1.

Pd 1529

Section 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of real estate, or to quiet title
thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition, or other proceedings of any
kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings
thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have
any effect upon registered land as against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a
memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the court wherein
the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution thereof, together with a reference to
the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land affected and the
registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1960/apr1960/gr_l-15689_1960.html

Moreover, as petitioners' claim is over one-half pro indiviso of all the properties involved in
the special proceedings, they may have some good sentimental reasons for opposing the
disposition of the two fishpond which reason they want to maintain pending the annotation
of lis pendens on the titles covering them. At any rate, the main purpose of the rule is to
keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is
over and since the litigation is not yet terminated petitioners are entitled to have their right
respected against third persons. The reasons advanced by the trial court are, in our opinion,
not sufficient in law to nullify this protection to which Petitioners entitled.

The effect of filing a notice of lis pendens is to charge the stranger with notice of the
particular litigation referred to in the notice; and if the notice is effective, a third party
who acquires likes subject to the eventuality of the litigation.

And its purpose is "to hold property within the jurisdiction and control of the court
Pending determination of the controversy, thereby preventing third persons from
acquiring such interests therein as would precluded giving effect to the judgment"

2. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/may2005/142406.htm

First, the general rule is that a notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled while the
action is pending and undetermined except in cases expressly provided by statute.

Section 77, P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides:

SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice

of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled
by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the
registration thereof.
At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition of the
action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or
buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of lis pendens has
been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice of lis pendens shall be
deemed cancelled upon the registration of certificate of the clerk of court in which the
action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof.

In the instant case, there was not even a hearing upon which could be predicated a
proper showing that any of the grounds provided by law exists. The cited case of
Victoriano presupposes that there must be a hearing where the evidence of the party
who sought the annotation of the notice of lis pendens must be considered.

Second, as shown in the above cited provisions, there are only two grounds for the
court to order the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens during the pendency of an
action, and they are: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of
the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the
party who caused it to be recorded. While the parties are locked up in legal battle and
until it becomes convincingly shown that either of the two grounds exists, the court
should not allow the cancellation.

Third, the Doctrine of Lis Pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power
of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment
or decree by subsequent alienation. This purpose would be rendered meaningless if
the private respondents are allowed to file a bond regardless of the amount, in
substitution of said notice. Moreover, the law does not authorize a judge to cancel a
notice of lis pendens pending litigation, upon the mere filing of a sufficient bond by
the party on whose title said notice is annotated.

In the case at bench, the judgment is even defective, in that the same does not specify
who among the private respondents whether the defendants-vendors or intervenors-
vendeesshould file a bond.

Fourth, if there was indeed an agreement to sell between the petitioner and the
private respondents-owners (which question of fact is not for this court to determine
in this petition), then the said parties are bound by the provisions of Article 1475 of
the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of
minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.

From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the
provisions of the law governing the form of contract.

As a matter of fact, there would have been no need for a notarial rescission if there
was no actionable contract at all.

Without ruling on the merits of the case below, we are constrained to remind the
public respondent that when a case is commenced involving any right to land
registered under the Land Registration Law, any decision therein will bind the parties
only, unless a notice of the pendency of such action is registered on the title of said
land, in order to bind the whole world as well. Therefore, in order that a notice
of lispendens may affect the right of a subsequent purchaser, such notice should be
annotated on the back of the certificate of title.

In any case, a notation of lis pendens does not create a non-existent right or lien. It
serves merely as a warning to a person who purchases or contracts on the subject
property that he does so at his peril and subject to the result of the pending litigation.
It is not even required that the applying party must prove his right or interest over the
property sought to be annotated.

Thus, it was legally erroneous for the respondent court to order the cancellation of the
notice.

Finally, when a judge improperly orders the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens, he
is said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion, as held in the case of Sarmiento
vs. Ortiz.

3. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/apr2001/143646.htm

Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

Sec. 14 Notice of lis pendens In an action affecting the title or the right of possession
of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in
his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which
the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall
contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a
description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of
filing of such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action,
and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of
the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it
to be recorded. (Emphasis ours)

Sec. 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:

Sec. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled
by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused registration
thereof.
 Petitioners claim that the notice of lis pendens practically covers his entire land
covered by TCT No. T-16375 and thus molests his right as an owner.
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the
registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he
would not lose the property or any part of it. For such notice serves as a warning to a
prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and
that he should keep his hands off the same unless of course, he intends to gamble on
the results of the litigation.[6] Based on this principle as well as the express provisions
of Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only the
particular property subject of litigation is covered by the notice of lis pendens. In this
case, only the 200 square meter portion of the entire area is embraced by the notice
of lis pendens. In causing the annotation of such notice,respondents aim is to protect
his right as an owner of this specific area. Thus, the ruling of the trial court that the
notice of lis pendens is tantamount to an unlawful dispossession and restriction of
petitioners right of dominion over the entire 5,432 square meter lot covered by TCT
16375 in their names is, therefore, an erroneous conclusion.
Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, earlier quoted, courts can cancel a notice of lis pendens only on two
grounds: a) after a proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party; or b) it is not necessary to protect the interest of the party who caused it
to be recorded
In justifying the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, the trial court held that
respondents unregistered deed of sale can not be accorded more weight than
petitioners certificate of title.
For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules
which requires the party seeking annotation to show that the land belongs to him. In
fact, there is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation of the notice
must prove his right or interest over the property sought to be annotated. [7] Hence,
even on the basis of an unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be
annotated on the title. And such annotation can not be considered as a collateral attack
against the certificate of title. This is based on the principle that the registration of a
notice of lis pendens does not produce a legal effect similar to a lien. It does not create
a right or lien. It only means that a person purchases or contracts on the property in
dispute subject to the result of the pending litigation.[8]
We observe that the trial judge was convinced that the cancellation of the lis
pendens is not in order. Otherwise, he should not have required petitioners to post a
bond of P2,000,000.00
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power
of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment
or decree by subsequent alienation. This purpose would be rendered meaningless if
petitioners are allowed to file a bond, regardless of the amount, in substitution of said
notice. In Tan vs. Lantin[9], this Court held that the law does not authorize a judge to
cancel a notice of lis pendens pending litigation upon the mere filing of sufficient
bond by the party on whose title said notice is annotated.
 4. http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/mar2010/gr_170339_2010.html

Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019

Section 3(e) of RA 3019 provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers—In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest impartiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. xxx. (emphasis supplied)

To be found guilty under said provision, the following elements must concur:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s official, administrative or
judicial functions;

(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and

(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.17 (emphasis
supplied)

It is undisputed that the first two elements are present in the case at bar. The only question left
is whether the third and fourth elements are likewise present. We hold that they are.

The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed in three ways, i.e., through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these
three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is enough to
convict.18

Explaining what "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" mean, we held:

"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature
of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so
far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property.
Aside from the allegation of undue injury to the government, petitioner was also charged with
having given unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to private suppliers.25 Under the
second mode, damage is not required.

The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;

unauthorized26 or without justification or adequate reason.27 "Advantage" means a more
favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some
course of action.28 "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or
estimation above another.29

In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given
unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial
functions. Petitioner did just that. The fact that he repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of
RA 7160 on personal canvass proves that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was
given to the winning suppliers. These suppliers were awarded the procurement contract without
the benefit of a fair system in determining the best possible price for the government. The
private suppliers, which were all personally chosen by respondent, were able to profit from the
transactions without showing proof that their prices were the most beneficial to the government.
For that, petitioner must now face the consequences of his acts.

5. http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_177105_2010.html

The petitioner was correctly held guilty of and liable for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in
rendering his decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88, but his conviction for usurpation of
judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code is reversed and set aside.

A.

Elements of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, established herein

RA 3019 was enacted to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike that
constitute graft or corrupt practices or may lead thereto.26 The law enumerates the punishable
acts or omissions and provides their corresponding penalties.

Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, under which petitioner was charged and found guilty, relevantly
provides:

Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

xxx

The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are the following:
 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and

3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
functions.27

The first element was established. The petitioner was a public officer when he rendered his
decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88, being then a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB
discharging the duty of adjudicating the conflicting claims of parties.

The second element includes the different and distinct modes by which the offense is
committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence. Proof of the existence of any of the modes suffices to warrant conviction under
Section 3 (e).28

Manifest partiality exists when the accused has a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side or one person rather than another.29 It is synonymous with bias,
which excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they
are.30

Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong
or to cause damage.31 It contemplates a breach of sworn duty through some perverse motive or
ill will.32

Gross inexcusable negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the
slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently
but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected.33

The decision rendered on February 20, 1986 in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 – nullifying the forged
deed of sale between Belen and Carlos; declaring Ricardo a purchaser in bad faith; ordering
Ricardo to reconvey the land to Belen; directing the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the
respective TCTs of Ricardo and Carlos; and reinstating Belen’s TCT – became final on March
15, 1986. After the entry of judgment was made on November 7, 1986, the records were
remanded to the RTC in Baliwag, Bulacan, which eventually granted Belen’s motion for
execution.

Due to its finality, the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 became immutable, and could no
longer be modified in any respect, whether the modification was to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law, whether made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of
the land.34 The reason for such immutability is that a litigation must end sometime, and an
effective and efficient administration of justice requires that the winning party be not deprived of
the fruits of the verdict once a judgment becomes final.35

The petitioner was fully aware of the finality of the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 prior to his
promulgation of the decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88. Indeed, he actually admitted
having read and examined the following documents (adduced by the Prosecution) prior to his
rendition of the decision,36 namely:

(1) Belen’s position paper dated August 7, 1992 submitted to him in DARAB Case No.
034 BUL’88, in which Belen stated that the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 had
become final and executory;37

(2) The entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883;38

 (3) Belen’s TCT No. 209298, reflecting the entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No.
02883 and the cancellation of the TCTs of the tenants-lessees by virtue of the decision
in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883;39 and

(4) Addendum to Belen’s position paper, mentioning the decree in the decision in AC-
G.R. CV No. 02883.40

Yet, the petitioner still rendered his decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88 that completely
contradicted and disregarded the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 by invalidating Belen’s title
on the land and upholding the TCTs of the tenants. He thereby exhibited manifest partiality, for
such decision of his was a total and willful disregard of the final decision in AC-G.R. CV No.
02883. His granting the tenants’ motion for execution made his partiality towards the tenants
and bias against Belen that much more apparent.

Similarly, the petitioner’s evident bad faith displayed itself by his arrogant refusal to recognize
and obey the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883, despite his unqualified obligation as Provincial
Adjudicator to abide by the CA’s ruling that was binding on him as Provincial Adjudicator and on
all the parties in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL’88.

Worthy of note is that the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39315, and this Court, in G.R. No. 128967,
had characterized the petitioner’s aforementioned conduct as "an utter disrespect to the
judiciary," as vested with a "dishonest purpose," and as constituting "a contumacious attitude
which should not be tolerated."41 These acute characterizations fortify the holding that he
harbored a deliberate intent to do wrong to Belen.

Correctly did the Sandiganbayan find that the petitioner had displayed manifest partiality and
evident bad faith in rendering his decision in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL’88.

The third element of the offense – when the act of the accused caused undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or, gave any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused – was also established. In this
regard, proof of the extent or quantum of damage was not essential, it being sufficient that the
injury suffered or the benefit received could be perceived to be substantial enough and was not
merely negligible.42
1avvphi1

Belen was constrained to engage the services of a lawyer and to incur other expenses in order
to protect and prosecute her interest in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88. In all, her expenses were
in the substantial sum of ₱990,000.00.43 Moreover, the petitioner’s stubborn refusal to recognize
and obey the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 forced a further but needless prejudicial delay
in the prompt termination of the cases. The delay proved very costly to Belen, for, in that length
of time (that is, from March 16, 1993 up to the present), Belen has been unduly deprived of her
exclusive ownership and undisturbed possession of the land, and the fruits thereof. The injury
and prejudice surely equated to undue injury for Belen.

Likewise, the petitioner’s ruling in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88 gave unwarranted benefit,
advantage, or preference to the tenants by allowing them to remain in possession of the land
and to enjoy the fruits.

Given the foregoing considerations, the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 24655 for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

B.

Usurpation of judicial functions

Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code states:

xxx The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correcional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any officer of the executive branch of the government who shall
assume judicial powers or shall obstruct the execution of any order or decision rendered by any
judge within his jurisdiction.
In usurpation of judicial function, the accused, who is not a judge, attempts to perform an act the
authority for which the law has vested only in a judge.44 However, the petitioner’s task as
Provincial Adjudicator when he rendered judgment in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88 was to
adjudicate the claims of the opposing parties. As such, he performed a quasi-judicial function,
closely akin to the function of a judge of a court of law. He could not be held liable under Article
241 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore, considering that the acts constitutive of usurpation of
judicial function were lacking herein.

6. http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/oct2004/gr_162314_2004.html

In Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan,40 the Court en banc held that proof of the extent or quantum of
damage is not essential. It is sufficient that the injury suffered or benefits received can be
perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible.

In this case, the Court finds that the four (4) Informations allege the essential elements of
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Information in Criminal Case No. 27555
specifically alleges that petitioners Librado Cabrera and Leonor, being then the Municipal Mayor
and Municipal Councilor, respectively, of the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, conspired and
connived with each other and, in relation to their office, through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or inexcusable negligence, gave unwarranted benefits to Diamond Laboratories, Inc., a
corporation owned by the relatives of petitioner Librado Cabrera

7. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/177105-
06.htm

A.
Elements of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
established herein

RA 3019 was enacted to repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike that constitute graft or corrupt practices or may lead thereto.[26] The
law enumerates the punishable acts or omissions and provides their corresponding
penalties.

Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, under which petitioner was charged and found
guilty, relevantly provides:

Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
 apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxx

The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are the following:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,

judicial, or official functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or

gross inexcusable negligence; and

3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.[27]

The first element was established. The petitioner was a public officer when
he rendered his decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88, being then a Provincial
Adjudicator of the DARAB discharging the duty of adjudicating the conflicting
claims of parties.

The second element includes the different and distinct modes by which the
offense is committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of the existence of any of the modes suffices
to warrant conviction under Section 3 (e).[28]

Manifest partiality exists when the accused has a clear, notorious, or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or one person rather than another. [29] It
is synonymous with bias, which excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are.[30]

Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the
accused to do wrong or to cause damage.[31] It contemplates a breach of sworn duty
through some perverse motive or ill will.[32]

Gross inexcusable negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want

of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty
to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference
to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[33]
 The decision rendered on February 20, 1986 in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883
nullifying the forged deed of sale between Belen and Carlos; declaring Ricardo a
purchaser in bad faith; ordering Ricardo to reconvey the land to Belen; directing
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the respective TCTs of Ricardo and
Carlos; and reinstating Belens TCT became final on March 15, 1986. After the
entry of judgment was made on November 7, 1986, the records were remanded to
the RTC in Baliwag, Bulacan, which eventually granted Belens motion for
execution.

Due to its finality, the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 became

immutable, and could no longer be modified in any respect, whether the
modification was to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, whether made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. [34] The reason for such
immutability is that a litigation must end sometime, and an effective and efficient
administration of justice requires that the winning party be not deprived of the
fruits of the verdict once a judgment becomes final.[35]

The petitioner was fully aware of the finality of the decision in AC-G.R. CV
No. 02883 prior to his promulgation of the decision in DARAB Case No. 034
BUL88. Indeed, he actually admitted having read and examined the following
documents (adduced by the Prosecution) prior to his rendition of the
decision,[36] namely:

(1) Belens position paper dated August 7, 1992 submitted to him

in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88, in which Belen stated that the
decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 had become final and
executory;[37]

(2) The entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883;[38]

(3) Belens TCT No. 209298, reflecting the entry of judgment issued in
AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 and the cancellation of the TCTs of the
tenants-lessees by virtue of the decision in AC-G.R. CV No.
02883;[39] and

(4) Addendum to Belens position paper, mentioning the decree in the

decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883.[40]

Yet, the petitioner still rendered his decision in DARAB Case No. 034
BUL88 that completely contradicted and disregarded the decision in AC-G.R. CV
No. 02883 by invalidating Belens title on the land and upholding the TCTs of the
tenants. He thereby exhibited manifest partiality, for such decision of his was a
total and willful disregard of the final decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883.
His granting the tenants motion for execution made his partiality towards the
tenants and bias against Belen that much more apparent.

Similarly, the petitioners evident bad faith displayed itself by his arrogant
refusal to recognize and obey the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883, despite his
unqualified obligation as Provincial Adjudicator to abide by the CAs ruling that
was binding on him as Provincial Adjudicator and on all the parties in DARAB
Case No. 034-BUL88.
8. http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jul2013/gr_192685_2013.html

On this point, we find that the appellate court erred when it affirmed the Ombudsman’s last
ruling that Espenesin is not administratively liable.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.48

In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the elements of corruption,

clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules, must be manifest49 and
established by substantial evidence. Grave Misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense
of Simple Misconduct.50 Thus, a person charged with Grave Misconduct may be held liable for
Simple Misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the elements to qualify the
misconduct as grave.51

In (G.R. No. 199115), the elements particular to Grave Misconduct are, by the Ombudsman’s
own finding, present. Corruption, as an element of Grave Misconduct, consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.52 This
has already been demonstrated as discussed above. And, there is here a manifest disregard for
established rules on land registration by a Register of Deeds himself. As he himself admits in
his letter, Espenesin erased the name of ASB on the specified CCTs because he believed that
Serrano’s request for the re-issuance thereof in MICO’s name constituted simple error.

Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides:

Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment

shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a
memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be Register of Deeds, except by order of
the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of other person having an interest in
registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the
Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate
appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing
upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the
same or any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has
married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or
interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned
registered land and has been dissolved has not convened the same within three years after its
dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the
petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new
certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other
relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may
consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court
authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or
ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a
certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written
consent. Where the owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed
as provided in the preceding section.

The foregoing clearly speaks of a court order prior to any erasure, alteration or amendment
upon a certificate of title.

In reversing its prior ruling, the Ombudsman cavalierly dismisses the fact of Espenesin already
signing the CCTs issued in ASB’s name as "only a part of the issuance process because the
final step in the titling procedure is indeed the release of the certificate of title."53 The
Ombudsman further ruled:

Considering that prior to the release of titles, Espenesin merely rectified what was represented
to this office as error in the preparation of typing or the certificates, hence, it is wrong to subject
him to an administrative sanction. This is bolstered by the fact that, at the time of release (and
perhaps even up to the present time), there was no final determination yet from the land
registration court as to who has a better right to the property in question. 54(Emphasis supplied).

This statement of the Ombudsman is virtually a declaration of Espenesin’s misconduct. It

highlights Espenesin’s awareness and knowledge that ASB and MICO are two different and
separate entities, albeit having entered into a joint venture for the building of "The Malayan
Tower."

As Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin was duty bound to inquire and ascertain the reason for
Serrano’s new instruction on those specific set of CCTs and not just heed Serrano’s bidding. He
heads the Office of Register of Deeds which is constituted by law as "a public repository of
records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands x x x in the province or city
wherein such office is situated." He should not have so easily taken Serrano’s word that the
amendment Serrano sought was to correct simple and innocuous error. Espenesin could have
then easily asked, as he is obliged to, for a contract or an authenticated writing to ascertain
which units and parking slots were really allotted for ASB and MICO. His actions would then be
based on what is documented and not merely by a lame claim of bona fides mistake.

Moreover, Espenesin was previously presented a MOA, and consulted this same MOA, in the
initial preparation and issuance of the 38 CCTs in ASB’s name. Certainly, a Registrar of Deeds
who is required by law to be a member of the legal profession,55 possesses common sense and
prudence to ask for documents on which to base his corrections. Reliance on the mere word of
even the point person for the transaction, smacks of gross negligence when all transactions with
the Office of the Register of Deeds, involving as it does registration of property, ought to be
properly recorded and documented.

That the Office of the Register of Deeds requires documentation in the registration of property,
whether as an original or a subsequent registration, brooks no argument. Again, and it cannot
be overlooked that, Espenesin initially referred to a MOA albeit Serrano worked on the
registration transaction for both ASB and MICO. Subsequently, Serrano returns, bearing
ostensible authority to transact even for ASB, and Espenesin fails to ask for documentation for
the correction Serrano sought to be made, and simply relies on Serrano’s word.

We are baffled by the Registrar of Deeds’ failure to require documentation which would serve as
his basis for the correction. The amendment sought by Serrano was not a mere clerical change
of registered name; it was a substantial one, changing ownership of 38 units in The Malayan
Tower from one entity, ASB, to another, MICO. Even just at Serrano’s initial request for
correction of the CCTs, a red flag should have gone up for a Registrar of Deeds. 1âwphi 1

Espenesin splits hairs when he claims that it is "in the Registration Book where the prohibition to
erase, alter, or amend, without court order, applies." We disagree with Espenesin. Chapter IV
on Certificate of Title of Presidential Decree No. 1529,56 specifically Sections 40, 42 and 43 belie
the claim of Espenesin:

Section 40. Entry of Original Certificate of Title. Upon receipt by the Register of Deeds of the
original and duplicate copies of the original certificate of title the same shall be entered in his
record book and shall be numbered, dated, signed and sealed by the Register of Deeds with the
seal of his office. Said certificate of title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof. The
Register of Deeds shall forthwith send notice by mail to the registered owner that his owner's
duplicate is ready for delivery to him upon payment of legal fees.

Section 42. Registration Books. The original copy of the original certificate of title shall be filed in
the Registry of Deeds. The same shall be bound in consecutive order together with similar
certificates of title and shall constitute the registration book for titled properties.

Section 43. Transfer Certificate of Title. The subsequent certificate of title that may be issued by
the Register of Deeds pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary instrument relating to the same
land shall be in like form, entitled "Transfer Certificate of Title", and likewise issued in duplicate.
The certificate shall show the number of the next previous certificate covering the same land
and also the fact that it was originally registered, giving the record number, the number of the
original certificate of title, and the volume and page of the registration book in which the latter is
found.

Recording or entry of the titles, whether an original or a subsequent transfer certificate of title in
the record, is simultaneous with the signing by the Register of Deeds. The signature on the
certificate by the Registrar of Deeds is accompanied by the dating, numbering and sealing of
the certificate. All these are part of a single registration process. Where there has been a
completed entry in the Record Book, as in this case where the Ombudsman found that "the
signature of Espenesin is already affixed on the CCTs, and on its face, it was explicitly declared
that the titles have already been entered in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of
Pasig City on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m.," the Register of Deeds can no longer tamper with
entries, specially the very name of the titleholder. The law says that the certificate of title shall
take effect upon the date of entry thereof.

To further drive home the point, as Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin knew full well that "there is no
final determination yet from the land registration court as to who has a better right to the
property in question." Espenesin’s attempt to minimize the significance of a Registrar of Deed’s
signature on a CCT only aggravates the lack of prudence in his action. The change in the
titleholder in the CCTs from ASB to MICO was an official documentation of a change of
ownership. It definitely cannot be characterized as simple error.

Grave misconduct, of which Espenesin has been charged, consists in a public officer’s
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. It is regarded as grave when the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules
are present.57 In particular, corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the
official’s unlawful and wrongful use of his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.58

In sum, the actions of Espenesin clearly demonstrate a disregard of well-known legal

rules.59 The penalty for Grave Misconduct is dismissalfrom service with the accessory penalties
of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service, including government-owned or controlled
corporation.60