Appearance of lawyers; general rule; instances when lawyers may be prohibited from appearing (j) Reply and rejoinder;

(k) Third-party complaints; and

A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC November 21, 2000 (l) Interventions.

RE: THE RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES

Section 16. Appearance. - the parties shall appear at the designated date of hearing personally or through Section 18. Appearance. - The parties shall personally appear on the designated date of hearing.
a representative authorized under a Special Power of Attorney (Form 5-SCC ) to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit of Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) and to enter into stipulations or admissions of
Appearance through a representative must be for a valid cause. The representative of an individual-party
facts and of documentary exhibits
must not be a lawyer and must be related to or next-of-kin of the individual-party. Juridical entities shall not
be represented by a lawyer in any capacity.

The representative must be authorized under a Special Power of Attorney (Form 7-SCC) to enter into an
A. M. No. 08-8-7-SC February 1, 2016 amicable settlement of the dispute and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documentary
exhibits.
THE REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES

Section 16. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

(a) Motion to dismiss the Statement of Claim/s;

(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial; Republic Act No. 7160 October 10, 1991

(d) Petition for relief from judgment;

Setion 41(b) Amended by RA 8553
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or any other paper; Setion 43 Amended by RA 8553

(f) Memoranda; AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991

(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties
court; must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.

(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;

(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;

Sanctions against practice or appearance of a lawyer without authority
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting
direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
Revised Rules of Court of 1997
of justice;

RULE 71 (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

CONTEMPT (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an

A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the order or process of a court held by him.

proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the

or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.

required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced.

exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt

Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he

imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court. should not be punished for contempt.

Sec. 2. Remedy therefrom. In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting

The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with

the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt

resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall

judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its

against him. discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. decision.

After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon Sec. 5. Where charge to be filed.

within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of Where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of

any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court.

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; Where such contempt has been committed against a lower court, the charge may be filed with the

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act Regional Trial Court of the place in which the lower court is sitting; but the proceedings may also be

of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of instituted in such lower court subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in the same

any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real manner as provided in section 2 of this Rule.

property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the Sec. 6. Hearing; release on bail.

possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; If the hearing is not ordered to be had forthwith, the respondent may be released from custody upon filing
a bond, in an amount fixed by the court, for his appearance at the hearing of the charge. On the day set
therefor, the court shall proceed to investigate the charge and consider such comment, testimony or
defense as the respondent may make or offer. Sec.12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities.
Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt.
Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities,
If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a
bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such rules as they
court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against
Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as
a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not
may be filed therefor.
exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt consists in the violation of a writ of injunction, temporary
restraining order or status quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party
injured by such violation of the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved.
The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the enforcement of a judgment imposing a
fine unless the court otherwise provides.
Sec. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed.
When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the
respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it.
Sec. 9. Proceeding when party released on bail fails to answer.
When a respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing, the court may issue
another order of arrest or may order the bond for his appearance to be forfeited and confiscated, or both;
and, if the bond be proceeded against, the measure of damages shall be the extent of the loss or injury
sustained by the aggrieved party by reason of the misconduct for which the contempt charge was
prosecuted, with the costs of the proceedings, and such recovery shall be for the benefit of the party
injured. If there is no aggrieved party, the bond shall be liable and disposed of as in criminal cases.
Sec. 10. Court may release respondent.
The court which issued the order imprisoning a person for contempt may discharge him from imprisonment
when it appears that public interest will not be prejudiced by his release.
Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.
The judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court
as in criminal cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is
filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken,
conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or final
order.
 Republic of the Philippines Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%

EN BANC
Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in
the present petition.
G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but his
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion
TENAZAS petitioners, contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered the motion for
vs. reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for review. 2 The case was
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3
MUNING respondents.
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for the division
of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is
condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.
attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not
petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of
be required to be represented by legal counsel ...
the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-
lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial
Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on
29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross
Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of
for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On evidence.
22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants
Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of
of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for
the bar.
the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of
a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates
Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —
through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf
of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for
for his services, ...
professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is
Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section
Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:
Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy
demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order
tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as
of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,
being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:
litigations.

But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of
not licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind,
Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their
the great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for legal services
appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious
cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or
situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive
in the jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5
action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be
taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
he has been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the
time.6
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the
backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other
7
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that acting as an attorney respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,8 and the
law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law; 9 and that
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.
if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult
concur.
in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are
not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10

And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-
lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to
recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should
suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial
Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special
jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU,
alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila and
Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that was
subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition
as co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to
institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for the
 Republic of the Philippines b. debarred from admission to the Philippine Bar until such time that the Court finds him fit to become such
SUPREME COURT a member.
Manila
It is further recommended that a circular be issued to all courts in the Philippines through the Office of the
EN BANC Court Administrator that respondent Elmo S. Abad has not been admitted to the Philippine Bar and is
therefore not authorized to practice law.
Bar Matter No. 139 October 11, 1984
We find the Report to be in order and its recommendations to be well-taken. However, the latter are not
sufficiently adequate in dealing with the improper activities of the respondent.
RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee, ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President
of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association. Inc., complainant,
vs. The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the respondent under oath, that he signed Exhibits B,
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent. C, and D, and that he made appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a
charge for perjury.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated with the respondent as counsels for
Antonio S. Maravilla one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional
On March 28, 1983, this Court held respondent ELMO S. ABAD in contempt of court for unauthorized
Trial Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit D.) Atty. Jacobe should be called to account for his association with the
practice of law and he was fined P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case he failed to pay the fine.
respondent.
(121 SCRA 217.) He paid the fine.

WHEREFORE, Elmo S. Abad is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P12,000.00 within ten (10) days from
On May 5, 1983, Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a MOTION TO CIRCULARIZE TO
notice, failing which he shall be imprisoned for twenty (20) days. He is also warned that if he persists in the
ALL METRO MANILA COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE
unauthorized practice of law he shall be dealt with more severely.
LAW.

The Court Administrator is directed to circularize all courts in the country that the respondent has not been
Asked to comment on the Motion, Mr. Abad opposed it. He denied the allegations in the Motion that he
authorized to practice law. A copy of the circular should be sent to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
had been practicing law even after our Decision of March 28, 1983.

The Clerk of Court is directed to file with the City Fiscal of Manila an appropriate complaint for false
Because the Motion and the Opposition raised a question of fact, in Our resolution of April 10, 1984, We
testimony against the respondent.
directed "the Clerk of Court to conduct an investigation in the premises and submit a report thereon with
appropriate recommendation."
Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be
disciplined for collaborating and associating in the practice of the law with the respondent who is not a
In a comprehensive and well-documented Report which is hereby made a part of this Resolution, the Clerk
member of the bar.
of Court concluded:

SO ORDERED.
The aforesaid documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the above report of
the NBI, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is still practicing law despite the
decision of this Court of March 28, 1983. Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
The Clerk of Court makes the following recommendations:
Guerrero, J., took no part.
a. imposed a fine of P2,000.00 payable within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution or an
imprisonment of twenty (20) days in case of non-payment thereof, with warning of drastic disciplinary Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., are on leave.
action of imprisonment in case of any further practice of law after receipt of this resolution; and
Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.
RE: Bar Matter No. 139 —
Elmo S. Abad, 1978 Successful
Bar Examinees
This report is submitted in compliance with the resolution of April 10, 1984.
In the En Banc decision of March 28, 1983 in the above-entitled case, the Court found respondent Elmo S.
Abad, who passed the 1978 Bar examinations but has not been admitted to the Philippine Bar, in contempt
of Court for illegal practice of law, and imposed upon him a fine of P500.00. Respondent paid the fine on
May 2, 1983.
On May 5, 1983 complainant filed a motion to circularize to all Metro Manila courts the fact that respondent
is not authorized to practice law. The Court in its resolution of May 26, 1983 required respondent to
comment on the said motion. Respondent filed "Opposition to Motion and Manifestation" which was noted
in the resolution of June 30, 1983.
The complainant on March 14, 1984 reiterated his motion to circularize to all Metro Manila courts that
respondent is not authorized to practice law, with prayer that the latter be punished with greater severity.
He stated that "Mr. Abad is still practicing law as evidenced by the fact that last December 8, 1983 at about
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Mr. Abad appeared before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 100 located at the 11th Floor, City Hall, Quezon City presided by the Honorable Judge
Jorge C. Macli-ing that Mr. Abad appeared as counsel for a certain Caroline T. Velez in Criminal Case
Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Maravilla, et al. Mr. Abad even cited in
the pleading his Professional Tax Receipt to prove that he is a licensed legal practitioner which is utterly
false. Mr. Abad gave his address as Ruben A. Jacobe & Associates, Ground Floor, ADC Building, Ayala
Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila."
Respondent filed an "Opposition to Motion" denying the complainant's allegation, to wit:
4. ... respondent is not presenting himself to the general public as a Practicing Lawyer like what Atty.
Procopio S. Beltran insists to the Honorable Court;
5. That this motion is motivated by Atty. Beltran's personal desire to inflict malice and oppression upon the
respondent who even until now does not accede to the terms and conditions of the former in connection
with several cases filed against him by the said Atty. Beltran;
6. Respondent respectfully submits that Atty. Beltran is trying his very best to harass the respondent under
the guise of conducting a Crusade personally with the end in view that respondent submit to his ill-desires
and veiled threats and finally come into terms with him.
In the hearings conducted by the undersigned, to prove the allegations in his motion, complainant
presented the records in Criminal Cases Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086, entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Antonio S. Maravilla, Jr., et al." of Branch 100, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, which were brought
to this Court and Identified by Atty. Candido A. Domingo, Clerk of Court of said trial court, and marked by
the undersigned as the following exhibits:
1. Transcript of stenographic notes taken down during the initial trial of the aforesaid criminal cases on
December 8, 1983, at 1:30 in the afternoon (Exhibit "A") where it is stated that Atty. Elmo Abad was
counsel for Juan del Gallego III (Exhibit "A-1");
2. Urgent motion for withdrawal from custody of motor vehicle filed for Caroline T. Velez by Elmo Abad
(Exhibit "B") with his name and signature appearing therein as counsel for the said movant (E exhibit "B-
1");
3. Page 4 of aforesaid motion (Exhibit "C") with the name and signature of Elmo Abad appearing therein as
submitting the aforesaid motion for consideration of the trial court (Exhibit "C-1");
4. Urgent motion for deferment of arraignment and trial filed for accused Antonio S. Maravilla, assisted by
counsel Ruben A. Jacobe with Elmo Abad (Exhibit "D"), with the names and signatures of Elmo Abad and
Ruben A. Jacobe appearing as counsel for the accused movant Antonio S. Maravilla (Exhibit "D-1");
5. Also page 3 of the aforesaid motion for deferment of arraignment and trial where the name and
signature of Elmo Abad, together with those of Ruben A. Jacobe, appear as submitting the aforesaid
motion for the consideration and approval of the trial court (Exhibit "D-2"); and
6. Order of Judge Jorge C. Macli-ing dated July 26, 1983 Exhibit "E") wherein on page 1 thereof appears
the statement that the urgent motion for deferment of arraignment and trial and the urgent motion for
withdrawal from court of motor vehicle were filed by "Atty. Elmo Abad (Exhibit "E-1").
Complainant also presented Exhibit "F", his letter to the branch Clerk of Court, Branch 100, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City requesting for certification that Mr. Abad had appeared as counsel for a certain Ma.
Caroline T. Velez in the case entitled People vs. Maravilla, et al., with Exhibit "F-1" to indicate that said
Clerk of Court was the addressee of the said letter.
After the original of the above records were presented to and marked as exhibits by the Investigator, the
same were xeroxed and the xerox copies were certified by Atty. Candido Domingo, Clerk of Court of
Branch 100, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City.
Complainant also testified that on December 8, 1983 he was at the 11th floor of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court NCJR, Branch 100, Quezon City and saw respondent Abad pass by in coat and tie and
because he knew that Mr. Abad is a respondent in a case before the Supreme Court and had been
declared as a non-lawyer in its decision of March 28, 1983, he (complainant) got curious and followed
respondent and saw the latter enter the sala of Branch 100 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; that
he saw him there and after about twenty minutes when he went back to the same sala, he saw respondent
in the place of the said court where the lawyers were supposed to be seated; that some days after, he
went back to the said sala and inspected the records of the criminal cases numbered 26084, 26085 and
26086,* which are the subject matters of the certification of the Clerk of Court, Atty. Domingo, before the
Investigator (TSN, May 26, 1984, pp. 24-26). 1. Structural formation of the elements of the signatures

Mrs. Eufrocina B. Ison the Court Reporter who took down and transcribed the stenographic notes of the 2. Proportion characteristics
proceedings in the afternoon of December 8, 1983 in the said criminal cases in the aforesaid trial court,
appeared before the undersigned Investigator and positively Identified respondent Elmo Abad as the Atty. 3. Movement impulses
Elmo Abad who appeared as counsel for Juan del Gallego III in the aforesaid proceedings that afternoon
of December 8, 1983 (pp. 1 & 2, TSN, May 11, 1984). She furthermore testified that she has no reason to 4. Direction of strokes
be interested in this case in Identifying respondent Abad as the one who appeared in said court on said
afternoon of December 8, 1983 (pp. 19-20, TSN, May 11, 1984). 5. Manner of execution which is free, spontaneous and coordinated.

Respondent, when asked about the aforesaid motions, Exhibits "B" and "D", and the signatures therein,
denied that he filed the same and that the signatures therein are his. He also denied that he appeared in
the hearing in the afternoon of December 8, 1983 in the said trial court. According to him, he was in
Batangas at the time. He also testified that the only explanation he could give regarding the signatures in
the aforesaid exhibits is that the same could have been effected by Atty. Beltran to show the Supreme
Court that he (respondent) was still illegally practicing law.
In connection with his defense, he filed —
(1) a motion to present the video tape to show his whereabouts at the time of the said hearing in the
afternoon of December 8, 1983 in Branch 100, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City; and
(2) a motion that his signature in the aforesaid motions filed in the said trial court in said criminal cases be
compared with his genuine signature.
The Investigator orally denied respondent's motion to present the video tape for the reason that the matter
intended to be proved thereby, that is the time of day, cannot be accurately determined from the film as the
same could be doctored by lighting effects (p. 16, TSN, May 11, 1984).
CONCLUSION: The questioned and the standard signatures ELMO S. ABAD were written by one and the
same person.
The aforesaid documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the above report of the NBI, have clearly
proved that respondent Abad is still practicing law despite the decision of this Court of March 28, 1983.
Moreover, the Investigator, thru the Office of the Court Administrator, requested the Metro Manila courts to
inform said Office if a certain Atty. Elmo Abad is appearing or has appeared in their courts. In response to
said query, the Branch Clerk of Court, Branch XCIV, Quezon City sent to the undersigned certified xerox
copies of the following that showed that Elmo Abad is appearing in Civil Case No. 36501: **
Certified True
Xerox Copies of
Court Record filed

As to the motion for examination and analysis of respondent's signature, the Investigator, to afford
respondent full opportunity to prove his defense, sought the assistance of the National Bureau of For Whom & signed by Elmo
Investigation to compare respondent's signature in the aforesaid exhibits with the signatures appearing in
the pleadings that he filed in the Supreme Court, which latter signature he admits as genuine and as his
own. Case No. Title Court as Counsel Abad

On August 7, 1984, the National Bureau of Investigation submitted its report regarding the questioned
signatures of respondent. Quoted hereunder are its findings and conclusion: 36501 Merian Estimada RTC For Defendant 1. Motion for

Findings: Comparative examination of the specimens, under magnification and stereoscopic microscope,
with the aid of photographic enlargements, reveals that there exist fundamental, significant similarities in vs. May N. Avila NCJR & Third Party Reconsideration
writing characteristics and Identifying details between the questioned and the standard signatures ELMO
S. ABAD, such as in:
Br. XCIV Plaintiff dated Aug. 29, by Elmo Abad

There was likewise received a certification dated May 9, 1984 from the Branch Clerk of Court of the
Q.C. 1983 signed by
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig, Branch CLIII, stating that Elmo Abad y
Sanchez is appearing before said court as accused in Criminal Case No. 50651, *** entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Atty. Elmo Abad y Sanchez" for Qualified Theft (Carnapping).
Elmo Abad
The actuations of respondent as shown from the foregoing constitute contempt of court that should be
punished more severely considering his temerity in still continuing the practice of law despite the decision
2. Transcript of
of March 28, 1983.

It is thus respectfully recommended that respondent be:

hearing of

a. imposed a fine of P2,000.00 payable within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution or an
imprisonment of twenty (20) days in case of non-payment thereof, with warning of drastic disciplinary
above motion in
action of imprisonment in case of any further practice of law after receipt of this resolution; and

b. debarred from admission to the Philippine Bar until such time that the Court finds him fit to become such
the morning
a member.

It is further recommended that a circular be issued to all courts in the Philippines through the Office of the
(9:00 A.M.) on
Court Administrator that respondent Elmo S. Abad has not been admitted to the Philippine Bar, and is
therefore not authorized to practice law.
September 22,
Respectfully submitted:

1983 shows his (SGD.) GLORIA C. PARAS

Clerk of Court

appearance for Respondent fined P2,000.00.

said party.

3. Minutes of said

hearing signed
 Republic of the Philippines such appointment to represent Eustaquia Montage in the court of the justice of the peace or to collect
SUPREME COURT money for services therein rendered. As to all these matters he is clearly in no better position than if he
Manila had never been appointed procurador judicial. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by
Act No. 1919, says:
EN BANC
No person not duly authorized to practice law may engaged in the occupation of appearing for or
G.R. No. L-12510 August 27, 1917 defending other persons in justice of the peace courts without being first authorized for that purpose by the
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, judge of the Court of First Instance.

vs. The defendant therefore has violated this provision of law; and the question is whether or not he is guilty of
estafa, under subsection 1 of article 535 of the Penal Code, as having defrauded another by falsely
CESAREO DURBAN, defendant-appellant. pretending to possess a qualification not actually possessed by him.
J. Lopez Vito for appellant. As the accused successfully managed the litigation which he undertook to conduct there might at first view
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee. seem to be room for the contention that the complaining witness was not defrauded within the meaning of
the provision of the Penal Code referred to above. But we believe that this position is not tenable. It would
seem to be clear that one who, falsely representing his own qualifications, renders a service which the law
DECISION expressly declares to be unlawful defrauds the person who in good faith receives and pays for such
services. In United States vs. Del Castillo (35 Phil. Rep., 413), this court held that a man who obtains the
STREET, J.: title deeds of another upon the false representation that he is qualified to represent him in litigation in a
court of a justice of the peace is guilty of estafa.
It appears from the record in this case that upon November 30, 1914, the judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, upon the petition and recommendation of Salvador Laguda, a practicing lawyer of Iloilo, FOR THE REASONS STATED we are constrained to AFFIRM the judgment in this cause, with costs
named Cesareo Durban as procurador judicial, with the right to appear in the courts of the justices of the against the appellant, with the modification that the defendant be required to indemnify Eustaqui Montage
peace in the Province of Iloilo as the representative of said Salvador Laguda, subject to certain restrictions in the sum of P50, instead of P30, as judged by the court below. SO ORDERED.
which were set out in the appointment. So far as affects the question involved in this case these
restrictions were that the said Durban should only be permitted to appear in matters signed and presented Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo and Malcolm, JJ., concur.
by the said Laguna with his own signature and when the latter should send the said Durban to attend to
such matters; that the said Durban should have no authority to make contracts to represent any person in
any justice court; that all contracts and appearances should be made by the said Laguda, and that the
latter could send the said Durban to represent him in said courts; and finally that said Durban should not
collect any sum for any service.
Upon a certain occasion while Laguda was absent for two months an elderly woman, Eustaqui Montage by
name, a resident of an outlying municipality, was brought to the office by a man named Adriano Coronado.
They were seeking a lawyer to represent her in a complaint in the justice of the peace court in her
municipality. Durban received the two and upon being informed of the nature of their errand gave her to
understand through Coronado, who acted as the principal spokesman, that he could attend to the business
for her. He was therefore engaged and did attend to that suit in the justice of the peace court successfully.
He collected P10 from her that day, and P10 upon each of the three visits he made out into the country to
attend to the proceedings in the justice of the peace court and when the case was there concluded
Coronado paid him another P10 from her money as a gratification. This made P50 in all which was
received by Durban in respect to that business. The suit in the justice of the peace court involved no more
than the possession of a piece of land worth about P20; and the fee collected by Durban was greatly in
excess of what he should have received. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act
No. 1919 provides that the compensation of a procurador judicial shall not exceed P5 for all services
rendered in any one case. But Durban claims that he was representing the office of Laguda and therefore
was entitled to charge more.
There would seem to be no just grounds for questioning the power of the judge of the Court of First
Instance to limit and restrict the activities of procuradores judiciales appointed under section 34 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 1919. It follows that the defendant was unauthorized by