G.R. No.

208719 June 9, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ROGER RINGOR UMAWID, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

Vicente Ringor was staying with his two (2) year old granddaughter, Maureen Joy Ringor, at the terrace
of their house. Suddenly, Umawid appeared and started attacking Vicente with a panabas (long bolo)
with neither reason nor provocation. While Vicente was able to evade Umawid’s blows, the latter
nevertheless hit Maureen on her abdomen and back, causing her instantaneous death. Upon seeing
Maureen bloodied, Umawid walked away.

Thereafter, Umawid went to a nearby house where his nephew, Jeffrey R. Mercado, was sleeping.
Awakened by the commotion, Jeffrey went outside only to see his uncle charging at him with his
panabas. Instinctively, Jeffrey, along with his sister and cousin, rushed inside the house to seek for
safety. However, Umawid was able to prevent Jeffrey from closing the door of the house, and, as such,
the former was able to barge into the said house. Cornered and nowhere else to go, Jeffrey crouched
and covered his head with his arms to shield him from Umawid’s impending attacks. Eventually,
Umawid delivered fatal hacking blows to Jeffrey, causing the mutilation of the latter’s fingers. Umawid
only stopped his barrage upon seeing Jeffrey, who was then pretending to be dead, leaning on the wall
and blood-stained.

Umawid was charged of the crimes of murder and frustrated murder. He set up the defense of insanity.

RTC found Umawid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. The CA affirmed Umawid’s
conviction.

ISSUE:

WON Umawid’s conviction for the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder should be upheld. YES.

RULING:

As case law instructs, the defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an
accused invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty
because of such insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said
defense bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the evidence on
this matter must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the
offense/s with which he is charged.

In order to lend credence to a defense of insanity, it must be shown that the accused had no full and
clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts.

In this case, Umawid solely relied on the testimonies of Dr. Quincina and Dr. Juliana to substantiate his
plea of insanity. Records, however, reveal that Dr. Quincina’s testimony showed that he only examined
Umawid six (6) months before the latter committed the crimes and three (3) months and four (4)
months thereafter. Notably, he admitted that his findings did not include Umawid’s mental disposition
immediately before or at the very moment when he committed such crimes. As such, Dr. Quincina’s
testimony cannot prove Umawid’s insanity. Neither would Dr. Juliana’s testimony shore up Umawid’s
cause as the former failed to attest to the latter’s mental condition and even referred him to another
doctor for further evaluation. Given these circumstances, Umawid’s defense of insanity remained
unsubstantiated and, hence, he was properly adjudged by the RTC and the CA as criminally liable.

G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City)

JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator,

vs.

THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.

FACTS:

Sometime in the third week of April 1994, at about 10:00 in the morning, Aileen Mendoza (niece by
affinity of Reynaldo de Villa) woke up to find petitioner Reynaldo de Villa on top of her. Aileen was then
aged 12 years and ten months. Petitioner succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. This
encounter allegedly resulted in Aileen's pregnancy. On December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth to a baby
girl whom she named Leahlyn Mendoza.

The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape. On
automatic review, petitioner's conviction for rape was affirmed.

Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced with the question of
Reynaldo de Villa's guilt or innocence.

Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He sought the conduct of a blood
type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of
the rape.

Having been informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-
relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to
ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four
grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa.

DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de
Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself was conducted.

After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report which showed that Reynaldo de Villa
could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match
between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of the other samples,
including Leahlyn's.

ISSUE:
WON the conviction of Reynaldo de Villa for the crime of rape should be set aside in view of the results
of the DNA tests conducted. NO.

RULING:

It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central to the issue of
petitioner's guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question,
separate and distinct from the question of the father of her child. Recently, in the case of People v.
Alberio, we ruled that the fact or not of the victim's pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in
determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape.
Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown
individual, is of no moment in determining an individual's guilt.

G.R. No. L-54470 May 8, 1990

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NATIVIDAD VDA. DE PADILLA, substituted by her legal heirs, namely:
AUGUSTO A. PADILLA, ALBERTO A. PADILLA, CRESENCIO R. ABES (representing the deceased Isabel
Padilla Abes) MIGUEL A. PADILLA and RAMON A. PADILLA, respondents.

FACTS:

On November 23, 1960, at 5:30 P.M., Starlight Flight No. 26 of the Philippine Air Lines took off from the
Manduriao Airport in Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 persons on board, including the plane's
complement. The plane did not reach its destination but crashed on Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour and
fifteen minutes after takeoff .The plane had flown almost 18,000 hours at the time of its illfated flight. It
had been certified as airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration.

Among the fatalities was Nicanor Padilla who was a passenger on the star crossed flight. He was 29
years old, single. His mother, Natividad A. Vda. de Padilla, was his only legal heir. As a result of her son's
death, Mrs. Padilla filed a complaint against PAL, demanding payment of P600,000 as actual and
compensatory damages, plus exemplary damages and P60,000 as attorney's fees.

In its answer, PAL denied that the accident was caused by its negligence or that of any of the plane's
flight crew, and that, moreover, the damages sought were excessive and speculative.

In addition to the stipulations of facts, private respondent Padilla testified that her son, Nicanor Padilla,
prior to his death, was 29 years old, single, in good health, President and General Manager of Padilla
Shipping Company at Iloilo City, and a legal assistant of the Padilla Law Office; that upon learning of the
death of her son in the plane crash, she suffered shock and mental anguish, because her son who was
still single was living with her; and that Nicanor had a life insurance of P20,000, the proceeds of which
were paid to his sister.
The Trial Court ordered PAL to pay the plaintiff Natividad A. Vda. de Padilla the sum of P477,000.00 as
award for the expected income of the deceased Nicanor; P10,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs. The CA affirmed the said ruling in toto.

1st ISSUE: Whether the indemnity for the death of private respondent's son, the late Nicanor A. Padilla
should be computed on the basis of his life expectancy, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals did,
rather than the life expectancy of private respondent, his only legal heir, as the petitioner contends

HELD: Petitioner relies on "the principle of law generally recognized and applied by the courts in the
United States" that "the controlling element in determining loss of earnings arising from death is, as
established by authorities, the life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is
shorter. However, resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or jurisprudence is
available locally to settle a controversy. Even in the absence of local statute and case law, foreign
jurisprudence is only persuasive.

For the settlement of the issue at hand, there are enough applicable local laws and jurisprudence. Under
Article 1764 and Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, the award of damages for death is computed on the
basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, not of his beneficiary. The articles provide:

Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in

accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall
also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a
common carrier.

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi- delict
shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death; . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)

In the case of Davila vs. PAL, which involved the same tragic plane crash, the SC determined the manner
of computing the damages due the plaintiff therein which it based on the life expectancy of the
deceased (i.e. (2/3 x [80-30*age of deceased*]

2nd ISSUE: What is the amount of damages the heirs of the deceased is entitled to?

HELD: Following the procedure used by the Supreme Court in the case of Davila vs. PAL, the trial court
determined the victims gross annual income to be P23,100 based on his yearly salaries of P18,000 from
the Padilla Shipping Company and P5,100 from the Allied Overseas Trading Corporation. Considering
that he was single, the court deducted P9,200 as yearly living expenses, resulting in a net income of
P13,900 (not P15,900 as erroneously stated in the decision). Since Nicanor Padilla was only 29 years old
and in good health, the trial court allowed him a life expectancy of 30 years. Multiplying his annual net
income of P13,900 by his life expectancy of 30 years, the product is P417,000 (not P477,000) which is
the amount of death indemnity due his mother and only forced heir.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The decision of the trial court is affirmed with modification. The
petitioner is ordered to pay the private respondent or her heirs death indemnity in the sum of P417,000
(not P477,000), with legal rate of interest of 6% per annum from the date of the judgment on August 31,
1973, until it is fully paid.

G.R. No. 101683 February 23, 1995

LBC AIR CARGO, INC. FERNANDO M. YU and JAIME TANO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Fourth Division, SHERWIN MONTEROLA y OYON-OYON, represented by
PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y MONTEROLA, and PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y MONTEROLA,
respondents.

FACTS:

Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver, was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangagoy
on the right lane along a dusty national road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo
van of the LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, driven by defendant Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the
opposite direction on its way to the Bislig Airport. On board were passengers Fernando Yu, Manager of
LBC Air Cargo, and his son who was seated beside Tano. When Tano was approaching the vicinity of the
airport road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the opposite
direction. Tano stopped his vehicle and waited for the two racing vehicles to pass by. The stirred cloud
of dust made visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting for the dust to settled, Tano started to make a
sharp left turn towards the airport road. When he was about to reach the center of the right lane, the
motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the
right side of the LBC van. Monterola died from the severe injuries he sustained.

A criminal case for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" was filed against Tano. A civil suit was likewise
instituted by the heirs of deceased Monterola against Tano, along with Fernando Yu and LBC Air Cargo
Incorporated, for the recovery of damages. The two cases were tried jointly by the RTC Branch 29, of
Surigao del Sur. The trial court dismissed both cases on the ground that the proximate cause of the
"accident" was the negligence of deceased Rogelio Monterola. The said ruling was reversed by the CA.

ISSUES:

1. WON Tano was negligent in in the driving of his vehicle and in failing to give a signal to approaching
vehicles of his intention to make a left turn? YES

2. WON the CA erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the accident was the victim's negligence
in the driving of his motorcycle in a very fast speed and thus hitting the petitioner's cargo van? YES
3. WON LBC was negligent in supervising its employee? YES

4. What is the amount of damages?

HELD:

1. That visibility was poor when Jaime Tano made a left turn was admitted by the latter. Tano should not
have made a left turn under the conditions admitted by him. Under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the driver of any vehicle upon a highway, before starting, stopping or turning from a direct line, is
called upon to first see that such movement can be made in safety, and whenever the operation of any
other vehicle approaching may be affected by such movement, shall give a signal plainly visible to the
driver of such other vehicles of the intention to make such movement. This means that before a driver
turns from a direct line, in this case to the left, the driver must first see to it that there are no
approaching vehicles and, if there are, to make the turn only if it can be made in safety, or at the very
least give a signal that is plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicle. Tano did neither in this case,
for he recklessly made a left turn even as visibility was still very poor, and thus failed to see the
approaching motorcycle and warn the latter, of his intention to make a left turn. This is plain and simple
negligence.

In thus making the left turn, he placed his vehicle directly at the path of the motorcycle which, unaware
of Tano's intention to make a left turn, smashed at Tano's vehicle. It was Tano's negligence that created
the risk or the condition of danger that set into operation the event that led to the smashedup and
untimely death of Rogelio Monterola. That Rogelio Monterola was running fast despite poor visibility as
evidenced by the magnitude of the damage to the vehicles is no defense. His negligence would at most
be contributory. Having negligently created the condition of danger, defendants may not avoid liability
by pointing to the negligence of the former.

2. From every indication, the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano who, despite
extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn (towards the Bislig airport road entrance) without
first waiting for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act of Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC
van) directly on the path of the motorcycle coming from the opposite direction, that almost
instantaneously caused the collision to occur. Simple prudence required him not to attempt to cross the
other lane until after it would have been safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle.

Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times, as "supervening
negligence" or as "discovered peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect that where both parties
are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it
is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who
had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude the recovery of damages for supervening negligence of, or bar a defense
against the liability sought by, another if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be. The
incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to his
left to the actual impact; that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the
collision.

It is true however, that the deceased was not all that free from negligence in evidently speeding too
closely behind the vehicle he was following. We, therefore, agree with the appellate court that there
indeed was contributory negligence on the victim's part that could warrant a mitigation of petitioners
liability for damages.

3. Tano's proven negligence created a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, the LBC
Air Cargo Corporation, in supervising its employees properly and adequately, which may only be
destroyed by proof of due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employees to prevent the
damage. No such defense was interposed by defendants in their answer.

We, however, fail to see Fernando Yu's liability as Manager of LBC-Mangagoy Branch Office, there being
no employer-employee relationship between him and Jaime Tano who is a driver of the LBC Air Cargo
Inc. It was held in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. et al. vs. Phil. American Forwarders, Inc., 63 SCRA 231,
that the term "Manager" in Article 2180 is used in the sense of "employer." Hence, no tortuous or quasi-
delictual liability can be fastened on Fernando Yu as branch manager of LBC Air Cargo Inc.

4. Aside from the indemnity for death which has been pegged at P50,000, the evidence disclose that as
a result of the accident, Rogelio Monterola's motorcycle was damaged, the repair cost of which
amounted to P7,361.00, for hospitalization, wake and burial expenses, plaintiff spent P15,000. There is
likewise no question that by reason of Rogelio Monterola's untimely death, his only child 14 years old
Sherwin Monterola, suffered mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock
that entitles him to moral damages which we hereby fix at P20,000. Because of defendants' refusal to
indemnify the plaintiff for his father's death, the latter was compelled to litigate and engage the services
of counsel. He is therefore entitled to an additional amount of P10,000 for attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation.

Considering, however, the contributory negligence of Rogelio Monterola in driving at a fast clip despite
the fact that the road was dusty, we reduce the aggregate amount of damages to which the plaintiff is
entitled by 20%.

G.R. No. 83376 May 29, 1989

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELICITAS RIVERA, respondents.

FACTS:

Cesar Rivera, a contract worker, was hired by Erectors, Inc. Erectors as helper electrician at the
International Airport Project in Baghdad, Iraq. In compliance with the rules and regulations of the
Ministry of Labor and Employment Erectors secured a group accident insurance from petitioner
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. (Stronghold) for all the contract workers it hired for deployment in
Baghdad. Under said insurance policy, Stronghold undertook to pay the covered contract worker in case
of a work or accident connected death.

Cesar Rivera died. In his Certificate of Death, myocardial infraction or what is commonly known as heart
attack, was listed as the disease or condition directly leading to his death. Thereafter, his remains were
transported back to the Philippines for burial.

Subsequently, the surviving wife of Cesar Rivera, private respondent Felicitas Rivera, filed her claim with
Stronghold for death benefits. Petitioner however refused to pay and satisfy her claim.

The body of the deceased was exhumed and autopsied by the NBI and found fractures, complete, ribs,
2nd, 3rd and 4th, alond (sic) midaxillary line, right. Brain, liquified.

Private respondent instituted an action against Stronghold with the Insurance Commission. She
presented as witness a certain Rudy L. Buendia to support her claim that her husband died due to an
accident. Buendia testified that: he was walking behind Cesar Rivera; that they were carrying boxes of
electrical fittings: that Cesar Rivera tripped on the marble flooring causing his violent fall; that his head
hit the concrete floor; that he saw the upper right forehead of Cesar Rivera bleeding; and he and three
(3) other co-workers rushed him to the hospital where he died on the same day.

Commission: dismissed the complaint.

CA: reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

WON the cause of death stated on the death certificate is conclusive. NO.

HELD:

The Court finds that respondent appellate court did not commit reversible error in ruling in favor of
Felicitas Rivera. Private respondent has clearly shown that an accident immediately preceded the death
of Cesar Rivera. Felicitas Rivera's witness, Buendia, described in detail the violent fall of Cesar Rivera.
The NBI Exhumation Report showing that the 2nd, 3rd and 4th ribs of the deceased were completely
fractured is further proof of this violent fall. That Cesar Rivera was rushed to the hospital for treatment
but died on the same day was also recounted by Buendia on the witness stand. These all point to the
fact that his accidental fall was the proximate cause or "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred" [Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina. 102 Phil. 181, 186 citing 38 Am. Jur. 695-
696] which led to the death of Cesar Rivera although the immediate cause thereof may have been
myocardial infarction Such being the case, his death is covered by Personal Accident Policy No. UPA-
100001 and is thus compensable.

That the death certificate lists down myocardial infarction as the cause of death is not conclusive. A
death certificate is conclusive evidence only as to the fact of death of the deceased. In this jurisdiction,
the rule is that a death certificate, if duly registered with the Civil Register, is considered a public
document and the entries found therein are presumed correct.

In the instant case an examination of the record would reveal that Cesar Rivera's death certificate was
not registered with the Civil Register and hence, cannot be considered a public document as would
make applicable the presumption that the entries found therein are correct. Even granting that the
death certificate is registered with the Civil Register so much so that the above-mentioned presumption
is made to apply, the Court had occasion to state that this presumption "is merely disputable and will
have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy" [Tolentino v. Paras, supra.] Here,
private respondent's witness, Buendia, was able to show by testimony that Cesar Rivera died from an
accident.

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig
City, and EVANGELINE PONCE,Respondents.

FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2)
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.

Crimes charged: 1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries; and 2) reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property

Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and was
meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

Lower Court: denied the motion to quash

Appellate Court: denied Ivler’s Petition for Certiorari in dismissing his Motion to Quash

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in
the information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property.
YES.

HELD:

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s conviction in the case of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries bars his prosecution in criminal reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property

1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only
to Determine the Penalty
Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional
criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of
intentional crimes.

2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-offense

Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof.

The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify
the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect
one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot
be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of
two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding
from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple
penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the mental
attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in
one or more consequences. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crime resulting in one or
more consequences.

Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for
a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2)
an offense which is a necessary means for committing another.

Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity
of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges
under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

People v. Operaa Jr.

G.R. No. 120546. October 13, 2000

FACTS:
Rodolfo Operaa, Jr. and the deceased Alicia Operaa were lawfully married. Their union
was blessed with five (5) children. Complainant Rufina Maminta is the mother of the
deceased. Complainant, and Joselito Paragas insisted that Alicia Operaa was still alive
when they first saw her lying on the floor of the kitchen of their house. Rufina Maminta,
an anguished mother and out of love for her daughter, begged the appellant, again
and again, that her dying daughter be brought to the hospital but seemingly without
any concern, appellant staunchly refused to rush Alicia to the nearest hospital;
reasoning that she could not reach the hospital alive.

An external examination of the body of the deceased was conducted on May 14, 1994
by Dr. Tomas Cornel, upon the request of Mrs. Maminta. On May 18, 1994, an
exhumation followed by an autopsy of the remains of the deceased was conducted
by Dr. Ronald Bandonill of the NBI, again upon the request of the herein complainant.
According to Dr. Bandonills report, the presence of multiple injuries all over the body
and the suspicious presence of multiple abrasions on the area of the neck not related
to the hanging gives the suicidal aspect a big question mark. With respect to the said
suspicious multiple abrasions on the neck, the same were clarified by the same doctor
as abrasions, multiple, with signs of strangulation, encircling the neck, at an area of 32.0
cms. x 4.5 cms., just below the thyroid cartilage.

SPO1 Daniel Coronel of the Dagupan City Police Station testified that per his
investigation, he found no markings on the roof truss from where the victim was
supposed to have hanged herself. He also measured the distance of the 2 x 3 by 1 yard
wooden truss from the floor of the kitchen and found it to be six (6) feet. The deceased
was 56 in height.

Accused was arraigned and entered a not guilty plea. By reason of the circumstantial
evidence attending the commission of the crime, the accused was found guilty by the
trial court.

Hence, this appeal is set before the Court. The Sol Gen recommended the imposition
of reclusion perpetua in lieu of the death penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court was correct in giving credence to the strangulation theory of
the prosecution.

HELD:

Yes. The Court agrees with the lower court that the wounds of the deceased would not
have been self-inflicted. The difference of asphyxia by hanging and asphyxia by
strangulation and the findings have supported the fact that the deceased died
involuntarily.

The suicide theory of appellant is full of holes and could not successfully account for the
following: the six feet distance of the wooden truss from the kitchen floor vis--vis the 56
height of Alicia Operaa; weight of the deceased vis--vis the 2 x 3 x 1 yard measurement
of the wooden truss; absence of any marking on the wooden truss (Exh. B-4); absence
of any marking on the electric cord; absence of the original of the alleged unsigned
suicide note; the multiple abrasions and contusions sustained by the deceased;
absence of any manifestation (except the ligature mark) of hanging e.g. protruding
tongue, elongation of neck, clenched hands, injury of the hyoid bone, ligature of a
knot located at the apex of the inverted V-shape mark, vertebral injury.

Suffice it to rule that after reviewing all the fine distinctions between asphyxia by
hanging and asphyxia by strangulation, the court is of the irresistible conclusion, and so
finds, that the medical literature, upon which the pivot of inquiry as to the cause of
death hinges, has only established the fact that the deceased died involuntarily. The
Court fully agrees with the trial court that the deceased could not have inflicted all the
wounds on herself if she committed suicide

People v. Caranto

G.R. No. 193768, March 05, 2014

FACTS:

Through a buy-bust operation, Caranto was arrested and charged for violating R.A.
9165 when he sold shabu to PO2 Arago who acted as poseur buyer. Jerry Caranto was
charged for violating Sec. 5, Art. II, R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002) on July 24, 2002 in Taguig for selling for P500, 1 heat sealed transparent sachet
containing 0.39 gram of white crystalline substance found positive of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (a.k.a “ shabu” )

RTC/CA convicted Caranto but the SC acquitted him for failure of the prosecution to
authenticate the evidence presented when it did not present proof to establish the links
in the chain of custody from the moment it was picked up to the time it was offered in
evidence. Evidence was not “ marked” in front of the accused or his representative. No
proof that the sachet delivered by the arresting officer to the investigating officer is the
same sachet that was delivered to the forensic chemist. There was also no information
on what happened to the drugs after the forensic chemist examined it.

ISSUES:

1) Whether there was compliance with the required police procedure embodied in Sec.
21, par. 1 of Art. II of R.A. 9165? (NO)

Prosecution did present any explanation to justify the non-observance of the prescribed
procedures. This non-observance by the police of the required procedure cannot be
excused. They also failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items
adduced were not tainted.

Sec. 21, par. 1, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165: 1) The apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.

Sec. 21(a), Art. II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165: (a) The apprehending officer/team having
initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

2) Whether the prosecution was able to prove that the dangerous drug recovered from
the accused is the same drug presented to the court, in other words, was the
prosecution able to establish the chain of custody? (NO)

The procedure of preserving the chain of custody as laid down in Mallillin v.

People was not observed. Ultimately, when the prosecution evidence is wanting,
deficient to the point of doubt that the dangerous drug recovered from the
accused is the same drug presented to the forensic chemist for review and
examination, or the same drug presented to the court, an essential element in
cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti,
is absent.

Maintenance of the chain of custody (Malillin v. People): As a method of

authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims to be.

Include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked
up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would:

describe how and from whom it was received,

where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession,

the condition in which it was received and

the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.

These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same (People v. Sanchez).

An unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of
real evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even
substitution and exchange.
Links to establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation

FIRST. The seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer

SECOND. The turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer.

THIRD. The turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination

FOURTH. The turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.

DOCTRINE: As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires

that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims to be.

Valenzuela v. People

GR No. 160188, June 21, 2007

FACTS:

Sometime in May 1994, petitioner and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside SM North
EDSA by security guard Lorenzo Lago, unloading cases of detergent Tide Ultramatic on
an open parking space. Minutes later, petitioner loaded the cartons of detergent while
Calderon was looking into a taxi and procedeed to leave the parking area. Lago
stopped the cab, checked the cartons, and asked for a receipt but Valezuela and
Calderon reacted a fled on foot. The same were apprehended on the scene and the
stolen merchandise recovered was worth P12,090.

The two pleaded not guilty. Valenzuela said that he was with a friend to buy snacks
when they heard a gunshot fired by Lago. Calderon, on the other hand, said that he
was with his cousin when he heard a gunshot fired by Lago that caused everyone to
flee on the viscinity.

RTC convicted the appellants guilty of consumated theft. CA affirmed. Petitioner

contends that he was only guilty of frustrated theft since at the time he was
apprefended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose the articles stolen.

ISSUE:

Whether Valenzuela is guilty of consumated theft.

HELD:

YES. The unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of
the same.
 Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the
following elements should be present – (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2)
that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4)
that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidating of persons or force
upon things. The court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal
property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or
unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts
of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts.
Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or
consummated.