMART, as well as on MORIS and on the latter’s
president or executive head, jointly and severally.
___________________________________________
De Leon vs. NLRC
(G.R. No. 112661. May 30, 2001)
Facts: Petitioners are security guards assigned in the
premises of Fortune Tobacco Services, Inc. (FTC)
pursuant to a contract for security services with Fortune
Integrated Services Inc. (FISI). Sometime after, FISI
stockholders executed a “Deed of Sale of Shares of
Stock” in favor of a group of new stockholders, it also
amended its Articles of Incorporation changing its name
to Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. (MISI). FTC
terminated the contract with FISI which resulted in the
displacement of some 582 security guards assigned to
FTC, including petitioners herein.
FTC Labor Union which is an affiliate of
NAFLU, sent a Notice of Strike which resulted in the
picketing of the premises of FTC, however, RTC of
Pasig, issued a writ of injunction to enjoin the picket.
Petitioners then filed the instant case to the Arbitration
branch of the NLRC.
Petitioners that they were regular employees of
FTC which was also using the corporate names FISI and
MISI, averring that they work under the control and
supervision of FTC’s security supervisors, and that, they
were dismissed without just cause and due process.
They also claimed that their dismissal was the design of
their employer to bust their newly organized union.
Respondent FTC, on the other hand, maintained that
there was no EE-ER relationship, that petitioners were
employee of MISI a separate and distinct corporation
from FTC.
LA ruled for respondents. NLRC reversed.
Issue: WON respondents are guilty of ULP.
Held: Yes, respondents are guilty of ULP.
Ratio: Respondents were guilty of interfering with
the right of petitioners to self-organization which
constitutes unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the
Labor Code. Petitioners have been employed with FISI
since the 1980s and have since been posted at the
premises of FTC (main factory plant, tobacco re-drying
plant and warehouse). FISI, while having its own
corporate identity, was a mere instrumentality of
FTC, tasked to provide protection and security in the
company premises. The 2 corporations had identical
stockholders and the same business address. FISI also
had no other clients except FTC and other companies
belonging to the Lucio Tan group of companies.
Page 16 of 37
Moreover, the early payslips of petitioners show that
their salaries were initially paid by FTC. To enforce their
rightful benefits under the laws on Labor Standards,
petitioners formed a union which was later certified as
bargaining agent of all the security guards. On
February 1, 1991, the stockholders of FISI sold all
their participations in the corporation to a new set
of stockholders which renamed the corporation Magnum
Integrated Services, Inc. On October 15, 1991, FTC,
without any reason, pre-terminated its contract of
security services with MISI and contracted 2 other
agencies to provide security services for its premises.
This resulted in the displacement of petitioners. As
MISI had no other clients, it failed to give new
assignments to petitioners. Petitioners have remained
unemployed since then. All these facts indicate a
concerted effort on the part of respondents to remove
petitioners from the company and thus abate the
growth of the union and block its actions to enforce
their demands in accordance with the Labor Standards
laws.
The test of whether an employer has
interfered with and coerced employees within the
meaning of section (a) (1) is whether the employer
has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be
said tends to interfere with the free exercise of
employees’ rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not
necessary that there be direct evidence that any
employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by
statements of threats of the employer if there is a
reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the
employer does have an adverse effect on self-
organization and collective bargaining.”
A corporation is an entity separate and
distinct from its stockholders and from other
corporations to which it is connected. However, when
the concept of separate legal entity is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or
defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an
association of persons, or in case of two corporations,
merge them into one. The separate juridical
personality of a corporation may also be disregarded
when such corporation is a mere alter ego or
business conduit of another person. FISI was a mere
adjunct of FTC. FISI, by virtue of a contract for security
services, provided FTC with security guards to
safeguard its premises. However, records show that
FISI and FTC have the same owners and business
address, and FISI provided security services only to
FTC and other companies belonging to the Lucio Tan
group of companies. The purported sale of the shares
of the former stockholders to a new set of
stockholders who changed the name of the corporation
to Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. appears to be part
of a scheme to terminate the services of FISI’s
security guards posted at the premises of FTC and
bust their newly-organized union which was then
beginning to become active in demanding the
company’s compliance with Labor Standards laws.
Under these circumstances, the Court cannot allow
FTC to use its separate corporate personality to
shield itself from liability for illegal acts committed
against its employees.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, petition is GRANTED.
The assailed resolutions of the NLRC are SET ASIDE.
Respondents are hereby ordered to pay petitioners their
full backwages, and to reinstate them to their former
position without loss of seniority rights and privileges, or
to award them separation pay in case reinstatement is
no longer possible.
___________________________________________
ME-SHURN CORPORATION AND SAMMY CHOU,
petitioners, vs. ME-SHURN WORKERS UNION-FSM
(G.R. No. 156292, January 11, 2005)
Doctrine: To justify the closure of a business and the
termination of the services of the concerned employees,
the law requires the employer to prove that it suffered
substantial actual losses. The cessation of a company’s
operations shortly after the organization of a labor union
as well as the resumption of business barely a month
after, gives credence to the employees’ claim that the
closure was meant to discourage union membership,
and to interfere in union activities. These acts constitute
unfair labor practices.
Facts: On June 7, 1998, the regular rank and file
employees of Me-Shurn Corporation organized Me-
Shurn Workers Union-FSM, an affiliate of the February
Six Movement (FSM).6 Respondent union had a
pending application for registration with the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) through a letter dated June 11,
1998.
Ten days later, or on June 17, 1998, petitioner
corporation started placing on forced leave all the rank
and file employees who were members of the union’s
bargaining unit.
On June 23, 1998, respondent union filed a
Petition for Certification Election with the Med-Arbitration
Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), Regional Office No. 3.
Instead of filing an answer to the Petition, the
corporation filed on July 27, 1998, a comment stating
that it would temporarily lay off employees and cease
operations, on account of its alleged inability to meet the
export quota required by the Board of Investment.
Page 17 of 37
While the Petition was pending, 184 union members
allegedly submitted a retraction/withdrawal thereof on
July 14, 1998. As a consequence, the med-arbiter
dismissed the Petition. On May 7, 1999, Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) Undersecretary
Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz granted the union’s appeal
and ordered the holding of a certification election among
the rank and file employees of the corporation.
Meanwhile, on August 4, 1998, respondent
union filed a Notice of Strike against petitioner
corporation on the ground of unfair labor practice (illegal
lockout and union busting). This matter was docketed as
Case No. NCMB-RO3-BEZ-NZ-08-42-98.
On August 31, 1998, Chou Fang Kuen (alias
Sammy Chou, the other petitioner herein) and Raquel
Lamayra (the Filipino administrative manager of the
corporation) imposed a precondition for the resumption
of operation and the rehiring of laid off workers. He
allegedly required the remaining union officers to sign an
Agreement containing a guarantee that upon their return
to work, no union or labor organization would be
organized. Instead, the union officers were to serve as
mediators between labor and management.13 After the
signing of the Agreement, the operations of the
corporation resumed in September 1998.
On November 5, 1998, the union reorganized
and elected a new set of officers. Respondent Rosalina
Cruz was elected president.15 Thereafter, it filed two
Complaints docketed as NLRC Case Nos. RAB-III-11-
9586-98 and RAB-III-09-0322-99. These cases were
consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter Henry
Isorena for compulsory arbitration. Respondents
charged petitioner corporation with unfair labor practice,
illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and deficiency
in separation pay, for which they prayed for damages
and attorney’s fees.
The corporation countered that because of
economic reversals, it was compelled to close and
cease its operations to prevent serious business losses;
that under Article 283 of the Labor Code, it had the right
to do so; that in August 1998, it had paid its 342 laid off
employees separation pay and benefits in the total
amount of P1,682,863.88; and that by virtue of these
payments, the cases had already become moot and
academic. It also averred that its resumption of
operations in September 1998 had been announced and
posted at the Bataan Export Processing Zone, and that
some of the former employees had reapplied.
Petitioner corporation questioned the legality of
the representation of respondent union. Allegedly, it was
not the latter, but the Me-Shurn Independent Employees’
Union -- with Christopher Malit as president -- that was
recognized as the existing exclusive bargaining agent of
the rank and file employees and as the one that had
concluded a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
with the corporation on May 19, 1999.16 Hence, the
corporation asserted that Undersecretary Dimapilis-
Baldoz’s Decision ordering the holding of a certification
election had become moot and academic.
On the other hand, respondents contested the legality of
the formation of the Me-Shurn Independent Employees’
Union and petitioners’ recognition of it as the exclusive
bargaining agent of the employees. Respondents
argued that the pendency of the representation issue
before the DOLE had barred the alleged recognition of
the aforementioned union.
Issues:
(1) Whether the dismissal of the employees of petitioner
Meshurn Corporation is for an authorized cause.
(2) Whether respondents can maintain a suit against
petitioners.
Ruling:
1. NO. Basic is the rule in termination cases that the
employer bears the burden of showing that the dismissal
was for a just or authorized cause. Otherwise, the
dismissal is deemed unjustified. Apropos this
responsibility, petitioner corporation should have
presented clear and convincing evidence24 of imminent
economic or business reversals as a form of affirmative
defense in the proceedings before the labor arbiter or,
under justifiable circumstances, even on appeal with the
NLRC.
Obviously, on the basis of the evidence -- or
the lack thereof -- the appellate court cannot be faulted
for ruling that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in finding that the closure of petitioner
corporation was not due to alleged financial losses.
At any rate, even if we admit these additional pieces of
evidence, the circumstances surrounding the cessation
of operations of the corporation reveal the doubtful
character of its supposed financial reason.
First, the claim of petitioners that they were
compelled to close down the company to prevent further
losses is belied by their resumption of operations barely
a month after the corporation supposedly folded up.
Second, the Statements of Income and Deficit
for the years 1996 and 1997 show that at the beginning
of 1996, the corporation had a deficit of P2,474,505. Yet,
the closure was effected only after more than a year
from such year-end deficit; that is, in the middle of 1998,
shortly after the formation of the union.
Third, as a condition for the rehiring of the
employees, the union officers were made to sign an
agreement that they would not form any union upon their
return to work. This move was contrary to law.
Page 18 of 37
 Fourth, notwithstanding the Petition for
Certification Election filed by respondents and despite
knowledge of the pendency thereof, petitioners
recognized a newly formed union and hastily signed with
it an alleged Collective Bargaining Agreement. Their
preference for the new union was at the expense of
respondent union. Moncada Bijon Factory v. CIR29 held
that an employer could be held guilty of discrimination,
even if the preferred union was not company-dominated.
Fifth, petitioners were not able to prove their
allegation that some of the employees’ contracts had
expired even before the cessation of operations. We find
this claim inconsistent with their position that all 342
employees of the corporation were paid their separation
pay plus accrued benefits in August 1998.
Sixth, proper written notices of the closure were
not sent to the DOLE and the employees at least one
month before the effectivity date of the termination, as
required under the Labor Code. Notice to the DOLE is
mandatory to enable the proper authorities to ascertain
whether the closure and/or dismissals were being done
in good faith and not just as a pretext for evading
compliance with the employer’s just obligations to the
affected employees.30 This requirement is intended to
protect the workers’ right to security of tenure. The
absence of such requirement taints the dismissal.
2. NO. Neither are we prepared to believe petitioners’
argument that respondent union was not legitimate. It
should be pointed out that on June 29, 1998, it filed a
Petition for Certification Election. While this Petition was
initially dismissed by the med-arbiter on the basis of a
supposed retraction, note that the appeal was granted
and that Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz ordered the
holding of a certification election.
The DOLE would not have entertained the
Petition if the union were not a legitimate labor
organization within the meaning of the Labor Code.
Under this Code, in an unorganized establishment, only
a legitimate union may file a petition for certification
election.34 Hence, while it is not clear from the record
whether respondent union is a legitimate organization,
we are not readily inclined to believe otherwise,
especially in the light of the pro-labor policies enshrined
in the Constitution and the Labor Code.
Verily, the union has the requisite personality to
sue in its own name in order to challenge the unfair labor
practice committed by petitioners against it and its
members.36 "It would be an unwarranted impairment of
the right to self-organization through formation of labor
associations if thereafter such collective entities would
be barred from instituting action in their representative
capacity."
Finally, in view of the discriminatory acts
committed by petitioners against respondent union prior
to the holding of the certification election on September
27, 2000 -- acts that included their immediate grant of
exclusive recognition to another union as a bargaining
agent despite the pending Petition for certification
election -- the results of that election cannot be said to
constitute a repudiation by the affected employees of the
unions right to represent them in the present case.
___________________________________________
St. John Colleges v. St. John Academy Faculty &
Employees Union
(G.R. No. 167892, October 27, 2006)
FACTS: Petitioner St. John Colleges, Inc. (SJCI) is a
domestic corporation which owns and operates the St.
John’s Academy (later renamed St. John Colleges) in
Calamba, Laguna. Prior to 1998, the Academy offered a
secondary course only. The high school then employed
about 80 teaching and non-teaching personnel who
were members of the St. John Academy Faculty &
Employees Union (Union).
CBA was set to expire
During the ensuing collective bargaining
negotiations, SJCI rejected all the proposals of the
Union for an increase in worker’s benefits. This resulted
to a bargaining deadlock which led to the holding of a
valid strike by the Union
SJCI and the Union, through the efforts of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB),
agreed to refer the labor dispute to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment (SOLE) for assumption of
jurisdiction:
After which, the strike ended and classes
resumed. Subsequently, the SOLE issued an Order
dated January 19, 1998 assuming jurisdiction over the
labor dispute pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code
Pending resolution of the labor dispute before
the SOLE, the Board of Directors of SJCI approved on
February 22, 1998 a resolution recommending the
closure of the high school which was approved by the
stockholders on even date. the reason was because of
the irreconcilable differences between the school
management and the Academy’s Union particularly the
safety of our students and the financial aspect of the
ongoing CBA negotiations.
25 employees conducted a protest action within the
perimeter of the high school. The Union filed a notice of
strike with the NCMB
On May 19, 1998, SJCI filed a petition to
declare the strike illegal before the NLRC which was
docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-5-10035-98-L. It
Page 19 of 37
claimed that the strike was conducted in violation of the
procedural requirements for holding a valid strike under
the Labor Code.
On May 21, 1998, the 25 employees filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal
dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits against
SJCI before the NLRC which was docketed as RAB-IV-
5-10039-98-L. The Union members alleged that the
closure of the high school was done in bad faith in order
to get rid of the Union and render useless any decision
of the SOLE on the CBA deadlocked issues.
Labor arbiter held the strike invlid and the loss
of employment of the 25 employees; he also dismissed
the unions ULP and illegal dismissal complaint after the
favorable decision of the Labor Arbiter, SJCI resolved to
reopen the high school for school year 1999-2000.
However, it did not restore the high school teaching and
non-teaching employees it earlier terminated.
On July 23, 1999, the SOLE denied SJCI’s
motions to dismiss and certified the CBA deadlock case
to the NLRC. It ordered the consolidation of the CBA
deadlock case with the ULP, illegal dismissal, and illegal
strike cases which were then pending appeal before the
NLRC.
NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and held
that there sa ULP illegal dismissal,and there was no
strike
CA affirmed
Issue:
1. w/n it was ULP when it closed down the school
2. w/n there was illegal strike
Held: Petitioenr is guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal;
there was no illegal strike as the respondents were
dismissed and not employers when they did the strike
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the following
requisites must concur for a valid closure of the
business: (1) serving a written notice on the workers at
least one (1) month before the intended date thereof; (2)
serving a notice with the DOLE one month before the
taking effect of the closure; (3) payment of separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month or at least one half (1/2)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher,
with a fraction of at least six (6) months to be considered
as a whole year; and (4) cessation of the operation must
be bona fide
the finding of the NLRC, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, that SJCI closed the high school in
bad faith is supported by substantial evidence and is,
thus, binding on this Court. Consequently, SJCI is liable
for ULP and illegal dismissal.
The two decisive factors in determining whether
SJCI acted in bad faith are (1) the timing of, and reasons
for the closure of the high school, and (2) the timing of,
and the reasons for the subsequent opening of a college
and elementary department, and, ultimately, the
reopening of the high school department by SJCI after
only one year from its closure.
Prior to the closure of the high school by SJCI, the
parties agreed to refer the 1997 CBA deadlock to the
SOLE for assumption of jurisdiction under Article 263 of
the Labor Code. As a result, the strike ended and
classes resumed.
it closed its school allegedly because of
irreconcilable differenc between school and union
nd to circumvent the Union’s right to collective
bargaining and its members’ right to security of tenure.
By admitting that the closure was due to irreconcilable
differences between the Union and school management,
specifically, the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA
negotiations, SJCI in effect admitted that it wanted to
end the bargaining deadlock and eliminate the problem
of dealing with the demands of the Union. This is
precisely what the Labor Code abhors and punishes as
unfair labor practice since the net effect is to defeat the
Union’s right to collective bargaining.
SJCI claims it had no choice but to refuse the
Union’s demands which thereafter led to the holding of a
strike on November 10, 1998. It argues that the Union’s
alleged illegal financial demands was a valid justification
for the closure of the high school considering that it was
financially incapable of meeting said demands
As already discussed,As to tSJCs contention
that the demand of union is unreasonable, neither party
is obliged to give-in to the other’s excessive or
unreasonable demands during collective bargaining,
The Labor Code does not authorize the employer to
close down the establishment on the ground of illegal or
excessive demands of the Union. Instead, aside from
the remedy of submitting the dispute for voluntary or
compulsory arbitration, the employer may file a
complaint for ULP against the Union for bargaining in
bad faith. If found guilty, this gives rise to civil and
criminal liabilities and allows the employer to implement
a lock out, but not the closure of the establishment
resulting to the permanent loss of employment of the
whole workforce.
In fine, SJCI undermined the Labor Code’s
system of dispute resolution by closing down the high
school while the 1997 CBA negotiations deadlock issues
were pending resolution before the SOLE. The closure
was done in bad faith for the purpose of defeating the
Union’s right to collective bargaining.
he fact that after one year from the time it closed its high
school, SJCI opened a college and elementary
department, and reopened its high school department
Page 20 of 37
showed that it never intended to cease operating as an
educational institution.
e agree with the findings of the NLRC and CA
that the protest actions of the Union cannot be
considered a strike because, by then, the employer-
employee relationship has long ceased to exist because
of the previous closure of the high school on March 31,
1998.
In sum, the timing of, and the reasons for the
closure of the high school and its reopening after only
one year from the time it was closed down, show that
the closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of
circumventing the Union’s right to collective bargaining
and its members’ right to security of tenure.
Consequently, SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal
dismissal.
__________________________________________
Mariano v. Royal Interocean Lines
(G.R. No. L-12429, February 27, 1961)
FACTS: Petitioner Ermidia A. Mariano was a
stenographer-typist and filing clerk of respondent when
she was dismissed from work on October 23, 1953. She
sent a letter to the managing directors of the company in
HK through its manager in the Philippines, respondent
J.V. Kamerling. In the letter, she complained about
Kamerling’s “inconsiderate and untactful attitude”
towards the employees under him and the clients of the
company. Kamerling advised petitioner that her letter
had been forwarded to the managing directors in HK and
that said directors believed that it was impossible to
maintain her in the company.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of her
dismissal from the managing directors in HK but
received no answer to any of her 5 letters. The
Company finally offered a “compromise settlement” with
the petitioner whereby she would be paid a sum
equivalent to 6 months salary, provided that she would
sign a quitclaim embodying a provision that she would
release the company from any liability arising from her
employment.
Not satisfied with the compromise, the
petitioner filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
against the company.
The CIR rendered judgment holding the
company guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered them
to reinstate petitioner to her former position. The
company filed with the SC a petition to review the
decision of the CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was guilty of unfair
labor practice in having dismissed the respondent
because the latter had filed charges against Kamerling
not connected with or necessarily arising from union
activities.
HELD: No. Despite the employees' right to self-
organization, the employer therefore still retains his
inherent right to discipline his employees, his normal
prerogative to hire or dismiss them. The prohibition is
directed only against the use of the right to employ or
discharge as an instrument of discrimination,
interference or oppression because of one's labor or
union activities.; (See Rotenberg on Labor Relations, pp.
398-399.) Even from a liberal and grammatical point of
view, the provision in dispute has to be interpreted in the
sense that the charges, the filing, of which is the cause
of the dismissal of the employee, must be related to his
right to self-organization, in order to give rise to unfair
labor practice on the part of the employer.
As the respondent's dismissal has no relation to
union activities and the charges filed by her against the
petitioner had nothing to do with or did not arise from her
union activities, the appealed decision is hereby
reversed and the directive for the respondent's
reinstatement with backpay revoked.
Nevertheless, as the dismissal of the appellee
was without cause, because her inefficiency as the
ground or reason for her dismissal as claimed by the
appellants is belied by the successive increases of her
compensation, the amount of P3,108 for six monthly
salary, as offend by the appellants, should be paid to
her.
___________________________________________
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees
Association – NATU v. The Insular Life Assurance
(G.R. No. L-25291, January 20, 1971)
FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.,
Employees Association - NATU, FGU Insurance Group
Workers and Employees Association - NATU, and
Insular Life Building Employees Association - NATU
(herein referred to as the Unions), while still members of
the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into
separate collective bargaining agreements with the
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., and the FGU Insurance
Group (herein referred to as the Companies).
Two of the lawyers and officers of the Unions
namely Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia, tried to
dissuade the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and
joining the National Association of Trade Unions
(NATU), to no avail. Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW
and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of
the Department of Justice and were thereafter hired by
Page 21 of 37
the companies - Garcia as assistant corporate secretary
and legal assistant, and Enaje as personnel manager
and chairman of the negotiating panel for the
Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.
On October 1957, negotiations for the collective
bargaining was conducted but resulted to a deadlock.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on
the labor demands but with no satisfactory results due to
the stalemate on the matter of salary increases. This
prompted the Unions to declare a strike in protest
against what they considered the Companies’ unfair
labor practices. On May 20, 1958, the Unions went on
strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building
at Plaza Moraga.
On May 21, Jose M. Olbes, the acting manager
and president, sent individual letters to the striking
employees urging them to abandon their strike with a
promise of free coffee, movies, overtime pay, and
accommodations. He also warned the strikers if they fail
to return to work by a certain date, they might be
replaced in their jobs. Further, the Companies hired men
to break into the picket lines resulting in violence, and
the filing of criminal charges against some union officers
and members. When eventually, the strikers called off
their strike to return to their jobs, they were subjected to
a screening process by a management committee,
among the members were Garcia and Enaje. After
screening, eighty-three (83) strikers were rejected due to
pending criminal charges, and adamantly refused
readmission of thirty-four (34) officials and members of
the Unions who were most active in the strike.
The CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair
labor practice against the Companies, specifically (1)
interfering with the members of the Unions in the
exercise of their right to concerted action; and (2)
discriminating against the members of the Unions as
regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis
of their union membership and degree of participation in
the strike. After the trial, the Court of Industrial Relations
dismissed the Unions’ complaint for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the Companies are guilty of
unfair labor practice when they sent individual letters to
the strikers with the promise of additional benefits, and
notifying them to either return to work, or lose their jobs;
and
II. Whether or not the Companies are guilty of
unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
striking members of the Unions in readmission of
employees after the strike.
HELD:
First issue. The Companies contended that by sending
those letters, it constituted a legitimate exercise of their
freedom of expression. That contention is untenable.
The Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice when
they sent individual letters to the strikers. It is an act of
interference with the right to collective bargaining
through dealing with the strikers individually instead of
through their collective bargaining representatives.
Although the Unions are on strike, the employer is still
obligated to bargain with the union as the employees’
bargaining representative. Further, it is also an act of
interference for the employer to send individual letters to
the employees notifying them to return to their jobs,
otherwise, they would be replaced. Individual solicitation
of the employees urging them to cease union activity or
cease striking consists of unfair labor practice.
Furthermore, when the Companies offered to “bribe” the
strikers with “comfortable cots, free coffee, and movies,
overtime work pay” so they would abandon their strike
and return to work, it was guilty of strike-breaking and/or
union busting which constitute unfair labor practice.
Second Issue. Some of the members of the Unions
were refused readmission because they had pending
criminal charges. However, despite the fact they were
able to secure clearances, 34 officials and members
were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that
they committed acts inimical to the Companies. It should
be noted, however, that non-strikers who also had
criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal’s
office, arising from the same incidents whence against
the criminal charges against the strikers are involved,
were readily readmitted and were not required to secure
clearances. This is an act of discrimination practiced by
the Companies in the process of rehiring and is
therefore a violation of Sec. 4(a)(4) of the Industrial
Peace Act.
The respondent Companies did not merely
discriminate against all strikers in general since they
separated the active rom the less active unionists on the
basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines.
Discrimination exists where the record shows that the
union activity of the rehired strikers has been less
prominent than that of the strikers who were denied
reinstatement.
___________________________________________
REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK vs. CIR
(G.R. No. L-20303, October 3, 1967)
FACTS:
1. The Bank employs Resuello et. al. In 1958, it then
discharged the private respondents for having written a
patently libelous letter tending to cause the dishonor,
Page 22 of 37
discredit, or contempt not only of officers and employees
of this bank, but also of the bank itself.
2. The letter was actually a letter-charge, which
Private Respondents had written to the bank president,
demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality,
nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination to bank employees.
3. At the instance of respondents, Prosecutor A.
Tirona filed a complaint in the CIR alleging that the Bank
violated the Industrial Peace Act, which makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate
against an employee for having filed charges.
4. In 1960, however, the Supreme Court overruled the
decision of the CIR in the Royal Interocean case and
held that "the charge, the filing of which is the cause of
the dismissal of the employee, must be related to his
right to self-organization in order to give rise to unfair
labor practice on the part of the employer," because
"under subsection 5 of section 4(a), the employee's (1)
having filed charges or (2) having given testimony or (3)
being about to give testimony, are modified by 'under
this Act' appearing after the last item."
5. Relying upon Royal Interocean Lines v. CIR, and
Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul v. CIR, the Bank
argues that the court should have dismissed the
complaint because the discharge of the respondents had
nothing to do with their union activities as the latter in
fact admitted at the hearing that the writing of the letter-
charge was not a "union action" but merely their
"individual" act.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Bank conducted unfair labor
practice
RULING: Yes. The action of the private respondents will
affect their labor organization.
Assuming that the private respondents acted in
their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-
charge they were nonetheless protected for they were
engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their
right of self-organization that includes concerted activity
for mutual aid and protection, interference with which
constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 4(a)(1).
This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as
has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or
demands, even by a small group of employees, if in
furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted
activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated.
Indeed, when the respondents complained
against nepotism, favoritism and other management
practices, they were acting within an area marked out by
the Act as a proper sphere of collective bargaining. Even
the reference to immorality was not irrelevant as it was
made to support the respondents' other charge that the
bank president had failed to provide wholesome working
conditions, let alone a good moral example, for the
employees by practicing discrimination and favoritism in
the appointment and promotion of certain employees on
the basis of illicit relations or blood relationship with
them.
DISPOSITIVE: Private Respondents won. In final sum
and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's
conduct, identified as an interference with the
employees' right of self-organization, or as a retaliatory
action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively,
constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning
and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace
Act.
DOCTRINE: Assuming that the private respondents
acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the
letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they
were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of
their right of self-organization that includes concerted
activity for mutual aid and protection, interference with
which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section
4(a)(1). This is the view of some members of this Court.
For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or
demands, even by a small group of employees, if in
furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted
activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated.
___________________________________________
HSBC Employees Union vs. NLRC
(G.R. No. 156635, January 11, 2016)
FACTS: The case at bar arose from the issuance of a
non-executive job evaluation program (JEP) lowering the
starting salaries of future employees, resulting from the
changes made in the job grades and structures, which
was unilaterally implemented by the Bank retroactive to
January 1, 1993. The program in question was
announced by the Bank on January 18, 1993.
UNION’S Answer: The Union, through its
President, Peter Paul Gamelo, reiterated its previous
verbal objections to the Banks unilateral decision to
devise and put into effect the said program because it
allegedly was in violation of the existing collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) between the parties and
thus constituted unfair labor practice. The Union
demanded the suspension of the implementation of the
JEP and proposed that the same be instead taken up or
included in their upcoming CBA negotiations.
Page 23 of 37
 HSBC’s Reply: The Bank replied in a letter
dated January 25, 1993 that the JEP was issued in
compliance with its obligation under the CBA, apparently
referring to Article III, Section 18 thereof which provides
that: Within the lifetime of this Agreement the BANK
shall conduct a job evaluation of employee positions.
The implementation timetable of the said exercise shall
be furnished the UNION by the BANK within two (2)
months from the signing of this Agreement.
This prompted the Union to undertake
concerted activities to protest the implementation of the
JEP, such as whistle blowing during office hours starting
on March 15, 1993 up to the 23rd day, and writing to
clients of the Bank allegedly to inform them of the real
situation then obtaining and of an imminent disastrous
showdown between the Bank and the Union.
The Union engaged in said activities despite
the fact that as early as February 11, 1993, it had
already initiated the renegotiation of the non-
representational provisions of the CBA by submitting
their proposal to the Bank, to which the latter submitted
a reply. As a matter of fact, negotiations on the CBA
commenced on March 5, 1993 and continued through
March 24, 1993 when the Bank was forced to declare a
recess to last for as long as the Union kept up with its
concerted activities. The Union refused to concede to
the demand of the Bank unless the latter agreed to
suspend the implementation of the JEP.
The Bank filed with the Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC a complaint for unfair labor practice against
the Union allegedly for engaging in the contrived
activities against the ongoing CBA negotiations between
the Bank and the Union in an attempt to unduly coerce
and pressure the Bank into agreeing to the Unions
demand for the suspension of the implementation of the
JEP. It averred that such concerted activities, despite
the ongoing CBA negotiations, constitute unfair labor
practice (ULP) and a violation of the Unions duty to
bargain collectively under Articles 249 (c) and 252 of the
Labor Code.
The Union filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action. It
alleged that its united activities were actually being
waged to protest the Banks arbitrary imposition of a job
evaluation program and its unjustifiable refusal to
suspend the implementation thereof. It further claimed
that the unilateral implementation of the JEP was in
violation of Article I, Section 3 of the CBA which prohibits
a diminution of existing rights, privileges and benefits
already granted and enjoyed by the employees. To be
sure, so the Union contended, the object of the Bank in
downgrading existing CBA salary scales, despite its
sanctimonious claim that the reduced rates will apply
only to future employees, is to torpedo the salary
structure built by the Union through three long decades
of periodic hard bargaining with the Bank and to
thereafter replace the relatively higher-paid unionized
employees with cheap newly hired personnel. In light of
these circumstances, the Union insists that the right to
engage in these concerted activities is protected under
Article 246 of the Labor Code regarding non-abridgment
of the right to self-organization and, hence, is not
actionable in law.
In its Opposition,[7] the Bank stated that the
Union was actually challenging merely that portion of the
JEP providing for a lower rate of salaries for future
employees. Contrary to the Unions allegations in its
motion to dismiss that the JEP had resulted in diminution
of existing rights, privileges and benefits, the program
has actually granted salary increases to, and in fact is
already being availed of by, the rank and file staff. The
Unions objections are premised on the erroneous belief
that the salary rates for future employees is a matter
which must be subject of collective bargaining
negotiation. The Bank believes that the implementation
of the JEP and the resultant lowering of the starting
salaries of future employees, as long as there is no
diminution of existing benefits and privileges being
accorded to existing rank and file staff, is entirely a
management prerogative.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint with
prejudice and ordered the parties to continue with the
collective bargaining negotiations, there having been no
showing that the Union acted with criminal intent in
refusing to comply with its duty to bargain but was
motivated by the refusal of management to suspend the
implementation of its job evaluation program, and that it
is not evident that the concerted activities caused
damage to the Bank.
On appeal, respondent NLRC declared that
based on the facts obtaining in this case, it becomes
necessary to resolve whether or not the Unions
objections to the implementation of the JEP are valid
and, if it is without basis, whether or not the concerted
activities conducted by the Union constitute unfair labor
practice. It held that the labor arbiter exceeded his
authority when he ordered the parties to return to the
bargaining table and continue with CBA negotiations,
considering that his jurisdiction is limited only to labor
disputes arising from those cases provided for under
Article 217 of the Labor Code, and that the labor arbiters
participation in this instance only begins when the
appropriate complaint for unfair labor practice due to a
party’s refusal to bargain collectively is filed.
Consequently, the case was ordered remanded to the
arbitration branch of origin for further proceedings in
accordance with the guidelines provided for therein.
Hence, this petition.
Page 24 of 37

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner acted in bad faith in
implementing the JE Program.
RULING: NO. We find no merit in the petition. In the
case at bar, private respondent union has miserably
failed to convince this Court that the petitioner acted in
bad faith in implementing the JE Program. There is no
showing that the JE Program was intended to
circumvent the law and deprive the members of
respondent union of the benefits they used to receive.
Accordingly, this Court, in a number of cases,
has recognized and affirmed the prerogative of
management to implement a job evaluation program or a
reorganization for as long as it is not contrary to law,
morals or public policy. In upholding managements
prerogative to implement the JEP, the Court held therein
that:
x x x It is the prerogative of management to
regulate, according to its discretion and judgment, all
aspects of employment. This flows from the established
rule that labor law does not authorize the substitution of
the judgment of the employer in the conduct of its
business. Such management prerogative may be
availed of without fear of any liability so long as it is
exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating
or circumventing the rights of employees under special
laws or valid agreement and are not exercised in a
malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton
manner or out of malice or spite.
It has been held that the crucial question
whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to
bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the
individual case. There is no per se test of good faith in
bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be
drawn from the facts. To some degree, the question of
good faith may be a question of credibility. The effect of
an employers or a unions actions individually is not the
test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such
occasions or actions, considered as a whole, and the
inferences fairly drawn therefrom collectively may offer a
basis for the finding of the NLRC. This, the court or the
quasi-judicial agency concerned can do only after it has
made a comprehensive review of the allegations made
in the pleadings filed and the evidence presented in
support thereof by the parties, but definitely not where,
as in the present case, the accusation of unfair labor
practice was negated and subsequently discharged on a
mere motion to dismiss.
It is a well-settled rule that labor laws do not
authorize interference with the employer’s judgment in
the conduct of his business. The Labor Code and its
implementing rules do not vest in the labor arbiters nor
in the different divisions of the NLRC nor in the courts
managerial authority.[16] The hiring, firing, transfer,
demotion, and promotion of employees has been
traditionally identified as a management prerogative
subject to limitations found in the law, a collective
bargaining agreement, or in general principles of fair
play and justice. This is a function associated with the
employers inherent right to control and manage
effectively its enterprise. Even as the law is solicitous of
the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of
an employer to exercise what are clearly management
prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its
own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be
denied.[17]
Notwithstanding the relevance of the foregoing
disquisition, considering however the factual
antecedents in this case, or the lack of a complete
presentation thereof, we are constrained to refrain from
ruling outright in favor of the Bank. While it would appear
that remanding the case would mean a further delay in
its disposition, we are not inclined to sacrifice equity and
justice for procedural technicalities or expediency. The
order dismissing the complaint for ULP with prejudice, to
say the least, leaves much to be desired.
WHEREFORE, subject to the foregoing
observation, the challenged disposition of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby
AFFIRMED.
___________________________________________
PhilCom Employees Union vs. PhilCom
(G.R. No. 144315, July 17, 2006)
Doctrine: Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate
the workers' right to organize. The prohibited acts are
related to the workers' right to self-organization and to
the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the
acts, no matter how unfair, are not unfair labor practices.
Facts:
• The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between petitioner Philcom Employees Union
and the respondent Philcom Corporation
expired.
o the parties started negotiations for the
renewal of their CBA in July 1997
o While negotiations were ongoing, PEU
filed a Notice of Strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) – National Capital
Region
 Ground: perceived unfair
labor practice committed by
the company
Page 25 of 37
 (a) PABX transfer and
contractualization of PABX
service and position;
(b) Massive
contractualization;
(c) Flexible labor and
additional work/function;
(d) Disallowance of union
leave intended for union
seminar;
(e) Misimplementation and/or
non-implementation of
employees' benefits like shoe
allowance, rainboots,
raincoats, OIC shift
allowance, P450.00 monthly
allowance, driving allowance,
motorcycle award and full-
time physician;
(f) Non-payment,
discrimination and/or
deprivation of overtime,
restday work, waiting/stand
by time and staff meetings;
(g) Economic inducement by
promotion during CBA
negotiation;
(h) Disinformation scheme,
surveillance and interference
with union affairs;
(i) Issuance of
memorandum/notice to
employees without giving
copy to union, change in
work schedule at Traffic
Records Section and ITTO
policies; and
(j) Inadequate transportation
allowance, water and
facilities."
o The company, then, suspended the
ongoing CBA negotiation
 Ground: bargaining deadlock
o The union went for another strike
• At a conciliation conference held at the NCMB-
NCR office, the parties agreed to consolidate
the two (2) Notices of Strike filed by the union
and to maintain the status quo during the
pendency of the proceedings
o While the union and the company
officers and representatives were
meeting, the remaining union officers
and members staged a strike at the
company premises.
• The company immediately filed a petition for
the Secretary of Labor and Employment to
assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
o Acting Labor Secretary Trajano:
enjoining any strike or lockout,
whether threatened or actual, directing
the parties to cease and desist from
committing any act that may
exacerbate the situation/
• Secretary of Labor: The Union's
Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out Portions of
and Attachments in Philcom's Position Paper is
hereby denied for lack of merit.
The Union's charges of
unfair labor practice
against the Company
are hereby dismissed.
• CA: Violations of CBAs, except those gross in
character, are mere grievances resolvable
through the appropriate grievance machinery or
voluntary arbitration as provided in the CBAs
Issue/s: 1.) Was there an illegal strike?
2.) Was there unfair labor practice?
Held: 1.) The Strike was illegal having found that PEU's
officers and members have committed illegal acts during
the strike.
2.) Those acts [enumerated] do not constitute
unfair labor practices under Article 248 of the Labor
Code
Ratio:
1.) On illegal strike:
• Philcom is engaged in a vital industry (in
this case, Philcom is engaged with the
communication industry) protected by
Presidential Decree No. 823 (PD 823), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 849,
from strikes and lockouts.
o the striking employees violated the no-
strike policy of the State in regard to
vital industries
• The Secretary had already assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute. Despite the
issuance of the return-to-work orders dated
Page 26 of 37
 19 November and 28 November 1997, the
striking employees failed to return to work
and continued with their strike.
o A return-to-work order is immediately
effective and executory despite the
filing of a motion for reconsideration. It
must be strictly complied with even
during the pendency of any petition
questioning its validity.
• PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of
the grievance procedure established in the
CBA.
o A strike declared on the basis of
grievances which have not been
submitted to the grievance committee
as stipulated in the CBA of the parties
is premature and illegal.
2.) On ULP:
• Unfair labor practices of the employer are
enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code
(check your codal, please)
 In this case, do not fall under any of
the prohibited acts defined and
enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor
Code.
 The issues of misimplementation or
non-implementation of employee
benefits, non-payment of overtime and
other monetary claims, inadequate
transportation allowance, water, and
other facilities, are all a matter of
implementation or interpretation of the
economic provisions of the CBA
between Philcom and PEU subject to
the grievance procedure.
o The Union failed to convincingly show that
there is flagrant and/or malicious refusal by the
Company to comply with the economic
provisions stipulated in the CBA.
 Guys, here inexplain kung bakit hindi
ULP yung acts nun employer. Medyo
madami sya kung i-enumerate.
Examples na lang, hehe:
 On contractualization and economic
inducement: the acts of said company
qualify as a valid exercise of
management prerogative. It is not
unfair labor practice to contract out
work for reason of reduction of labor
cost through the acquisition of
automatic machines.
 On the union's charge that
management disallowed leave of
union officers and members to attend
union seminar: this is belied by the
evidence submitted by the union itself.
In a letter to PEU's President, the
company granted the leave of several
union officers and members to attend
a seminar notwithstanding that its
request to be given more details about
the affair was left unheeded by the
union. Those who were denied leave
were urgently needed for the
operation of the company.
__________________________________________
G. Aronson Co., Inc vs. ALU
(G.R. No. L-23010, July 9, 1971)
___________________________________________
People’s Industrial and Commercial Employees
Union v. PICC
(G.R. No. L-37687, March 15, 1982)
___________________________________________
Lapanday Workers' Union vs. NLRC.
(G.R. Nos. 95494-95, September 7, 1995)
CASE BRIEF: Petitioner Lapanday Agricultural Workers’
Union (Union for brevity) and petitioners-workers of
Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation
and CADECO Agro Development Philippines, Inc., seek
to reverse the consolidated Decision, dated August 29,
1990,1 rendered by public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, declaring their strike illegal and
ordering the dismissal of their leaders.
FACTS: Private respondents are sister companies
engaged in the production of bananas while peitioner
Union is the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank
and file employees of private respondents. Union has a
collective bargaining agreement with private
respondents. A few months before the expiration of their
CBA, private respondents initiated certain management
policies which disrupted the relationship of the parties.
First, respondents contracted Philippine Eagle
Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to provide security
services for their business premises. Their contract also
called for the protection of the lives and limbs of private
respondents’ officers, employees and guests within
company premises. The Union branded the security
guards posted within the company premises as private
respondents’ “goons” and “special forces.” It also
accused the guards of intimidating and harassing their
members. Second, respondents conducted seminars on
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Human Development and Industrial Relations (HDIR) for
their managerial and supervisory employees and, later,
the rank-and-filers, to promote their social education and
economic growth. Among the topics discussed in the
seminar were the mission statement of the company,
corporate values, and the Philippine political spectrum.
The Union claimed that the module on the Philippine
political spectrum lumped the ANGLO (Alliance of
Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization), with other
outlawed labor organizations such as the National
Democratic Front or other leftist groups. Union directed
its members not to attend the seminars scheduled.
Union, led by petitioners Bacolod and Arao, picketed the
premises of the Philippine Eagle Protectors to show their
displeasure on the hiring of the guards. Worse still, the
Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). It accused
the company of unfair labor practices consisting of
coercion of employees, intimidation of union members
and union-busting.
While issues were being discussed before
NCMB, Martinez, a member of the Board of Directors of
the Union, was gunned down in his house. The gunman
was later identified as an alleged member of the new
security forces of private respondents. The day after the
killing, most of the members of the Union refused to
report for work. They returned to work the following day
but they did not comply with the “quota system” adopted
by the management to bolster production output.
Allegedly, the Union instructed the workers to reduce
their production to 30%. Respondents charged the
Union with economic sabotage through slowdown.
Respondents filed separate charges against the Union
and its members for illegal strike, unfair labor practice
and damages, with prayer for injunction. Petitioners
skipped work to pay their last respect to Martinez. Again,
petitioners did not report for work. Instead, they
proceeded to private respondents’ office at Lanang,
carrying placards and posters which called for the
removal of the security guards, the ouster of certain
management officials, and the approval of their mass
leave application. Their mass action did not succeed.
A strike vote was conducted among the
members of the Union and those in favor of the strike
won overwhelming support from the workers. The result
of the strike vote was then submitted to the NCMB. Two
days later, the Union struck.
Before the promulgation of the decision of LA,
the Union, together with Basco and 25 other workers,
filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal
suspension against LADECO. On even date, another
complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal
was filed by the Union, together with Arquilao Bacolod
and 58 other complainants.
ISSUE: Whether the Union staged an illegal strike.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
On Illegal Strike
LA: Union staged an illegal strike.
On ULP and Illegal Dismissal
LA: Declared LADECO and CADECOguilty of unfair
labor practices and illegal dismissal and ordered the
reinstatement of the dismissed employees of private
respondents, with backwages and other benefits.
It considered the refusal of the workers to report for work
on justified by the circumstance then prevailing, the
killing of Martinez.
Consolidated Decision:
NLRC: Declared strike as illegal.
As a consequence thereof, the following employees-
union officers are declared to have lost their employment
status with LADECO and CADECO. However, the
individual respondents (union members), being merely
rank-and-file employees and who merely joined the
strike declared as illegal, are ordered reinstated but
without backwages, the period they were out of work is
deemed the penalty for the illegal strike they staged. It
further ordered the Union to desist from further
committing an illegal strike. Lastly, it dismissed the
complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension
and illegal dismissal for lack of merit.
COURT RATIONALE:
Yes. The strike conducted by the union on October 12,
1988 is plainly illegal as it was held within the seven (7)
day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article
263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in
holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor
and Employment from verifying whether it carried the
approval of the majority of the union members. It set to
naught an important policy consideration of our law on
strike. Considering this finding, we need not exhaustively
rule on the legality of the work stoppage conducted by
the union and some of their members on September 9
and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the ruling of the
public respondent on the matter is supported by
substantial evidence.
We affirm the decision of the public respondent
limiting the penalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the
illegal strike, especially the officers of the union who
served as its major players. They cannot claim good
faith to exculpate themselves. They admitted knowledge
of the law on strike, including its procedure. They cannot
violate the law which ironically was cast to promote their
interest.
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We, likewise, agree with the public respondent that the
union members who were merely instigated to
participate in the illegal strike should be treated
differently from their leaders. Part of our benign
consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-
and-file workers who were merely misled in supporting
illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated workers
shall not be entitled to backwages as they should not be
compensated for services skipped during the illegal
strike.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure
to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
public respondent. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
___________________________________________
Shell Oil Workers’ Union v. Shell Company & CIR
(G.R. No. L-28607, May 31, 1971)
FACTS: Respondent Shell Company of the Philippines
(COMPANY) dissolved its security guard section
stationed at its Pandacan Installation, notwithstanding its
(guard section) continuance and that such is assured by
an existing collective bargaining contract. The
respondent company transferred 18 security guards to
its other department and consequently hired a private
security agency to undertake the work of said security
guards. This resulted in a strike called by petitioner Shell
Oil Workers’ Union (UNION), The President certified it to
respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). CIR
declared the strike illegal on the ground that such
dissolution was a valid exercise of a management
prerogative. Thus this appeal is taken.
Petitioner argued that the 18 security guards
affected are part of the bargaining unit and covered by
the existing collective bargaining contract, as such, their
transfers and eventual dismissals are illegal being done
in violation of the existing contract. The Company
maintained that in contracting out the security service
and redeploying the 18 security guards affected, it was
merely performing its legitimate prerogative to adopt the
most efficient and economical method of operation, that
said action was motivated by business consideration in
line with past established practice and made after notice
to and discussion with the Union, that the 18 guards
concerned were dismissed for wilfully refusing to obey
the transfer order, and that the strike staged by the
Union is illegal.
ISSUE: Whether the existing collective bargaining
contract on maintaining security guard section, among
others, constitute a bar to the decision of the
management to contract out security guards.
RULING: YES. The strike was legal because there was
a violation of the collective bargaining agreement by
Company. It was part of the CBA that the Security Guard
Section will remain. Yet, the Company did not comply
with the stipulation in CBA. It was thus an assurance of
security of tenure, at least, during the lifetime of the
agreement. For what is involved is the integrity of the
agreement reached, the terms of which should be
binding on both parties
The stand of Shell Company as to the scope of
management prerogative is not devoid of plausibility,
management prerogative of the Company would have
been valid if it were not bound by what was stipulated in
CBA. The freedom to manage the business remains with
management. It cannot be denied the faculty of
promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study
of what units are essential for its operation. To it belongs
the ultimate determination of whether services should be
performed by its personnel or contracted to outside
agencies. However, while management has the final say
on such matter, the labor union is not to be completely
left out.
An unfair labor practice is committed by a labor
union or its agent by its refusal ‘to bargain collectively
with the employer’. Collective bargaining does not end
with the execution of an agreement, being a continuous
process, the duty to bargain necessarily imposing on the
parties the obligation to live up to the terms of such a
collective bargaining agreement if entered into, it is
undeniable that non-compliance therewith constitutes an
unfair labor practice.
The right to self-organization guarded by the
Industrial Peace Act explicitly includes the right “to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and to the mutual aid or protection.”
The employee, tenant or laborer is inhibited from striking
or walking out of his employment only when so enjoined
by the CIR and after a dispute has been submitted
thereto and pending award or decision by the court of
such dispute.
In the present case, the employees or laborers
may strike before being ordered not to do so and before
an industrial dispute is submitted to the CIR, subject to
the power of the latter, after hearing when public interest
so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be
promptly decided or settled, to order them to return to
work, with the consequence that if the strikers fail to
return to work, when so ordered, the court may authorize
the employer to accept other employees or laborers.”
Thus a strike may not be staged only when, during the
pendency of an industrial dispute, the CIR has issued
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the proper injunction against the laborers (section 19,
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended).
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent
Court of Industrial Relations of August 5, 1967 is
reversed.
**NOTE:
BELIEF IN GOOD FAITH THAT EMPLOYER COMMITTED UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE RENDERS STRIKE LEGAL:
It is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice
committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good faith is
entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a strike. So it
was declared: “As a consequence, we hold that the strike in question
had been called to offset what petitioners were wanted in believing in
good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of Management,
that petitioners were not bound, therefore, to wait for the expiration of
thirty (30) days from notice of strike before staging the same, that
said strike was not, accordingly, illegal and that the strikers had not
thereby lost their status as employees of respondents herein.”
___________________________________________
Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc (INPORT) vs.
NLRC
(G.R. No. 103560, July 6, 1995)
Facts: Petitioner’s employees stopped working and
gathered in a mass action to express their grievances
regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay.
Said employees were all members of the Macajalar
Labor Union — Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW)
with whom petitioner had an existing collective
bargaining agreement.
Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and
arrastre services at the port of Cagayan de Oro. The
strike paralyzed operations at said port.
The strikers filed individual notices of strike
(“Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-Welga”) with the
then Ministry of Labor and Employment.
With the failure of conciliation conferences
between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with
prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction.
The National Labor Relations Commission
issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter,
majority of the strikers returned to work, leaving herein
private respondents who continued their protest.
For not having complied with the formal
requirements in Article 264 of the Labor Code, 3 the
strike staged by petitioner’s workers on April 30, 1985
was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal. 4 The
workers who participated in the illegal strike did not,
however, lose their employment, since there was no
evidence that they participated in illegal acts. After
noting that petitioner accepted the other striking
employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held that the
private respondents should similarly be allowed to return
to work without having to undergo the required
screening to be undertaken by their union (MLU-FFW).
As regards the six private respondents who
were union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they
could not have possibly been “duped or tricked” into
signing the strike notice for they were active participants
in the conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware of
what was going on. Hence, said union officers should be
accepted back to work after seeking reconsideration
from herein petitioner. 5
The NLRC affirmed with modification 8 the
Arbiter’s decision. It held that the concerted action by the
workers was more of a “protest action” than a strike.
Private respondents, including the six union officers,
should also be allowed to work unconditionally to avoid
discrimination. However, in view of the strained relations
between the parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu
of reinstatement.
Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
public respondent modified the above resolution.
The Commission ruled that since private
respondents were not actually terminated from service,
there was no basis for reinstatement. However, it
awarded six months’ salary as separation pay or
financial assistance in the nature of “equitable relief.”
The award for backwages was also deleted for lack of
factual and legal basis. In lieu of backwages,
compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given.
Issue: Whether separation pay and backwages be
awarded by public respondent NLRC to participants of
an illegal strike?
Held: Reinstatement and backwages or, if no longer
feasible, separation pay, can only be granted if sufficient
bases exist under the law, particularly after a showing of
illegal dismissal. However, while the union members
may thus be entitled under the law to be reinstated or to
receive separation pay, their expulsion from the union in
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement
renders the same impossible.
Ratio: A strike, considered as the most effective weapon
of labor, 13 is defined as any temporary stoppage of
work by the concerted action of employees as a result of
an industrial or labor dispute. 14 A labor dispute includes
any controversy or matter concerning terms or
conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employers and employees.
Page 30 of 37
 Private respondents and their co-workers
stopped working and held the mass action on April 30,
1985 to press for their wages and other benefits. What
transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of
work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute.
The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved
the legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that
the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the
requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263) paragraphs
(c) and (f) of the Labor Code.
The individual notices of strike filed by the
workers did not conform to the notice required by the law
to be filed since they were represented by a union (MLU-
FFW) which even had an existing collective bargaining
agreement with INPORT.
Neither did the striking workers observe the
strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period and
reporting requirements.
A union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost their
employment status. 20 An ordinary striking worker
cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal
strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts
during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may
be terminated from work when he knowingly participates
in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he
commits an illegal act during a strike.
In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the
majority of the striking workers, including union officers,
back to work. Private respondents were left to continue
with the strike after they refused to submit to the
“screening” required by the company.
Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker
merely participating in an illegal strike may not be
terminated from his employment. It is only when he
commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be
declared to have lost his employment status. Since there
appears no proof that these union members committed
illegal acts during the strike, they cannot be dismissed.
The striking union members among private respondents
are thus entitled to reinstatement, there being no just
cause for their dismissal.
However, considering that a decade has
already lapsed from the time the disputed strike
occurred, we find that to award separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement would be more practical and appropriate.
No backwages will be awarded to private
respondent-union members as a penalty for their
participation in the illegal strike. Their continued
participation in said strike, even after most of their co-
workers had returned to work, can hardly be rewarded
by such an award.
The fate of private respondent-union officers is
different. Their insistence on unconditional reinstatement
or separation pay and backwages is unwarranted and
unjustified. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike,
the law mandates that a union officer may be terminated
from employment.
Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT
previously accepted other union officers and that the
screening required by it was uncalled for, still it cannot
be gainsaid that it possessed the right and prerogative to
terminate the union officers from service. The law, in
using the word may, grants the employer the option of
declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal
strike as having lost his employment.
Moreover, an illegal strike which, more often
than not, brings about unnecessary economic disruption
and chaos in the workplace should not be countenanced
by a relaxation of the sanctions prescribed by law.
The union officers are, therefore, not entitled to
any relief.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, from the foregoing
premises, the petition in G.R. No. 103560 (“Gold City
Integrated Port Service Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al.”) is GRANTED. One month salary for
each year of service until 1985 is awarded to private
respondents who were not union officers as separation
pay. The petition in G.R. No. 103599 (“Adelo Ebuna, et
al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.”) is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
___________________________________________
De Ocampo v. NLRC
(G.R. No. 81077, June 6, 1990)
FACTS: 65 employees of private respondent Makati
Development Corporation were terminated on the
ground of the expiration of their contracts; that the said
employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
the MDC. As a result of the aforementioned termination,
the Philippine Transport and General Workers
Association, of which the complainants were members,
filed a notice of strike on the grounds of union-busting,
subcontracting of projects which could have been
assigned to the dismissed employees, and unfair labor
practice. The PTGWA declared a strike and established
picket lines in the perimeter of the MDC premises. The
MDC filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a motion
to declare the strike illegal and restrain the workers from
continuing the strike. On that same day and several
days thereafter the MDC filed applications for clearance
to terminate the employment of 90 of the striking
workers, whom it had meanwhile preventively
suspended. The said workers, 74 were project
Page 31 of 37
employees under contract with the MDC with fixed terms
of employment. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
denying the applications for clearance filed by the MDC
and directing it to reinstate the individual complainants
with two months back wages each.
It was modified by the NLRC which is now
faulted by the petitioners for grave abuse of discretion.
The contention is that the public respondent acted
arbitrarily and erroneously in ruling that: a) the motion for
reconsideration was filed out of time; b) the strike was
illegal; and c) the separation of the project employees
was justified.
ISSUE(s): WON the NLRC was proper in ruling that (a)
the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time; (b)
the strike was illegal; and (c) the separation of the
project employees was justified?
HELD: MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION, CASE
AT BAR. – Motions for reconsideration of any order,
resolution or decision of the Commission shall not be
entertained except when based on palpable or patent
errors, provided that the motion is under oath and filed
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the order,
resolution or decision, with proof of service that a copy
of the same has been furnished, within the aforesaid
reglementary period, the adverse party and provided
further, that only one such motion shall be entertained.
However, this section was promulgated only on
November 5, 1986, and became effective only on
November 29, 1986, after the required publication. It
was therefore not yet in force when the required
resolution in the present case was rendered in 1984.
Apparently the reglementary period then was fifteen
days.
REGLAMENTARY PERIOD, WHEN IT COMMENCE. –
The date that the copy of the decision was received by
the petitioner it is only then that the reglementary period
commenced to run.
STRIKE, CASE AT BAR. – The strike was indeed illegal.
In the first place, it was based not on the ground of
unresolved economic issues, which was the only ground
allowed at that time, when the policy was indeed to limit
and discourage strikes. Secondly, the strike was
declared only after 6 days from the notice of strike and
before the lapse of the 30-day period prescribed in the
said law for a cooling-off of the differences between the
workers and management and a possible avoidance of
the intended strike.
The leaders of the illegal strike were correctly
punished with dismissal, but their followers (other than
the contract workers) were properly ordered reinstated,
considering their lesser degree of responsibility. The
penalty imposed upon the leaders was only proper
because it was they who instigated the strike even if
they knew, or should have known, that it was illegal. It
was also fair to rule that the reinstated strikers were not
entitled to backpay as they certainly should not be
compensated for services not rendered during the illegal
strike. This is a reasonable compromise between the
demands of the workers and the rights of the employer.
PROJECT EMPLYEES, CASE AT BAR. – Contract
workers are not considered regular employees, their
services being needed only when there are projects to
be undertaken. The rationale of this rule is that if a
project has already been completed, it would be unjust
to require the employer to maintain them in the payroll
while they are doing absolutely nothing except waiting
until another project is begun, if at all. In effect, these
stand-by workers would be enjoying the status of
privileged retainers, collecting payment for work not
done, to be disbursed by the employer from profits not
earned. This is not fair by any standard and can only
lead to a coddling of labor at the expense of
management.
However, this rule is not applicable in the case
at bar, and for good reason. The record shows that
although the contracts of the project workers had indeed
expired, the project itself was still on-going and so
continued to require the workers’ services for its
completion. There is no showing that such services were
unsatisfactory to justify their termination. One can
therefore only wonder why, in view of these
circumstances, the contract workers were not retained to
finish the project they had begun and were still working
on.
Their services were discontinued by the MDC
not because of the expiration of their contracts, which
had not prevented their retention or rehiring before as
long as the project they were working on had not yet
been completed. The real purpose of the MDC was to
retaliate against the workers, to punish them for their
defiance by replacing them with more tractable
employees.
___________________________________________
Ferrer v. CIR
(G.R. No. 2446267-68, May 31, 1966)
Facts:
• Hon. Ansberto P. Paredes, the trial judge, rendered a
decision dismissing the complaints in both cases.
• On motion for reconsideration filed by the
Management, the Court of Industrial Relations en banc,
dismissed the complaint. Decreed that the officers and
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members of the Union who had participated in a
peaceful strike staged by the latter from July 1 to July
15, 1963, "be considered to have lost their status as
employees of the companies".
• March 27, 1963 – immediately after an election, which
the Union obtained the requisites majority, it submitted
to the management a set of demands for a CBA. This
led to negotiations and a draft of agreement were
incorporated. Due to additional points, another draft of
agreement was prepared.
• May 29, 1963 – another draft was drawn to which the
Management refers as “final draft”. However, petitioners'
representatives pressed for the inclusion of a union
clause, an accumulated sick leave clause, and an
accumulated vacation leave clause, apart from the
increase of the high cost of living monthly allowance
from P20.00 to P30.00, the creation of a grievance
committee and a general salary increase. When the
union’s request for the inclusion of a union shop or union
security clause was not incorporated, it refused to sign
the agreement.
• June 7, 1963 – the Management sent a memorandum
to all of its employees, purporting to inform them of the
status of the negotiations with their representatives, and
stating that the latter had refused to sign the draft of
agreement — copies of which were made available to all
employees — and instead "came with a new demand —
'Union Shop' " — upon the ground that such was the
desire of the Union members, who had allegedly
disauthorized the officers of the Union.
• June 10-15, 1963 - several members of the Union
resigned.
• June 13, 1963 - Petitioners filed a 30-day notice of
strike. (Reason: Respondents had been "bargaining in
bad faith"). However, the Management, in turn, filed
unfair labor practice charges against the Union, for
alleged refusal to bargain.
• June 10 to June 22, 1963 — the Management had
transferred 2 members of the Union, suspended a third
one and assigned still another to a work less dignified
than that which he did before.
• June 24, 1963 - Petitioners filed an unfair labor
practice charge against the Management, for the
suspension or demotion of union members due allegedly
to union activities.
• June 25, 1963 - Union gave another notice of strike
upon the ground that the Management was engaged in
unfair labor practices, by suspending, demoting,
intimidating and coercing union members, on account of
their union activities.
• July 1 to July 15, 1963 – in accordance with a strike
vote, the Union staged a strike.
Issue: WON the strike was legal.
Ruling:
Respondents:
Maintained that petitioner failed to give a 30-day notice
of their intention to strike and the strike had allegedly
been called in bad faith.
Petitioners:
Strike was legal because it was provoked by alleged
unfair labor practices on the part of the respondents and
because said petitioners had acted in good faith in
staging said strike.
CIR en banc
The strike staged was not provoked by ULP on
the part of the Management. Since 30 days had not
elapsed since appellants had given the corresponding
notice, the strike was illegal and those who took part in it
are deemed separated from the service.
The trial judge held otherwise. Petitioners were
reasonably justified in believing that the respondents'
acts constituted ULP and that petitioners had to strike in
order to arrest the evil effects of said practices upon the
Union and its members.
Supreme Court
We are inclined to agree with the latter view.
The fact that both parties affixed their initials to the
"draft" does not necessarily prove that the same was
more "final" than the "final draft". The drafts signed was
no more than a draft of contract, not a contract in itself.
It is not true that petitioners had made new
demands. The demand for a union shop or union
security clause, which was the main bone of contention,
had been included in the draft of agreement. What
happened, merely, was that the demands incorporated
in said draft were discussed by both parties, one after
the other; that an agreement on the former did not
connote an abandonment of the latter; and that, after the
settlement of one issue, it was understood that the
others would be taken up thereafter.
When the Union members learned that said
document did not include the union shop or union
security clause, they withdrew from their representatives
the authority to sign, on their behalf, the collective
bargaining agreement with the Management. Under
these circumstances, said representatives could not
validly sign said agreement, and their refusal to do so is
not and cannot be an act of bad faith.
Neither may the Union members be held to
have acted in bad faith in so withdrawing said authority
from their representatives, unless the clause
aforementioned were included in the agreement, since
that clause was part of their original demands and their
representatives could not waive it without their consent.
Page 33 of 37
 Although the Management may have had the
strict legal right to take against union members the
disciplinary and other administrative measures, there is
no denying the fact that the time chosen by the
Management reasonably justified the belief of the Union
that its real or main purpose was to discourage
membership in the Union, to discredit the officers.
The Court holds that:
• the strike in question had been called to offset what
petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to
be unfair labor practices on the part of Management;
• petitioners were not bound to wait for the expiration of
thirty (30) days from notice of strike before staging the
same;
• said strike was not illegal;
• the strikers had not lost their status as employees of
respondents herein.
Considering that the latter have been absolved
from the charge of unfair labor practice, the
reinstatement of the strikers must be without backpay.
Wherefore, the resolution appealed from should
be, as it is hereby modified accordingly, without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
___________________________________________
Jacinto v. CA
(G.R. No. 124540. November 14, 1997)
FACTS: Petitioners are public school teachers from
various schools in Metropolitan Manila. They incurred
unauthorized absences in connection with the mass
actions then staged. DECS Sec. Cariño immediately
issued a return-to-work order, but it was ignored by
petitioners. Sec. Cariño issued formal charges and
preventive suspension orders against them. They were
administratively charged with gross misconduct; gross
neglect of duty, etc. for joining unauthorized mass
actions; ignoring report-to-work directives; etc. During
the investigation, petitioners did not file their answers or
controvert the charges against them. As a
consequence, Sec. Cariño, in his decisions found them
guilty as charged and imposed the penalty of dismissal
except Jacinto which is and Agustin who were meted
only six (6) months suspension.
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB): dismissed the
appeals for lack of merit
CSC: set aside the Orders of the MSPB; found the
petitioners (except Merlinda Jacinto) guilty of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; imposed
upon them the penalty of six (6) months suspension
without pay; and automatically reinstated them to the
service without payment of back salaries; the CSC found
her guilty of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and
Regulations; imposed upon her the penalty of
reprimand; and automatically reinstated her in the
service without payment of back salaries
CA: Affirmed decision of CSC
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether civil servants are guilty of grave
misconduct in participating in mass actions.
HELD: Yes. The terms and conditions of employment in
the government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof and government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters are
governed by law and employees therein shall not strike
for the purpose of securing changes. Workers in the
public sector do not enjoy the right to strike, the
Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the proviso
“in accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation
that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right,
or even deny certain sectors such right. The Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted activities and
strikes in the government service shall be observed.
The teachers have given cause for their
suspension, for being absent in their classes and joining
in the mass actions. They were not fully innocent of the
charges against them although they were eventually
found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and not grave misconduct or other
offense warranting their dismissal from the service;
“being found liable for a lesser offense is not equivalent
to exoneration.” In the case of Merlinda Jacinto, there
was a finding that there was no proof that she joined the
unlawful mass actions.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with
modification.
___________________________________________
Bangalisan v. CA, CSC & Secretary of DECS
(G.R. No. 124678, July 31, 1997)
FACTS: Petitioners were among the 800 public school
teachers who staged “mass actions” on September 17 to
19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances concerning the
alleged failure of the public authorities to implement in a
just and correct manner certain laws and measures
intended for their material benefit.
Page 34 of 37
 On September 17, 1990, the Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to
comply with said order, hence they were charged by the
Secretary with “grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty;
gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations
and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform
official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service; and absence without
official leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise known as
the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines.” They were
simultaneously placed under preventive suspension.
Thereafter, the DECS Secretary rendered a
decision finding petitioners guilty as charged and
dismissing them from the service effective immediately.
Acting on the motions for reconsideration filed
by some of the petitioners the Secretary subsequently
modified the penalty of dismissal to suspension for nine
months without pay. The other petitioners also filed
individual appeals to the MSPB, but all of their appeals
were dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioners then
appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) where
it ruled that respondents were guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It,
however, modified the penalty of nine months
suspension previously meted to them to six months
suspension with automatic reinstatement in the service
but without payment of back wages.
All the petitioners moved for reconsideration of
the CSC resolutions but these were all denied, except
that of petitioner Rodolfo Mariano who was found guilty
only of a violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations because of his failure to inform the school of
his intended absence and to file an application for leave
therefor. This petitioner was accordingly given only a
reprimand.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for lack of merit
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the resolutions
of the CSC that penalized petitioners whose only offense
was to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances
HELD: No, the CA did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that
employees in the public service may not engage in
strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of
government employees to organize, they are prohibited
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-
outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public services.
The right of government employees to organize is limited
only to the formation of unions or associations, without
including the right to strike.
It is an undisputed fact that there was a work
stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize
their demands by withholding their services. The fact
that the conventional term “strike” was not used by the
striking employees to describe their common course of
action is inconsequential, since the substance of the
situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right
of association. To grant employees of the public sector
the right to strike, there must be a clear and direct
legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any
express legislation allowing government employees to
strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the
exercise of the right, employees in the public service
may not engage in strikes, walkouts and temporary work
stoppages like workers in the private sector
“It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was
punished, but the manner in which they exercised such
right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service and classes in various public
schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient
but non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions
in question, whereby petitioners could petition the
government for redress of grievances.”
It bears stressing that suspension of public
services, however temporary, will inevitably derail
services to the public, which is one of the reasons why
the right to strike is denied government employees. It
may be conceded that the petitioners had valid
grievances and noble intentions in staging the “mass
actions,” but that will not justify their absences to the
prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous
indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.
The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work
stoppages by public employees was clearly recognized
at common law.
DISPOSITIVE: The decision of the Court of Appeals was
AFFIRMED.
___________________________________________
Republic Flour Mills Workers’ Association v. Reyes
(G.R. No. L-21378, November 28, 1966)
FACTS: Respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. filed a petition
for injunction before the CFI of Rizal, alleging, among
others, that petitioner unions declared a strike against
their employer, RFM and picket lines were formed
Page 35 of 37
around the premises of the company preventing the
peaceful passing of other persons not connected with
said employer.
Respondent is a lessee occupying a parcel of
land owned by RFM.
It claimed that it is a completely different
corporation from RFM with a different set of officers and
employees; and there was no employer-employee
relation between the striking employees and respondent;
and that due to the picket lines formed by the striking
unions the employees of herein respondent could not
enter and leave its premises “thereby causing the same
to stop its operation which constitute an invasion of its
property rights and therefore causing irreparable and
substantial damages.
Petitioners, Republic Flour Mills Workers
Association and PAFLU, filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that the injunction prayed for by herein
respondent is a “labor injunction” and because the
petition for injunction failed to allege the jurisdictional
requisites provided for in Section 9 (b) of Republic Act
875 it is fatally defective and, therefore, should be
dismissed.
The respondent Judge found that AIA Feed
Mills, Inc. is a distinct and separate entity from the RFM.,
that it has a distinct personnel of its own, that it was
engaged in a different business, and that petitioner
unions’ picketing had no connection whatsoever with
herein respondent. Based on said findings, the
respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary
injunction.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with
the SC, with preliminary injunction, seeking to set aside
the order of the respondent Judge Andres Reyes of the
Court of First Instance of in issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction “ordering and commanding the defendants to
desist from preventing the petitioner’s employees from
entering its premises.
Petitioners contend that the respondent AIA
Feed Mills, Inc. is a subsidiary corporation of RFM; that
it is located at the very site and compound of the latter,
the entrance to, and the walls of, the compound being
common to both entities; that the operations of the
former and of the latter were intermingled and
complementary, including an interchange of employees;
thus the picketing of one necessarily is extended to both.
AIA Feed Mills, Inc. alleged that it is a business
entity distinct and separate RFM, Inc., that there is no
employer-employee relation between it and the striking
members of the petitioner labor unions and no labor
dispute exist between it and the striking and picketing
employees; that the picketing was not a peaceful one
because the picketing members of petitioners unions
were employing violence against the employees of
respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal had jurisdiction to issue
the writ of preliminary injunction in question, or whether
or not it had acted with abuse of discretion in issuing
said injunction.
HELD: No. Respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. is a distinct
and separate entity from, the Republic Flour Mills, Inc.,
with distinct personality of its own from the latter
corporation, including the business in which it is
engaged, and the picketing by the petitioner unions has
no connection whatsoever with respondent AIA Feed
Mills, Inc.
There is no labor dispute between the
petitioners and respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc., and
neither is there an employer-employee relation between
them.
The Court declared that the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the respondent Judge is not a labor
injunction that is provided for in Section 9, paragraph (d)
of Republic Act 875. The court may issue an injunction,
whether temporary or permanent, as provided in said
section of Republic Act 875, only in a case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute.
No labor dispute existed between the petitioner
unions and the respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. The
preliminary injunction issued by the respondent Judge
was, therefore, one that was within its jurisdiction to
issue pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60 of the Rules
of Court (now Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court.)
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
respondent Judge did not in any way curtail the right of
petitioner unions to picket, because the writ simply and
clearly ordered and commanded the petitioner unions “to
desist from preventing AIA Feed Mills; employees from
entering its premises.
The writ did not prevent petitioner unions from
picketing against their employer, the Republic Flour
Mills, Inc. The record shows that the respondent Judge
issued the writ of preliminary injunction after a hearing.
The respondent Judge, therefore, had not acted in a
manner that was in violation of the law or with grave
abuse of discretion when he issued the writ of
preliminary injunction in question.
___________________________________________
Liwayway Publications Inc. v. Permanent Concrete
Workers’ Union
(G.R. No. L-25003, October 23, 1981)
Page 36 of 37
FACTS: Plaintiff alleged that it is a second sublessee of
a part of the premises of the Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. Their premises are separated by a
concrete and barbed wire fence with its own entrance
and road leading to the national road. This entrance is
separate and distinct from the entrance road of PCPI.
The daily supply of newsprint needed to feed its printing
plant is taken from this bodega.
PCPI employees, who are reps and mems of
the Union declared a strike against the company. Less
than a month later, Union members picketed, stopped
and prohibited plaintiff's truck from entering the
compound to load newsprint from its bodega. The union
members intimidated and threatened with bodily harm
the employees who were in the truck. They also stopped
and prohibited the general manager, personnel
manager, bodega-in-charge and other employees of the
plaintiff from getting newsprint in their bodega. Despite
pleas to stop intimidating and threatening P’s
employees, the Union continued their acts.
As a consequence thereof, plaintiff rented
another bodega during the time members of the
defendant union prevented its employees from entering
its bodega in the compound of Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. and thus incurred expenses both in terms
of bodega rentals and in transporting newsprint from the
pier to the temporary bodega.
P then brought an action for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and for damages against
the union. The LC issued the WPI for the Union to stop
threatening and intimidating P’s employees. The Union
filed Mtd because the CFI had no juris over the ULP and
that P is not the real party in interest. P opposed by
saying that there is no ER-EE rel, no labor dispute and
that P’s compound is separate and distinct from the
Union’s place of employment. LC: denied Mtd and
motion to dissolve writ on the ground that there was no
labor dispute between the plaintiff and defendant of
which the Court of Industrial Relations may take
cognizance.
The Union was declared in default and the WPI
was made permanent. P then filed with the Supreme
Court a petition praying that a writ of attachment be
issued on any sum of money which may be used to
satisfy the judgment. SC denied but without prejudice to
same petition with the CFI.
ISSUE: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to issue a
WPI considering that there was a labor dispute between
Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and appellants for
alleged unfair labor practices committed by the former
RATIO: Appellee is not in any way related to the striking
union except for the fact that it is the sublessee of a
bodega in the company's compound. The business of
the appellee is exclusively the publication of the
magazines Bannawag Bisaya, Hiligaynon and Liwayway
weekly magazines which has absolutely no relation or
connection whatsoever with the cause of the strike of the
union against their company, much less with the terms,
conditions or demands of the strikers. In such a factual
situation, the query to be resolved is whether the
appellee is a third party or an "innocent bystander"
whose right has been invaded and, therefore, entitled to
protection by the regular courts.
While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection
as an exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are
not without power to confine or localize the sphere of
communication or the demonstration to the parties to the
labor dispute, including those with related interest, and
to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial
connection or having interest totally foreign to the
context of the dispute. Thus, the right may be regulated
at the instance of third parties or "innocent bystanders" if
it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to
create an impression that a labor dispute with which they
have no connection or interest exists between them and
the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their
rights.
It may be conceded that the appellant Union
has a labor dispute with the Permanent Concrete
Products company and that the dispute is pending
before the Court of Industrial Relations
We find and hold that there is no connection between
the appellee Liwayway publications, Inc. and the striking
Union, nor with the company against whom the strikers
staged the strike, and neither are the acts of the driver of
the appellee, its general manager, personnel manager,
the man in-charge of the bodega and other employees
of the appellee in reaching the bodega to obtain
newsprint therefrom to feed and supply its publishing
business interwoven with the labor dispute between the
striking Union and the Permanent Concrete Products
company. Being situated in the same premises does not
mean being interwoven.
The acts complained of against the striking
union members are properly called mere acts of
trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) such that
following the doctrine laid down in Goldstein vs. Roces,
the lessor shall not be obliged to answer for the mere
fact of a trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) made
by a third person in the use of the estate leased but the
lessee shag have a direct action against the trespasser.
Page 37 of 37