Our Lady of Fatima University

COLLEGE OF HOSPITALITY & INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT Antipolo City

SUPERVISED WORK EXPERIENCE PROGRAM

ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

PAL GATE 1-A ANDREWS AVE., NICHOLS, PASAY CITY

PNB FINANCIAL CENTER, PRES. DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL AVENUE, PASAY CITY
TRAINING PERIOD: MAY 14 – June 27, 2019

In Partial fulfillment of the requirements for the course

SWEP-Supervised Work Experience Program

For a degree in
Bachelor of Science in Travel Management

Submitted by:
Mariah Jarie C. Almero
49 kabesang Segundo St. Fortunata Village Sucat, Paranaque
09565762246

Submitted to:
Ms. Judiren Torres, MBA
SWEP Coordinator, TM
Submitted on:
June 27, 2019
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES
I. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
II.INTRODUCTION
A. Name and History 1
B. Location 2
C. Mission, Vision and Objective 2
D. Ownership 3
E. Organizational Chart 5
F. Facilities 7
G. Outstanding Characteristics 9
III.DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS/ ANALYSLIS/ RECOMMENDATIONS
A. DEPARTMENT: FINANCIAL OFFICE DEPARTMENT
I.Areas of Concern
A. Organizational Chart 11
B. Operation System & Procedures 11
C. Facilities & Equipment 12
D. Manpower Scheduling, Work Method, Style of Communicating 13
E. Work Atmosphere 13
F. Use of Material Resources 13
G. Sanitation Procedures & Practices 13
II. Strengths 14
III. Improvements Areas / Weaknesses 14
IV. Recommendations 14
V. CONCLUSION38
VI.WEEKLY & MONTHLY REPORT39
VII.APPENDICES 40
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The internship opportunity I had with Philippine Airlines was a great chance for learning and
professional development. This success of mine couldn’t be turn into really without this
following person who with all their help me in different ways from the beginning and for
showing unconditional love and umending support financially, emotionally, and spiritually.

To my Institution Our Lady Of fatime University- Antipolo Campus, where I am continuously

growing as a Bachelor of Science in Travel Management , To Ms. Judiren B. Torres my OJT
Coordinator of Our Lady Of Fatima University-Antipolo Campus and most specially to my On-
The-Job training supervisor Ms. Heidei Shiane Ochigne, My warmest thanks for your guidance
that will help me achieve my goal as I go a long with my journey in life. To all employees Of
Philippine Airlines Financial Office Department, for your goodness and all the things you’re
contribute to me to continue my journey, And Lastly to our Almighty God, who gave me
wisdom, knowledge and strength every day, for the divine guidance and good health that help
perform my task to accomplish my On-The-Job Training for his word that keeps on reminding
me that “I can all do thing through Christ, Who strengthen me.” (Philippines 4:13) I will strive to
use gained skills and knowledge in the best possible way. I will continue to work to improve, in
order to desired career objectives on gaining something new every day.
MARIAH JARIE C. ALMERO
49 Kabesang Segundo St. Fortunata Village
Brgy. San Isidro Sucat Paranaque City
Contact No. +639565762246
Email:almeroxmariah@yahoo.com

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

2016 – Present Bachelor of Science in Travel Management

Our Lady of Fatima University
Antipolo City

2012 – 2015 LESIL Montessori School

Paranaque City

2006 – 2012 New Jerusalem School

Sorsogon City

TRAININGS AND SEMINARS ATTENDED

October 5, 2018 Borderless Connecting Culture Through Global Tourism

Travel Management 8th Annual Convention
Sofitel Philippine Plaza Manila

March 17, 2018 Fusion, Enterpreneurship and

Personal Development
Our Lady of Fatima University - Antipolo City

November 19, 2017 Tour Guiding Services

NCII TESDA Assessment & Certification
PRIME Technological Institute
Ermita, Manila

October 2, 2017 Business Communication in Hospitality and Tourism

American Hospitality Academy
Online Course

September 2, 2017 World Tourism Day Seminar

Our Lady of Fatima University- Antipolo City

March 20, 2017 Introduction to Hospitality and Tourism (IHT)

American Hospitality Academy
Online Course
PERSONAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth : August 15, 1999

Sex : Female
Nationality : Filipino
Civil Status : Single
Height : 5’5”
Weight : 50 Kg

CHARACTER REFERENCES

Ms. Charito A. Corpus

CHIM Program Head
Our Lady of Fatima University – Antipolo City
Contact Number: 661-3023 loc. 115

Ms. Judiren B. Torres

TM Practicum Coordinator

Our Lady of Fatima University – Antipolo City

Contact Number: 661-3023 loc. 115

Ms. Sandra R. Pepito

HRM Practicum Coordinator
Our Lady of Fatima University – Antipolo City
Contact Number: 661-3023 loc. 115

FOR PRACTICUM PURPOSES ONLY

________________________
Mariah Jarie C. Almero
II.INTRODUCTION

Philippine Airlines has received a 4-Star rating from Skytrax, the international air transport
rating organization.
Across Skytrax's global quality metrics that measure product and service quality, we have
proven our excellence and commitment to world-class standards.
This marks yet another historic milestone as we have become the country's first and only
airline to receive such honor.
According to PAL President and COO, Jaime J. Bautista regarding PAL’s 4-Stars, "It is the
latest proof of something we’ve known in our hearts all along: that we, the Filipino people, can
produce world-class achievements and offer world-class products.”
Philippine Airlines is the Full-Service National Carrier of the Philippines that represents
the Best of the Country and the Best of the Filipino People. And today, Philippine Airlines
becomes a global 4-Star airline.

A. Name and History

Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) has been the dominant air carrier in the Philippines.
Operating both internationally and within the 7,100 islands that make up the country, PAL has
been something of a curiosity and scandal among the world's major airlines, for decades losing
money while being traded among the handful of wealthy families in control of the Philippine
economy. After 14 years of ownership by the government of deposed President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, PAL was sold at the order of President Corazon Aquino in 1992 to a consortium of
companies under the leadership of the Soriano and Cojuangco families. Because Aquino's
maiden name was Cojuangco, many believed this "privatization" of PAL was not likely to break
the pattern of corruption and inefficiency that has marred the carrier's history since 1941. But
events in the late 1990s would conspire to force significant changes in the airline.
The first Philippine air transport companies were created in the early 1930s, primarily as a
means of travel and freight delivery between the nation's scattered islands. One of these
pioneering companies was the Philippine Aerial Taxi Company (PATCO), which was granted a
25-year charter by the Philippine legislature in 1931 for both domestic and international flights.
At that early date, when the country was still a possession of the United States, Pan American
Airways provided most of the Philippines' international air transportation.
The 1941 transformation of PATCO into PAL involved an international cast of characters,
most notably General Douglas D. MacArthur, at that time in charge of the United States Armed
Forces in the Philippines preparing for an expected Japanese invasion of the islands.
The general employed as his aide-de-camp a wealthy Spaniard named Andres Soriano,
who had previously served as consul in Manila for the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco.
Soriano controlled the large San Miguel Breweries along with a number of other corporations,
and had powerful connections in the Philippine capital. In 1941 he put those connections to good
use by teaming with the National Development Company, a government agency, in forming
Philippine Airlines, Inc., which promptly absorbed PATCO, thereby becoming the nation's
largest air carrier.
As the creation of General MacArthur's aide de camp, PAL stood an excellent chance of
winning contracts from the United States Armed Forces for its transport needs in the coming
war. Unfortunately for Andres Soriano and his fellow investors, the invasion came early and
ended quickly, with the Japanese gaining control over the islands by the summer of 1942. It is
not clear what became of PAL during the Japanese occupation, but on December 8, 1941, the
day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, General MacArthur made Andres Soriano a
colonel in the U.S. Army, and an American citizen as well. It is safe to assume that Soriano
returned to Manila with MacArthur's liberating forces in 1944 and resumed control of his various
business interests, including PAL.
There is considerable evidence that MacArthur helped Soriano and PAL whenever he
could. In 1946, MacArthur instructed the War Department to fly 20 tons of bottle caps to
Soriano's San Miguel Brewery to cover a shortage. In addition, the two men were both strongly
anti-Communist, and MacArthur's own extensive business holdings in the Philippines made his
relationship with Soriano more like one of business partners than military officers.
Helped by such massive infusions of American capital, the Philippine economy rebounded
from its wartime privations. PAL prospered so quickly that by 1948 it had already bought out
two of its largest competitors, Far Eastern Air Transport, Inc., and Commercial Air Lines, Inc.
Within a few years three other competing lines also threw in the towel, and PAL stood alone as
the airline of the Philippines. Its ownership was still split between the Philippine government and
the Soriano interests. The Sorianos were minority shareholders, but handled the day-to-day
management of the airline, which, if the later pattern of graft and kickbacks was already
established in the 1950s, was the more lucrative end of the business. Philippine magnate Enrique
Zobel once bluntly remarked in the media that "PAL is a milking cow," and most of the milk
seems to have been generated by what Far Eastern Economic Review described delicately as the
"company's operations, for instance by dictating its material requirements."
PAL's activities were described more directly in the New York Times, which quoted a
1989 World Bank study. The latter found that the airline was holding "millions of dollars of
spare parts for aircraft it no longer owns and ground equipment so badly maintained that it has
little value except as scrap." At one time PAL was even accused of carrying an "inexplicably
large inventory of 750,000 sanitary napkins," as reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review.
Clearly the finances were being toyed with to someone's advantage, which may help to explain
how an airline that so often reported a loss in its annual report could remain a financial plum
much sought after by Philippines business families.
Whatever the intrigue surrounding its operation, PAL expanded its route system and doubled
passenger miles between 1946 and 1950. The airline was serving 36 domestic airports by 1955
and owned a fleet of 35 planes, some of them DC 3/C47s and the rest Convair 240s. PAL's
primary business still lay in freight and communication services, such as the mail, since its ticket
prices were far beyond the means of the average Filipino. From the international airport in
Manila, PAL sent 33 flights weekly to Cebu City, the transport hub of the southern islands, and
offered regular service to all sections of the widely scattered nation, even the more remote
islands where passengers were few and the operation ran at a loss.
Indeed, the airline has repeatedly blamed its financial troubles on the large number of short,
unprofitable flights it must offer as the nation's only airline. In this regard, it was significant that
on the eve of its sale to private investors in 1991, PAL announced a dramatic cutback in the
number of its shorter domestic flights, encouraging the formation of new private companies to
take these on. PAL claimed in reports published as far apart as 1950 and 1989 that it enjoyed the
lowest cost of operation in the industry, so it would be hard to explain its frequent losses other
than by blaming the unprofitability of the line's short-haul domestic business. (Unless, as some
suspect, the airline's "loose accounting methods" have been to blame.)
 The Soriano family retained control of PAL until the late 1960s, the period of Ferdinand
Marcos's rise to power. Marcos was first elected president of the Philippines in 1965 and
remained the country's absolute ruler until his forced exile in 1985, when it was discovered that
he and his wife, Imelda, had systematically plundered their country for decades while amassing a
fortune estimated to be at least $1 billion. Marcos literally had a hand in every major Philippine
enterprise, including the nation's airline monopoly. As Imelda Marcos became a regular guest at
parties and government capitals around the world, she accrued a debt to PAL of nearly $6
million in the mid-1970s. The airline's owner, Benny Toda, offered to cut the bill in half if the
Marcoses would pay it; instead, Imelda Marcos demanded that he transfer his interests in the
airline to the government--which meant, in effect, to the Marcoses themselves. Afraid to refuse,
Toda settled on a price with Ferdinand Marcos and turned over his stock, for which he later said
he was never paid.
PAL became one of the many baubles flaunted by Imelda Marcos, who by this time was
one of the richest women in the world. The First Lady of the Philippines traveled around the
world in her own PAL DC-8 jet equipped with beds, a built-in shower, and gold bathroom
fixtures, sometimes also commandeering a second jet to carry her personal luggage. The airline
was officially under the control of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), which
controlled the pension funds of all government employees in the country and was one of the
Philippines' largest financial institutions. GSIS was run by Roman A. Cruz, one of Imelda's
favorites, and it was Cruz and his family who ran PAL from its takeover to the election of
Corazon Aquino in 1986.
By that time the airline had racked up consistent losses for the better part of two decades.
PAL was at least able to enjoy the benefits of Manila's new international airport, completed in
1982 to replace a network of runways dangerously in need of repair; but, in the words of the Far
Eastern Economic Review, "the airline [was] hobbled by ineffective management and
corruption." It was also plagued by employee defections to other airlines, which generally paid
about four times as much as PAL and were not "hobbled" by corruption in such gross forms.
During the 1980s more than 1,000 of PAL's licensed mechanics, its most valuable ground
workers, were lured by competing airlines, "exacerbating flight reliability problems," according
to the industry magazine Aviation Week & Space Technology. PAL had become something of
an embarrassment to the international aviation industry.
 The rise of "People Power" in the mid-1980s, culminating in the election of Corazon
Aquino and the escape by the Marcoses to the United States in 1986, apparently offered a chance
for significant changes in the Philippine economy. Not dwelt upon in the international press,
however, was Aquino's membership in the Cojuangco family, probably the wealthiest of all
Philippine business clans and for many years crucial supporters of the Marcos regime. Observers
point out that the election of Aquino changed less in the Philippines than her less affluent
supporters had hoped, and the privatization of PAL in 1992 offered little evidence of any real
diminution of the powers of the elite families.
President Aquino originally ordered the sale of PAL along with hundreds of other
government-owned companies shortly after her election in 1986. Since the airline had been run
at a loss for many years, Aquino first hired a Philippine businessman named Dante Santos to
make PAL profitable prior to its sale. Under Santos, PAL did report two years of net income, but
these were widely assumed to be the result of creative accounting methods rather than of any
substantive changes in PAL's performance. Indeed, in late 1990, four years after the accession of
Dante Santos as president of the airline, no fewer than 22 of PAL's top executives were charged
with negligence, fraud, and/or mismanagement; ten of these officials were eventually fired,
including an executive vice-president, two senior vice-presidents, and four vice-presidents. They
were accused of precisely the sort of corrupt operational practices that had been a way of life at
PAL for decades, including theft of parts, over-purchasing, and kickbacks from travel agents.
The sale of PAL was carried out in a curious fashion. The government first paid
approximately $350,000 to the Asian Development Bank for recommendations on how best to
proceed with the privatization of the airline. The study concluded that a large infusion of foreign
ownership and management would be needed to turn around the airline's performance. For
reasons of its own, the government rejected this proposal and instead commissioned a second
study, this one from a branch of the World Bank. The second report also recommended that
about one-third of the airline be transferred to foreign hands, chiefly as a means of retiring some
of PAL's $650 million in foreign debt.
Thus when president and COO Jose Antonio Garcia in early 1996 proclaimed that PAL
would "take on the world" once it had "a clean house," to many observers this sounded like a
familiar refrain built around false notes. According to Michael Mackey in Air Transport World
in February 1996, the company had lost P 1.7 billion (US$61 million) in the fiscal year that
ended March 31, a figure that in subsequent reports would be raised to $70 million (Asian
Business, April 1996) and $93 million (Airfinance Journal, June 1996). Revenues had flattened,
operating expenses had risen, losses were spreading, and debt-equity ratios were moving in the
wrong direction. The causes of the airline's poor economic performance were likewise familiar.
Mackey identified three key factors: problems with the country's aviation infrastructure, growing
competition for the Philippine market, and "the huge, sprawling subject of PAL's relationship
with the government and role in development of the economy."
In its domestic service, the company continued to be hampered by a government order
forcing it to fly some commercially undesirable routes, an order to which competitors were not
subject. And competition was growing, not only from international airlines but an upstart local
carrier, Grand Air. Nonetheless, PAL was still managing to maintain vestiges of its control over
the Philippine market, but by 1996 it was under pressure to relinquish its hold--and the pressure
came not from Quezon City, but from Washington.
For years, U.S. negotiators had been trying to get PAL to comply with an "open skies
agreement," signed in the early 1980s, whereby both U.S. and Philippine carriers would have
unlimited access to markets in each other's territory. PAL had gotten its compliance deadline
postponed four times. But by 1996 it had run out of largesse from the Philippine government,
which was concerned that limitations on passenger service could lead to a loss of tourism
income, a significant industry in that country. Thus it was confronted with a more or less final
deadline of 2003. "This," as Abby Tan wrote in Asian Business, "gives PAL just seven years to
fix a host of problems that have dulled its competitive edge and sapped its profits."
In the mid-to-late 1990s, PAL began taking positive steps toward eliminating its problems,
both technical and human-related. In the technical realm, it began to update its aging fleet with
an enormous order for new planes. In December 1995 it placed on order 24 Airbus A340-300s
(in addition to four already on order), as well as 12 A320s and eight A330-300s. Financing of
$1.1 billion worth of Airbus equipment came from a variety of Asian banks. PAL did not simply
add aircraft; it was "refleeting," creating an entirely new service fleet, and Mackey in late 1997
predicted that with the delivery of several new aircraft in the following year, "PAL will have one
of the most modern and youngest fleets in Asia.”
PAL's operations would also be bolstered by a new computer system, including a $7
million revenue accounting system that became operational in 1997, as well as two mainframes
ordered from a Danish company. Another "new" feature, one very familiar to most airlines but
not PAL, would be a direct linkage between travel agents and the company's reservation system.
Also in the realm of service, PAL began to explore the possibilities of the Chinese and Japanese
markets. It had no service to the former, and only a limited number of flights to Tokyo in the
latter case. By late 1997, it was "very close" to Shanghai service, as well as increased routes to
Japan.
In a development that suggested increasing confidence within the community of airlines, it
also entered into discussion with several possible strategic partners. "In the past," Garcia told Air
Transport World, "it was exceedingly difficult to even get people to talk to us. But times are
changing." As for its human resources, PAL slashed its roster of senior vice-presidents in half, to
15, and sought to train its 14,000 employees for greater efficiency. In line with its increased fleet
size, it would be hiring 1,800 cabin crew staffers, as well as 2,000 mechanics.
Perhaps most significant was the airline's move toward privatization. Once Tan emerged as
chairman of the company in March 1995, it appeared that PAL's future course was set: it might
not remain a property of Tan--one critic quoted inAirfinance Journal claimed he was "trying to
make the airline look decent and then sell it"--but it was not going to remain a property of
Quezon City either. Thus in October 1997 Mackey, a critical observer, lauded the "end of
government involvement and [indications] that business people are back in control.”
For the fiscal year that ended March 31, 1997, the company showed losses of P 2.5 billion
(US$83 million), and for the next fiscal year Garcia projected losses of P 2 billion (US$66
million). "And for the financial year ending March, 1999," he said, "if we do not break even, we
should be very close to it." PAL was negotiating, he told Mackey, with Lufthansa for the German
airline's catering services; with GE Engine Services for a maintenance deal; and with an
unnamed company for a joint venture involving maintenance and engineering. Corporate Finance
Vice-President Andy Hwang said, "To be Asia's best, we must align ourselves with the best."
This is one of many new slogans, Mackey wrote, employed by the carrier that now described
itself as "Asia's Sunniest Airline." By the late 1990s, for the first time in 50 years, such promises
began to seem like more than mere words.
 B. General Location

PAL GATE 1-A ANDREWS AVE., NICHOLS, PASAY CITY

PNB FINANCIAL CENTER, PRES. DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL AVENUE, PASAY CITY

Tel. No.

C. Mission, Vision and Objective

OUR MISSION
OUR VISSION
D. Ownership
E. Outstanding Characteristics
F. Embarkation & Disembarkation
CHAPTER III.DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS/ ANALYSLIS/ RECOMMENDATIONS

DEPARTMENT ASSIGNED:
FINANCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

Lucio Tan
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer

Ramon Ang
President & Chief Operating Officer

Rafael Rollan
Officer in Charge - Comm

Estelito Menoza
Corporate SecretarY

Erwin Go
Corporate Secretary & Corporate Compliance Officer

Irene Cipriano
Assistant Corporate Secretary

Daniel Ang Tan Chai

Chief Financial Officer

Harry Tan
Vice Chairman & Treasurer
Ismael Augusto Gozon
Senior Vice President
C. Facilities & Equipment
F. Operation System & Procedures
G. Facilities & Equipment
H. Manpower Scheduling, Work Method, Style of Communicating
I. Work Atmosphere
J. Use of Material Resources
K. Sanitation Procedures & Practices
II. Strengths
III. Improvements Areas / Weaknesses
IV. Recommendations
RECOMMENDATION
Philippine Airlines is commited to provide the best airline service in the country.
Embodying the core values of the company built on individual ownership and responsibility, we
serve our clients anchored on the principle of: Safety, Qaulity, On time performance, adherence
to international standards.

CONCLUSION
They say nothing beats experience
VI.WEEKLY & MONTHLY REPORT39
VII.APPENDICES