Republic of the Philippines Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove

SUPREME COURT timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area
Manila of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from
October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;
THIRD DIVISION
(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990 [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order
stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner, logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to
vs. presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents. (c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the
contents of which were as follows:
Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.
PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE REQUESTED TO STOP ALL
Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks Development LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE
Corporation. ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE
WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIOR TO
THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE
COURTS, J.: APPRECIATED — [Annex "4" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 48];

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March
17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister
Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement
of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos
administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks
Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry
laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take
possession of all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the Petition;
Rollo, pp. 54-63].
Petitioner made the following allegations:
(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as
TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then
(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a
letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the
Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to alleging that it was not given
the forest conservation and opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging
531, but no operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken
on this letter;
(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the
area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and
Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the
other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal
award or license; and,
(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed
President Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister
Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July 22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. The
Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the
Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or
welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact
that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover,
emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija,
Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for reinstatement has been denied in
view of the total ban of all logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva
Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao which was imposed for reasons of conservation and national
security.
The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] in
respect to forest t considers itself the trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure
the availability of forest resources not only for the present, but also for the future
generations of Filipinos.
On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of the country are well
documented. Their financial demands on logging concessionaires are well known. The
government, therefore, is well within its right to deprive its enemy of sources of funds in
order to preserve itself, its established institutions and the liberty and democratic way of life
of its people.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating, among others. its
request that TLA No. 356 issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR
however denied this motion in an order dated September 15, 1986. stating in part:
xxx xxx xxx
Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare portion of TLA No. 87 to
Twin Peaks Realty Development Corporation under TLA No. 356 be declared null and void,
suffice it to say that the Ministry is now in the process of reviewing all contracts, permits or
other form of privileges for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of
natural resources entered into, granted, issued or acquired before the issuance of
Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution for the purpose of
amending, modifying or revoking them when the national interest so requires.
xxx xxx xxx
The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has jurisdiction and authority over
all forest lands. On the basis of this authority, the Ministry issued the order banning all
logging operations/activities in Quirino province, among others, where movant's former
concession area is located. Therefore, the issuance of an order disallowing any person or
entity from removing cut or uncut logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA No.
356, would constitute an unnecessary or superfluous act on the part of the Ministry.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]
On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Meanwhile, per MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on
November 26, 1986, the logging ban in the province of Quirino was lifted.
Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President.
In a resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of the President, acting through then Deputy
Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The
Office of the President ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter
not having been terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
on August 14, 1987.
Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the
issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, on August 27, 1987. On
October 13, 1987, it filed a supplement to its petition for certiorari. Thereafter, public and
private respondents submitted their respective comments, and petitioner filed its
consolidated reply thereto. In a resolution dated May 22, 1989, the Court resolved to give
due course to the petition.
After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds several factors
which militate against the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner.
1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory
administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are
as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered
by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a
matter once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction
[See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax
Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 80160, June 26, 1989].
In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April
2, 1986, respectively, sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the
Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well
as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents
in 1984.
But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e.
Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative
actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly
appointed Minister of the MNR requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions,
these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of
Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300 (1959); Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28,
1962, 6 SCRA 609; Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 374].
No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September 19, 1983
which petitioner claimed to have sent to then President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo,
pp. 50-53], seeking the reconsideration of the 1983 order issued by Director Cortes of the
Bureau. It must be pointed out that the averments in this letter are entirely different from
the charges of fraud against officials under the previous regime made by petitioner in its
letters to public respondents herein. In the letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply
contested its inclusion in the list of concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled, by
defending its record of selective logging and reforestation practices in the subject
concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to have been taken by petitioner
until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent scheme became apparent in 1984 as
evidenced by the awarding of the subject timber concession area to other entities in that
year.
2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari
in the present case because he failed to file his petition within a reasonable period.
The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is whether or
not public respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their
predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what the petition ultimately seeks is the nullification of
the Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87 and granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent,
which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.
Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the
earlier administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a petition for certiorari is
prejudicial to its cause. For although no specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must
nevertheless be done within a "reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of
a petition for certiorari is the "reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from
the commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul
the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566, 571]. And
failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the
petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches [Municipality of Carcar v.
Court of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 392).
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,
or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R.
No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2,
1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking
to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the
right itself. Verily, the laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights
(Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt) [See Buenaventura v. David, 37 Phil. 435
(1918)].
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and
1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of
the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its
delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly,
the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.
3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of
certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. It is precisely this for
which prevents the Court from departing from the general application of the rules
enunciated above.
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the
MNR which were ed by the Office of the President, will disclose public policy consideration
which effectively forestall judicial interference in the case at bar,
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy
to develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing
department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses
issued, under the previous dispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative
departments of the incumbent administration are presently taking stock of its environmental
policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands and developing an agenda for future
programs for their conservation and rehabilitation.
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and
growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their
crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can
hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the
profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the
irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even more
disastrous and lasting economic and social effects. The delicate balance of nature having
been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply of
food and energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.
While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the
country's immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to ensure future
generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment demands effective and
circumspect action from the government to check further denudation of whatever remains
of the forest lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear
constitutional command to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article
II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused
by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of
cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies [See
Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938
(1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28,
1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G. R. No. L-
21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-21352,
November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37
SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay
Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as
in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the
public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court
recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the
appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on
parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources [Director of Forestry v. the part of public respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari
Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought.
Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 751]. Timber
licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by SO ORDERED.
the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right
to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so
require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law Feliciano, J., is on leave.
clause [See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director
of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify
the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued
under the previous regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate corrective measures
by the department.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged irregularities
in the issuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in
contravention of the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue
influence exerted on department officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise
of the State's power to regulate the use and exploitation of forest resources. The alleged
practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred individuals, regardless of merit, would be
an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the
avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should
the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of
officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public
policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked, in the
exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992
SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS,
ISIDRO GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI, respondents.
Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner.
Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues raised in this petition — the
correct application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove
and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in
Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992.
On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious
violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.
The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a
complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative
remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605.
Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987, 1 and the
motion for reconsideration on February 15, 1988. 2 The petitioner then elevated the matter
to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a decision dated July
4, 1988, 3 and in its resolution of September 27, 1988, denying the motion for
reconsideration. 4
The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was
not without exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it
could be dispensed with. The respondent court found that in the case before it, the
applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention, which it explained thus:
The lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the City Council of Pagadian in its
Resolution No. 111 requested the Bureau of Forest Development to reserve 1,000 hectares
in Lison Valley. This request remained unacted upon. Instead in 1982, a TLA covering 29,500
hectares, including the area requested, was given to petitioner.
Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its resolution became reality.
"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the logging operations of the defendant
has caused heavy siltation not only in the Labangan River (as predicted by the City Council
of Pagadian City in 1981) but also in the Tukuran River, Salug River, Sindangan River, and
Sibuguey River. In other words, the adverse effects of the logging operations of the
defendant have already covered a wider area than that feared to be adversely affected by
the City Council of Pagadian City.
Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested areas years back, particularly in the
Island of Mindanao. When the grant of logging concessions started, so was the denudation
of forests. . . . It is common knowledge that heavy floods have occurred in areas/places
adjoining logging concessions. (Resolution dated December 11, 1987, p. 5).
Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. Irreparable damage would ensue
unless the court intervenes. Reliance on the DENR may not be enough, judging from its
inaction on the council's request seven years back.
The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the case of De Lara v. Cloribel, 5
where "irreparable damage and injury" was allowed as an exceptional ground, and Arrow
Transportation Corporation v. Board of Transportation, 6 where the doctrine was waived
because of "the strong public interest in having the matter settled" as soon as possible.
The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:
Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing
out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action
whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits,
patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation,
utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines.
This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and
the lower courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited
Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 7 where several presidential decrees were
declared unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the judicial power to determine just
compensation in expropriation cases.
The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not correctly applied and that the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was improper.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction
before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the
doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the
Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure
to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and
the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins
upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily
(albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that
the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their
particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be
rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is
that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the
rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which
otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets. 9
As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances
when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to
immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal;
10 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 11 3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; 12 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 13 5) when the
claim involved is small; 14 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 15 7) when there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 16 8) when strong public interest is involved;
17 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; 18 and 10) in quo warranto
proceedings. 19
The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions
because forestry laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to
judicial action; the question they are raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will
cause great and irreparable damage; and public interest is involved.
We rule for the petitioner.
Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to
administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would
suffice to still require its observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still
be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to
regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's
forests" and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all
lands of the public domain," 20 and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau
of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws aid
regulations 21 here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly
implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any
controversy coming under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene.
The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not
acceptable. The private respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before
the DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, that the
petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry
laws and regulations. The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of
supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities,
employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated,
before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review.
As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the
case on the national interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have
satisfactorily established these extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the
doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort to the courts of
justice. In fact, this particular submission must fall flat against the petitioner's uncontested
contention that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with
the order of the DENR.
In the Petition for prohibition filed with the respondent court, the petitioner alleged that its
logging operations had been suspended pursuant to a telegram 22 received on February 23,
1988, by the District Forester from the Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Zamboanga
City; reading as follows:
DISTRICT FORESTER
PAGADIAN CITY
QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1988 FROM SECRETARY
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR. QUOTE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY CMA SUSPEND ALL
LOGGING OPERATIONS OF SUNVILLE IN VIEW OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FOREST
PROTECTION AND REFORESTATION UNQUOTE SUBMIT REPORT ASAP.
RED BATCAGAN
The petition now before us contains the allegations that the "petition for cancellation of
petitioner's TLA is still pending up to this date and that petitioner's logging operations
(were) ordered suspended by the Secretary of the DENR pending further investigation." 23
In the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is informed that "the Secretary
of the DENR suspended petitioner's logging operations until further investigation. The
suspension is still in force up to this date after the lapse of almost 3 years." 24
These statements have not been disputed by the private respondents in their pleadings
before the respondent court and this Court and are therefore deemed admitted.
There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the
respondent court. Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly
committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary
first to determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed
been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question is the primary
responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of the
expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a condition
precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a court of
justice.
In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court
to declare the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of
constitutionality must be avoided where the case can be decided on some other available
ground, 25 as we have done in the case before us. The resolution of this same question
must await another case, where all the indispensable requisites of a judicial inquiry into a
constitutional question are satisfactorily established. In such an event, it will be time for the
Court "to make the hammer fall, and heavily," in the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is
warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated July 4,
1988, and its resolution dated September 27, 1988, as well as the resolutions of the trial
court dated December 11, 1987 and February 15, 1988, are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4116 June 30, 1952
GRACIANO DE LOS REYES and PRECEDES DE LOS REYES, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
HILARIO DE LOS REYES, oppositor-appellant.
Delfin Ramirez for appellants.
Porifiro V. Sison for appellees.
PADILLA, J.:
In land registration case No. 8162, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 33149 of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, the title to four parcels of land situated in the barrio of San Jose
Barangoborong, municipality of Natividad, province of Pangasinan, was confirmed and
registration thereof decreed in the name of Graciano and his sister Precedes surnamed de
los Reyes and original certificate of title No. 36580 was issued to them by the registrar of
deeds in and for the province of Pangasinan. Hilario de los Reyes, an uncle of the registered
owners, kept the owner's duplicate of the original certificate of title and enjoyed the
possession of the four parcels of land since 1929, because Graciano de los Reyes left his
town at the age of 17, went to the province of Camarines Sur, resided there for 15 years and
went back to Natividad in 1943 only. After his return he called on and asked his uncle Hilario
to give him the owner's duplicate of original certificate of title No. 36580, his co-owner
having died leaving neither descendants nor ascendants, but Hilario refused to do so. For
the reason he filed a sworn petition in the corresponding land registration case where he
states all the foregoing facts and prays that Hilario de los Reyes be directed to deliver the
owner's duplicate of original certificate of title No. 36580 within five days or to show cause,
if any, why he should not do so.
The petition was objected to in a motion for reconsideration of an order dated 30
September 1949, which directed Hilario de los Reyes to deliver the owner's duplicate of the
original certificate of title No. 36580, and in a petition where Hilario de los Reyes gave the
reason for his refusal to surrender or deliver the owner's duplicate of the original certificate
of title, to wit: that the possession of a parcel of rice land described in a private document
was given him by Teodora Lana, the mother of Graciano, and her husband Juan Salamanca,
Graciano's stepfather, to secure the payment of P320 and of an additional loan of P200
which was increased to P1,086.05 by P266.05 he paid to the Land Title Association of
Pangasinan for survey and registration of the four parcels of land under Act No. 496 and by
P300 he spent in defending the ownership of said parcels of land against the claim of Ana
Villegas, and for the reason he claims an adverse right of interest for P1,086.05 against the
registered owners of the four parcels of land described in original certificate of title No.
36580.
On 28 April 1950, the court entered an order holding the adverse claim of Hilario de los
Reyes invalid and directing the registrar of deeds in and for the province of Pangasinan to
cancel said adverse claim which in the meantime was filed and registered by means of
affidavit, and the clerk of court to deliver to Graciano de los Reyes the owner's duplicate of
original certificate of title No. 36580 surrendered to him by Hilario de los Reyes upon
signing a receipt therefor. From this order Hilario de los Reyes has appealed.
In the record on appeal the reservation by Graciano de los Reyes to bring a separate action
against his uncle Hilario de los Reyes to recover the products of the four parcels of land or
their value during the time the latter was in possession thereof. In the order appealed from
there is a pronouncement that the adverse claim not being subsequent but prior to the
decree of registration cannot be registered pursuant to section 110 of the Land Registration
Act, because the loan of the late mother and the late stepfather of Graciano de los Reyes
was made on 5 April 1924, whereas the original certificate of title No. 36580 was issued on
28 March 1930.
We hold with the court below that the claim of Hilario being prior and not subsequent to
the date of the original registration cannot be entered upon the Torrens certificate of title
and it does not entitle him to retain of said certificate of title. If he has valid claim he should
bring an action to enforce it.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81961 April 18, 1989
DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MINO HILARIO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
R.M. Molintas Law Office for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision which affirmed the
trial court's decision ordering the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of Mino Hilario
over a parcel of land particularly described in survey plan PSU-221769.
The facts of the case as stated in the Court of Appeals' decision are as follows:
The land subject matter of the application for registration is situated in the sitio of Cosaran,
Bo. Baloy, Itogon, Benguet, Philippines. It is within the "Central Cordillera Forest Reserve",
established under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929, the Ambuklao-Binga
Watershed covered by Executive Proclamation No. 548, dated April 19, 1969, and the Upper
Agno River Basin Multiple Use of Forest Management District created under Forestry
Administrative Order No. 518, dated March 9, 1971.
In his application for land registration filed on March 10, 1975 with the Court of First
Instance of Baguio-Benguet (now RTC), applicant-appellee Mino Hilario claimed ownership
in fee simple over said land by purchase from his father Hilario Molang on April 17, 1972.
The subject land, consisting of one (1) parcel, with an area of 5.3213 hectares, is situated,
bounded and described as shown in plan PSU-221769, the technical description of which is
attached to the application and made a part thereof.
The applicant seeks to register the title to the subject land under the Land Registration Act
(Act 496). However, as an alternative, the applicant invokes the benefits of Chapter VIII of
Act No. 2874 as superseded by Commonwealth Act 141, as well as the provisions of
Republic Act 1942 and Republic Act 3872 because the applicant is a member of the cultural
minorities.
On December 3, 1975, the Director of Bureau of Lands filed his opposition dated July 14,
1975, alleging that neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient
title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land applied for, the same not having been
acquired by any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish Government, or have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the present
application, and that the aforesaid property is a portion of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines and is not subject to private appropriation.
On March 8, 1976, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development filed his opposition
dated March 1, 1976, to the registration of whatever title of the applicant on the ground
that the area applied for is within the "Central Cordillera Forest Reserve" under LC Map No.
1435, aside from the fact that it is a part of the Ambuklao-Binga Watershed covered by
Executive Proclamation No. 548 dated April 19, 1969 as evidenced by the letter-report of
Forest Ranger Antonio Chagyo, and Engineer Carlito Banac; that the area sought to be
registered is not in the entire possession of applicant Mino Hilario in the concept of an
owner considering that there are several houses built by different individuals within the area
in question; that the applicant does not have any registrable title either in law or in fact over
the property; and that the area is not classified as alienable or disposable land.
After due trial, the lower court rendered its decision dated May 16, 1985, which decreed the
confirmation and registration of the subject land in the name of applicant Mino Hilario,
married to Sofina Hilario.
The decision is based on the facts found by the trial court, to wit:
The evidence for the applicant consists of his testimony and those of his witnesses, namely,
Dionisio Capsula, 54 years old, farmer and a neighbor in the place; Hilario Molang, 55 years
old, the applicant's father; and Eustaquio Cabson, 80 years old, and another neighbor; and
documentary exhibits, Exhibits "A" to "U". Also, an ocular inspection was conducted on the
premises. From these, the Court gathers that the applicant acquired the land subject hereof
by purchase from his father, Hilario Molang on April 17, 1972; that his said father, in turn
acquired the property from the latter's father, and the applicant's grandfather Shawidi; that
the applicant and his predecessors successively, continuously, publicly and adversely
occupied, possessed and worked on the land in the concept of absolute owners since before
the First World War, building supporting walls, rice paddies where they planted rice, and
planting fruit-bearing trees; that as seen during the ocular inspection there are about 100
mango trees, three of which are more than 100 years old, about 50 matured avocado trees,
about 200 banana trees, about 30 maguey, about 40 cheza trees, about 30 coffee trees,
about 8 jackfruit trees, cassava, two bamboo groves more than 100 years old, 70 orange
trees, camote patches, three rice paddies for planting rice, about 50 pineapple plants, stone
walls, fence of German cables, around 30 scattered Kaingins, 22 young coconut trees, and
about two old coconut trees; that the land is suitable to agriculture; and that there are seven
old houses made of galvanized iron inside the area being registered. The property had been
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Hilario Molang, and land tax therefor had
been paid by him since 1945. Since 1972 the property has been declared in the name of the
applicant and land tax has been paid by him.
The evidence for the Government oppositors consists of the testimonies of Antonio
Chaggyo, a Forest Manager of the Bureau of Forest Development, and Alfredo A. Ramirez, a
Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, and their respective reports (Exhibits "1" and "2")
and the first indorsement of the District Land Office that the land in question "appears to be
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reservation which is outside the jurisdiction of this
office." (Exhibit "3"). The testimonies of these witnesses on their respective observations
when they separately investigated the land in question and their respective reports do not
refute the evidence of the applicant as to the length, nature and manner of possession of
the land subject of this case by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest. On the
contrary, their testimonies, viewed in their entirety, would tend to corroborate the evidence
adduced by the applicant. The report of the Land Investigator even states that the other
houses found within the land at issue are "owned by his (applicant's) relatives ... who swore
that they are not claiming any portion of the land they occupy.
The preponderance of evidence clearly shows that the applicant, and his predecessors-in-
interest before him, all of whom are members of the national cultural minorities, have been
in actual, open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject hereof which is suitable to agriculture, under a bona fide
claim of ownership since before the First World War up to the present or at least more than
sixty (60) years.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.
Hence, this present petition.
The Director of Land Management and the Director of Forest Development raise the
following assignments of errors in this petition, to wit:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the land in question,
notwithstanding that it is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, is registrable on the
basis of Republic Act No. 3872; which said court misconstrued and misapplied.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that private respondent Mino Hilario
had acquired a private right to the land in question prior to the issuance of Proclamation
No. 217 on February 17, 1929 establishing the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and
Executive Proclamation No. 548 on April 19, 1969 establishing the Ambuklao-Binga
Watershed, and therefore, said land is exempted from the force and effect of those
executive issuances.
3. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the lower Court's Decision which
granted the application for registration of the land in question of respondent Mino Hilario.
(Rollo, pp. 12-13).
The petition is impressed with merit.
There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or
alienable. Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of Government. It
cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed waived.
As held in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, [154 SCRA 476 (1987)]:

... It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private
property, (Vano v. Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz 23 SCRA 1183; Republic v. De la Cruz,
67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands v. Reyes & Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177;
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133
SCRA 701) unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the
Director of Forestry, but even then, possession of the land prior to the reclassification of the
land as disposable and alienable cannot be credited as part of the thirty-year requirement
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra). In
this case, there is no showing that the land in question is disposable or alienable. This is a
matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.
In the instant case, the subject land is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. Private
respondent Hilario submits that even assuming that this is so, still he may own the land
situated within the forest reserve as he is a member of the cultural minorities. His basis for
this is Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended (Public Land Act), sec. 48 (c) which provides:
... The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof. (as amended by RA. No. 3872, section 1, approved June 18,
1964).
Respondent Hilario contends that the phrase "whether disposable or not" should be
construed to mean that a parcel of land situated in an inalienable land may be privately-
owned by a member of the cultural minorities.
We agree with the Solicitor General's observations, to wit:
1. Republic Act No. 3872 is only amendatory to Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The Public Land Act applies to agricultural public
lands and to no other type of land borne out by the explicit terms of Section 2, Chapter I
and Section 2, Chapter II, both under Title I of the Public Land Act. Chapter I is subtitled
"Short title of the Act, lands to which it applies, and officers charged with its execution."
Section 2 clearly states that the "provisions of this Act apply to the lands of the public
domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws ... Section 10
provides that the words "alienation", "disposition", or "concession" as used in this Act, shall
mean any of the methods authorized by this Act for the acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of
the lands of the public domain other than timber or mineral lands. (Emphasis supplied).
2. The new sub-section (c) of Section 48 of the Public Land Act should be read together with
the provision of the preceding subsection (b) which expressly refers to "agricultural lands of
the public domain." Perforce, the term "lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture"
as used in the said new subsection of Sec. 48 should mean the same thing as the term
"agricultural lands of public domain." It does not appear that two different classes of lands
were intended to be the subject matter of one section of the same Public Land Act. And
both terms manifestly do not refer to either timber or forest land including forest reserves.
3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of law
involved, as to include even forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is to
unconstitutionally apply such provision. For, both the 1973 and present Constitution
petitions do not include timber or forest lands as alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of
1973 Constitution states that 'with the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be affirming the decision of the trial court which granted the private respondent's application
alienated." The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also expressly states that "with for registration of the land in question is reversed and set aside. The application for land
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated." registration is dismissed.

What the law contemplates are lands that are agricultural although not disposable, such as SO ORDERED.
agricultural lands within a reservation for fruit experiments (as the one in Baguio City
administered by the Bureau of Plant Industry, or agricultural lands reserved for the Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Camarines Sur Agricultural School in Pili, Camarines Sur), or those reserved for a specific
purpose, but certainly not a forest reserve, a timber land, which the Constitution, the Public
Land Act itself, and jurisprudence have excluded from alienation. (Rollo, pp. 16-18).

As to the lower court's ruling that "applicant's predecessor, Shawidi, had been occupying
and working on the land at the outbreak of the First World War in 1914" long before
Proclamation No. 217 declaring the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve was issued, this Court
has had the opportunity to rule on this issue earlier.

As held in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra:

There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the challenged decision of the Court of

Appeals, which the government oppositors also appear to have overlooked. This is the
reliance on Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General Henry L. Stimson as the operative act
which converted the lands covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve into forest lands.
This is wrong. The land was not non-forest or agricultural land prior to the 1929
proclamation. It did not earn a classification from non-forest into forest land because of the
proclamation. The proclamation merely declared a special forest reserve out of already
existing forest lands. The land was already forest or timber land even before the
proclamation. The alleged entry in 1915 of Salming Piraso and the cultivation of 15 hectares
out of a 219.7879 hectares claimed area has no legal significance. A person cannot enter
into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits
towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the
forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry,
cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-56984. September 30, 1987.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Forest Development and the
Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA
CARANTES for and in behalf of the Heirs of SALMING PIRASO, Respondents.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Branch
III, at La Trinidad in LRC Case No. N-287, Record No. 37205, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
"It having been proven convincingly that this land was owned and possessed by the late
Salming Piraso and later by his successors-in- interest, who are his children for a period of
more than thirty years up to this date, they have shown to have a registerable title on the
property which the Court therefore confirms and affirms in accordance with the law. Let the
land so described in the technical description of the survey made of the same and in
accordance with the corresponding plan be so registered." (p. 50, Rollo)
On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S. Carantes for and in behalf of the Heirs of Salming
Piraso filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Land Registration No. N-
287, covering the following described property:
"A parcel of land (as shown on plan PSU-43639) situated in the Barrio of Ansagan,
Municipality of Tuba, Mountain Province. Bounded in the NE., along line 1-2 by property of
Sioco Carino (PSU-43643, Lot 1); on the SE., and SW., along lines 2-3-4-5 by public land, on
the W., along lines 5-6-1 by property of Tunccalo. Containing an area of TWO MILLION ONE
HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTY NINE (2,197,879)
SQUARE METERS. . ." (p. 13, Rollo)
On January 13, 1970, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed an opposition
to the application for registration stating, among others:
"That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to said
parcel of land the same not having been acquired by them either by composition title from
the Spanish Government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894;
"That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the present application;
"That the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines." (pp. 13-14, Rollo)
On April 7, 1970, the Director of Forestry also filed an opposition to the application for
registration on the following grounds:
"That the whole area applied for registration is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
established under Proclamation No. 217, dated February 16, 1929;
"That the area sought to be registered is neither released for disposition nor alienation; and
that the herein applicant has no registerable title over the whole parcel of land either in fact
or in law." (p. 14, Rollo)
After trial, a decision was rendered by the land registration court, as earlier stated,
adjudicating the parcel of land to the applicants. The motion for reconsideration filed by
Government oppositor’s having been denied, an appeal was made to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed in toto the decision of the land registration court.
In this petition, the petitioner assigns the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
A. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION
IS NOT CAPABLE OF REGISTRATION BEING PART OF THE PUBLIC FORESTS WITHIN THE
CENTRAL CORDILLERA FOREST RESERVE:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
B. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION
OF THE LAND BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST WAS
NOT IN CONCEPT OF OWNER UNDER SECTION 48 of the PUBLIC LAND LAW, THE LAND
BEING IN-ALIENABLE;
C. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LAND IS AGRICULTURAL
BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO SUBMIT PROOF THAT THE LAND IS MORE
VALUABLE FOR FOREST PURPOSES;
D. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROPERTY BECAME
SEGREGATED FROM THE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND ASSUMED THE CHARACTER
OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP UPON APPROVAL OF ITS SURVEY PLAN BY THE DIRECTOR OF
LAND IN 1925;)
E. ASSUMING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED 10
TO 15 HECTARES OF THE LAND APPLIED FOR, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THEY HAD ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP THRU CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OVER THE
REST OF THE 219.7879 HECTARES APPLIED FOR. (p. 18, Rollo)
The issues raised are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether or not the land in question is part of the public forest within the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve; and
2. Whether or not private respondents have established registerable title over the
land in question.
It is the stand of the petitioner that the land in question covered by the Plan-Psu-43639 is
part of the public forests within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under
Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General Henry Stimson dated February 16, 1929. On
February 27, 1980, an ocular inspection of said property was made by Land Inspector
Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of Lands together with representatives of the Bureau of
Forestry, the Land Registration Court, and the applicants for registration. During the ocular
inspection, the land was found to be rolling and stony in nature. Bartolo, Jr., submitted a
report on April 17, 1970 stating among others, that the land is covered with trees, bushes
and grasses and being also stony is not suitable for agricultural purposes.
The representative of the Bureau of Forestry, Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero, submitted to the
Provincial Fiscal a separate report dated April 6, 1970 to the effect that the whole area falls
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and that the same has not been released for
agricultural purposes by the Director of Forestry who had administrative jurisdiction over the
same.
The petitioner states that since the land in question is indubitably part of the public forest
and has not been reclassified or released from the forest zone, the same can not be the
subject of registration either under Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
or under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act. The petitioner points out that lands within the forest zone or within a duly established
reservation do not form part of the disposable portion of the public domain nor can the
same be alienated as said lands are not capable of private appropriation or ownership and
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert that same into private property.
It is further argued by the petitioner that the private respondents or their predecessors-in-
interest, Salming Piraso, had not acquired ownership over the land prior to its classification
as part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve because there is no evidence on record that Salming
Piraso had possessed the property for any appreciable period prior to 1929 when the and
became part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve.
On the other hand, the private respondents assert that the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals show that the land subject of application is not within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve and the same land applied for registration is disposable and alienable. The private
respondents, as applicants, claim to have sufficiently shown by preponderance of evidence
that the land being applied for registration had been possessed by Salming Piraso as far
back as 1915 when he and his workers planted the arable portion of about 15 hectares to
rice and other products and raised cows on the other portion suited for pasture. The late
Salming Piraso had the land surveyed by private surveyor Jose Castro on April 3-9, 1924 as
Plan Psu-43639 which was approved by the then Director of Lands, Jorge B. Vargas on
March 6, 1925, while Proclamation No. 217 was promulgated only on February 16, 1929.
They state that the approval of the said survey by the government thru the Director of Lands
Jorge B. Vargas can only mean that said land was no longer included in the overall survey of
the government as it was no longer part of the public land. As applicants, they contend that
they have possessed the land applied for in concept of owner, openly and publicly, adverse
against the whole world and continuously for more than thirty (30) years before they filed
the application over the land which is agricultural and separate from the public domain.
We find the petition to be meritorious. It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest
reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long,
cannot convert them into private property (Vano v. Government of Philippine Islands, 41
Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23
SCRA 1183; Republic v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands v. Reyes & Alinsunurin v.
Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701) unless such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry, but even then, possession of the land
by the applicants prior to the reclassification of the land as disposable and alienable cannot
be credited as part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra). In this case, there is no showing of
reclassification by the Director of Forestry that the land in question is disposable or
alienable. This is a matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.
There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
which the government oppositors also appear to have overlooked. This is the reliance on
Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General Henry L. Stimson as the operative act which
converted the lands covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve into forest lands. This is
wrong. The land was not non-forest or agricultural land prior to the 1929 proclamation. It
did not earn a classification from non-forest into forest land because of the proclamation.
The proclamation merely declared a special forest reserve out of already existing forest
lands. The land was already forest or timber land even before the proclamation. The alleged
entry in 1915 of Salming Piraso and the cultivation of 15 hectares out of a 219.7879 hectares
claimed area has no legal significance. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the
simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual
confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be
alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive
and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
The records positively establish that the land in question is part of the public forest which
the Executive formally proclaimed as the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve to further
preserve its integrity and to give it a status which is more special for certain purposes than
that of ordinary forest lands.
One reason for the respondent court’s decision finding a registerable title for the private
respondents is its observation that the Government failed to show that the disputed land is
more valuable for forest purposes. The court noted a failure to prove that trees are thriving
in the land.
The Court of Appeals finding is based on a wrong concept of what is forest land. There is a
big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
classification of lands of the public domain in the Constitution. (Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, as amended; and Section
1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution).
One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a
classification for legal purposes.
The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded land with dense growths
of trees and underbush. However, the cutting down of trees and the disappearance of virgin
forest and not automatically convert the lands of the public domain from forest or timber
land to alienable agricultural land.
As stated by this Court in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69, 75);
"A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.’Forest lands’ do not have to be on mountains
or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as ‘forest’ is released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not "Q In connection with your duty to inspect the lands that are subject matters of land
apply. registration cases, have you inspected this land in question also?

"This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that "A Yes, I inspected it, sir.
possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in
Republic v. Animas, (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the area "Q What is the purpose of your inspection?
covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest
zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a "A The purpose of my inspection is to determine the status of the area if it falls within
positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to the reservation, or within the alienable or disposable area.
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes." (at p. 75)
"Q What is your finding, if any?
On February 27, 1970, an ocular inspection of the questioned property was conducted by
Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of Lands, together with Forester Ricardo "A My finding was that the area falls within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve.
D. Zapatero of the Bureau of Forestry, Deputy Clerk of Court Roberto Gogoling as
representative of the land registration court, Fiscal Navarro and Andres Carantes as "Q Was that finding reduced into writing?
representative of the applicant.
"A Yes, sir.
Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., submitted his report dated April 17, 1970, which
states, among others, that the land is covered with trees, bushes and grasses and being "Q I am showing to you a report found on Pages Sixty-Eight (68) of the records which
stony is not suitable for agricultural purposes. This negates the claim of the private for purposes of identification, we pray that the same be marked as Exhibit "A" for the
respondents that the land has been cultivated since 1915. government oppositors, your Honor.

More important, however, than the appearance of the land is its status, as stated in the "COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
separate report dated April 6, 1970 submitted to the Provincial Fiscal of Benguet Province by
Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero which declares that the whole area applied for by the applicant As what?
falls within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and that the same has not been released for
agricultural purposes by the Director of Forestry who has administrative jurisdiction over the "FISCAL BRAWNER:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
same. This has not been successfully refuted. It has not been proved erroneous.
Rather as Exhibit "1."
Testifying in connection with the matters stated in his report, Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero
stated that: "COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"Q Do you know the land in question here in this case? Have it marked.

"A I know sir. "Q What is the relation of this report with that report that you made?
"A This is the original copy of the Report which I submitted to the Provincial Fiscal. "FISCAL BRAWNER:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q There appears a signature above the typewritten name ‘Ricardo D. Zapatero’, "Q You stated in paragraph 2 of your report that the topography of the land applied
whose signature is that? for is generally stony, and because of the Binayuyu species, the condition of the land is not
suited for agricultural purposes?
"A That is mine, sir.
"A Yes, sir.
"Q You stated that in paragraph 3 of your report, Exhibit 1 that the land falls within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, how did you arrive at that conclusion? "Q What is the basis of that statement?

"A Because of what I have even of the improvements of the applicant and because of "A Because of the topography which is of solid inclination, we believe that is not good
the Bureau of Forestry map. for agricultural purposes. The land applied for is more suited for pasture purposes." (pp.
203-206, tsn., September 6, 1971; Emphasis supplied)
"Q Did you actually go to the land in question or the land applied for?
The reports and testimonies of Land Inspector Bartolo and Forester Zapatero support the
"A Yes, sir. contention of the petitioner that the area applied for by the applicant is forest land within
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. In the case of Ramos v. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175)
"Q So, you actually saw this land applied for? we have stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A Yes, sir. "Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts
to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on Forestry matters."cralaw
"Q What is the nature of this land applied for? virtua1aw library

"A It is generally stony and the topography is level to rolling and there are certain There is no factual basis for the conclusion of the appellate court that the property in
species of plants inside the land, in some area. question was no longer part of the public land when the Government through the Director
of Lands approved on March 6, 1925, the survey plan (Psu-43639) for Salming Piraso. The
"COURT:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph existence of a sketch plan of real property even if approved by the Bureau of Lands is no
proof in itself of ownership of the land covered by the plan. (Gimeno v. Court of Appeals, 80
"Q What are the species of plants? SCRA 623). The fact that a claimant or a possessor has a sketch plan or a survey map
prepared for a parcel of land which forms part of the country’s forest reserves does not
"A There are species of Binayuyu. convert such land into alienable land, much less private property. Assuming that a public
officer erroneously approves the sketch plan, such approval is null and void. There must first
"Q That is for lumber? be a formal Government declaration that the forest land has been re-classified into alienable
and disposable agricultural land which may then be acquired by private persons in
"A No, that is not. accordance with the various modes of acquiring public agricultural lands.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the land registration court which granted the private respondents’
application for registration of the land in question is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application for land registration is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 521518. August 13, 1991.]
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner-
Appellee, v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., Respondents-
Appellants.
Tañada, Vivo & Tan for Petitioner-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF; PLEADINGS
CONSIDERED AMENDED IN CASE AT BAR. — Where the issues in the case bring the matter
within the scope of an action for declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court and render meaningless the appeal to the rule laid down in Sarmiento, Et. Al. v.
Capapas, Et Al., that declaratory relief cannot be joined by injunction, because herein
petitioner, for all legal intents and purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in the
Stipulation of Facts, what attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the complaint and the
answer), which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — The requisites for declaratory relief: (a) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy;
and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. — There is a justiciable controversy
where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one exists between the parties,
all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought will help in
ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into
a claim of right which is actually contested.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; R. A. 3990; INTENDS UNEQUIVOCAL ABSOLUTE TRANSFER
OF ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP SUBJECT TO EXISTING CONCESSIONS. — Pursuant, however, to
R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station for the use of the UP in
connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the "reserved"
area was "ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject
to any existing concessions, if any." When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the
Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and, more
specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and
segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and
relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner
thereof, subject only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of the
absolute ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe it.
Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any essential
quality. The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner.
All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be
affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPERTY CONVERTED INTO A REGISTERED PRIVATE WOODLAND
OVER WHICH THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY HAS NO JURISDICTION. — Insofar as the Republic
of the Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were effectively
assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full
ownership. This is further borne out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia,
that "any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the
University of the Philippines." Having been effectively segregated and removed from the
public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private
woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise
terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition in Proclamation No. 971 to the
effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations is not
reproduced in R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not likewise provide that it is subject to the
conditions set forth in the proclamation.
6. CIVIL LAW; OWNERSHIP; RIGHT OF OWNER. — An owner has the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law. The right to
enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the
jus abutendi, or the right to consume the thing by its use. As provided for in Article 441 of
the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits.
There are, however, exceptions to this rule, as where the property is subject to a usufruct, in
which case the usufructuary gets the fruits.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, that exception is made for the
petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to cut,
collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until 1 February 1985.
However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to
the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The charges
should not be paid anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of
Internal Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently,
even the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to
measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees
due thereon.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna dated 3 June
1968 in a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil Case No. SC-650
entitled International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines v. University of the
Philippines and Jose Campos, the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner and against the
respondents:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of the
Philippines, in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry, to scale,
measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land referred to in said
Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed by the National Internal
Revenue Code therefor; and
(b) Dismissing the respondents’ counterclaim."cralaw virtua1aw library
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No.
49409-R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)
promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this Court as the
"entire case hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic Act 3990 as it applies
to a set of facts which are not disputed by the parties and therefore, is a legal question." 1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on 28 June
1966. 2 Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent University of the Philippines
(hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise and regulate the cutting
and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut
and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from petitioner and/or
impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its concession, covered
by License Agreement No. 27-A issued on 1 February 1963, ceded in full ownership to the
UP by Republic Act No. 3990; asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts
complained of; and prays that respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of
P100,000.00 as damages and costs of the suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably acted
upon, and pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967, respondents filed their
Answer on 13 September 1987, 3 wherein they interpose the affirmative defenses of, among
others, improper venue and that the petition states no cause of action; they further set up a
counterclaim for the payment of it by petitioner of forest charges on the forest products cut
and felled within the area ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with
surcharges and interests as provided in the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 4 On 18 October 1967, the parties
submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of the Case for Judgment, 5
which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, by the undersigned counsel, and
respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION
OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT, without prejudice to the presentation of evidence by either
party:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE
2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation
of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the Government an exclusive license for a
period of 25 years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber from that
portion of timber land located in the Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc,
Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavinti and Calauan,
Province of Laguna under License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) issued and
promulgated by the Government through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources on January 11, 1960. . . .;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a renewal of the
Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by the Government to the plaintiff
on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. . . .;
4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been in peaceful
possession of said timber concession and had been felling, cutting and removing timber
therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned Timber License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) of January 11, 1960;
5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the Government on
June 4, 1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) of January 11, 1960, has constructed roads and other improvements and
installations of the aforementioned area subject to the grant and purchased equipment in
implementation of the conditions contained in the aforementioned License Agreement and
has in connection therewith spent more than P7,000,000.00 as follows: . . .;
6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License Agreement No.
27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of the Philippines issued Executive
Proclamation No. 791 which reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS
AND FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS COLLEGE A
CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY IN THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND PAKIL PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND PARTLY IN THE
MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of the
Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the College of
Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as experiment station for the proposed Dairy
Research and production studies of this College, a certain parcel of land of the Public
domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil, province of Laguna, and
partly in the municipality of Infanta, Province of Quezon, Island of Luzon, subject to private
rights, if any there be, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and other forest
products found therein shall be subject to the forestry laws and regulations, which parcel of
land is more particularly described as follows, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of
the Philippines to be affixed.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the sixteenth.
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA
President of the Philippines
x x x
7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the aforementioned
License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11, 1960, Republic Act No. 3990 was
enacted by the Congress of the Philippines and approved by the President of the
Philippines, which Republic Act provides as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central experiment station for the use of the
University of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension functions,
particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts
and Sciences.
SECTION 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public domain consisting of three
thousand hectares, more or less, located in the Municipality of Paete, Province of Laguna,
the precise boundaries of which are stated in Executive Proclamation 791, Series of 1961, is
hereby ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines, subject
to any existing concessions, if any.
SECTION 3. All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station
shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the
general fund of the University of the Philippines.
SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 18, 1964.
8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and prior to the
institution of the present suit, defendants have demanded, verbally as well as in writing to
plaintiff:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff under the License Agreement
27-A (Amendment) referred to in paragraph 2 hereof be paid to the University of the
Philippines, instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
(b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff within the boundaries of the
Central Experiment Station as defined in Republic Act No. 3990 be performed by personnel
of the University of the Philippines.
9. That the position of the plaintiff on the demand of the defendants was fully
discussed in the letter dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiffs lawyer addressed to the President of
the University of the Philippines, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof.
10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph 9 hereof, plaintiff has refused to
allow entry to personnel of the University of the Philippines to the Central Experiment
Station area assigned thereto for the purpose of supervising the felling, cutting and removal
of timber therein and scaling any such timber cut and felled prior to removal;
11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in relation to the implementation of
Republic Act No. 3990 the defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
February 8, 1966
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Manila
Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant
Dear Sir:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest land approximately 3,500
hectares in area was ceded in full ownership by the government to the University of the
Philippines. This area is known as Paete Land Grant, the title to which is presently issued in
the name of the University of the Philippines. The law transferring the ownership to the
University of the Philippines gives the University full rights of dominion and ownership,
subject to the existing concession of International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the
Philippines. Under the terms of this law all forest charges due from the concessionaire U.P. Paete Land Grant
should now be paid to the University of the Philippines. The purpose of giving this land
grant to the University is to enable us to generate income out of the land grant and University of the Philippines
establish a research and experimental station for the Colleges of Agriculture, Forestry, Arts
and Sciences and Veterinary Medicine. Diliman, Quezon City

I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval of the following Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.
matters:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Business Executive
1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District Forester of Laguna from June,
1964 up to the present should be remitted in favor of the University of the Philippines; Gentlemen:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall hereafter be paid to the This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as follows:chanrob1es virtual
University of the Philippines and lastly 1aw library

3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive all forest charges and x x x
royalties due from any logging concession at the land grant.

May we request that proper instructions be issued by the District Forester of Laguna about In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
this matter. Thank you.
In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by Section 15(a) of Revenue
Very truly yours, Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products Regulations, forest products, cut, gathered and
removed from registered private woodlands are not subject to forest charges, but they must
(Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. be invoiced when removed to another municipality or for commercial purposes in the
manner prescribed by the regulations. As the Paete Land Grant was ceded by law to the U.P.
Business Executive in full private ownership and as the grant is manifestly to be considered registered, no forest
charges are actually due and payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest
12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business Executive dated February 8, charges purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing agreement
1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the following letter-ruling dated March entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are, therefore, to be considered not as the charges
11, 1966:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by
the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the land grant.
x x x
Accordingly, your queries are answered viz:.

March 11, 1966

1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest charges payable by
concessionaires of the land grant.
2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the
Philippines may be refunded provided that a formal claim for the refund thereof is made
within two years from the date of payment. The proper claimant shall be International
Hardwood and not the University.
Please take note of page ‘2’ of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the following points raised by the
University:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly collect forest charges from
INTERWOOD, the existing logging concessionaire.

Very truly yours, 2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau of Forestry from June, 1964
up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to the University of the Philippines. In this manner,
(Sgd.) MISAEL P. VERA INTERWOOD is requested to file a claim for the refund in the amount heretofore paid by it
to be remitted to the University of the Philippines.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
Commissioner of Internal Revenue chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below to On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is understood that
the District Forester of the province of Laguna dated April 18, 1966:chanrob1es virtual 1aw forest charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land Grant as scaled by scalers of the
library University of the Philippines shall now be paid directly to the University of the Philippines. In
another ruling by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the University, particularly the
April 18, 1966 Laguna Land Grant, is exempted from all kinds of Internal Revenue taxes.

The District Forester Very truly yours,

Bureau of Forestry (Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr.

Sta. Cruz, Laguna Business Executive

Dear Sir:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concerning the right
of the University of the Philippines to collect forest charges from the existing logging
concessionaire at the Laguna Land Grant (formerly Paete Land Grant). This tract of forest
land containing some 3,500 hectares was ceded to the University of the Philippines in full
ownership by Republic Act No. 3990, approved in June, 1964. In view thereof, the University
of the Philippines requested that its authority over said land be recognized and that the
existing concessionaire, International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines, in
turn pay its forest charges directly to the University instead of to the national government.
14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business Executive dated April 18, 1966
was duly endorsed by the District Forester of the province of Laguna to the Director of
Forestry;
15. That on or about June 7, 1966, the Assistant Director of Forestry addressed to
plaintiff the letter dated June 7, 1966, which states as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sirs:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
This is in connection with your request for this Office to comment on your reply to the letter
of Mr. Jose C. Campos, Jr. of the University of the Philippines.
In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the University of the Philippines is
claiming the right:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut inside the areas covered by the U.P. Land
Grant at Paete, Laguna;
(b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;
(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest charges; and
(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by law upon the Bureau of Forestry in
the cutting, removal and disposition of the timber from said area, and the authority of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue respecting the measurement and scaling of the logs and the
collection of the corresponding forest charges and other fees in connection therewith.
This office is in full accord with your arguments against the claim of the University of the
Philippines to have acquired the above rights. We believe that the right vested the
INTERWOOD by virtue of Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) to utilize the
timber inside subject area is still binding and should therefore, be respected. It is on the
basis of this acknowledgment that we sent your client our letter of November 4, 1965
requesting him to comment on the application of the State University for a Special Timber
License over the said area.
16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in paragraph 14, the Director of Bureau
of Forestry issued the letter ruling quoted below, dated June 30, 1966:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
x x x
June 30, 1966
District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)
Sir:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph of your letter dated April 26,
1966, designated as above, as to whether or not you shall turn over the scaling work for logs
cut from the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines in
the Paete Land Grant to Scalers of the University of the Philippines.
In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the Paete Land Grant,
which embraces the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer Company of the
Philippines, is considered a registered private woodland of the University of the Philippines
and therefore no forest charges are actually due and payable on the timber cut and
removed therefrom, and in view further of the ruling of said Commissioner that the forest
charges purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing agreement
entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are to be considered not as the charges
contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by
the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the land grant, you may
turn over the scaling work therein to the scalers of the U.P.
However, you should guard against the use of such licensing agreements entered or to be
entered into by the U.P. as a means of smuggling forest products from the neighboring
public forests.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ANTONIO A. QUEJADA
x x x
On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the pleadings filed in the case,
and whatever additional evidence may be presented by the parties, the parties hereto,
through counsel, jointly move and pray of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered
granting full and appropriate relief, on the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest
charges due and payable under its Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set
forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of the
Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges are to
be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of the Philippines
is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and
removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act
No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled and cut.
Manila for Laguna, September 29, 1967."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered its judgment on 3 June
1968 in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is quoted at the beginning of
this decision. In deciding the case against UP, it held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the court finds that the respondents’ demand on the petitioner has no legal basis. In the
first place, the cession in full ownership of the tract of land referred to in the Act was
expressly made ‘subject to any existing concessions.’ Inasmuch as at the time of the
enactment of the Act, the petitioner’s timber concession over the tract of land was existing
and would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the University of the Philippines will
acquire `full ownership’ and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the property
only after February 1, 1985. The cession of the property to the University of the Philippines is
akin to the donation of a parcel of land, subject to usufruct. The donee acquires full
ownership thereof only upon the termination of the usufruct. At the time of the donation, all
what the donee acquires is the ‘naked’ ownership of the property donated. In the second
place, the respondents’ demand cannot be valid unless the provisions of Secs. 262 to 276 of
the National Internal Revenue Code regarding the measuring of timber cut from the forest
and the collection of the prescribed forest charges by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
Bureau of Forestry are first amended. In their arguments, the respondents tried to stretch
the scope of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990 in order to include therein such
amendment of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and Revised
Administrative Code, but they failed to convince the Court, not only because of the first
reason above stated, but also because it clearly appears that such amendment is not
intended in Republic Act No. 3990, which does not contain even a remote allusion thereto in
its title or a general amendatory provision at the end. In the third place, under Republic Act
No. 3990, the University of the Philippines cannot legally use the tract of land ceded to it for
purposes other than those therein expressly provided, namely, `for the use of the University
of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the
College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.’
Hence, upon the expiration of the petitioner’s timber concession, the University of the
Philippines cannot even legally renew it or grant timber concession over the whole tract of
land or over portions thereof to other private individuals and exercise the functions of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry by scaling and measuring the timber cut
within the area and collecting from them the forest charges prescribed by the National
Internal Revenue Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"I
. . . WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WITH
INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS THAT SHOULD
WARRANT A DISMISSAL.
II
. . . WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT EMPOWER THE
RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE AND BUREAU OF FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE AND SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY
THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT OF LAND REFERRED TO IN SAID ACT, AND COLLECT
THE CORRESPONDING FOREST CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE."cralaw virtua1aw library
1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the parties
jointly move and pray that the trial court render judgment "granting full and appropriate
remedy on the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest charges due
and payable under its Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in
paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of the
Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges are to
be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of the Philippines
is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and
removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act
No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled.’"
These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief under
Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal to the rule laid
down in Sarmiento, Et. Al. v. Caparas, Et Al., 6 that declaratory relief cannot be joined by
injunction, because herein petitioner, for all legal intents and purposes, abandoned it by its
failure to raise it in the Stipulation of Facts. Thus, what attains is an amendment to both
pleadings (the complaint and the answer), which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court. Said section pertinently provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. —
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respect, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even
after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of the trial by these issues.
. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy the
requisites for declaratory relief: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked
must be ripe for judicial determination. 7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds
of one exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the
declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a justiciable
controversy when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested. 8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No. 3990, the
Republic of the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges through the University of
the Philippines because the License Agreement does not expressly provide that the forest
charges shall be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue; in the absence of a specific
contractual provision limiting it to a particular agency in collecting forest charges owing to
it, the Republic may effect such collection through another agency. (b) Having been vested
with administrative jurisdiction over and being the owner of the tract of land in question, the
UP acquired full control and benefit of the timber and other resources within the area.
Timber areas within the ceded property but outside the concession of petitioner can be fully
exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas within the ceded property but covered
by the concession of petitioner, only forest charges (or more appropriately, royalties) may be
enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner’s license. To deny it such charges would
render its "full ownership" empty and futile. (c) The UP is clearly entitled to the income
derived from the tract of land ceded to it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 expressly
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station shall be exempt
from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and
any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the
University of the Philippines." (Italics supplied for emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a
central experiment station; since this law does not provide for appropriations for such
purpose, it is clearly the legislative intention that the establishment and maintenance
thereof must be financed by the earnings or income from the area, which can only come
from the timber and the royalties or charges payable therefrom. This is in accordance with
the general principle that a grant of authority or Jurisdiction extends to all incidents that
may arise in connection with the matter over which jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision
of the License Agreement in favor of petitioner by UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990. (f)
Finally, the two government agencies affected by R.A. No. 3990 have issued specific rulings
recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges and to supervise petitioner’s
logging operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a) The UP has
not been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest charges or the authority to
supervise the operation by the petitioner of the timber concession affected by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public
and most strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be included in the grant except that
which is granted expressly or by clear implication. Under Section 262 of the Tax Code, as
amended, the duties incident to the measuring of forest products and the collection of the
charges thereon shall be discharged by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under the
regulations of the Department of Finance. The reforestation fee shall be collected by the
Bureau of Forestry. 9 The supervision and regulation of the use of forest products and of the
cutting and removal of forest products are vested upon the Bureau of Forestry. 10 R.A. No.
3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant the UP any authority to collect from the
holders of timber concessions on the area ceded to it forest charges due and payable to the
Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce its provisions relating to charges on forest
products or to supervise the operations of the concessions by the holders thereof. (b) The
cession in full ownership of the land in question was expressly made "subject to any
concession, if any", and that petitioner’s concession would continue until 1 February 1985;
the UP then would acquire full ownership and exclusive jurisdiction to control and
administer the property only after 1 February 1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a
donee of a parcel of land subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently incorrect; moreover,
said agencies do not have the power to interpret the law, which is primarily a function of the
judiciary. (d) Finally, it has acquired a vested right to operate the timber concession under
the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the public
domain described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very parcel of land
subject of R.A. No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved for the
College of Agriculture of the UP as experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and
Training Institute and for research and production studies of said college, subject however
to private rights, if any, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and other forest
products found thereon shall-be subject to forestry laws and regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner’s timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station for the
use of the UP in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the
College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the
above "reserved" area was "ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the
Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if any."cralaw virtua1aw library
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines
completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas
covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest;
it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to
the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing
concession. That the law intended a transfer of the absolute ownership is unequivocally
evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe it. Full means entire, complete, or
possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any essential quality. 11 The proviso regarding
existing concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is
that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or
diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is
concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and
conveyed to UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further
borne out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any incidental
receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the
Philippines." Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or
from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the
authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated. This is
obvious from the fact that the condition in Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the
disposition of timber shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced in
R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set
forth in the proclamation. An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law. 12 The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi
or the right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi, or the right to
consume the thing by its use. 13 As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the
owner belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however, appointed personnel, the logging, felling, and removal of timber within the aforesaid area
exceptions to this rules, as where the property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the covered by R.A. No. 3990.
usufructuary gets the fruits. 14 In the instant case, that exception is made for the petitioner
as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect, Costs against petitioner.
and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until 1 February 1985.
However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to SO ORDERED.
the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The charges
should not be paid anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Internal Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently,
even the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to
measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees
due thereon.

The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not grant the
UP the authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of its concession
insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its argument that it has acquired
vested rights to operate its concession under the supervision and control of the Bureau of
Forestry is preposterous. The grantor, Republic of the Philippines, was by no means bound
under the License to perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is there force to its
contention that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most
strongly against the grantee. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of absolute, full and
entire ownership which leaves no room for a strict interpretation against the grantee, the
UP. The reservation therein made is in favor of the private party pursuant to the license,
which is nevertheless protected. It is the concession in favor of the petitioner which should,
on the contrary, be bound by the rule.

It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed
personnel, the logging, felling, and removal of timber within the area covered by R.A. No.
3990.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3 June 1968; DECLARING that
forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within the area ceded and transferred to the University
of the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to the University of the Philippines;
DECLARING that the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and
NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T.
NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all
surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented
by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA,
CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN
JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE
MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS
BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation
or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region.
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented
and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed
for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
— dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush
and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be
found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the
basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance
of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise
known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water
table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which
may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive
erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the
volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum —
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and
other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent
spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of
typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands
and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j)
the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention
to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the
course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares
of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and
about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex
"A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25
hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines
will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and
enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On
March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits
in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country
that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to
the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of
dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section
14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural
law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant
action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss
the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action
against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states
no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the
latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging
than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not
contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest
so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their
complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to
them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question
of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should
be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They
therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot
be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a
certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same
can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and
hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.
Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said
civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since
the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all
of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but
an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to
the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but
agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all
intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they
are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and
redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to
state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with
political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by
this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the
three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed,
and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon
the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation,
but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary
sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution —
air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of
which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall
be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of
all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of
the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection
and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different
segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also
the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation
of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity
of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of
such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well
as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development
and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on
the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization,
and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will
serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present
and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and
P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing
policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the
social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and
(c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity
and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as
trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute,
on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires
that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and
its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant,
and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for
resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other
matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence
thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts
alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively
nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs
prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they
are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis
policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to
the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving
the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority
represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was
before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature
and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion,"
which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment
of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms
and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber
license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in
this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not
a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to
whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does
not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54
O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may
be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also,
Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating
cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the
non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could
have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their
health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be
free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could
apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of
renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason,
JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this
case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last
few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly
the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of
course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our
polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be
saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi
to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit.
Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this
"class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary
locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of
action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative
agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector
of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and
all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the
governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination
in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14).
There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental"
and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific,"
without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language
more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and
healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and
smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage
and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and
whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or
slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources
through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground
water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements
pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1,
Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 —
all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional
statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful
ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon
the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management
policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating
to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management; My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific
legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article
(c) land use management; II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act,
imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing: judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources; our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and
the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given
(ii) wild life; petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings
on a motion to dismiss.
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
(iv) flood control and natural calamities; action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for
at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
(v) energy development; disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water dimensions to this matter.

(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court
has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment
Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.
Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular
government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and
programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The
Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the
part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be
explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to
be hinted at here.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or
applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on
the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article
VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. ...
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments —
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose
concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must
be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to
the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of
one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I
suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners
should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific
legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment,
including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The
doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to
closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this
case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last
few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly
the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of
course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our
polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be
saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi
to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit.
Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this
"class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary
locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of
action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative
agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector
of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and
all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the
governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination
in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14).
There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental"
and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific,"
without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language
more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and
healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and
smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage
and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and
whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or
slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources
through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground
water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements
pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1,
Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 —
all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional
statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful
ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular
government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and
programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The
Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the
part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon
the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management
policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating
to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be
explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to
be hinted at here.

(b) water quality management; My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific
legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article
(c) land use management; II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act,
imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing: judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources; our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and
the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given
(ii) wild life; petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings
on a motion to dismiss.
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
(iv) flood control and natural calamities; action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for
at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
(v) energy development; disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water dimensions to this matter.

(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court
has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment
Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or
applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on
the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article
VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. ...

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments —
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose
concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must
be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to
the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of
one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I
suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners
should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific
legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment,
including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The
doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to
closer examination.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant
PUNO, J.:p
Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705 1 as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277. 2
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the
Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck
bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos
Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol
several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City. 3
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc
went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the
corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-
wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and
apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge. 4
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant
Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified accused- appellant as the owner
of the truck and the cargo. 5
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When
interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in
between the coconut slabs. 6
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the cargo's supporting documents, specifically: (1)
certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4)
receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of
the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents . All he could
show was a certification 7 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification
was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. 7
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the
provincial capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task
Force that there were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs. 9
At 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together with
three CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo
consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the
sides of the truck, concealing the tanguile lumber. 10 When the CENRO personnel
inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they counted two hundred fifty eight
(258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters)
and total assessed value of P93,232.50. 11
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag
with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an
I(s)uzu Ten wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces of
various sizes of Forest Products chainsawn lumber (species of Tanguile) with a total volume
of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50
at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities,
thus violating the aforecited provision of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 12
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258
pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land
timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa 13 and Elpidio Sabal. 14 The
PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by
the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by the
PLTP's of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as
payment for his hauling services. 15
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence
against him. He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an
uncounselled extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It
also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by
accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision 16 states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by Executive Order
No. 277 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all
the accessory penalties provided by law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the
accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the ten-wheeler
truck bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the crime are hereby
ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.17
Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of
errors: 18
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD 705 as amended
by EO 277 for possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations on the ground that since it is only in EO
No. 277 where for the first time mere possession of timber was criminalized, there are no
existing forest laws and regulations which required certain legal documents for possession
of timber and other forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional
rights of accused against unlawful searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional
rights of accused under custodial investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for violation
of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents did not
indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the
other forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its enactment.
Appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705 provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without
License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found. (emphasis supplied).
Appellant interprets the phrase "existing forest laws and regulations" to refer to those laws
and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. The
suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction
should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and
regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR
Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the
transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order
provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood, veneer,
non-timber forest products and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities
shall be covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued by authorized DENR officials,
as specified in the succeeding sections.
xxx xxx xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be
accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly
authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the processing plant producing the
said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be valid,
the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in case of
sale, a lumber sales invoice.
xxx xxx xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any certificate of
origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court found:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not present a
single document to justify his possession of the subject lumber. . . .
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he readily
showed documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a
certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a xerox copy of the original certificate of title covering the
parcel of land where the coconut slabs were cut.(Exhibit "F").
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be transported by Mr.
Wilson Que on board truck bearing Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from matured coconut
palms gathered inside the private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614(8)
located at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que for the purpose of
facilitating the transportation of said coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San
Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of its
cargoes at its final destination, whichever comes first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to transport one
(1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was
apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate number PAD-548 which was
loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the
lumber could not be seen from the outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not
visible unless the coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck
were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much aware
that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one
and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a manner that they could
not be seen by police authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3, 1994
addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO
that he would be transporting the subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira,
Cagayan to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the reason that he did not
need a permit to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibits "8", "8-A").
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March 4, 1994, the
Court has doubts that this was duly filed with the concerned office. According to the
accused, he filed the letter in the morning of March 4 and returned in the afternoon of the
same day. He was then informed by an employee of the CENRO whom he did not identify
that he did not need a permit to transport the lumber because the lumber would be for
personal used (sic) and ". . . came from PLTP." (Ibid) The letter-request was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance of the
accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a government
agency are not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits any document to a
government agency, the agency gets the original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy
to show that he has filed such document with the agency. Moreover, his avoidance as
regards the identity of the employee of the CENRO who allegedly returned the letter-
request to him also creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on cross-examination, the accused,
when asked about the identity of the employee of the CENRO who returned the letter-
request to him answered that he could recognize the person ". . . but they were already
reshuffled." (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused also said that he did
not know if that person was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letter-request, to
wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view of the fact that I am
hauling and transporting my own lumber for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of transport
agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him when he
transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted source. 19
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant's possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly
constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellant's argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest
products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting,
gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are two (2) distinct
and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization
issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting,
gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of
forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the
lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as malum
prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are
inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous tree". Appellant avers that these
pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unlawful
searches and seizures as well as his right to counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by this
court in People vs. Bagista, 20 thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person
shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence
except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the
rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the
aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal
lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial
Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck
described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, accused-
appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in
between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumber's supporting
documents, accused-appellant could not present any. The foregoing circumstances are
sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive search of
appellant's truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were
lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-
appellant.
The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether appellant's right to
counsel under custodial investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not affect
the finding of guilt of appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain SO ORDERED.
exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been
upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view. Regalado, Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long
as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle
to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellant's
truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable
 Republic of the Philippines The first and third case, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to
SUPREME COURT the Second and Third Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were subsequently
Manila consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc.

EN BANC Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street,
Tondo, Manila, and with a Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as
G.R. No. 104988 June 18, 1996 such was to expire on 25 September 1990.

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special
Actions and Investigations Division, DENR, respondents.
G.R. No. 106424 June 18, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and RI CHUY
PO, respondents.
G.R. No. 123784 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and
Investigation Division, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY.
NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR., respondents.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles
were, during all the time material to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the Special Actions and
Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and
slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the
SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the
said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the
lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and
impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City.1 The team was
not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.2
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano
R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof,
the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra
shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately
200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.3

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner
failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary
invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the
lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.4
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the
physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and
signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them
until further orders.5
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension
of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized
articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in
the Province of Quirino Robles denied the motion on the ground that the documents being
required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest products placed under
seizure.6
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to Secretary
Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang
Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of
Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck
with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in
the event its owner fails to submit documents showing legitimacy of the source of said
lumber within ten days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc.
and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga
lumber and shorts if and when recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV. 458 as well as the lumber
loaded therein for transport lumber using "recycled" documents.7
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the
petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to
explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the
latter that the petitioner had already secured the required documents and was ready to
submit them. None, however, was submitted.8
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the events
which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered "CONFISCATED in favor of the
government to be disposed of in accordance with law" the approximately 311,000 board
feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's
lumberyard.9
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL
CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 of the said court.
The petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and
seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted
lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and dimensions with a
total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack
of prior notice and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon instruction
of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to
the business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila.
The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's
permit had already been suspended or 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's
lumberyard was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer
loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team was informed that the lumber loaded on
the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales
invoice covering the transaction. The members of the team then introduced themselves to
the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's president and
general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer was
able to take photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust
around sawing or cutting machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded
with lumber. The team thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately 20,000
board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt
therefor. 10
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL
CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the
petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate preliminary investigation, the
investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a resolution 11 whose dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in
violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs
covered by legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa. 12
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, who served
as Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging." 13
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with
Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 58 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter,
the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the
premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and
lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations. 14
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision 15 in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the
approximately 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa, end almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks,
found inside and seized from the Lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune
Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set
aside and vacated, and instead the respondents are required to report and bring to the Hon.
Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the
said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt
with as directed by Law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action
before the proper court regarding the Lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions Loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which were seized on
April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be
rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this judgment;.
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the Lauan, supa and almaciga lumber,
shorts and sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to
said petitioner is withheld in this case until after the proper court has taken cognizance and
determined how those Lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1
April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber without covering
document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional
mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell
under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is
justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle. 16 As to the seizure of a large volume of
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled
that the said seizure was a continuation of that made the previous day and was still pursuant
to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the
petitioner did not even question. 17 And, although the search warrant did not specifically
mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is
settled that the executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands observed during the
conduct of the
search.18
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the
confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since the
articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they
should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled that
the same had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's
lumber dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner admitted in its
memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of
Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or
to Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not
charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him
for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch
35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals,
which involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question. 19
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, and possession thereof without the required legal documents is
penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of
1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber
from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal
logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources. 20
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, 21 respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-
Capulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that
"possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws and regulations
is not a crime. 22
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October 1991, 23 the
People filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends
that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to
quash and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 24 in CA-G.R. SP No.
25510 dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST
CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to the claim that
the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law punishing the possession
of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession without the required legal
documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product involved has
always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of lumber
dealership. But what is important to consider is that when appellant was required to present
the valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in
question, it failed to present any despite the period of extension granted to it. 25
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of Appeals
in its resolution of 3 March 1992. 26 Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a
petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed on 2 May 1992. 27
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in the
SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the
petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17
September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under
suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and
(d) the seizure was justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No.
705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the
appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
In its decision 28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal in
CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial
court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition of "lumber" by
Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the market," and by the
Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or
adapted for various building purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is
included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize the
forest product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80
thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part as follows:
Sec. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the Bureau
or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest even
without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, or the forest
products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the cutting,
gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products or possession of timber
or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in the
resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a
petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. No. 106424 with which the other
two were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the
ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the
motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is
LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required legal documents is
not prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be
quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has
been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the averments
in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute
the elements of the
offense, 29 and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the
information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the
information state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber
or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b)
possession of timber forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that this
omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts
averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation of the said
section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber
is not solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the
possession of the private respondent, without the required legal documents, are truckloads
of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa.
The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as "lumber."
They cannot refer to the "lumber" in no. (2) because they are separated by the words
"approximately 200,000 bd. ft." with the conjunction "and," and not with the preposition
"of." They must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under Section 3(q)
of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
Sec. 3. Definitions. --
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey,
beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest plant, the associated water, fish game, scenic, historical,
recreational and geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public
and the private respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information.
Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted
above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly
charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion that this
Court go beyond the four corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the
information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the annexes
thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that "only lumber has been envisioned in the
indictment."
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule that
only the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in
determining whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his conclusion.
On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one
of the annexes he referred to, 30 cannot lead one to infer that what the team seized was all
lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4) truckloads
of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga
and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species. (emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution31 of the investigating prosecutor,
which served as the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber;
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting
of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63
of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the
respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal
documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized
in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the
former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which
reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine
used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallbond, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly,
the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright
edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as
"timber or logs after being prepared for the market." 32 Simply put, lumber is a processed
log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used
in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33 And
insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber.
Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to
quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show that
the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November
1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322
was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of
different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with the required invoices and
transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the
power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended
by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in
the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could
be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
constitutional mandate 34 that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The
other exceptions are (3) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in
plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless search. 35
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on
4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of
the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be
served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be
accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until
completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be
continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day
period. 36
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of
lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in the term forest
product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpally fail to shaw
prima facie that a reversible error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its
challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No.
33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to require the
respondents to comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the
trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its lumber-
dealer's license or permit had been suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The
suspension was never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25 September
1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber.
Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had the authority to seize
the Lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which provides as
follows:
Sec. 68-A Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest
laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed
or abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must also fail
view of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is
totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves administrative seizure as a
consequence of the violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to cover up
blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as
amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of the DENR to
enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the public in light of the
urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our forests whose
continuous destruction only ensures to the generations to come, if not the present, an
inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its
vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any person who
dares to violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING,
for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August
1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172,
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po"; (c) REINSTATING the information in the said
criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge or her successor to hear and decide
the case with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure
of the petitioner to show that the respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error in the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST
CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 on the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., dissenting:
The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the
annulment of the 16th August 1991 Order of respondent Judge granting the motion of
private respondent Ri Chuy Po to quash the information that has charged him with the
Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 705 (otherwise known as the
Forestry Reform Code, as amended by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 2771) and the 18th
October 1991 Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged inculpatory facts against private
respondent, reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI CHUY PO of the crime of violation of
Section 68, Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of
1987, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the
premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession
truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the quashal of the information on the
ground that the facts comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense, or in the
alternative, to suspend the proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question, private
respondent having formally challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber in question
in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Manila, Branch 35, and now pending
with the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now questioned order granting the
motion of private respondent to quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the possession
of "timber or other forest products" (without supporting legal documents), the mere
possession of "lumber" had not itself been declared a criminal offense under Section 68 of
PD 705. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration insisting that lumber should be held to come
within the purview of "timber" defined by Section 2.26 (b) of DENR Administrative Order No.
50, Series of 1986. The motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the petition for review
on certiorari filed by the prosecution before this Court.
Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705 distinguishes "timber" and "other forest
products," on the one hand, from "lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the
other, and that the possession of lumber of any specie, size or dimension, whether it be
lauan, tanguile, apitong, almaciga, supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal
offense; (2) that DENR Administrative Order No. 74, Series of 1987, totally bans the cutting,
handling and disposition of almaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is not
considered illegal; (3) that while under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987,
the cutting or gathering of narra and other premium hardwood species (supa included) is
prohibited, it does not, however, make possession of premium hardwood lumber (narra and
supa included) punishable by mere inference; and (4) that Bureau of Forest Development
Circular No. 10, Series of 1983, clarified by DENR Memorandum No. 12, Series of 1988,
requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO") only on lumber shipped outside the province,
city or the greater Manila area to another province or city or, in lieu of a CLO, an invoice to
accompany a lumber shipment from legitimate sources if the origin and destination points
are both within the greater Manila area or within the same province or city, and not, like in
the instant case, where the lumber is not removed from the lumber yard.
Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan lumber products found in the
compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as amended by EO
No. 277, the possession of which without requisite legal documents is penalized under
Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989, dated 17 March 1989, that
defines "lumber" to be a --
. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and
passing lengthwise through a standard planing machine, including boules or unedged
lumber;
and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated
28 December 1987, to be --
. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at 1.5
meters long, except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber
regardless of size;
which may either be --
a) Squared timber (or) timber squared with an ax or other similar mechanical hard
tools in the forest and which from the size of the piece and the character of the wood is
obviously unfit for use in that form (Sec. 1.10 DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of
1987, dated December 28, 1987); or
b) Manufactured timber (or) timber other than round and squared timber shall
include logs longitudinally sawn into pieces, even if only to facilitate transporting or hauling,
as well as all sawn products, all timber hewn or otherwise worked to approximate its finished
form, such as house posts, ship keels, mine props, ties, trolly poles, bancas, troughs, bowls,
cart wheels, table tops and other similar articles (Sec. 2.26, DENR Administrative Order No.
50, Series of 1986, dated November 11, 1986) --
(2) that to exclude "lumber" under Section 68 of PD 705 would be to defeat the
purpose of the law, i.e., to stop or minimize illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid
denudation of forest resources; (3) that the claim of private respondent that a CLO is
required only upon the transportation or shipment of lumber, and not when lumber is
merely stored in a compound, contravenes the provisions of Section 68 of PD 705; (4) that
the failure to show any CLO or other legal document required by administrative issuances
raises the presumption that the lumber has been shipped or received from illegal sources;
and, (5) that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 90-53648 sustaining the legality of the
seizure has rendered moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case.
The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the
two consolidated cases (G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not the term
"timber or other forest products" the possession of which without the required legal
documents would be a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers "lumber".
Prefatorily, I might point out that the information, charging private respondent with the
possession without required legal documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and lauan and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga
and supa, . . ." has failed to specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there mentioned
refer to "timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal of the pleadings and annexes before the
Court, however, would indicate that only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment. For
instance --
(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman
Belleng,3 subscribed and sworn to before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon which basis
the latter recommended the filing of the information, read, as follows:
"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the security detail from our agency
continued to monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended and later
on brought to the DENR compound a six-wheeler truck loaded with almaciga and lauan
lumber after the truck driver failed to produce any documents covering the shipment;
xxx xxx xxx
"That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a criminal complaint against Mr. Ri
Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber for violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as amended by
Executive Order 277, having in its possession prohibited wood and wood products without
the required documents."4 (Emphasis supplied)
(b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by Investigating Prosecutor Arellano,
approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that --
" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued to monitor the activities inside the
compound and in fact apprehended a six-wheeler truck coming from the compound of
Mustang loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber without the necessary legal documents
covering the shipment."5
(c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, suspending
the Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang Lumber, Inc., was issued
because of, among other things, the latter's possession of almaciga lumber without the
required documents.6

(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued by Secretary Factoran,
authorized the confiscation of approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks of various sizes and dimensions owned by Mustang
Lumber, Inc.7
(e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A. Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR,
before the Department of Justice, Manila, against private respondent was for possession of
lauan and almaciga lumber without required legal documents,8 in violation of P.D. 705, as
amended by EO 277.
(f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private respondent's motion to quash, sought
to argue that the possession of "almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in the compound
of Mustang Lumber, Inc.,9 was covered by the penal provisions of P.D. 705, as amended,
pursuant to Section 32 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989.
Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal order of the court a quo solely on
the thesis that "lumber" should be held to be among the items that are banned under
Section 68 of PD 705.
While generally factual matters outside of the information should not weigh in resolving a
motion to quash following the standing rule that the allegations of the information must
alone be considered and should not be challenged, there should, however, be no serious
objections to taking into account additional and clarificatory facts which, although not made
out in the information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the parties. As early as the
case of People vs. Navarro, 10 reiterated in People vs. Dela Rosa, 11 the Court has had
occasion to explain --
. . . It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the motion the
parties and the judge were precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be
true, simply because they were not described in the complaint. Of course, it may be added
that upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go beyond the
averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky
revelation of his evidence. But we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all
candor, admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never be sufficiently
reiterated that such official's role is to see that justice is done: not that all accused are
convicted, but that the guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the
court from considering those admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the interest of a
speedy administration of justice.
And now on the main substantive issue.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without
License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found.
I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section 68, PD 705, as so amended, is
explicit, and it is confined to "timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the decree
defines "forest product" to mean --
(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey,
beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the
associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic resources in forest
lands (emphasis supplied);
and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of the law, from that which has
undergone processing. In defining a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it to
refer to --

. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of
logs and other forest raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board,
paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products (emphasis supplied).
In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the law, as a forest product, while
lumber has been categorized, under Section 3(aa), among the various finished wood
products.
The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor General, to wit:
(1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28 December 1987, Series of 1987,
which defines "timber" to be --
. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at 1.5
meters long, except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber
regardless of size; 12
(2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, dated 17 March 1989, Series of
1989, stating that "lumber" includes --
. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and
passing lengthwise through a standard planing machine, including boules or unedged
lumber;" and
(3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, dated 06 May 1988, to the effect
that the term "forest products" shall include "lumber --
cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the basic law.
While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an interpretation or construction of a statute by
the government agency called upon to implement the enactment, 13 the rule would only be
good, however, to the extent that such interpretation or construction is congruous with the
governing statute. 14 Administrative issuances can aptly carry the law into effect 15 but it
would be legal absurdity to allow such issuances to also have the effect, particularly those
which are penal in nature, of extending the scope of the law or its plain
mandate. 16
Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition in G.R. No. 106424, to grant the
petition in G.R. No. 104988 and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784. I
must hasten to add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate the well-meant rationale of DENR
Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving whatever
remains of the country's forest reserves can never now be fully emphasized. Until properly
addressed and checked, the continued denudation of forest resources, already known to be
the cause of no few disasters, as well as of untold loss of lives and property, could well be on
end the expected order of the day. I, therefore, join ail those who call for the passage of
remedial legislation before the problem truly becomes irreversible.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the
annulment of the 16th August 1991 Order of respondent Judge granting the motion of
private respondent Ri Chuy Po to quash the information that has charged him with the
Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 705 (otherwise known as the
Forestry Reform Code, as amended by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 2771) and the 18th
October 1991 Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged inculpatory facts against private
respondent, reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI CHUY PO of the crime of violation of
Section 68, Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of
1987, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the
premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession
truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the quashal of the information on the
ground that the facts comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense, or in the
alternative, to suspend the proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question, private
respondent having formally challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber in question
in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Manila, Branch 35, and now pending
with the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now questioned order granting the
motion of private respondent to quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the possession
of "timber or other forest products" (without supporting legal documents), the mere
possession of "lumber" had not itself been declared a criminal offense under Section 68 of
PD 705. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration insisting that lumber should be held to come
within the purview of "timber" defined by Section 2.26 (b) of DENR Administrative Order No.
50, Series of 1986. The motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the petition for review
on certiorari filed by the prosecution before this Court.
Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705 distinguishes "timber" and "other forest
products," on the one hand, from "lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the
other, and that the possession of lumber of any specie, size or dimension, whether it be
lauan, tanguile, apitong, almaciga, supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal
offense; (2) that DENR Administrative Order No. 74, Series of 1987, totally bans the cutting,
handling and disposition of almaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is not
considered illegal; (3) that while under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987,
the cutting or gathering of narra and other premium hardwood species (supa included) is
prohibited, it does not, however, make possession of premium hardwood lumber (narra and
supa included) punishable by mere inference; and (4) that Bureau of Forest Development
Circular No. 10, Series of 1983, clarified by DENR Memorandum No. 12, Series of 1988,
requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO") only on lumber shipped outside the province,
city or the greater Manila area to another province or city or, in lieu of a CLO, an invoice to
accompany a lumber shipment from legitimate sources if the origin and destination points
are both within the greater Manila area or within the same province or city, and not, like in
the instant case, where the lumber is not removed from the lumber yard.
Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan lumber products found in the
compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as amended by EO
No. 277, the possession of which without requisite legal documents is penalized under
Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989, dated 17 March 1989, that
defines "lumber" to be a --
. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and
passing lengthwise through a standard planing machine, including boules or unedged
lumber;
and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated
28 December 1987, to be --
. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at 1.5
meters long, except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber
regardless of size;
which may either be --
a) Squared timber (or) timber squared with an ax or other similar mechanical hard
tools in the forest and which from the size of the piece and the character of the wood is
obviously unfit for use in that form (Sec. 1.10 DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of
1987, dated December 28, 1987); or
b) Manufactured timber (or) timber other than round and squared timber shall
include logs longitudinally sawn into pieces, even if only to facilitate transporting or hauling,
as well as all sawn products, all timber hewn or otherwise worked to approximate its finished
form, such as house posts, ship keels, mine props, ties, trolly poles, bancas, troughs, bowls,
cart wheels, table tops and other similar articles (Sec. 2.26, DENR Administrative Order No.
50, Series of 1986, dated November 11, 1986) --
(2) that to exclude "lumber" under Section 68 of PD 705 would be to defeat the
purpose of the law, i.e., to stop or minimize illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid
denudation of forest resources; (3) that the claim of private respondent that a CLO is
required only upon the transportation or shipment of lumber, and not when lumber is
merely stored in a compound, contravenes the provisions of Section 68 of PD 705; (4) that
the failure to show any CLO or other legal document required by administrative issuances
raises the presumption that the lumber has been shipped or received from illegal sources;
and, (5) that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 90-53648 sustaining the legality of the
seizure has rendered moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case.
The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the
two consolidated cases (G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not the term
"timber or other forest products" the possession of which without the required legal
documents would be a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers "lumber".
Prefatorily, I might point out that the information, charging private respondent with the
possession without required legal documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and lauan and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga
and supa, . . ." has failed to specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there mentioned
refer to "timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal of the pleadings and annexes before the
Court, however, would indicate that only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment. For
instance --
(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman
Belleng,3 subscribed and sworn to before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon which basis
the latter recommended the filing of the information, read, as follows:
"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the security detail from our agency
continued to monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended and later
on brought to the DENR compound a six-wheeler truck loaded with almaciga and lauan
lumber after the truck driver failed to produce any documents covering the shipment;
xxx xxx xxx
"That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a criminal complaint against Mr. Ri
Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber for violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as amended by
Executive Order 277, having in its possession prohibited wood and wood products without
the required documents."4 (Emphasis supplied)
(b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by Investigating Prosecutor Arellano,
approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that --
" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued to monitor the activities inside the
compound and in fact apprehended a six-wheeler truck coming from the compound of
Mustang loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber without the necessary legal documents
covering the shipment."5
(c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, suspending
the Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang Lumber, Inc., was issued
because of, among other things, the latter's possession of almaciga lumber without the
required documents.6
(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued by Secretary Factoran,
authorized the confiscation of approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks of various sizes and dimensions owned by Mustang
Lumber, Inc.7
(e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A. Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR,
before the Department of Justice, Manila, against private respondent was for possession of
lauan and almaciga lumber without required legal documents,8 in violation of P.D. 705, as
amended by EO 277.
(f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private respondent's motion to quash, sought
to argue that the possession of "almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in the compound
of Mustang Lumber, Inc.,9 was covered by the penal provisions of P.D. 705, as amended,
pursuant to Section 32 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989.
Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal order of the court a quo solely on
the thesis that "lumber" should be held to be among the items that are banned under
Section 68 of PD 705.
While generally factual matters outside of the information should not weigh in resolving a
motion to quash following the standing rule that the allegations of the information must
alone be considered and should not be challenged, there should, however, be no serious
objections to taking into account additional and clarificatory facts which, although not made
out in the information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the parties. As early as the
case of People vs. Navarro, 10 reiterated in People vs. Dela Rosa, 11 the Court has had
occasion to explain --
. . . It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the motion the
parties and the judge were precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be
true, simply because they were not described in the complaint. Of course, it may be added
that upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go beyond the
averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky
revelation of his evidence. But we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all
candor, admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never be sufficiently
reiterated that such official's role is to see that justice is done: not that all accused are
convicted, but that the guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the
court from considering those admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the interest of a
speedy administration of justice.
And now on the main substantive issue.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without
License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found.
I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section 68, PD 705, as so amended, is
explicit, and it is confined to "timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the decree
defines "forest product" to mean --
(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey,
beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the
associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic resources in forest
lands (emphasis supplied);
and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of the law, from that which has
undergone processing. In defining a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it to
refer to --
. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of
logs and other forest raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board,
paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products (emphasis supplied).
In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the law, as a forest product, while
lumber has been categorized, under Section 3(aa), among the various finished wood
products.
The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor General, to wit:
(1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28 December 1987, Series of 1987,
which defines "timber" to be --
. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at 1.5
meters long, except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber
regardless of size; 12
(2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, dated 17 March 1989, Series of
1989, stating that "lumber" includes --
. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and
passing lengthwise through a standard planing machine, including boules or unedged
lumber;" and

(3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, dated 06 May 1988, to the effect
that the term "forest products" shall include "lumber --

cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the basic law.

While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an interpretation or construction of a statute by

the government agency called upon to implement the enactment, 13 the rule would only be
good, however, to the extent that such interpretation or construction is congruous with the
governing statute. 14 Administrative issuances can aptly carry the law into effect 15 but it
would be legal absurdity to allow such issuances to also have the effect, particularly those
which are penal in nature, of extending the scope of the law or its plain
mandate. 16

Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition in G.R. No. 106424, to grant the
petition in G.R. No. 104988 and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784. I
must hasten to add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate the well-meant rationale of DENR
Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving whatever
remains of the country's forest reserves can never now be fully emphasized. Until properly
addressed and checked, the continued denudation of forest resources, already known to be
the cause of no few disasters, as well as of untold loss of lives and property, could well be on
end the expected order of the day. I, therefore, join ail those who call for the passage of
remedial legislation before the problem truly becomes irreversible.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 125797 February 15, 2002
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Region VIII, Tacloban
City, Represented by Regional Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C. ROSALES, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog City, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized
representative may order the confiscation in favor of the government of, among others, the
vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said Code.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the December 6, 1995 Decision1 and the June 3, 1996 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused GREGORIO
DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de [o]ficio.
"The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.
"The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is taking
custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle ‘St. Jude’, with Plate No. HAJ-848, to
return the said vehicle to the owner thereof."3
The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last paragraph of
the Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein respondents.
The Facts
In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
"The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with] violation
of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 in an
information which is quoted herein below:
‘That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at
Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber,
with a total volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS
(P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or license
therefor from the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.
705, as amended and further Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.
‘CONTRARY TO LAW.’
"Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not
guilty.
"Thereafter trial was conducted.
"The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:
"That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a
Forest Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while he was
in his house in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named ‘St. Jude’ with Plate No. HAJ-
848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora passed by. He stopped the said vehicle and found
some lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside. The lumber consisted of 62
pieces of 1" x 2" x 4", 16 pieces of 1" x 24" x 2.3" and 1 piece of 1" x 2" x 4." In his estimate at
the price of ₱10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber would be ₱729.30. He asked
the driver for [the] owner of the lumber and he was informed that it was a certain Asan of
Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also informed him that the vehicle was owned by his
employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then
took hold of the vehicle and the assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt
marked as Exhs. ‘B’ and series. He also took photographs of the lumber which are now
marked as Exhs. ‘C’ and series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag,
also a Forest Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for some papers for the
assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not his. Daraman
further told him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from
the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his
assorted lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to his
(Asan’s) house in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City.
"The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both the
prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that the
case would be merely corroborative [of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion. The
prosecution rested its case with the admission of Exhs. ‘A’ and ‘B’ and their series. Its Exhs.
‘C’ and series were rejected because the photographer who took them did not testify to
identify [them].
"For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused would
merely offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts have been
established:
"That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio instructed him
to procure some wood shavings (‘sinapyo’) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the service vehicle
of the Holy Cross Funeral Services. His companion[s] were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi
Mabutol. They went to barangay Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got
some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by a certain Asan Abing. They loaded
20 sacks of wood shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2 inches in
circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were] being used by the
Holy Cross Funeral Services as cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood shavings
were loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house
in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral Services [was] also located.
Asan himself personally loaded his assorted lumber into the vehicle. The subject assorted
lumber were already in the furniture shop where they got the wood shavings. On their way
home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo Opinion stopped him and took the wood
shavings. Opinion also inquired about the assorted lumber and he told him that they were
owned by Asan, owner of the furniture shop in Brgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded them in his
vehicle to be brought to his (Asan’s) house in Barangay Obrero, Calbayog City. He told
Opinion also that Asan advised him that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to
tell the person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at
Brgy. Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and
he instead impounded the vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 o’clock
in the afternoon, the vehicle was still not returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and
returned to his employer at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the latter about what
happened."4
After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed vehicle to
Lucenecio.
Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-
Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) of Catbalogan,
Samar conducted administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle
in the presence of private respondents.5 The two failed to present documents to show the
legality of their possession and transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer
Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional Executive Director (RED) the final
confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance.6 Atty. Pastor C. Salazar filed a
Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, concurring with the recommendation to forfeit the
lumber and the vehicle seized from private respondents. The Memorandum was approved
by RED Augustus L. Momongan and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the
DENR, Region VIII, Tacloban City.7
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the reconsideration of
the assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the "return of the said vehicle to the owner
thereof."8 He contended that the vehicle had already been administratively confiscated by
the DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED approved its forfeiture on January 26,
1994.9 He further claimed that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance,
which had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of
PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence. The unrebutted
testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood shavings from Asan,
the former agreed to take the lumber to the latter’s house in Calbayog City, where the Holy
Cross Funeral Services office was also located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked,
that the papers showing the authorization for the lumber were in the former’s shop in
Barangay Blanca Aurora. Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise
insufficient, the RTC considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and ordered its delivery
to him.
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was
untenable on procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign of his
disapproval of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
"x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by the
Court the owner of the vehicle in question, ‘St. Jude,’ which is the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor
owned by accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the
prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that accused Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept
control of the lumber subject of the motion which would thereby demonstrate that he had x
x x possession of the subject forest products. Instead, as established by the evidence it was a
certain Asan who owned the subject lumber. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
"The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has long
become final and executory.
"Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by the
OIC DENR Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the lumber in question
[was] found to be owned by Asan Abing. But notwithstanding this fact, for reasons not
known to the Court, the said Asan Abing was never made an accused in the present case.
"Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is himself a
violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have conspired with any other persons who
committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of his vehicle in
violating the said law. In the present case as shown by the evidence, neither the Holy Cross
Funeral Parlor or its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has committed a violation of P.D. 705
as already declared by the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused
Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the
decision has not been appealed."10
Hence, this Petition.11
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
"(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the return of
property already owned by the government.
(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known as
the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of mistake, error
or failure of its officers to perform their duties."12
Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated
vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3) whether, as a
result of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from confiscating the vehicle
administratively.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle
Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the return of
the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government property by
virtue of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his
duly authorized representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may
order the confiscation and disposition of all conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in
illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or abandoning forest products.
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.13 A comparison of the provisions of
the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC
covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest
products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest
products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense. Section 68
reads:
"Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: x x x.
"The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found."14
Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:
"SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest
laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed
or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of
the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or
policies on the matter."15
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal
meaning and applied without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording
correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts may not construe it differently.16
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial arts;17
equipment covers physical facilities available for production, including buildings,
machineries and tools;18 and implements pertains to whatever may supply a want,
especially an instrument, tool or utensil.19 These terms do not include conveyances that are
specifically covered by Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A define
conveyance in a manner that includes "any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether motorized
or not, used either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode of transport
used in the movement of any forest product."20
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of "all conveyances used
either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same" is
vested in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly
authorized representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and control over the
enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and
regulations.21
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-93,
amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides the
guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in violation of
forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to private
respondents to "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two
(72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first securing and obtaining any permit
or license therefor from the proper authorities, x x x." The Information did not contain any
allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance of illegally cut, gathered,
possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended.
Confiscation Without Due Process
Private respondents’ main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex "C") is a "false,
falsified and perjurious document." The Order was attached to and made part of the record
only when petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only
after the trial court rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it appear, according to
the private respondents, that RED Momongan had approved the Memorandum on January
26, 1994. This does not appear to be true because Atty. Marmita, officer-in-charge (OIC) of
the DENR Legal Division of Tacloban City, signed the Memorandum recommending
approval only on January 31, 1994.
Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32) ordered the
provincial environment and natural resources officer to transfer the confiscated vehicle and
pieces of lumber in connection with the prosecution of Criminal Case 1958.22 Reynaldo R.
Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), replied
that his office could not deliver the vehicle because it was not in running condition.23
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls outside the
ambit of the review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed Order to
release the vehicle was private respondents’ acquittal of the charge of violating Section 68.
On the other hand, the forfeiture Order issued by the DENR was based on Section 68-A,
which involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable by it. Petitioner is questioning only
the RTC’s jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the confiscated vehicle. Private
respondents have not appealed the DENR’s Order of Forfeiture, the validity of which can
thus be presumed.24 The genuineness of the Order and its proper service upon them are
factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court, which is not a trier of facts.25
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the main limited
to reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court.26 Under PD 705, the actions and the
decisions of the DENR are reviewable by the courts only through special civil actions for
certiorari or prohibition.27
Second Issue:
Construing PD 705, as Amended
Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-A, PD
705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator or was
a conspirator with other violators of that law. Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993,
provides that the proceedings for the confiscation and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall
be directed against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal use shall not bar its
forfeiture.
In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of PD 705
contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law or
conspired with other persons who violated it or consented to the use of his or her vehicle in
violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have violated PD 705,
and their acquittals were not appealed.
We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case is
immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or
conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The DENR secretary or the
authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of
making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD
705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority.
Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial courts the
confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws.1âwphi1 Hence, we cannot
expect the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the accused before it impounds such
vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest products without
proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.28
We also uphold petitioner’s argument that the release of the vehicle to private respondents
would defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry laws. The
preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to conserve the remaining
forest resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future generations. Our
forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only through the vigilant
enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws.29 Strong paramount public policy
should not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or
unreasonably restrict its scope.30

Third Issue:

Estoppel

In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioner’s third
issue. It is no longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that
the assistant provincial prosecutor’s failure to comment on petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was an implied disapproval thereof. The public prosecutor’s disapproval
does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to private
respondents.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.