People’s Diplomacy Can Stop War between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Part 2)

Introductory Remarks
The Pillars of People’s Diplomacy
Let us explore two aspects of people’s diplomacy in Eritrea. The internal aspect of people’s
diplomacy is born from the desire of the Eritrean people to live together in unity and internal
peace. The dynamics of this desire is expressed in the debate surrounding the draft
constitution. The external aspect of people’s diplomacy emerges from the need to live in
peace and cooperation with our neighbours. The internal aspect of people’s diplomacy can be
resolved by establishing constitutional pluralism, while the external aspect focuses on
partaking in a collective project of avoiding armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In a
situation of extreme tension, where regular diplomatic channels have collapsed (as in the case
of these two neighbours), the people may act, en masse in a demonstrative form or other
forms of protest associated with social revolution - for the purpose of avoiding an impending
catastrophe. When such a context obtains it can be said that the conditions for people’s
diplomacy have attained relevance.

1. The Internal Aspect of People’s Diplomacy

1a. Unity of Vision and Vision of Unity
The Adi Strategy represents a unity of vision on all central issues that are important for
retrieving Eritrean rights and Eritrean nationhood. At the centre of these rights are the land
and cultural questions. At the same time, the Adi Strategy advocates a vision of unity that is
represented in a constitution - ratified by an elected parliament. The Eritrean Congress Party
appreciates the propagation of the principles that are etched in its program and the hearts of
the Eritrean people: ‘Spread the Word but do not pilfer’! Is our motto. We take issue with
parties that plagiarize our program without making reference to it.

1b. Weaving a Unity of Vision

The Adi Strategy pointed out a fact that was not perceived by the post-federal generations for
its significance to the task of weaving a unity of vision:

“Modern Eritrean political and constitutional history confirms that the struggle for liberation
was based on a national commitment to build an independent, sovereign, and unitary Eritrea.

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Every child knows that the Moslem League and the Unionist Party had diametrically opposed
views on the question of the self-determination of Eritrea: the League advocated
independence, while the Unionists pressed for union with Ethiopia. Not many are, however,
familiar with the fact that these competing political forces concurred on the question of the
indivisibility of Eritrea and the Eritrean people. The struggle for liberation was a continuation
of the credo that the people, the land, the sea, air, and the state of Eritrea are indivisible. The
blunders of the dictatorship, and the weaknesses of the draft constitution, do not justify the
parceling out of the territory, resources, and institutions, of our country: the solution to the
demands of Biher, religion, and language lies in political and constitutional adjustments
based on our history.”

1c. The Land Question as a Central Element of the Unity of Vision

On the land question the Adi Strategy holds that “Eritrean economics shall be based on the
principle of private ownership. The revised constitution must include the following principles
explicitly:
• Land belongs to the Adis
• Land shall be distributed among the inhabitants of the Adis for farming and
residential purposes
• The government’s role on the Land Question is limited to the correction of the
injustices that haves been inflicted (by successive colonial powers and the PFDJ)
upon large sectors of our population.”

1d. The Cultural Question as a Key Component of the Unity of Vision

The Adi Strategy states further: “Of the many weaknesses of the draft constitution the
confusion between the rights of the individual citizen versus nationality is the most serious.
Democratic constitutions are based on individual citizenship; whereas, communist
constitutions, such as the Chinese constitution, are based on the collective principles such as
class and nationality. In democratic constitutions minorities are protected both as individuals
and as groups. The draft constitution combines these irreconcilable constitutional traditions:
the provision that the languages of all the nationalities of Eritrea are equal is a collectivist
approach to constitution-making. This aspect of the draft constitution gave impetus to the
distortions of the national question and internal federalism.”
1e. The Draft Constitution as a Hurdle to the Vision of Unity
The Adi Startegy expounded,

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“The draft constitution has been at the centre of the Eritrean democratic debate for two major
reasons: the first reason is related to the question of participation in the process of
constitution-making, while the second reason is associated with the inherent weaknesses of
the constitution. There are certain national issues whose result is binding on us irrespective of
our level of participation: a good illustration of this observation is the UN administered
referendum that resulted in Eritrean independence and sovereignty. Not all the Eritrean
liberation organisations participated in the referendum; nevertheless, all members of these
liberation organisations welcomed the independence of the country for which they fought
valiantly.

Here, we are faced with the situation where, on the one hand, the opposition forces were not
in a position to participate in the constitution making process, while on the other, it may be
argued that a majority of the Eritrean people participated in that very process. In both cases
the dictatorship’s aim was the marginalisation of the opposition forces from mainstream
Eritrean politics; the tactics of the PFDJ not withstanding, we remain entangled in this
complex dilemma. Once again the indivisibility of the sovereignty of our people, and the
continuity of the institutions of sovereignty, make it incumbent upon us not to reject the draft
constitution off-hand. The above observation does not signify that the draft constitution
should be accepted warts and all; in fact, its weaknesses are so glaring that the
instrumentality of amendment alone may not suffice to redress the inflicted damage. Simply
put: the draft constitution must be revised.”

1f. ‘Ratification’: a Hurdle to the Vision of Unity

On the question of ratification the Adi Strategy postulated: “The draft constitution was
approved by the dictator’s assembly; to claim that it was ‘ratified’ amounts to accepting
Issayas’s dictatorship as legitimate.” The Eritrean constitution was Issayas’ project and
nobody else’s. He set the parameters and the objectives of the constitution as he also
appointed the members of the commission. It may be added, that the posts that the members
of the commission held were granted by Issayas. The commission for the drafting of the
constitution did not include the instrumentalities of party and election laws; after all, the
entire exercise was designed to adduce constitutional legitimacy on the person of the dictator.
Asmara witnessed theatrical fan-fares surrounding the ‘ratification’ of the constitution;
strangely enough, Issayas was weary of this game of make-believe: That is why the

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declaration of Election 2001 was, subsequently, accompanied by party and election laws. By
this act the dictator admitted that the draft constitution was approved but not ratified; far
more seriously, he also admitted (by his action) that a document without stipulations that
regulate party building and democratic elections could not be considered a full-fledged
constitution.

2. The External Aspect of Peoples Diplomacy

2a. People’s Diplomacy as a Fire Escape
Is there a strategic relationship between the Ethiopian and Eritrean states? Judging by the
history of conflict between these neighbours a claim of this magnitude can hardly be made. Is
there a strategic relationship between the Ethiopian state and the Eritrean opposition? No.
Such a relationship would assume that the Eritrean opposition has attained international
recognition. Is there a strategic relationship between the Ethiopian ruling party and the
Eritrean opposition? No. The relationship between a ruling party and opposition forces is
often based upon good behaviour and utility. Is there a strategic relationship between the
Ethiopian and Eritrean people? Yes! Even in a situation of war, we assert that there is a
strategic relationship between these two fraternal peoples - despite temporary disturbances in
their relationship. People’s diplomacy can contribute to the stabilization of political tremors as
it can normalize abnormal relations. It can also be safely asserted that in circumstances where
there is good will between these two neighbourly peoples the possibility of fostering strategic
relation between their respective states may be available in the future.

2b. The Eritrean View of the Conflict

The Eritrean regime sees the conflict as a matter of accepting the decisions of the border
commission, and marking the international border between the two neighbors on the ground.

2c. The Ethiopian View of the Conflict

The Ethiopian government sees the conflict as matter of sovereignty and requires that certain
adjustments be made to the decisions of the border commission - via negotiations - in order to
remove the causes of future tensions.

2d. International Arbitration Versus Face- to-Face Negotiations

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The boundary question took its present form because both Eritrea and Ethiopia decided to
submit the border dispute to international arbitration. An alternative course could have been
eyeball-to-eyeball negotiations between these two neighbors. An agreement reached via this
diplomatic method could have been presented to the relevant UN bodies for international
legitimation. This type of negotiation, if successful, is known to lead to a reasonably stable
peace, while decisions reached by international bodies tend to lead to the argument: “you
accepted the conditions of the game willingly, now you need to accept the results”.

The border issue has been resolved by the international commission; yet, Eritrea and Ethiopia
are still rearing to go at each other’s throat. Let us consider the official versions of the
Eritrean and Ethiopian governments:

The peace plan of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Mr. Meles Zenawi, rejects war in favor of
negotiations, and accepts the decisions of the Border Commission - in principle - leading to
mutual corrections of sticky issues.

3. Identifying Sticky Issues

3a. Ethiopian Sticky Issues
Ethiopian proposal focuses on some territorial adjustments in the Badume and Ali Tena areas
in exchange of the Tsorona locality.

3b. Eritrean Sticky Issues

From the territorial adjustment point view, the military implication of Ali Tena to the canyon
and sea-port of Arefaile, and subsequently, the sovereignty of Eritrea is a sticky issue that
requires a thoughtful approach. There are also developmental sticky issues in the Denkalia
region that have been resolved in favour of Ethiopia. The first of these is an agricultural
region that is central to the food security of the inhabitants of Beda; the second is a salt
production area that is essential to the cash economy of Denkalia.

3c. Negotiations Now

The proponents of people’s diplomacy call for immediate negotiations between Eritrea and
Ethiopia. Negotiations are inevitable one way or the other. The Eritrean government holds the
untenable position that the demarcation of the border is merely a technical issue that does not

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require a political summit between the leaders of both countries. It is important to keep in
mind the fact that the border commission tribunal did not workout the rules that govern the
implementation process. The implementation process requires detailed political and technical
agreements regarding troop withdrawals, de-escalation, and other related matters. Drawing the
international border on the ground is not solely a technical matter – it is primarily a political
matter. The Eritrean regime needs to grasp that political negotiation sets the conditions for the
consummation of the technical aspects of the border decision. This means that the two
countries must negotiate in order to discuss the implementation annex and international
legitimacy issues. The question is: should the Eritrean regime negotiate before war breaks and
by, so doing, gain the peace, or wait for war to break out and repeat the US/Rwanda
catastrophe? The president of the Eritrean regime must negotiate now!

3d. Negotiations Pay

The next task, directly related to the question of implementation, is the important matter of
ratification. The implementation of the decisions of the border commission needs to be
complemented by ratification on the part of the parliaments of Ethiopia and Eritrea. In the
case of Eritrea, only an elected Eritrean parliament can ratify the international decisions of the
border commission. This means that there must be democratic elections now!

Fellow Eritreans, in this new phase our duty is to agitate around the slogan of
“Negotiations Now for the implementation of the border decision!”

Herui Tedla Bairu

Chairman
League of Eritrean Democratic Forces