Philosophy vs.

Science
Philosopher Julian
Baggini fears that, as
we learn more and
more about the
universe, scientists
are becoming
increasingly
determined to
stamp their mark on
other disciplines.
Here, he challenges
theoretical physicist
Lawrence Krauss
over 'mission creep'
among his peers.

Which can answer the big questions of life?

Julian Baggini (JB) and Lawrence Krauss (LK)

JB Many traditional questions of JB It would certainly be foolish composed of regular polygons –

metaphysics are now best to rule out in advance the triangles, squares, etc. – and which
approached by scientists and "why possibility that what now could be circumscribed by spheres
is there something rather than appears to be a non-factual whose size would increase as the
The Observer, Sunday 9 September 2012

nothing?" is one of them.
My contention is that the chief
philosophical questions remain
unanswered when all the facts are
in. Moral questions are the prime
example. No factual discovery could
ever settle a question of right or
wrong.
LK I do think philosophical
discussions can inform decision-
making in many important ways, by
allowing reflections on facts, but
that ultimately the only source of
facts is via empirical exploration.
I admit I am pleased to have read
that you agree that "why is there
something rather than nothing?" is
a question best addressed by
scientists.
But, in this regard, as I have argued
that "why" questions are really
"how" questions, would you also
agree that all "why" questions have
no meaning, as they presume
"purpose“ that may not exist?
question might one day be
answered by science. But it's
also important to be properly
skeptical about how far we
anticipate science being able to
go
LK I want to change the subject.
I admit I am pleased that you
agree that "why is there
something rather than nothing"
is a question best addressed by
scientists. But I claim more
generally that the only
meaningful "why" questions are
really "how" questions. Do you
agree?
Let me give an example to put
things in context. Astronomer
Johannes Kepler claimed in.
1595 to answer an important
"why" question: why are there
six planets? The answer, he
believed, lay in the five Platonic
solids whose faces can be
number of faces increased. If these
spheres then separated the orbits of
the planets, he conjectured, perhaps
their relative distances from the sun
and their number could be
understood as revealing, in a deep
sense, the mind of God.
"Why" was then meaningful because
its answer revealed purpose to the
universe. Now, we understand the
question is meaningless. We not only
know there are not six planets, but
moreover that our solar system is not
unique, nor necessarily typical. The
important question then becomes:
"How does our solar system have the
number of planets distributed as it
does?" The answer to this question
might shed light on the likelihood of
finding life elsewhere in the universe,
for example. Not only has "why"
become "how" but "why" no longer
has any useful meaning, given that it
presumes purpose for which there is
no evidence.