Structural and Decision-Making Models:

A Political Example
HARRY IZMIRLIAN, JR.
Syracuse University
In this paper decision and structural models are distinguished on conceptual and empirical
grounds. At one level of analysis the two models discharge different functions and apply
to distinct logical universes. At another level, the two models apply to similar kinds of
“reality!’ Political data from a village in India provides an example of the appli-
cation of these models at both levels of analysis. Finally, propositions are formulated that
clarify the employment of these models for other kinds of data.

I N RECENT YEARS the strategy of an-

thropological investigation has under-
gone a marked shift in emphasis. Rather
than collecting data in terms of structure,
fieldworkers have come to focus on activity
systems: and rather than examining what
people would probably do in terms of for-
mal group principles, anthropologists inves-
tigate what people do in specific action con-
texts. The former approach yields a view of
society as an integrated whole whose parts
make functional sense; the latter yields an
image of society where parts of the ma-
chinery do not mesh, where some bits and
pieces are disconnected and isolated, and
where everything does not make sense-at
least not functional sense.
With this shift in the strategy of the
investigation there has also emerged a theo-
retical shift. A question may illustrate this.
Does what has been loosely designated as
“systems theory” constitute an adequate ex-
planation of social data? Consider an exam-
ple from India. One kind of systemic theory
views the ranking of caste in terms of rela-
tive states of pollution and purity (Stevenson
1954). Thus, high castes derive their status
from their greater ritual purity vis-his
lower castes. In some situations, however,
members of caste groups rank themselves
according to different models. In the Punjab,
Jat-Sikh agriculturists invoke the pollution-
purity model when drawing distinctions be-
tween themselves and low-caste untouch-
Accepted for publication 27 August 1968.
1062
ables but refer to differences in wealth and
land ownership when placing themselves
above high-caste Brahmins. One might sim-
ply say that the two models together consti-
tute an adequate description of caste rank-
ing. Members of a particular caste invoke
one model or the other depending on their
object of comparison. But even where Brah-
mins are wealthy and own land, Jat-Sikhs
denigrate them, describing them as money-
lenders with a Bania (commerical) mental-
ity. “In any case we do not believe in caste,”
they say. Evidently these are cases where ac-
tors choose among a number of alternative
models.
The growing tendency in recent years has
been toward an actor-oriented analysis of
social data in addition to a systems-oriented
analysis. A number of writers have phrased
this distinction in terms of two different
kinds of models: a decision model as op-
posed to a mechanical or statistical model.
This paper falls broadly into three parts. In
the first part I examine the notion of models
in general with particular reference to deci-
sion-making and structural models.’ In the
second part I deal with political data from
an Indian village in terms of these two mod-
els. Finally, in the third part I attempt to
formulate principles that will help us decide
which model to use to explicate data.
I
Since L6vi-Strauss (1963)z distinguished
between statistical and mechanical models,
the term “model“ has appeared in the an-
[IZMIRLIAN] Structural & Decision-Making Models 1063
thropological literature with increasing fre- A decision-making model emphasizes
quency. Barth (1959) writes of game theory choices made by actors. Structure itself may
models, Leach (1961) of topological mod- be altered or perpetuated depending on the
els, Howard (1963) and Keesing (1967) of decisions made. Barth phrases political rela-
decision models, Schneider (1965) of de- tions of Swat Pathans in terms of choices,
scent and alliance models, and Barth again both at leadership and support levels: “In
(1966) of transaction models. Each em- Swat, persons find their place in the political
ploys his particular kind of model in contra- order through a series of choices, many of
distinction to what he identifies as its oppo- which are temporary o r revocable”
site. Thus, in LBvi-Strauss’s usage, the two ( 1965:2). Writing of nationalistic politics in
kinds of models represent polarities of the British Guiana, Despres states
quantitative (statistical) -qualitative (me- In the action dimension individuals are more
chanical) dichotomy. Leach refers to a to- than units related to one another in time and
pological model as opposed to what we space. They may be this, but they are also
might designate as Radcliffe-Brown’s taxo- conscious agents capable of calculated action
nomic model. Howard and Keesing consider with respect to themselves as well as the
universe around them. Thus, individuals weigh
decision models in contrast to mechanical the alternatives available, plan strategy, and
and statistical modek. Schneider refers to select the means to implement strategy.
descent models as opposed to alliance mod- [1964: 10741.
els. Each of the dichotomies issues from a Howard in his study of land transactions in
particular universe of discourse, and each Rotuma, prefaces his analysis with the fol-
reflects its unique polemical history. In this lowing:
paper my focus3 is on one of these dichoto-
Instead of conceiving of society as having a
mies-structure and decision. social structure, I would suggest we conceive
In early structural studies (e.g., Fortes of social behavior as being structured by par-
and Evans-Pritchard 1940) the point of ticipation in given activities within which be-
reference was the social system as a whole, havioral choices (decisions) are regular and
and the aim was to make a statement of the predictable [1963:4 101
architectural form of that system. Individual In the field of kinship studies Coult (1964)
behavior was viewed as a function of struc- has pointed out the importance of choice
tural arrangements, so the actor’s orientation and decision in ambilineal descent groups.
was largely excluded from consideration. Even in a unilineal descent system there is
Also the structural model rested on the im- latitude for choice, as Barth (1959) demon-
plicit assumption that social structure mir- strates in his Swat Pathan study. Although
rors normative expectations, Radcliffe- there has been a growing bias toward a deci-
Brown wrote, sion-making model, none of the above writ-
ers suggests that one model should be used
The social relationships, of which the con-
tinuing network constitute social structure, to the exclusion of the other. But when one
are not haphazard conjunctions of individ- model is more appropriate than the other
uals, but are determined by the social pro- has not been made explicit. The data and
cesses, and any relationship is one in which analysis presented here attempt to clarify
the conduct of persons in their interactions this issue.
with each other is controlled by norms, rules
or patterns [1952: 101.
XI
The early British writers recognized that I chose to analyze political action because
such patterns and rules were sometimes vio- it best exemplifies the active-passive dimen-
lated; but despite disclaimers, the model of sion implicit in our two models. At the level
society that emerged rested on a structural- of individual action I am concerned with the
normative isomorphism. kinds of things people do in order to main-
1064 American Anthropologist
tain themselves and be maintained in posi-
tions of power. At the systemic level I con-
sider factors that are significant for the
maintenance of political structure as it is en-
countered in an Indian village. I view village
political structure as a system of communi-
cation. In this context the position a unit
(an individual or group) occupies is crucial
because it is in terms of such position that a
unit has access to information and influence.
Additionally, a unit's position has a crucial
bearing on the kind of contribution it makes
to the maintenance of that system. The first
part of this presentation will be devoted to
elucidating the principal positions that politi-
cal persons and groups occupy within the
village. In the second part I examine the
way in which an individual's or group's con-
tribution to the maintenance of the political
structure is idiosyncratic to the position oc-
cupied by that individual or group. I then
consider these positions (and the behaviors
implicit in them) in terms of the two models
discussed previously. First a brief descriptive
note on the village is in order.
Nalli (a pseudonym) is a village of the
central Punjab. It is situated about ten miles
south of the city of Ludhiana, an urban-
industrial complex. Ninety percent of the vil-
lage's population of 1,071 is Sikh. About 8
million of the approximately 20 million peo-
ple in Punjab are Sikhs. The Sikh population
lives in the northwestern portion of the state.
In order to make this minority an effective
political force the religious party of the Sikhs,
the Akali party, has agitated for partition of
the state.4 Not all Sikhs are Akali-oriented,
however; many of them support the Congress
Party.
In Nalli we can view political participa-
tion in terms of two distinguishable classes
of persons-those who are members of
groups that participate almost continually in
the political process and those whose partici-
pation is restricted to election times. I call
the former class active political groups and
the latter politically nonactive villagers. The
basis of voting for persons of both classes
differs but in predictable ways.
[71, 1969
Briefly, in active political groups, the in-
dividual's vote is based on his commitment
to his group. Commitment means here sim-
ply that an individual's vote is influenced by
his prior investment as a group member.
The electoral response of some politically
nonactive villagers reflects primarily a com-
mon sensitivity to differential access to land
(here we have special reference to the land-
less), while the vote of others is influenced
by religion. Still others are influenced by
personal oppositions of various kinds. I call
these categories of nonactive persons land-
less, communal, and oppositional (see Izmir-
lian 1966).
Village political structure is thus viewed
in terms of active political groups and non-
active villagers. Political action in the former
produces clearly differentiated roles as lead-
ers and supporters among members of these
groups. There are three major active groups;
one supports the Akali party (accounting
for 11 percent of the village vote), and the
other two support the Congress party (ac-
counting for 22 percent of the village vote).
The leaders of each of these groups main-
tain contact with politically influential men
outside the village. Members of active
groups articulate their interests to their lead-
ers. Political nonactives are to some degree
isolated within the network and in scale of
priority have their interests served last.
Implicit in the above discussion is the no-
tion of position; that is, the notion that the
location of a group or person with respect to
other groups and persons and with respect
to access to information and influence (let
us call this content) has a crucial bearing on
the way in which the interests and demands
of any particular sector come be articulated.
In this sense, leaders of active groups have
the greatest access to content, political non-
actives have the least, and members of ac-
tive groups, by virtue of their contacts with
their leaders, fall somewhere in between.
Differential access to content also has im-
portant consequences for the way each so-
cial unit contributes to the maintenance of
the political structure. Let us consider the
IZMIRLIAN] Structural & Decision-Making Models
social forces that tend to perpetuate the po-
litical structure of Nalli. These forces are
discussed as they relate to the positions that
major leaders and active group members oc-
cupy.
A village (or any social collectivity, for
that matter) may be united in some social
contexts and divided in others. Moreover,
parts of the social system may be perma-
nently posed against each other, while other
parts may vary from opposition in some sit-
uations to congeniality in others. At election
times members of active groups rarely inter-
act with members of rival groups. Leaders
of such groups are in permanent opposition
to one another. Only when a prestigious out-
sider (e.g., a government official) visits the
village do major leaders and their supporters
present a united front. On some occasions
two leaders will combine to oppose a third,
but such combinations are not random.
Major leader A (the Akali leader) never
combines with major leader C (an opportu-
nistic Congressman) because the two men
have been bitter enemies since the early
1930s. Thus major leader B (an ideologi-
cally oriented Congressman) is, on occasion,
able to ally himself with either A or C.
The presence of three leaders in Nalli is
structurally important for the maintenance
of open communication between major lead-
ers. Simmel called attention to the peculiari-
ties of a three-person situation noting that
“the way the position of the third person
impinged upon the other two, whether this
position be as mediator, as holder of the bal-
ance of power or as constant disturber of
the solidarity engaged by the other two” was
important (Mills 1953:428). To the extent
that opposition between units in a system is
disintegrative, to that extent will disintegra-
tive effects be checked by the balancing pos-
sible in a three-person group. As Simmel
also noted, dyadic situations are less integra-
tive than triadic ones; cleavage of a system
into hostile halves can produce a stalemate,
with no satisfactory outcome for either
party, whereas the possibility of a coalition
or mediation in a triad makes for a better
1065
balance of oppositions, thus promoting inte-
gration. In Nalli none of the three major
leaders possesses enough power to eliminate
the opposition. In some situations where two
leaders ally themselves there may be oppor-
tunities to crush one opponent, but that
might create a dyadic power block, one not
easily resolved. Another possibility is that
the supporters of the defeated leader would
join one of the remaining groups, thus mak-
ing it more powerful than the other,
Leadership in Nalli is an intricate game
of strategy in which coalitions endure long
enough to result in gain for those in the co-
alition but not long enough to defeat com-
pletely the opponent outside it. Major leader
B (the one who is able to effect alliances
with either A or C ) must intentionally bal-
ance both of these possibilities. He is aware
of their importance, for when he and leader
C were allied, he would not accede to the
latter’s request to crush major leader A .
Major leader B is also in the best position
to play the game because the enmity be-
tween his opponents is too great to allow
them to effect a coalition against him. But
he is by no means unchecked in his power.
In May 1962, B as head of the panchayat
(village council) attempted to have a cer-
tain amount of land set aside for this body.
Leader C appealed to landowners to oppose
the move, criticizing B (who was of the non-
landowning caste) for interfering with land-
owners’ prerogatives. Major leader A did not
ally himself with C, but he also opposed B,
thus creating, in effect, a coalition against B,
who was forced to drop the issue.
Supporters of each of the active groups
interact with one another much more freely
than do their leaders. They meet informally
at a concrete platform located near the vil-
lage center. There association tends to be
open, interaction taking place across active
group lines. Nonactives are present, though
they add little to the conversation. They are
largely the recipients of communication.
In Table 1 are recorded occasions over a
seven-month period when members of active
groups met and gossiped at the concrete
1066 American Anthropologist
TABLE
1. INTERACTION
AMONG MEMBERS OF
ACTIVE GROUPS (SUPPORTERS)
Dis- Agree- Neu-
Participation agree- Merit tral Total
ment
X Rival group
participation 4 8 2 14
Y Single group
participants 3 8 - 11
platform. The horizontal row X indicates
situations where participants belong to rival
active groups; participants in row Y are
from a single active group. The numbers of
the horizontal rows tabulate the frequency
of agreement, disagreement, and neutral
conversations.
It may be seen from this table that there
were fourteen cases where members of rival
active groups communicated with one an-
other and that of those fourteen cases, ten
resulted in agreeable or neutral exchanges.
In none of the ten cases were major leaders
involved but only members of the active
groups (the ten cases involve at least one
representative from each of eleven active
families in A and B ) . It is interesting to
note, too, that in only one of the four cases
in X that resulted in disagreement and argu-
ment was politics the subject. Politics was
discussed in only one of the agreeable or
neutral conversations.
The platform meeting is a social activity
involving largely members of active groups
A and B. In only one of the fourteen cases
in X was a member of active group C pres-
ent. One might speculate, because of this ab-
sence, that the boundaries of group C are
more rigid than those of A and B. At least
this appears to be so in the case of platform
meetings during the observation period. In
another social activity, however, members of
active group C tend to be well represented.
Several afternoons a week ten to twenty
men collect at the house of one of the gold-
smiths. The goldsmith no longer foIIows his
traditional occupation but sells opium to vil-
lagers instead. The opium is brewed with tea
[71, 1969
and drunk, the men relaxing and chatting as
they imbibe. They gossip about such things as
work, land, crops, sexual scandal, govern-
ment ineptitude, and travel to other places.
Conversation is general, the tone pleasant.
Two persons from active group A regularly
attend these parties, three from C, and two
from B. Nine other men who visit regularly
are nonactives (one oppositional and eight
communals) . The opium party thus provides
communication links to persons from all ac-
tive groups as well as to some nonactives.
Thus, in two nonpolitical contexts-the
platform meeting and the opium party-
members of different active groups interact
with one another on a close convivial basis.
It is important to note that much of the con-
tent of these interactions is segregated from
political matters and leaders are usually ab-
sent. Robin Williams writes that “if groups
differ radically in their values and interests,
a mutually accepted insulation is one if not
necessarily the best mechanism for at least
the temporary avoidance of overt friction”
(1952:522). Insulation from political discus-
sion may in part explain the high degree of
conviviality at platform meetings and opium
parties. Divergence of interests in the politi-
cal realm appears to weight little on members
of active groups in other contexts. As one
man commented about someone else at a
platform session, “Though we’re of different
parties, he is still a good person, and anyway
we don’t talk of politics.” After an opium
party another villager observed, “Now the
election is over, the supporters of different
parties will not let their differences stop them
from associating. Only the leaders will re-
main apart.”
There are two possible explanations for
the congeniality in one context (platform
meeting or opium party) and avoidance in
another (during elections). Since active
groups occasionally form coalitions, mem-
bers of each group may anticipate such pos-
sibilities and maintain friendly relations in
the contexts mentioned. One difficulty with
this explanation, however, is that groups A
and C have never formed a coalition, yet
IZMIRLIAN] Structural & Decision-Making Models
their members interact at opium parties. A
more cogent explanation relates to the posi-
tion of active group members in the commu-
nications network. The political field exter-
nal to the village is vague to actives as far as
contacts between their leaders and the out-
side are concerned. Because their perspec-
tives are not so wide as those of their major
leaders, the relevance of outside networks
eludes them, and consequently they maxi-
mize opportunities for communication with
each other within the village. Thus, associa-
tion with rival group members has political
implications. The lines of communication
with other active groups are kept open, so it
is not difficult to change affiliation. Just
prior to the election, for instance, one mem-
ber of B’s group was on the point of joining
a rival group (as retaliation for an insult by
his leader) but was induced to remain in his
group.
With respect to their supporters, then,
leaders encounter a further restraint that
prevents concentration of their power. Be-
cause their supporters are congeniaI with
followers of their opponents, leaders are con-
stantly reminded that there are real limits to
their power. In the terminology of communi-
cations theory, major leader B does nothing
to extend the communication channels and
network of his followers. It is because of
their narrower horizons that actives main-
tain open communication among themselves
as members of rival groups. If they do this
to keep open the possibility of changing af-
filiation, the intent appears covert, because
they rationalize the desirability of such ami-
cable exchanges in terms of the necessity for
congeniality and friendliness in the village.
Analytically, however, such cross-group as-
sociations allow the greatest flexibility in ac-
tive group affiliations.
In Nalli maintenance of the political
structure depends on the factors previously
discussed-the intentional balancing of
forces on the part of the leaders and the CO-
vert intentional acts of actives in maintain-
ing internal networks. Nonactives are most
frequently the recipients of communication
1067
because they exert little control on a social
field that appears vague to them. Political
integration is thus viewed here not simply as
the operation and adjustment of opposition
(structure) but in terms of the sum and bal-
ance of the particular responses of individu-
als, each of whose position has its own pe-
culiar attributes and ambiguities in the polit-
ical field.
From the foregoing it is apparent that the
conceptual model most appropriate for the
analysis of leadership and support behavior
in Nalli is the decision-making model. Lead-
ers make several kinds of decisions. With re-
spect to other leaders, they decide on the ad-
visability of temporary coalitions; concern-
ing individual supporters within their group,
they decide on priorities of interest; and
they make decisions concerning nonactives
when they articulate some demand to a
leader. The range of decisions made by ac-
tive supporttrs is not so wide. Their primary
concern has to do with group membership,
that is, whether to continue in their present
group or affiliate with another. This in turn
depends on whether they feel they are re-
ceiving adequate rewards and being ac-
corded proper status in their present group.
In the case of nonactives, a structural
model is applicable. They are recipients of
political culture. They affect political inte-
gration in the village but only in the passive
sense that they subscribe to values legitimiz-
ing the positions of leaders and members of
active groups. If this minimal agreement
were absent, the village might no longer be
the political arena for them.5 Beyond this
minimal consent nonactives do little to dis-
turb the system. Indeed, actives need hardly
consider their interests because the political
support of nonactives is based on nonpoliti-
cal factors. This becomes particularly clear
when we examine the nonactive bases of
voting for leaders in a village election.
Twenty-eight percent of the nonactives
vote because of their religious (communal)
orientation. The electoral response of thirty-
seven percent is conditioned by their status
as landless persons. The vote of the remain-
1068 American Anthropologist
ing thirty-five percent is influenced by oppo-
sitions; that is, an individual is conditioned
to vote in opposition to another person with
whom he is on bad terms. The most signifi-
cant kind of opposition occurs between re-
lated farm families because land fragmenta-
tion creates enmity among male members of
each stem family. Voting is one of a number
of ways of expressing social distance and
antagonism (Izmirlian 1966: 130,131).
Thus, the voting intentions of nonactives are
a structural consequence of either commu-
nal, landless, or oppositional orientations.
Members of active groups vote in accor-
dance with their group membership, but, as
was pointed out before, such affiliations de-
pend on the conscious choice of the individ-
ual.
At the level of concrete data the choice
of one model over another appears to be rel-
atively simple. Where an individual’s actions
are a consequence of structural or ideologi-
cal factors (e.g., voting by nonactive opposi-
tionals and communals) I a structural model
is appropriate; where the individuaI makes a
decision that operationaIizes one structure as
opposed to others, a decision-making model
is applicable. In the first case the individual
is a passive pawn of structural arrange-
ments; in the second he chooses to make
one structural unit more relevant than an-
other. Structural models view action as a
consequence of structure, whereas decision
models see action as a consequence of ideas
(conscious choice).
We have been discussing the decisions
and actions of people that affect the stability
of political structure. In sum, leaders and
supporters are in positions that maximize
their capacity to instigate decisions in the
political field, whereas nonactives do not
have that capacity. Thus, in terms of the
data presented, the application of one model
or the other is apparent. Is it possible to for-
mulate general principles to help one deter-
mine which model to employ?
I11
At a general level the two models direct
themselves to different sorts of problems. A
[71, 1969
structural model in this sense provides a
conceptual framework for data, a decision
model a strategy for the analysis of data.
Thus the two models discharge different
functions. A decision model has little con-
cern for the overall conceptual framework.
Game theory for Barth (1959) and deci-
sion-making for Howard (1963) are viewed
as strategies utilized by actors. How such
strategies fit into a larger framework remains
unclear. If decision models are to transcend
situational analysis,6 it is necessary to spec-
ify such a framework. Structural models, on
the other hand, satisfy this condition but are
in danger of relapsing into an “anti-intellec-
tualistic positivism” (Parsons 1937: 67) by
excluding the actor’s orientation. How is
such a dilemma to be resolved?
A structural model is nothing more than
a postulated theoretical system. It is cer-
tainly a necessary step, but earlier writers
making analogies from other sciences (e.g.,
Radcliffe-Brown 1952: 12) tended to view
most parts of the system as bearing an in-
flexible relationship to human groups and
individuals within the system. What is re-
quired, therefore, is a model that provides a
conceptual framework but retains the flexi-
bility necessary to account for the mutual
interactional character of actor and system.
I submit that the political-communication
model delineated above meets these condi-
tions. The structure consists of units occu-
pying hierarchically distributed positions.
Some units are exposed to a range of con-
scious options by virtue of their high posi-
tions; units in low positions are screened
from reflecting on alternative courses of ac-
tion. Eisenstadt states this point well:
The leaders usually act in terms of several
sets of institutional norms and attempt to re-
solve the inconsistencies by arranging them
.
hierarchically. . . The recipient of com-
munication, on the other hand, acts to a
much larger extent within one set of institu-
tional norms [1955: 1631.
The employment of models takes place at
two levels of analysis. At a general level a
structural (in the sense of systemic) model
is postulated. Such a model provides a con-
[ZMIRLIAN] Structural & Decision-Making Models
ceptual framework but does not prejudge
the case at a specific level of analysis. Once
a structural model is postulated, attention is
directed to the question of which model is
more appropriate for the analysis of the var-
ious propositions implicit in the model. We
now turn to this question.
Three interrelated variables determine the
degree to which individual action is “struc-
tured‘’ or “structuring” (Coult 1966). These
variables are position, structure, and culture.
Position refers to the social space occupied
by a unit. A single position by itself is
meaningless; only when regarded in a para-
digm containing other positions does a par-
ticular position gain significance. A logical
consequence of position is differential access
to information and power. On the basis of
position alone (holding the other two vari-
ables constant), the behavior of actors in
high positions would probably be more ade-
quately conceptualized in terms of a deci-
sion model.
Structure refers here to a group of inter-
acting individuals. To the degree that com-
mitment to groups is voluntary and not pre-
determined by basic social divisions within
the society, a decision model is appropriate.
Finally, culture involves the dimension of
norms and values. Where values are explicit
and explicitly subscribed to, there is not
great latitude for decision-making.
The statements above consider the vari-
ables in isolation. Interrelationships between
these variables yield the following eight
propositions:
(1) High position plus cultural and
structural‘ flexibility yield a decision
model.
( 2 ) High position plus cultural and struc-
tural rigidity provisionally yield a struc-
tural model.
( 3 ) High position plus cultural flexibility
and structural rigidity yield structural/
decision models.
(4) High position plus cultural rigidity
and structural flexibility yield structural/
decision models.
(5) Low position plus cultural and/or
structural rigidity yield a structural model.
1069
( 6 ) Low position plus cultural and struc-
tural flexibility provisionally yield a deci-
sion model.
(7) Low position plus cultural flexibility
and structural rigidity yield an indetermi-
nate model.
(8) Low position plus cultural rigidity
and structural flexibility yield an indeter-
minate model.
Let us illustrate these propositions with the
data presented in this paper. It is obvious
that even decision-makers are not in a con-
tinuous process of making decisions. There
are two phases to this process. First the
actor in a high position entertains a range of
cultural and structural alternatives. Then,
having chosen a course of action, he is com-
mitted-at least for a time. Propositions (1)
and ( 2 ) cover these situations. Consider the
following case. Active supporters entertain
questions in the form: “What do I do to im-
prove my station-remain in my present
group or join another? Will material rewards
from joining a new group compensate for
possible loss of status?” The possibility of
entertaining such questions is due to the
sanctioned normative alternatives regarding
both the change in group affiliation and the
basis for such change (improvement of sta-
tion). Once these possibilities have been en-
tertained and acted upon, however, the indi-
vidual is obliged to remain committed to that
course of action, at least until a new constel-
lation of possibilities presents itself. It is in
terms of such possibilities that we discuss
propositions ( 3 ) and (4).
It may be noted that these propositions
yield alternative models, This means that the
appropriate model choice depends on the
specification of still another variable. The
high position of the actor presumes that he
has the capacity to enact changes in his rela-
tion to value and structural spheres. Such
capacity is a function of two sets of factors
-the ease with which it may be carried out
(a function of cultural and structural flexibil-
ity) and the motivational strength of the
actor himself. If social and cultural milieus
remain rigid, as postulated in proposition
( 2 ) , then it is probable that the actor’s re-
1079 American Anthropologist
sponse will be structured. On the other
hand, the case is less clear in situations cov-
ered by propositions (3) and (4).At one
point of time the actor’s response may be
structured, at another structuring. Two
things may account for the change. Pres-
sures from the external environment may
operate in such a way as to reduce the rigid-
ity of either cultural and/or structural
fields; thus the situation in proposition (2)
becomes a situation described in proposi-
tions ( 3 ) , (4),or even (1). Still another
way pressures may operate is on the actor
himself, increasing his motivation to change
what he may have viewed as unalterable
previously. Consider the following example.
A village leader has for some time been
committed to certain political values. Such
values are also articulated by outside leaders
with whom the village leader has viable con-
tacts, Thus, the values represent significant
segments of the broader political culture.
However, political expediency requires a
complete reversal of values held by outside
leaders. The village leader may abide by
such a change and maintain his affinity with
outside leaders [proposition (3)], or he may
decide to maintain his present political ide-
ology and affiliate himself with another set
of leaders [proposition (4)]. Still another
possibility is that though the external politi-
cal climate has changed, circumstances do
not necessitate monolithic agreement with
outside leaders. In such cases village leaders
may continue to hold to earlier commit-
ments (both cultural and structural). How-
ever, in the face of increased external pres-
sure, it may be necessary to alter either
structural or cultural arrangements. In the
first two examples provided above, a deci-
sion model would be appropriate, while in
the third example (prior to increased pres-
sure) the actor’s response is structured by
previous commitments.
The questions and alternatives we have
posed for actives do not arise in the case of
nonactives. Here the individual either does
not perceive alternative possibilities or lacks
the capacity to act upon such alternatives or
[71, 1969
both. Proposition ( 5 ) appropriately applies
to situations involving communal, landless,
and oppositional responses. Thus with com-
munals, ideological commitment to religious
values combined with the identification of
such values with group membership almost
exclusively occupies the individual’s cogni-
tive orientation. The landless exemplify a
secular translation of the above in that their
response is structured by what they view as
economic rather than religious encroach-
ment. For oppositionals,a their crucial real-
ity involves the expression of antagonism to-
ward members of related families.
Our concern in this paper has been with
the actor’s orientation. Nonactive orienta-
tion is single dimensional, restricted to a
rigid structural-cultural medium. Indeed,
here culture comes to be mirrored in struc-
tural arrangements. In these terms the rela-
tions stated in propositions (7) and (8) are
inapt and excluded from consideration. It is
only when actors extricate themselves from
the medium in which they are enmeshed
that they appreciate its separateness and ac-
quire the capacity to manipulate it. Hence,
in some phases of the first four propositions,
especially (3) and (4), we may more easily
perceive the separate status of culture and
structure as compared to situations covered
by proposition ( 5 ) .
The propositions discussed in this paper
are logical combinations of the three vari-
ables. Two points should be made in con-
nection with these propositions. First they
are exemplified here by a certain body of
data that centers on activities in the political
sphere. In other spheres the application of
data to these propositions may differ. Hence,
a particular actor may occupy a low posi-
tion in the political network, in which case
his responses may be largely structured. On
the other hand, his position in clan and
caste may be high, enabling him to structure
his social and cultural environment in these
spheres. It is necessary therefore to specify
the domain of activities to which the propo-
sitions are to be applied. The second point
has to do with states of change. It is appar-
IZMIRLIAN] Structural Q Decision-Making Models
ent that actors in high positions alternate be-
tween states described by propositions (1)
and (2). The degree of persistence of a state
described by proposition (2) depends upon
the kinds of pressure that come to operate
on the actor and his environment. As we
have noted, kinds of pressure also define the
nature of the response in states represented
by propositions ( 3 ) and (4).
Nonactives, on the other hand, appear to
remain confined to states described by prop-
osition ( 5 ) . I see two possible ways in
which transitions to other states may occur.
Individuals in low positions may come to
occupy high positions, in which case their
behavior would belong to states described by
one of the first four propositions. For exam-
ple, some oppositionals belong to active
groups. Where this is so, group commitment
prevails over family antagonisms. Another
possibility, not exemplified in the data here,
is a transition to a state represented by prop-
osition ( 6 ) . In states described by proposi-
tion (5) the individual's cognitive orienta-
tion is circumscribed by the rigid structural-
cultural medium in which he finds himself.
Where both dimensions are in a state of
flux, the individual in a low position may
quite suddenly be in circumstances that en-
able or enjoin him to be a decision-maker.
Whether this new status endures is another
matter. This interesting variant is illustrated
in an article by Geertz (1957). In this situa-
tion, during a funeral ritual a townsman is
forced to entertain the possibility of alterna-
tive modes of action with respect to the per-
formance of the ceremony, His action in
this case had broader political implications.
The individual is incapable of resolving the
issue and another actor intercedes, returning
the situation to the circumstances described
by proposition ( 5 ) .
There is one final point to be made. It is
clear from the previous discussion and our
general comments on models that models
are not replicas of the empirical case. The
purpose of employing a model is to create a
conceptual tool of general application. As
such, it approximates specific empirical
1071
cases. In this sense oppositional voting ex-
presses the antagonisms among male rela-
tives, which in turn reflects fission of struc-
ture. But this does not occur in all cases
where it might. Where male members are
leaders or supporters of active groups, inter-
familial hostility is subjugated to the greater
demands of group commitment, Thus, the
model of structural opposition is an approxi-
mation of the actual case. In order to dem-
onstrate this feature of approximation with
decision models, two things must be made
clear: a specification of the alternatives sub-
ject to choice, and of the variables on which
choice depends. Consider an example. A
supporter chooses to affiliate with another
group because he believes he will receive
greater material rewards in the second
group. Another supporter of the same active
group chooses to remain within the group
since he believes that his status will not be
so high in the second group, although he too
is aware that joining the second group
would benefit him materially. Thus, the
choice of one alternative over another in
this case depends upon establishment of
priorities between these two variables (mate-
rial benefits and high status), The model is
but an approximation of the empirical situa-
tion because it specifies the alternatives and
variables and may make a probabilistic
statement regarding choice. Actual choice
may and will sometimes differ.
In this paper we have considered struc-
tural and decision models as complementary
tools for the analysis of social data. Models
are employed at two levels of analysis-at a
general level, where it is necessary to postu-
late systemic or structural models, and at a
specific level that focuses on elements of the
postulated model. The first level is the
means by which a conceptual framework is
provided. The second level provides a strat-
egy for the analysis of individual elements
of the postulated model in terms of struc-
ture and decision. The employment of one
model or the other is a function of the vari-
ables as stated in the propositions previously
set forth. A fourth variable involves the in-
1072 American Anthropologist
tensity of pressure on actor and environ-
ment: In some cases both models may apply
to the same individual at different points of
time. The crucial question relates to the de-
gree to which actors control their fate, the
degree to which they consciously manipulate
their social environment.
NOTES
’The crucial difference between decision-
making and the other two models is the role
that the actor plays in the social field. In a
mechanical model the actor’s behavior is viewed
as a consequence of some structural arrange-
ment. Although the level of abstraction differs,
this is also the case for statistical models. In this
paper I lump the two together, referring to
them as structural models.
’This in no way implies that Uvi-Strauss was
the first to use the concept. Durkheim’s me-
chanical and organic solidarity and Weber’s
“ideal types” are earlier examples. Probably the
first systematic use of models to explain human
behavior was employed by the classical econo-
mists.
An exploration into the relationship between
these dichotomous models and the logic they
subsume would entail consideration of a num-
ber of methodological issues. These matters will
be taken up in a forthcoming publication.
’Partition took place in 1966. The data from
which this analysis is drawn were collected dur-
ing 1961-62.
‘This is the case in a village contiguous to
Nalli, where nonactives tend to articulate their
political interests through kin networks out-
side the village.
* Barth’s use of transaction models (1966) is
a step in this direction.
‘The manner in which culture and structure
are employed in this study is in terms of their
mutual relevance for one another. The main
criterion for judging relevance is the actor’s
orientation, i.e., his perception of his value
judgments and the implications these have for
structural commitment.
* A feature not commented on previously is
the frame of reference for analysis (Coult
1966). Oppositional voting is a structural ex-
pression of family fragmentation. Family frag-
mentation in the first instance results from the
decision to separate. Thus, if we expand our
frame of reference to include the basis of
family fragmentation, the model employed is
actor-oriented. Given family fragmentation,
voting, as well as other activities, is a structural
expression of the fission of this unit.
[71, 1969
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