Camille Anne D.

Marquez

LAW 1-A

Legal Logic

G. R. No. 204819 April 08, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG AND LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF THEIR
MINOR CHILDREN, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG AND BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG AND
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,

VS.

HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS AND HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RESPONDENTS.

I. Facts of the Case

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law) was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012
despite various criticisms from different sectors of the society. Notwithstanding its aim to
mitigate the rapid growth of population and address proliferation of issues on abortion,
contraception and family health, the law received massive opposition, especially from the
religious sector, due to its alleged violation of the different provisions of the Constitution.

On March 15, 2013, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) for the enforcement
of the said law took effect. Shortly thereafter, on March 19, 2013, the court issued the
Status Quo Ante Order enjoining the effects and implementation of the said law for a period
of 120 days or until July 17, 2013. The same was extended until further order of the court
after several oral arguments made in between dates.

Petitioners argue that the law is violative of the right to health of women and the
sanctity of life as guaranteed by the constitution, thus, the prayer that the entire RH Law be
declared unconstitutional.

II. Issues

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for

violating the:

1. Right to Life of the Unborn

2. Right to Health & the Right to Protection from Hazardous Products
3. Right to Religious Freedom
4. Constitutional Provision on Involuntary Servitude
5. Right to Equal Protection of the Law
 6. Freedom of Speech
7. Zone of Privacy of One’s Family as protected by the Constitution

III. Decision/Discussion

1. No, the RH Law does not violate the life of the unborn. Since the issue on “when life
begins”, as agreed by the majority of the Members of the Court, is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence, it was agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this
matter.
In reference to Section 12, Article III of the Constitution which provides protection to
the unborn from conception, the Court ruled that the word “conception” should be
given its plain and ordinary meaning; life begins at fertilization. This view finds support
in various medical sources, conception begins at fertilization. This is in line with the
intent of the framers which refers conception as the moment of fertilization. In this
case, it is worthy to note that the framers did not intend to ban all types of
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. Only those that kill, destroy or interfere with
the development of the fertilized ovum would be considered prohibited. On the other
hand, those that prevent the union of the ovum and the sperm, in short prior to
fertilization, are deemed non-abortifacient, thus, constitutional.

In its IRR, however, the authors gravely abused their office when they redefined
abortifacient those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother’s womb” which may give room for the approval of those contraceptives
that may harm the fertilized ovum. The Court ruled that the word “primarily” be stricken
out from the definition.

In its decision, the Court employed deductive reasoning since several statement or
premises were linked in coming up with what should be considered unconstitutional
contraceptives which violate the right to life of the unborn.

2. No, the RH Law is not violative of the right to health and protection from hazardous
products. In its decision, the Court ruled that the RH law does not intend to deviate
from the provisions of RA 4729, “An Act to Regulate the Sale, Disposition, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices”, which provides for sufficient and
adequate safeguards to ensure that only those contraceptives that are safe will be made
available to the public. The Congress cannot predetermine if contraceptives are safe,
legal and non-abortifacient without the proper scientific examination.

In ruling on the instant issue, the court may have employed Analogical Arguments. The
Court ruled on the constitutionality of the RH Law with respect to the issue on the
violation of right to health and protection from hazardous products by way of drawing
the similarity of its provision on prior determination as to whether the contraceptives
 are safe for use by the public with the provisions of RA 4729 which safeguards the public
from unsafe contraceptives.

3. In this issue, the Court pointed out that it cannot rule on the issue of morality from a
religious standpoint. It only has the authority to determine if the RH Law infringes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. It held that the State can enhance
population control program with the implementation of RH Law even if it is contrary to
religious beliefs of others. It is well settled that the functions of the State may not be
dictated upon by any religion.

Furthermore, the Court assailed that the condition on the issuance of marriage license
upon compliance with the provisions of Section 15 of the RH Law is a reasonable
exercise of police power and no violation of religious freedom is perceived thereof.

The Court, however, ruled that obliging hospital or medical practitioner to immediately
refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible
healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs is vioalative of Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise
Clause, whose basis is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. The
guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it
being an externalization of one’s thought and conscience.

The issues on religious freedom and free speech were ruled by the Court using
Deductive Reasoning since in order to nail the conclusion; the Court determined
whether correct rules of law were applied.

4. No the RH Law does not violate the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. On
this issue, the Court ruled that the provision encouraging private and non-government
health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services is not
tantamount to involuntary servitude since the nature of their profession is infused with
public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it
in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Furthermore, no penalty, aside from
PHILHEALTH Accreditation, shall be imposed should these healthcare providers do
otherwise.

5. No, the RH Law does not violate the equal protection clause. The Court’s ruling draws
support from the Constitution itself which, under Section 11, Article XIII, provides that
the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women,
and children and that it shall endeavour to provide medical care to paupers. This
addresses the concern of giving priority to the poor. Moreover, the Court ruled that the
exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program
is valid since the State recognizes academic freedom of these private institutions
especially on their religious instructions.
 The Court employed deductive reasoning in this ruling considering the determination of
appropriate rules of law used on the facts.

6. Please see discussion on No. 3

7. Yes, RH Law violates the right to privacy. In its decision on the said issue, the court ruled
that Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes
into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for
the family as the basic social institution. Furthermore, the exclusion of parental consent
in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12
of the Constitution.

The Court used deductive reasoning on this ruling. It is evident that the premises laid
down secured the conclusion presented.

IV. Conclusion

The petition was partially granted. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the RH Law
except with certain provisions which were ordered to be stricken out for being
unconstitutional.
GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016

NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioner,

-versus

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, Respondents,

I. The Facts

Born in 1968, Natividad “Grace” S. Poe – Llamanzares was found as newborn

infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted by celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) when she was 5
years old. In 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San
Jose Parish in San Juan City and migrated thereto to live with her husband who was
assigned in the U.S. at that time. She was naturalized as American citizen in 2001.

In 2004, petitioner came back to the Philippines in order to support the

candidacy of her father. She went back to the U.S. shortly after the elections. In
December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippine due to the worsening
condition of her father who eventually died the same year. The petitioner stayed in
the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father’s funeral arrangements
as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate. Finally, petitioner came home to
the Philippines on May 24, 2005 to stay in the country for good. On July 7, 2006,
petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on July 10, 2006. As can be
gathered from its July 18, 2006 Order, the BI acted favourably on petitioner’s
petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner’s name and
in the names of her three (3) children.

On October 2, 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years
and 6 months” to the question “Period of residence in the Philippines before May
13, 2013.” Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed
Senator on May 16, 2013.

In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that
she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day
before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
II. Issues

1. WON Grace Poe Llamanzares is a natural born citizen

2. WON Gace Po Llamanzares satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
3. WON Gace Po Llamanzares’ candidacy should be cancelled or denied for
committing material misrepresentation

III. Decision/Discussion

1. Yes, Grace Poe is considerably a natural-born Filipino, thus, satisfies one of the
constitutional requirements for Philippine Presidency. The Court held that her
physical features are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an
infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a
child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her
parents’ nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are
admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To
assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the
norm. Furthermore, the Court pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-
born citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be
covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration
with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the
framers. In addition, the Court ruled that foundlings are automatically conferred
with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the general principles
of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these
treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born
of the country in which the foundling is found.

In this issue, the court employed inductive reasoning citing probabilities and
causal arguments to establish the citizenship of Grace Poe – Llamanzares. For the
first time, the Court made reference to physical appearance stating that the
physical attributes of Grace Poe resemble that of a Filipino.

2. Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements in acquiring a new domicile. Grace
Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18,
2006 when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. In its ruling,
the Court recognized the overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to
abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous
stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on
May 24, 2005, it was for good.

The Court once again used the inductive reasoning to settle the residency
requirement. The decision goes beyond what truth the premises present. It did
 not make reference to other cases and validity of rules applied were not focused
on.

3. No, her COC should not be cancelled on the ground that she misrepresented
facts as to her citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for
ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when
there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny
due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding
her qualifications. In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is
now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence, there
cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and
residency

The Court in this case used inductive type of reasoning since it validates
appropriate application of rules of law and procedures to determine whether
COMELEC has jurisdiction over cancellation of Poe’s COC.

IV. Conclusion

The Court dismissed the petitions praying for the cancellation of Grace Poe
Llamanzares’ COC for President and declared that she is a natural-born citizen, thus,
a qualified candidate for the Office of the President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
G.R. No. 176864, December 14, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.

HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ,

MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.

I. FACTS

Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura,
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging"
Rodriguez, and Joey Filart were charged of the crime Rape with Homicide following
the brutal death of Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years
old, and Carmela’s sister, seven, at their home in Parañaque City on June 30, 1991.
After an extreme investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of
whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court suspected a frame-up and
eventually ordered them discharged.

In 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation presented Jessica M. Alfaro, an

informant, who claimed that she witnessed the crime, accusing Hubert Jeffrey P.
Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart
as the felons. She also tagged police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory to the
crime. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, the public prosecutors filed an
information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al on August 10, 1995.

The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others
corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who examined
the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former
laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend,
and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.

In his defense, Webb contended that he was then in the United States of
America when the crime was committed. He presented the testimonies of witnesses
as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense
presented witnesses to attack the credibility of Alfaro in providing such testimonies.

But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events
surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by
grueling cross-examinations.

On January 4, 2000 the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused
guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate
prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial
court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that
rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those
who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.
It did not agree on the claims that the accused were tried by publicity and that the
honorable trial judge impartial, thus, affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying
the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and
increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court
issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the
semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed
still under the safekeeping of the NBI.

The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that
they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has
custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The
trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence
that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the
ground that the government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in
the denial of his right to due process.

II. Issues

1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness is entitled to belief

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi
3. Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s
failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver,
thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence
4. Whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to
death her mother and sister.

III. Decision/Discussion

1. No, Alfaro’s story is not entitled to belief. The honorable Court ruled that the
testimonies offered by Alfaro suffers from inherent inconsistencies. The mere
fact that Alfaro provided detailed testimonies to pin down the accused despite
her being under the influence of prohibited drugs gives the Court doubt as to her
credibility. Furthermore, being an asset of the NBI who was trying to prove
herself as a valuable to the Bureau, her credibility as an eye-witness is strongly
refutable.
 The Court, in this case, used the inductive type of reasoning to come up with
such ruling. The Court scrutinized her statement to come up with generalizations
arriving at the facts of the case.

2. Yes, Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi. The Court ruled that
the documentary and corroborating evidence provided by Webb satisfies the
requisites in establishing a strong alibi for the case. Webb was able to convince
the court that he was present at another place when the crime took place and
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene since he was in
the United States of America.

The Court in this issue employed deductive reasoning in evaluating the validity
and sufficiency of the evidence to prove Webb’s alibi. The rules on evidence
were properly looked into and disregarded the view on validity of documents
presented.

3. No, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the
semen specimen found in the dead body of Carmela. The Court rejected the
notion that Webb is entitled to acquittal for failure of the State to preserve the
semen specimen found on Carmela’s body. When the issue was raised by Webb,
the admissibility of DNA evidence was still not recognized by the judicial system.
Furthermore, the country was not yet in position then to admit DNA evidence as
there were no sufficient technology then to administer and determine validity of
the same. The Court also made reference to Arizona v. Youngblood where the US
Supreme court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the
semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is
able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police.

In this ruling, the Court used deductive reasoning to resolve the issue. The use of
jurisprudence in order to support Webb’s claim was scrutinized by the Court in
order to determine whether correct law and jurisprudence were used in the
instant case. Moreover, analysis on general rules and precedents were made to
pen the decision.

4. No, Webb was not acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart raped and killed Carmela and her mother
and sister. In ruling on the instant case, the Court stressed out that in
determining whether or not Webb’s alibi warrants merit, it follows that the
testimony of Alfaro, which was the sole basis of the decision of the trial court
and the CA, is refuted. This covers not only the accusation against Webb but
among all accused since the supposed absence of Webb due to the validity of his
alibi devoids Alfaro’s statement; Webb being the core person in her testimony.

This issue was decided using deductive reasoning. To come up with the
conclusion, the Court verified the facts and determined the validity of the
premises as to the alibi of Webb and the credibility of Alfaro to come up with the
conclusion that Webb and the others did not act in conspiracy.
IV. Conclusion

The honorable court reversed the decision of the appellate court and acquitted the
accused due to the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. They were ordered immediate release from detention unless they are
confined for another lawful cause.