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Manchester United Analysis 2019

Throwing money at a problem


has never produced a solution for me.

Sir Alex Ferguson

For r/reddevils, with love.


Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 3
Identity .................................................................................................................................... 4
Squad Composition ............................................................................................................ 4
Composition of the 1998-1999 squad ............................................................................. 4
Composition of the 2003-2004 squad ............................................................................. 5
Composition of the 2007-2008 squad ............................................................................. 5
Composition of the 2018-2019 squad ............................................................................. 6
Style of Play (Attacking Pillars) ......................................................................................... 8
Club Structure ....................................................................................................................... 11
Chairpersons ..................................................................................................................... 11
Board of Directors ............................................................................................................ 11
First-Line Managers ......................................................................................................... 12
Non-Managerial Staff ....................................................................................................... 12
Assessment ........................................................................................................................... 13
Ed Woodward ................................................................................................................... 13
Board of Directors ............................................................................................................ 14
First-Team Players ............................................................................................................ 14
Analysis ................................................................................................................................ 22
Club structure and Ed Woodward .................................................................................... 22
Squad adjustment and Manchester United’s identity ....................................................... 22
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 25
Introduction

Manchester United Football Club, founded as Newton Heath LYR Football Club in 1878,
has by now completed six years without challenging for the title of their local
championship, the Premier League. Under the helms of Sir Matt Busby (1945-1969) and
Sir Alex Ferguson (1986-2013,) Manchester United rose as the greatest powerhouse in
British football; and yet, since the departure of the latter, their highest finishing league
position has been second place, a full 19 points below league champions Manchester City.

This essay aims to analyse the identity of the club, as defined by the squad composition
principles and attacking pillars established by their most renowned managers; the club
structure; and finally, an assessment of some individuals, with the goal of shedding light
into potential errors that, if fixed, could help the team and the club as a whole to move
forward successfully.

The author of this essay is currently a Level 2 football coach and Level 1 goalkeeping
coach (English FA) and a candidate youth coach (Chilean FA.) He is also a registered
football scout (English PFSA) and translator. In terms of potential conflicts of interests, the
author declares that he has no financial relationship with Manchester United, other than
being a member of the club.
Identity

The purpose of this section is to identify Manchester United’s identity in terms of squad
composition and style of play, considering that the identity of a club and/or a company is
meant to serve as a compass if and when it seems lost.

Squad Composition

Historically, Manchester United’s squad has been composed by a combination of:

1. The best English, British and Irish players available.


2. Young and promising talents.
3. Academy players.
4. Exciting foreign talent that would significantly improve specific positions.

Prior to the Premier League era (which began in 1992,) English clubs almost exclusively
featured English and British players – so it seems obvious that the fourth principle will not
be applicable for Sir Matt Busby’s squads. The squad that won the European Cup in 1968
included academy graduates such as Francis Burns (born in 1948,) David Sadler (1946,)
John Aston Jr. (1947,) George Best (1946,) Bobby Charlton (1937,) and Brian Kidd (1949,)
who easily fulfil principles 1-3.

To provide some evidence and discuss the applicability of these identity principles in the
Sir Alex Ferguson era, the two squads that won the Champions League under his command
will be discussed, as well as the squad of the 2003-2004 season (sitting in the middle point
between these two continental trophies.)

Composition of the 1998-1999 squad

Out of the 30 players who featured in at least one match during the season:

1. 14 were English; 1 was Scottish; 1 was Welsh; 1 was Northern Irish; and 2 were
Irish (19 in total, 63.3%.)
2. Several of these players belonged to the so-called “Class of ‘92” and were around
23-24 years old at the time.
3. As mentioned above, these young talents were academy products.
4. Schmeichel (Danish) was arguably the best goalkeeper in the world at Manchester
United; Johnsen (Norwegian) and Stam (Dutch) were essentially first-choice centre-
backs throughout the season; Blomqvist (Swedish) provided competition for Giggs
and played in almost the same amount of games as the Welsh; Yorke (Trinidadian
and Tobagonian) was first-choice striker alongside Cole; Solskjaer (Norwegian)
was still a strong second-choice striker and super-sub; and there were some 4 other
foreign players who did not enjoy as much success as the rest in this list.

Composition of the 2003-2004 squad

Out of the 29 players who featured in at least one match during the season:

1. 12 were English; 1 was Scottish; 1 was Welsh; 1 was Northern Irish; and 3 were
Irish (18 in total, 62%.)
2. Cristiano Ronaldo was 19 years old at the time; Bellion was 22; Djemba-Djemba
was 22; Forlán was 24. Although two of these names did not reach great heights,
they were indeed promising at the time.
3. This season featured 14(!) academy products (48.3%.)
4. Cristiano Ronaldo (Portuguese) was one of the two most promising attacking
youngsters in the world; Saha (French) was a solid second-choice striker; van
Nistelrooy (Dutch) was arguably one of the best strikers in the world; Howard
(American) was brought in to replace World Cup-winner-but-shaky Barthez; Forlán
(Uruguayan) was one of the top South American strikers and Manchester United
were in a campaign to open their doors to top South American players (they had
agreed deal with Ronaldinho this season, who changed his mind at the last minute);
Silvestre (French) was another highly rated foreign defender (who won 10 club
titles, all of them with Man United.)

Composition of the 2007-2008 squad

Out of the 31 players who featured in at least one match during the season:

1. 13 were English; 1 was Scottish; 1 was Welsh; 1 was Northern Irish; and 1 was
Irish (17 in total, 54.8%.)
2. Anderson was 20 years old at the time; Rooney was 23; Nani was 22; Piqué was 21;
Fangzhuo was 23; Tévez was 24.
3. This season featured 11 academy products (35.4%.)
4. Van der Sar (Dutch) was at this stage one of the best goalkeepers in the world; Evra
(French,) same at left-back; Cristiano (Portuguese) was already mentioned;
Anderson (Brazilian) was extremely promising; Park (South Korean) was an all-
rounder; Vidic (Serbian) was one of the best defenders in the world; Nani
(Portuguese) was skilful and had many conditions to be a world-class talent; Piqué
(Catalan) would end up becoming one of the best defenders in the world; Tévez
(Argentinian) was a solid and hard-working forward, a top target for the biggest
clubs in the world and Manchester City.

These three examples of squad compositions show that there is at least a reasonably high
degree of truth in the four principles put forth above.

It should be noted that point number 4 does not say ‘Top foreign talent,’ but rather
‘Exciting foreign talent.’ Prior to Sir Alex’s departure, Manchester United never brought in
a fully established, widely-recognised, ready-made ‘star,’ except perhaps for Robin van
Persie in Sir Alex’s final season and/or Juan Sebastián Verón in 2001-2002. At Manchester
United, the goal was to identify relatively young exciting talents and nurture them into
world-class players.

In order to weigh these principles against the current (2018-2019) Manchester United
squad, let us have a look at its composition.

Composition of the 2018-2019 squad

Out of the 30 players who featured in at least one match during the season (before the final
fixture of the 2018-2019 season):

1. 10 were English; 1 was Scottish; 0 were Welsh; 0 were Northern Irish; and 0 were
Irish (11 in total, 36.6%.)
2. Martial is 23; Rashford is 21; Dalot is 20; Shaw is 23; McTominay is 22; Chong is
19; Greenwood is 17; and Gomes is 18.
3. This season has featured 9 academy products (30%.)
4. De Gea (Spain) and Romero (Argentina) are highly rated, world-class goalkeepers;
Lindelöf (Sweden) was the defender with the most number of appearances for Man
United; Mata (Spain) has continuously been the first-choice right-winger; Lukaku
(Belgium) was one of the top goal-scorers in the team; Herrera (Bilbao, Spain) was
a first-choice midfielder; Matic was a first-choice defensive midfielder; there were
some 8 foreign players who saw very limited playing time and/or were considered
to disappoint with their performances.

At first glance, and from a purely quantitative perspective, we can see a great contrast
between the ‘traditional’ UK + Irish presence in the squad (averaging 60.03% in the first
three samples) with their presence in the current squad (only 36.6%.) Although it should be
noted that the percentage of UK + Irish presence had been gradually declining in the first
three samples –something that could suggest that such a low percentage should be naturally
expected-, the high number of foreign players who were not considered first-choice or
strong second-choice could be telling us something different: since principle number 4
deals with exciting foreign talent that would significantly improve specific positions, these
8 foreign players who were not used as first-choice or strong second-choice could have had
their ‘player slots’ used up by British and/or Irish talent. Even by taking into account the
fact that it is normal in football that some transfers do not work out as expected, if only 5 of
those 8 ‘player slots’ would have been assigned to British and/or Irish players, it would
have brought the percentage of local talent from 36.6% to 53.3%, a number much more
aligned with Manchester United’s identity.
Style of Play (Attacking Pillars)

As disclosed by former Manchester United coach and assistant manager René Meulensteen,
Manchester United had four principles when it came to their attacking style of play:

1. Pace
2. Power
3. Penetration
4. Unpredictability

In order to provide a reasonable description to readers, these principles will be compared


against three of the most noteworthy football teams in the modern era: Manchester City,
Liverpool and Barcelona.

Manchester City
In terms of pace, the only Manchester City players who fulfil this principle on the pitch are
Sané and, arguably, Walker; other than them, Manchester City’s build-up play is slow and
patient, and their style aims to disassemble the opposition’s defensive structure by means of
their positioning and smart, distracting movements, as opposed to by sheer pace.

In terms of power, players such as Kompany, Laporte, and perhaps Agüero, fit the profile
of players able to produce power, defined as a combination of strength and speed (in
different measures for attackers and defenders, of course.) Manchester City does not rely on
powerful players, other than their centre-backs. Their midfielders and wingers are highly
technical instead.

In terms of penetration, Manchester City players that fit the mould are David Silva,
Bernardo Silva and De Bruyne, who are very capable of providing deep vertical passes
from all sorts of positions. Manchester City relies heavily on this principle in order to create
goal-scoring chances. They also often penetrate by dribbling.

Finally, in terms of unpredictability, Manchester City features heavy on-field rotation and
opposition defenders rarely know for sure if, for example, they should be tracking City’s
right-back, right-winger or centre-forward.

Liverpool
In terms of pace, several Liverpool players fit the mould, including Robertson, Alexander-
Arnold, Mane and perhaps Salah. The team’s style relies heavily on pace for their direct
attack, particularly on the wings. Usually, Liverpool’s transitions will be extremely quick
and will feature vertical and diagonal runs directly into the opposition box.

In terms of power, van Dijk, Mane and Shaqiri are great examples. Liverpool relies on
powerful players for the centre of the pitch (less pacey but strong players include
Henderson, Milner, Wijnaldum, and Keita.)

In terms of penetration, Liverpool commonly uses long passes behind the opposition’s
defence, looking to attack directly the most dangerous areas. It could be argued that
Liverpool uses penetration equally to crosses in order to create goal-scoring opportunities.
They also achieve penetration by means of their dribbling through Mané, Firmino and
Salah in the centre, and their full-backs on both sides.

Finally, in terms of unpredictability, it is a common feature in Liverpool’s attack. One key


example could be Trent Alexander-Arnold’s corner kick assist to Origi that helped them
qualify to the 2019 Champions League Final. Surprising and/or quick free kicks, defenders
attacking the opposition’s box and being able to play both a low-tempo build-up and a
quick-paced direct attack prevents opposition teams from knowing exactly how Liverpool
will attack.

Barcelona
In terms of pace, and not unlike Manchester City above, Barcelona only tends to rely on it
in their final third after a slow tempo build-up. Generally, Messi, Alba and Dembele will be
the best examples of what Barcelona has to offer in terms of pace.

In terms of power, Suárez and Messi (and perhaps Piqué) are the very rare examples of this
characteristic in Barcelona players. The huge majority of Barcelona players will be rather
‘slow’ (comparatively) and technical than fast and strong.

In terms of penetration, Barcelona currently relies on it far less than under Guardiola and
Vilanova. Messi can provide passes from anywhere on the pitch, but aside from him
Barcelona do not rely on passes from deep, and would rather build-up slowly and circulate
the ball around the opposition box until they find an opportunity for a long shot or a quick
one-two.

Finally, in terms of unpredictability, Messi is the only player who will periodically provide
something unpredictable; other than that, most teams know exactly how Barcelona will
play (which does not necessarily mean that they will be able to stop them.)
Manchester United (2018-2019)
In terms of pace, Rashford (and to a lesser extent Martial and Lingard) are the only players
who provide a threat with their pace. Manchester United’s build-up tends to be slow and,
unless they are playing a counter-attack, pace is not a resource that the team uses
predominantly. It should be noted how keen Solskjaer was to mention the attackers’ pace
when he first arrived at Manchester United as caretaker manager.

In terms of power, Herrera, Pogba (potentially) and Lukaku are the best examples in the
team. The lack of any powerful player in defence is worthy of a mention.

In terms of penetration, Pogba and Herrera are occasionally capable of providing accurate
penetrative passes from deep; other than that, Manchester United relies heavily on crosses
and long-shot attempts to create goal-scoring opportunities. Shaw also surfaced as a
penetrative option in the second half of the season, entering the box on the left and
providing low crosses.

Finally, in terms of unpredictability, Manchester United does not offer much. Herrera and
Pogba occasionally would provide a surprising pass or a surprising presence in or around
the opposition box; Sánchez would also occasionally make surprising decisions that would
contribute to goal-scoring opportunities, but he saw limited time on the pitch.

We can conclude that Manchester United have drifted away from their traditional style (the
reasons of which go beyond the scope of this analysis) in every aspect of these four pillars.
The departure of Ander Herrera, who contributed power as well as some penetration and
unpredictability, further decreases the alignment of the current squad with the traditional
principles of the club.

It can also be argued that Liverpool have taken (perhaps inadvertently) these four attacking
pillars and achieved great success with them; they have also done this whilst using a
significant number of UK + Irish players in their first team (including Alexander-Arnold,
Robertson, Gomez, Milner, Henderson, Oxlade-Chamberlain, among others.)
Club Structure

Chairpersons

Joel and Avram Glazer are the two co-chairmen of the club and they have been in their
positions since 2003. Ed Woodward has been Manchester United’s Executive Vice-
Chairman since 2012.

One of the major roles of a chairperson is to ensure that the Board of Directors is effective
in setting and implementing the direction and strategy of the club; hence, any potential
removal of a member of the Board would be their responsibility. The removal of the
Executive Vice-Chairman would, in theory, be the responsibility of the two co-chairmen.

They were highly successful in their role between 2003 and 2013; after the fundamental
changes made in 2013 they have not been active in terms of structural decision-making,
either suggesting that they consider the club to be properly ran or that they are respecting a
set length of time given to their Vice-Chairman to ensure that the club is being properly ran
after the departure of Sir Alex Ferguson and David Hill in 2013.

Board of Directors

The Board of Directors is currently composed of twelve members: Joel, Avram, Bryan,
Kevin, Edward, and Darcie Glazer, Ed Woodward, Richard Arnold, Sir Bobby Charlton,
David Gill, Michael Edelson, and Sir Alex Ferguson.

One of the main roles of the Board of Directors is to set the direction and strategy of the
club, as well as the sporting and commercial objectives, and to make decisions in regards to
the club personnel right below them (such as the Chief Financial Officer, First Team
Manager, Academy Manager, Women’s Manager, Director of Communications, Grounds
Manager, Ticket Office Manager, etc.) Usually, Boards of Directors can also introduce no-
confidence votes in order to remove a member.

In theory, a Board of Directors would have no direct saying over decisions such as player
recruitment: they could provide guidelines in terms of the type of player that should be
recruited, but the recruitment of players would be the direct responsibility of the First Team
Manager (or Director of Football), for good or bad.
First-Line Managers

In theory, First-Line Managers are those directly in charge of non-managerial personnel.


For instance, the First Team Manager, Academy Manager, Women’s Manager, Chief
Financial Officer, etc.

Interestingly, I was not able to find a Middle Management level in Manchester United’s
structure; a Director of Football (i.e., a middle manager) would oversee the football
managers (First Team, Academy, Women’s, perhaps Chief Scout, etc.) and would be
overseen directly by the Board of Directors.

Generally, First-Line Managers are assessed by their short- and mid-term performance and
have their contracts extended or rescinded accordingly.

Non-Managerial Staff

This is the lowest level in the structure and it includes all non-managerial personnel, from
football players to medical staff and people selling tickets. They are generally assessed by
their short- and mid-term performance and results. They report directly to their respective
First-Line Managers.
Assessment

Ed Woodward

In his six years as CEO, he has overseen the Board of Director’s hiring and firing of three
first-team managers (two of which are amongst the best managers/coaches football has ever
seen,) and the club is currently in their fourth manager.

He has also overseen the expenditure of over £805 million in transfers (for a net
expenditure of around £553 million.)

According to the reputable book Soccernomics, there is a solid long-term correlation


between size of wage bill and final league position. 1 Manchester United have consistently
had the highest or second-highest wage bill in the Premier League since 2012-2013 (and
well before that too) but, unlike during the Sir Alex Ferguson era, the team’s final league
position since then does not correlate.

Finally, and if off-the-record remarks that started under David Moyes and that have
extended for six years are to be considered, he has played a part in the failure to sign
players requested by managers, due to his inexperience in the player transferring business,
his almost non-existent networks in the football world, and/or his personal footballing
considerations as to whether a player is good or young enough to play for Manchester
United.

Considering that his job, as described above, is to oversee the workings of the Board of
Directors and ensure that it is effectively setting and (perhaps most importantly)
implementing the direction and strategy of the club, and assuming that the targets set by the
Board did not include finishing outside the top four in the Premier League four times in six
seasons, he has objectively not done a good job.

Whether he deserves to be removed or not and how long should his grace period last, only
the two Co-Chairpersons know. We know that David Moyes was removed before he even
managed to complete one full season due to bad results, poor performance and a general
bad fit with the club, but also coinciding with the mathematical inability to qualify for
Champions League. If there is an equivalent trigger that would cause the immediate and
unquestionable removal of Ed Woodward from his current duties, is only a matter of
speculation.

1
“The size of their wage bills explained a massive 92 percent of variation in their league positions…”; “It
seems that over the long term, high wages help a club much more than do spectacular transfers. Obviously,
we don’t believe that if you took a random bunch of players, and doubled their salaries, they would suddenly
play twice as well… Rather, we think that high pay attracts good performers.”
Hypothetically, who could and/or should replace him? Considering that my background in
writing this article is purely football-related, the answer to this question falls outside my
scope. David Gill would be an easy, far too romanticised answer.

Board of Directors

As mentioned above, this Board of Directors has made decisions regarding the hiring and
sacking of three first-team managers in six years. In terms of setting the goals and strategies
for the club, it is difficult for me to find a major flaw in their activities. Most areas of the
club seem to be working properly (for example, the Women’s team have a good setup and
they had a very successful first season) and when things have gone wrong in sporting terms,
they have made decisions. Managerial choices for the first team have not been uninspired
and they have all seemed reasonable at the time.

I have no information regarding their possibly having a say in terms of player recruitment,
both in terms of vetoing or proposing players.

First-Team Players

In order to assess the current squad as objectively as possible, it is important to understand


that there are five aspects to football:

1. Technical: Mastery of the ball (e.g., first touch, headers, passes, shots, etc.)
2. Tactical: Mastery of game intelligence (e.g., smart ball distribution, knowing when
to attack, when to take a breather, when to execute a free-kick under the wall, etc.)
3. Physical: Mastery of the body (e.g., agility, strength, speed, pace, endurance, etc.)
4. Psychological: Mastery of the mind (e.g., thriving under pressure, self-motivation,
discipline, concentration, etc.)
5. Regulatory: Mastery of the Laws of the Game (and figuring out how to use them to
your advantage.)

In the following analysis, Manchester United first-team players will be briefly assessed in
relation to these aspects and how strong they are in each.
David de Gea
1. Technical: Highly proficient in most areas. Occasional flaws have surfaced recently
(that, however, seem to be more strongly linked to his mental side than his purely
technical side.)
2. Tactical: Highly proficient in most areas. Indecision and hesitancy when stepping
of the goal-line have caused him problems for years.
3. Physical: Highly fit in all areas.
4. Psychological: Historically, during times of contract negotiations his performances
have suffered heavily; it happened in 2015 under Louis van Gaal (to the point where
the manager benched him until the transfer window closed) and it happened in 2019
as his contract was approaching his final year and contract negotiations with
Manchester United and other clubs were ongoing.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.

Sergio Romero
1. Technical: Highly proficient in most areas, with occasional imprecisions.
2. Tactical: Generally, very strong.
3. Physical: Highly proficient and very fit in all areas.
4. Psychological: Generally, very strong. Endured two Copa America finals (lost) and
one World Cup final (lost) without decreasing his level.
5. Regulatory: Strong, with elements of stereotypical Latin American trickery (e.g.,
pretending to be slightly injured in order to run down the clock or to reduce the
tempo of a match that is getting out of hand.)

Lee Grant
1. Technical: Quite proficient in most areas.
2. Tactical: Unable to assess fairly, as he has seen very limited game time.
3. Physical: Quite fit in all areas.
4. Psychological: Unable to assess fairly.
5. Regulatory: Unable to assess fairly.
Victor Lindelöf
1. Technical: Quite proficient in most areas.
2. Tactical: Highest proficiency amongst Manchester United centre-backs.
3. Physical: Quite fit, could be stronger.
4. Psychological: Unable to assess fairly, apparently in a decent level.
5. Regulatory: Unable to assess fairly.

Eric Bailly
1. Technical: Quite poor in some areas.
2. Tactical: Very limited game intelligence. Tendency towards risky actions.
3. Physical: Quite injury-prone.
4. Psychological: Tendency towards risky actions. Overconfident.
5. Regulatory: Goes into reckless challenges often.

Phil Jones
1. Technical: Very limited in most areas.
2. Tactical: Very limited in general.
3. Physical: Very injury-prone.
4. Psychological: No particular comments.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.

Chris Smalling
1. Technical: Quite limited in most areas; second-best centre-back in this sense.
2. Tactical: Quite limited in general.
3. Physical: Somewhat injury-prone. Helpful height.
4. Psychological: No particular comments.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.

Marcos Rojo
1. Technical: Decent to poor in most areas.
2. Tactical: Quite limited in general.
3. Physical: Quite injury-prone. Otherwise, very strong. Relatively slow.
4. Psychological: No particular comments. Might be homesick.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.
Ashley Young
1. Technical: Very limited in most areas, particularly in his passing (long and short)
and running with the ball. Since these are the two most common actions in the
game, team performances are significantly affected.
2. Tactical: Quite limited in general.
3. Physical: Relatively decent.
4. Psychological: No particular comments. Prone to switching off after conceding a
goal.
5. Regulatory: Tends to argue with the referee, to little positive effect for the team.

Diogo Dalot
1. Technical: Quite skilled in most areas. Good long-distance shot. Possibly the best
crosser in the squad.
2. Tactical: Quite skilled in general.
3. Physical: Apparently quite fit. Needs more game time to assess properly.
4. Psychological: Apparently quite solid.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.

Luke Shaw
1. Technical: Relatively limited in most areas. Capable of putting in very decent
crosses.
2. Tactical: Relatively limited in general. Quite predictable.
3. Physical: Tends towards a low fitness and energy levels. Might be injury-prone.
4. Psychological: Might be quite affected by national expectations. Might suffer from
anxiety and/or other mental issues that hinder his performances.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.

Antonio Valencia
1. Technical: Quite skilled in most areas. Extremely one-footed. Very strong shot.
2. Tactical: Decent, but limited in general.
3. Physical: Very injury-prone. Unable to consistently perform.
4. Psychological: Apparently affected by internal criticism. Otherwise, apparently
strong.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.
Matteo Darmian
1. Technical: Quite solid in most areas.
2. Tactical: Relatively limited in general.
3. Physical: Unable to assess fairly.
4. Psychological: Unable to assess fairly.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.

Paul Pogba
1. Technical: Skilled in most areas. Less skilled in his passing than he believes.
2. Tactical: Relatively decent in general. Prone to making poor decisions in all zones
of the pitch. Can create a high number of goal-scoring opportunities for himself or
team mates.
3. Physical: Generally fit. Tends towards low-energy performances.
4. Psychological: Switches off very often. Apparently, heavily affected by internal
criticism. Very inconsistent in his efforts. Apparently, has a very delicate ego.
Complacency is a significant problem.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.

Juan Mata
1. Technical: Quite skilled in most areas.
2. Tactical: Generally, quite skilled. Relatively low level during the 2018-2019
season.
3. Physical: Might be slightly injury-prone. Not the fastest.
4. Psychological: Apparently, quite strong in the face of little playing time.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.

Jesse Lingard
1. Technical: Relatively limited in most areas. Some issues with his passing, first
touch and shot accuracy.
2. Tactical: Quite poor in general.
3. Physical: Generally fit.
4. Psychological: Switches off during games. Might be distracted by off-pitch events.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.
Andreas Pereira
1. Technical: Relatively decent in most areas.
2. Tactical: Decent in general.
3. Physical: Relatively weak and slow. Might be slightly injury-prone.
4. Psychological: Apparently affected by receiving little game time. Believes to be
worthy of a starting spot at the team.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.

Fred
1. Technical: Inconsistent in most areas. Generally poor in the air.
2. Tactical: Quite limited in general.
3. Physical: Unable to assess fairly.
4. Psychological: Apparently fearful or anxious during certain matches. Might be
homesick.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.

Ander Herrera
1. Technical: Quite skilled in most areas. Arguably, the most consistently technically-
proficient player in the squad.
2. Tactical: Quite skilled in general. Smart decisions, good reading of spaces and the
game in general.
3. Physical: Might be slightly injury-prone. Otherwise, very fit. High stamina.
4. Psychological: Apparently very strong. Leadership qualities.
5. Regulatory: Able to benefit the team through footballing ‘tricks’ such as so-called
‘tactical fouls’ and/or slightly exaggerating when receiving fouls. Tends to argue
with the referee, usually for the benefit of the team.

Nemanja Matic
1. Technical: Quite skilled in most areas.
2. Tactical: Quite skilled in general.
3. Physical: Might be slightly injury-prone. Might have relatively low-stamina and/or
need longer rest periods than the average player. Relatively slow movements
occasionally.
4. Psychological: Insecurities after a poor performance might hinder future
performances.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.
Scott McTominay
1. Technical: Relatively decent in most areas.
2. Tactical: Quite decent in general. Tends to play a simple game. Smart reading of
passing lanes.
3. Physical: Generally fit.
4. Psychological: Apparently quite strong and determined.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.

Alexis Sánchez
1. Technical: Highly skilled in most areas. Occasionally poor ball control.
2. Tactical: Quite skilled in general. Can create a high number of goal-scoring
opportunities for his team mates.
3. Physical: Muscle speed might be decreasing with age. Tends to perform
movements that are slower than needed for them to be effective.
4. Psychological: Might suffer from bouts of depression and/or anxiety. Might be
homesick. Might be affected by the weather and food. Might be going through a
difficult period after a romantic break-up, a declining career and hard criticism.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.

Romelu Lukaku
1. Technical: Relatively limited in most areas. Good shot and header. Can be prone to
a poor first touch.
2. Tactical: Relatively limited in general, but a fast learner.
3. Physical: Generally fit, but might have excess weight. Very strong.
4. Psychological: Apparently strong.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.

Marcus Rashford
1. Technical: Highly inconsistent in most areas.
2. Tactical: Quite poor in general. Unable to identify some dangerous runs. Tends to
attempt spectacular (yet ineffective) shots.
3. Physical: Generally fit. Very fast.
4. Psychological: Unable to assess fairly.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.
Anthony Martial
1. Technical: Skilled but inconsistent in most areas. Loses the ball easily.
2. Tactical: Quite limited in general. Tends to be predictable in the final third.
3. Physical: Generally fit. Might be slightly injury prone.
4. Psychological: Apparently quite weak. Heavily affected by internal criticism and
personal issues. Low-energy performances.
5. Regulatory: No particular comments.
Analysis

Club structure and Ed Woodward

In terms of structure, and beyond whether Ed Woodward stays in his role as Executive
Vice-President, it seems that he is over-reaching in his role, micro-managing activities that
are/should be under the control of the first-team manager (e.g., deciding who gets a contract
renewal, defining transfer targets, and perhaps even negotiating transfer deals.) His role
should be limited to overseeing the decisions of the Board of Directors; it is their role to
oversee the first-team manager and to produce a timely judgement of his results and overall
performance in terms of contract renewals and transfer targets.

It has been rumoured that Manchester United are looking to bring in a Director of Football
to oversee the activities of the footballing side. Whether that entails only the men’s first
team or every footballing side (i.e., men’s first team, women’s first team, reserves, etc.) is a
matter of speculation. This role will only be effective if performed properly: the Director of
Football oversees and helps the work of the first-team manager and, in turn, the Board of
Directors oversees, and helps the work of the Director of Football, while the Executive
Vice-President oversees and helps the work of the Board of Directors. Regardless of how
many management levels the club designs, if the Executive Vice-President directly
interferes with the work of the first-team manager, the football machine is not going to
work. A manager’s autonomy and authority is paramount, if not in the entire football world,
at least certainly at Manchester United.

Squad adjustment and Manchester United’s identity

Considering a squad of 30 players, a ‘traditional’ Manchester United squad should have a


combined number of English + British + Irish players of around 18. With a current total of
11, that means bringing in 7 players (either from the academy or from outside sources).

Firstly, it would be important to point out the many remarkable targets that Manchester
United has missed throughout the previous six seasons: Kyle Walker, John Stones, Andy
Robertson, Trent Alexander-Arnold, Ben Davis, Eric Dier and Raheem Sterling, among
others. These have been promising targets since at least 2014, yet Manchester United were
unable to secure the services of even one of them.
Between July of 2013 and May of 2019, the British + Irish players brought in externally by
Manchester United include: Luke Shaw, Regan Poole, Lee Grant and Paul Woolston, while
also permanently promoting Lingard, Rashford and McTominay. That is a total of four
British + Irish additions who have actually played regularly for Manchester United in six
years, certainly a failure in terms of staying true to Manchester United’s identity, especially
considering the progress of the English National Team in recent years.

Very briefly, here are six somewhat realistic targets that could theoretically help fulfilling
the local ‘quota’ of the first team while also contributing to improving its qualities, keeping
in mind the club’s football identity:

Angel Gomes and Mason Greenwood


These two young English players could contribute sporadically next season.

Jadon Sancho
19-year old English attacking right winger, who has already featured in almost 100 matches
(including Champions League), while scoring or assisting approximately three goals every
five matches. He’s fast, strong and not easily predictable. However, at the time of writing,
according to Transfermarkt his value is £72 million2 and according to CIES Football
Observatory his value is £103 million. 3

Eric Dier
He would provide a solid challenge to the team’s centre-backs, defensive midfielders and
even right-backs. Decent technique, very strong, generally a decent reader of the game.
High-energy player. Manchester United supporter, which could also contribute to setting
high standards. English National Team player. He alone would be an upgrade over
Darmian, Rojo and Bailly.

2
“Jadon Sancho,” https://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/jadon-sancho/profil/spieler/401173, retrieved on May 14,
2019.
3
“Top transfer values for U20 big-5 league players,” http://www.football-
observatory.com/IMG/sites/b5wp/2018/261/en/, retrieved on May 14, 2019.
James Ward-Prowse
Quite experienced in the Premier League, he could be a good squad-rotation option for
midfield, challenging for a permanent place in the first team. Quite decent both technically
and tactically.

Kieran Tierney
Could provide a challenge for Luke Shaw in order to find and develop a consistent first-
choice left-back. Tierney has already played more minutes in professional football than
Shaw, despite being two years younger. He has also provided a total of 37 assists for Celtic,
against Shaw’s 9 assists total for Manchester United.

Now, let us have a quick look at the foreign players that are not automatic starters nor solid
backup options and that, going by Manchester United’s traditions, should be eventually
moved on:

Eric Bailly and Marcos Rojo


I put these two players together because they are both at the bottom of the list in
Manchester United’s defence. They have spent a great number of days injured and
otherwise unavailable, and they have not shown to possess the merits to secure their place
in the starting XI.

Alexis Sánchez
He is currently last choice attacker. On the right wing, Manchester United’s coaching staff
has even preferred Dalot over him.

Matteo Darmian
Also currently last choice in defence, and has been for approximately three seasons now.
Conclusion

Current manager Ole Gunnar Solskjaer knows the culture of the club and faces a steep
challenge to bring it back. As it happened under Sir Matt Busby and under Sir Alex
Ferguson, the team needs to be rebuilt. Akin to Guardiola’s saying that at Barcelona it was
Johan Cruijff who built the cathedral and that the job of subsequent managers is simply to
maintain it, Manchester United’s blueprint was designed Sir Matt Busby and significantly
improved upon by Sir Alex Ferguson. Solskjaer and his assistant, Mike Phelan, developed
professionally deeply rooted in Manchester United’s culture and most successful period;
they too believe that the club should stay true to its principles and values in order to have a
strong foundation over which to build a new successful chapter in its history.

By executing three key changes, the club would be slowly stepping back into familiar
territory: No longer should rivals hoard the best British and Irish talents; no longer should
superstar signings be prioritised; and no longer should the CEO micromanage the
footballing side of things.

Although there is no single recipe for success, and even less in a competitive sport whose
results can be defined by such slim margins, there is a reason why the concept of ‘The
Manchester United Way’ exists beyond any single manager, any single CEO and any
particular owner. It is my personal hope that as the Glazers trusted in Ed Woodward to lead
the workings of Manchester United, Ed Woodward also trusts ‘The Manchester United
Way’ and makes his best effort to allow and help this personnel to execute it.

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