1) Quimiguing v Icao G.R. No.

26795 July 31, 1970

J. J.B.L. Reyes

Facts:

Carmen Quimiging, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in
Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was
married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with the plaintiff under force and
intimidation and without her consent.

As a result, she became pregnant and had to pay for hospitalization and stopped
studying. The latter claimed damages of Php 120 a month.

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since
the complaint did not allege that the child had been born. The trial judge
sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.

Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse,
she had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection,
ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no
cause of action. The plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

Issue: Is a conceived child entitled to support?

Held: Yes. Petition granted.

A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of

its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its
progenitors.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring
that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate
support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291.

It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the fetus be alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb).
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to
force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights
of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Article
21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts

Hence, the girl has a cause of action.

2) De Jesus v Syquia

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop
owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the
defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila
was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with
Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got
pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On

February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his
and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country,
he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and
“junior’s” sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and
hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines
Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed
signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with
another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in
charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be
given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by
defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity?

2. Whether the defendant is liable for damages for the breach to marry?

HELD:

1. Yes. The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity
and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by
Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.

“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession
of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal
the father's resolution to admit the status”.

2. No. Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide
damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on
this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment
could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.

Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of

maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They
likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the
order as to the amount of pension.

3)Continental Steel v. Montaño

Doctrines:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality
first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.

Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation
(Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death
and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA).

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife had a
premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus
died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.

Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his
claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits.

It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the
CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or
must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be
covered by the CBA death benefits.

Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death
of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two
elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as
legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel
contended that only one with civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and
42 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered
born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within
twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the
rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child never died because it never
acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental
Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a
person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never
acquired juridical personality.
Labor arbiter Montaño argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the
parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on
another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself
without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother.

Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s resolution. Hence
this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die

2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent
3. Whether or not Montano is entitled to bereavement leave

Held:

1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for
the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is
considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case.

The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death.
Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality
first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.

No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that
the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life,
then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not
have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance.
The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child
must have been born or must have acquired civil personality. Without such
qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes
the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

3. Yes. Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to
give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who
suffered the loss of a loved one.

It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of
their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died
during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
subsequently.

4) Limjoco vs Estate of Fragrante

FACTS:

Pedro Fragrante, a Filipino citizen, applied for a certificate of public convenience to

install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal.

Fragrante dies while his application was still pending. At the time of his death, his
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.

The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the

intestate estate of the deceased through authorizing the said intestate estate with its
special or judicial administrator, appointed by the Court, to maintain and operate the
plant.
Limjoco (petitioner) argues that the intestate estate of Fragrante cannot be substituted
as the applicant for the deceased and is a contravention of the law.

ISSUE:

1) Whether the estate of Fragante is a person.

2) Whether the estate of Fragante may be considered as a citizen

HELD:

1). YES.
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, under the Bill of Rights, it
seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases
relate to natural persons, the term “person” must be deemed to include artificial or
juridical persons.

It was the intent of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural,
persons in these constitutional immunities and in other of similar nature. Among these
artificial or juridical persons fare estates of deceased persons.

Hence, the Court held that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of
Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purpose of the
settlement and distribution of his estate which include the exercise during the judicial
administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his
which survived after his death.

Fragante has rights and obligation which survived after his death. One of those rights
involved the pending application for public convenience before the PSC.

Under the present legal system, rights and obligations which survived after death
have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased.

3. YES.
The fiction of such extension of Fragante’s citizenship is made necessary to avoid the
injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death, to
the loss of the investment which he had already made in the ice plant, not counting
the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding.