MIDTERM CASES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of
CHAPTER 4: THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
I. STATE IMMUNITY
i. Determine if Suit is Against the State
CASE: Republic vs. Feliciano
Facts:
The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion,
representing the Republic of the Philippines to dismiss the
complaint filed by Feliciano, on the ground that the Republic
of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent.
Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land
consisting of four lots. The trial court rendered a decision
declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and
the rest of the property, Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public
domain.
The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion
to intervene and to set aside the decision of the trial court by
86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the
land for more than 20 years under claim of ownership. The trial
court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they
did not appear at the day of presentation of evidence.
Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence.
Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and the trial
court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration.
The case was reopened to allow them to present their
evidence. But before this motion was acted upon, Feliciano
filed a motion for execution with the Appellate Court but it was
denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent
and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed
by Feliciano.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and
possession of a parcel of land.
Discussions:
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not
permitted, except upon a showing that the State has
consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication
through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at
any stage of the proceedings.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not
be inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris
(of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a
legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must
emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity
can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
Ruling/s:
No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper
application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the
Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land,
bringing the State to court just like any private person who is
claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the
recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in
personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or
parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or
parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent
herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency
created by Republic Act No. 3844.
The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under
settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing
that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too plain to
be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant
case.
such consent.
CASE: Tan vs. Director of Forestry
FACTS:
The Bureau of Forestry issued Notice 2087 advertising for
public hearing a certain tract of public forest land. Petitioner
submitted his application in due form after paying the
necessary fees and posting the required bond. Later that year,
President Carlos Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the
Bureau of Forestry to convert the land into a forest reserve for
watershed purposes. The Agriculture and Natural Resources
issued General Memorandum No. 46 granting ordinary timber
license where the area is not more than 3,000 hectares. This
was subsequently revoked by General Memorandum No. 60.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the doctrine of State immunity applies in this
case.
HELD:
YES. Petitioners not only failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, but also failed to note that his action is a suit against
the State which cannot prosper unless the State give its
consent.
ii. Suits Against Government Agencies (Incorporated)
CASE: PNB vs. CIR
Facts:
A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V.
Manansala had previously been issued. He was the counsel of
the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and
Laborers Association. The validity of the order assailed is
challenged on two grounds:
That the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as
authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was
contrary to law and
That the funds subject of the garnishment “may be public in
character.” In thus denying the motion to quash, petitioner
contended that there was on the part of respondent Court a
failure to abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a
grave abuse of discretion.
The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the notice
of garnishment is denied for the lack of merit. PNB is therefore
ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the
‘notice of Garnishment’ dated May 6, 1970.”
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of
garnishment can be stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion.
Discussions:
According to the doctrine of state immunity, under suits
against Government Agencies:
“An incorporated Agency has a charter of its own that invests
it with a separate judicial personality. If the agency is
incorporated, the test of suability is found in its charter.”
From the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice
Marshall. As was pointed out by him: “It is, we think, a sound
principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any
trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the
transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and
takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the
company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a
level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the
character which belongs to its associates, and to the business
which is to be transacted.
Rulings:
No. Supreme Court ruled that there has not been a grave abuse
of discretion. The premise that the funds could be spoken of as
public in character may be accepted in the sense that the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation was a
government-owned entity It does not follow though that they
were exempt from garnishment.
As stated in “National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court
of Industrial Relations”, a government owned and controlled
corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and separate
from that of the Government. It may sue and be sued and may
be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation.
Justice Ozaeta held that it is well settled that when the
government enters into commercial business, it abandons its
sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the
instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests
itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations.
CASE: RAYO vs. CFI OF BULACAN
FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the
respondent opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of
the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden, precipitate and
simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns in
Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages
against the respondent corporation.
Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn
dismissal of the case and contended that the respondent
corporation is merely performing a propriety functions and
that under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued in court.
ISSUE:
W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its
organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort.
HELD: The government has organized a private corporation,
put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any
court under its charter.
As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a
personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
government. Moreover, the charter provision that it can sue
and be sued in any court.
CASE: SSS vs. CA
FACTS:S pouses David and Socorro Cruz, applied and granted a
real estate loan by the SSS with residential lot located at
Pateros, Rizal as collateral. The spouses Cruz complied with
their monthly payments. When delayed were incurred in their
monthly payments SSS filed a petition for foreclosure of their
real estate mortgage executed by the spouses Cruz on the
ground that the spouses Cruz defaulted in payment, Pursuant
for these application for foreclosure notices were published on
the second notice the counsel for spouses Cruz sent a letter to
SSS informing the latter that his clients are up to date in their
payment of the monthly amortization and the SSS should
discontinued the publication of the notices of foreclosure. This
request remain unheaded, this spouses Cruz filed an action for
damages against SSS before RTC in Rizal. SSS invoking its
immunity from suit being an agency of the government
performing government function. The trial court and court of
appeal nevertheless awarded damages in favor of spouses
Cruz which was affirmed by court of appeal, Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not SSS is immune from suit.
HELD: No. The SSS has a distinct legal personality and it can be
sued for damages. The SSS doesnot enjoy immunity from suit
by express statutory consent .It has corporate power separate
and distinct from the government. SSS own organic act
specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in court. These
words “sue and be sued” embrace all civil process incident to
a legal action. So that even assuming that the SSS, as it claims,
enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing
governmental function, by virtue of the explicit provision of
the afore cited enabling law, the government must be deemed
to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does
not thereby concede its liability that statutory law has given to
the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and
protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to
submit to the jurisdiction of the court; subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
CASE: Municipality of San Fernando, La union vs. Judge Firme
Facts:
The case was filed by petitioner, which is a municipal
corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines.
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by
the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck owned
by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality
of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to
the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including
Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they
sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of physical
injuries.
The private respondents instituted a compliant for damages
against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot,
owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney.
However, the defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against
the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.
Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such
as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State,
prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner
and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of
the collision.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and
Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. The owner and driver of the jeepney
were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was dismissed for having been filed out
of time.
Issues:
Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse
of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense
of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in a motion to dismiss
Discussions:
The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or
not the driver acting in behalf of the municipality is performing
governmental or proprietary functions. Municipal
corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the
State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the
defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when
the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover.
Rulings:
Yes. In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the
defense of non-suability of the State until trial. However, the
respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded
with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the
municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when in the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily
failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in
the guise of the municipality. However, the judge acted in
excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision, he held the
municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular
employee.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued,
liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean
that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if
it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by
the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued.
When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only
giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the
defendant is liable. Anent the issue of whether or not the
municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee,
the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or
not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions.
iii. Suits Against Government Agencies (Unincorporated)
CASE: Sanders vs. Veridiano
FACTS:
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S.
Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was thecommanding officer
of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an
American citizen with permanent residence inthe Philippines.
Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as
game room attendants in the special servicesdepartment of
the NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the private respondents
were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They instituted
grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S.
Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for
reinstatement of their permanent full-time status. However, in
a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed
with the hearing officer's report. The letter contained the
statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-
workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have
proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be
difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the
grievant were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone,
(they) placed the records in public places where others not
involved in the case could hear."Before the start of the
grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent
to the Chief of Naval Personnelexplaining the change of the
private respondent's employment status. So, private
respondent filed for damages allegingthat the letters
contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of
the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal
and proprietary rights.However, petitioners argued that the
acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge
of their official dutiesand that, consequently, the court had no
jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.
However, the motionwas denied on the main ground that the
petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts
were official in nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official
duties?
RULING:
Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of
NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel,
including the private respondents. Given the official character
of the letters, the petitioners were being sued as officers of the
United States government because they have acted on behalf
of that government and within the scope of their authority.
Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally
that is responsible for their acts. It is stressed at the outset that
the mere allegation that a government functionary is being
sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him
from the protection of the law of public officers and, if
appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same
token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice
to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed
to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his
authority. These well-settle dprinciples are applicable not only
to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued
in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as
in the present case. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it
is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of
damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the
petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States
government as their principal. This will require that
government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
judgment,
viz,
the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the
damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that
government without its consent.
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is
that "there can be no legal right against the authority which
makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of
foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the
sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par
in parem non habet imperium
and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of
nations."
Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article
II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our
previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
CASE: Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing
Facts:
The action in question was upon complaint of the respondents
Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU)Pacifico
Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo
Toleran filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court
against herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador,
the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services,
and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of Printing.
The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano
Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by
interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of
Printing particularly the members of the complaining
association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-
organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of
their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing
the union activities. The petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin
Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair
labor practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative
defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents
Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and
Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an
administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil
Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of
Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that
said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for
the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing
government functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case
could be heard, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking
for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised
by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the
case on the merits pending the determination of such
jurisdictional question. The motion was granted, but after
hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated
January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the
theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are
"exclusively proprietary in nature," and, consequently, denied
the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this order having
been also denied by the court in banc.
Note: The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government
created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As
such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the
direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, and is" charged with the execution of all printing
and binding, including work incidental to those processes,
required by the National Government and such other work of
the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of
the (Secretary of Finance)Executive Secretary, be authorized to
undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no
corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in
the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing
needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and
obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary
profit.
Issue:
whether or not Bureau of Printing can be sued.
Ruling:
No. Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any
corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printingcannot
be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to
produce any effect, would actually be a suit, actionor
proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is
settled that the Government cannot be sued without
itsconsent, much less over its objection. It is true that the
Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its
employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days
and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion
that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature."
Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the
interest of the service so requires. As a matter of
administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be
paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the
Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it
cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said
Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Clearly, while the
Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing
jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or
business concern. The additional work it executes for private
parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such
work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no
showing that the employees performing said proprietary
function are separate and distinct from those employed in its
general governmental functions.
CASE: Mobil Phils. Exploration vs. Customs Arrastre Service
Facts:
This case was filed by Mobil Phil Exploration Inc. against the
Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to
recover the value of the undelivered case of rotary drill parts.
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad,
consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. The shipment
was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service,
the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre
operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later
delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of
the shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc filed suit in
the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs
Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the
value of the undelivered case plus other damages.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that not being persons under the law, defendants
cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not all government
entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of
Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of
Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can
be sued by private individuals.
Issues:
Whether or not both Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau
of Customs can invoke state immunity
Discussions:
The Bureau of Custom, is a part of Department of Finance. It
does not have a separate juridical personality of its own apart
from that of the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues
from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties,
fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this
function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. As stated in
the law, agencies of the government is not suable if it is
performing governmental functions and if it an unincorporated
government entity without a separate juridical personality
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Customs
cannot be sued for recovery of money and damages involving
arrastre services, considering that said arrastre function may
be deemed proprietary, because it is a necessary incident of
the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of
Customs. The Court ruled that the fact that a non-corporate
government entity performs a function proprietary in nature
does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-
governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its
governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the
sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government
entity. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff should have
filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being
for money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327,
which state the conditions under which money claims against
the Government may be filed.
iv. Suits Against Public Officers
CASE: Veterans Manpower vs. C.A
FACTS: VMPSI (Veterans Manpower and Protective Services,
Inc.) alleges that the provisions of RA 5487(Private Security
Agency Law) violate the provisions of the Constitution against
monopolies, unfair competition and combinations of restraint
of trade and tend to favor and institutionalize the PADPAO
(Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Services,
Inc.). Furthermore, VMPSI questions the provision on requiring
all private security agencies or company security forces to
register as members of any PADPAO chapter organized within
the region. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement
was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the
minimum monthly contract rate per guard for 8hours of
security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and
P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila. PADPAO found VMPSI
guilty of cut-throat competition when it charged Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System lower than the standard
minimum rates provided in the MOA. As a result, PADPAO
refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to
VMPSI. VMPSI filed a civil case against the PC chief and PC-
SUSIA (Philippine Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security
and Investigation Agencies). PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the case is against the
State which had not given consent thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and
PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.
HELD:
Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his
personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond
the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the
acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to
account in this case, were performed as part of their official
duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no
recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of
Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12,
1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be
sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, notfrom a mere
memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not
acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents. Petition for
review is denied and the judgment appealed from is affirmed
in toto.
CASE: Shauf vs. C.A
FACTS:
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, is a Filipino by origin and married to
an American who is a member of the United States Air Force
was rejected for the position of Guidance Counselor in the
Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. According to applicable
regulations, where qualified dependents of military or civilian
personnel are locally available for appointment to positions in
foreign areas which are designated for U.S. citizen occupancy
and for which recruitment outside the current work force is
appropriate, appointment to the position will be limited to
such dependents. Shauf possessed all the qualifications,
however, a certain Mr. Edward B. Isakson who was not a
dependent of a military or civilian personnel was selected for
the position. Feeling aggrieved of the shabby treatment, Shauf
questioned the qualifications of Isakson and the U.S. Civil
Service Commission thereafter ordered his removal from the
office. In connection with said complaint, and by reason of her
credentials, she was offered a temporary position of Assistant
Education Adviser for 180 days with the condition that if a
vacancy occurs in a permanent position she will be
automatically selected. Shauf accepted the offer. During that
time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo was about to vacate her permanent
GS 1710-9 position. But she was indefinitely extended by
Detwiler and Shauf was never appointed to the said position.
By reason of her non-selection, petitioner filed an equal
employment opportunity complaint and damages against Don
Detwiler (civilian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi
(Education Director) for alleged discrimination against her by
reason of her national origin (Filipino by birth), color (brown)
and sex (female). Private respondents, filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground that as officers of the United
States Armed Forces performing official government functions
in accordance with the powers vested in them under the
Philippine-American Military bases Agreement, they are
immune from suit,
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are immune from suit being
officers of the US Armed Forces
HELD:
No, respondents are not immune from suit as they are being
sued in their private capacity for discriminatory acts performed
beyond their authority. The acts complained were done by
respondents while administering the civil service laws of the
United States. The States authorize only legal acts by its
officers. Unauthorized acts of government officials are not acts
of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by
one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts,
for the protection of his rights is not a suit against the State.
CASE: Wylie vs. Rarang
FACTS: Petitioner M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrative
officer while petitioner Capt. James Williams was the
commanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic Bay,
Olongapo City. Private Respondent (PR) Aurora Rarang was
assigned as merchandise control guard in the Office of the
Provost Marshal M.H. Wylie, in his capacity as asst. admin.
Officer, supervised the publication of the so-
called “Plan of the Day” (POD) published
daily by the US Naval Base Station. The POD featured
important announcements, necessary precautions andgeneral
matters of interest to military personnel. One of the regular
features of the POD was the
“action line inquiry” (NAVSTA ACTION LINEINQUIRY), a
telephone answering device in the Office of the Admin Asst
intended to provide personnel access to the Commanding
Officer on matters they feel should be brought to his attention
for correction or investigation. On February 3, 1978, the POD
under the (NAVSTA) action line inquiry, published and
mentioned a certain “AURING” as “…a disgrace to her division
and to the Office of the
Provost Marshal. The same article explicitly implied that Auring
was consuming and appropriating for herself confiscated items
like cigarettes and
foodstuffs. The PR was the only one who was named “Auring”
in the
Office of the Provost Marshal. As a result thereof, she was
investigated by her superior. The PR commenced an ACTION
FOR DAMAGES in the CFI of Zambales against M.H. Wylie, Capt.
James Williams and the US Naval Base alleging that the article
constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel
tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation
exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. The TC
ruled in favour of the PR and dismissedthe suit against the US
Naval Base. The IAC (now,CA) affirmed the judgment of the TC
with modifications as to theamount of damages awarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the American naval officers (such as Wylie and
Capt. Williams) who commit a crime or tortious act while
discharging official functions still covered by the principle of
state immunity from suit. Does the grant of rights, power, and
authority to the US under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover
immunity of its officers from crimes and torts?
HELD:
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in
connection with official duties where they have acted ultra
vires or where there is showing of bad faith (Chavezv.
Sandiganbayan).It may be argued, as a general rule, that Capt.
Williams as commanding officer of the naval base was far
removed in the chain of command from the offensive
publication and it would be asking too much to hold him
responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base.
However, in this particular case, the records show that the
offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for
approval and that he approved it. ART. 2176, CC prescribes a
civil liability for damages caused by a person’s act or omission
constituting fault or negligence, stating that, “Whoever by act
or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence,..” Moreover, ART. 2219(7),
Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in
case of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation.” Indeed, the imputation of theft contained in the
POD was a defamation against the character and reputation of
the PR. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the
Provost Marshal explicitly
recommended the deletion of the name “Auring” if the article
will be published. The petitioners, however, were NEGLIGENT
because under their direction, they issued the publication
without deleting the said name. Such act or omission was
ULTRA VIRES and CANNOT be deemed part of official duty. It
was a TORTIOUS ACT which ridiculed the PR. As a result of
petitioner’s act, PR suffered besmirched reputation, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, especially so,
since the article was baseless and false. The petitioners, alone,
in their personal capacities, are liable for the damages they
caused the Private Respondent
CASE: Republic vs. Sandoval
FACTS:
The doctrines of immunity of the government from suit is
expressly provided in the Constitution under Article XVI,
Section 3. It is provided that the State may not be sued without
its consent. Some instances when a suit against the State is
proper are: (1) When the Republic is sued by name; (2) When
the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; (3)
When the suit is, on its face, against a government officer but
the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the
officer but to the government. With respect to the incident
that happened in Mendiola on January 22, 1987 that befell
twelve rallyists, the case filed against the military officers was
dismissed by the lower court. The defendants were held liable
but it would not result in financial responsibility to the
government. The petitioner (Caylao Group) filed a suit against
the State that for them the State has waived its immunity when
the Mendiola Commission recommended the government to
indemnify the victims of the Mendiola incident and the acts
and utterances of President Aquino which is sympathetic to
the cause is indicative of State's waiver of immunity and
therefore, the government should also be liable and should be
compensated by the government . The case has been
dismissed that State has not waived its immunity. On the other
hand, the Military Officer filed a petition for certiorari to
review the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit
and therefore should the State be liable for the incident?
HELD:
No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission
regarding the indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and
the victims of the incident does not in any way mean liability
authomatically attaches to the State. The purpose of which is
to investigate of the disorders that took place and the
recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State.
The acts and utterances of President Aquino does not mean
admission of the State of its liability. Moreover, the case does
not qualify as suit against the State. While the Republic in this
case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to
the government. The military officials are held liable for the
damages for their official functions ceased the moment they
have exceeded to their authority. They were deployed to
ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly and should
guarantee the safety of the people. The court has made it quite
clear that even a “high position in the government does not
confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another.” The
court rules that there is no reversible error and no grave abuse
of discretion committed by the respondent Judge in issuing the
questioned orders
CASE: Minucher vs. C.A
FACTS: Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was
filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust operation”
conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied
by Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where
heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later
acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up
charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge
of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department
of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that, being a special agent of the United States
Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to
diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic
Note of the United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the
Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna
Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy
of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic
immunity.
RULLING
YES. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be
cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the
activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency,
however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of
the government of the two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department
of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics
Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted at the
residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status”
of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct
surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having
ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who
would then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting
as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against
Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the
scope of his official function or duties.
v. Consent to be Sued (Express Consent)
CASE: Amigable vs. Cuenca
FACTS:
Petitioner Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a lot in
Banilad Estate, Cebu City. Without prior expropriation or
negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for
the construction of road, specifically, the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues.
Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the
Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the land traversed by the Mango
and Gorordo Avenues. RTC dismissed the case on the ground
of State Immunity, that the government cannot be sued
without its consent.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner may properly sue the government.
HELD:
Yes. Where the government takes away property from a
private landowner for public use without going through the
legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
party may properly maintain a suit against the government
without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent.
Strongly upheld is that the doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government
appears at the back of the petitioner’s certificate of title and
that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any
portion of her lot to the government, the petitioner remains
the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could
bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in
question at anytime because possession is one of the
attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of
possession of said portion by the government is neither
convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has
been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and
should have done years ago. To determine the due
compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or
value thereof at the time of the taking.
Decision is set aside and remanded for determination of just
compensation.
CASE: Ministerio vs. City of Cebu
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu in its Civil Case, dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the petitioner is a rightful owner of a lot in
Cebu City. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of said lot for the construction of
the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines,
requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was
disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement.
Petitioner then filed a complaint against the Republic of the
Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways, for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the lot.
Defendants argue that the: (1) that the action was premature,
the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the
Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery
had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against
the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney’s fees
and costs had no valid basis since the Government had not
given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was
the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area
involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no
cause of action against the defendants.
The court rendered its decision holding that it had no
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of action for the recovery
of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the
government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had
neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide
plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages, being a money
claim against the government; and that it had long prescribed,
nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the
government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly,
the complaint was dismissed.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Amigable, may properly sue the
government under the facts of the case.
Decisions
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
Quoting the decision from Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance
of Cebu, “Where the government takes away property from a
private landowner for public use without going through the
legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
party may properly maintain a suit against the government
without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit.
Rulings:
Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government
appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has
not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot
to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the
whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to
recover possession of the portion of land in question at any
time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the
government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time
because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the
only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago.
To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis
should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled
thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land
from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made
by the government. In addition, the government should pay for
attorney’s fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the
trial court after hearing.
vi. Consent to be Sued (Implied Consent)
CASE: U.S vs. Ruiz
Facts:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain
perpetually the proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic,
Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military
Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the
submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de
Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and
submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received
from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price
proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The
company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they
complied with the requests. The company received a letter
which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the
Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein
informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award
for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were
awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific
performance was filed by him against the US.
Issues:
Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts
exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state
immunity.
Discussions:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from
being sued in the courts of another state without its consent
or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle
of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of
international law are not petrified; they are continually and
evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It
has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign
and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial
and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil. The restrictive
application of State immunity is now the rule in the United
States, the United Kingdom and other states in western
Europe.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are
an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order,
they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of
the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic
affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued. Only when it enters into business contracts.
CASE: U.S vs. Guinto
Facts:
The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United
States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has
moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits
against it to which it has not consented.
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air
Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding
conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said
base. Among those who submitted their bids were private
respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and
Pablo C. del Pilar.
The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the
private respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4
facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not
included in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below
to compel Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and the individual
petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a
rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the
private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to
continue operating the concessions pending litigation.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the
petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the
action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived
its non-suability, but trial court denied the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
Issues:
Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United
States of America.
Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under
the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the
performance of their official duties.
Discussions:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is
one of the generally accepted principles of international law
that we have adopted as part of the law of our land.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the
generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by
the majority of states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition
and consequence of its membership in the society of nations.
Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically
obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with
other states.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed
by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be
regarded as against the state although it has not been formally
impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from
suit with its implied consent.
Rulings:
The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions
granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises
operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the
United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable
as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These
establishments provide for the grooming needs of their
customers. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead
any immunity from the complaint filed by the private
respondents in the court below.
Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their
official functions as officers or agents of the United States.
They are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in
which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable,
they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the
defendants, except for the paucity of the record in the case at
hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of
the barbershop concessions is not before the Court. The
respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it
can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are
entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case must also
be remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
CASE: U.S vs. Rodrigo
FACTS: Genove, employed as a cook in the Main Club at John
Hay Station, was dismissed after it had been ascertained in an
investigation that he poured urine in the soup stock. Genove
filed a complaint for damages against the club manager who
was also an officer of USAF.
ISSUE: Whether or not state immunity could be applied to the
defendants?
HELD:
The restaurant services offered at the John Hay Station
operated for profit as a commercial and not a government
activity. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of self-
immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit filed by
Genove. Not even the US government can claim such immunity
because by entering into the employment contract with
Geneove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
Still, the court holds that the complaint against petitioners in
the lower court be dismissed. There was nothing arbitrary
about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, the
petitioner acted quite properly in terminating the private
respondent’s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act
of polluting the soup stock with urine
CHAPTER 5: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
II. REPUBLICANISM
CASE: Villavicencio vs. Lukban
Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from
society, and then at night, without their consent and without
any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their
rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble
attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly,
that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the
presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed
necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades
of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a
fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.
ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women
with ill repute.
HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is
above the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion
by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their
will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the
contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly
authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to
change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as
citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as
stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Thei
rchoice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination.
It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it
does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate
themselves from the rest of the human race. These women
have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao
without even being given the opportunity to collect their
belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being
transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be
severely punished.
CHAPTER 6: SEPARATION OF POWERS
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service Comission
FACTS:
Pangasinan Transportation Company Inc. (PTI) has been
engaged for 20 years in the business of transporting
passengers in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU
busesin accordance with the terms and conditions of the
certificates of public convenience issued by the Public Utility
Commission (later called Public Service Commission). The
company applied for an authorization to operate ten
additional Brockway trucks on the ground that they were
needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing
certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour
Labor Law. PSC agreed to grant the authorization, but with two
conditions as provided for by section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 454: First, that the certificatesof authorization issued to it
would be valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the
date ofpromulgation; and second, that the company may be
acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth with proper
payment of the cost price of its equipment, taking into account
reasonable depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the
time of it acquisition. PTI did not agree with the conditions, and
instead asked the Supreme Court to declare Commonwealth
Act No. 454.
ISSUE: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 454 is
unconstitutional for being undue delegation of legislative
power on the ground that without limitation, guide or rule
except the unfettered discretion and judgment of the
Commission, constitute a complete and total abdication by the
Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason,
the Act, in so far as those powers are concerned.
HELD: No, the law is not unconstitutional. The law is made
subject to a sufficient standard that the PSC must strictly
follow. Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission
under section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said
period cannot be disregarded by the
Commission in determining the question whether the issuance
of the certificate will promote the public interests in a proper
and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite
period oftime," the Commission will be guided by "public
interests," the only limitation to its power being that said
period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth
Act No. 146; Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) The Supreme Court
had earlier ruled that "public interest" furnishes a sufficient
standard.
CASE: Maceda vs. Vasquez
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before
the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio
Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda
has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and
criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period
of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January
31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no
decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have
been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that
petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman
constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of
supervision over all inferior courts
Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is
administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under
Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the
State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from
the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee
the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take
the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee
arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer
action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties.
III. ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
CASE: Angara vs. Electoral Committee
FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio
Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed
Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering
the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on
Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which
declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua
filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest
against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected
member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a
resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the
Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the
protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The
Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to
restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further
cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the
Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said
Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested
elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the
conflict of authority between two agencies created by the
Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy
for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent
of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec
4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance
of the election protest filed by Ynsua.
CASE: Aquino vs. Enrile
FACT:
Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the
order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of
individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any
charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed for
habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile’s answer
contained a common and special affirmative defense that the
arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in
accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state,
when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the
state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet
disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger
against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant
to the President’s order.
CASE: Bondoc vs. Pineda
FACT:
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a
Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda was
a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While
Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda
won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result in
the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal).
Bondoc won in the protest and he was subsequently declared
as the winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito
Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep.
Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc even
though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He confessed that he
believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election.
This resulted to Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP. Pineda
then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET.
They further prayed that a new election be held and that the
new LDP representative be appointed in the HRET. This new
representative will be voting for Pineda in the reopening of the
election contest. Camasura was then removed by HRET’s
chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc
questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal
is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of
separation of powers, the judiciary may not interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon
the validity of the said act of the HRET without violating the
doctrine of separation of powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar
without encroaching upon the function of the legislature
particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial
question. It must be noted that what is being complained of is
the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when
Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already
been made, members of the tribunal have already voted
regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc
wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their
representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already
reached a decision. They cannot hold the same election since
the issue has already become moot and academic. LDP is
merely changing their representative to change the outcome
of the election. Camasura should be reinstated because his
removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to
party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the
HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of
tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from
the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1 coming
from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the
Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
IV. RESIDUAL POWER
CASE: Marcos vs. Manglapus
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three
year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines.
The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the
respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the
petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution:
"The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is
meant by executive power although the same article tackles
on exercises of certain powers by the President such as
appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section
17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21),
borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22),
informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in
the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.
V. POLITICAL AND JUSTICEABLE QUESTIONS
CASE: Casibang vs. Aquino
FACTS: Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected
mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan. Casibang, his only rival, filed a
protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote
buying, anomalies and irregularities and others. During the
proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into
effect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest
of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost
jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new
Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government.
ISSUES:
Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution
rendered the protest moot and academic; and
Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National
Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure.
RULING:
As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, “the constitutional grant of
privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution
for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or
employees of the Government when the new Constitution
took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately
encompassing every person who at the time happened to be
performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest
or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically
mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory
Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of
the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and
shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective
position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election
Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the
proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed
candidate-elect's right to the contested office.”
Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that
electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that
section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to
enact a local government code "which may not thereafter be
amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining a
more responsive and accountable local government allocating
among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their
qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers,
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units"
but "... any change in the existing form of local government
shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite called for.
CASE: Tanada vs. Angara
FACTS: After the 1955 national elections, the membership in
the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista
Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who
belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the
other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was
contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But
prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members.
It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members
comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3
senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the
minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the
other two SET members supposed to come from the minority
were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before
the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that
if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a
member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his
election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of
the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take
cognizance of the issue because it is a political question.
Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the
SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada
and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts
but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that
the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political Question
connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
measure. chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI,
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose such other officers
Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide upon as it may deem necessary.” The method of choosing who will
the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision.
SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate
a separate and independent body from the Senate which does itself, not by the Court.
not perform legislative acts. CASE: Lagman vs. Medialdea (Marcos Burial at the Libingan
But how should the gridlock be resolved? ng mga Bayani)
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the *WALA KO KASABOT. HUHUHU ☹
supposed seat of the minority members) must not come from
the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET,
apparently already appointed members that would fill in the
minority seats (even though those will come from the majority
party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the
SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the
Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations
like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
CASE: Defensor Santiago vs. Guingona
Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress,
Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the
Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that,
with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only
other member of the minority, he was assuming the position
of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for
Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who
had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the
minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and,
thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the
body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the
minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad
filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator
Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position
that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the
Constitution
Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is
entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the
petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the
petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused
their discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives.
However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no
clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the
Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term
“majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a total
or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or
more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution
mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by
a number constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could
thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states
that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.