Tro

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

THE INCORPORATORS OF G.R. No. 171765

MINDANAO INSTITUTE INC.
and THE BOARD OF
TRUSTEES OF MINDANAO Present:
INSTITUTE INC., represented by
ENGR. VICTORIOSO D.
UDARBE,
Petitioners, VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,
- versus -
ABAD,

MENDOZA, and
THE UNITED CHURCH OF
CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
acting through AGUSAN
DISTRICT CONFERENCE
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST
IN THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by REV. RODOLFO
BASLOT,
Respondent.
 Promulgated:

March 21, 2012

X ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court are the September 30, 2005 Decision[1] and the March 1, 2006
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 79156, which
dissolved the Writ of Preliminary Injunction[3] dated July 9, 2003 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, Branch 34 (RTC).

The Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On April 29, 2003, Gregorio D. Calo, Zoilito L. Cepeda, Victorioso D.

Udarbe, Tita B. Udarbe, Edgar B. Palarca, Louie Libarios, Anna Mae Pelegrino,
Cirilia A. Sanchez, Anita V. Carloto and Eduardo Andit, the incorporators of
Mindanao Institute Inc. (MI Incorporators), represented by Engineer Victorioso D.
Udarbe (Engr. Udarbe),[4] filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction[5] against
the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP), acting through the Agusan
District Conference of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and
represented by Reverend Rodolfo Baslot (Rev. Baslot), before the RTC, which was
docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. 03-02. The incorporators prayed that
Mindanao Institute, Inc. (MI) be declared the sole owner of the assets and
properties of MI and to prevent the impending takeover by UCCP of MIs
properties. They averred that UCCP was unlawfully claiming ownership of MIs
properties.
 On June 5, 2003, UCCP filed its Answer with Counterclaim, [6] asserting its
ownership of MIs properties based on certain documents.[7] It claimed that the
question of ownership in this case was a settled issue and required no further
discourse because they constitute a majority of the Board of Trustees and,
therefore, in complete control thereof x x x.[8]
On June 10, 2003, the RTC issued a TRO[9] against UCCP reasoning out that
MI would suffer grave and irreparable damages if the ownership and possession of
its assets and properties would be transferred to UCCP. The RTC disposed:

WHEREFORE, it appearing that petitioners will suffer grave

injustice and irreparable injury, let a temporary restraining order against
respondents be issued restraining respondents, their representatives,
attorneys, agents or any other person acting in their behalf from seizing
control and management of the assets and properties of Mindanao
Institute.

IT IS ORDERED.[10]

Meanwhile, UCCP received copies of MIs Amended Articles of

Incorporation[11] (2003 Amended AOI) which was adopted by the MI Incorporators
on May 9, 2003 and approved by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on May 26, 2003.

On June 11, 2003, UCCP, represented by Rev. Baslot, and MI, represented
by its President Dr. Edgardo R. Batitang (Dr. Batitang), lodged a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of the 2003 Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-
Laws of Mindanao Institute with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction and/or Damages[12] before the RTC, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 09-2003. UCCP and MI asserted that the Amendment
of MIs Articles of Incorporation effected by signatories in a reckless and hasty
fashion was accomplished without the required majority vote in clear violation of
Section 16[13] of Corporation Code.[14] Of the ten (10) signatures appearing in
the 2003 Amended AOI constituting 2/3 of the Board of Trustees of MI, five (5)
were affixed by mere representatives who were not duly authorized to vote.
Further, UCCP and MI, as represented by Dr. Batitang, stressed that the procedure
in the acceptance of corporate members as embodied in the Amended By-Laws
contains discriminatory provisions, wherein certain members maybe subjected to
confirmation and acceptance or rejection, but aimed specifically at members to be
nominated by UCCP.

On June 17, 2003, the signatories moved to dismiss[15] the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the 2003 Amended AOI. They contended that the SEC, in
approving the amendments to the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, was
exercising its quasi-judicial function and, therefore, a co-equal body of the RTC.
Thus, the RTC could not grant any of the reliefs prayed for by UCCP.

At the scheduled joint hearing of Special Civil Action Case No. 03-02 and
Civil Case No. 09-2003 to determine the propriety of the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, the Law Office of Bernabe, Doyon, Bringas and Partners
entered its appearance[16] as collaborating counsel for UCCP. Incidentally, Atty.
Roy Doyon (Atty. Doyon), the son of Executive Judge Orlando F. Doyon (Judge
Doyon), was one of the partners in the said law firm. This prompted Atty. Nelbert
T. Poculan, UCCPs lead counsel, to move for the inhibition of Judge Doyon from
the case. On the other hand, Atty. Rolando F. Carlota, MI Incorporators counsel,
expressed no objection to the continued participation of Judge Doyon in the
proceedings of the case despite the said development.

Subsequently, Judge Doyon proceeded with the joint hearing. Thereafter, the
RTC granted the MI incorporators prayer for preliminary injunction against UCCP
in its Omnibus Order[17] dated July 4, 2003, the decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining

Order in Civil Case No. 09-2003 is hereby denied with finality.

As prayed for in Special Civil Case No. 03-02, let a Writ of

Preliminary Injunction be issued, restraining, prohibiting, and enjoining
respondents, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES
(UCCP) acting thru AGUSAN DISTRICT CONFERENCE (ADC-UCCP),
represented by Rev. Rodolfo Baslot, their agents, representatives,
attorneys, and any other persons acting for and in their behalf from taking
over, seizing control, managing, or administering MINDANAO
INSTITUTE and preventing plaintiffs in discharging their functions and
duties in the management, control and administration of the school, its
premises and assets, upon plaintiffs putting up a bond in the amount
of ₱200,000.00 duly approved by the Court, which bond shall be executed
in favour of the defendants to answer for whatever damages they may
sustain by reason of or arising from the issuance of the writ in the event
that the Court will finally rule that the plaintiffs are not entitled thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

In issuing the preliminary injunction against UCCP, the RTC explained:

The prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,

hereinafter known as TRO, in Civil Case No. 09-2003, is anchored on the
assumption that the Amended Articles of Incorporation and Amended By-
Laws of Mindanao Institute adopted on May 26, 2003, is null and void for
being ultra vires. However, at this stage of the proceedings where the
action of the Court is generally based on initial and incomplete evidence,
the Court cannot just precipitately rule that the amendments were ultra
vires acts of the respondents.

It should be stressed that the questioned Amended Articles of

Incorporation and By-Laws is duly approved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, hereinafter referred to as SEC. As such, there
being no evidence thus far presented to the contrary, the presumption is
that the official duty of the SEC has been regularly performed.

Thus, the actuations of respondents in Civil Case No. 09-2003

based on those documents are presumptively valid unless declared void by
this Court after a full-blown trial. In other words, plaintiffs at this stage,
have not shown the existence of a clear legal right which has been violated
warranting the issuance of a TRO, because before a TRO or injunction is
issued, it is essential that there must be a right in esse or the existence of a
right to be protected and that the act against which the injunction is issued
is a violation of such right.

On the other hand, plaintiffs in Special Civil Case No. 03-02 have
shown that they have the legal right in the management and
administration of Mindanao Institute because their actuations are based in
an Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws duly approved by the
SEC. The allegation that it was approved by the SEC in record time cannot
be taken as evidence that per se the approval was against any law, rule or
regulation.

It is precisely for this reason that the Court issued a TRO because
from the amendments, plaintiffs in Special Civil Case No. 03-02 and
respondents in Civil Case No. 09-2003 have clear legal rights over the
management and administration of Mindanao Institute and that the acts
of plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 09-2003 and respondents in Special Civil
Case No. 03-02 are in violation of those rights. Pending determination,
 therefore, of the principal action in Special Civil Case No. 03-02, the Court
is inclined to issue a preliminary injunction to protect and preserve the
rights of plaintiffs.[18]

UCCP moved for a reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in
its Resolution[19] dated August 15, 2003.

In its Omnibus Order[20] dated August 20, 2003, Judge Doyon inhibited
himself from the cases citing the fact that his sons law firm entered its appearance
as collaborating counsel for UCCP.

Disappointed with the unfavorable ruling, UCCP and MI, as represented by

Dr. Batitang, sought relief with the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
issuing the assailed order.

The CA granted the petition in its September 30, 2005 Decision, the fallo of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the instant Petition

is GRANTED. The writ of preliminary injunction issued against the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) in Special Civil Case No. 02-03
is hereby DISSOLVED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[21]

The CA reasoned, among others, that the petition for certiorari (Civil Case
No. 09-2003) having been jointly filed by UCCP and MI, as represented by Dr.
Batitang, was adequate evidence to support the conclusion that MI did not require
any injunctive relief from UCCP. The CA also stated that in actions for declaratory
relief, the court was only called upon to determine the parties rights and
obligations. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,[22] it reasoned out that the RTC
could not issue injunction in an action for declaratory relief in as much as the right
of the MI incorporators had not yet been violated. Moreover, it stated that the
subsequent inhibition of Judge Doyon in the cases was pursuant to the rules on
compulsory disqualification of a judge under Rule 3.12(d) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.[23]

The MI incorporators, represented by Engr. Udarbe, moved for

reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March
1, 2006.

Hence, this petition.

THE ISSUES

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
SPECIAL TWENTY THIRD DIVISION, IN AN ORIGINAL ACTION FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 ERRED IN CONSIDERING AND
RULING ON FACTUAL ISSUES NOT YET HEARD AND TRIED IN THE
COURT OF ORIGIN AND BASED ITS DECISION THEREON.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

SPECIAL TWENTY THIRD DIVISION ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION
OF RULE 3.12(D) OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS UNDER THE
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THIS CASE.[24]

In their Memorandum,[25] the petitioners argue that the CA went beyond the
province of a writ of certiorari by resolving factual questions, which should
appropriately be threshed out in the trial. On the inhibition, they pointed out that it
was solely the law partner of Judge Doyons son, Atty. J. Ma. James L.
Bringas (Atty. Bringas), who personally entered his appearance as collaborating
counsel, and not the law firm. Furthermore, they claim that Atty. Doyon, Judge
Doyons son, was neither present in court on the day Atty. Bringas entered his
appearance nor was he present in any of the previous hearings of the subject cases.
Hence, petitioners claim that Rule 3.12(d) of the Code of Judicial Conduct [26] is not
applicable in this case because Atty. Doyon never represented any party in any of
the subject cases being heard by Judge Doyon.
 In its Memorandum,[27] respondent claims that the petition for review
on certiorari filed by the petitioners was not properly verified as to authorize Engr.
Udarbe to file the same - a fatal procedural infirmity. Further, it points out that
petitioners are raising questions of fact in their petition not cognizable by this
Court.

THE COURTS RULING

The petition lacks merit.

The Court is called upon to resolve the issue of whether or not the CA erred
in dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued against UCCP. The writ of
preliminary injunction enjoined UCCP from taking control and management of MI
and preventing petitioners from discharging their functions in its management.
Thus, the Court shall confine itself only with the concerned writ and not the merits
of the cases, which are still pending with the RTC. A preliminary injunction,
being a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or interests, is
not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main
suit.[28]

A preliminary injunction is defined under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of

Court, as follows:

Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. A preliminary

injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior
to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a
person to refrain from a particular act or acts. x x x

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in

order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an
action.[29] The objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be fully heard. Status quo is the last actual,
peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.[30]

Significantly, Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the

grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the
act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or
is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
Based on the foregoing provision, the Court in St. James College of
Paraaque v. Equitable PCI Bank[31] ruled that the following requisites must be
proved before a writ of preliminary injunction will issue:

(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be

protected, that is, a right in esse;

(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;

(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to
the applicant; and

(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent

the infliction of irreparable injury.[32] [Underscoring supplied]

It bears stressing that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be

protected and the violation against that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary
injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be
protected during the pendency of the principal action.[33] When the complainants
right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and,
therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper.[34]

In the present case, the records fail to reveal any clear and unmistakable
right on the part of petitioners. They posit that they are suing in behalf of MIs
interests by preventing UCCP from unlawfully wresting control of MIs properties.
Their claimed derivative interest, however, has been disputed by UCCP in both its
Answer with Counterclaim in Special Civil Action Case No. 03-02 and its
Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-2003, wherein MI itself, represented by Dr.
Batitang himself, is its co-petitioner. Evidently, the conflicting claims of the parties
regarding the issue of ownership over MIs property create the impression that the
petitioners derivative right, used as basis for the issuance of the preliminary
injunction, is far from clear. Petitioners claimed right is still indefinite, at least
until it is properly threshed out in a trial, negating the presence of a
right in esse that requires the protection of an injunctive writ. Verily, petitioners
cannot lay claim to a clear and positive right based on the 2003 Amended AOI, the
provisions of which are strongly disputed and alleged to be invalidly obtained.

As regards the issue of Judge Doyons disqualification to sit as judge in the subject
cases, the Court agrees with the CA. The pertinent rule on the mandatory
disqualification of judicial officers is laid down in Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
Section 1 thereof provides:

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer

shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniary
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record. [Underscoring supplied]

x x x.
 Moreover, Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
took effect from October 20 1989 until May 31, 2004, the applicable rule then,
reads as follows:

A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judges

impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among
others, proceedings where:
xxx
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant
within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree.
[Underscoring supplied]

The prohibitions under the afore-quoted provisions of the Rules are clear.
The disqualification is mandatory and gives the judicial officer concerned no
discretion but to inhibit himself from trying or sitting in a case. The rationale,
therefore, is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary's fairness
and objectivity.[35]

While the Court finds it ludicrous that it was the counsel of UCCP, Atty.
Poculan, who sought the inhibition of Judge Doyon, considering that the law firm
of the latters son is his collaborating counsel, still the mandatory prohibition
applies. Judge Doyon should have immediately inhibited himself from the case
upon learning of the entry of appearance of his sons law firm. Where the
disqualifying fact is indubitable and the parties to the case make no waiver of such
disqualification, as in the case at bench, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court
forthwith completely strips the judge of authority to proceed.[36]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed September 30,

2005 Decision and March 1, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79156, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 24-34. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro and concurred in by Associate Justice
Edgardo A. Camello and Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.
[2]
Id. at 37-40.
[3]
Id. at 97-98. Issued by Executive Judge Orlando F. Doyon.
[4]
Id. at 68-69. Gathered based on the Amended Articles of Incorporation annexed to the petition.
[5]
Id. at 45-54.
[6]
Id. at 55-61.
[7]
Id. at 57. The documents referred to by respondent UCCP in its Answer with Counterclaim are the ff: 1)Articles
of Incorporation of MI; 2) Deed of Donation; 3) Deed of Quitclaim.
[8]
Answer, Par. 5, id. at 57.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 61a-62.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id. at 63-69.
[12]
Id. at 70-87.
[13]
Sec. 16. Amendment of Articles of Incorporation. Unless otherwise prescribed by this Code or by special law,
and for legitimate purposes, any provision or matter stated in the articles of incorporation may be amended by a
majority vote of the board of directors or trustees and the vote or written assent of the stockholders representing at
least two-thirds (2/3) of the outstanding capital stock, without prejudice to the appraisal right of dissenting
stockholders in accordance with the provisions of this Code, or the vote or written assent of at least two-thirds (2/3)
of the members if it be a non-stock corporation.
xxx
[14]
Batas Pamabansa Blg. 68.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 88-90.
[16]
Id. at 95-96.
[17]
CA rollo, pp. 36-38.
[18]
Id. at 34-35. Citations omitted.
[19]
Id. at 52-55.
[20]
Id. at 56.
[21]
Rollo, p. 33.
[22]
383 Phil. 398 (2000).
[23]
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judges impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the
fourth degree.
[24]
Rollo, p. 10.
[25]
Id. at 190-204.
[26]
Supra note 23.
[27]
Rollo, pp. 170-188.
[28]
Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, G.R. 156358, August 17, 2011.
[29]
Limitless Potentials, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164459, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 70, 82.
[30]
Preysler, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 527 Phil. 129,136 (2006), citing Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Domingo
Samut/Antonia Samut, 491 Phil. 458, 472 (2005); Los Baos Rural Bank, Inc. v. Africa, 433 Phil. 930, 945 (2002).
[31]
G.R. No. 179441, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 328, 344, citing Bian Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 439
Phil. 688, 703-704 (2002); Hutchison Ports Philippines Ltd. v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 393 Phil. 843, 859
(2000).
[32]
Id.
[33]
Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. OJ-Mark Trading, Inc., G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 79, 88,
citing Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169846, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 269, 280; Lim v. Court of
Appeals, 517 Phil. 522, 527 (2006).
[34]
Barayuga v. Adventist University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 168008, August 17, 2011.
[35]
Busilac Builders, Inc. v. Judge Charles A. Aguilar, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1809, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 585,
598, citing Ortiz v. Jaculbe, Jr., 500 Phil. 142, 147 (2005); Pimentel v. Salanga, 128 Phil. 176, 183
(1967); Hacienda Benito, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 237 Phil. 46, 63 (1987).
[36]
Geotina v. Gonzales, 148-B Phil. 556, 568-569 (1971)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 159277. December 21, 2004]

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION QUEZON
CITY, petitioner, vs. HON. LITA S. TOLENTINO-GENILO, as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
91, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, LIGHT
RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, CITY ENGINEER OF QUEZON CITY,
and BUILDING OFFICIAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56430, to
wit:

1. Decision dated January 30, 2003 , affirming an earlier resolution of the

[1]

Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch 91, which denied petitioners
application for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction; and

2. Resolution dated July 2, 2003, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

On August 27, 1999, in the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch 91,
petitioner Philippine School of Business Administration filed a complaint for reformation
of contract with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction, against the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH, for short),
the Light Rail Transit Authority, and the Building Official and the City Engineer of
Quezon City.[2]
In its complaint, petitioner alleged, inter alia, that on August 27, 1997, it entered into
a deed of conditional sale with the Republic of the Philippines, through the DPWH,
whereunder it would convey to DPWH a parcel of land with a area of 1,128 square
meters upon DPWHs payment of the sum of P10,467,840.00, at the rate of P9,200.00
per square meter, a condition which was duly satisfied by DPWH.
In the same complaint, petitioner principally prayed for the reformation of the
aforementioned deed of conditional sale on account of an alleged mutual mistake
committed by the parties relative to the actual area subject of the deed. Petitioner
claimed that the area it sold to DPWH was erroneously placed at 1,128 square meters
when, in truth and in fact, its intention was to cede only the area of the land outside its
existing perimeter fence, consisting of 543 square meters.
Petitioner further alleged that respondents, to pave the way for the construction of
the Light Rail Transit Line 2 Project, were poised to take the land within its present
perimeter fence and demolish its existing improvements thereon, such as its school
bookstore, clinic, canteen, water reservoir, septic vault and drainage system, all located
within the area mistakenly conveyed by it to the DPWH under the aforementioned deed
of conditional sale.
As provisional remedies, petitioner implored the trial court to issue a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction enjoining all the named defendants
[now private respondents] from proceeding with the take over of portion of its property
mistakenly included in the aforementioned deed of conditional sale and the demolition
of its existing improvements thereon.
In a resolution dated September 7, 1999, the trial court denied petitioners
application for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. [3] Says the
trial court in the same resolution:

xxx Movant argued that they are not enjoining the government project but what they
are against is the demolition of the school building as it is without due process. The
Court believes that the government infrastructure cannot be accomplished without
demolishing plaintiffs structure. This is a situation wherein the welfare of the plaintiff
has to be sacrificed in favor of the welfare of the State. Further, as stated in their
pleading, what is to be demolished is a one-storey building used as canteen,
bookstore, etc. Plaintiff failed to prove that these services could not be housed in
another area of the premises. Movant failed to show to the Court that the damage or
injury to be suffered is irreparable. Further, whether or not P.D. 1818 is constitutional
cannot be resolved in a summary proceeding. Since no forum has made the
pronouncement that it is unconstitutional, the presumption that all laws are
constitutional holds.

The Court finds no reasonable ground established by the plaintiff to warrant the grant
of the temporary restraining order and/or injunction, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 58,
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Further, the Supreme Court has issued an Administrative Circular No. 07-99
regarding the utmost caution and prudence of all lower court judges in issuance of
TRO and Writs of Preliminary Injunction. xxx

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its
subsequent resolution of October 28, 1999,[4] petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals, whereat its recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
56430.
In the herein assailed decision dated January 30, 2003,[5] the Court of Appeals
denied the petition. In time, petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but the motion was
similarly denied by the appellate court in its resolution of July 2, 2003.[6]
Petitioner is now with us via the instant recourse on the following assigned errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT UPHELD THE COURT A QUOS DENIAL OF THE ISSUANCE OF A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES FOR
THE ISSUANCE THEREOF ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE:

A. THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES THAT NO PERSON CAN BE

DEPRIVED OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
B. THE DEMOLITION, AND/OR TAKING OF PSBAS PROPERTY HAS
VIOLATED PSBAS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
C. PSBA, NOT TO MENTION, ITS STUDENT POPULATION, WILL SUFFER
GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY IF THE TAKING OF ITS PROPERTY
IS NOT ENJOINED.
II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR

WHEN IT AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE COURT A
QUO DENYING THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, ON THE BASIS OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1818 (P.D. 1818). P.D. 1818 IS NOT
APPLICABLE, CONSIDERING THAT:

A. WHAT PSBA SOUGHT TO ENJOIN IS NOT A GOVERNMENT

INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT, BUT THE DEMOLITION AND TAKING OF
PSBAS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
B. THE PROHIBITION IN P.D. 1818 APPLIED ONLY TO TROS AND
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS IN CONTROVERSIES
INVOLVING FACTS OR THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IN TECHNICAL
CASES; IT DOES NOT APPLY TO CASES, SUCH AS THIS ONE,
INVOLVING QUESTIONS OF LAW.
C. THE PROHIBITION IN P.D. 1818 DOES NOT APPLY IN CASES, SUCH AS
THIS ONE, WHERE THERE IS CLEAR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT AGENCY SOUGHT TO BE
ENJOINED.
III

THE SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULARS IMPLEMENTING

P.D. 1818 DO NOT PROHIBIT COURTS OF LAW FROM ISSUING TROS AND
INJUNCTIONS. WHAT IS PROHIBITED IS THE INDISCRIMINATE ISSUANCE
THEREOF.

IV
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT P.D. 1818 APPLIES IN THIS CASE, IT
CANNOT, AND SHOULD NOT, PREVAIL AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF PSBA NOT TO BE DEPRIVED OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR

WHEN IT FAILED TO HOLD THAT THE COURT A QUOHASTILY PRE-
JUDGED PSBAS APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTION WHEN IT RULED ON THE
SAME DURING THE HEARING OF 6 SEPTEMBER 1999, WHEN WHAT WAS
PENDING THEN WAS ONLY THE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER. [7]

We deny.
As we see it, the only issue which commends itself for our resolution is whether or
not petitioner has the right to provisionally enjoin the respondents from using the
disputed portion of its property.
In the main, petitioner maintains that it only sold 543 square meters of land out of
the 1,128 square meters subject of the deed of conditional sale. Asserting absolute
ownership over the excess area, petitioner argues that respondents taking thereof and
the demolition of its improvements thereon without any negotiated settlement or
expropriation proceedings therefor violated its right to due process.
The requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are: (a) the invasion of right sought to
be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.[8]
Here, petitioner failed to show a clear and unmistakable right which need the
protection of an injunctive writ. Its claim of ownership of the disputed area is a poor
argument to justify the issuance of the temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction prayed for.
To begin with, we cannot ignore the prima facie value of the deed of conditional sale
executed by the parties on August 27, 1997, which deed expressly states that petitioner
would lose title over the property therein conveyed upon DPWHs full payment of the
purchase price agreed upon. We quote condition No. 6 of the same deed:

6. That upon receipt of the full payment therefore, [PSBA] is lawfully and perpetually
seized of any and all the rights and title over the described property and likewise
[PSBA] hereby warrants and will defend peaceful occupation and title over said parcel
of land of [DPWH] at all times from all other claimant, whatsoever. [9]
 There is no denying the fact that DPWH had already paid the purchase price of the
land subject of the deed of conditional sale. For sure, petitioner even offered to refund
the excess payment of DPWH by reason of the alleged mistake of the parties as to the
area conveyed in the same deed.
With petitioners receipt of the full payment from DPWH, the deed of conditional sale
ripened into an absolute contract of sale, which necessarily enjoys the presumption of
validity. And among the rights enjoyed by DPWH is jus utendi or the right to use the
property conveyed to it. The presumption lasts until and unless the trial court shall have
resolved petitioners complaint in its favor.
But there is more which militates against petitioners application for an injunctive
writ. We refer to Presidential Decree No. 1818, Section 1 of which explicitly provides:

"SECTION 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any

restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any
case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery,
forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public
utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the
transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit
any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or
continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of
such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution,
implementation or operation."

In Garcia vs. Burgos,[10] this Court has made it clear that the aforequoted provision
deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writ against the implementation or
execution of a government infrastructure project. Unquestionably, the construction of
the Light Rail Transit Line 2 Project is an infrastructure project of the government.
Of course, petitioner argues that it is not seeking to enjoin the prosecution of the
same project. As correctly held by the trial court, however, said project cannot be
accomplished without demolishing [petitioners] structure.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
\

Injunction, TRO; when properly issued.

- G. R. No. 183367
G. R. No. 183367

"x x x.

Substantive Issue: Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA

The issue that must be resolved by this Court is whether the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of Status
Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction (Motion for Injunction).
A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and
preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests.[12] An
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO may be
granted upon the filing of a verified application showing facts entitling the
applicant to the relief demanded.
Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent
necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only if the
matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury would
arise unless it is issued immediately.[13] Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of
Court,[14] a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits
or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on
the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1)
there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly
threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material
and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious and irreparable damage.[15]
The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests
on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the
assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact
left to the said court for its conclusive determination.[16] Hence, the exercise of
judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with,
except when there is grave abuse of discretion.[17]
 Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.[18] The burden is thus on petitioner to show in his application that there is
meritorious ground for the issuance of a TRO in his favor.[19]
In this case, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the CA. It did
not exercise judgment in a capricious and whimsical manner or exercise power in
an arbitrary or despotic manner.

No clear legal right

A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is
enforceable as a matter of law.[20] In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance
of the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.[21] The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction.[22]
A perusal of the Motion for Injunction and its accompanying Affidavit filed
before the CA shows that petitioners rely on their alleged right to the full and
faithful execution of the MOA. However, while the enforcement of the Writ of
Execution, which would nullify the implementation of the MOA, is manifestly
prejudicial to petitioners’ interests, they have failed to establish in their Petition
that they possess a clear legal right that merits the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Their rights under the MOA have already been declared inferior or
inexistent in relation to respondent in the RTC case, under a judgment that has
become final and executory.[23] At the very least, their rights under the MOA are
precisely disputed by respondent. Hence, there can be no “clear and unmistakable”
right in favor of petitioners to warrant the issuance of a writ of injunction. Where
the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.[24]
 The general rule is that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court should interfere, by
injunction or otherwise, to restrain such execution.[25] The rule, however, admits of
exceptions, such as the following: (1) when facts and circumstances later transpire
that would render execution inequitable or unjust; or (2) when there is a change in
the situation of the parties that may warrant an injunctive relief. [26] In this case,
after the finality of the RTC Decision, there were no supervening events or
changes in the situation of the parties that would entail the injunction of the Writ of
Execution.
No irreparable injury
Damages are irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount
can be measured with reasonable accuracy.[27] In this case, petitioners have alleged
that the loss of the public market entails costs of about ₱30,000,000 in investments,
₱100,000 monthly revenue in rentals, and amounts as yet unquantified – but not
unquantifiable – in terms of the alleged loss of jobs of APRI’s employees and
potential suits that may be filed by the leaseholders of the public market for breach
of contract. Clearly, the injuries alleged by petitioners are capable of pecuniary
estimation. Any loss petitioners may suffer is easily subject to mathematical
computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary
injunction is not warranted.[28] With respect to the allegations of loss of
employment and potential suits, these are speculative at best, with no proof
adduced to substantiate them.
The foregoing considered, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying the Motion for Injunction. In any case, petitioners may still seek
recourse in their pending Petition before the Court of Appeals.
x x x."

Blog Archives
Civil Procedure: Rule 58 Preliminary Injunction
DEC 18

Posted by Magz
Sec. 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. – A preliminary injunction is an order granted at
any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court ,
agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a
particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.

The primary purpose of injunction is to preserve the status quo by restraining action or interference
or by furnishing preventive relief. The status quo is the last actual, peaceable, uncontested status
which precedes the pending controversy.

A mandatory injunction is an extreme remedy and will be granted only on a showing that (a) the
invasion of the right is material and substantial, (b) the right of the complainant is clear and
unmistakable, and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.

Distinctions between injunction and prohibition

1. Injunction is generally directed against a party in the action while prohibition is directed against a
court, tribunal or person exercising judicial powers;
2. Injunction does not involve the jurisdiction of the court, whereas prohibition may be on the ground
that the court against whom the writ is sought acted without or in excess of jurisdiction;
3. Injunction may be the main action itself, or just a provisional remedy in the main action, whereas
prohibition is always a main action. Hence, for temporary restraint in a proceeding for prohibition,
preliminary injunction must be sought therein.

Bataclan v. Court of Appeals

175 SCRA

A writ of preliminary injunction is primarily intended to maintain the status quo between the parties
existing prior to the filing of the case. As an ancillary or preventive remedy, it may only be resorted to
by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action.

Courts should not just summarily issue an order of denial without an adequate hearing and judicious
evaluation of the merits of the application as the same would be a denial of procedural due process
and could result in irreparable prejudice to a party.
Sec. 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted by the
court where the action or proceeding is pending. If the action or proceeding is pending in the Court
of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, it may be issued by said court or any member thereof.

Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be

granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring
the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probable in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Bacolod Murcia Milling v. Capitol

17 SCRA

For the writ of preliminary injunction to issue, there must be a showing based on facts that the party
availing of the remedy is entitled to the relief demanded.

An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise or to restrain an
act, which does not give rise to a cause of action

The function of an injunction is the maintenance of the status quo as of the time of its issuance. In
the case at bar, the right of the Central in using the railway has already expired: there being no right
to be protected anymore, the writ of preliminary injunction cannot be had.

Merville Park Homeowners Association Inc. v. Velez

196 SCRA

Where the village association seeks to take possession and control of the waterworks system from
the Salandanan who failed to undertake certain contractual obligations necessary to assure the
homeowners of a steady water supply, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction will not be granted
absent a showing that the severe water shortage had not been remedied and that a clear and
present danger of the same or similar default on Salandanan’s part, threatening the same severe
consequences for the subdivision residents.
A preliminary mandatory injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the possession and
control of one party and to deliver the same to the other party where possession of such property is
being disputed. It may issue pendente lite only in cases of extreme urgency, where the right to the
possession, during the pendency of the main case, of the property involved is very clear; where the
considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant seeking the
possession of pendente lite; where there was willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s rights, over
his protest and remonstrance the injury being a continuing one; where the effect of the preliminary
mandatory injunction is to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing and continuing relationship
between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, rather than to establish a
new relationship during the pendency of the principal case. It is for the party requesting the writ to
demonstrate clearly the presence of one or more of the above grounds.

Sec. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. – A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when:
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified and shows facts entitling the
applicant to the relief demanded; and
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or
proceeding is pending a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by
the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may
sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide
that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary
injunction shall be issued.
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is
included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be
raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In
any event, such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied by service of
summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant’s affidavit
and bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines.
However, where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service
despite diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent
therefrom or is a nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of
summons shall not apply.
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be acted upon only after
all parties are heard in a summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty-four (24) hours
after the sheriff’s return of service and/or the records are received by the branch selected by raffle
and to which the records shall be transmitted immediately.

Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary injunction
shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it
shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by verified application that great or irreparable injury
would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the
application for preliminary injunction was made, nay issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to
be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said
party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be
granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme
urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a
multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately
comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the
documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge
before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the
temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be
heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty
(20 days, including the original seventy-two hours provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the
said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a
temporary restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect
and no court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was
issued.

However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary restraining order
shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. A
restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further
orders.

Temporary restraining order, when issued

1. When great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant even before the application is heard
on notice; 20-day temporary restraining order is issued.
2. If the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable
injury, the court may issue ex parte a 72-hour temporary restraining order; can only be issued by
the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or by the presiding judge of a single-sala court.

The judge issuing a 72-hour TRO is obliged to conduct a summary hearing within the effectivity of
the 72-hour TRO to determine whether the TRO shall be extended in which case, the same is
converted into a 20-day TRO. Within the 20-day period of effectivity of the TRO the court shall
determine in a hearing whether or not the preliminary injunction is to be granted. This 20-day period
is inextendible.

Thus, a TRO may be converted to a preliminary injunction, which in turn may be converted into a
final injunction. TRO and preliminary injunction are issued to maintain the status quo ante, that is,
prior to the institution of the main action. A final injunction confirms a preliminary injunction and
perpetually enjoins a party or person from doing the act/s complained of.

Effectivity of TROs:

TRO issued by trail court may either be for 72 hours or 20 days; if issued by the CA or a member
thereof, it shall be effective for sixty (60) days; TROs0 issued by the SC shall be effective until
further notice.

Social Security Commission v. Bayona

5 SCRA

Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction when
there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. An
irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and
continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by
conjecture and not by any accurate standard of measurement. An irreparable injury to authorize an
injunction consists of “a serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects, either
physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the property has some
peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss
thereof.”

For an injury to be irreparable, it does not have to refer to the amount of damages that may be
caused but rather to the difficulty of measuring the damages inflicted. If full compensation can be
obtained by way of damages, equity will not apply the remedy of injunction.

Sec. 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of, injunction or restraining
order. – The application for injunction or restraining order may be denied, upon a showing of its
insufficiency. The injunction or restraining order may also be denied, or, if granted, may be
dissolved, on other grounds upon affidavits of the party or person enjoined, which may be opposed
by the applicant also by affidavits. It may further be denied or granted, may be dissolved, if it
appears after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the
issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party
or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may
suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay all
damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or
restraining order. If it appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction or restraining order granted
is too great, it may be modified.
Sec. 7. Service of copies of bonds; effect of disapproval of same. – The party filing a bond in
accordance with the provisions of this Rule shall forthwith serve a copy of such bond on the other
party, who may except to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon. If the
applicant’s bond is found to be insufficient in amount, or if the surety or sureties thereon fail to justify,
and a bond sufficient in amount with sufficient sureties approved after justification is not filed
forthwith, the injunction shall be dissolved. If the bond of the adverse party is found to be insufficient
in amount, or the surety or sureties thereon fail to justify a bond sufficient in amount with sufficient
sureties approved after justification is not filed forthwith, the injunction shall be granted or restored,
as the case may be.
Sec. 8. Judgment to include damages against party and sureties. – AT the trial, the amount of
damages to be awarded to either party, upon the bond of the adverse party, shall be claimed,
ascertained, and awarded under the same procedure prescribed in section 20 of Rule 57.
Sec. 9. When final injunction granted. – If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant
is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final
injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of
the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.

TRO; writ of preliminary injunction;

judge fined for gross ignorance of the
law.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255

SPOUSES DEMOCRITO AND OLIVIA LAGO vs.

JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 43, GINGOOG CITY,

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3335-RTJ)
January 17, 2011
x x x.

We find the recommendations of the OCA to be well-taken.

Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court on preliminary injunction, pertinent to this case,
provide—

SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.—A
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when:

(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the
relief demanded; and

(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding is
pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the
effect that the applicant will pay such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.

(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is included in a
complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after
notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice
shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied by service of summons, together with a copy of
the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant’s affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the
Philippines.

However, where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent
efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a
nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply.

(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be acted upon only after all parties
are heard in a summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the sheriff’s
return of service and/or the records are received by the branch selected by raffle and to which the records
shall be transmitted immediately.

SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception.—No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear
from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary
injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of
twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided.
Within the twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time
and place, why the injunction should not be granted. The court shall also determine, within the same
period, whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the
corresponding order.

However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the
applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or
the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for
only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance, but shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next
preceding section as to the service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter,
within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a
summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the
application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours provided
herein.

In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the said period,
the temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary
restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect, and no court shall
have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.

However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary restraining order shall be
effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining order
issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further orders.

The trial court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Tax Appeals that issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against a lower court, board, officer, or quasi-judicial agency shall decide the main
case or petition within six (6) months from the issuance of the writ.[13]

Culled from the foregoing provisions, particularly with respect to the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court, as amended, it is clear that, on the matter of the issuance of an ex parte 72-hour
TRO, an executive judge of a multiple-sala court (applicable to respondent judge), or the presiding judge
of a single-sala court, is empowered to issue the same in matters of extreme emergency, in order to
prevent grave injustice and irreparable injury to the applicant. However, it is also an unequivocal provision
that, after the issuance of the 72-hour TRO, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court is bound to
comply with Section 4(c) of the same rule with respect to the service of summons and the documents to
be served therewith.
The records of this case clearly show that respondent judge failed to cause the raffle of Civil Case No.
2009-905, since RTC, Gingoog City, is a multiple-sala court, or to cause the notification and service of
summons to complainants after he issued the 72-hour TRO. Respondent judge’s July 7, 2009 Order was
explicit when the civil case was set for summary hearing on July 14, 2009, purportedly to determine
whether or not the TRO issued could be extended for another period. Thus, it is manifest that respondent
judge had directly assumed jurisdiction over the civil action and all together disregarded the mandatory
requirements of Section 4(c), Rule 58, relative to the raffle in the presence of the parties, and service of
summons. This is gross error.

Even assuming that there was a valid raffle to RTC, Branch 43, Gingoog City, where respondent judge
acts as the presiding magistrate, the supposed extreme urgency of the issuance of the 72-hour TRO was
belied by his setting of the required summary hearing for the determination of the necessity of extending
the 72-hour TRO to 20 days, one week after the issuance thereof. Indeed, Section 5, Rule 58 is explicit
that such summary hearing must be conducted within the said 72-hour period. Notwithstanding the
explanation of respondent judge that he could not set the required summary hearing except on Tuesdays
and Wednesdays, it should be noted that July 7, 2009, the date of the issuance of the 72-hour TRO, was
a Tuesday, yet respondent judge could have set the summary hearing on July 8, 2009, a Wednesday. He
failed to do so on the mistaken notion that, aside from his alleged hectic schedule, he could, at any time,
extend the 72-hour TRO for another period as long as the total period did not exceed 20 days.

What is more appalling is that respondent judge extended the 72-hour TRO, which had already and
obviously expired, into a full 20-day TRO. An already expired TRO can no longer be extended.
Respondent judge should have known that the TRO he issued in his capacity as an acting executive
judge was valid for only 72 hours. Beyond such time, the TRO automatically expires, unless, before the
expiration of the said period, he, supposedly in his capacity as presiding judge to whom the case was
raffled, conducted the required summary hearing in order to extend the TRO’s lifetime. Indubitably, a 72-
hour TRO, issued by an executive judge, is a separate and distinct TRO which can stand on its own,
regardless of whether it is eventually extended or not. It is not, as respondent judge attempts to impress
upon us, a mere part of the 20-day TRO issued by a presiding judge to whom the case is raffled.

Moreover, respondent judge committed another blunder when he ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction without the required hearing and without prior notice to the defendants, herein
complainants. The records plainly disclose that the only hearing conducted prior to the August 11, 2009
Resolution granting the preliminary injunction was the July 14, 2009 summary hearing for the extension of
the 72-hour TRO. This could be gathered from the August 11, 2009 Resolution, wherein respondent
judge declared—

During the hearing for the determination of the propriety (sic) the Temporary Restraining Order should be
extended or whether the Writ of Injunction be granted, the plaintiff presented Christina M. Obico, who in
essence testified that she operated fish cages at Gingoog Bay. x x x.[14]

Again, Rule 58, as amended, mandates a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination of the
propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, separate from the summary hearing for the
extension of the 72-hour TRO. The preliminary injunction prayed for by the applicant can only be heard
after the trial court has ordered the issuance of the usual 20-day TRO. Within that period of 20 days, the
court shall order the party sought to be enjoined to show cause at a specified time and place why the
injunction should not be granted. During that same period, the court shall also determine the propriety of
granting the preliminary injunction and then issue the corresponding order to that effect. In the case of
respondent judge, he gravely failed to comply with what the rule requires, i.e., to give complainants the
opportunity to comment or object, through a full-blown hearing, to the writ of injunction prayed for.
Instead, respondent judge railroaded the entire process by treating the summary hearing for the
extension of the TRO as the very same hearing required for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.

Verily, the absence of the hearing required by the Rules of Court is downright reprehensible and, thus,
should not be countenanced. The requirement of a hearing is so fundamental that failure to comply with it
not only amounts to gross ignorance of rules and procedure, but also to an outright denial of due process
to the party denied such a hearing. Undoubtedly, the acts and omissions of respondent judge warrant
sanction from this Court.

Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of the rules, and that, when committed in
good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases within the parameters
of tolerable misjudgment. When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if
one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a
judge owes the public and the court proficiency in the law, and the duty to maintain professional
competence at all times. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the
confidence of the public in the courts. A judge is expected to keep abreast of the developments and
amendments thereto, as well as of prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be
the mainspring of injustice.[15]

In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action. However, the assailed judicial acts must not be in gross violation of clearly
established law or procedure, which every judge must be familiar with. Every magistrate presiding over a
court of law must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands and maintain professional competence at
all times.[16]

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the law or procedure as a serious
offense for which the imposable sanction ranges from dismissal from the service to suspension from
office, and a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. Under the premises, this Court
finds it appropriate to impose on respondent judge the penalty of a fine in the amount of P25,000.00.

WHEREFORE, Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Gingoog City, is
found liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure, and is hereby meted a fine of P25,000.00,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same, or any similar infraction in the future, shall be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Tamayo

June 21, 2017

G.R. No. 222685

LORETA SAMBALILO, SALVADOR SAMBALILO, ZOILO SAMBALILO, JR. and RENANTE

SAMBALILO,Petitioners
vs.
SPOUSES PABLO LLARENAS AND FE LLARENAS, Respondents

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the January 30, 2014 Decision1 and the December 4, 2015 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals,
Cebu City (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 05120, which reversed the May 6, 2010 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog City (RTC). The RTC overruled the January 12, 2009 Decision4 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Calbayog City (MTCC) in a special civil action for forcible entry.

The Antecedents

This case originated from a complaint for forcible entry, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, filed by Spouses Pablo Llarenas and Fe Llarenas (Sps.
Llarenas) against Loreta Sambalilo and her children, Salvador, Zoilo, Jr., and Renante (the
Sambalilos), before the MTCC, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 1506.

Sps. Llarenas, in their complaint, alleged that they were the owners of a parcel of land with an area
of 120 square meters, located in Barrio Matobato, Calbayog City, having acquired it by purchase
under a deed of sale, dated April 17, 1972, from Zoilo Sambalilo (Zoilo), late husband of petitioner
Loreta Sambalilo (Loreta), with the following adjoining boundaries: on the north - by the remaining
portion of Zoilo; east - by the land of Ricardo Delgado; south - by the seashore; and west - by the
remaining portion of Zoilo. Subsequently, or on November 23, 1981, Sps. Llarenas acquired another
parcel of land, by purchase from the same vendor, consisting of 176 square meters, bounded as
follows: on the north - by the provincial road; east - by the land of Conrado Ignacio and Jurado
Sarmiento; south - by the seashore; and west by the land of Tiburcio Chan. Immediately thereafter,
they occupied and took possession of the said properties by introducing improvements, such as the
construction of a septic tank, a piggery building, a house rented to Spouses Cabuenas, the house of
their caretaker, a steel gate, a fence made of coco lumber, and another house where they allowed
their daughter to stay. On August 20, 2004, under the pretext of inspecting their septic tank, the
petitioners suddenly entered their property, forcibly removed the steel gate from its concrete
mounting and, with the assistance of several helpers, began constructing a concrete fence within the
premises of their property.
In their answer, the Sambalilos contended that Loreta was, and had always been, in possession of
the property where the concrete fence and framework of a future house had been erected because
that area was within the portion of their land, left unsold, and where her residential house had been
standing.5

During the hearing on the application for injunction, Sps. Llarenas presented a sketch plan depicting
the location of the properties described in the complaint and various pictures showing the
constructed structures erected by the Sambalilos. On September 22, 2005, the MTCC issued a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining the Sambalilos and their successors-ininterest from entering the
disputed premises and to refrain from continuing with their construction or to desist from introducing
any improvement pending the final resolution of the main action.6

Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective position papers. Sps. Llarenas attached the tax
declarations of their properties and those of the adjoining owners. The Sambalilos, on the other
1âw phi 1

hand, appended several documents like the sketch plan of Lot 2692 of the Calbayog Cadastre,
prepared by Geodetic Engineer Joel S. Ungab; the joint affidavit of Barangay Captain Sisenio
Santiago (Brgy. Capt. Santiago), and Barangay Kagawad Manuel Caber, Jr. (Brgy. Kag.
Caber); Minutes of the conciliation proceeding conducted by the Office of the Barangay Captain of
Matobato, Calbayog City; and the affidavit of Primitiva Ignacio (Primitiva ), daughter of the late
Bonifacio Ignacio (Bonifacio), the owner of Lot 2692-E, among others.7

In their position paper,8 the Sambalilos alleged that Loreta was the widow of the late Zoilo; and
Salvador, Zoilo, Jr. and Renante were the children of Zoilo and Loreta; that Zoilo and Loreta owned
a parcel of residential lot with an area of 640 square meters, more or less, designated in the survey
as Lot No. 2692, CAD 422, located along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Matobato, Calbayog City;
that during his lifetime, Zoilo, together with Loreta, sold portions of Lot 2692 to various persons; that
among the buyers were Tiburcio Chan, Bonifacio, and Sps. Llarenas, who were able to buy two
separate portions; that as a result of the sales, Lot 2692 was subsequently subdivided into eight (8)
parcels of land, from Lot 2692-A to Lot 2692-H; that the portion bought by Bonifacio was designated
as Lot 2692-E, while the portions purchased by Sps. Llarenas were designated as They also claimed
that they had allowed a pathway to be constructed within Lot 2692 from the Maharlika Highway to
the seashore (or the Samar Sea) which was used by the people as ingress and egress to the sea
from Maharlika Highway and vice-versa; that Loreta used the pathway to access her residential
house constructed in Lot 2692-G; that a conciliation proceedings involving Loreta and Pablo
Llanares was conducted before the barangay officials ofBrgy. Matobato, Calbayog City, headed by
Brgy. Capt. Santiago because of the complaint of Loreta against Pablo who put up a gate shutter in
a steel gate constructed across the pathway, which obstructed passage from the Maharlika Highway
to the seashore and also towards the house of Loreta; that during the said conciliation proceedings,
Loreta and Pablo agreed, among others, that (1) the lots would be relocated by a geodetic engineer
with the expenses equally shared by the parties; and (2) the barangay officials would remove the
gate shutter. Eventually, the said gate shutter was removed with the help of barangay officials and in
the presence of Pablo. Lot 2692-C and Lot 2692-F, respectively; and that the remaining portion still
owned by the Sambalilos was designated as Lot 2692-G.

They also claimed that they had allowed a pathway to be constructed within Lot 2692 from the
Maharlika Highway to the seashore (or the Samar Sea) which was used by the people as ingress
and egress to the sea from Maharlika Highway and vice-versa; that Loreta used the pathway to
access her residential house constructed in Lot 2692-G; that a conciliation proceedings involving
Loreta and Pablo Llanares was conducted before the barangay officials ofBrgy. Matobato, Calbayog
City, headed by Brgy. Capt. Santiago because of the complaint of Loreta against Pablo who put up a
gate shutter in a steel gate constructed across the pathway, which obstructed passage from the
Maharlika Highway to the seashore and also towards the house of Loreta; that during the said
conciliation proceedings, Loreta and Pablo agreed, among others, that (1) the lots would be
relocated by a geodetic engineer with the expenses equally shared by the parties; and (2) the
barangay officials would remove the gate shutter. Eventually, the said gate shutter was removed
with the help of barangay officials and in the presence of Pablo.

It was further averred that Lot 2692-C and Lot 2692-F of Pablo were distinct, separate and different
from Lot 2692-G owned by the Sambalilos; that Sps. Llarenas never stayed or occupied these lots
because they actually resided in their house along Umbria Street, Brgy. Balud, Calbayog City, as
alleged in their complaint; and that it was only Loreta who had a residential house in Lot 2692-G
where she had been living openly up to the present time.

The Ruling of the MTCC

In its January 12, 2009 Decision, the MTCC ruled in favor of Sps. Llarenas. It explained that Sps.
Llarenas were able to prove prior physical possession of the contested property and that the
Sambalilos were guilty of forcible entry by removing the steel gate and constructing concrete fences
on the said property. The MTCC explained that the improvements disturbed Sps. Llarenas'
possession of their adjoining properties near the seashore. It did not give credence to the
conciliation proceedings because the same were conducted after the commission of the forcible
entry. The MTCC disposed the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds preponderant evidence for the plaintiffs and renders judgment as
follows: a) Making permanent the preliminary injunction; b) Ordering the defendants to demolish and
remove at their expense all structures they made or cause to be made inside the premises of
plaintiffs' property covered by their Exh. "A" and Exh. "B;" c) Ordering the defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiffs ₱35,ooo.oo for their attorney's acceptance fee, plus ₱3,ooo.oo for the
latter's appearance fee for three hearings; d) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
the plaintiffs ₱50,ooo.oo for moral damages; and e) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to
pay the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED.9

Aggrieved, the Sambalilos appealed to the RTC.

The Ruling of the RTC

In its May 6, 2010 Decision, the R TC reversed the MTCC decision. It pointed out that based on the
respective sketch plans of the parties, there was a consensus that the alleged illegal structures were
located on the western side of the pathway when facing the seashore. The R TC noted that based
on the evidence on record, it was shown that the concrete fences, built as improvements, were
made on Lot 2692-G, where Loreta's house was located, and not on Lot 2692-C. It stated that the
area actually occupied by Sps. Llarenas after the sale at the western side of the pathway (Lot 2692-
C) did not actually reach the side of the seashore where the structures in question stood because
Lot 2692-H and Lot 2692-G, under the name of the Sambalilos, existed in between. The R TC wrote
that this was in consonance with the boundaries stated in the tax declaration for Lot 2692-C and
supported by the witnesses of the Sambalilos.

The RTC belied Sps. Llarenas' claim that the Sambalilos forcibly removed the steel gate along the
pathway because based on the minutes of the mediation conference at the barangay level, the steel
gate was removed pursuant to the voluntary agreement of the parties. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated January 12, 2009 is hereby reversed and set aside, and
the Injunction issued therein is likewise hereby dissolved and lifted.
SO ORDERED. 10

Undeterred, Sps. Llarenas appealed before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In its assailed January 30, 2014 Decision, the CA overruled the RTC decision and reinstated the
MTCC decision. It held that Sps. Llarenas were able to establish that they were in prior physical
possession of Cadastral Lot 2692-F. Moreover, the CA gave more credence to their photographs
which showed that the steel gate was removed and a concrete fence was constructed. Further, even
if it was agreed that the steel gate was to be removed, the CA said that there was no excuse for the
Sambalilos to erect the said concrete fences within the premises possessed by Sps. Llarenas. It
disposed the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The May 6, 2010 Decision of the RTC, Branch
32, Calbayog City in Special Civil Action No. 117 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 12,
2009 Decision of the MTCC, Calbayog City in Special Civil Action No. 1506 is REINSTATED with
MODIFICATIONS that the awards for moral damages, attorney's acceptance fee, appearance fee
and costs of the suit are DELETED. SO ORDERED.11

The Sambalilos moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion in its assailed December
4, 2015 Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

GROUNDS

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

FOUND THAT THE CONTROVERSY AROSE IN LOT 2692-F, WHICH IS DECLARED IN THE
NAME OF THE RESPONDENTS, ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE AT HAND, AS CORRECTLY
FOUND BY THE RTC BRANCH 32, WOULD INDUBITABLY POINT THAT THE IMPROVEMENTS
MADE BY PETITIONERS WERE ON THEIR OWN LOT WHICH IS LOT 2692-G.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HELD

THAT PETITIONERS HA VE NO PRIOR PHYSICAL POSSESSION ON THE LOT WHERE THE
IMPROVEMENTS WERE MADE.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

FOUND THAT THE STEEL GATE OF RESPONDENTS WERE FORCIBLY REMOVED BY
PETITIONERS THUS DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE AT HAND WHICH POINTED TO
RESPONDENT HAVING VOLUNTARILY AGREED FOR ITS REMOVAL BY THE BARANGAY
AUTHORITIES.12

The Sambalilos agree that only questions of law are allowed in the present action. The petition,
however, falls within the exception considering that the findings of the CA are contrary to those of
the RTC and contradicted by the evidence on record, and that its judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts.

Moreover, petitioners insist that the concrete fences they built were introduced within the premises of
Lot 2692-G, which they owned. Thus, there can be no forcibly entry. The respondents Sps.
Llarenas (respondents) possessed Lot 2692-F, and not the lot where they built the structures which
was Lot 2692-G. Further, petitioners claim that the steel gate was removed because of the
agreement of the parties during the conciliation proceedings before the barangay.

On June 23, 2016, respondents filed their Comment. 13 They asserted that they were able to
establish, by preponderance of evidence, the identities of the two parcels of land they bought from
Zoilo and his wife Loreta measuring 120 and 176 square meters (sq.m.), respectively. The
testimonies of respondents and their witnesses clearly and preponderantly established their prior
physical possession of the same parcels of land up to, and until, August 20, 2004 when petitioners
forcibly entered the said land. Respondents argued that forcible entry was committed not only with
the use of force, but also by means of strategy and/or stealth, because, petitioners had convinced
respondents' daughter to let them in on the pretext of just inspecting the land and the septic tank.
Respondents asserted that this conclusion of fact by the MTCC could not be overturned by the RTC.

On October 3, 2016, petitioners filed their Reply14 stressing that they never contested that
respondents bought two (2) parcels of land from Zoilo, their predecessor, and that they were in prior
possession of these two (2) parcels, Lot 2692-C and Lot 2692-F. What was being contested,
according to them, was the actual area where these two (2) lots were located. Petitioners insisted
that, as correctly found by the RTC, the area which respondents had improved by August 20, 2004,
the alleged date of forcible entry, was their lot, Lot 2692-G, and not the portions bought by
respondents.

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether the improvements, specifically the concrete fence and
the framework of a future house, introduced by the petitioners disturbed respondents' possession of
the land in question.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Considering that the CA and the RTC arrived at different factual findings and conclusions, the Court
is constrained to depart from the general rule that only errors of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and to review the evidence presented. 15

For a forcible entry case to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior
physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and (c) that the action was filed within one year from the time
the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the
property. 16 The only purpose of a forcible entry suit is to protect the person who had prior physical
possession against another who unlawfully entered the property and usurped possession. 17 Hence,
in this case, it is imperative that respondents establish that the improvements introduced by
petitioners dispossessed them of the land they owned.

It is undisputed that petitioners had constructed a concrete fence and a framework of a future house,
the very structures complained of, as the direct result of the alleged illegal intrusion of petitioners on
the disputed lots.

In this case, it was shown that the structures were introduced on the lot west of the pathway when
facing the seashore. The Court agrees with the RTC that the evidence on record show that the said
lot was Lot 2692-G, which was under the name of petitioners, and not Lot 2692-F as found by the
CA. Neither were the constructions made on Lot 2692-C owned by respondents. As correctly found
by the RTC:
Now then, considering the common consensus of the parties, as culled from their respective sketch
plans, that the alleged illegal structures were located on the western side of the pathway, if one is
facing against the Samar Sea, and that this area is adjacent to the seashore, on the southern side,
the task of determining who is actually in prior physical possession of this area becomes relatively
easier.

As shown in the appellants' sketch plan, the lot on the western side of the pathway and adjacent to
the seashore, if one is facing against the Samar Sea, is Lot 2692-G/Lot 2692-H. Unfortunately for
the appellees, Lot 2692-G and Lot 2692-H are the properties of the appellants as shown in their Tax
Declaration No. 99 01016 00929 (Appellees' Exhibit "V"), and Tax Declaration No. 99 01016 00928
(Appellees' Exhibit "T").

Appellees' property (Lot 2692-F) declared under Tax Declaration No. 99 01016 00478 (Appellees'
Exhibit "S") while bounded by the seashore on its southern side could not have been the area where
the illegal structure is located because as shown on the sketch plan of the appellants, it is located
along the Eastern side of the pathway, not on the Western side where the disputed property is
situated.

As regards the appellees' other property, (Lot 2692-C) per Tax Declaration No. 99 01016 00406
(Appellees' Exhibit "R"), which is located at the western side of the pathway, if one is facing against
the Samar Sea, the location of the contested structures could not have also been inside this property
because as shown in the same sketch plan, its southern side is not bounded by the seashore but by
Lot 2692-G/Lot 2692-H, which, to repeat, are properties declared in the name of the appellants.

Consequently, from the foregoing presentation and analysis, it is clear that the contested structures
are located within the area of Lot 2692-H (Appellees' Exhibit "T") and Lot 2692-G (Appellees' Exhibit
"V"), both of which belong to the appellants. 18

The RTC was correct in giving more credence to the sketch plan of petitioners. Although
respondents' sketch plan,19 relied upon by the MTCC and the CA, showed the area containing the
constructions as located on the western side of what appeared to be a pathway, when facing the
seashore, this pathway which divided the two parcels of land, the 176 and 117 sq. m. lots, traversed
from the northern side up to only the edge of the 11 7 sq. m. lot. The said sketch plan, as properly
argued by petitioners, was relatively limited as it did not depict the adjoining properties after the
subdivision of the entire Lot 2692 into various sub-lots. Indeed, the sketch plan was insufficient
because it did not even identify the exact location of the properties, Lot 2692-C and Lot 2692-F,
actually possessed by respondents based on their own tax declarations.

Quite the contrary, the sketch plan of petitioners20 showed an existing pathway (Lot 2692-I) that
traversed the entire Lot 2692 from its northern side along the Maharlika Highway, all the way up to
the seashore of the Samar Sea to the northern side. This sketch plan was consistent with the
statement made by the barangay officials in their joint-affidavit21 that there was a pathway along the
said lot used by the people in going to and from the highway to the seashore.

This Court cannot subscribe to respondents' claim that the disputed structures were erected on their
property as their two lots were adjoining each other as shown in their sketch plan. A perusal of both
the deeds of absolute sale22 as well as the tax declarations23 pertaining to the two parcels of land,
however, shows that the two portions were not adjacent to each other. Thus, the theory of
respondents that it was through their lot with 120 sq. m. (Lot-C) that their lot with 176 sq. m. (Lot-F)
was entered by petitioners on August 20, 2004 deserves scant consideration.
The Court, thus, shares the view of petitioners that their sketch plan was more credible than that of
respondents inasmuch as the former was consistent with the boundaries of the parcels of land as
depicted in respondents' own documentary evidence.24

Having established that the improvements made by petitioners were in Lots 2692-G and H, the next
issue to address is whether petitioners were in actual physical possession of these lots.

The MTCC found that respondents were in physical possession of the contested area by virtue of
the instruments of sale that transferred the property to them. It may be true that the deeds of
conveyances covering respondents' acquisition of the 120 and 176 sq. m. lots from Zoilo have the
seashore as their common boundaries. It bears to emphasize that petitioners disputed the
correctness of the area sold to respondents although they admitted the sale. Indeed, petitioners
vehemently denied the seashore as the south boundary of Lot 2692-C, and contended that the deed
of sale for the said land contained erroneous boundaries. The MTCC, however, overlooked the fact
that after the sale, the area occupied by respondents at the western side of the pathway, Lot 2692-
C, did not actually reach the side of the seashore where the structures stood because, as aptly
noted by the RTC, Lot 2692-H and Lot 2692-G, in the name of petitioners, existed in between.
Records show that Tax Declaration No. 99 01016 00406,25indicated that the adjoining boundary on
the south towards the direction of Samar Sea were Lots 2692-H and Lot 2692-G, and not the
seashore.

This finding is further confirmed by the sketch plan of petitioners showing that the extent of the
property occupied by respondents on the western side of the pathway (Lot 2692-C) was only up to
the property of petitioners (Lots 2692-H and 2692-G), and did not reach the seashore.

The flimsy excuse of respondents that the boundaries on the tax declarations for the two parcels,
Lots 2692-C and 2692-F, were altered by the Office of the City Assessor of Calbayog City,
explaining why the two parcels were not adjoining each other, fails to persuade. For one, if indeed
the boundaries were altered, they should have filed an action or protest before the City Assessor's
Office to have them corrected from the time they discovered the same. Unfortunately, they did not.
The same is true with respect to Tax Declaration No. 99 01016 0040626 for Lot 2692-C. When the
said lot was transferred in their names, the declaration contained an area of 120 sq. m. with the
boundaries indicated in the south as 05-103 (2692 H) 102 (2692 G), and not the seashore. Their
acquiescence for the longest time indicated their conformity to the said declaration of boundaries. As
correctly pointed out by the RTC, respondents' declaration before the City Assessor's Office on the
extent of the area they actually occupied, as the basis for the issuance of the corresponding tax
declaration of the property, was an admission against their interest. The rationale for the rule is
based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such
declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it
is his fault if it does not. 27

The RTC was also correct when it held that the tax declaration enjoys the presumption of regularity,
and must be respected, unless rebutted by contrary evidence which, in this case, respondents
miserably failed to adduce.

Even assuming that the tax declarations were not reliable as to the true and correct boundaries of
the two parcels of land, the deeds of sale of the said properties which were even marked as exhibits
for respondents, also failed to show that the two lots were adjacent to each other.

Further, petitioners' stance that they had a house in Lot 2692-G where they had been living until the
present and that the improvements had been made thereon was bolstered by the affidavit28 of their
neighbor Primitiva and the joint affidavit 29 of Brgy. Capt. Santiago and Brgy. Kag. Caber. Primitiva
affirmed that her house was adjacent to respondents' house and across was the house of Loreta in
Lot 2692-G. Further, they stated that respondents placed a steel gate, at the comer of the house of
Bonifacio and the lot of Pablo, along the pathway obstructing the general public in going to the
seashore from the highway or vice-versa, and which caused Loreta to complain before the
barangay. Primitiva and the barangay officials narrated that during the proceedings before the
barangay, Loreta and Pablo agreed that the steel gate should be removed and that the same was
done in their presence and in the presence of petitioners and Pablo.

Thus, respondents' claim of actual physical possession of the questioned land has no leg to stand. It
must be noted that aside from their self-serving assertions, respondents did not adduce evidence of
their actual possession of the disputed area. Interestingly, respondents made reference to people
who allegedly occupied their Lots 2692-C and 2692-F, Mr. and Mrs. Cabuenos, Marisa Cabuenos,
Rolando Pua and the like, but surprisingly none of them executed corroborative affidavits to support
their position. Obviously, it was only their daughter, Marie Effie L. Becerrel, whom they were able to
present as· their witness. On the contrary, their own documentary exhibits belie their claim that they
physically possessed that portion of the lot where the improvements were made.

After having proven that the improvements were made on Lot 2692- G, the testimonies of
respondents as to their physical possession of Lots 2692-C and 2692-F become irrelevant. The CA,
therefore, erred in affirming the MTCC finding that petitioners had no prior physical possession on
the lot where the improvements were made.

Anent the issue of forcible entry, to repeat, the only witness presented by respondents to show that
petitioners were guilty of committing forcible entry was their daughter. Her claim of stealthy intrusion
1âwphi1

of petitioners over their land by forcibly removing the steel gate, as aptly concluded by the

RTC, was debunked by the Minutes30 of conciliation meeting before the Office of the Barangay of
Matobato, Calbayog City, and the joint affidavit of the Barangay Captain and Kagawad of the place.
The barangay officials stated that the steel gate along the pathway was dismantled and removed by
them, upon voluntary agreement of the parties, and not by petitioners alone as falsely claimed by
respondents.

Basic is the rule in evidence that the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts, not upon him
who denies, because, by the nature of things, the one who denies a fact cannot produce any proof of
it. 31 In this case, the burden to prove that they were in prior physical possession of the property and
that they were deprived of possession thereof by force and/or stealth lies with respondents. The
Court holds that respondents failed to carry out this burden because, as already stated, even their
own evidence belied their assertions.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds sufficient justification to reverse the assailed CA decision.

On a final note, the Court cautions that the ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of
possession de facto or material possession. This adjudication is not a final determination on the
issue of ownership and, thus, without prejudice to any party's right to file action on the matter of
ownership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 30, 2014 Decision and the December 4,
2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 05120 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The May 6, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog City,
is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On Official Leave)

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA (On Leave)

Associate Justice MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Acting Chairperson Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
On Official Leave.

**
Per Special Order No. 2445 dated June 16, 2017.

***
On Leave.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap, with Associate Justice Gabriel T.
Ingles and Associate Justice Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla, concurring; rollo (Vol. I), pp. 89-104.

2
Id. at 46-48.
3
Penned by Presiding Judge Romeo Dizon Tagra; id. at 195-206.

4
Penned by Presiding Judge Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr.; id. at 270-284.

5
Id. at 196.

6
Id.

7
Id. at 196-197.

8
Id. at 285-294.

9
Id. at 284.

10
Id. at 206.

11
Id. at 104.

12
Id. at 17 & 31.

13
Id. at 485-523.

14
Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 786-807.

15
MOF Company, Inc. v. Shin Yang Brokerage Corporation, 623 Phil. 424, 433 (2009).

Mangaser v. Ugay, G.R. No. 204926, December 3, 2014, 744 SCRA 13, 23-24, citing Dela
16

Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 539 Phil. 158, 170 (2006).

17
Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk, Inc. v. Spouses Sison, G.R. No. 191132, January 27, 2016.

18
Rollo (Vol. I), p. 201.

19
Id. at 480.

20
Id. at 295.

21
Id. at 296.

22
Id. at 335-336.

23
Id. at 601-612.

24
Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 795-796.

25
Rollo (Vol. I), p. 600.

26
Id. at 308.
27
Manila Electric Company v. Heirs of Spouses Deloy, 710 Phil. 427, 441 (2013), citing Heirs
of Bernardo Ulep v. Ducat, 597 Phil. 5, 16 (2009), citing Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, 478
Phil. 544, 558 (2004).

28
Rollo (Vol. I), p. 301.

29
Id. at 296.

30
Id. at 299-300.

C.I. CM Mission Seminaries School of Theology, Inc. v. Perez, G.R. No. 220506, January
31

18, 2017, citing Acabal v. Acabal, 494 Phil. 528, 541 (2005).