V.
Privacy of Communications and "keep the Constitution up to date" or "to bring it
Correspondence
1) Katz vs. US
Facts: Acting on a suspicion that Katz was
transmitting gambling information over the phone to
clients in other states, Federal agents attached an
eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone
booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of
the conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-
count indictment for the illegal transmission of
wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston
and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his conviction
arguing that the recordings could not be used as
evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected
this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion
into the phone booth itself. The Court granted
certiorari.
Issue: Does the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures require the police
to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public
pay phone?
Held: Yes. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations
and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied
was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play.
"The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"
wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A
concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan
introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of
Fourth Amendment protection.
Dissenting opinion of Justice Black: Fourth
amendment should not be applied in cases of
eavesdropping or in this case wiretapping. The limits
given by the Fourth amendment are “persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures…” which are all tangible and can be searched
while conversations effected by eavesdropping or
wiretapping is not tangible and can neither be
searched or seized. Also, the list in the Fourth
amendment should only apply to something that
already exists so that it can be described. Overhearing
conversations are something that can only take place
in the future and indescribable at the moment. If the
framers of the Constitution wanted to include
eavesdropping to be prohibited, they would have done
so by changing the language thereof. “I will not
distort the words of the Amendment in order to
into harmony with the times." It was never meant
that this Court have such power, which, in effect,
would make us a continuously functioning
constitutional convention.”
2) Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA
Facts: Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with
the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita
Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage
license and/or psychological incapacity of the
petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private
respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and
unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to
Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial
court admitted all of private respondent’s offered
evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition
for certiorari with the CA to assail the admission in
evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
These tape recordings were made and obtained
when private respondent allowed his friends from the
military to wire tap his home telephone.
CA denied the petition because (1) Tape
recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any
other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for
certain purposes, depending on how they are
presented and offered and on how the trial judge
utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and
the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A
petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to
rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence
adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is
interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction.
If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in
the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not
through the special civil action of certiorari. The
error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be
anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by
appeal and not by certiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: W/N the recordings of the telephone
conversations are admissible in evidence
W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the
petitioner in the Court of Appeal

Held: 1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to
Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication,
and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not
being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word,
or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained, obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of
this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is
generally not available to challenge an interlocutory
order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases
is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment,
incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing
the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court
may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
3) Ramirez vs. CA
Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in
the RTC alleging that the private respondent in a
confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious
mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s
dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.” In support of her claim,
petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought moral damages, attorney’s fees and other
expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00,
in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript
on which the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the
event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed
a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication,
and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
the Information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of
R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From the
RTC’s order, the private respondent filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which
forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA
declared the RTC’s order null and void, and holding
that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioner
filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private
Conversation” without the consent of both of the party
is a violation of R.A. 4200.
Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act
to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and
Other Purposes,” provides that it shall be unlawful for
any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described. The
aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes
it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to
be a party other than or different from those involved
in the private communication. The statute’s intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
“any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation
with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator. The unambiguity of the express
words of the provision, therefore plainly supports the
view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
4) Navarro vs. CA
FACTS: Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena,
Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the police
station to report alledged indecent show in one of the
night establishment shows in the City. At the station, a
heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan
and accused policeman Navarro who was then having
drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs.
The victim was hit with the handle of the accused's
gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment.
The exchange of words was recorded on tape,
specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro
after the altercation that it was the victim who
provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the
other media man , testified. Presented in evidence to
confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had
made of the heated discussion at the police station
between the accused police officer Navarro and the
deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the
knowledge of the two.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is
admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping.
2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party and lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of the
accused.
HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is
admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the
voice recording he had made.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting,
or recording of private communications (Ramirez v
Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was
not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately
preceded the acts of the accused, constituted sufficient
provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or
improper conduct of the offended party capable of
exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The
provocation must be sufficient and must immediately
precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must
be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong,
which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity.
The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong must also be considered.
The exclamations made by Navarro after the scuffle
that it was Lingan who provoked him showed that he
had no intent to kill the latter.
5) Zulueta vs. CA
The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescrbied by law. Any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceeding section,
shall inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of
private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother,
a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic
and took 157 documents consisting of private
respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries,
Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence
in a case for legal separation and for disqualification
from the practice of medicine which petitioner had
filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials
obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful
means are admissible as evidence in court regarding
marital separation and disqualification from medical
practice.
HELD: Indeed the documents and papers in question
are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injuction declaring "the privacy of communication
and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is
to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition
in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from
the court or which public safety or order require
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible
"for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity
or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
The law insures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for
or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from
the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other. And
this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
6) Alejano vs. Cabuay
Facts: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321
armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior
officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood
Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”). The
soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood
and planted explosive devices in its immediate
surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced
their support for the administration and called for the
resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
several cabinet members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the
same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities after several negotiations with government
emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive
devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then
returned to their barracks. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of
Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major
Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten
junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The
transfer took place while military and civilian
authorities were investigating the soldiers’
involvement in the Oakwood incident. Government
prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with
the RTC against the soldiers involved in the Oakwood
incident. the CA rendered its decision ordered Gen.
Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the
regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold
faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance
with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The
appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his
commitment made in court regarding visiting hours
and the detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a
day. The appellate court declared that while the
opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent
violation of his right to privacy of communication,
this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal
restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus
proceedings.
Issue: Whether the opening, inspection and reading of
the letter of the detainees is an infringement of a
citizen’s privacy rights.
Held: No, the SC do not agree with the CA that the
opening and reading of the detainees’ letters violated
the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The
letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection
of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the
same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the
inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to have
been read by the ISAFP authorities were not
confidential letters between the detainees and their
lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from
detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely
acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as
their counsel when he received the letters for mailing.
In the present case, since the letters were not
confidential communication between the detainees
and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention
Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked
confidential communication between the detainees
and their lawyers, the detention officials should not
read the letters but only open the envelopes for
inspection in the presence of the detainees. The right
to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of
RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in
lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of
their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted
prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy
rights. The detainees in the present case are junior
officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing
coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion
perpetua. The junior officers are not ordinary
detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident
involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in
the heart of the financial district of the country. As
members of the military armed forces, the detainees
are subject to the Articles of War. Moreover, the
junior officers are detained with other high-risk
persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we
must give the military custodian a wider range of
deference in implementing the regulations in the
ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in
a better position to know the security risks involved in
detaining the junior officers, together with the
suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the
appropriate regulations depend largely on the security
risks involved, we should defer to the regulations
adopted by the military custodian in the absence of
patent arbitrariness.

7) Data Privacy Act

- Comprehensive and strict privacy legislation “to
protect the fundamental human right of privacy, of
communication while ensuring free flow of
information to promote innovation and growth.”
- The Data Privacy Act is broadly applicable to
individuals and legal entities that process personal
information, with some exceptions. The law has
extraterritorial application, applying not only to
businesses with offices in the Philippines, but when
equipment based in the Philippines is used for
processing. The act further applies to the processing
of the personal information of Philippines citizens
regardless of where they reside.
- “The processing of personal data shall be allowed
subject to adherence to the principles of transparency,
legitimate purpose, and proportionality.”