Heinz R. Heck vs. Judge Anthony E.

Santos

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, February 23, 2004

FACTS:

Heinz R. Heck filed a disbarment case against Judge Anthony E. Santos, who retired as Cagayan de Oro
RTC judge on May 22, 2002. Judge Santos allegedly violated the Notarial Law. The complaint alleged that
Judge Santos subscribed and forwarded, on a non-regular basis, notarized documents since January
1980, when in fact, it was only until January 9, 1984, that he became a duly commissioned notary public.
The complaint further alleged that Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the
expiration of his commission in December 1989.

Heck vs Santos (2004)Facts: In 2001, Heinz Heck filed a complaint, praying for the disbarment of Judge
Anthony Santos, a Cagayan de Oro RTC judge. He alleged that from 1980 to 1984, Santos had been
notarizing documents without being duly commission as notary public.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the fact that Judge Santos was already retired precludes an administrative charge
against him.

2. Whether or not a judge may be disciplined for acts committed before his appointment to the judiciary.

3. Whether or not an administrative complaint against a member of the bar prescribe.

Held:

Issue 1: No. In order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or justice to be
dismissed outright, the following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed within
six months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have
occurred at least a year before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass
the respondent. These elements are not present in this case.

Issue 2: Yes. It need not be shown that the respondent continued the doing of the act or acts complained
of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge on the respondent, considering the
gravity of the offense. Although there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act complained of must be
continuing in order for the respondent judge to be disciplined therefor, the respondents in those cases
were actually exonerated, because of lack of evidence. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal
profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a
bounden duty as well. This is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.

Issue 3: No. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very
oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the
practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the
time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring
members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical
pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them from
committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or
the Lawyers Oath. This should particularly apply in this case, considering the seriousness of the matter
involved - the respondents dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial documents.
Lozano v. Martinez

G.R .No. L-63419; December 18, 1986

The sole issue presented by these petitions for decision is the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979.
hese petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in
those cases moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not
constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent
trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared
the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to court for
relief. Those who question the constitutionality of the said statute insist the following ground:

1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;

2) it impairs freedom of contract;

3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;

4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and

5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the interim Batasan violated the
constitutional provision prohibiting to a bill on Third Reading.

ISSUE:

Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.

RULING:

No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the
legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but certainly it is within the
prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. Acts mala in se are not only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the
community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in
the exercise of its police power.
The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the
making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of
penal sanctions.
IN RE: L. PORTER HAMILTON

G.R. No. L-7725 January 17, 1913

Facts:

L. Porter Hamilton advised and counseled Luciano Andrada in regard to a claim (by Andrada) against
Isabelo Alburo. In lieu thereof, Hamilton received various documents (vouchers, notes) from Andrada.
Hamilton prepared a formal petition for Andrada, and also prepared papers relating to attachment
proceedings against the property of Alburo. It appeared, however, that Hamilton was not noted as
attorney of record for Andrada. Later on, Hamilton entered appearance as attorney of record for Alburo
(the defendant in the same case). Hamilton only surrendered the documents received from Andrada
when the court ordered him to do so. Another misconduct was committed by Hamilton when he
proposed, through a letter, to S.L. Joseph of Cebu that he be employed as attorney for S.L. Joseph
Lumber Yard, under a threat to compel said person to accept his proposition. Judge Wislezinus said: “Ah
hindi pwede yan!” He orderd the fiscal to file an action for disbarment against Hamilton for professional
misconduct. Hamilton’s defense was that there was no attorney -client relationship between him and
Andrada since he was not the attorney of record. On the second misconduct, Hamilton’s defense was
that the letter (where he made the proposition) was privileged communication so it cannot be used as
evidence against him.

Issue: Is Atty Hamilton guilty of professional misconduct?

Held: Yes, and he should be suspended for 6 years. The existence of an attorney-client relationship could
be established by overt acts. By accepting papers relating to the claim, the confidential relationship was
established. Hamilton also counseled with Andrada regarding the subject matter of the suit. The fact that
he did not allow his name to be place by the clerk of court as attorney of record for Andrada (when the
papers were filed) can only be considered as proof of lack of good faith with the client to whome he was
rendering professional services. A stipulated fee is not necessary to establish the relationship either.

By representing the opposing party in the same case (without the other’s consent) and by refusing to
surrender the documents received from Andrada (until there were court orders), counsel violated the
confidence between him and Andrada. He did not offer his services in good faith to his client. As to the
claim that the letter to S.L. Joseph was privileged, there was no proof that there was an attorney-client
relationship between Hamilton and S.L. Joseph. Furthermore, in a disbarment proceeding, where the
alleged client himself is not insisting on the privilege, counsel cannot be permitted to shield himself
behind the privilege.
Ching v. CA, 423 SCRA 356, February 23, 2004

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing guaranty with
the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans so ABC
filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment
against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to answer
for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the
levy on attachment allegeing inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were
acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds. Petitioner spouses aver
that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor
when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. !21 and that such
presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in this
case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted
in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s profession or business.44

ISSUE: WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans guaranteed
by petitioner Alfredo Ching

HELD: No.

RATIO: The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with
the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the exercise
of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business.

The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The
private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his
exclusive money.

The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account of
PBMCI.

Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted
by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there
must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was
benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement
with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private
respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the
fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of
surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to
establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.