FMCT- Case study of Pakistan & India

The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is a proposed international treaty to

prohibit the further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.
The treaty has not been negotiated and its terms remain to be defined. According to a proposal by
the United States, fissile material includes high-enriched uranium and plutonium (except
plutonium that is over 80% Pu-238). According to a proposal by Russia, fissile material would
be limited to weapons-grade uranium (with more than 90% U-235) and plutonium (with more
than 90% Pu-239). Neither proposal would prohibit the production of fissile material for non-
weapons purposes, including use in civil or naval nuclear reactors.

1. Steps towards disarmament:

The efforts for nuclear disarmament date back to 1945 post-world war 2, when the two
super powers, the US and USSR, invented the lethal weapons of mass destruction. This
damaging invention brought dramatic change in military circle and gave a boost to the concept of
universal nuclear disarmament.
Basically, eradication of nuclear weapons is a desirable universal goal to maintain
international peace and security, United Nations contributed in the efforts and devised a
conference known as “Conference on Disarmament “(CD) to advance the process further.
FMCT is one of the off-shoot of CD, working with the goal of nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament.

2. FMCT at a glance:

A fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is a proposed international agreement that

would prohibit the production of the two main components of nuclear weapons: highly-enriched
uranium (HEU) and plutonium. Discussions on this subject have taken place at the UN
Conference on Disarmament (CD), a body of 65 member nations established as the sole
multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. The CD operates by consensus and is often
stagnant, impeding progress on an FMCT.
Those nations that joined the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-weapon
states are already prohibited from producing or acquiring fissile material for weapons. An FMCT
would provide new restrictions for the five recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS—United
States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China), and for the four nations that are not NPT
members (Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea).

3. Background:
Efforts to curb the spread of nuclear material and technology began only a short time
after the world was introduced to the destructive potential of atomic weaponry. In 1946
the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, authored in part by Manhattan Project physicist J. Robert
Oppenheimer, advocated for an Atomic Development Agency to regulate fissile material and
ensure that state rivalries over the technology did not occur. Ultimately, neither Dean Acheson
nor David Lilienthal presented the U.S. plan to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission
(UNAEC). Instead, Bernard Baruch presented the Baruch Plan, which also would have
established an Atomic Development Authority that answered to the UN Security-Council. The
plan called for the United States to disassemble its nuclear arsenal, but only after an agreement
had been reached assuring the United States that the Soviets would not be able to acquire a
bomb. The plan failed to achieve consensus within the UNAEC.
Much later, UN resolution 78/57 L, which passed unanimously in 1993, called for a
“non-discriminatory, multi-lateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
In March 1995, the CD took up a mandate presented by Canadian Ambassador Gerald
Shannon. The Shannon Mandate established an ad hoc committee that was directed to negotiate
an FMCT by the end of the 1995 session. A lack of consensus over verification provisions, as
well as desires to hold parallel negotiations on outer space arms control issues, prevented
negotiations from getting underway. China and Russia articulated a desire to hold parallel
negotiations on Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), a point which has further
stalled efforts to begin FMCT negotiations.
 4. Critical issues of FMCT:
The concept of a cut-off of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons has been
discussed for a long time, and the agreement on a mandate (known as the Shannon Mandate) to
begin negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) broke down in 1995. Since then,
there has been very little formal progress.
There are three draft treaty texts which have been presented as documents of the CD,
one presented by the United States in May 2006, another submitted Greenpeace International in
April 2004 and a third in September 2009 by the International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM).
An FMCT will require many technical issues to be resolved, from actually defining fissile
material to ensuring that the treaty is effective by developing specific procedures for verification.
There are a number of different approaches to these issues ranging from a simple approach to a
more comprehensive one.

5. Obligations:

There are two primary issues that divide the different drafts for an FMCT:

 Verification
 Pre-existing stocks
With regard to the issue of pre-existing stocks, under the 2009 International Panel on
Fissile Materials' (IPFM) draft treaty, States Parties would be required to declare to the IAEA all
fissile materials in its civilian sector, excess for all military purposes, and for use in military
reactors. Under Article I, State Parties would agree not to produce, acquire or encourage the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Each State Party would also agree to disable, decommission and, when feasible,
dismantle its fissile material production facilities. Article I also calls on States to declare and
submit to IAEA monitoring fissile materials in excess of their military requirements and future
excess materials resulting from future nuclear disarmament measures. Article V of the draft
treaty would establish an FM(C) T Organization to implement the treaty objectives, ensure
implementation with the IAEA, and provide a forum for the State Parties.
 While a "ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices" implies a cut-off, a number of states often call for a fissile material treaty
(FMT) that would limit existing stockpiles of fissile material in addition to future production.
The Shannon Mandate specifically does not preclude these states from raising this issue in
negotiations. In this manner an FMT would promote the principles of both nonproliferation and
disarmament. Pakistan, in particular, has advocated for the negotiation of an FMT due to its
concern regarding India's large stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material.

6. Compliance:
With regard to compliance, the verification issue is what separates the various drafts of
an FMCT. In the 2009 draft released by IPFM, the treaty requires verification. The treaty itself
does not state the verification requirements, but calls upon the IAEA to implement any needed
verification arrangements. In contrast, the 2006 draft tabled by the United States contained no
verification procedures, as the Bush Administration believed such a treaty could not be
effectively verified.

Under the NPT, non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) have already committed not to
produce fissile material for weapons and are under verification requirements by the IAEA.
Therefore the obligations of an FM(C)T would primarily impose limitations on the five declared
nuclear weapon states under the NPT (China, France, Russia, the United States, and the United
Kingdom) as well as the four countries currently outside of the NPT (India, Israel, North Korea
and Pakistan). Unless all or most of these states participated, a fissile material cut-off would be
of little value.

The possibility of extending verification procedures to India, Israel, North Korea and
Pakistan is viewed by many as crucial, as it would legally bring them into the international
nonproliferation regime.
 7. RECENT DEVELOPMENT

From 15-16 February 2018, the chair of the High-level FMCT Expert Preparatory
Group held an informal consultative meeting, allowing member states to share their views on the
FMCT before the Preparatory Group convened.

On 13 July, the UN released a report detailing the results and recommendations of the
High-level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group, advocating that negotiations for the FMCT should
continue, despite the lack of significant improvements in negotiations.

o Point of Contention:

In order for negotiations to begin on an FMCT, Pakistan will have to remove its
opposition vote, and a consensus to move forward with negotiations must be reached. Pakistan
has been primarily concerned that an FMCT would lock them into a disadvantageous position
relative to India’s superior nuclear stockpile. Consequently, Islamabad would like an FMCT to
include current fissile material stockpiles, instead of just capping future production, a position
shared by several other countries.

8. PAKISTAN’S STANCE ON FMCT:

Pakistan has blocked the negotiations on the fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT),
strictly following it a stance that pre-existing stockpiles should be included in the draft of the
FMCT before negotiations. It supported the December 1993 UN General Assembly resolution
and Shannon Mandate (1995) because it will help to deal with the pre-existing stocks of fissile
material.
Pressure on international community especially US is building that it should make
Pakistan agree to the initiate negotiations on FMCT, whereas Pakistan is reluctant to sign the
treaty as it is also attributed to the discriminatory policies of the West on civilian nuclear
cooperation. Pakistan’s position on FMCT is determined by the national security interests and
the objectives of strategic stability in South Asia as growing conventional imbalance and absence
of arms control regime to deter an arms race are primary concerns of Pakistan.
It is significant to note that it was not Pakistan to introduce nuclear weapons in the
region. Actually, it was provoked to maintain the Minimum Credible Deterrence to fulfill its
security demands. Additionally, Pakistan’s nuclear program is based on the defensive posture. It
has initiated its nuclear program to address its security issues as well as chalked out it’s
apprehensions regarding the potential FMCT in a way that it could address Pakistan’s security
concerns as it is viewed that extensive difference between India and Pakistan’s fissile material
Stockpiles has the ability to erode the nuclear deterrence stability in the region because there is
no doubt that India will use its fissile material stocks to manufacture the nuclear weapon. The
Indo-US nuclear deal has further consolidated Islamabad’s stance on the FMCT at CD. In this
regard, Pakistan shouldn’t agree to accept or freeze the inequality.
Along with the issue of existing stockpiles, Pakistan has concerns on the term “FMCT”
because cut-off involves a mere halt in future production whereas the actual objective of the
treaty is to ban the production and to stockpile of fissile material. Pakistan seems most likely to
stand in the way unless some method can be found to deal with the pre-existing stocks. The most
interesting side is that several states and foreign analysts support the Pakistan’s proposal
regarding the title of the treaty and the demand of eliminating pre-existing stocks. Another
important dimension of the issue is that Pakistan is not alone in its claims, but most of the non-
Aligned countries like Syria, Iran and Egypt are also in favour of Pakistan’s stance.
If FMCT is concluded, then a military nuclear program of states will also be affected,
especially Japan, Canada and Australia will suffer a lot by this ban. It is viewed that Pakistan
will be among the most affected countries once any negotiated settlement on FMCT is reached.
Because P-5 has already enough fissile material and they do not require more in future.
However, Israel and India, with the help of the United States and European countries would also
have huge stockpiles of fissile material. Ultimately it will be Pakistan, left behind with minimal
fissile material.
Keeping in mind the stance of Pakistan on FMCT, it is clear that Pakistan’s position on
FMCT actually revolve around its national security issues, dynamics of strategic stability in the
region and to ensure the peace in the world. Pakistan will have to face serious security problems
if FMCT is concluded without addressing Pakistan’s concerns of existing stockpiles.
It might be possible that Pakistan enters into negotiations regarding treaty in future after
its concerns of existing stockpiles are addressed, and reduction of the existing stockpiles of
nuclear material takes place under disarmament measures. Hence, preferably, the treaty should
be titled as FMT rather than FMCT and ideally must be concluded in a way that it must follow
non-discriminatory approach and it must address national security concerns of all states under
the present realities to achieve the non-proliferation objectives.

 PAKISTAN’S DIPLOMATIC VERSION REGARDING FMCT:

On May 16, 2006, Pakistan ambassador to the CD, Masood Khan in his statement
maintained that the treaty must address the question of production past, present and future in its
entirety both at regional and global levels. He gave a rational of Pakistan’s position on following
grounds;
 For states with huge stockpiles, a halt in their production at some point in future will be
virtually cost free. All NWS have sufficient stocks of HEU and Plutonium to service and
modernize their nuclear forces.
 A cut-off in future production alone will simply finalize and formalize the status quo.
For them the only cost would be to accept the safeguards on their non-operational
enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
 A mere cut-off will run the risk of both vertical and horizontal proliferation.
 Existing stockpiles, unless accounted for and monitored, could be used for the
development of new and most sophisticated nuclear weapons.
 The asymmetry in the stockpiles at the global and regional levels will be a factor of
strategic instability. One can only presume that overtime large fissile material stocks will
be transformed into nuclear weapons, thus accentuating asymmetries. Inequalities should
not be frozen and perpetuated. An FMT, which freezes regional asymmetries, will, in our
view, accelerate not arrest nuclear weapons proliferation.
 An FMT will have little credibility if existing stocks of military fissile material are not
addressed in some form. In addressing the question of existing stocks, upper limits of
fissile materials as well as the principles of proportionality and sufficiency must be taken
into account.
 The proposed treaty should not be called an FMCT, implying a halt only in future
production, but more appropriately, an FMT. A treaty that aims at only cutoff in the
future production will be a non-proliferation measure whereas inclusion of the past
production will be a step towards disarmament. A large number of member states, think
 tanks, academic institutions, and representatives of civil society use the term „fissile
material treaty‟ and the acronym FMT.
 As Secretary General Kofi Annan said in May 2005, we can only hope to achieve
meaningful disarmament, “If every state has a clear and reliable picture of the fissile
material holdings of every other State, and if every State is confident that this material in
other States is secure.”

 Pakistan's efforts towards nuclear free environment in South Asia:

In 1995 Treaty of Bangkok disallowed the use or threat of nuclear weapons in the area
of signatory countries. As per agreement South East Asia was declared as Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone (NWF). The then Pakistani Prime Minister Ms Benazir Bhutto proposed a similar
arrangement in South Asia but India did not agree to the proposal. After India’s nuclear
explosion in 1974 Pakistan was very keen to organize a nuclear free environment in South Asia
neither the Soviet nor the Americans whole heartedly supported Pakistan idea. Pakistan moved
the proposal for a South Asian (NFWZ) before the UNGA sessions on October 28, 1974.
Although it was accepted by 82 votes in favor and 2 against (India and Bhutan). It never
becomes reality.

 Pakistan’s Nuclear Program:

Pakistan asserts the origin of its nuclear program lies in its adversarial relationship
with India. The two countries have engaged in several conflicts centered mainly on State of
Jammu and Kashmir. Initial step towards the development of Pakistan's nuclear program was
establishment of PAEC. After the 1971 defeat in conflict with India, Bhutto issued a directive
instructing the country nuclear establishment to build a nuclear device within three years.

 Pakistan’s Stance on Disarmament:

Pakistan's stance on nuclear disarmament is that it will only give up nuclear weapons if
India gives up its own nuclear arsenal. Process of disarmament and no proliferation must be non-
discriminatory and issue should be taken up on the Conference of Disarmament (CD) in
comprehensive manner. Pakistan stance is that talks should be held on all the three elements of
nuclear disarmament, non proliferation, arms race in outer space and negative security assurance.

9. INDIAN PERSPECTIVE:-

 INDIA’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE:

India’s ongoing nuclear modernization does not seem compatible with its declared
nuclear doctrine of 2003. Several influential voices from within the country have argued for the
need to review its nuclear posture. As a consequence, and to restore the credibility of its
deterrence posture, some former senior Indian decision-makers have hinted that the country may
have already moved from its traditional posture of No First Use (NFU) and could possibly
contemplate a comprehensive first-strike against Pakistan. This potential shift in India‟s nuclear
posture, along with operationalisation of second-strike capability, suggests that India may have
drifted away from its stated policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). It is not yet clear
whether this shift is real, intended to maintain deliberate ambiguity, or else a result of prevailing
dissonance within India’s strategic elite. The resultant discord between its declaratory position
and its ongoing developments may force Pakistan to take remedial measures that could lead to
action-reaction syndrome, thus, causing instability in South Asia.

 Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) 1999:

India released its DND on August 17, 1999 with an aim to restore public confidence in
the country’s deterrence capability since NWs could not prevent a military crisis with Pakistan.
Key elements of the DND that also became the basis for the subsequent draft committed India to:

 Pursue CMD posture as per the policy of „retaliation only‟.

 Any threat of use of NWs against India shall invoke Measures to counter the threat
 Any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with NWs to
inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.
 India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive
retaliation should deterrence fail.
 NFU would remain India’s underlying commitment
  The 2003 Press Release:

India released its official nuclear policy on January 4, 2003 immediately after its
second military crisis with Pakistan in the post-1998 period. This could have been an attempt to
deflect domestic criticism, since India’s political and military leadership remained in a state of
„strategic paralysis‟ and could not take any punitive measures despite enjoying significant
conventional military advantage. The 2003 doctrine reiterated some of the key elements from the
1999 draft, but contained several inconsistencies that are difficult to corroborate with India’s
ongoing nuclear developments. In fact, statements made by senior officials have further
compounded India’s dilemma to establish the credibility of its declaratory policy. One of the
senior officials had also hinted that the 2003 draft was not necessarily a complete document, and
that there are parts of it that were not shared with the public. In November 2016, India’s then
Defense Minister, while arguing against providing transparency on nuclear doctrine had stated
having a written down policy on the use of NWs would mean giving away strength. Some of the
main clauses from the 2003 document that need deeper reflection to bring clarity on India’s
intent include its promise of :

 Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent

 A posture of NFU - NWs will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on
Indian Territory, or on Indian forces anywhere.
 Nuclear retaliation to a first-strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable
damage.
 In the event of major attack against India, or on Indian forces anywhere, by biological or
chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with NWs.

 FMCT IN CONTEXT OF INDIA’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE:

The basic question for India is whether there is any set of circumstances which could
strongly influence the signing of FMCT. In order to consider this, India’s security objectives in
the short and long term have to be clearly formulated, and the consequent steps to achieve them
identified. It has to be kept in mind that with the end of the cold war, India’s security in the
foreseeable future will have to be ensured with its own capabilities to a greater extent than
before, with a clear perception of threat and of the capability to meet them. On the other hand,
economically India’s intertwinement with global economic forces and players is being deepened
at a rapid pace in a departure from the past; this can be both an opportunity as well as an obstacle
in terms of India’s security policy. Having exploded nuclear devices and having taken the
necessary steps towards weaponisation, India has to have a proper means-end analysis between
its capabilities and needs.

Specifically, if China rather than Pakistan is to be viewed as the primary target of

Indian nuclear “deterrence,” then the pressures on the Indian nuclear weaponisation would be of
a different character and magnitude, with important implications not only for fissile material
decisions but also the attendant delivery systems. On this key question, there appears to be very
little study being done.16 The technical aspects of FMCT relate to stockpiling; processes such as
reprocessing, enrichment and separation techniques, plant types and construction; verification;
civilian versus military applications of Pu; and whether the Treaty should also include stockpile
and spent fuel (which will be a very large source of Pu in the near future much in excess of that
released from weapons).

India currently faces no legal constraints on production of fissile material for weapons,
similar to the nuclear weapon states, and NPT non-signatories Pakistan and Israel. The P5 have
already stockpiled enormous quantities of fissile material both as weapons and those released
from weapons consequent to arms reduction. The U.S. and Russia hence have excess weapons
Pu; and Britain and France seem to have concluded that there is little security justification for
building up their weapons Pu any further and that their current stockpile levels are adequate.

For India, the problem is more political than technical. The country has demonstrated
that it has the necessary technical capability in both nuclear testing and the production of Pu, but
the question is whether it has reached a stage of sufficiency in providing adequate deterrence
with reference to the capabilities of its immediate neighbors, at least for a time period before the
much talked about total disarmament is achieved. It is also to be emphasized that a “freeze” at
this point of time does not have any effect on the P5, especially U.S. and Russia, which have
large stockpiles. It is so very evident and not too difficult to conclude that the target nations of
FMCT are India, Pakistan, Israel and perhaps to some extent China.
  FMCT Options for India:

Six possible options for India are identified and analyzed in terms of benefits and risks.
These six options are:

 Option One: Sign as is.

 Option Two: Sign but with conditions.
 Option Three: Sign with quid-pro-quo.
 Option Four: Declare moratorium on fissile material production.
 Option Five: Sign CTBT, declare moratorium on fissile material production.
 Option Six: Reject FMCT

10. How to move forward along with the contemporary issues:

The issue of an FMCT is often referred to "ripe for negotiations" and touted as the
most likely next step for the Conference on Disarmament. Nevertheless, since this body has been
unable to launch negotiations thus far, it is possible that an ad hoc committee be created through
the General Assembly’s First Committee to address the issue. As Australian Ambassador to the
UN Gary Quinlan stated, “the CD does not have a monopoly on negotiations and other treaties
have been successfully negotiated outside the CD.”

There is nothing stopping members of the CD from coming together and negotiating in
informal groups, but this does not occur because they all recognize that it is essential for
disarmament treaties to include key states: States with much at stake will not sign a treaty unless
they played an active role in shaping the agreement. A case in point is the United States’ refusal
to sign the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty because it did not participate in negotiations.
Creating an ad hoc committee through the General Assembly is possible and has
benefits. Unlike the CD, which is limited to only 65 member states, the General Assembly is
open to all states, making it possible to build momentum and generate political from many more
actors in order to put more pressure on those states opposing an FMCT. Furthermore, the
General Assembly can simply put an issue to a vote without struggling to achieve consensus.
 Another suggestion on how to facilitate the commencement of negotiations for an
FMCT was made by The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission in 2006. In its report, the
Commission strongly recommended that the CD abolish the rule requiring consensus on
procedural items a notion supported by many states.

11. CONCLUSIVE COMMENTS:

A FMT should be concluded in such a way that it should represent a nondiscriminatory
approach; address legitimate security concerns of all its member states; accommodate present
realities and become a real and practical foundation for a world free of nuclear weapons. By
focusing on regional security dynamics the international community can bring onboard countries
like Pakistan. Otherwise it would become difficult for Pakistan to join an FMT at the expense of
its national security. In a regional context India and Pakistan should pursue a strategic restraint
regime by not indulge in any conventional or nuclear arms race. Negative security guarantees
should also be extended to these new nuclear weapons states by major powers in order to win
their trust. Furthermore, without a credible and acceptable international verification regime a
meaningful conclusion of an FMT is not possible. To accommodate nuclear non-proliferation
and nuclear disarmament objectives the treaty should rather be called as Fissile Material Cutoff
& Elimination Treaty (FMCET). This will not only help to cut future production, but it would
also be helpful for a gradual and proportional elimination of existing fissile material stockpiles.
 12. REFFRENCES:

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(Islamabad), 30, 1-2.

 Ali, S., & Khalil, T. (2018). Debating Potential Doctrinal Changes in India’s Nuclear
Ambitions. IPRI JOURNAL, 18(2), 53-77

 Rajagopal, S. (1999). Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and Options for India (Vol. 1).
National Institute of Advanced Studies

 Malik, Q. M. (2010). FMCT and Pakistan: futuristic perspectives. Strategic Studies, 30(3
and 4).

 Khan, M. K. (2011). Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: An Overview from

Pakistan. Strategic Studies, 31(1-2).