TITLE: People vs.

Ulit
CITATION: 423 SCRA 374, G.R. Nos. 131799-801 February 23, 2004
TOPIC: Confessions

FACTS:
X was charged with rape. During trial, Barangay Tanod testified that the barangay chairman
ordered him to bring X to the barangay hall. The barangay chairman asked X if he raped L and
the latter replied that he did. A Sinumpaang Salaysay was prepared in the Office of the Barangay
Chairman which he signed in the presence of the barangay chairman and the barangay tanods.
When the prosecution offered in evidence the Sinumpaang Salaysay, X objected to its admission
on the ground that he was not assisted by counsel and that, he was forced and coerced into
signing the same. If you are the judge, decide on the objection.

ANSWER:
Overruled.

The exclusionary rule covers “investigation conducted by police authorities which will include
investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police
agencies in our government.” The barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer
for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution.

In the case at bar, although X was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to
the barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against
him because he was not under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his
statement.

Thus, it cannot be successfully claimed that X’s statement before the barangay chairman is
inadmissible.

TITLE: People vs. Tomaquin

CITATION: 435 SCRA 23, G.R. No. 133188 July 23, 2004
TOPIC: Confessions

FACTS:
X was charged with murder. In the police station, X told SPO2 M that he was willing to confess
and asked for Atty. P (their barangay captain) to assist him. Atty. P then called SPO2 M and told
him that X was ready to give his extrajudicial confession. Is the confession admissible in
evidence?

ANSWER:
No.

The words “competent and independent counsel” in the constitutional provision stresses the
need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation,
an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.

In this case, considering that Atty. P’s role as a barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of
his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance
to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. P could not be
considered as an independent counsel of X, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession.

Thus, it is inadmissible.
TITLE: People vs. Rapeza
CITATION: 520 SCRA 596, G.R. No. 169431 April 4, 2007
TOPIC: Confessions

FACTS:
X was charged with murder. X was then held in the police station overnight before he was taken
to the house of Atty. R. It was alleged that an interpreter was provided because X was not well
versed in Tagalog being a native of Samar. As he is illiterate, he affixed only his thumbmark on
the statement above his printed name. The interpreter, and Atty. R, as the assisting counsel,
also signed the statement. Atty. R signed again as the notary public who notarized the statement.
The interpreter was not presented as a witness during trial. Is the confession admissible in
evidence?

ANSWER:
No.

An extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must conform to the following requisites: 1) the

confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent
and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant’s choice; 3) the confession must be
express; and 4) the confession must be in writing.

In the case at bar, X was illiterate and not well-versed in Tagalog but there was no evidence that
there was in fact an interpreter because none was presented during trial. Further, although Atty.
R signed the confession as X’s counsel and he himself notarized the statement, there is no
evidence on how he assisted X starting from the time he was taken to the police station.

Thus, the confession is inadmissible.

TITLE: United States vs. Pineda

CITATION: 37 Phil. 456, No. 12858 January 22, 1918
TOPIC: Similar Acts

FACTS:
X is a registered pharmacist and the owner of a drug store. S, under the belief that he had
purchased the potassium chlorate which he bought from X’s drug store, gave the doses to two of
his sick horses which died shortly afterwards. S took the remaining packages to the Bureau of
Science for examination and found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but
barium chlorate (a poison). Drs. P and D of the Bureau also went to the drug store of X and
bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate. X was
criminally charged for violating the Pharmacy Law. Drs. P and D were presented as witnesses.
Are their testimonies admissible?

ANSWER:
Yes.

(RES INTER ALIOS ACTA)

As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. As
one exception, however, it is permissible to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent and to
fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts,
accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may
even be established. There is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents.

The case at bar falls under the exception.

TITLE: People vs. Asinas
CITATION: 53 Phil. 59, No. 29832 March 25, 1929
TOPIC: Similar Acts

FACTS:
C and E were charged with parricide of their father with the aid of L and F. Based upon the same
alleged facts, another information was also filed by the fiscal against L and F charging them with
the crime of murder. Defendant L in the murder case was discharged so that he could be used
as a witness for the Government. L testified that the victim died of strangulation. Three other
witnesses were also presented who testified that on 3 different occasions, C and E attempted to
kill their father. Are their testimonies admissible in evidence?

ANSWER:
No.

The general rule is that evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show that accused
in a criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on
trial. One crime does not prove another unless there is such a relation between them that proof
of one tends to prove the other.

In the case at bar, the testimony of the 3 witnesses has no relation as to the proving of the
commission of the crime in the manner in which it was committed. Unless there is such a
relation, their evidence is illegal and manifestly unfair to the defendants.

TITLE: People vs. Irang

CITATION: 64 Phil. 285, No. 45179 Match 30, 1937
TOPIC: Similar Acts

FACTS:
An Information for robbery with homicide was filed against X. One of the victims M, testified that
one of the malefactors had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. J also testified that her
house, situated only about 100 meters from the crime scene, was assaulted that same night by
some malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and that one of them, with pockmarks on
his face and a scar on his left eyelid and dressed in a maong-colored suit, who later turned out
to be X.. Is J’s testimony admissible in evidence?

ANSWER:
Yes.

While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is
admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the
perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity
of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the
crime.

In this case, J’s testimony indirectly corroborates M’s testimony that the man of the same
description was the one who went to her house.

TITLE: Nicolas vs. Hon. Enriquez, etc., et al.

CITATION: 97 Phil. 286, No. L-8371 June 30, 1955
TOPIC: Similar Acts

FACTS:
A case for concubinage was filed by W against H and M. W alleged that prior sexual relations
between H and W were admissible to show "propensity" to commit the offense charged or
disposition to maintain such relations even after H and W’s marriage. Mandamus was filed to
compel the trial court to admit the evidence. Is W correct?

ANSWER:
No.

The Rules of Court provides that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time
is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time;
but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like.

In this case, the previous sexual relations sought to be proved have taken place when there was
yet no legal impediment to the same. It is not a proof that they would be continued after W’s
marriage to H to constitute the crime of concubinage.

TITLE: Boston Bank of the Philippines vs. Manalo

CITATION: 482 SCRA 108, G.R. No. 158149 February 9, 2006
TOPIC: Similar Acts

FACTS:
Sps. Y expressed their intention to buy 2 lots from X. However, due to X’s failure to transmit a
deed of conditional sale, Sps. Y refused to pay the downpayment. Later, X sold the said lots to
O. Sps. Y filed a complaint for specific performance against O to execute and deliver a Deed of
Absolute Sale. The court decided in favor of the spouses and ruled that there was a perfected
contract and that the balance of Sps. Y is payable for 120 months, based on the deeds of
conditional sale executed by X in favor of other lot buyers. Is the court correct?

ANSWER:
No.

Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing
at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time,
although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent
of the parties. Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts.
The examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous enough
to base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind
of sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.

In this case, the fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price
of lots purchased by them in 120 monthly installments does not constitute evidence that X also
agreed to give Sps. Y the same mode and timeline of payment.

TITLE: Richmond vs. Anchuelo

CITATION: 4 Phil., 596, No. 1785 July 17, 1905
TOPIC: Testimonial Knowledge

FACTS:
X, who was blind, employed the Dr. Y, a doctor, to treat his eyes. Dr. Y did so, without success,
and brought an action to recover for his services. At the trial, X presented Z as witness and
offered to prove by him that X, on returning from the Dr. Y’s office, had stated to Z that Dr. Y
had agreed to cure him for 200 pesos, and not to charge anything if no cure was effected. Is Z’s
testimony admissible in evidence?
ANSWER:
No.

The Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only on facts which are derived from his
own perception.

In this case, Z did not offer to testify to anything which Dr. Y had said, but offered to testify to
what X said that Dr. Y had said. Z did not know that Dr. Y had made these statements; he only
knew that X said that Dr. Y had made them.

Thus, Z’s testimony is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.

TITLE: Lea Mer Industries, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.
CITATION: 471 SCRA 698, G.R. No. 161745 September 30, 2005
TOPIC: Testimonial Knowledge

FACTS:

X entered into a contract of carriage with Y for the shipment of silica sand. The vessel sank
during the voyage. Z, as insurer, paid the value of the lost cargo and instituted a complaint
against Y. During trial, the survey report of the cargo surveyor S was presented but S did not
testify. The said report was made as basis for the final Adjustment Report prepared by R to which
was also presented and testified to by R. Is the survey report admissible in evidence?

ANSWER:
Yes.

As a general rule, unless the affiant is presented as a witness, an affidavit is considered hearsay.
An exception to the foregoing rule is that on “independently relevant statements.” A report
made by a person is admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the
statements. Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement given in the report, the fact
that it has been made is relevant.

In the case at bar, the referral to S’s Report was in relation to R’s final Adjustment Report. It was
the existence of the Survey Report that was testified to.

Thus, the Survey Report prepared by S is admissible but only as part of the testimony of R.

TITLE: Estrada vs. Desierto

CITATION: 356 SCRA 108, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, G.R. No. 146738 April 3, 2001
TOPIC: Testimonial Knowledge

FACTS:

Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
claims she is the President. During trial, the Angara diary was presented. The diary contains
statements of Estrada which reflect his state of mind. It also contains statements of Secretary
Angara from which Estrada’s intent to resign can be deduced. Is the diary admissible in evidence?
ANSWER:

No.

The ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. These are
statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or not, like statements of
a person to show, among others, his state of mind, mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention,
ill will, and other emotions.

In this case, the incidents described in the Angara diary tell a story of desperation, duress and
helplessness surrounding Estrada, arguing eloquently against the idea of intent and
voluntariness on his part to leave the Presidency.

Thus, it is admissible and not covered by the rule on hearsay.

TITLE: People vs. Comiling

CITATION: 424 SCRA 698, G.R. No. 140405 March 4, 2004
TOPIC: Dying declaration

FACTS:

An information for robbery with homicide was filed against X. It was alleged that in the emergency
room, the victim identified X as the robber who shot him. His statement was taken down and the
victim affixed his thumbmark with his own blood. Is the victim’s statement admissible in
evidence?

ANSWER:

Yes.

Under Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, the declaration of a dying person with the
consciousness of impending death may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject
of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of such death. There are
four requisites which must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible: (1) it
must concern the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (2) at the time
it was made, the declarant was under the consciousness of an impending death; (3) the declarant
was competent as a witness; and (4) the declaration is offered in any criminal case for homicide,
murder or parricide in which the declarant was the victim.

In this case, the victim’s dying declaration is complete in the sense that it was a full expression
of all that he wanted to say with regard to the circumstances of his death. An ante-mortem
statement is evidence of the highest order. It is doctrinal that, when a person is at the point of
death, every motive of falsehood is silenced.

TITLE: People vs. Salafranca

CITATION:666 SCRA 501, G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012
TOPIC: Dying declaration

FACTS:
S was charged with murder for stabbing B. During trial, the testimony of E, B’s uncle, was
presented. According to E, B went to E’s residence to seek help right after being stabbed in the
chest. E brought B to the hospital and on the way there, E asked B who stabbed him, and the
latter answered that his assailant was S. That time, B seemed to be having a hard time breathing.
About ten minutes after his admission at the hospital, B died.

Is B’s dying declaration admissible in evidence?

ANSWER:
Yes.

For a dying declaration to be admissible, the following requisites must concur: (a) that the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b)
that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending
death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in
a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.

In this case, B communicated his ante-mortem statement to E, identifying S as the person who
had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, B was conscious of his impending death, having
sustained a stab wound in the chest and was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. B’s
belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by his own statements. B would have been
competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying
declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which B was the victim.

TITLE: People vs. Sabio

CITATION: 102 SCRA 218, No. L-26193 January 27, 1981
TOPIC: Dying declaration

FACTS:
An information for robbery with homicide was filed against X. During trial, one of the police
officers testified that when he asked the victim who had hacked him, the latter answered that it
was X. The statement was taken down in a detached leaf from a calendar and was thumbmarked
by the victim with his own blood. X objected to the admissibility of the declaration on the ground
that it was not made under a consciousness of an impending death because the victim had hopes
of recovery tor his first word to his grandnephew was for the latter to fetch the police. Is X’s
contention tenable?

ANSWER:
No.

Case law provides that the probative force of a dying declaration does not depend on the declarant
not dying immediately after its execution. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid
succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible.

In this case, the fact that the victim died three days after the declaration was made will not alter
its probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant dies immediately thereafter.
Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew to fetch the police, does not negate the
victim’s feeling of hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the realization that he had so
little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities.
TITLE: People vs. Laquinon
CITATION: 135 SCRA 91, No. L-45470 February 28, 1985
TOPIC: Dying declaration

FACTS:
X was charged with the crime of murder for killing P. P did not immediately die and was able to
make a statement. P positively identified that it was X who shot him. When he was asked “Do
you think you’ll die with your wound?”, he answered “I don’t know.” X argues that the statement
is inadmissible in evidence as an ante-mortem declaration because it was not executed under a
consciousness of an impending death.

Is the statement admissible as a dying declaration?

ANSWER:
No.

Case law provides that where the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not, his
dying declaration is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration.

In the case at bar, the dying declaration of P is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration
since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die nor not. The declaration fails to
show that the deceased believed himself in extremis, “at the point of death when every hope of
recovery is extinct,” which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception
to the hearsay rule.

TITLE: People vs. De Joya

CITATION: 203 SCRA 343, G.R. No. 75028 November 8, 1991
TOPIC: Dying declaration

FACTS:
X was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. During trial, the victim’s grandson A
testified that immediately after the incident, he asked her “What happened” and the victim
answered “Si Paki!” and then she died. When A was asked during his testimony who is Paki, he
pointed X. Is A’s dying declaration admissible in evidence against X?

ANSWER:
No.

Jurisprudence provides that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To

be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted
the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be
a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.
The reason upon is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from
saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the statements
which he was prevented from making.

In the case at bar, A asked “What happened?” and not “Who did this to you?”. The victim’s answer
“Si Paki!” was incomplete. The courts cannot speculate what the rest of her statement might be.
It cannot be assumed that the victim intended to say that it was X who stabbed her.
TITLE: Marturillas vs. People
CITATION: 487 SCRA 273, G.R. No. 163217 April 18, 2006
TOPIC: Dying declaration

FACTS:
X was charged with the crime of homicide for killing Y. Y’s neighbor testified that after being shot
in the chest, Y went to him and shouted “Tabangi ko pre, gipusil ko ni Kapitan.” Shortly, Y’s wife
came out from their house and shouted “Kapital, ngano imong gipatay ang akong bana?” X
objected to the admissibility of the dying declaration on the ground that it Y’s statement did not
expressly show that he was conscious of his impending death. Is X correct?

ANSWER:
No.

The law does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death.
The perception may be established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the
declarant’s injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness
of impending death.

In this case, even if Y did not make an explicit statement of that realization, the degree and
seriousness of the words and the fact that death occurred shortly afterwards may be considered
as sufficient evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of
being in a dying condition.

TITLE: Parel vs. Prudencio

CITATION: 487 SCRA 405, G.R. No. 146556 April 19, 2006
TOPIC: Declaration Against Interest

FACTS:
X filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Y alleging that X is the owner
of a certain residential house and that he allowed Y’s parents to occupy the second floor. In 1985,
X wrote Y a notice for them to vacate the house but Y refused. For his defense, Y alleged that his
parents are co-owners of the said house. During trial, an affidavit was presented which was
executed by Y’s father in 1973 stating that he is not the owner of the subject house but X. Can
the court admit the affidavit in evidence?

ANSWER:
Yes.

The rules of court provides that the declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to the declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence
against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.

In the case at bar, the affiant was Y’s father and had adequate knowledge with respect to the
subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Y’s father categorically declared that while he
is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by X.
It is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be
true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s interests as his heirs.