TEAM CODE: TN – 222

2ND SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL HYDERABAD NATIONAL MOOT COURT

COMPETITION

22ND-24TH SEPTEMBER, 2017

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDOSTAN

IN THE MATTER OF:

COMMON MAN UNION OF CIVIL LIBERTY & HOLA TECHNOLOGIES PVT. LTD.
(PETITIONER)

V.

GOVERNMENT OF ARIDABAD & SOBER PVT. LTD.

(RESPONDENTS)

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

Memorandum on behalf of respondents[Type text] Page 1

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................ ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................... 2

ISSUES RAISED .................................................................................................................. 4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................... 5

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ............................................................................................... 6

1. THE RULES FRAMED ARE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDOSTAN. ......................................................................................................................... 6

1.2. The rules framed are not in violation of the right to equality of the taxi service
providers enshrined under article 14 of the Constitution of Indostan. ............................. 9

2. THAT THE RULES ARE NOT IN CONTRAVENTION TO THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY THAT THE
CITIZENS OF INDOSTAN ARE ENTITLED TO AS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT. .................................. 12

2.1. The right to privacy is not an absolute right. ...................................................... 12

3. THAT SOBER PVT. LTD. HAS NOT VIOLATED CONTRACT AND DATA PROTECTION LAWS. .. 18

PRAYER ............................................................................................................................ 21

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page i

 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And

A.C Appeal Cases

AIR All India Reporter

Anr. Another

C.P.D Common Pleas Division

CCTV Closed-circuit Television

CLC Company Law Cases

CLJ Cambridge Law Journal

DLT Delhi Law Times

ER English Reports

EWCA (Civ) Court of Appeal of England

and Wales Decisions (Civil
Division)

GPS Global Positioning System

HL House of Lords

Ibid Ibidem

LR Law Reporter

Ltd. Limited

MWN (Cri) Madras Weekly Notes

(Criminal)

NCT National Capital Territory

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page ii

NCT National Capital Territory

Ors. Others

Q.B Queen’s Bench

Rep. Report

S Section

S. Ct Supreme Court Reporter

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reports

SCW Supreme Court Weekly

Tr.L.R Trading Law Report

U.P. Uttar Pradesh

U.S United States

UKPC United Kingdom Privy

Council

UOI Union of India

v. Versus

W.L. Weekly Law Reports

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page iii

 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES, LEGISLATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

 Indian Contract Act, 1872.

 Information Technology Act, 2000.
 Motor Vehicle Act, 1988.

MISCELLANEOUS

 Constitution of India, 1949.

BOOKS

 Apar Gupta, Commentary on Information Technology Act (2 nd Ed., Lexis Nexis)

2011
 Avtar Singh, Contract and Special Relief Act (12th Ed., Eastern Book Company)
2017.
 Jack Beatson, Andrew Burrows, John Cartwright, Anson’s Law of Contract (29th Ed.,
Oxford) 2010.
 Josheph Chitty, Chitty on Contracts (29th Ed., Sweet and Maxwell) 1999.
 M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (7th Ed., Lexis Nexis) 2014.

DICTIONARY REFERRED

 Campbell Black, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed., West Publishing Co.) 1998.

CASES REFERED

INDIAN CASES

 Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1.

 AP Coop All Seeds growers Federation Ltd. v. D. Achyuta Rao, (2007) 13 SCC 320.

 Ashuthosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34.

 Auto Shankar’s case, 1994 SCC (6) 632.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page iv

  B. Manmad Reddy v. Chandra Prakash Reddy, (2010) 3 SCC 314 (320).

 BhaveshJayanti Lakhani v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 MWN (Cri) 233.

 City of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohd. Usman bhai, AIR (1986) SC 1205.

 Confederation of Ex-serviceman Association v. Union of India, AIR (2006) SC 2945.

 Cooverjee v. Excise Commissioner, (1954) SCR 873.

 Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, AIR (2004) SC 1295.

 Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1975) 2 SCC 148.

 Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 88.

 HUDA v. Kedarnath, (2015) 1 SCC 186.

 K. Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, AIR (2001) SC 467.

 Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 SCR 332.

 Krishna Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala, AIR (1997) SC 128.

 Laxmi v. State of U.P., AIR (1971) SC 873.

 M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, AIR (1995) SC 1770.

 M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, (1954) SCR 1077.

 Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, (1978) 1 SCC 248.

 Mukesh&Anr v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors., (2014) 16 SCC 86.

 Municipal Corporation, City of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohd. Usmanbhai, AIR (1986) SC

1205.

 Mylapore Club v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 12SCC 752.

 National Council for Teacher Education and Ors., v. Shri ShyamShikha Prakashan
Sansthan, AIR (2011) SC 932.

 Phoolan Devi v.Shekhar Kapoor and Ors., (1995) DLT 154.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page v

  R. Rajagopal v. State Of T.N., (1994) SCC (6) 632.

 R.C. Cooper v U.O.I., (1970) 1 SCC 248.

 RamkrishnaDalmia v. Tendolkar AIR (1957) SC 532.

 Santosh Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR (1973) SC 1091.

 Shankar Raju v. Union of India, (2011) 2 SCC 132.

 Sivarajan v. Union of India, AIR (1959) SC 556.

 State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600.

 State of Madras v. Row (1952) SCR 597.

 State of Maharashtra v. Rao Himmatbhai Narbheram AIR (1971) SC 1157.

 State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh (1974) 3 SCC 277.

 State of Rajasthan v. Shankar Lal Parmar, AIR (2012) SC 1913.

 Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1.

 Tomaso Bruno &Anr v. State Of U.P., (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 54.

 Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust (2011) AIR SCW 220.

 Union of India v. M. Valliapan, (1999) 6 SCC 259, 269.

 Virendra v. State of PunjabAIR (1957) SC 896.

FOREIGN CASES

 Bank for Gemeinwirstschaft Aktiengesellschaft v. City of London Garages Ltd

(1971)1. W.L.R. 149.

 BP Refinery (Westenport) Pty Ltd v. Shrine of Hasting (1977) UKPC 13.

 Cf. Grogan v. Robin Meredith Plant Hire (1996) CLC 1127.

 Couch v. United States 409 US 322 (1973).

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page vi

  Equitable life Assurance Society v. Hyman, (2002)1 A.C. 408, 459.

 Hamlyn & Co v. Wood &Co., (1891) 2 Q.B. 488, 494.

 In Kyllo v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 2038

 Jones v. St John’s College Oxford, (1970) L.R.6 Q.B. 115, 126.

 JSC v. Standard Bank Plc., (2008), EWCA 819, (2008).

 L.French & Co. v. Leeston Shipping Co., (1992)1 A.C. 451, 455.

 Liverpool CC v. Irwin, (1977) A.C. 239, 266.

 London Export Corp Ltd v. Jubilee Coffee Roasting Co. Ltd., (1958) 1 W.L.R. 661.

 Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v. Cooper, (1941) AC 108, 137.

 Mason v. Clarke, (1955) A.C. 778, 793, 805.

 Parker v. South Eastern Railway company, (1877) 2 C.P.D 416, 421.

 Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) 1 AIIE.R. 109.

 Shell UK Ltd v. Lostock Garage Ltd., (1976) 1 W.L.R. 1187, 1197, 1201.

 Smith v. US, 99 S.Ct. 2577.

 The Moorcock in re., (1889) (1886-90) All ER 530.

 Trollope & Colls Ltd v. Northwest Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board, (1973) 1
W.L.R.601, 609.
 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945.

 United States v. Miller, 96 S.Ct. 1619/425 US 435 (1976).

 Young & Marten v. Mc. Manus Childs Ltd., (1969)1 A.C. 454, 465.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page vii

 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The respondents respectfully submit to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
invoked by the petitioners under Article 136 1 of the Constitution of India.

1
Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to
appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by
any court or tribunal in the territory of India
(2) Nothing in clause ( 1 ) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any
court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 1

 STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Indostan is a country whose laws are identical to that of India. Public transport in Indostan
is completely dependent on private players, including local taxis that are governed by self-
regulated unions.

2. In 2014, Sober International Private Limited, a multinational app-based cab service

provider headquartered in the Disunited States of Hoppipola, made an entry into the Indostani
transportation market. Sober offered a superior technology application which served as a
platform to connect drivers registered with them to passengers who have downloaded the
Sober Cab App.

3. In 2014, Sober offered “upfront pricing” to customers whereby before the customer books
a cab, a price estimate for the ride is shown on the App to the customer so that the customer
is aware of the expense that will be incurred. The fares for the rides were very reasonable.

4. The local taxi unions were inspired by the success of Sober and created their own appbased
taxi Service Company for the benefit of the local cab drivers by the name of “Hola,
Technologies Private Limited. The only difference in their mode of operation was that while
Sober cabs charged their customers using a technology which determined the fares on the
basis of GPS data, Hola cabs used traditional taxi meters.

5. The drivers registered with Hola complained of a lower revenue than their Sober
counterparts and complained that the lower fares charged by Hola made it difficult for them
to provide profitable service. Due to this, Hola decided to introduce a higher night rate that
would be applicable to Hola rides after 11 PM till 5 AM.

6. The increased complaints against the higher pricing mechanisms by all app-based cab
service providers demanded government intervention. Thus, in July 2016, to address the
concerns of passengers, the Aridabad, Ministry of Road Transport & Highways (“MORTH”)
framed the “Aridabad City Taxi Rules, 2016” (hereinafter “Rules”) under the City Taxi Act,
2016 to regulate app-based cab service providers. These Rules were drafted after taking into
consideration feedback received from various stakeholders pursuant to a consultation paper
being published, which invited the public to present their views on the proposed Rules. Rule
6.9 of the Rules set out a cap on the maximum amount that could be charged over and above
the normal fare, stipulating that Indostaniappbased taxi service providers could not charge

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 2

more than Rs. 2,000 as additional fare per ride. Rule 6.10 of the Rules prescribed a penalty of
Rs. 3,00,000 for first contravention of Rule 6.9 and mandated cancellation of the license to do
business of the private app-based taxi service provider for any subsequent contravention of
the said Rule.

7. At this juncture, a section of Hola cab drivers wanted to migrate from traditional taxi fare
meters to the GPS based model of calculating fare (similar to the fare model of Sober).
However, as the change from traditional taxi meters to a higher technology meter system
would entail incurring significant cost, the other section of Hola cab drivers shot down the
proposal.

8. Sober started cashless payments for its cab rides and thereby collected banking payment
information from its customers, such as credit/debit card numbers and other details.

9. In early 2017, MORTH realized that there have been increased instances of harassment,
molestation and rape by the drivers of apps based cab service providers. Therefore, Rules 7.1
to 7.6 were introduced in the Rules that required app based cab service providers to install
cameras in the cab that would continuously video record the inside of the cab. The Rules also
mandated preserving of the recorded video footages for at least one year. These Rules were
opposed by Hola as it would entail costs for installation of cameras. Sober readily installed
the cameras to be in compliance with the Rules whilst Hola continued its agitation. The Rules
were also opposed by privacy activists of Indostan.

10. Aggrieved by the actions, some consumers collectively filed a writ in the High Court of
Aridabad through a Non-Governmental Organisation, Common Man Union of Civil Liberty
(“CMUCL”), (later on joined by Hola). Sober managed to procure the latest financials filed
by Hola, which showed Hola making substantial donations to CMUCL. Based on this
finding, Sober opposed the writ, stating that it was a motivated litigation and no public
interest was involved.

11. The High Court then decided in the favour of government of Indostan and Sober. So,
aggrieved by the decision, CMUCL has filed Special Leave Petition in this Hon’ble Supreme
Court.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 3

 ISSUES RAISED

1. WHETHER THE RULES FRAMED BY THE MINISTRY OF ROAD TRANSPORT AND HIGHWAYS
ARE ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDOSTAN OR NOT?

2. WHETHER THE RULES FRAMED BY THE MINISTRY OF ROAD TRANSPORT AND HIGHWAYS
VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OR NOT?

3. WHETHER SOBER PVT. LTD. HAS VIOLATED CONTRACT AND DATA

PRIVACY/PROTECTION LAWS OF INDOSTAN?

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 4

 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. THAT THE RULES ARE NOT ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDOSTAN.

The rules framed by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways are not ultra vires the
Constitution of Indostan and are not arbitrary, unjust and unfair since mere cause of
temporary hardship doesn’t become the ground of striking down of a legislation. Also, the
rules framed do not violate the right to equality since the rules framed intend to standardize
the code of conduct of the taxi service providers, of which the utmost beneficiary would be
public in general.

2. THAT THE RULES ARE NOT VIOLATIVE OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY.

The rules framed by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways do not violate the right to
privacy of the citizens since no privacy is invaded through the rules. Moreover, the right to
privacy is not an absolute right and is subject to reasonable restrictions.

3. THAT SOBER PVT. LTD. HAS NOT VIOLATED CONTRACT AND DATA PROTECTION

LAWS.

Sober has not violated the contract and a data privacy law since no instance has been put
forth proving either violation of contract or data protection laws. Moreover, all the
requirements have been fulfilled for an agreement to be enforceable by law and no data
leakage has occurred.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 5

 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. THE RULES FRAMED ARE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDOSTAN.

It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the rules “Aridabad City Taxi
Rules, 2016” framed by Ministry of Road Transport & Highways under City Tax Act, 2016,
are not in contravention to the Constitution of Indostan and are not, therefore, ultra vires the
Constitution.

1.1 THE RULES FRAMED ARE NOT ARBITRARY, UNJUST AND UNFAIR.
1.1.1. It is most humbly submitted that the rules are not arbitrary, unjust, and unfair
since “mere factor that some hardship or injustice is caused to someone is no
ground to strike down the rule altogether if otherwise the rule appears to be just,
fair and reasonable and not constitutional.” 2
1.1.2. Moreover, the rules introduced are purely for the regulation and facilitating the
taxi transport and do not, in any sense; arbitrarily or unreasonably restrain easy
and safe transportation.
1.1.3. In this case, the Hola taxi providers didn’t demonstrate complete and absolute
failure to comply with the rules. It is evident and precisely clear from the facts that
a section of the Hola union wanted to migrate to the new system after introduction
of rules 6.9 - 6.10. The failure to build a consensus over a common system on the
part of Hola union consequently resulted in the turbulence for one section. Further
it has been unflaggingly held by the Supreme Court in the cases of Krishna
Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala,3 Municipal Corporation, City of Ahmedabad v. Jan
Mohd. Usmanbhai,4 M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka,5 that a control which is
commensurate with the need for protection of the public cannot be said to be
perverse, even though it may cause hardship in individual cases. No restriction can
be said to be unreasonable merely on the ground that in a given case it operates
harshly.

2
AP Coop All Seeds growers Federation Ltd. v. D. Achyuta Rao, (2007) 13 SCC 320.
3
AIR (1997) SC 128.
4
AIR (1986) SC 1205.
5
AIR (1995) SC 1770.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 6

 1.1.4. It is further submitted that a piece of legislation which may impose unreasonable
restrictions in one set of circumstances may be eminently reasonable in a different
set of circumstances. In such cases, public interest should be kept in mind, as
repeatedly determined by the Apex Court in a series of judgements - State of
Madras v. Row,6 Cooverjee v. Excise Commissioner7 and Virendra v. State of
Punjab.8
1.1.5. Moreover, it was held by Supreme Court in the case of Mylapore Club v. State of
Tamil Nadu,9 “a statute cannot be struck down merely because the Court thinks it
to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Any such ground of invalidity must be related to a
constitutional provision, such as Article 1410, Article 1911 or Article 2112.

6
(1952) SCR 597.
7
(1954) SCR 873.
8
AIR (1957) SC 896.
9
12 SCC 752.
10
Equality before law - The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of
the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or
place of birth
11
Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc.
(1) All citizens shall have the right
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
(f) omitted
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business
(2) Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause ( 1 ) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State
from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred
by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly
relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offence
(3) Nothing in sub clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of
India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause
(4) Nothing in sub clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of
India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub
clause
(5) Nothing in sub clauses (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as
it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of
the rights conferred by the said sub clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the
interests of any Scheduled Tribe
(6) Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said
sub clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from
making any law relating to,
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any
occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business,
industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 7

 Challenge on ground of wisdom of legislation is not permissible as it is for the
legislature to balance various interests”.
1.1.6. Further, in the case of Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar,13 it was held by Supreme
Court that once the policy is laid down by law it cannot be held invalid merely on
the ground that the discretion conferred by it may be abused in some cases and
may be exercised in a manner which is in fact discriminatory. This clears the fact
that abuse of the rules in one instance cannot be the ground for striking down of
rules.
1.1.7. It is brought to submission that a restriction which is commensurate with the need
for protection of the public cannot be said to be unreasonable,14 even though it
may cause hardship in individual cases, as held by the Supreme Court in State of
Maharashtra v. Rao Himmatbhai Narbheram.15
1.1.8. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in numerous cases -
Krishna Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala,16 Municipal Corporation, City of
Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohd. Usmanbhai17and M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka18 -
that no restriction or regulation can be said to be unreasonable merely because in a
given case it operates harshly.
1.1.9. Moreover, it is submitted that while dealing with a challenge to the constitutional
validity of any legislation, the court may prima facie lean in favour of
constitutionality and support the legislation, if it is possible to do so, on any
reasonable ground and it is for the party who attacks the validity of the legislation
to place all tools before the court which would make out a case for invalidating
the legislation.19
1.1.10. Similarly, as unmistakeably evident from the facts that the arbitrary refusal by the
taxi providers, which later formed the Hola Technologies Private Ltd., resulted in
a stream of complaints from disgruntled passengers requesting the government to
intervene. Hence, it is clear from this fact, that government’s intervention was a
necessity for the public which cannot be ignored by the courts.

12
Protection of life and personal liberty - No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law.
13
AIR (1957) SC 532.
14
Sivarajan v. Union of India, AIR (1959) SC 556.
15
AIR (1971) SC 1157.
16
AIR (1997) SC 128.
17
AIR (1986) SC 1205.
18
AIR (1995) SC 1770.
19
Dharam Dutt v. Union of India AIR (2004) SC 1295.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 8

 1.1.11. Altogether, it is submitted that the impugned rules are not substantially ultra vires
the Constitution of Indostan and are not arbitrary, unjust and unfair. The rules
facilitate, regulate and expedite the taxi transport system to develop into a more
efficient and safe system of which the utmost beneficiary is public in general and
taxi providers. Failure of Hola Technologies Private Ltd. taxi providers to unify
and build consensus over opting a common operating system is the basic reason of
inconvenience among them which cannot be the ground of invading the rules so
introduced.

1.2.The rules framed are not in violation of the right to equality of the taxi service
providers enshrined under article 1420 of the Constitution of Indostan.
1.2.1. It is humbly submitted that the rules framed by the Ministry of Road Transport
and Highways do not violate the right to equality as enshrined under Art. 1421
since, the rules do not seek to impose any benefitting or negating position on
either party. The rules place each taxi service provider on equal standpoint and in
no sense disrupt or tend to disrupt the equilibrium of equality and equity among
services and service providers.
1.2.2. Further, it is brought to submission that in accordance with Article 14,22 the
framed rules are in compliance with the right to equality and instead of, as
claimed, disturbing the status quo of equality, have established a standard and
static conduct for the taxi drivers which eradicates the arbitrary and illogical
modes of deportment on the behalf of taxi service providers which was an usual
manner of facilitating rides before imposition of standard rules, as is evident from
facts.
1.2.3. Furthermore, in the case of Ashuthosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan,23 the Apex
Court held that it is necessary in the first place to ascertain the policy underlying
the statute and the object intended to be achieved by the legislation. Hence, the
government intervention had become highly necessary to lay a standard set of
instructions ruling out the possibilities of arbitrary use of the discretionary power
possessed by the taxi drivers.

20
Supra note 9.
21
Supra note 9.
22
Ibid.
23
(2002) 4 SCC 34.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 9

 1.2.4. Moreover, it is submitted that the Apex Court in its repeated judgements has
emphatically held through various cases, such as Transport & Dock Workers
Union v. Mumbai Port Trust,24 State of Rajasthan v. Shankar Lal Parmar,25 B.
Manmad Reddy v. Chandra Prakash Reddy 26and National Council for Teacher
Education v. Shri Shyam Shikha Prakashan Sansthan,27 that differential treatment
does not per se amount to violation of Article 1428 of the Constitution. It violates
Article 1429 only when there is no reasonable basis.
1.2.5. Likewise, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in Thimmappa,30 “when a law is
challenged to be discriminatory essentially on the ground that it denies equal
treatment or protection, the question for determination by the Court is not whether
it has resulted in inequality but whether there is some difference which bears a just
and reasonable relation to the object of legislation”. In the above-mentioned
case,31 the Court went on further to explain that mere differentiation doesn’t per se
amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. To
attract the operation of the clause it is necessary to show that the selection or
differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary, that it doesn’t rest on any rational
basis having regard to the object which the legislature has in view.
1.2.6. Moreover, the Supreme Court has observed that it is settled law that
differentiation is not always discriminatory. If there is a rational nexus on the
basis of which differentiation has been made with the object sought to be achieved
by practical provision, then such differentiation is not discriminatory and doesn’t
violate the principles of Article 1432 of the Constitution of India. 33
1.2.7. It is further submitted that in the matter at hand, the rules framed by the Ministry
are not in violation of the right to equality as the rules do not aim to place
anybody on a positive or negative stand. The rules aim to lay a standard for
conduct for the taxi service providers. The mere fact that a portion of people has
failed to comply with the rules becomes no ground for attack on the statute.

24
(2011) AIR SCW 220.
25
AIR (2012) SC 1913.
26
(2010) 3 SCC 314.
27
AIR (2011) SC 932.
28
Supra note 9.
29
Supra note 9.
30
K. Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, AIR (2001) SC 467.
31
Ibid.
32
Supra note 9.
33
Union of India v. M. Valliapan, (1999) 6 SCC 259, 269.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 10

 1.2.8. Moreover, there cannot be any such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty
wholly freed from restraint for that would lead to anarchy and disorder. The
possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as
may be deemed to be essential to the safety, health, peace, general order and
morals of the community, as has been held in various cases by Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India34
1.2.9. Lastly, it is brought to submission that individual rights cannot be absolute in a
welfare state.35 It has to be subservient to the rights of the public at large. In
Santosh Singh v. Delhi Administration,36 it was held by the Supreme Court “the
test of reasonableness of restriction has to be considered in each case in the light
of the nature of right infringed, the purpose of the restriction, the extent and nature
of the mischief required to be suppressed and the prevailing social order and
conditions at the time. There can be no abstract standard of reasonableness and
our Constitution provides reasonably precise general guidance in that matter”.
1.2.10. Hence, the rules framed are not ultra vires the Constitution of Indostan. The rules
are framed by keeping the public policy in sight and are the result of stream of
complaints requesting government intervention. Furthermore, the rules lay down a
set of standard code of conduct which is a necessity for organised and structured
regulation of a system where the complete public transport is dependent on private
players.

34
Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 88; Santokh Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR (1973) SC 1091;
Laxmi v. State of U.P., AIR (1971) SC 873.
35
Confederation of Ex-serviceman Association v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 399.
36
Santosh Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR (1973) SC 1091.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 11

 2. THAT THE RULES ARE NOT IN CONTRAVENTION TO THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY THAT
THE CITIZENS OF INDOSTAN ARE ENTITLED TO AS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT.

It is humbly submitted that the rules “Aridabad City Taxi Rules, 2016” framed by Ministry of
Road Transport & Highways under City Tax Act, 2016, are not in contravention to the right
to privacy that the citizens of Indostan are entitled to as a fundamental right.

2.1.The right to privacy is not an absolute right.

2.1.1. It is humbly submitted that the right to privacy, like every right, is not an absolute
right.
2.1.2. It is brought to the submission of the Hon’ble Court that the Supreme Court in J.
KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India37declared that right to privacy is not an absolute
right but is subject to certain reasonable restrictions.
2.1.3. Further, in the above-mentioned case, J. Chandrachud held “like other rights
which form part of the fundamental freedoms protected by Part III, including the
right to life and personal liberty, privacy is not an absolute right. A law which
encroaches upon privacy will have to withstand the touchstone of permissible
restrictions on fundamental rights in the context of Article 21 an invasion of
privacy must be justified on the basis of a law which stipulated a procedure which
is fair, just and reasonable.”
2.1.4. Furthermore, in the case mentioned above, the Court went on to observe that an
invasion of life or personal liberty must meet the three-fold requirement of: (i)
legality, which postulates the existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a
legitimate aim; and (iii) proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between
objects and the means adopted to achieve them. The tests laid down in the case
discussed above have been met by the Rules framed by the government i.e., first,
there is a law; second, there is a need of security and protection inside the cab and;
third, the rules imposed fulfil the rational nexus between the object and the means
adopted to achieve them.
2.1.5. Moreover, in the Puttaswamy’s case,38 the Hon’ble Apex Court opined that the
legitimate aims of the state would include for instance protecting national security,
preventing and investigating crime, encouraging innovation and the spread of
knowledge and prevention of dissipation of social welfare benefits. These are

37
(2015) 10 SCC 92.
38
Supra note 38.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 12

 matters of policy to be considered by the Union government. Likewise, the Rules
imposed aim to ensure security and prevent crimes inside the cabs.
2.1.6. It is pertinent to note that the concept of privacy has to be viewed in light of two
qualitative relationships: one, between the citizen and the State; the other between
citizens and non-state actors39. Issues of privacy in respect of both have to be dealt
with separately. The first has constitutional implications and the second relates to
confidentiality. Thus, the right to privacy has both horizontal and vertical
attributes.
2.1.7. Further, the State may at times, require access to personal information for public
good. In this context, the citizen may be obliged to give access to such
information for enhancing citizens’ entitlements, access to services, prevention or
detection of crime, national security, investigation and prosecution of criminal
offences.
2.1.8. Furthermore, in respect of data shared with the State on account of a legal
mandate or otherwise, the issue of privacy is directly linked with fundamental
rights enshrined in the Constitution. 40
2.1.9. Moreover, the second aspect relating to the right to privacy in the context of State
action relates to data, which is shared either by law or otherwise with the State.
Such data is shared for specific purposes. It is also true of data relating to a
person‘s physical attributes shared via taxi service provider. Access to such data
by another government agency, to which the citizen has not consented, would also
infringe the citizen‘s right to privacy.
2.1.10. It is respectfully submitted that Right to privacy is not an absolute right flowing
out of the bouquet of rights under enshrined under Article 21 41.
2.1.11. The judgements in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra,42 (8 Judge Bench) and Kharak
Singh v. State of U.P.,43(6 Judge Bench) which had made certain observations that
right to privacy was not a guaranteed right under Part III were premised on an

39
In United States v. Jones 132 S.Ct. 945, Justice Sotomayor‘s concurring opinion, while holding that extended
GPS monitoring of a suspect by the law enforcement agencies violated his right to privacy, observed that ―it
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties‖ (Smith v. US 99 S.Ct. 2577/; Couch v. United States 409 US
322 (1973); and United States v. Miller 96 S.Ct. 1619/ 425 US 435 (1976)).
40
In Kyllo v. United States 121 S.Ct. 2038 – The US Supreme Court held that the thermal imaging of the house
of a persons suspected of growing marijuana was a violation of his right to privacy.
41
Supra note 11.
42
Supra note 58.
43
Supra note 59.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 13

 understanding of Part III as per the law laid down in the case of A.K. Gopalan44.
A.K. Gopalan’s case45 was specifically overruled in R.C. Cooper v. UOI46 (11
Hon‘ble judges) and thereafter further clarified to be so in Maneka Gandhi v.
U.O.I.,47 (7 Hon‘ble judges). It was conclusively and consistently declared by the
Supreme Court in these cases that the right to privacy is not an absolute right.
2.1.12. Further, in Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 48 Justice Mathew in unequivocal
terms after noticing Kharak Singh’s case49 held that the right to privacy is implicit
in the concept of individual autonomy and liberty. However, the Court
categorically states that it is not an absolute right and can be subjected to
restrictions based on compelling public interest.
2.1.13. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record
Assn. v. Union of India50 held that the right to privacy is not an absolute right and
cannot be held to overpower the concerns of security and public order.
2.1.14. In view of the above it is submitted that these judgments which have rightly held
the field should not be unsettled as aptly described “those things which have been
so often adjudged ought to rest in peace 51”. Similarly, it is a well settled principle
that the right to privacy, like every fundamental right, is not an absolute right, and
hence, ought to rest in peace.
2.1.15. Altogether, it is submitted that the right to privacy is not an absolute right. As
discussed in the cases above, the right to privacy is not extended to absoluteness.
It is further submitted, therefore, that any legislation in public interest, demanding
some data cannot be held bad by erecting the right to privacy as an absolute
fundamental right.

2.2.The rules are not in contravention to right to privacy.

2.2.1. It is humbly submitted that the rules framed are not in contravention to the right to
privacy as the rules framed are aimed to secure the passengers in course of travel
through public transport. As it is evident from facts, a security strategy was

44
(1958) SCR 88.
45
Id.
46
(1970) 1 SCC 248.
47
(1978) 1 SCC 248.
48
(1975) 2 SCC 148.
49
Supra note 59.
50
(2016) 5 SCC 1.
51
Shankar Raju v. Union of India, (2011) 2 SCC 132.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 14

 needed in order to ensure safety of passengers by improving safety and preventing
the incidents of crimes, especially rapes and molestations.
2.2.2. In the instant case, the presence of CCTV doesn’t violate privacy of the
passengers as privacy is linked to private property, and not to public property,
whereas the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, explicitly places cabs and taxis under the
tag of public transport through S. 2 (35)52 which defines “public service vehicle”
as: “any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers
for hire or reward, and includes a maxicab, a motorcab, contract carriage, and
stage carriage”. This clears the fact that taxis and cabs are an integral part of
public transport.
2.2.3. Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court remarked in Bhavesh Jayanti Lakhani v. State of
Maharashtra,53 “if the cameras are installed in public areas or common area
where people have the right to access in such place no one has any right to
complain that the cameras invade their right to privacy. The right to privacy has to
be linked to private property not with property which is held in common or which
is for public use”.
2.2.4. Furthermore, Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified again in the case of Phoolan Devi
v. Shekhar Kapoor And Ors,54 while confirming the judgement of Auto Shankar’s
case,55 “in the arena of right to privacy Auto Shankar judgment makes it clear that
right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and property guaranteed to the
citizens of this country by Article 21 56 of the Constitution, consent and public
record being exception in contravening the right to privacy”.
2.2.5. Similarly, in the case of R. Rajagopal v. State Of T.N.,57 the Supreme Court said
“once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer
subsists”.
2.2.6. It is further submitted that as taxi and cabs are part of public transport, as evident
from the S. 2(35) of Motor Vehicles Act, 198858, no privacy can be expected in

52
(35) “public service vehicle” means any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of
passengers for hire or reward, and includes a maxicab, a motorcab, contract carriage, and stage carriage.
53
(2011) 2 MWN (Cri) 233.
54
57 (1995) DLT 154.
55
(1994)SCC (6) 632.
56
Supra note 11.
57
(1995) AIR 264.
58
Supra note 37.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 15

 public places and property, as remarked by the Supreme Court in Bhavesh Jayanti
Lakhani v. State of Maharashtra.59
2.2.7. Moreover, the history of crimes in India has witnessed numerable instances of
illicit happenings in public transports. With the presence of CCTV surveillance,
the wrongdoers could have been prevented from committing the felonious deeds,
or at least better investigations could be done.
2.2.8. Further, it is important here to remember the case of Shiv Kumar Yadav v. State60
where a woman was returning home in a cab called from ‘Uber Cab Mobile
Application’ and was raped by the driver. The presence of CCTV cameras in such
instances would prevent such cruel felonies being committed.
2.2.9. Furthermore, Hon’ble Supreme Court remarked in the case of State of Punjab v.
Jagir Singh61: "A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give
flight to one’s imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to
whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is
charged”. For the same reason, it is contended that the use of CCTV for
surveillance should not be obstructed as it eliminates the chances of delivery of
injustice as there exists no doubts for the benefit of the accused.
2.2.10. In another rueful case, Mukesh & Anr vs State of NCT Of Delhi & Ors.,62 the
twenty-three year old lady, who had gone with her friend to watch a film, got into
a bus to be dropped at a particular place, but became a prey to the savage lust of a
gang of six, and faced brutal rape. This incident is also another pitiful happening
of which the prevention would be possible through the existence of surveillance
by cameras.
2.2.11. It is pertinent to note that in both the abovementioned cases, the molestations and
rapes were committed inside the transport vehicles. If there had been CCTV
surveillance, such acts might have been prevented and better investigation could
have been done. The CCTV footages clearly showing the sad incident could have
fastened up the process and easier and speedier justice could have been provided
to the victim. It is not only about these cases, but about all the numerous similar
incidents which have taken place or are about to take place. The benefits of doubt
given to the accused would also be ruled out.

59
Supra note 38.
60
CRL .M.C.725/2015.
61
(1974) 3 SCC 277.
62
(2014) 16 SCC 86.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 16

 2.2.12. Similarly, Hon’ble Supreme Court said in Tomaso Bruno & Anr v. State Of U.P.63
“with the advancement of information technology, scientific temper in the
individual and at the institutional level is to pervade the methods of investigation.
With the increasing impact of technology in everyday life and as a result, the
production of electronic evidence in cases has become relevant to establish the
guilt of the accused or the liability of the defendant. Electronic documents strictu
sensu (strictly speaking) are admitted as material evidence”.
2.2.13. It is further submitted that the production of scientific and CCTV records have
been of great help to the investigating agency and also to the prosecution. The
relevance of electronic evidence is also evident in the light of Mohd. Ajmal
Mohammad Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra,64 wherein production of
transcripts of internet transactions helped the prosecution case a great deal in
proving the guilt of the accused”.
2.2.14. Similarly, in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu65 in which five
heavily armed persons practically stormed the Parliament House complex and
inflicted heavy casualties on the security men on duty, CCTV cameras acted as the
best evidence available and significantly helped the prosecution to investigate.
2.2.15. It is submitted that the presence of CCTV surveillance in public transport will
only enhance the security and safety of the passengers. Even the Supreme Court in
Tomaso Bruno’s case66 opined CCTV footage as “best evidence”. The presence of
surveillance creates a sense of fear in the minds of criminals and a feeling of
safety in the minds of innocent passengers. The public in general is the supreme
beneficiary of the rules directing installation of CCTV cameras in cabs, and
negating this policy would not be the best move for public security enhancement.
2.2.16. It is further submitted, again, that there has been no violation of the right to
privacy in the instant case since the right to privacy is not an absolute right and
individual’s right are not more important than public’s security.

63
(2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 54.
64
(2012) 9 SCC 1.
65
(2005) 11 SCC 600.
66
(2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 54.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 17

3. THAT SOBER PVT. LTD. HAS NOT VIOLATED CONTRACT AND DATA PROTECTION LAWS.
3.1.1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Sober Pvt. Ltd. has not violated
the contract laws... There have been no proved instances signifying a breach of
contract.
3.1.2. Further, it is submitted that where the agreement of the parties has been reduced to
writing and the document containing the agreement has been signed by one or both of
them, it is well established that the party signing will ordinarily be bound by the terms
of the written agreement whether or not he has read them and whether or not he is
ignorant of their precise legal effect.67
3.1.3. Furthermore, the other party cannot be exempted as if a party signs a contractual
document,68 he will normally be bound by its terms. 69 Frequently, however, the
document is simply made available to him before or at the time of making the
contract, and the question will then arise whether the printed conditions which it
contains or to which it refers have become terms of the contract.70
3.1.4. It is submitted that the contract between Sober Pvt. Ltd. and its users is a standard
form of contract. Moreover, the party to whom the document is supplied will probably
not trouble to read it, and may even be ignorant that it contains any conditions at all.
Yet standard form contracts very frequently embody clauses which purport to impose
obligations on him or to exclude or restrict the liability of the person supplying the
document.71Similarly, despite the probability of act of ignorance by another party to
read the contract, the party cannot be exempted from the terms of contract.
3.1.5. Moreover, despite acknowledgement by the users of a contract concerning their
financial information, neither ignorance of terms and conditions nor ignorance of law
is a good excuse.
3.1.6. Likewise, in many cases, one or other of the parties seeks to imply a term from the
wording of a particular contract and the facts and circumstances surrounding it 72. The
court will not make a contract for the parties. 73 Similarly, it is submitted that authority
of courts is extended only to interpretation of terms and conditions and not to
structuring of contract.

67
Parker v. South Eastern Railway company (1877) 2 C.P.D416, 421.
68
Cf. Grogan v. Robin Meredith Plant Hire (1996) CLC 1127.
69
Supra note 73.
70
Clarke (1976) C.L.J. 57.
71
Joseph Chitty, Chitty on Contracts: General principles, 1012 (H. G. Beale, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012).
72
Hamlyn & Co v. Wood &Co (1891) 2 Q.B. 488, 494.
73
Trollope & Colls Ltd v. Northwest Metropolitian Regional Hospital Board (1973) 1 W.L.R.601, 609.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 18

3.1.7. Moreover, the knowledge or ignorance of each party of the matter to be implied, but
there are no complexities in the contract in the case in hand and everything mentioned
is explicitly communicated.
3.1.8. It is further submitted that the general presumption is that the parties have expressed
every material term which they intended should govern their contract, whether oral or
in writing. 74The court will only imply a contract if it is one which must necessarily
have been intended by them, 75 and in particular will be reluctant to make any
implication where it is essential that contracts of the particular type “should operate in
accordance with the terms which appear on their face” 76 or “where the parties have
entered into a carefully drafted written contract containing detailed terms agreed
between them”. 77 However, in the case at hand, it is submitted that the contract has
explicitly laid down all terms and conditions and there is no confusing over any term.
3.1.9. Moreover, there have been no instances of breach of contract or hampering of public
policy in the case-at-hand which necessitates implication. The touchstone is always
necessity and not merely reasonableness. 78
3.1.10. Furthermore, a term, such as “future amendment” will not be implied if it would be
inconsistent with the express wording of the contract,79 and in the case-at-hand, the
contract cannot be considered as needing implication.
3.1.11. It is further submitted that when the contract does not necessarily involves the
commission of a legally objectionable act and the legally objectionable intention or
purpose of one party is unknown to the other, the latter is not precluded from
enforcing the contract80
3.1.12. It is pertinent to note that the Courts do not interpret contracts where it would be
reasonable to do so but only where it would be necessity to give business efficacy to
the contract. Such a term is sometimes said to be implied by fact. Here the implication
of terms depends upon the intention of the parties gleaned from the express terms of
the agreement and the surrounding circumstances.81

74
Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v. Cooper (1941) A.C. 108, 137.
75
L.French& Co v. Leeston Shipping Co (1992)1 A.C. 451, 455.
76
JSC v. Standard Bank Plc (2008) EWCA Civ 819, (2008) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 456.
77
Jones v. St John’s College Oxford (1970) L.R.6 Q.B. 115, 126.
78
Liverpool CC v. Irwin (1977) A.C. 239,266.
79
BP Refinery (Western port) Pty Ltd v. Shrine of Hasting (1977) UKPC 13.
80
Mason v. Clarke (1955) A.C. 778, 793, 805; bank fur Gemeinwirstschaft Aktiengesellschaft v. City of London
Garages Ltd (1971)1. W.L.R. 149.
81
Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v. Cooper (1941) AC 108, 137.

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 19

3.1.13. Furthermore, it involves the court determining, in the light of general considerations
of policy, the standard incidents of the particular type relationship rather than
constructing a hypothetical bargain. Although it has usually been said that the
criterion for this form of implication is also ‘necessity’ rather than ‘reasonableness’ 82
3.1.14. Moreover, in the case of HUDA v. Kedarnath83, the Supreme Court adopted the view
that such a unilateral option is not unfair, unreasonable, or against public policy.
Financial institutions carrying on the business of collecting, investing, landing funds
are well within the rights to carve out ways and means of settlement of commercial
transactions with their borrowers.
3.1.15. Altogether, it is submitted that Sober Pvt. Ltd. has not violated the contract and data
protection laws. Moreover, no evidence has been furnished proving a breach on the
behalf of respondents.

82
Liverpool City Council v Irwin (1977) AC 239.
83
(2015) 1 SCC 186

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 20

 PRAYER

WHEREFORE, in the light of issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Respondent humbly prays that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to

 Quash the Special Leave Petition.

 Uphold the judgment of High Court of Aridabad.

And/Or,

Pass any other order as it deems fit in the interest of equity, justice and good
conscience.

For This Act of Kindness, the Respondent Shall Duty Bound Forever Pray.

Sd/-
(Counsel for Respondent)

Memorandum on behalf of respondents Page 21