Republic of the Philippines

SUMPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 145368 - April 12, 2002

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, Petitioner, v. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as

Ombudsman, respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:

On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a
Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998." The Committee was
mandated "to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos
Congress."1

Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting the Committee
for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee as the
"National Centennial Commission." Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary
Chairpersons.2

Characterized as an "i body," the existence of the Commission "shall terminate upon the completion of
all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations."3 Like its predecessor Committee, the Commission
was tasked to "take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."

Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the responsibility to
"prepare, for approval of the President, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations within six
(6) months from the effectivity of" the Executive Order.

E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:

Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff support
by a Secretariat to be composed of, among others, detailed personnel from the
Presidential Management Staff, the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, and
the National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed by a full time Executive
Director who shall be designated by the President.

Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the
Department of Tourism and the president's Contingent Fund, in an amount to be
recommended by the Commission, and approved by the President. Appropriations for
succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office of the President.

Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo '98 Corporation (Expocorp) was
created.4 Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9)
directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.

On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate
denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at
the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Coseteng's privilege
speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue
Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation.

On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc
and independent citizens' committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
Philippine centennial projects, including its component activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag
was appointed to chair the Committee.

On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its
Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committee's recommendations
was "the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP
for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia
Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to
Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has
caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of
the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation. of the
anti-graft law."5

Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended "the
further investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of," among others, NCC Chair
Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11
of R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were apparently referred to the
Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000, the Bureau
issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:

1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before

the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman
against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP
President Teodoro Q. Peña and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec.
3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and
Regulations;

2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal
complainant.6

In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses.

On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning
the jurisdiction of said office.

In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.

On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but the motion was
denied in an Order dated October 5, 2000.

On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.

On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding
"probable cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEÑA before the
Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic
Act No. 1594." The resolution also directed that an information for violation of the said law be filed
against Laurel and Peña. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel
but dismissed the charge against Peña.

In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, commanding
respondents to desist from filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or any court against
petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the parties in oral argument.

Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because:

A.

EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK THE FREEDOM
RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-
OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.

B.

THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.

C.

PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A "PUBLIC OFFICER" AS
DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.7

In addition, petitioner in his reply8 invokes this Court's decision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,9 where it was
held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, i.e.,
over public officers of Grade 27 and higher. As petitioner's position was purportedly not classified as
Grade 27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction
over him.

This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Court's decision in Uy, we held that "it is the prosecutor,
not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in
the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan."

In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded:

The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and
regular provincial and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control
over prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully
falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770
("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman, and for other purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman "primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan." And this is further buttressed
by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated references
to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsman's and Special
Prosecutor's authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the
original.]
The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for clarification by the Ombudsman
in the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its Resolution dated March 20,
2001. The Court explained the rationale for this reversal:

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary
and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law
does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission
of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
officer or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly

in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory
and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the
Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not
necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and
employees by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of
his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and
employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to
the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance
and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of
office.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with
the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office
of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and
may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman.
Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not
intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these
types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against
officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the
law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law
likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the
most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress
deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and
effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. A review of the
development of our Ombudsman law reveals this intent. [Emphasis in the original.]

Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which petitioner relies.
We first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer.
The Constitution10 describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as "protectors of the people," who "shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations." Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the
Constitution11upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to "[i]nvestigate. any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper,
or inefficient."

The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known
as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989." Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law respectively provide:

SEC. 13. Mandate. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people shall
act promptly on complaints file in any form or manner against officers or employees of
the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil
and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote
efficient service by the Government to the people.

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation
of such cases;

x x x.

The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to Section 13, supra:

SEC 16. Applicability. - The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.

In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.12

Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A
definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence13 is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority
on the subject:

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which,
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer.14

The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions,
its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties,
and the designation of the position as an office.15
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC Chair, namely:
(1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any
compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.

Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as
"[t]he most important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or not.

The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or

contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the
individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for
the benefit of the public; - that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either
legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the
public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a
public officer.16

Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the law
did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial : May the
functions of the NCC then be described as executive?

We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power "is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance."17 The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation
of the policies as set forth by law.

The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports)
thereof:

Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve,
promote, and popularize the nation's historical and cultural heritage and resources, as
well as artistic creations.

In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998:

Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in 1998, and the
centennial presents an important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of
Filipino identity;

Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and thereby
strengthen Filipino values;

Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only through long-
range planning and continuous developmental programming;

Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special expertise
and capability, particularly in communication and information dissemination, is
necessary for long-range planning and continuous developmental programming;

Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake the primary
task of harnessing the multisectoral components from the business, cultural, and
business sectors to serve as effective instruments from the launching and overseeing of
this long-term project;

x x x.
E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the
"need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of
the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-government or private
organizations." It also referred to the "need to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other
countries."

The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry them into effect.
Thus, the Commission was vested with the following functions:

(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation and implementation

of programs and projects on the utilization of culture, arts, literature and media as
vehicles for history, economic endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of national unity
and sense of accomplishment in every Filipino in the context of the Centennial
Celebrations. In this regard, it shall include a Philippine National Exposition '98 within
Metro Manila, the original eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues;

(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness and
celebration of the Centennial;

(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and dissemination of all
information about the plans and events for the Centennial Celebrations;

(d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the implementation of the
programs and projects;

(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures nationwide. In this
regard, the Commission shall formulate schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-transfer,
build-operate-transfer, and similar arrangements) to ensure the preservation and
maintenance of the historical sites and structures;

(f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and corporation, and to invite
private individuals and organizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks; and,

(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans, programs, projects, activities
as well as the status of the preparations for the Celebration.18

It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested, 19 created the NCC by executive
order. Book III (Office of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2 describes the nature
of executive orders:

SEC. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. [Underscoring ours.]

Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the country's economic development, especially in
Central Luzon. Petitioner himself admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court:

MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:

And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos, don't

you agree that the task of the centennial commission was also to focus
on the long term over all socio economic development of the zone and
Central Luzon by attracting investors in the area because of the eruption
of Mt. Pinatubo.
FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:

I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I

wanted to touch on by lack of material time I could not but that is a very
important point. When I was made Chairman I wanted the Expo to be
in Batangas because I am a Batangeño but President Ramos said Mr.
Vice President the Central Luzon is suffering, suffering because of the
eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to catalize [sic] economic recovery in
that area by putting this Expo in Clark Field and so it was done I agreed
and Your Honor if I may also mention we wanted to generate
employment aside from attracting business investments and
employment. And the Estrada administration decided to junk this project
there 48, 40 thousand people who lost job, they were employed in Expo.
And our target was to provide 75 thousand jobs. It would have really
calibrated, accelerated the development of Central Luzon. Now, I think
they are going back to that because they had the airport and there are
plan to revive the Expo site into key park which was the original plan.

There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full
employment is a fundamental state policy.20

Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla21 that the holding by a
municipality of a town fiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental function.
Petitioner argues that the "holding of a nationwide celebration which marked the nation's
100th birthday may be likened to a national fiesta which involved only the exercise of
the national government's proprietary function."22 In Torio, we held:

[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised

Administrative Code] simply gives authority to the municipality to
[celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to
observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a
religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for
the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of
the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact
that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but
merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a
conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source
of income for the town, nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking as
distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like
which are for public service.

As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of
determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a
municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to
be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however
beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is government
in essence, otherwise, the function becomes private or propriety in
character. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is
involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the
Court cautioned that "there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining
the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding
circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive." Thus, in
footnote 15 of Torio, the Court, citing an American case, illustrated how the "surrounding
circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds" could produce a
conclusion different from that in Torio:
 We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding
circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds may
have a decisive bearing on this question. The case of Pope v. City of
New Haven, et al. was an action to recover damages for personal injuries
caused during a Fourth of July fireworks display resulting in the death
of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants' negligence.
The defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that
the city was engaged in the performance of a public governmental duty
from which it received no pecuniary benefit and for negligence in the
performance of which no statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer
was sustained by the Superior Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff
sought to amend his complaint to allege that the celebration was for the
corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming the order,
the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held inter alia:

Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent

performance of purely public governmental duties, unless made liable
by statute..

A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its

charter or of statute, conducted a public Fourth of July celebration,
including a display of fireworks, and sent up a bomb intended to explode
in the air, but which failed to explode until it reached the ground, and
then killed a spectator, was engaged in the performance of a
governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51)

This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.

At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from [this]
excerpt:

"July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a public
holiday, called Independence Day, by our statutes. All or nearly all of
the other states have similar statutes. While there is no United States
statute making a similar provision, the different departments of the
government recognize, and have recognized since the government was
established, July 4th as a national holiday. Throughout the country it
has been recognized and celebrated as such. These celebrations,
calculated to entertain and instruct the people generally and to arouse
and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently take
the form of literary exercises consisting of patriotic speeches and the
reading of the Constitution, accompanied by a musical program
including patriotic air sometimes preceded by the firing of cannon and
followed by fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the
general public and their promotion a proper subject of legislation can
hardly be questioned. x x x"

Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The
Centennial Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after
centuries of struggle against our former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation
of our people from oppression by a foreign power. 1998 marked 100 years of
independence and sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations was an occasion
to reflect upon our history and reinvigorate our patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a
"vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity," an opportunity
to "showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values." The significance
of the Celebrations could not have been lost on petitioner, who remarked during the
hearing:
 Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we
wanted to rekindle the love for freedom, love for country, that is the
over-all goal that has to make everybody feel proud that he is a Filipino,
proud of our history, proud of what our forefather did in their time. x x
x.

Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and
petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.

That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little
consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature
of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of
the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or
honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. 23 Hence,
the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as
opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation
or fees are attached.24 But it is a public office, nonetheless.

Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an "ad-hoc body"
make said commission less of a public office.

The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration,
and certainly a position which is merely temporary and local cannot
ordinarily be considered an office. "But," says Chief Justice Marshall, "if
a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the
government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by
government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his
station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue
though the person be changed, -- it seems very difficult to distinguish
such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs
the duties from an officer."

At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be

considered as indispensable, for, if the other elements are present "it
can make no difference," says Pearson, C.J., "whether there be but one
act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the office expires as soon
as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during good
behavior."25

Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.26 There
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United
States Centennial Commission is an "office of trust" as to disqualify its holder as elector
of the United States President and Vice-President. (Under Article II of the United States
Constitution, a person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States is
disqualified from being appointed an elector.)

x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial

Commission holds an office of trust under the United States, and that
he is therefore disqualified for the office of elector of President and Vice-
President of the United States.

The commission was created under a statute of the United States

approved March 3, 1871. That statute provides for the holding of an
exhibition of American and foreign arts, products, and manufactures,
"under the auspices of the government of the United States," and for
the constitution of a commission, to consist of more than one delegate
from each State and from each Territory of the United States, "whose
 functions shall continue until close of the exhibition," and "whose duty
it shall be to prepare and superintend the execution of the plan for
holding the exhibition." Under the statute the commissioners are
appointed by the President of the United States, on the nomination of
the governor of the States and Territories respectively. Various duties
were imposed upon the commission, and under the statute provision
was to be made for it to have exclusive control of the exhibit before the
President should announce, by proclamation, the date and place of
opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of Congress approved June
1st, 1872, the duties and functions of the commission were further
increased and defined. That act created a corporation, called "The
Centennial Board of Finance," to cooperate with the commission and to
raise and disburse the funds. It was to be organized under the direction
of the commission. The seventh section of the act provides "that the
grounds for exhibition shall be prepared and the buildings erected by
the corporation, in accordance with plans which shall have been adopted
by the United States Centennial Commission; and the rules and
regulations of said corporation, governing rates for entrance and
admission fees, or otherwise affecting the rights, privileges, or interests
of the exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed and established by the
United States Centennial Commission; and no grant conferring rights or
privileges of any description connected with said grounds or buildings,
or relating to said exhibition or celebration, shall be made without the
consent of the United States Centennial Commission, and said
commission shall have power to control, change, or revoke all such
grants, and shall appoint all judges and examiners and award all
premiums." The tenth section of the act provides that "it shall be the
duty of the United States Centennial Commission to supervise the
closing up of the affairs of said corporation, to audit its accounts, and
submit in a report to the President of the United States the financial
results of the centennial exhibition."

It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the duties
and functions of the commission were various, delicate, and important;
that they could be successfully performed only by men of large
experience and knowledge of affairs; and that they were not merely
subordinate and provisional, but in the highest degree authoritative,
discretionary, and final in their character. We think that persons
performing such duties and exercising such functions, in pursuance of
statutory direction and authority, are not to be regarded as mere
employees, agents, or committee men, but that they are, properly
speaking, officers, and that the places which they hold are offices. It
appears, moreover, that they were originally regarded as officers by
Congress; for the act under which they were appointed declares, section
7, that "no compensation for services shall be paid to the commissioners
or other officers, provided for in this act, from the treasury of the United
States." The only other officers provided for were the "alternates"
appointed to serve as commissioners when the commissioners were
unable to attend.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is,
therefore, a public office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether
Expocorp is a private or a public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private
corporation, petitioner's position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose
from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of
Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair. 27
Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any compensation
for his services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic
Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.

Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of said law, which
reads:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions.

A "public officer," under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:

SEC. 2. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term -

xxx

(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and

employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal,
from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph. [Emphasis
supplied.]

It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a "public officer" is expressly
limited to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes
of determining the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989.

Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law,
matters that are best resolved at trial.

To illustrate, the use of the term "includes" in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition
is not restrictive.28 The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws
that define "public officers." Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides
that a public officer is:

x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or

appointment by competent authority, takes part in the performance of
public functions in the Government of Philippines, or performs in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee,
agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class.
Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987,29 on
the other hand, states:

Officer - as distinguished from "clerk" or "employee", refers to a person

whose duties not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the
exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the
government. When used with reference to a person having authority to
do a particular act or perform a particular person in the exercise of
governmental power, "officer" includes any government employee,
agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.

It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a
"public official" whether or not one receives compensation, thus:

"Public Officials" include elective and appointive officials and employees,

permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service
including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive
compensation, regardless of amount.

Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?

Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive, the term
"compensation," which is not defined by said law, has many meanings.

Under particular circumstances, "compensation" has been held to

include allowance for personal expenses, commissions, expenses, fees,
an honorarium, mileage or traveling expenses, payments for services,
restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary, and wages.30

How then is "compensation," as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 3019, to
be interpreted?

Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting that petitioner
did not receive any salary, the records do not reveal if he received any allowance, fee,
honorarium, or some other form of compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of
Expocorp, the CEO is entitled to per diems and compensation.31 Would such fact bear
any significance?

Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues lest we preempt
the trial court from resolving them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the Court's
Resolution dated September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), no part due to close relation to a party
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 145368. July 1, 2002

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, Petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as

Ombudsman, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Petitioner Salvador H. Laurel moves for a reconsideration of this Courts decision declaring him, as Chair
of the National Centennial Commission (NCC), a public officer. Petitioner also prays that the case be
referred to the Court En Banc.

First, petitioner points out that the decision has serious constitutional repercussions[1 because the
composition of the NCC included members of the Cabinet, the Senate, the House of Representatives
and the Supreme Court,[2 who are prohibited by the Constitution from holding any other office during
their term or tenure.[3

In connection, the Court, in its decision, allegedly disregarded the pronouncement in Manila Electric Co.
vs. Panay Transportation Co.[4 that the Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or
connected with the administering of judicial functions.[5

These arguments are irrelevant. The issue in this case is whether petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, is a
public officer under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Assuming, as petitioner proposes, that the
designation of other members to the NCC runs counter to the Constitution, it does not make petitioner,
as NCC Chair, less a public officer. Such serious constitutional repercussions do not reduce the force of
the rationale behind this Courts decision.

Second, petitioner invokes estoppel. He claims that the official acts of the President, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Supreme Court, in designating Cabinet
members, Senators, Congressmen and Justices to the NCC, led him to believe that the NCC is not a
public office.[6

The contention has no merit. In estoppel, the party representing material facts must have the intention
that the other party would act upon the representation.[7 It is preposterous to suppose that the
President, the Senate President, the Speaker and the Supreme Court, by the designation of such officials
to the NCC, intended to mislead petitioner just so he would accept the position of NCC Chair. Estoppel
must be unequivocal and intentional.[8Moreover, petitioner himself admits that the principle of estoppel
does not operate against the Government in the exercise of its sovereign powers.[9

Third, as ground for the referral of the case to the Court En Banc, petitioner submits that our decision
in this case modified or reversed doctrines rendered by this Court, which can only be done by the
Court En Banc.

It is argued that by designating three of its then incumbent members to the NCC, the Court took the
position that the NCC was not a public office.[10 The argument is a bit of a stretch. Section 4 (3), Article
VIII of the Constitution provides that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. In
designating three of its incumbent members to the NCC, the Court did not render a decision, in the
context of said constitutional provision, which contemplates an actual case. Much less did the Court, by
such designation, articulate any doctrine or principle of law.

Invoking the same provision, petitioner asserts[11that the decision in this case reversed or
modified Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan,[12 holding that the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division
and the Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC) is not a public officer under Republic Act No. 3019. This contention also has no
merit. The rationale for the ruling in Macalino is that the PNCC has no original charter as it was
incorporated under the general law on corporations. However, as we pointed out in our decision, a
conclusion that EXPOCORP is a government-owned or controlled corporation would not alter the outcome
of this case because petitioners position and functions as Chief Executive Officer of EXPOCORP are by
virtue of his being Chairman of the NCC. The other issues raised by petitioner are mere reiterations of
his earlier arguments. The Court, however, remains unswayed thereby.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration and referral to the Court En Banc is DENIED. This denial
is final.

Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), no part, due to close relationship to a party.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED

VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in
his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his
Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
93352(Attrition Act of 2005).

RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. 4

The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from
the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted
amount of tax revenue.5

The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the
Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the
Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file
employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.6

Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund;
(2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls
short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system
for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit
an annual report to Congress.7

The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
for such purpose.9

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification
or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks
a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be
dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however,
fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President
without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in
order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine
of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment
and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.

In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for being premature as
there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the
exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution
of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the allegation that the reward system will breed
mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared
objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct
from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard
that will guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative
policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the implementing
agencies.

After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed.

Actual Case And Ripeness

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial adjudication.10 A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And
a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it.11 Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in
the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court. 12

In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere enactment
of the law even without any further overt act, 13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or
to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a personal stake in the outcome
of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account, their petition is procedurally infirm.

This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by petitioners. The grave
nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And where
an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact
the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.14

Accountability of
Public Officers

Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice,
and lead modest lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the
public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs
of the people they are called upon to serve.

Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption necessarily
obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection.15

The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture
or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle
to advance a declared public policy.

Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty
hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.

A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. 16 To invalidate RA 9335 based
on petitioners’ baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it.

Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional
performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept
of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public
service of deserving government personnel.

In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to officers of the customs as well
as other parties an amount not exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws against
smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court said:

The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward their zeal and industry in
detecting fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes.

In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a consequence of
their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335
establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or
mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of official duties. One of these precautionary measures
is embodied in Section 8 of the law:

SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. – The officials, examiners,
and employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts
of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties
shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of
such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.

Equal Protection

Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons
similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on
substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. 19 When things or persons are different in fact or
circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,20 this Court
declared:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon
all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation
of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to
 the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The
equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within
which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has
held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its
jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the
classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary
that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from
recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear. 21 (emphasis
supplied)

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. 23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the
common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes,
customs duties, fees and charges.

The BIR performs the following functions:

Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. – The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and
subject to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by
the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:

(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;

(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;

(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;

(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and

(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. 24

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:

Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. – The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the
management and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the
following functions:
 (1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;

(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;

(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;

(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of entry;

(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports
of entry;

(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;

(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;

(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;

(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. 25

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

Undue Delegation

Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.27 To be sufficient, the standard
must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented.28

RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system
of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets.

Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" 29 the delegated power to the President to fix revenue
targets:

SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. – A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund,
is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective
revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee
(DBCC), in the following percentages:

Excess of Collection of the Excess Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to Accrue to
the Revenue Targets the Fund
30% or below – 15%
 More than 30% – 15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the remaining
excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the
revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.

Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the
BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF)
submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution
of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the
collection districts in the case of the BOC.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC
for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. 30 Thus,
the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions under which
officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the
service:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and
functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration
of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated
under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and
procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:

1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation,
as has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and

2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the
period under consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or
potential nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of
responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic
difficulties brought about by natural calamities or force majeure or economic causes as may be
determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the
Board.

(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That
such decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the
separation of an official or employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the
application of other relevant laws on accountability of public officers and employees, such as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act;

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The
guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other
than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. 31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down
a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. 32 The action
for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural
due process.

At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public
convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare." 33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.

Separation Of Powers

Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:

SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby created a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of
Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two
senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by
the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have
approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore
cease to exist.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved
the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment
on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the constitutionality of
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).

The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional oversight in Macalintal
v. Commission on Elections34 is illuminating:

Concept and bases of congressional oversight

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly,
oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic
compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c)
to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x x x

Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the perceived
"exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the 20 th century, Congress
has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the administrative
agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies perform
their functions within the authority delegated to them. x x x x x x x x x

Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided
into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.

a. Scrutiny
 Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative
operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of
government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and
report from the other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for
consideration of the agency involved.

xxx xxx xxx

b. Congressional investigation

While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily
available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of
Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article
VI, xxx xxx xxx

c. Legislative supervision

The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative
supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional
committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny
and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive
branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-
making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.

Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto
provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the
force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to
Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such
legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of
a certain period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime.
Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively
approves it.

Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between the
legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to
the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of
such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this
arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected
administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains:

It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply embedded in our
law and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern government have often led
Congress-whether by actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and
general statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive
officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of
parties who may or may not have participated in or agreed with the development of those aims.
Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme could
be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative
power to enact new legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of overseeing post
enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to determine whether its
policies have been implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative
intervention is appropriate.

Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the executive
prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend that legislative veto constitutes an
impermissible evasion of the President’s veto authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive
or judicial branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers
 as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much power. They
submit that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to scrutinize
only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow Congress to review executive
proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions
of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to participate prospectively in the
approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a delegation
of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the
accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that
legislative veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the evolution and
implementation of its policy as declared by statute."

In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the validity of
legislative veto provisions. The case arose from the order of the immigration judge suspending the
deportation of Chadha pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States House
of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to § 244(c)(2) authorizing either
House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the executive branch to allow a particular
deportable alien to remain in the United States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings
to implement the House order and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals
dismissed the alien’s appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress. The
United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House was without constitutional authority to
order the alien’s deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine on separation of powers.

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the Court shied away from
the issue of separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the presentment clause and
bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is
subject to the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both
Houses and presentment to the President. x x x x x x x x x

Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision, two lower court decisions
invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act of 1980. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes containing
legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions required the approval of both Houses of
Congress and thus met the bicameralism requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were
not even exercised.35 (emphasis supplied)

In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and considering the nature
and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in RA 9189
(The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked
not only to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the
IRR promulgated by the Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional
independence of the Commission on Elections.36

With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation
of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in
fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution
imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. 37 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members
with either executive or judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution,39 including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment.

Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses
on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation 40 and
 (2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.42

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative
vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a
"right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the
form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
delegated broad powers.43It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it
entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws. 44

Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative
competence.45 It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making
necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards. 46 In the latter case, the law must be complete in
all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive
branch or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill
up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent
rule-making).48

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature
of a statute50and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and
effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court. 51 Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass
upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers
established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of
whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga

Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition
for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment.52

Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)

Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws)53 is vested in Congress which consists of
two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of
both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either
or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a
congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.

Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed
to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass
the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
 cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting
for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House
where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he
had signed it. (emphasis supplied)

Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment
to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is a
joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of
law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of Congress.

In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of
Congress.54Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President. 55 As summarized by Justice Isagani
Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:

A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for some measures
that must originate only in the former chamber.

The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral by the Senate
President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.

The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or without amendments,
sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature or purpose,
they may all be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a committee bill.

Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in its
entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second reading is the most important
stage in the passage of a bill.

The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at least
three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their votes and explain
them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.

Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the three readings.
If there are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a conference
committee58 representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the
House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his consideration.

The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with the
signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers… 59

The President’s role in law-making.

The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the
required publication.60

Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards
established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands
of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it becomes effective because it
is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled by the language
of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process clause, 61 the determination
as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. 62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law
may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point,
the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.63

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing
rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its
members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with the
implementation of the law.

Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While there may be similar
provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from invalidating
them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought before
us.64

The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335 on the other
provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law unconstitutional? No.

Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:

SEC. 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent court, the
remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and
effect.

In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the following rules:

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability
clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete
nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion
that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not
constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which
carries out the legislative intent. x x x

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected,
as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the
statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried
out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional,
all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.

The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid provision
from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently
of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law
which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board.

To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers
of general circulation66 and became effective 15 days thereafter.67 Until and unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are
presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of
RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de-Castro, Brion, JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. 159813 August 9, 2006

TONY N. FIGUEROA and ROGELIO J. FLAVIANO, Petitioners,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision 1dated
October 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17235, affirming in toto an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 17, which found herein petitioners guilty of the crime of libel.

The antecedent facts:

On March 24, 1992, in the RTC of Davao City, the city prosecutor of Davao, at the instance of one Aproniano Rivera,
filed an Information 2 for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code against the herein
petitioners, Tony N. Figueroa and Rogelio J. Flaviano. Docketed in the same court as Criminal Case No. 25,957-92
and raffled to Branch 17 thereof, the Information alleges as follows:

That on or about April 9, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, Tony VN. Figueroa, writer under the column entitled "Footprints" of the People's Daily
Forum, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with his co-accused Rogelio J. Flaviano, Publisher-Editor of
the same magazine, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, integrity, character as well as the reputation and
the social standing of one Aproniano Rivera and with intent to cast dishonor, discredit and contempt upon said
Aproniano Rivera, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously published in the People's Daily Forum, a news publication as
follows:

"Bangkerohan public market these days is no different from the US Times Square. Bullies, thugs, hooligans and gyppers
roam with impunity, some using organizational clout as a ploy to keep themselves from obvious exposure. Some
leeches, like a certain Aproniano "Rey" Rivera, our sources say, are lording it over like the city's sprawling vegetable
and meat complex has become an apportioned bailiwick.

"Rivera, apparently a non-Visayan pseudobully flaunting with his tag as president of a vendor's federation, has intimated
a good number of lowly hawkers. This is a confirmed fact, our sources believe. And our independent eveasdroppers
[sic] have come with a similar perception of a man who continues to lead a federation when, in the first place, he has
no business being in Davao or in Bankerohan.

"Often, Mr. "Re" (King?) Rivera strolls the stretches which criss-cross the Bankerohan confines with the arrogance of
a tribal chieftain; the only differences, however, are that: he uses no G-strings, speaks in some strange Luzon lingo
and twang, and has no solid leadership. Our reports have finely outlined the mechanics of Rivera's tactics despite
assertions the man is nothing but a paper tiger conveniently propped up by federation members loyal to his sometime
indecent role as a sachem.

"This man, the sources add, is backed by powerful city government hooligans who, it was reported, have direct hand
in the planned manipulation in the distribution of stalls to privileged applicants. Even if he has reportedly sold his interest
in the public market, which should be reason enough for him to resign from his position, Rivera still carries the false
aura of intimidating poor vendors and imposing his insensible remarks about what must be done about the governance
of Bangkerohan.

"Sometimes its hard to compel a man with Rivera's mind about the nuances of honorable resignation. May iba d'yan
na pakapalan na lang ng mukha!"
xxx xxx xxx
"Rivera, however, must be consoled in knowing he's not alone with his dirty antics. Romy Miclat, a president of a meat
vendors group in Bankerohan, and his board member, Erning Garcia, have tacitly followed the way of the thugs, floating
little fibs to gullible victims. Our moles have gathered the due are seeling [sic] the new public market stalls for P9,000
with the assurances that the buyer gets a display area ordinarily occupied by two applicants. A lot more have fallen
prey to the scheme, and more the blindly swallowing all the books the two are peddling.

"This dilemma has been there for so long, but the city hall, RCDP, and the city council have continuously evaded the
vicious cabal of men out to derail the raffling of the stalls to applicants. Some believe strongly this is odd, but they can
only whimper at their helplessness against power-brokers who have taken over the dominance of Bangkerohan. One
of the likely victims in this filthy machination are the sinapo vendors who have become explosively furious over the
snafu they are facing because of the manipulation of stalls inside Bangkerohan.

"Insiders continuo[u]sly tell of woeful tales about how they have been given runarounds by many so-called public
servants, but they have maintained their composures quite curiously. They are talking, however, of anger which, our
sources [s]ay, may end up with a bloody retaliation. This probability is looming more lucid every day the officials handling
the Bangkerohan stall mess are condoning their plight. Even politicos are oddly silent about the whole controversy for
some unknown reasons. It looks like the alleged schemes perpetrated by Rivera, Miclat and Garcia will remain
unperturbed, no thanks to power-brokers."

which newspaper was read by the people throughout Davao City, to the dishonor, discredit and contempt upon said
Aproniano Rivera.

Contrary to law.

On arraignment, petitioners as accused, assisted by counsel, entered a common plea of "Not Guilty." Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.

On June 8, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision 3 finding both petitioners guilty as charged and accordingly sentenced
them, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused, Tony Figueroa and
Rogelio Flaviano, columnist and publisher-editor, respectively of the People's Daily Forum, of the offense charged,
beyond reasonable doubt; their evidence adduced is not sufficient to afford their exoneration, pursuant to Art. 355 in
relation to Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating ot [sic] aggravating circumstances, proved in the
commission of the offense charged, imposing the indeterminate sentence law, both accused are hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of five months and one day of arresto mayor maximum as minimum
penalty, to two years four months and 31 days of prision correccional minimum as maximum penalty with accessory
penalty as provided for by law.

Moreover, pursuant to Art. 100 in relation to Art. 104 of the Revised Penal Code, governing civil indemnity, both accused
are ordered to pay jointly and solidarily the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to complainant, Aproniano Rivera
and the amount of P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees with costs.

Without any aggravating circumstances proved by the prosecution, in the commission of the offense charged exemplary
damages against both accused, cannot be awarded. x x x

SO ORDERED.

From the trial court’s judgment of conviction, petitioners went to the CA whereat their appellate recourse was docketed
as CA-G.R. CR No. 17235.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision 4 dated October 11, 2002, affirmed that of the
trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.
Undaunted, petitioners are now with this Court via this petition for review on their submissions that the CA erred -

1. IN HOLDING THAT THE COLUMN ENTITLED "FOOTPRINTS" OF THE PEOPLE’S DAILY FORUM IS LIBELOUS
OR DEFAMATORY TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT APRONIANO RIVERA;

2. IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER, HENCE THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION;

3. IN UPHOLDING THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.

The petition lacks merit.

In praying for their acquittal, petitioners attempt to pass off the subject published article as one that portrays the
condition of the Bankerohan Public Market in general. Citing Jimenez v. Reyes, 5 they challenge the finding of the two
courts below on the libelous or defamatory nature of the same article which, to them, must be read and construed in its
entirety. It is their posture that the article was not directed at the private character of complainant Aproniano Rivera but
on the sorry state of affairs at the Bankerohan Public Market.

Petitioners’ posture cannot save the day for them.

Our own reading of the entire text of the published article convinces us of its libelous or defamatory character. While it
is true that a publication's libelous nature depends on its scope, spirit and motive taken in their entirety, the article in
question as a whole explicitly makes mention of private complainant Rivera all throughout. It cannot be said that the
article was a mere general commentary on the alleged existing state of affairs at the aforementioned public market
because Rivera was not only specifically pointed out several times therein but was even tagged with derogatory names.
Indubitably, this name-calling was, as correctly found by the two courts below, directed at the very person of Rivera
himself.

If, as argued, the published article was indeed merely intended to innocently present the current condition of the
Bankerohan Public Market, there would then be no place in the article for the needless name-calling which it is wrought
full of. It is beyond comprehension how calling Rivera a "leech," "a paper tiger," a "non-Visayan pseudobully" with the
"arrogance of a tribal chieftain" save for his speaking in "some strange Luzon lingo and twang" and who "has no
business being in Davao or Bankerohan" can ever be regarded or viewed as comments free of malice. As it is, the tag
and description thus given Rivera have no place in a general account of the situation in the public market, and cannot,
by any stretch of the imagination, be construed to be anything other than what they really are: defamatory and libelous
in nature, and definitely directed at the private character of complainant Rivera. For indeed, no logical connection can
possibly be made between Rivera's Luzon origin and the conditions of the Bankerohan Public Market. Doubtless, the
words used in the article reek of venom towards the very person of Rivera.

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as follows:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect, real or imaginary,
or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural
or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false
and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or
confidence in the complainant or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about him. It is the publication of anything
which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. 6

In the light of the numerable defamatory imputations made against complainant Rivera as a person, the article in dispute,
even taken, as urged, in its totality, undeniably caused serious damage to his character and person and clearly injurious
to his reputation.

At any rate, in libel cases, the question is not what the writer of the libelous material means, but what the words used
by him mean. 7 Here, the defamatory character of the words used by the petitioners is shown by the very recitals thereof
in the questioned article.
It is next contended by the petitioners that Rivera is a public officer. On this premise, they invoke in their favor the
application of one of the exceptions to the legal presumption of the malicious nature of every defamatory imputation,
as provided for under paragraph (2), Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Again, as correctly found by both the trial court and the CA, Rivera is not a public officer or employee but a private
citizen. Hence, the published article cannot be considered as falling within the ambit of privileged communication within
the context of the above-quoted provision of the Penal Code.

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer. The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an
employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involve a delegation to the individual of some of
the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the
sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless
the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer. 8

Clearly, Rivera cannot be considered a public officer. Being a member of the market committee did not vest upon him
any sovereign function of the government, be it legislative, executive or judicial. As reasoned out by the CA, the
operation of a public market is not a governmental function but merely an activity undertaken by the city in its private
proprietary capacity. Furthermore, Rivera's membership in the market committee was in representation of the
association of market vendors, a non-governmental organization belonging to the private sector.

Indeed, even if we were to pretend that Rivera was a public officer, which he clearly is not, the subject article still would
not pass muster as Article 354(2), supra, of the Revised Penal Code expressly requires that it be a "fair and true report,
made in good faith, without any comments or remarks." Even a mere cursory glance at the article reveals that it is far
from being that.

Finally, petitioners assail the award by the two courts below of moral damages and attorney's fees in favor of Rivera.

The assault must fail. Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code is express in stating that moral damages may be recovered in
case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. From the very publication and circulation of the subject
defamatory and libelous material itself, there can be no doubt as to the resulting wounded feelings and besmirched
reputation sustained by complainant Rivera. The branding of defamatory names against him most certainly exposed
him to public contempt and ridicule. As found by the trial court in its judgment of conviction:

Complainant, when he read the subject publication, was embarrass on what was written against him, made more
unpleasant on the occasion of the reunion of his son-in-law, who just arrived from the United States for the first time,
was confronted of the above-defamatory publication. He was worried and depressed, about the comments against him,
affecting his credibility and personality, as representative of many market organizations in Davao City.

Having been exposed to embarrassment and ridicule occasioned by the publication of the subject article, Rivera is
entitled to moral damages and attorney's fees.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed CA Decision dated October 11, 2002
is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 147026-27 September 11, 2009

CAROLINA R. JAVIER, Petitioner,

vs.
THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Carolina R. Javier in
Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Carolina R. Javier,
Accused," seeking to nullify respondent Sandiganbayan's: (1) Order 2 dated November 14, 2000 in Criminal Case No.
25867, which denied her Motion to Quash Information; (2) Resolution 3 dated January 17, 2001 in Criminal Case No.
25898, which denied her Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Quash Information; and (3) Order 4 dated February
12, 2001, declaring that a motion for reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 25898 would be superfluous as the issues
are fairly simple and straightforward.

The factual antecedents follow.

On June 7, 1995, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047,5 or otherwise known as the "Book Publishing Industry Development
Act", was enacted into law. Foremost in its policy is the State's goal in promoting the continuing development of the
book publishing industry, through the active participation of the private sector, to ensure an adequate supply of
affordable, quality-produced books for the domestic and export market.

To achieve this purpose, the law provided for the creation of the National Book Development Board (NBDB or the
Governing Board, for brevity), which shall be under the administration and supervision of the Office of the President.
The Governing Board shall be composed of eleven (11) members who shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines, five (5) of whom shall come from the government, while the remaining six (6) shall be chosen from the
nominees of organizations of private book publishers, printers, writers, book industry related activities, students and
the private education sector.

On February 26, 1996, petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board as a private sector representative for a term
of one (1) year.6 During that time, she was also the President of the Book Suppliers Association of the Philippines
(BSAP). She was on a hold-over capacity in the following year. On September 14, 1998, she was again appointed to
the same position and for the same period of one (1) year.7 Part of her functions as a member of the Governing Board
is to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing bodies. On September 29, 1997, she was
issued by the Office of the President a travel authority to attend the Madrid International Book Fair in Spain on October
8-12, 1997.8 Based on her itinerary of travel,9 she was paid ₱139,199.0010 as her travelling expenses.

Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to attend the scheduled international book fair.

On February 16, 1998, Resident Auditor Rosario T. Martin advised petitioner to immediately return/refund her cash
advance considering that her trip was canceled.11 Petitioner, however, failed to do so. On July 6, 1998, she was issued
a Summary of Disallowances12 from which the balance for settlement amounted to ₱220,349.00. Despite said notice,
no action was forthcoming from the petitioner.

On September 23, 1999, Dr. Nellie R. Apolonio, then the Executive Director of the NBDB, filed with the Ombudsman a
complaint against petitioner for malversation of public funds and properties. She averred that despite the cancellation
of the foreign trip, petitioner failed to liquidate or return to the NBDB her cash advance within sixty (60) days from date
of arrival, or in this case from the date of cancellation of the trip, in accordance with government accounting and auditing
rules and regulations. Dr. Apolonio further charged petitioner with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 13 for failure
to file her Statement of Assets and Liabilities.

The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, 14 as amended,
and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. 15 It, however, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence,
the charge for violation of R.A. No. 6713.

In an Information dated February 18, 2000, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before
the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

That on or about October 8, 1997, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Quezon, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, a public officer, being then a member of the
governing Board of the National Book Development Board (NBDB), while in the performance of her official and
administrative functions, and acting with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, without any justifiable cause, and despite due demand by the Resident Auditor and the
Executive Director of NBDB, fail and refuse to return and/or liquidate her cash advances intended for official travel
abroad which did not materialize, in the total amount of ₱139,199.00 as of September 23, 1999, as required under EO
No. 248 and Sec. 5 of COA Circular No. 97-002 thereby causing damage and undue injury to the Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.16

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25867 and raffled to the First Division.

Meanwhile, the Commission on Audit charged petitioner with Malversation of Public Funds, as defined and penalized
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for not liquidating the cash advance granted to her in connection with her
supposed trip to Spain. During the conduct of the preliminary investigation, petitioner was required to submit her
counter-affidavit but she failed to do so. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for the crime charged
and recommended the filing of the corresponding information against her. 17

Thus, an Information dated February 29, 2000 was filed before the Sandiganbayan, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 25898, and raffled to the Third Division, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about and during the period from October 8, 1997 to February 16, 1999, or for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
high ranking officer, being a member of the Governing Board of the National Book Development Board and as such, is
accountable for the public funds she received as cash advance in connection with her trip to Spain from October 8-12,
1997, per LBP Check No. 10188 in the amount of ₱139,199.00, which trip did not materialize, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, malverse, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own personal use and benefit
the aforementioned amount of ₱139,199.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.18

During her arraignment in Criminal Case No. 25867, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, petitioner delivered to the
First Division the money subject of the criminal cases, which amount was deposited in a special trust account during
the pendency of the criminal cases.

Meanwhile, the Third Division set a clarificatory hearing in Criminal Case No. 25898 on May 16, 2000 in order to
determine jurisdictional issues. On June 3, 2000, petitioner filed with the same Division a Motion for Consolidation 19of
Criminal Case No. 25898 with Criminal Case No. 25867, pending before the First Division. On July 6, 2000, the People
filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information20 in Criminal Case No. 25898, which was granted.
Accordingly, the Amended Information dated June 28, 2000 reads as follows:

That on or about and during the period from October 8, 1997 to February 16, 1999, or for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
high ranking officer, being a member of the Governing Board of the National Book Development Board equated to
Board Member II with a salary grade 28 and as such, is accountable for the public funds she received as case advance
in connection with her trip to Spain from October 8-12, 1997, per LBP Check No. 10188 in the amount of ₱139,199.00,
which trip did not materialize, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, malverse, misappropriate,
embezzle and convert to her own personal use and benefit the aforementioned amount of ₱139,199.00, Philippine
currency, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.21

In its Resolution dated October 5, 2000, the Third Division ordered the consolidation of Criminal Case No. 25898 with
Criminal Case No. 25867. 22

On October 10, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Information, 23 averring that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction to hear Criminal Case No. 25867 as the information did not allege that she is a public official who is classified
as Grade "27" or higher. Neither did the information charge her as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public
officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public officer
or employee and that she belongs to the Governing Board only as a private sector representative under R.A. No. 8047,
hence, she may not be charged under R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers
public officials. Moreover, she claimed that she does not perform public functions and is without any administrative or
political power to speak of – that she is serving the private book publishing industry by advancing their interest as
participant in the government's book development policy.

In an Order24 dated November 14, 2000, the First Division25 denied the motion to quash with the following disquisition:

The fact that the accused does not receive any compensation in terms of salaries and allowances, if that indeed be the
case, is not the sole qualification for being in the government service or a public official. The National Book Development
Board is a statutory government agency and the persons who participated therein even if they are from the private
sector, are public officers to the extent that they are performing their duty therein as such.

Insofar as the accusation is concerned herein, it would appear that monies were advanced to the accused in her
capacity as Director of the National Book Development Board for purposes of official travel. While indeed under ordinary
circumstances a member of the board remains a private individual, still when that individual is performing her functions
as a member of the board or when that person receives benefits or when the person is supposed to travel abroad and
is given government money to effect that travel, to that extent the private sector representative is a public official
performing public functions; if only for that reason, and not even considering situation of her being in possession of
public funds even as a private individual for which she would also covered by provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
she is properly charged before this Court.

On November 15, 2000, the First Division accepted the consolidation of the criminal cases against petitioner and
scheduled her arraignment on November 17, 2000, for Criminal Case No. 25898. On said date, petitioner manifested
that she is not prepared to accept the propriety of the accusation since it refers to the same subject matter as that
covered in Criminal Case No. 25867 for which the Sandiganbayan gave her time to file a motion to quash. On November
22, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information26 in Criminal Case No. 25898, by invoking her right against
double jeopardy. However, her motion was denied in open court. She then filed a motion for reconsideration.

On January 17, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution27 denying petitioner’s motion with the following
disquisition:

The accused is under the jurisdiction of this Court because Sec. 4 (g) of P.D. 1606 as amended so provides, thus:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations;

xxxx
The offense is office-related because the money for her travel abroad was given to her because of her Directorship in
the National Book Development Board.

Furthermore, there are also allegations to hold the accused liable under Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code which
reads:

Art. 222. Officers included in the preceding provisions. – The provisions of this chapter shall apply to private individuals
who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to
any administrator or depository of funds or property attached , seized or deposited by public authority, even if such
property belongs to a private individual.

Likewise, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 25898 on the ground of litis pendencia is denied
since in this instance, these two Informations speak of offenses under different statutes, i.e., R.A. No. 3019 and the
Revised Penal Code, neither of which precludes prosecution of the other.

Petitioner hinges the present petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft Law
and the Revised Penal Code on malversation of public funds. She advanced the following arguments in support of her
petition, to wit: first, she is not a public officer, and second, she was being charged under two (2) informations, which
is in violation of her right against double jeopardy.

A motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of
the Information.28

Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for
certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to
quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often
dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action. 29

The above general rule, however admits of several exceptions, one of which is when the court, in denying the motion
to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari
or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and
expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue,
or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. 30

To substantiate her claim, petitioner maintained that she is not a public officer and only a private sector representative,
stressing that her only function among the eleven (11) basic purposes and objectives provided for in Section 4, R.A.
No. 8047, is to obtain priority status for the book publishing industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD
Board, she was the President of the BSAP, a book publishers association. As such, she could not be held liable for the
crimes imputed against her, and in turn, she is outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the Philippine book publishing industry. It is a
statutory government agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure the full development of
the book publishing industry as well as for the creation of organization structures to implement the said policy. To
achieve this end, the Governing Board of the NBDB was created to supervise the implementation. The Governing
Board was vested with powers and functions, to wit:

a) assume responsibility for carrying out and implementing the policies, purposes and objectives provided for
in this Act;

b) formulate plans and programs as well as operational policies and guidelines for undertaking activities
relative to promoting book development, production and distribution as well as an incentive scheme for
individual authors and writers;
 c) formulate policies, guidelines and mechanisms to ensure that editors, compilers and especially authors are
paid justly and promptly royalties due them for reproduction of their works in any form and number and for
whatever purpose;

d) conduct or contract research on the book publishing industry including monitoring, compiling and providing
data and information of book production;

e) provide a forum for interaction among private publishers, and, for the purpose, establish and maintain liaison
will all the segments of the book publishing industry;

f) ask the appropriate government authority to ensure effective implementation of the National Book
Development Plan;

g) promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act in consultation with other agencies
concerned, except for Section 9 hereof on incentives for book development, which shall be the concern of
appropriate agencies involved;

h) approve, with the concurrence of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), the annual and
supplemental budgets submitted to it by the Executive director;

i) own, lease, mortgage, encumber or otherwise real and personal property for the attainment of its purposes
and objectives;

j) enter into any obligation or contract essential to the proper administration of its affairs, the conduct of its
operations or the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives;

k) receive donations, grants, legacies, devices and similar acquisitions which shall form a trust fund of the
Board to accomplish its development plans on book publishing;

l) import books or raw materials used in book publishing which are exempt from all taxes, customs duties and
other charges in behalf of persons and enterprises engaged in book publishing and its related activities duly
registered with the board;

m) promulgate rules and regulations governing the matter in which the general affairs of the Board are to be
exercised and amend, repeal, and modify such rules and regulations whenever necessary;

n) recommend to the President of the Philippines nominees for the positions of the Executive Officer and
Deputy Executive Officer of the Board;

o) adopt rules and procedures and fix the time and place for holding meetings: Provided, That at least one (1)
regular meeting shall be held monthly;

p) conduct studies, seminars, workshops, lectures, conferences, exhibits, and other related activities on book
development such as indigenous authorship, intellectual property rights, use of alternative materials for
printing, distribution and others; and

q) exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be required by the law. 31

A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude that they partake of the nature of public functions.
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed
by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.32

Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested her with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this
case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national
development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or
agencies of the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was appointed to
the Governing Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. The Governing
Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one body. The purpose of the law for appointing members from
the private sector is to ensure that they are also properly represented in the implementation of government objectives
to cultivate the book publishing industry.

Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, which provides
that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. 33

Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office.
Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that
does not make her private person exercising a public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is
also of no moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive per diem
and such allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and
regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of one's appointment, and whether the compensation one
receives from the government is only nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is still
considered a public officer.

On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by direct provision of the law,
popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public
functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public
officer.34

Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No. 8047, verily, she
is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in the government whether as an employee,
agent, subordinate official, of any rank or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and
promulgation of several rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the country
in the canceled book fair in Spain.

In fine, We hold that petitioner is a public officer. The next question for the Court to resolve is whether, as a public
officer, petitioner is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Presently,35 the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused
are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:

xxxx

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "Grade '27'" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
 (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "Grade '27'" and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.

xxxx

Notably, the Director of Organization, Position Classification and Compensation Bureau, of the Department of Budget
and management provided the following information regarding the compensation and position classification and/or rank
equivalence of the member of the Governing Board of the NBDB, thus:

Per FY 1999 Personal Services Itemization, the Governing Board of NDBD is composed of one (1) Chairman (ex-
officio), one (1) Vice-Chairman (ex-officio), and nine (9) Members, four (4) of whom are ex-officio and the remaining
five (5) members represent the private sector. The said five members of the Board do not receive any salary and as
such their position are not classified and are not assigned any salary grade.

For purposes however of determining the rank equivalence of said positions, notwithstanding that they do not have any
salary grade assignment, the same may be equated to Board Member II, SG-28.36

Thus, based on the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 25898, petitioner belongs to the employees classified
as SG-28, included in the phrase "all other national and local officials classified as ‘Grade 27' and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."

Anent the issue of double jeopardy, We can not likewise give in to the contentions advanced by petitioner. She argued
that her right against double jeopardy was violated when the Sandiganbayan denied her motion to quash the two
informations filed against her.1avvphi1

We believe otherwise. Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898 refer to offenses
penalized by different statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach,
the case against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon valid information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the
charge.37 In the instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. She was
not yet arraigned in the criminal case for malversation of public funds because she had filed a motion to quash the
latter information. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach considering that the two cases remain pending before
the Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her.

It is well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same
is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the
accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.38The
third and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.

In view of the foregoing, We hold that the present petition does not fall under the exceptions wherein the remedy of
certiorari may be resorted to after the denial of one's motion to quash the information. And even assuming that petitioner
may avail of such remedy, We still hold that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions and Order of the Sandiganbayan
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 193036

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

--- Justice Jose P. Laurel1

The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several
departments.2 The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer.3 Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter
what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much
more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and the people who run it. 4

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases 5 both of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010."

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in
his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power
of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to
create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.7

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then
Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble
objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported
cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1

CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the
principle that a public office is a public trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who
are servants of the people, must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;

WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principle and notorious
violation of this mandate;

WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political, economic, and
social life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the
marginalized and underprivileged sector of society;

WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and undermined the
people’s trust and confidence in the Government and its institutions;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large
scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the
appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil,
restore the people’s faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;

WHEREAS, the President’s battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last elections
"kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap" expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end
corruption and the evil it breeds;

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and
which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;

WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the Office of the President.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH

COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find
the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and
magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if
any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure
to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.

The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as an
independent collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily
tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption
referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.

In particular, it shall:

a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it
will investigate;

b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases
of large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require
any agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents, books, records and other
papers;

c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from

the Senate and the House of Representatives records of investigations conducted
by committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being investigated by the
Commission;

d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts,
including the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator, information
or documents in respect to corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
regular courts, as the case may be;

e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose,
administer oaths or affirmations as the case may be;

f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state

witness to ensure that the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who
qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines be
admitted for that purpose;

g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and
recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and
their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the
course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to
believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;

h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the

Department of Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it may require in the
discharge of its functions and duties;

i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other

personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;

j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to

effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to
ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and hearings,
including the presentation of evidence;

k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in

connection with the objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. – x x x.

SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. – x x x.

SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. – x x x

SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. – x x x.

SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. – x x x.

SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. – x x x.

SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. – Any government official
or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission
or who, appearing before the Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or
produce documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary
action. Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in accordance with law.

SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. – x x x.

SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. – The Office of the President shall provide the
necessary funds for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its functions,
and perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.

SECTION 12. Office. – x x x.

SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. – x x x.

SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. – The Commission shall accomplish its mission on or
before December 31, 2012.

SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. – x x x.

SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. – x x x.

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the
President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof
to include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior
administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive
Order.

SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared unconstitutional, the
same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions hereof.

SECTION 19. Effectivity. – This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.

(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

By the President:

(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.

Executive Secretary

Nature of the Truth Commission

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body
formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed
by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the
Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is
one.8

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book
I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of
graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable
cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal,
civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.

The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as official, transitory and
non-judicial fact-finding bodies "to establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of international
humanitarian law in a country’s past."9 They are usually established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest,
civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.

Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they examine only past
events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3)
they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and
recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State. 10 "Commission’s
members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent
recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past
abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional
reforms."11

Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals are
examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A
form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the principal function of
which was to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for
victims.

The PTC is a far cry from South Africa’s model. The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial
retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer12puts
it:

The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural speech: "To
those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to simply forget about the wrongs that they
have committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no reconciliation without justice. When we allow crimes
to go unpunished, we give consent to their occurring over and over again."

The Thrusts of the Petitions

Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional
and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows
that they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following manner:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the "Truth Commission."
 (c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the "Truth Commission"
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under
the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

(e) The creation of the "Philippine Truth Commission of 2010" violates the consistent and general international
practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate human rights
violations, which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted principles of international law which
the Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.

(f) The creation of the "Truth Commission" is an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a
launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the people
that widespread poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the other
major causes of poverty.

(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment because
neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of an executive
issuance or even a statute."13

In their Consolidated Comment,14 the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), essentially
questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the President’s
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code
of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), 15 Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 141616 (as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No.
9970,17 and settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation
but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.

The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders and presidential issuances
creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action
Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance
Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and Government
Operations (PARGO)by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.18

From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question
Executive Order No. 1;

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers
of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
 4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain
whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are present.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.19

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to demonstrate their
personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or
are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of
the commission’s investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings. 20

The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive
Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present
the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,21

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,
which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the
courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which,
to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. 22

With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of the PTC
and the budget for its operations.23 It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the
commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement
of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the President’s power
over contingent funds.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an
assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over
presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo 24 explained the deep-seated rules
on locus standi. Thus:

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, standing is
governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to
the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing
an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected
no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer."
In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make
out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was
first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category
from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the
latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel
Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the right, if not
the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer
to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he
disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State
Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v.
Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and
it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v.
President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest."25

Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,26 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases,27 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance28 laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco29are
non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the
petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where
the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar,
they should be resolved for the guidance of all.30 Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the
status of the President’s first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the
petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the
Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance
to society.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely
an adjunct body of the Office of the President.31 Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be
empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power
cannot be presumed32 since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President
to create a truth commission.33 He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the
continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering
the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and
"abolish."34 Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the extent
of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the
Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof. 35

Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province of
Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the President
to reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public
office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of
the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of
functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. 36Such continuing authority
of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the
limits of this delegated authority.

The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding body
such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the
President to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long been recognized. 37 According to
the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create
fact-finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of
its administrative functions.38 This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by
the President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the Constitution. 39

It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to
his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of
his authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the
discretion of his officials.40 The power of the President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control
over his subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power
to discipline subordinates,41 his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes 42 and in order to be
informed on matters which he is entitled to know.43

The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita, 44 where it was held that the President has the power to
reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control
and by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the OSG, the
President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption
in the government.45

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to
reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization"
as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the
provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said
provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure"– an "alteration of an existing structure."
Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order
No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,46

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive
branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power – that which constitutes an
express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the
President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place
when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control,
authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under
the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the President’s continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control. Control is essentially the
power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. 47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from
the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid
delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public
office?

According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis
under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.48 The said law granted the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices,
to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize
salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several
cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.49

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office.
Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos
of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create
offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the organization
of the national government.

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in
Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says "it
was enacted to prepare the transition from presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of government,
the legislative and executive powers are fused, correct?

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree with me that P.D. 1416
should not be considered effective anymore upon the promulgation, adoption, ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to reorganize the entire National Government is deemed
repealed, at least, upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, correct.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.50

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D.
No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a
grant of all powers inherent in them. The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in the
President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create
bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft
of such authority.51 As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus: 52

x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation
of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government
with provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is
head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless
the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only
one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any
provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise
of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive
power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in
the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. x x x.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.53 One of the recognized powers
of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This
flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department
of Health v. Camposano,54 the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative
committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the
anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate,
the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the
PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]

It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters
which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the
objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission,
the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court
is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have
changed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation
of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds
already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, in the words of the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission." 55 Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated
to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
 Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows
from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. 56 As the Chief Executive, the
president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees
of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive department. 57

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body
as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance
with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law." 58 In simpler terms, judicial
discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and
must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cariño v.
Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study.
The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire
into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation.
To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn
described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm
L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or
matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule
on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the
merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or
rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x
x."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included.
Citations Omitted]

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not
a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law.60 Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial
power.61

Contrary to petitioners’ apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out
by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission
to conduct a fact-finding investigation."62 The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the
merits of the charges against them,63 is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, "when in the
course of its investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from
that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the
courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.64
At any rate, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia, 65 it was written:

This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal
trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public
employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the
Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and
the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].

Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under
Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases
supplied]

The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary
investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTC’s sphere of
functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC
commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsman’s primordial duties.

The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the
Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to
investigate the commission of crimes.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded
conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa
Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ
have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are
not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for
violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds
difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that
it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous
administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." 66 Thus, in order to be accorded
with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to
that of former President Arroyo.67

The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts
committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the
"same magnitude of controversies and anomalies"68 were reported to have been committed against the Filipino people.
They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because
first, "there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No.
1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification
is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption."69 In order to attain constitutional permission,
the petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with "graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo
administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force." 70

Position of respondents

According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the "previous administration" as the initial subject of
the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption
solely during the said administration.71 Assuming arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings to
officials of the previous administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection
clause for "the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects
of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive
Order seeks to correct."72 To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it recited the following:

First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the previous
administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore, an urgent call for the
determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the people’s faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants.

Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding is warranted by the reality that
unlike with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely bear the immediate consequence of
the policies of the previous administration.

Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for investigation lies in the reality that
the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated,
the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more easily
established in the regime that immediately precede the current administration.

Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to investigations to provide closure to
issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by a
nascent administration like the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), created by the late President
Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former
President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph
Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens’ committee to investigate all
the facts and circumstances surrounding "Philippine Centennial projects" of his predecessor, former President Fidel V.
Ramos.73 [Emphases supplied]

Concept of the Equal Protection Clause

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process,
as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate
clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular
act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause.74

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." 75 It "requires public bodies and institutions
to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." 76 "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities."77 "In other words,
the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective." 78

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. 79 Its inhibitions cover
all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test
has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.81 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 82

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class.83 "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."84

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union 85 and reiterated in a long line of cases,86

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens
of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them.
It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things
that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" 87 only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order. Specifically, these are:

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution
of the offenders and secure justice for all;

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end,
investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical
sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without
fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body
under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-
finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers
and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
[Emphases supplied]

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates
to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations,
these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the "previous administration"
only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said
administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety.
They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification." 88

The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation
to the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that "to include other past administrations, at this point,
may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness." 89The reason given is specious. It
is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or "end corruption and the evil
it breeds."90

The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier
administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have
already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct
simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the body’s limited time and resources. "The law does
not require the impossible" (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).91

Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating
almost a century’s worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary
classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable
prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted
language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,92

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.
[Emphasis supplied]

It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the
considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws
should not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which
all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered.93 Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. 94While
the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive,
must be read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of
"substantial distinctions" would only confirm the petitioners’ lament that the subject executive order is only an "adventure
in partisan hostility." In the case of US v. Cyprian,95 it was written: "A rather limited number of such classifications have
routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political activity or
membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise of first
amendment rights."

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class.96 "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only,
or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations
and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the
members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the
members of the class."97

The Court is not unaware that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection
clause."98 "Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils
within its reach."99 It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a
rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. 100 In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not
considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or
regulations. These cases refer to the "step by step" process.101 "With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature
does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise,
to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked." 102

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was
deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed
executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report
to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. "The equal protection clause is violated by
purposeful and intentional discrimination."103

To disprove petitioners’ contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission does
not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.104The
OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to
expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and
instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by
way of a supplemental Executive Order.

The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of
investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it
does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still
depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be
meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was "crafted to tailor-fit the
prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration." 105

The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,106 that the "PCGG
Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause." The decision,
however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said
case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.

A final word

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive
department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the
Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this
issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain
the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nation’s thrust to progress.

The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial
Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however,
have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of
government, on the other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.

To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: "And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments;
it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them." 107

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather
simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by
the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more
authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as
void and unconstitutional.

It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment
of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: "The end does not justify
the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in
accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.108 The Court
cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.

"The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed
to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude." 109

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present
administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would
allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches of the
government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a
hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be within
constitutional bounds for "ours is still a government of laws and not of men." 110

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar
as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of
Executive Order No. 1.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 196425 July 24, 2012

PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE AND
ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON.
CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an ex-officio member of the Monetary
Board, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The Case

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, seeking
to declare as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 13, entitled, "Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and
Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the Office Of The Deputy Executive
Secretary For Legal Affairs, Office of the President",1 and to permanently prohibit respondents from administratively
proceeding against petitioner on the strength of the assailed executive order.

The Facts

On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and
recommendations to the President. Pertinent portions of E.O. 12 provide:

Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions. –

(a) x x x xxx xxx

(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against all presidential appointees in the government and any of its agencies or instrumentalities xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Section 8. Submission of Report and Recommendations. – After completing its investigation or hearing, the
Commission en banc shall submit its report and recommendations to the President. The report and recommendations
shall state, among others, the factual findings and legal conclusions, as well as the penalty recommend (sic) to be
imposed or such other action that may be taken."

On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the
PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more
particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). The full text of the assailed executive
order reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13

ABOLISHING THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION AND TRANSFERRING ITS

INVESTIGATIVE, ADJUDICATORY AND RECOMMENDATORY FUNCTIONS TO THE OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

WHEREAS, this administration has a continuing mandate and advocacy to fight and eradicate
corruption in the different departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and
instrumentalities;

WHEREAS, the government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to

promote economy and efficiency in government;

WHEREAS, Section VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices;

WHEREAS, Section 31 Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of
1987) provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the administrative structure
of the Office of the President;

WHEREAS, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416 (Granting Continuing Authority to the President of
the Philippines to Reorganize the National Government), as amended by PD 1722, provides that the
President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure
of the National Government and may, at his discretion, create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge or
integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities and units of the National Government, as well as,
expand, amend, change or otherwise modify their powers, functions and authorities;

WHEREAS, Section 78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 9970 (General Appropriations
Act of 2010) authorizes the President of the Philippines to direct changes in the organizational units
or key positions in any department or agency;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby order the following:

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the government to fight and eradicate graft and
corruption in the different departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and
instrumentalities.

The government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote economy
and efficiency in the government.

SECTION 2. Abolition of Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). To enable the Office of the
President (OP) to directly investigate graft and corrupt cases of Presidential appointees in the
Executive Department including heads of government-owned and controlled corporations, the

Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) is hereby abolished and their vital functions and other
powers and functions inherent or incidental thereto, transferred to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), OP in accordance with the provisions of this Executive Order.

SECTION 3. Restructuring of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, OP. In
addition to the Legal and Legislative Divisions of the ODESLA, the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division shall be created.

The newly created Investigative and Adjudicatory Division shall perform powers, functions and duties
mentioned in Section 2 hereof, of PAGC.
 The Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (DESLA) will be the recommending authority to the
President, thru the Executive Secretary, for approval, adoption or modification of the report and
recommendations of the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of ODESLA.

SECTION 4. Personnel Who May Be Affected By the Abolition of PAGC. The personnel who may be
affected by the abolition of the PAGC shall be allowed to avail of the benefits provided under existing
laws if applicable. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby ordered to release
the necessary funds for the benefits of the employees.

SECTION 5. Winding Up of the Operation and Disposition of the Functions, Positions, Personnel,
Assets and Liabilities of PAGC. The winding up of the operations of PAGC including the final
disposition or transfer of their functions, positions, personnel, assets and liabilities as may be
necessary, shall be in accordance with the applicable provision(s) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing EO 72 (Rationalizing the Agencies Under or Attached to the Office of the President)
dated March 15, 2002. The winding up shall be implemented not later than 31 December 2010.

The Office of the Executive Secretary, with the assistance of the Department of Budget and
Management, shall ensure the smooth and efficient implementation of the dispositive actions and
winding-up of the activities of PAGC.

SECTION 6. Repealing Clause. All executive orders, rules, regulations and other issuances or parts
thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, are hereby revoked or
modified accordingly.

SECTION 7. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit2 for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees,
namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose
from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377)
shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and
his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed
a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of
grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is
already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary course of law,
petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition upon the following grounds:

I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A

PUBLIC OFFICE.

II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO

APPROPRIATE FUNDS.

III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO DELEGATE

QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.

IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING UPON THE POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN.

V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS.

VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

Our Ruling

In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not authorized under any existing
law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the
President has not only usurped the powers of congress to create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-
judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon the powers of the Ombudsman. Petitioner
avers that the unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when weighed against the due process requirement and
equal protection clause under the 1987 Constitution.

The contentions are unavailing.

The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292.

Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the
President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose:

(1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices,
the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as
transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and

(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.4

In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora 5 the Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out a
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of
E.O. 292, thus:

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive
branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power – that which constitutes an
express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the
President. (Emphasis supplied)

And in Domingo v. Zamora,6 the Court gave the rationale behind the President's continuing authority in this wise:

The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office
"to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch.
To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the
command post of the President. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is
properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his
own office pursuant to E.O. 292.

Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or a function from
the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way around. 7

Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the
President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from
the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another. Again, in Domingo v. Zamora 8 the
Court noted:

However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should
be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the
President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's
power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the

President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or
Agencies, and vice versa.

The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2)
and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the
validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed
under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2)
Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively, 9 and was placed directly "under the
Office of the President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been
transferred, is an office within the Office of the President Proper. 11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office of
the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA
is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.

Petitioner, however, goes on to assert that the President went beyond the authority granted by E.O. 292 for him to
reorganize the executive department since his issuance of E.O. 13 did not merely involve the abolition of an office but
the creation of one as well. He argues that nowhere in the legal definition laid down by the Court in several cases does
a reorganization include the act of creating an office.

The contention is misplaced.

The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.

The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and functions
that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within
the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative
structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division – the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division –
through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13. In
Canonizado v. Aguirre,12 We ruled that –

Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.

The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.

A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be pursued in good faith.
A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes of economy and efficiency. 13 It appears
in this case that the streamlining of functions within the Office of the President Proper was pursued with such purposes
in mind.

In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of eradicating corruption in the
government and promoting economy and efficiency in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the
reorganization is shown by the fact that while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation
in the 2010 annual budget,14 no separate or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever required after the
transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.

Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its functions and maintain its
personnel would be sourced from the following year's appropriation for the President's Offices under the General
Appropriations Act of 2011.15 Petitioner asseverates, however, that since Congress did not indicate the manner by
which the appropriation for the Office of the President was to be distributed, taking therefrom the operational funds of
the IAD-ODESLA would amount to an illegal appropriation by the President. The contention is without legal basis.

There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds.

In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to recommend the budget
necessary for the operation of the Government,16 which implies that he has the necessary authority to evaluate and
determine the structure that each government agency in the executive department would need to operate in the most
economical and efficient manner.17 Hence, the express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President’s authority to "direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in
any department or agency." The aforecited provision, often and consistently included in the general appropriations laws,
recognizes the extent of the President’s power to reorganize the executive offices and agencies under him, which is,
"even to the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose." 18

And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise given constitutional
authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the savings in other items of the appropriation
for his office.19 In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which is included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved
after its enactment.20

Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated by
Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly
sourced from the President's own office budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no
usurpation of the legislature's power to appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the existing funds
previously appropriated by Congress for his office.

The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers.

Petitioner next avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power which is reserved to the Judicial
Department and, by way of exception through an express grant by the legislature, to administrative agencies. He points
out that the name Investigative and Adjudicatory Division is proof itself that the IAD-ODESLA wields quasi-judicial
power.

The argument is tenuous. As the OSG aptly explained in its Comment, 21 while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of
its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations,
preparation of reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall
"perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."22

Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints against all
presidential appointees in the government" 23 and to "submit its report and recommendations to the President."24 The
IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to settle controversies
and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 25 and later reiterated in Biraogo
v. The Philippine Truth Commission:26

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not
a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law.

The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-finding investigator cannot be
doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the Executive Department to ensure the
enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power in the President to
conduct investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the executive department. 27

The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.

Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction
when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and
administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of the Ombudsman. The primary
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman
may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A.
No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, empowers the Ombudsman to –

(1)Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases. (Emphasis
supplied)

Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct, petitioner may
not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation.
In any event, the Ombudsman's authority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the government,
extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. 28

While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the adjudication
of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding
investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. As such, it
commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.

Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due Process and the Equal Protection of the Laws.

Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal protection clause pointing to the arbitrariness of limiting
the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the government.
The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. 29 It
is embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application of the law, "all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." 30 The equal
protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupations bearing
substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other. This we ruled in Farinas v. Executive
Secretary,31 wherein we further stated that –

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (Emphasis supplied)

Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds from the well settled
principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority on
which the power to appoint is vested.32 Having the power to remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the
President has the corollary authority to investigate such public officials and look into their conduct in office. 33 Petitioner
is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under
the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order an investigation into matters that require
his informed decision.

There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in government
from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government. In Salumbides v. Office of
the Ombudsman,34 we had ruled extensively on the substantial distinctions that exist between elective and appointive
public officials, thus:

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and
are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

xxxx

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people.1âwphi1 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that
elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, x x x complete deference is accorded to the
will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In
contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. (Emphasis supplied)

Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took
cognizance of the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to oppose the formal
complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable
opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of
due process,35 which simply means having the opportunity to explain one’s side. 36 Hence, as long as petitioner was
given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily
complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.37 The records show that
petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to submit his written explanation under oath with respect to the charge of
grave misconduct filed against him. His own failure to submit his explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent
claim of denial of due process.

Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial tribunal, contending that
both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the President. The mere suspicion of
partiality will not suffice to invalidate the actions of the IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof. Bias
and partiality

cannot be presumed.38 Petitioner must present substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably sided
against him in the conduct of the investigation. No such evidence has been presented as to defeat the presumption of
regularity m the performance of the fact-finding investigator's duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves scant
consideration.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 39 Petitioner has failed to discharge the
burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the President's continuing authority
to reorganize the Office of the President.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition IS hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23226 March 4, 1925

VICENTE SEGOVIA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
PEDRO NOEL, respondent-appellant.

Provincial Fiscal Diaz for appellant.

Del Rosario and Del Rosario for appellee.
Vicente Zacarias as amicus curiae.

MALCOLM, J.:

The question to be decided on this appeal is whether that portion of Act No. 3107 which provides, that justices of the
peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty- five years,
should be given retroactive or prospective effect.

Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of Dumanjug, Cebu, on January 21, 1907. He continuously
occupied this position until having passed sixty-five mile- stones, he was ordered by the Secretary of Justice on July 1,
1924, to vacate the office. Since that date, Pedro Noel, the auxiliary justice of the peace has acted as justice of the
peace for the municipality of Dumanjug.

Mr. Segovia being desirous of avoiding a public scandal and of opposing physical resistance to the occupancy of the
office of justice of the peace by the auxiliary justice of the peace, instituted friendly quo warranto proceedings in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu to inquire into the right of Pedro Noel to occupy the office of justice of the peace, to oust
the latter therefrom, and to procure reinstatement as justice of the peace of Dumanjug. To this complaint, Pedro Noel
interposed a demurrer on the ground that it did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because Act
No. 3107 was constitutional and because Mr. Segovia being sixty-five years old had automatically ceased to be justice
of the peace. On the issue thus framed and on stipulated facts, judgment was rendered by Honorable Adolph Wislizenus,
Judge of First Instance, overruling the demurrer, and in favor of petitioner and against respondent.

Proceeding by way of elimination so as to resolve the case into its simplest factors, it will first be noted that the petitioner
abandons the untenable position, assumed by him in one portion of his complaint, to the effect that section 1 of Act No.
3107 is unconstitutional in that it impairs the contractual right of the petitioner to an office. It is a fundamental principle
that a public office cannot be regarded as the property of the incumbent, and that a public office is not a contract.

It will next be noted that, while the respondent as appellant assigns three errors in this court, the first two relating to
preliminary matters are ultimately renounced by him in order that there may be an authoritative decision on the main
issue. The third error specified and argued with ability by the provincial fiscal of Cebu, is that the trial judge erred in
declaring that the limitation regarding the age of justices of the peace provided by section 1 of Act No. 3107 is not
applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed and acting before said law went into
effect.

Coming now to the law, we find on investigation the original provision pertinent to the appointment and term of office of
justices of the peace, in section 67 of Act No. 136, wherein it was provided that justices of the peace shall hold office
during the pleasure of the Commission. Act No. 1450, in force when Vicente Segovia was originally appointed justice
of the peace, amended section 67 of the Judiciary Law by making the term of office of justices and auxiliary justices of
the peace two years from the first Monday in January nearest the date of appointment. Shortly after Segovia's
appointment, however, the law was again amended by Act No. 1627 by providing that "all justices of the peace and
auxiliary justices of the peace shall hold office during good behavior and those now in office shall so continue." Later
amended by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2617, the law was ultimately codified in sections 203 and 206 of the Administrative
Code.
Codal section 203 in its first paragraph provides that "one justice of the peace and one auxiliary justice of the peace
shall be appointed by the Governor-General for the City of Manila, the City of Baguio, and for each municipality,
township, and municipal district in the Philippine Islands, and if the public interests shall so require, for any other minor
political division or unorganized territory in said Islands." It was this section which section 1 of Act No. 3107 amended
by adding at the end thereof the following proviso: "Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years." But section 206 of the Administrative Code
entitled "Tenure of office," and reading "a justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office
during good behavior unless his office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice," was
left unchanged by Act No. 3107.

A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the
legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication.
Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court and putting the rule more strongly, a statute ought not to receive
a construction making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other
meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No court will
hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. As our Civil Code has it in article 3, "Law shall not
have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." (Farrel vs. Pingree [1888], 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac., 843;
Greer vs. City of Asheville [1894], 114 N.C., 495; United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. vs. Struthers Wells Co. [1907],
209 U.S., 306; Montilla vs. Agustinian Corporation [1913], 24 Phil., 220; In re will of Riosa [1918], 39 Phil., 23.)

The same rule is followed by the courts with reference to public offices. A well-known New York decision held that
"though there is no vested right in an office, which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a
sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose is
stated." (People ex rel. Ryan vs. Green [1874], 58 N.Y., 295.) In another case, a new constitutional provision as to the
advanced age which should prevent the incumbents of certain judicial offices from retaining them was held prospective;
it did not apply to persons in office at the time of its taking effect. (People vs. Gardner, 59 Barb., 198; II Lewis' Sutherland
Statutory Construction, Chap. XVII, particularly pages 1161, 1162; Mechem on Public Officers, sec. 389.)

The case at bar is not the same as the case of Chanco vs. Imperial ( [1916], 34 Phil., 329). In that case, the question
was as to the validity of section 7 of Act No. 2347. The law under consideration not only provided that Judges of First
Instance shall serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years, but it further provided "that the present judges
of Courts of First Instance ... vacate their positions on the taking effect of this Act: and the Governor-General, with the
advice and consent of the Philippine Commission, shall make new appointments of judges of Courts of First
Instance ... ." There the intention of the Legislature to vacate the office was clearly expressed. Here, it is not expressed
at all.

The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section 203 of the Administrative Code, gives no indication of retroactive
effect. The law signifies no purpose of operating upon existing rights. A proviso was merely tacked on to section 203
of the Administrative Code, while leaving intact section 206 of the same Code which permits justices of the peace to
hold office during good behavior. In the absence of provisions expressly making the law applicable to justices of the
peace then in office, and in the absence of provisions impliedly indicative of such legislative intent, the courts would
not be justified in giving the law an interpretation which would legislate faithful public servants out of office.

Answering the question with which we began our decision, we hold that the proviso added to section 203 of the
Administrative Code by section 1 of Act No. 3107, providing that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years, should be given prospective effect only, and so
is not applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed before Act No. 3107 went into
force. Consequently, it results that the decision of the trial court is correct in its findings of fact and law and in its
disposition of the case.

Judgment affirmed, without costs. It is so ordered.

Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., concurs in the result
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 112283 August 30, 1994

EVELYN ABEJA, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE FEDERICO TAÑADA, Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 58, and ROSAURO RADOVAN
(deceased) *, respondents.

Roger E. Panotes for petitioner.

Antonio P. Relova for Conrado de Rama.

Eduardo R. Santos collaborating counsel for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner seeks the annulment of the orders dated September 21, 1992 and October 18,
1993 issued by respondent Judge Federico Tañada which decreed, among others, the revision of some 36 precincts
contained in the counter-protest filed by respondent Radovan. The said orders were issued by respondent judge in
resolving petitioner/protestant's "Motion to Determine Votes, to Proclaim Winner and to Allow Assumption of Office"
dated August 27, 1993.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Evelyn Abeja and private respondent Rosauro Radovan (deceased) were contenders for the office of
municipal mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, in the May 11, 1992, national elections.

Based on the official returns of the Municipal Board of Canvassers for the said municipality, private respondent was
credited with 6,215 votes as against petitioner's 5,951 votes.

Soon after the proclamation of private respondent, petitioner filed an election contest, docketed as Election Case No.
92-1, entitled "Evelyn Abeja vs. Rosauro Radovan" with the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. The protest covered
twenty-two (22) precincts.

On June 5, 1992, private respondent filed an Answer with a Counter-Protest of the results in thirty-six (36) precincts.

During the pre-trial, private respondent's counsel filed a motion praying that the 36 counter-protested precincts be
revised only if it is shown after completion of the revision of the 22 protested precincts that petitioner leads by a margin
of at least one (1) vote. The trial court declared discussion on the matter to be premature (TSN, July 6, 1992, pp. 8-12;
Rollo, p. 148). The revision of the ballots covering 22 protested precincts was completed in September 1992. Thereafter,
petitioner urged private respondent to commence the revision of the 36 counter-protested precincts by praying the
necessary fees for the purpose. Private respondent refused.

In view thereof, petitioner moved that the counter-protest of private respondent be considered withdrawn. Private
respondent opposed the motion and reiterated that the ballots of the 36 counter-protested precincts should only be
revised and recounted if it is shown after the revision of the contested ballots of the 22 precincts that petitioner leads
by at least one (1) vote.
Petitioner filed another manifestation and motion on September 29, 1992, praying that the counter-protest be
considered withdrawn from the time the final report of the Board of Revisors is submitted to the court for approval.

The then presiding Judge, Hon. Ludovico Lopez, did not rule on the aforementioned motions but, according to petitioner,
he (Judge Lopez) declared during a hearing in October 1992 that once a ruling is made on the contested ballots of the
22 protested precincts, he will not allow further revision of ballots.

By April 1993, all pending incidents including the report of the Board of Revisors as well as petitioner's formal offer of
evidence were considered submitted for resolution without private respondent having caused the revision of the ballots
in the 36 counter-protested precincts.

In an order dated April 15, 1993, Presiding Judge Lopez ruled that "(p)rotestant's offer of evidence as well as the
protestee's objections thereto are now submitted for the Court's resolution" (Rollo, p. 61).

On June 13, 1993, private respondent Rosauro Radovan died. He was substituted by Vice-Mayor Conrado de Rama
and, surprisingly, by his surviving spouse, Ediltrudes Radovan.

On July 13, 1993, private respondents de Rama and Radovan filed a Manifestation seeking a prompt resolution of all
pending incidents.

On August 12, 1993, the trial court issued an order stating that "(c)ounsels for both parties having signified to this Court
that they are submitting the motion to resolve without further argument. This motion being a motion to resolve, the Court
hereby informs the parties that pending matters submitted for resolution will be duly resolved on or before August 20,
1993" (Rollo, p. 143).

Shortly thereafter, Judge Lopez was reassigned to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Before transferring to his
new post, however, Judge Lopez issued an order dated August 18, 1993 which contained his ruling in each of the
contested ballots in the 22 contested precincts and the reasons therefor. In the said order, Judge Lopez emphasized
that "in ruling on the various objections lodged by both parties during the revision proceedings, the originals of the
contested ballots in the ballot boxes were subjected to careful scrutiny in the seclusion of the Court's chamber" (Rollo,
p. 161). Nonetheless, the ruling did not contain a summation of the exact number of votes to be credited to each of the
parties, or a declaration of the winner in the election protest for that matter.

On August 27, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion to Determine Votes, To Proclaim Winner and to Allow Assumption of
Office" considering that based on her own computation of revised ballots ruled upon by Judge Lopez, she led private
respondent by a margin of 281 votes.

Private respondents filed a Motion to Correct the order dated August 18, 1993, issued by Judge Lopez as well as
oppositions to the motion of petitioner. Respondents claim that petitioner's "Motion to Proclaim Winner" is premature
since the 36 counter-protested precincts are yet to be revised.

In an order dated September 21, 1993, herein respondent Judge Federico Tañada, who succeeded Judge Lopez,
denied the "Motion to Determine Votes, to Proclaim Winner and to Allow Assumption of Office" filed by petitioner.
Respondent judge ruled that petitioner's motion was indeed premature on the ground that until after the 36 counter-
protested precincts have been revised, the court could not render a valid decision.

On October 18, 1993, respondent judge issued another order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and
directed the revision committee to conduct a revision of the results of the 36 counter-protested precincts scheduled on
November 10, 1993.

These orders are the subject of this petition filed on November 8, 1993.

As prayed for by petitioner, the Court issued a temporary restraining order on November 17, 1993, enjoining
respondents from continuing with the revision of the ballots in the 36 counter-protested precincts. It appears, however,
that the restraining order was served on November 19, 1993, after the revision committee had completed revising 11
ballot boxes.
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not private respondents should be allowed to proceed with the
revision of the 36 precincts subject of the counter-protest.

It is clear from the records that Judge Lopez failed to issue a definitive ruling on this specific procedural issue raised
by the parties, which this Court must now provide.

Although petitioner claims that Judge Lopez issued a warning to private respondent to the effect that he (private
respondent) shall not be allowed to cause the revision of the counter-protested precincts after the revision of the
protested precincts is completed and ruled upon, she fails to cite a specific oral or written order of Judge Lopez
containing such warning or at least the date and circumstances of the hearing in which the said warning was issued.
Consequently, the alleged warning issued by Judge Lopez is unsubstantiated and must therefore be disregarded.

Coming now to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the revision of the counter-protested precincts filed by
private respondent has already been abandoned by his failure to pursue the same, right after the revision of the 22
protested precincts. Petitioner also argue that the case was deemed submitted for decision upon submission by the
Board of Revisors of the Report on the Revision of the 22 protested precincts.

In the instant case, petitioner, as protestant below, completed the revision of ballots in the 22 protested precincts in
September 1992 and her presentation of evidence in April 1993. Likewise, the Board of Revisors had submitted its
report and the trial court issued a ruling dated August 18, 1993 on the said revision. Given this state of the proceedings,
the question to be resolved is whether respondent may still be allowed to commence the revision of the counter-
protested precincts or should he be deemed to have waived his right to present his own evidence, i.e., the revision of
the counter-protested precincts after stubbornly refusing to do so.

Petitioner argues that while the sequence in the presentation of evidence may be altered for special reasons, the
applicable rules of procedure do not allow presentation of evidence after the court has already rendered a decision.
Clearly, petitioner considers the August 18, 1993 Order of Judge Lopez to be the "decision" on the case although the
order did not contain a summation of the total votes credited to each of the parties or a declaration of the winner in the
election protest.

Petitioner objects to the stand taken by private respondent on the procedure to be followed for being "unprocedural" in
the sense that a decision rendered on the election protest would be subject to another decision for the counter-protest.
It is further argued that since the 36 counter-protested precincts were already under the jurisdiction of the trial court,
the same should have been revised unconditionally and should not have been subjected to the whim and caprice of
the private respondent.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Considering that this petition involves an election protest heard by a regional trial court, the Comelec Rules of Procedure
are controlling.

In view of the fact that the subject election contest was filed on May 26, 1992, Section 2, Rule 17 and Section 11, Rule
35 of the aforementioned Comelec rules are applicable. Rule 17 treats of Hearings whereas Rule 35 treats of Election
Contests Before Courts of General Jurisdiction. *

Section 2, Rule 17 provides, in part:

Sec. 2. Order of hearing. — Unless the Commission or the Division, as the case may be, for special
reasons, directs otherwise, the order of hearing shall be as follows:

(a) The petitioner or protestant shall present evidence on his part;

(b) The protestant-in-intervention, if any, shall then offer evidence in support of his defense or
counter-protest, if any;

(c) The respondent or protestee shall then offer evidence in support of his defense or counter-protest,
if any;
It thus appears from the foregoing rule that the petitioner/protestant and the respondent/protestee shall present their
evidence upon their original case in succession in accordance with the order or sequence provided therein.

On the other hand, Section 11, Rule 35 provides:

Sec. 11. Presentation and reception of evidence. — The presentation and reception of evidence in
election contests shall be made in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 17 of these Rules, but the same
shall be completed within thirty (30) days from the date of the commencement thereof.

The record shows that the revision of ballots in the 22 protested precincts was completed sometime in September 1992.
Judge Lopez issued a ruling on the said revision almost a year later, or on August 18, 1993.

In the interim, private respondent failed to commence the revision of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts,
stubbornly maintaining the position that said precincts should be revised only if it is shown after the revision that
petitioner leads private respondent by at least one (1) vote. No law or rule authorizes such a procedure. Consequently,
private respondent must be deemed to have waived or abandoned his counter-protest.

The applicable Comelec rules provide for the presentation of evidence by the parties in succession in the order or
sequence provided under Sec. 2, rule 17 (Comelec Rules) which must be submitted within a reasonable time, if not
immediately after the revision of the precincts covered by the protest proper.

By insisting that the counter-protested precincts should be revised only if it is shown after the revision of the protested
precincts that petitioner, his opponent, leads by at least one (1) vote, private respondent is adopting a self-serving rule
without legal sanction calculated to unduly prolong the litigation.

Furthermore, it is readily apparent from the provisions of the applicable Comelec Rules that the court shall render its
decision after both parties shall have presented their respective evidence. Nowhere in the said provisions is it indicated
that presentation of evidence by the protestee may continue after the court has ruled on the evidence of the protestant
and determine the number of votes obtained by the latter. Otherwise, it would be possible for the protestee to prolong
the protest and render it moot by expiration of the term of office contested.

There is likewise merit to petitioner's claim that private respondent is guilty of laches, which, in a general sense, is a
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time,
warranting a presumption that a party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Republic v.
Caballero, 79 SCRA 177 [1977]).

In the case at bar, private respondent unreasonably failed to cause the revision of the counter-protested precincts
despite being afforded ample time to do so and must be deemed to have abandoned it. However, it is not clear from
the record of the case whether Judge Lopez issued an order requiring private respondent to pay the required cash
deposit for the revision of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts in accordance with Section 10, (b), Rule 35 of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure, otherwise, the counter-protest shall be automatically dismissed as provided in Sec.
10[c] thereof:

Sec. 10. Cash Deposit. —

xxx xxx xxx

(b) In case revision of ballots is required, there shall be deposited, within ten days after being required
by the Court, the sum of three hundred pesos (P300.00) for every ballot box for the compensation of
revisors at the rate of P100.00 each.

(c) Failure to make the cash deposits herein provided within the prescribed time limit shall result in
the automatic dismissal of the protest, counter-protest or protest-in-intervention, as the case may be.

In the Comment of private respondent's widow, it is alleged that "the record of the case definitely show (sic) that Judge
Lopez himself categorically ruled that the counter-protest was filed on time and the necessary cash deposit submitted
by private respondent pursuant to law" (Rollo, p. 60). However, private respondent fails to cite that part of the record in
which the said ruling may be found.

Private respondent attributes the delay in the resolution of the case to Judge Lopez for failing to rule on the issues
raised by the parties. However, it cannot be denied that private respondent has maintained the same position regarding
the revision of his counter-protest from the very beginning, as early as the pre-trial of the case, and all throughout the
course of the proceedings. Although Judge Lopez' inaction may have contributed to the delay of the case, private
respondent Radovan must bear the grave consequences of his stubborn and unfounded refusal to proceed with the
revision of the counter-protested precincts. Instead of conducting the revision of his counter-protested precincts, private
respondent hedged and stalled on the resolution of the case which is a purely dilatory technique.

Private respondent's argument is that the procedure advocated by him would actually save time. Nothing that the
resolution of petitioner's protest took almost a year, he contends that about the same length of time would be saved in
the event a revision of the counter-protested precincts would be declared unnecessary. Suffice it to state that the
procedure proposed by private respondent is not sanctioned by the Rules and need not delay us any longer that it
already has in the disposition of this case.

Upon the foregoing, we hold that the respondent judge erred in rendering the assailed orders denying petitioner's
"Motion to Determine Votes, to Declare Winner and to Allow Assumption of Office" and directing the revision of the
counter-protested precincts at this late hour, so to speak. Under the circumstances and for reasons discussed above,
the order of Judge Lopez dated August 18, 1993 which resolved the party litigants' objections to the revised ballots
may very well be the subject of a valid decision to resolve the instant electoral protest based on the revised ballots of
the 22 protested precincts.

In the event petitioner is declared the winning candidate, she should, upon proper motion, be allowed to immediately
assume the contested office. We say this because in their pleadings, petitioner and private respondent have amply
discussed their respective arguments in the applicability of Garcia v. de Jesus and the accompanying case of Tobon
Uy v. Comelec (206 SCRA 779 [1992]) and the possibility is not remote that private respondent may once again resort
to dilatory tactics.

Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal in election cases upon good reasons (Garcia
v. de Jesus, supra; in relation to Rule 43, Sec. 1, COMELEC Rules of Procedure) which we find obtaining in the case
before us.

Gahol v. Riodique (64 SCRA 494 [1975]) is even more emphatic:

Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as a basis of the right to assume
office, subject to future contingencies attendant to a protest, and not the decision of a court of justice?
Indeed, when it is considered that the board of canvassers is composed of person who are less
technically prepared to make an accurate appreciation of the ballots, apart from their being more apt
to yield to external consideration, and that the board must act summarily, practically racing against
time, while on the other hand, the judge has the benefit of all the evidence the parties can offer and
of admittedly better technical preparation and background, apart from his being allowed ample time
for conscientious study and mature deliberation before rendering judgment, one cannot but perceive
the wisdom of allowing the immediate execution of decisions in election cases adverse to the
protestees, notwithstanding the perfection and pendency of appeals therefrom, as long as there are,
in the sound discretion of the court, good reasons therefor. (cited in Garcia v. de Jesus, supra)

We also find as erroneous the substitution of the deceased Rosauro Radovan's widow, Ediltrudes Radovan, on the
ground that private respondent had a counter-claim for damages. "Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not
a property which passes to his heirs" (Santos vs. Secretary of Labor, 22 SCRA 848 [1968]; De la Victoria vs. Comelec,
199 SCRA 561 [1991]). The heirs may no longer prosecute the deceased protestee's counter-claim for damages against
the protestant for that was extinguished when death terminated his right to occupy the contested office (Dela
Victoria, supra).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of respondent judge as well as the results of the
revision of the 11 ballot boxes subject of the counter-protest are SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is further ordered to
DISMISS the counter-protest in Election Case No. 92-1 and to resolve the "Motion to Determine Votes, to Proclaim
Winner and to Allow Assumption of Office" filed by petitioner conformably with this decision within a non-extendible
period of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent
Ediltrudes Radovan.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Romero, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 125249 February 7, 1997

JIMMY S. DE CASTRO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AMANDO A. MEDRANO, respondent

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari raising twin issues as regards the effect of the contestant's death in an election
protest: Is said contest a personal action extinguished upon the death of the real party in interest? If not, what is the
mandatory period within which to effectuate the substitution of parties?

The following antecedent facts have been culled from the pleadings and are not in dispute:

Petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Gloria, Oriental Mindoro during the May 8, 1995 elections.

In the same elections, private respondent was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of the same municipality.

On May 19, 1995, petitioner's rival candidate, the late Nicolas M. Jamilla, filed an election protest 1 before the Regional
Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.2

During the pendency of said contest, Jamilla died.3 Four days after such death or on December 19, 1995, the trial court
dismissed the election protest ruling as it did that "[a]s this case is personal, the death of the protestant extinguishes
the case itself. The issue or issues brought out in this protest have become moot and academic". 4

On January 9, 1995, private respondent learned about the dismissal of the protest from one Atty. Gaudencio S. Sadicon,
who, as the late Jamilla's counsel, was the one who informed the trial court of his client's demise.

On January 15, 1996, private respondent filed his Omnibus Petition/Motion (For Intervention and/or Substitution with
Motion for Reconsideration).5 Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner on January 30, 1996. 6

In an Order dated February 14, 1996,7 the trial court denied private respondent's Omnibus Petition/Motion and
stubbornly held that an election protest being personal to the protestant, is ipso facto terminated by the latter's death.

Unable to agree with the trial court's dismissal of the election protest., private respondent filed a petition
for certiorariand mandamus before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); private respondent mainly assailed the
trial court orders as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

COMELEC granted the petition for certiorari and mandamus.8 It ruled that an election contest involves both the private
interests of the rival candidates and the public interest in the final determination of the real choice of the electorate, and
for this reason, an election contest necessarily survives the death of the protestant or the protestee.

We agree.
It is true that a public office is personal to the public officer and is not a property transmissible to his heirs upon
death.9 Thus, applying the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona, upon the death of the incumbent, no heir
of his may be allowed to continue holding his office in his place.

But while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely
personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all
authority to continue the protest proceedings.

An election contest, after all, involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with paramount public
interests. As we have held in the case of Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias: 10

. . . It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication and settlement
of the private interests of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling once and for
all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge
the prerogatives of the offices within their gift, is a proceeding imbued with public interest which raises
it onto a plane over and above ordinary civil actions. For this reason, broad perspectives of public
policy impose upon courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their command who
is the real candidate elected in as expeditious a manner as possible, without being fettered by
technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be frustrated
(Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al., G.R. L-17512, December 29, 1960; Reforma vs. De Luna, G.R. L-13242, July
31, 1958). So inextricably intertwined are the interests of the contestants and those of the public that
there can be no gainsaying the logic of the proposition that even the voluntary cessation in office of
the protestee not only does not ipso facto divest him of the character of an adversary in the contest
inasmuch as he retains a party interest to keep his political opponent out of the office and maintain
therein his successor, but also does not in any manner impair or detract from the jurisdiction of the
court to pursue the proceeding to its final conclusion (De Los Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595,
597; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584, 587; Galves vs. Maramba, G.R. L-13206).

Upon the same principle, the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in the
election protest filed against him, and it may stated as a rule that an election contest survives and
must be prosecuted to final judgment despite the death of the protestee. 11

The death of the protestant, as in this case, neither constitutes a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor ousts the
trial court of its jurisdiction to decide the election contest. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this court in the
case of Lomugdang v. Javier: 12

Determination of what candidate has been in fact elected is a matter clothed with public interest,
wherefore, public policy demands that an election contest, duly commenced, be not abated by the
death of the contestant. We have squarely so rule in Sibulo Vda. de Mesa vs. Judge Mencias, G.R.
No. L-24583, October 29, 1966, in the same spirit that led this Court to hold that the ineligibility of the
protestant is not a defense (Caesar vs. Garrido, 53 Phil. 57), and that the protestee's cessation in
office is not a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor detract the Courts jurisdiction to decide the
case (Angeles vs. Rodriguez, 46 Phil. 595; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 62 Phil. 584). 13

The asseveration of petitioner that private respondent is not a real party in interest entitled to be substituted in the
election protest in place of the late Jamilla, is utterly without legal basis. Categorical was our ruling in Vda. de
Mesaand Lomugdang that:

. . . the Vice Mayor elect has the status of a real party in interest in the continuation of the proceedings
and is entitled to intervene therein. For if the protest succeeds and the Frotestee is unseated, the
Vice-Mayor succeeds to the office of Mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected can not
assume the post. 14

To finally dispose of this case, we rule that the filing by private respondent of his Omnibus Petition/Motion on January
15, 1996, well within a period of thirty days from December 19, 1995 when Jamilla's counsel informed the trial court of
Jamilla's death, was in compliance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. Since the Rules of Court,
though not generally applicable to election cases, may however be applied by analogy or in a suppletory
character, 15 private respondent was correct to rely thereon.
The above jurisprudence is not ancient; in fact these legal moorings have been recently reiterated in the 1991 case
of De la Victoria vs. COMELEC. 16 If only petitioner's diligence in updating himself with case law is as spirited as his
persistence in pursuing his legal asseverations up to the highest court of the land, no doubt further derailment of the
election protest proceedings could have been avoided.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Panganiban and Torres, Jr., concur.
Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes, Petitioner vs
Court of Appeals

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J:

Although a resignation is not complete without an acceptance thereof by the proper authority, an office may still be deemed
relinquished through voluntary abandonment which needs no acceptance.

Statement of the Case

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 promulgated on January 31, 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34158, which modified the Decision dated February 18, 1994
of the Regional Trial Court 3 of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 42, in Sp. Civil Case No. 1654.

The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision of the appellate court reads:

"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED such that paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 thereof are deleted.
Paragraph 3 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs." 4

Antecedent Facts

Private Respondent Augusto T. Antonio was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay, San Andres, Catanduanes in March
1989. He was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) 5 for the Municipality of San Andres,
Catanduanes. In that capacity and pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the President as
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Andres.

Meanwhile, then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) declared the election
for the president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils (FABC) of the same province, in which private
respondent was a voting member, void for want of a quorum. Hence, a reorganization of the provincial council became
necessary. Conformably, the DILG secretary designated private respondent as a temporary member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Catanduanes, effective June 15, 1990.

In view of his designation, private respondent resigned as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. He tendered his resignation
6 dated June 14, 1990 to Mayor Lydia T. Romano of San Andres, Catanduanes, with copies furnished to the provincial
governor, the DILG and the municipal treasurer. Pursuant to Section 50 of the 1983 Local Government Code 7 (B.P. Blg.
337), Nenito F. Aquino, then vice president of the ABC, was subsequently appointed by the provincial governor as member
of the Sangguniang Bayan 8 in place of private respondent. Aquino assumed office on July 18, 1990 after taking his oath. 9

Subsequently, the ruling of DILG Secretary Santos annulling the election of the FABC president was reversed by the Supreme
Court in Taule vs. Santos.10 In the same case, the appointment of Private Respondent Antonio as sectoral representative to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was declared void, because he did not possess the basic qualification that he should be
president of the federation of barangay councils. 11 This ruling of the Court became final and executory on December 9,
1991.

On March 31, 1992, private respondent wrote to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, advising them of
his re-assumption of his "original position, duties and responsibilities as sectoral representative" 12 therein. In response
thereto, the Sanggunian issue Resolution No. 6, Series of 1992, declaring that Antonio had no legal basis to resume office as
a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. 13

On August 13, 1992, private respondent sought from the DILG a definite ruling relative to his right to resume his office as
member of the Sangguniang Bayan. 14 Director Jacob F. Montesa, department legal counsel of the DILG, clarified Antonio's
status in this wise:

"Having been elected President of the ABC in accordance with the Department's Memorandum Circular No. 89-09, 15 you
became an ex-officio member in the sanggunian. Such position has not been vacated inasmuch as you did not resign nor
abandon said office when you were designated as temporary representative of the Federation to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Catanduanes on June 7, 1990. The Supreme Court in Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees (192
SCRA 327), declared that: 'designation implies temporariness. Thus, to 'designate' a public officer to another position may
mean to vest him with additional duties while he performs the functions of his permanent office. In some cases, a public
officer may be 'designated' to a position in an acting capacity as when an undersecretary is designated to discharge the
functions of the Secretary pending the appointment of a permanent Secretary.'

Furthermore, incumbent ABC presidents are mandated by the Rules and Regulations Implementing the 1991 Local
Government Code to continue to act as president of the association and to serve as ex-officio members of the sangguniang
bayan, to wit:

Article 210 (d) (3), Rule XXIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 7160, provides that:

'The incumbent presidents of the municipal, city and provincial chapters of the liga shall continue to serve as ex-officio
members of the sanggunian concerned until the expiration of their term of office, unless sooner removed for cause.'

'(f) . . . Pending election of the presidents of the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan chapters of the liga, the
incumbent presidents of the association of barangay councils in the municipality, city, province and Metropolitan Manila,
shall continue to act as president of the corresponding liga chapters under this Rule.'

In view of the foregoing, considering that the annulled designation is only an additional duty to your primary function,
which is the ABC President, we find no legal obstacle if you re-assume your representation in the sanggunian bayan as ex-
officio member." 16

Despite this clarification, the local legislative body issued another resolution 17 reiterating its previous stand.

In response to private respondent's request, 18 Director Montesa opined that Antonio did not relinquish or abandon his
office; and that since he was the duly elected ABC president, he could re-assume his position in the Sanggunian.19 A copy
of said reply was sent to the members of the local legislative body.

Notwithstanding, the Sanggunian refused to acknowledge the right of private respondent to re-assume office as sectoral
representative.

On December 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or restraining order before the RTC. On February 18, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision holding that
Augusto T. Antonio's resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan was ineffective and in operative, since there was no
acceptance thereof by the proper authorities. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents
and ordering the latter:

(1) to pay the petitioner jointly and severally the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and the cost of the suit;

(2) to allow petitioner to assume his position as sectoral representative of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres,
Catanduanes;

(3) to pay the petitioner jointly and severally his uncollected salaries similar to those received by the other members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes as certified to by the Municipal Budget Officer and Municipal Treasurer of
the same municipality from April 8, 1992 up to the date of this judgment; and

(4) declaring Resolution No[s]. 7 & 28 series of 1992 null and void and to have no effect." 20

Petitioners appealed this judgment to the Court of Appeals.

Appellate Court's Ruling

Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling but deleted the first, second and fourth paragraphs of its
dispositive portion. It held that private respondent's resignation was not accepted by the proper authority, who is the
President of the Philippines. While the old Local Government Code is silent as to who should accept and act on the
resignation of any member of the Sanggunian, the law vests in the President the power to appoint members of the local
legislative unit. Thus, resignations must be addressed to and accepted by him. It added that, though the secretary of the
DILG is the later ego of the President and notice to him may be considered notice to the President, the records are bereft of
any evidence showing that the DILG secretary received and accepted the resignation letter of Antonio.

Moreover, granting that there was complete and effective resignation, private respondent was still the president of the ABC
and, as such, he was qualified to sit in the Sangguniang Bayan in an ex officio capacity by virtue of Section 494 21 of R.A.
7160 22 and Memorandum Circular No. 92-38. 23 In view, however, of the May 1994 elections in which a new set of
barangay officials was elected, Antonio's reassumption of office as barangay representative to the Sangguniang Bayan was
no longer legally feasible.

The appellate court added that private respondent could not be considered to have abandoned his office. His designation
as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was merely temporary and not incompatible with his position as president of
the ABC of San Andres, Catanduanes.

Finally, Respondent Court deleted the award of attorney's fees for being without basis, and held that Resolution Nos. 6 and
28 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres involved a valid exercise of the powers of said local body. It thus modified the
trial court's judgment by affirming paragraph 3 and deleting the other items. Unsatisfied, petitioners brought the present
recourse. 24

Issues

The petitioner, in its memorandum, 25 submits before this Court the following issues:

"I. Whether or not respondent's resignation as ex-officio member of Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan ng San Andres,
Catanduanes is deemed complete so as to terminate his official relation thereto;

"II. Whether or not respondent had totally abandoned his ex-officio membership in Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan;

"III. Whether or not respondent is entitled to collect salaries similar to those received by other members of Petitioner
Sangguniang Bayan from April 8, 1992 up to date of judgment in this case by the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes."
26

In sum, was there a complete and effective resignation? If not, was there an abandonment of office?

This Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious. Although the terms of office of barangay captains, including private respondent, elected in
March 1989 have expired, the Court deemed it necessary to resolve this case, as the Court of Appeals had ordered the
payment of the uncollected salaries allegedly due prior to the expiration of Respondent Antonio's term.

First Issue : Validity of Resignation

The petitioner submits that the resignation of private respondent was valid and effective despite the absence of an express
acceptance by the President of the Philippines. The letter of resignation was submitted to the secretary of the DILG, an alter
ego of the President, the appointing authority. The acceptance of respondent's resignation may be inferred from the fact
that the DILG secretary himself appointed him a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes. 27

In Ortiz vs. COMELEC, 28 we defined resignation as the "act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his
office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the
intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competence and lawful authority." To
constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of
the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. 29 The last one is required by reason
of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. 30

The records are bereft of any evidence that private respondent's resignation was accepted by the proper authority. From
the time that he was elected as punong barangay up to the time he resigned as a member of Sangguniang Bayan, the
governing law was B.P. 337 or the Local Government Code of 1983. While said law was silent as to who specifically should
accept the resignation of an appointive member of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sec. 6 of Rule XIX of its implementing rules states
that the "resignation of sanggunian members shall be acted upon by the sanggunian concerned, and a copy of the action
taken shall be furnished the official responsible for appointing a replacement and the Ministry of Local Government. The
position shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance of the resignation."

It is not disputed that private respondent's resignation letter was addressed only to the municipal mayor of San Andres,
Catanduanes. It is indicated thereon that copies were furnished the provincial governor, the municipal treasurer and the
DILG. Neither the mayor not the officers who had been furnished copies of said letter expressly acted on it. On hindsight,
and assuming arguendo that the aforecited Sec. 6 of Rule XIX is valid and applicable, the mayor should have referred or
endorsed the latter to the Sangguniang Bayan for proper action. In any event, there is no evidence that the resignation was
accepted by any government functionary or office.

Parenthetically, Section 146 of B.P. Blg. 337 states:

"Sec. 146. Composition. (1) The sangguniang bayan shall be the legislative body of the municipality and shall be composed
of the municipal mayor, who shall be the presiding officer, the vice-mayor, who shall be the presiding officer pro tempore,
eight members elected at large, and the members appointed by the President consisting of the president of the katipunang
bayan and the president of the kabataang barangay municipal federation. . . ."

Under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions as to whom they should be submitted,
should be tendered to the appointing person or body. 31 Private respondent, therefore, should have submitted his letter of
resignation to the President or to his alter ego, the DILG secretary. Although he supposedly furnished the latter a copy of
his letter, there is no showing that it was duly received, much less, that it was acted upon. The third requisite being absent,
there was therefore no valid and complete resignation.

Second Issue : Abandonment of Office

While we agree with Respondent Court that the resignation was not valid absent any acceptance thereof by the proper
authority, we nonetheless hold that Private Respondent Antonio has effectively relinquished his membership in the
Sangguniang Bayan due to his voluntary abandonment of said post.

Abandonment of an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of
terminating his possession and control thereof. 32 Indeed, abandonment of office is a species of resignation; while
resignation in general is a formal relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser. 33
Nonuser refers to a neglect to use a privilege or a right (Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.) or to exercise an easement or
an office (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed.).

Abandonment springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. 34 Its concomitant effect is that the
former holder of an office can no longer legally repossess it even by forcible reoccupancy. 35

Clear intention to abandon should be manifested by the officer concerned. Such intention may be express or inferred from
his own conduct. 36 Thus, the failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with the officer's actual or
imputed intention to abandon and relinquish the office. 37 Abandonment of an office is not wholly a matter of intention; it
results from a complete abandonment of duties of such a continuance that the law will infer a relinquish.38 Therefore, there
are two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and, second, an overt or "external" act by which
the intention is carried into effect. 39

Petitioner argues that the following clearly demonstrate private respondent's abandonment of his post in the Sangguniang
Bayan:

"Admittedly, the designation of respondent as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes was worded
'temporary,' but his acts more than clearly established his intention to totally abandon his office, indicating an absolute
relinquishment thereof. it bears to emphasize that respondent actually tendered his resignation and subsequently accepted
an ex-officio membership in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes. He performed his duties and functions of said
office for almost two (2) years, and was completely aware of the appointment and assumption on July 18, 1990 of Nenito F.
Aquino, who was then Vice-President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of San Andres, Catanduanes, as ex-
officio member of petitioner Sangguniang Bayan representing the ABC.

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, it may be well-noted that ABC Vice President Nenito Aquino assumed respondent's former position for twenty
(20) months, without him questioning the term of office of the former if indeed respondent's designation as ex-officio
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was only temporary. Likewise, for almost eight (8) months after knowledge of
the decision in Taule vs. Santos, et al., Ibid., nullifying his designation as representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
respondent opted to remain silent, and in fact failed to seasonably act for the purpose of reassuming his former position.
Evidently, respondent had clearly abandoned his former position by voluntary relinquishment of his office through non-
user." 40

We agree with petitioner. Indeed, the following clearly manifest the intention of private respondent to abandon his position:
(1) his failure to perform his function as member of the Sangguniang Bayan, (2) his failure to collect the corresponding
remuneration for the position, (3) his failure to object to the appointment of Aquino as his replacement in the Sangguniang
Bayan, (4) his prolonged failure to initiate any act to reassume his post in the Sangguniang Bayan after the Supreme Court
had nullified his designation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

On the other hand, the following overt acts demonstrate that he had effected his intention: (1) his letter of resignation from
the Sangguniang Bayan, 41 (2) his assumption of office as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful
discharge of his duties and functions as member of said Sanggunian, and (4) his receipt of the remuneration for such post.

It must be stressed that when an officer is "designated" to another post, he is usually called upon to discharge duties in
addition to his regular responsibilities. Indeed, his additional responsibilities are prescribed by law to inhere, as it were, to
his original position. A Supreme Court justice, for instance, may be designated member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. In some cases, a public officer may be "designated" to a position in an acting capacity, as when an
undersecretary is tasked to discharge the functions of a secretary for a temporary period. 42 In all cases, however, the law
does not require the public servant to resign from his original post. Rather, the law allows him to concurrently discharge
the functions of both offices.

Private respondent, however, did not simultaneously discharge the duties and obligations of both positions. Neither did he,
at that time, express an intention to resume his office as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. His overt acts, silence, inaction
and acquiescence, when Aquino succeeded him to his original position, show that Antonio had abandoned the contested
office. His immediate and natural reaction upon Aquino's appointment should have been to object or, failing to do that, to
file appropriate legal action or proceeding. But he did neither. It is significant that he expressed his intention to resume
office only on March 31, 1992, after Aquino had been deemed resigned on March 23, 1992, and months after this Court had
nullified his "designation" on August 12, 1991. From his passivity, he is deemed to have recognized the validity of Aquino's
appointment and the latter's discharged of his duties as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
In all, private respondent's failure to promptly assert his alleged right implies his loss of interest in the position. His overt
acts plainly show that he really meant his resignation and understood its effects. As pointed out by the eminent American
commentator, Mechem: 43

"Public offices are held upon the implied condition that the officer will diligently and faithfully execute the duties belonging
to them, and while a temporary or accidental failure to perform them in a single instance or during a short period will not
operate as an abandonment, yet if the officer refuses or neglects to exercise the functions of the office for so long a period
as to reasonably warrant the presumption that he does not desire or intend to perform the duties of the office at all, he will
be held to have abandoned it, not only when his refusal to perform was willful, but also where, while he intended to vacate
the office, it was because he in good faith but mistakenly supposed he had no right to hold it."

Lastly, private respondent, who remained ABC president, claims the legal right to be a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
by virtue of Section 146 of B.P. Blg. 337. However, his right thereto is not self-executory, for the law itself requires another
positive act - an appointment by the President or the secretary of local government per E.O. 342. 44 What private
respondent could have done in order to be able to reassume his post after Aquino's resignation was to seek a reappointment
from the President or the secretary of local government. By and large, private respondent cannot claim an absolute right to
the office which, by his own actuations, he is deemed to have relinquished. 45

We reiterate our ruling in Aparri vs. Court of Appeals: 46

"A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public . . . The right to hold a public office under our political
system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all, only because and by virtue of some law expressly or
impliedly creating and conferring it . . . There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute
right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
once can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. . ."

Third Issue : Salary

Having ruled that private respondent had voluntarily abandoned his post at the Sangguniang Bayan, he cannot be entitled
to any back salaries. Basic is the "no work, no pay" 47 rule. A public officer is entitled to receive compensation for services
actually rendered for as long as he has the right to the office being claimed. 48 When the act or conduct of a public servant
constitutes a relinquishment of his office, he has no right to receive any salary incident to the office he had abandoned. 49

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Romano, Melo and Francisco, JJ ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 146875 July 14, 2003

KAGAWADS JOSE G. MENDOZA, ROSARIO B. ESPINO, TERESITA S. MENDOZA, JORGE BANAL, Chairman
of the Special Investigation Committee on Administrative Cases Against Elected Barangay Officials of the
Quezon City Council and ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR., City Mayor of Quezon City, petitioners,
vs.
BARANGAY CAPTAIN MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR., respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Is the taking of an oath of office anew by a duly proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective official a
condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office where the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
orders the relinquishment of the contested position?

This is the legal question raised in this petition under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the
November 13, 2000 Summary Judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, which set aside the
decision of the City Council of Quezon City finding respondent Barangay Captain Manuel D. Laxina guilty of grave
misconduct.

On May 27, 1997, respondent took his oath and thereafter assumed office as the duly proclaimed and elected barangay
captain of Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, in the 1997 Barangay Elections. Meanwhile, Roque Fermo, his rival
candidate, filed an election protest with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. On January 18, 1999,
Fermo was declared as the winner in the Barangay Elections. Respondent filed a notice of appeal with the COMELEC
while Fermo filed a motion for execution pending appeal.

On January 20, 1999, an order was issued by the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal. Hence,
respondent vacated the position and relinquished the same to Fermo. Thereafter, respondent filed a petition with the
COMELEC questioning the January 20, 1999 order of the trial court. On September 16, 1999, the COMELEC issued a
resolution2 annulling the order which granted the execution of the decision pending appeal on the ground that there
existed no good reasons to justify execution. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Commission En Banc GRANTS the petition. Accordingly, the
January 20, 1999 Order of the Court a quo is hereby ANNULLED. Private respondent ROQUE FERMO is
hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from further performing the functions of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Batasan Hills, District II, Quezon City and to relinquish the same to Petitioner MANUEL LAXINA,
SR., pending final resolution of appeal.

SO ORDERED.3

On October 27, 1999, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution directing Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Batasan Hills. On October 28, 1999, Fermo was served a copy of the writ of execution but
refused to acknowledge receipt thereof. He also refused to vacate the premises of the barangay hall of Batasan
Hills.4 This did not, however, prevent respondent and his staff from discharging their functions and from holding office
at the SK-Hall of Batasan Hills.5 On the same date, respondent appointed Godofredo L. Ramos as Barangay
Secretary6 and on November 8, 1999, he appointed Rodel G. Liquido as Barangay Treasurer. 7

On November 12, 1999, the COMELEC, acting on respondent's motion to cite Fermo for contempt, 8 issued an alias
writ of execution,9 which was likewise returned unsatisfied. Finally, on November 16, 1999, respondent took his oath
of office as Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City before Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr. 10 The following day,
November 17, 1999, Roque Fermo turned over to respondent all the assets and properties of the barangay. 11

On November 20, 1999, the Barangay Council of Batasan Hills issued Resolution No. 001-S-1999 ratifying the
appointment of Godofredo L. Ramos as Barangay Secretary, effective November 1, 199912 and Resolution No. 002-S-
1999 ratifying the appointment of Rodel G. Liquido, as Barangay Treasurer, also effective November 1, 1999. 13However,
the appointees of Roque Fermo to the same position registered objections to the said Resolutions. In order to
accommodate these appointees, respondent agreed to grant them allowances and renumerations for the period of
November 1–7, 1999.14

In Resolution No. 017-S-99 dated December 11, 1999, the barangay council of Batasan Hills, authorized the
appropriation of P864,326.00 for the November to December 1999 salary of its barangay officials and
employees.15Pursuant thereto, the barangay payroll was issued on December 18, 1999, enumerating the names of
respondent and his appointed barangay secretary and barangay treasurer as among those entitled to compensation
for services rendered for the period November 8, 1999 to December 31, 1999. 16 Petitioners Jose G. Mendoza, Jr.,
Rosario E. Espino and Teresita S. Mendoza, who were barangay councilors, refused to sign Resolution No. 017-S-99
as well as said payroll.17

Sometime in January 2000, petitioner barangay councilors filed with the Quezon City Council a complaint 18 for violation
of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act and falsification of legislative documents against respondent and all other
barangay officials who signed the questioned resolution and payroll, namely, Barangay Secretary Godofredo L. Ramos,
Barangay Treasurer Rodel G. Liquido, Barangay Kagawad Charlie O. Mangune, Gonzalo S. Briones, Sr., Maryann T.
Castañeda, Elias G. Gamboa, and SK-Chairman Sharone Amog. They contended that defendants made it appear in
the payroll that he and his appointees rendered services starting November 8, 1999 when, in truth, they commenced
to serve only on November 17, 1999 after respondent took his oath and assumed the office of barangay chairman.
They further claimed that the effectivity date of the barangay secretary and barangay treasurer's appointment, as
approved in Resolution No. 001-S-1999, was November 16, 1999, but respondent fraudulently antedated it to
November 1, 1999. Petitioners also contended that respondent connived with the other barangay officials in crossing
out their names in the payroll.

In their joint counter-affidavit,19 defendants claimed that the taking anew of the oath of office as barangay chairman
was a mere formality and was not a requirement before respondent can validly discharge the duties of his office. They
contended that respondent's appointees are entitled to the remuneration for the period stated in the payroll as they
commenced to serve as early as October 28, 1999. They added that the names of the 3 petitioner barangay councilors
who refused to sign the assailed resolution and daily wage payroll were crossed out from the said payroll to prevent
any further delay in the release of the salaries of all barangay officials and employees listed therein. 20

On October 2, 2000, the Special Investigation Committee on Administrative Cases of the City ruled that respondent
had no power to make appointments prior to his oath taking on November 16, 1999.21 The Committee, however, found
that respondent and the other barangay officials who signed the questioned resolution and payroll acted in good faith
when they erroneously approved the grant of renumerations to respondent's appointees starting November 8, 1999.
Nevertheless, it found respondent guilty of grave misconduct and recommended the penalty of 2 months suspension.
The charges against Barangay Secretary Godofredo Ramos and Barangay Treasurer Rodel Liquido were dismissed,
inasmuch as the City Council's disciplinary jurisdiction is limited to elective barangay officials only. As to Barangay
Kagawad Charlie O. Mangune, Gonzalo S. Briones, Sr., Maryann T. Castañeda, Elias G. Gamboa, and SK-Chairman
Sharone Amog, the charges against them were likewise dismissed on the ground that there was no "separate and
independent proof that . . . [they] conspired with Punong Barangay Laxina . . . Ramos and Liquido in committing the
acts therein complained of."22

On October 3, 2000, the Quezon City Council adopted the findings and recommendations of the
Committee.23Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 24 On October 9, 2000, however, the City Council
implemented the decision and appointed Charlie Mangune as acting barangay chairman of Batasan Hills, Quezon
City.25

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari26 with the Regional Trial of Quezon City, Branch 67, seeking to annul the
decision of the Quezon City Council. In their answer, petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that
respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case because
appeals from the decision of the City Council should be brought to the Office of the President.

On November 13, 2000, a summary judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of respondent. It did not rule on
the propriety of the re-taking of the oath office by the latter, but nevertheless, exonerated him on the basis of the finding
of the City Council that he did not act in bad faith but merely "misread the law, as applied to the facts." The dispositive
portion of the said decision, states:
 WHEREFORE, the decision finding herein petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and imposing upon him the
penalty of suspension and loss of concomitant benefits for two (2) months is hereby annulled and set aside.
The suspension of the petitioner is hereby lifted and all benefits due to him are ordered restored.

The motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of respondents and the motion to drop City
Councilor Banal as party respondent are both denied.

SO ORDERED.27

Petitioners filed the instant petition for review raising pure questions of law.

Before going into the substantive issues, we shall first resolve the issue on exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The trial court ruled that Section 67 of the Local Government Code, which allows an appeal to the Office of the President,
is not applicable because the decision of the City Council is final and executory. It added that respondent correctly filed
a petition for certiorari because he had no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. The trial court further ratiocinated
that an appeal to the Office of the President before going to the regular courts might render the case moot and academic
inasmuch as the penalty of suspension might have been fully served by the time the court renders a decision.

Sections 61 and 67 of the Local Government Code, provide:

Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. — A verified complaint against any erring local
elective official shall be prepared as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory. (emphasis supplied)

Sec. 67. Administrative Appeals. — Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt
thereof, be appealed to the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities.

Decision of the Office of the President shall be final and executory.

In interpreting the foregoing provisions, the trial court did not consider Section 68 of the same code which provides:

An appeal shall not prevent a decision from being final and executory. The respondent shall be considered as
having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event that he wins
such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other
emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.

Obviously, the said Code does not preclude the taking of an appeal. On the contrary, it specifically allows a party to
appeal to the Office of the President. The phrases "final and executory," and "final or executory" in Sections 67 and 68,
respectively, of the Local Government Code, are not, as erroneously ruled by the trial court, indicative of the appropriate
mode of relief from the decision of the Sanggunian concerned. These phrases simply mean that the administrative
appeals will not prevent the enforcement of the decisions.28 The decision is immediately executory but the respondent
may nevertheless appeal the adverse decision to the Office of the President or to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as
the case may be.29

It is clear that respondent failed to exhaust all the administrative remedies available to him. The rule is that, before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means
of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be availed of
by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction,
then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation
of the court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. 30

The application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, however, admits of exceptions, one of which
is when the issue involved is purely legal.31 In the case at bar, the issues of whether or not the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod in disciplinary cases is appealable to the Office of the President, as well as the propriety
of taking an oath of office anew by respondent, are certainly questions of law which call for judicial
intervention.32Furthermore, an appeal to the Office of the President would not necessarily render the case moot and
academic. Under Section 68, in the event the appeal results in his exoneration, the respondent shall be paid his salary
and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal. Hence, the execution of the penalty or expiration of
term of the public official will not prevent recovery of all salaries and emoluments due him in case he is exonerated of
the charges. Clearly, therefore, the trial court correctly took cognizance of the case at bar, albeit for the wrong reasons.

We now come to the substantive issues.

To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the
office. It is only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position
becomes plenary and complete.33 However, once proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to
assume office and to exercise the functions thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin
him from assuming office or from discharging his functions. 34 Unless his election is annulled by a final and executory
decision,35 or a valid execution of an order unseating him pending appeal is issued, he has the lawful right to assume
and perform the duties of the office to which he has been elected.

In the case at bar, respondent was proclaimed as the winner in the 1997 Barangay Elections in Batasan Hills, Quezon
City; he took his oath on May 27, 1997 and thereafter assumed office. He is therefore vested with all the rights to
discharge the functions of his office. Although in the interim, he was unseated by virtue of a decision in an election
protest decided against him, the execution of said decision was annulled by the COMELEC in its September 16, 1999
Resolution which, incidentally, was sustained by this Court on March 13, 2000, in Fermo v. Commission on
Elections.36 It was held therein that "[w]hen the COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending appeal in favor of
FERMO, the decision of the MTC proclaiming FERMO as the winner of the election was stayed and the 'status quo' or
the last actual peaceful uncontested situation preceding the controversy was restored . . ."37The status quo referred to
the stage when respondent was occupying the office of Barangay Captain and discharging its functions. For purposes
of determining the continuity and effectivity of the rights arising from respondent's proclamation and oath taken on May
27, 1997, it is as if the said writ of execution pending appeal was not issued and he was not ousted from office. The re-
taking of his oath of office on November 16, 1999 was a mere formality considering that his oath taken on May 27,
1997 operated as a full investiture on him of the rights of the office. Hence, the taking anew of his oath of office as
Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City was not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption
in office and to the exercise of the functions thereof.

Having thus ruled out the necessity of respondent's taking anew of the oath of office, the next question to be resolved
is: when is respondent considered to have validly re-assumed office — from October 28, 1999, the date of service of
the writ of execution to Roque Fermo and the date respondent actually commenced to discharge the functions of the
office, or from November 17, 1999, the date Roque Fermo turned over to respondent the assets and properties of
Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City?

The records show that the COMELEC served on October 28, 1999 a writ of execution ordering Fermo to desist from
performing the function of the Office of Barangay Captain, but the latter refused to comply therewith. His supporters
prevented respondent from occupying the barangay hall, prompting the latter to move for the issuance of an alias wit
of execution, which was granted on November 12, 1999. It was only on November 17, 1999 that the turn-over to
respondent of the assets and properties of the barangay was effected. Undoubtedly, it was Fermo's defiance of the writ
that prevented respondent from assuming office at the barangay hall. To reckon, therefore, the effectivity of
respondent's assumption in office on November 17, 1999, as petitioners insist, would be to sanction dilatory maneuvers
and to put a premium on disobedience of lawful orders which this Court will not countenance. It is essential to the
effective administration of justice that the processes of the courts and quasi-judicial bodies be obeyed.38 Moreover, it
is worthy to note that although the physical possession of the Office of the Barangay Captain was not immediately
relinquished by Fermo to respondent, the latter exercised the powers and functions thereof at the SK-Hall of Batasan
Hills, Quezon City starting October 28, 1999. His re-assumption in office effectively enforced the decision of the
COMELEC which reinstated him in office. It follows that all lawful acts of the latter arising from his re-assumption in
office on October 28, 1999 are valid. Hence, no grave misconduct was committed by him in appointing Godofredo L.
Ramos and Rodel G. Liquido as Barangay Secretary and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, and in granting them
emoluments and renumerations for the period served.

Respondent was also charged of conniving with the other barangay officials in crossing out the names of the petitioner
barangay councilors in the payroll. The petition alleged that as a consequence of the striking out of the names of the
petitioner barangay officials, they were not able to receive their salaries for the period November 8 to December 31,
1999.39 A reading of the payroll reveals that the names of said petitioners and their corresponding salaries are written
thereon. However, they refused to sign the payroll and to acknowledge receipt of their salaries to manifest their
protest. Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentire. Indeed, he who suffered injury through his own fault is not considered
to have suffered any damage.40 Hence, the investigative committee correctly brushed aside this charge against
respondent.

The trial court therefore did not err in exonerating respondent and pursuant to Article 68 of the Local Government Code,
he should be paid his salaries and emoluments for the period during which he was suspended without pay.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The Summary Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-00-42155, exonerating respondent Manuel D.
Laxina, Sr., of the charge of grave misconduct and ordering the payment of all benefits due him during the period of his
suspension, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., concurs in the result
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 154155 August 6, 2008

THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,

vs.
BEN C. JURADO, respondent.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

NO less than Our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the speedy disposition of
cases.1However, it needs to be underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and flexible concept. A mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.2

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58925. The
CA reversed and set aside the decision and resolution of the Ombudsman finding respondent Bureau of Customs
Division Chief administratively liable for neglect of duty, penalizing him with suspension for six months without pay.

The Facts

Sometime in 1992, Maglei Enterprises Co., (Maglei), a partnership owned by Rose Cuyos and John Elvin C. Medina,
filed an application before the Bureau of Customs for the operation of a Customs Bonded Warehouse (CBW)-
Manufacturing Warehouse. As part of the evaluation of Maglei’s application, CBW Supervisor Juanito A. Baliwag
conducted an inspection of Maglei’s compliance with structural requirements. Baliwag submitted a
report4 recommending approval of the application.

On March 16, 1992, respondent Jurado, who was then the Chief of the Warehouse Inspection Division, adopted the
recommendation of Baliwag. Then he indorsed the papers of Maglei to the Chief of the Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Bonded Warehouse Division (MMBWD). The indorsement letter, in full, reads:

1st Indorsement
16 March 1992

Respectfully forwarded to the Chief, MMBWD, This Port, the within papers relative to the request of MAGLEI
ENTERPRISES CO., to establish and operate a Customs Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse, pursuant to
CMO 39-91, to be located at 129 Jose Bautista St., Caloocan City, together with the attached report submitted
by CBW Supervisor J. A.

Baliwag of this Office, inviting attention to the recommendation stated therein to which the undersigned
concurs.

(Sgd.)

Atty. Ben C. Jurado

Chief
Warehousing Inspection Division5
Maglei’s application was submitted to Rolando A. Mendoza, Chief of the MMBWD for his comment and
recommendation. In a Memorandum (for the District Collector of Customs) dated March 20, 1992, Mendoza reported
that Maglei has substantially complied with the physical and documentary requirements relative to their application for
the operation of a Customs Bonded Warehouse. Mendoza further recommended that Maglei’s application be approved.
Following the indorsements of the different divisions of the Bureau of Customs – Emma M. Rosqueta (District Collector
of Customs); Titus B. Villanueva (Deputy Commissioner for Assessment and Operations); and Atty. Alex Gaticales
(Executive Director of the Customs – SGS Import Valuation and Classification Committee) – Maglei’s application was
recommended for approval.

On June 25, 1992, Maglei was finally granted the authority to establish and operate CBW No. M-1467 located at 129
J. Bautista, Caloocan City. By virtue of such authority, Maglei imported various textile materials which were then
transferred to the said warehouse. The textiles were to be manufactured into car covers for exportation.

Subsequently, on July 8 and 22, 1992, MMBWD Senior Storekeeper Account Officer George O. Dizon was tasked by
MMBWD Chief Mendoza to check and verify the status of Maglei’s CBW. Dizon reported that the subject CBW was
existing and operating. However, upon further verification by the Bureau of Customs, it was discovered that the
purported CBW of Maglei did not exist at the alleged site in Caloocan City. Rather, what was reported located at the
site was a School of the Divine Mercy. Only a small signboard bearing the name "Maglei Enterprises Company" was
posted inconspicuously in the corner of the lot. Further investigation revealed that Maglei’s shipment of textile materials
disappeared, without proof of the materials being exported or the corresponding taxes being paid.

Ombudsman Disposition

On August 11, 1992, the Bureau of Customs initiated a complaint against George P. Dizon, Rose Cuyos and John Elvin
C. Medina for prosecution under the Tariff and Customs Code. After receiving a copy of the resolution, the Ombudsman
conducted the investigation on the complaint.

On February 13, 1996, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) recommended that the Resolution of the Bureau of Customs be reversed. The EPIB further recommended that
the complaint against George P. Dizon be dismissed and another one be filed against Emma Rosqueta and Atty.
Rolando Mendoza, subject to further fact-finding investigation by the Fact Finding Bureau (FFB) of the OMB. With
regard to the case against Rose Cuyos and John Medina, the EPIB recommended that the charges be taken up together
with those of Rosqueta and Atty. Mendoza. The case was then forwarded to the FFB.

On September 29, 1997, the FFB submitted its report with the following recommendations:

WHEREFORE, premises considered; the undersigned investigators respectfully recommend the following:

1. That criminal charges for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and Section 3081 of the Tariff and Customs
Code be filed against the following officials namely:

a. Emma M. Rosqueta
Director Collector, Port of Manila

b. Rolando A. Mendoza
Chief, Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Bonded Warehouse Division

c. Alex Gaticales
Executive Staff, Deputy Commissioner

d. Ben C. Jurado
Chief, Warehouse Inspection Division
CBW Supervisor

e. Juanito A. Baliwag
CBW Supervisor
 f. George P. Dizon
Senior Storekeeper

All of the Bureau of Customs, and

g. Rose Cuyos and John Elvin C. Medina

Owner, Maglei Enterprises
Private Respondents

2. That records of this case be forwarded to the EPIB, this Office for the conduct of the required preliminary
investigation

3. That administrative charges for dishonesty and gross misconduct be likewise filed against the above-named
BOC officials before the AAB, this Office.6

On October 17, 1997, the OMB approved the above recommendation.

On August 2, 1999, the OMB dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents and violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code filed against respondent.
The complaint was dismissed on the ground of lack of prima facie evidence to charge respondent of the crime.

On the other hand, on August 16, 1999, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the OMB rendered judgment
finding respondent administratively liable, penalizing him with suspension for six (6) months without pay. Respondent’s
motion for reconsideration of his suspension was likewise denied by the Ombudsman.

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA. In his appeal, respondent argued, among others, that his right to a speedy
disposition of his case had been violated; that the administrative case against him should have been dismissed following
the dismissal of the criminal charges against him; and that there is no substantial evidence on record to make him
administratively liable.

CA Disposition

In a Decision dated July 3, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the questioned decision and resolution of the OMB.
The dispositive part of the CA decision runs in this wise:

Foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. Resultantly, the challenged
Decision/Resolution of the Ombudsman is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.7

In ruling in favor of respondent, the appellate court ratiocinated:

Indeed, we are in accord with Petitioner’s arguments that his right to speedy disposition of cases had been
violated. To be sure, Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides thus:

"All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial
or administrative bodies."

xxxx

In the case at bench, the incident which gave rise to the complaint against Petitioner happened on March 16,
1992. And yet it was only on November 20, 1997 or a lapse of more than five (5) years that the case relative
to the said incident was filed against him. Records disclose that on August 11, 1992, the complaint only
charged George O. Dizon and 2 others. Then on February 13, 1996 or after almost 4 years, the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the OMB made another recommendation which ultimately included
 Petitioner as among those to be charged. From February 13, 1996 to November 20, 1997 or a period of more
than one (1) year, what took them so long to decide that Petitioner be included in the charges?

From the foregoing unfolding of events, it is quite clear that it took the Ombudsman almost six (6) years to
decide that a case be filed against Petitioner. Under such circumstances, We cannot fault Petitioner for
invoking violation of his right to speedy disposition of his case.

More importantly, We do not agree that Petitioner, under attendant facts and circumstances can be held liable
for negligence. First of all, Petitioner as, Deputy Commissioner for Assessment and Operation, did not have
the duty to make inspection on the alleged warehouse. Such duty belongs to other personnel/officers.
Secondly, in Petitioner’s 1stIndorsement dated March 22, 1992, he merely stated thus:

"Respectfully forwarded to the Chief, MMBWD, This Port, the within papers relative to the request of
MAGLEI ENTERPRISES CO., to establish and operate a Customs Manufacturing Bonded
Warehouse, pursuant to CMO 39-91, to be located at 129 Jose Bautista St., Caloocan City, together
with the attached report submitted by CBW Supervisor J.A. Baliwag of this Office, inviting attention
to the recommendation stated therein to which the undersigned concurs." (p. 185, Rollo)

A careful reading of said 1st Indorsement undoubtedly shows that Petitioner invited attention to the inspector’s
(Supervisor Baliwag) qualified recommendation, to wit:

"Approval respectfully recommended, subject to re-inspection, before transfer of imported goods."

(Underscoring for emphasis.)

After Petitioner made the indorsement, he no longer had any participation nor was he under obligation or duty
to make a re-inspection. If afterwards damage was suffered, Petitioner cannot be faulted but rather only those
who had the duty to make re-inspection. It is precisely because of such fact that the criminal complaint filed
against Petitioner did not prosper. Where there is no duty or responsibility, one should not be held liable for
neglect, as what has been done to Petitioner.8

Issues

Petitioner Ombudsman now comes to this Court, raising twin issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL WAS VIOLATED;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY, AS THE
CHIEF OF THE WAREHOUSING INSPECTION DIVISION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT
ENSURE THAT THE SUPPOSED WAREHOUSE WAS NOT IN EXISTENCE.9

Our Ruling

No violation of respondent’s right

to speedy disposition of cases.

We shall first tackle the issue on speedy disposition of cases.

Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution provides that, all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of
cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration
of justice.10

It bears stressing that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, it is a flexible
concept. Due regard must be given to the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. The right to a speedy
disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured,
or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.11 Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial," "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory. 12

In determining whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has laid down
the following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.13

Gleaned from the foregoing, We find that respondent’s right to the speedy disposition of cases has not been violated.

First. It is undisputed that the FFB of the OMB recommended that respondent together with other officials of the Bureau
of Customs be criminally charged for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 3601 of the Tariff and
Customs Code. The same bureau also recommended that respondent be administratively charged. Prior to the fact-
finding report of the FFB of the OMB, respondent was never the subject of any complaint or investigation relating to the
incident surrounding Maglei’s non-existent customs bonded warehouse. In fact, in the original complaint filed by the
Bureau of Customs, respondent was not included as one of the parties charged with violation of the Tariff and Customs
Code. With respect to respondent, there were no vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays because he was not
made to undergo any investigative proceeding prior to the report and findings of the FFB.

Simply put, prior to the report and recommendation by the FFB that respondent be criminally and administratively
charged, respondent was neither investigated nor charged. That respondent was charged only in 1997 while the subject
incident occurred in 1992, is not necessarily a violation of his right to the speedy disposition of his case. The record is
clear that prior to 1997, respondent had no case to speak of – he was not made the subject of any complaint or made
to undergo any investigation. As held in Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals:14

In the Tatad case, there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the termination of the proceedings before
the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its resolution on April 17, 1985. The Court found that "political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process" against then Secretary
Francisco S. Tatad. In the Angchangco case, the criminal complaints remained pending in the Office of the
Ombudsman for more than six years despite the respondent’s numerous motions for early resolution and the
respondent, who had been retired, was being unreasonably deprived of the fruits of his retirement because of
the still unresolved criminal complaints against him. In both cases, we ruled that the period of time that elapsed
for the resolution of the cases against the petitioners therein was deemed a violation of the accused’s right to
a speedy disposition of cases against them.

In the present case, no proof was presented to show any persecution of the accused, political or otherwise,
unlike in the Tatad case. There is no showing that petitioner was made to endure any vexatious process
during the two-year period before the filing of the proper informations, unlike in the Angchangco case
where petitioner therein was deprived of his retirement benefits for an unreasonably long time. Thus,
the circumstances present in the Tatad and Angchangco cases justifying the "radical relief" granted by us in
said cases are not existent in the present case."15 (Emphasis supplied)

Second. Even if We were to reckon the period from when respondent was administratively charged to the point when
the Ombudsman found respondent administratively liable, We still find no violation of the right to speedy disposition of
cases.

In making a determination of what constitutes a violation of the right to the speedy disposition of cases, this Court has
time and again employed the balancing test. The balancing test first adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in Barker v. Wingo16 was crucial in the Court’s resolution of the recent case of Perez v. People:17
 The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the "balancing test," in which "the conduct of both the prosecution
and defendant are weighed." Mr. Justice Powell, ponente, explained the concept, thus:

A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We
can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether
a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express them in different
ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.

The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is
presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the
balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that
will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.
To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably
less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.

Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too,
different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in
order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless
should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the
government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should
serve to justify appropriate delay. We have already discussed the third factor, the defendant’s
responsibility to assert his right. Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to
the other factors we have mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the
delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice,
which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the
more likely a defendant is to complain. The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is
entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the
right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that
he was denied a speedy trial.

A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of
the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has
identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety
and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these,
the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is
obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the
distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been
forgotten can rarely be shown.18 (Underscoring supplied)

The Court likewise held in Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan:19

The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence,
the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. 20

To reiterate, there is a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured,
or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.21

In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,22 this Court found the delay of almost three (3) years in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation violative of the rights of the accused to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Said the Court:
 We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case
to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance
with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella
of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied
in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution), the inordinate delay is violative of
the petitioner’s constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt
of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay
may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In the
first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected.
Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn
statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a
delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to
alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial
legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the
Tanodbayan to resolve the case.

It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed
fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the
information. True – but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such
investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until
now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.23

Too, in Angchangco v. Ombudsman,24 this Court ruled that the delay of almost six (6) years in resolving the criminal
charges constitutes a violation of the right of the accused to due process and speedy disposition of the cases against
them.

Here, the circumstance attendant in Tatad and Angchangco are clearly absent. Records reveal that on September 29,
1997, the FFB of the OMB recommended that respondent be criminally and administratively charged. Subsequently,
the OMB approved the recommendation on October 17, 1997. Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit on February
2, 1998 and motion to dismiss on October 8, 1998 before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the OMB.
On August 16, 1999, the AAB rendered a decision finding petitioner administratively liable for neglect of duty. More or
less, a period of two (2) years lapsed from the fact-finding report and recommendation of the FFB until the time that the
AAB rendered its assailed decision.

To our mind, the time it took the Ombudsman to complete the investigation can hardly be considered an unreasonable
and arbitrary delay as to deprive respondent of his constitutional right to the speedy disposition of his case. Further,
there is nothing in the records to show that said period was characterized by delay which was vexatious, capricious or
oppressive. There was no inordinate delay amounting to a violation of respondent’s constitutional rights. The assertion
of respondent that there was a violation of his right to the speedy disposition of cases against him must necessarily fail.

Respondent administratively
liable for neglect of duty.

It is elementary that the dismissal of criminal charges will not necessarily result in the dismissal of the administrative
complaint based on the same set of facts.25 The quantum of evidence in order to sustain a conviction for a criminal
case is different from the proof needed to find one administratively liable. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
provides that for criminal cases, conviction is warranted only when the guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt is defined as moral certainty, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.26 On the other hand, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable
is substantial evidence. Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. – In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (Underscoring supplied)
Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but such kind
of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence commonly
accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.27

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez,28 the Court ruled:

x x x Be that as it may, its dismissal of the criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence was never
meant, as respondent doggedly believed and arrogantly asserted, to foreclose administrative action against
him or to give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, was simply
saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a
condition sine qua non for conviction because of the presumption of innocence which the Constitution
guarantees an accused. Lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of
any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, thought insufficient to establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the
"substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires in these cases such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.29

Verily, respondent can still be held administratively liable despite the dismissal of the criminal charges against him.

We now discuss the administrative liability of respondent for neglect of duty. We opt to reexamine the records
considering the divergent findings of the Ombudsman and the CA.

It is undisputed that respondent was the Chief of the Warehousing Inspection Division (WID) of the Bureau of Customs.
The WID is the inspection and audit arm of the District Collector of Customs.

On March 16, 1992, CBW Inspector Baliwag submitted a report to respondent showing the result of the ocular
inspection of the proposed warehouse of applicant Maglei. The report stated: "approval respectfully recommended
subject to re-inspection before transfer of imported goods is allowed."30

On March 16, 1992, respondent, as Chief of the WID, issued a 1st Indorsement 31 concurring with the recommendation
of CBW Inspector Baliwag that the application of Maglei be approved.

Respondent’s indorsement was then submitted to the Chief of the MMBWD for comment and recommendation. The
Chief of the MMBWD eventually recommended that Maglei’s application be approved since it has complied with all the
necessary physical and documentary requirements. Following the indorsements of the different divisions of the Bureau
of Customs, Maglei was eventually granted the authority to operate a CBW despite the fact that the records disclose
that there was no actual warehouse to speak of.

Respondent posits that since he was not the approving officer for application for CBWs nor was it his duty or obligation
to conduct re-inspection of the subject warehouse premises, he cannot be held liable for neglect of duty.

The CA, in its decision, declared that respondent cannot be held liable for negligence for the simple reason that it was
not respondent’s duty to make the inspection and verification of Maglei’s application.

We cannot agree.

The finding of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-97-0656 is more in accord with the evidence on record:

Evidence on record shows that on 16 March 1992, respondent Juanito Baliwag (Customs Bonded Warehouse
Supervisor) submitted an Inspection Report of the same date showing the result of an ocular inspection of the
proposed warehouse of applicant Maglei Enterprises with the recommendation: "approval respectfully
recommended subject to re-inspection before the transfer of imported goods is allowed" and with the
observation that construction is going on for compartments for raw materials, finished products and wastages
by products. On the same date, 16 March 1992, respondent Ben Jurado (Chief, Warehousing Inspection
Division) issued 1st Indorsement concurring with the recommendation of CBW Inspector and co-respondent
Juanito Baliwag for the approval of the application.
 xxxx

On 08 July 1992, respondent Rolando Mendoza directed George Dizon (Documents Processor) to verify the
existence and operation of several bonded warehouses including the warehouse of applicant Maglei
Enterprises. On 23 July 1992, the same George Dizon was again directed by respondent Rolando Mendoza
to verify the transfer of shipment covered Boat No. 13853454 in a container van with No. GSTV 824227 to the
warehouse of Maglei Enterprises (CBW No. M-1467). In those two occasions, respondent George Dizon
reported the existence of the applicant’s Warehouse located at No. 129 Jose Bautista Avenue, Caloocan City.

xxxx

Evidence on records likewise revealed that No. 129 Jose Bautista Avenue, Caloocan City which was given as
the location address of CBW No. M-1467 is actually the address of a school, that of the School of Divine Mercy.

xxxx

While respondent Dizon was authorized to verify the existence of Maglei Enterprises Warehouse, it is admitted
that he did not even look and see the premises of the alleged warehouse. Likewise, CBW Supervisor and co-
respondent Baliwag made a report on the existence of the bonded warehouse earlier on 16 March 1992 in his
Compliance with Structural Requirements For Customs Bonded Warehouse Inspection Report. Both Dizon
and Baliwag reported the existence of the Warehouse in their respective and separate reports.

On the basis of the foregoing undisputed facts, it is apparent that the immediate cause of the injury complained
of was occasioned not only by the failure of the CBW Inspectors to conduct an ocular inspection of the
premises in a manner and in accordance with the existing Customs rules and regulations as well as the failure
of their immediate supervisors to verify the accuracy of the reports, but also by subverting the reports by
making misrepresentation as to the existence of the warehouse.

xxxx

Respondent, Ben Jurado, the Chief of the WID, cannot likewise escape liability for Neglect of Duty since his
Office is the inspection arm of the District Collector of Customs.32

As adverted to earlier, the Warehousing Inspection Division is the inspection and audit arm of the Bureau of Customs.
Respondent Jurado, as chief of the said division, was duty-bound to verify the accuracy of the reports furnished by his
subordinates. We agree with the Ombudsman that respondent failed to validate the report of Baliwag and initiate,
institute or recommend the conduct of appropriate investigation immediately upon discovery of the irregularity. As a
supervisor, respondent was clearly negligent in the performance of his duties.

In Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 defined the power of supervision as "overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that their subordinate officials perform their duties."34 The Court added that
in case the subordinate fails or neglects to fulfill his or her duties, it is the supervisor’s responsibility to take such action
or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.35 The doctrine was reiterated in Deang v. Intermediate
Appellate Court36 and Municipality of Malolos v. Libangang Malolos, Inc.37

It bears stressing that public office is a public trust. 38 When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to
perform the duties of his office faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of
the public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is to use that prudence, caution and attention which careful men use
in the management of their affairs.39 Public officials and employees are therefore expected to act with utmost diligence
and care in discharging the duties and functions of their office. Unfortunately, respondent failed to measure up to this
standard. Clearly, respondent should be held administratively liable for neglect of duty.

Neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a task expected of him, signifying "disregard of
a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference." 40 By merely acquiescing to the report and recommendation of his
subordinate without verifying its accuracy, respondent was negligent in overseeing that the duties and responsibilities
of the WID were performed with utmost responsibility. Respondent was likewise negligent when he failed, as supervisor,
to initiate, institute, or recommend investigation and disciplinary proceedings against his subordinate Baliwag after the
anomaly was discovered. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence which the
circumstances warrant.

We are of course not unaware that as a general rule, superior officers cannot be held liable for the acts of their
subordinates. However, there are exceptions, viz.: (1) where, being charged with the duty of employing or retaining his
subordinates, he negligently or willfully employs or retains unfit or improper persons; or (2) where, being charged with
the duty to see that they are appointed and qualified in a proper manner, he negligently or willfully fails to require of
them the due conformity to the prescribed regulations; or (3) where he so carelessly or negligently oversees, conducts
or carries on the business of his office as to furnish the opportunity for the default; or (4) and a fortiori where he has
directed, authorized or cooperated in the wrong.41

In Advincula v. Dicen,42 the Court found a provincial agriculturist liable for misconduct despite his protestations
anchored on reliance to a subordinate. In finding him liable, the Court scored the said official for failing to scrutinize
each and every document proffered to him by subordinates. In Amane v. Mendoza-Arce,43 respondent clerk of court
was held liable for neglect of duty for failing to discipline her subordinates and make sure that they regularly and
promptly performed their duties. In the case under review, respondent was careless or negligent in overseeing,
conducting, or carrying on the business of his office as to furnish the opportunity for the default of a subordinate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-97-0656 finding respondent guilty of neglect of duty is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED