Property Case Digest

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China Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals G.R. NO. 140687

China Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. NO. 140687 DATE18 Dec. 2006
PONENTE CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS: Jose Gotianuy accused his daughter Mary Margaret Dee of stealing, among his other
properties, US dollar deposits with Citibank N.A. amounting to not less than P35,000,000.00 and
US$864,000.00. Mary Margaret Dee received these amounts from Citibank N.A. through checks
which she allegedly deposited at China Banking Corporation (China Bank). He likewise accused
his son-in-law, George Dee, husband of his daughter, Mary Margaret, of transferring his real
properties and shares of stock in George Dees name without any consideration. Jose Gotianuy,
died during the pendency of the case before the trial court. He was substituted by his daughter,
Elizabeth Gotianuy Lo. The latter presented the US Dollar checks withdrawn by Mary Margaret Dee
from his US dollar placement with Citibank.
RTC ruling: As the foreign currency fund is deposited with the movant China Banking Corporation,
the disclosure only as to the name or in whose name the said fund is deposited is not violative of
the law.
China Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner China Bank is correct in its submission that the Citibank dollar checks
with both Jose Gotianuy and/or Mary Margaret Dee as payees, deposited with China Bank, may
not be looked into under the law on secrecy of foreign currency deposits.
RULING: NO.
The law provides that all foreign currency deposits authorized under Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended by Sec. 8, Presidential Decree No. 1246, Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign
currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034 are considered absolutely
confidential in nature and may not be inquired into. There is only one exception to the secrecy of
foreign currency deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed upon the written permission of the depositor.
In the case at bar, there is no issue as to the source of the funds. Mary Margaret Dee declared the
source to be Jose Gotianuy. There is likewise no dispute that these funds in the form of Citibank
US dollar Checks are now deposited with China Bank. As the owner of the funds unlawfully taken
and which are undisputably now deposited with China Bank, Jose Gotianuy has the right to inquire
into the said deposits.
Leung Yee vs Frank Strong Machinery Co.
November 20, 2011
37 Phil. 644 – Civil Law – Law on Property – Multiple Sale to Different Vendees – Real vs Personal
Property
In 1913, Compania Agricola Filipina (CAF) was indebted to two personalities: Leung Yee and
Frank L. Strong Machinery Co. CAF purchased some rice cleaning machines from Strong
Machinery. CAF installed the machines in a building. As security for the purchase price, CAF
executed a chattel mortgage on the rice cleaning machines including the building where the
machines were installed. CAF failed to pay Strong Machinery, hence the latter foreclosed the
mortgage – the same was registered in the chattel mortgage registry.
CAF also sold the land (where the building was standing) to Strong Machinery. Strong Machinery
took possession of the building and the land.
On the other hand, Yee, another creditor of CAF who engaged in the construction of the
building, being the highest bidder in an auction conducted by the sheriff, purchased the same
building where the machines were installed. Apparently CAF also executed a chattel mortgage in
favor Yee. Yee registered the sale in the registry of land. Yee was however aware that prior to
his buying, the property has been sold in favor of Strong Machinery – evidence is the chattel
mortgage already registered by Strong Machinery (constructive notice).
ISSUE: Who is the owner of the building?
HELD: The SC ruled that Strong Machinery has a better right to the contested property. Yee
cannot be regarded as a buyer in good faith as he was already aware of the fact that there was a
prior sale of the same property to Strong Machinery.
The SC also noted that the Chattel Mortgage Law expressly contemplates provisions for chattel
mortgages which only deal with personal properties. The fact that the parties dealt the building
as if it’s a personal property does not change the nature of the thing. It is still a real property. Its
inscription in the Chattel Mortgage registry does not modify its inscription the registry of real
property.
Jun
18
Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo, G.R. No. L-20329 (March 16, 1923) Case Digest
Facts:
Gervasia de la Rosa, Vda. de Vera, was the lessee of a parcel of land and owner of the house of
strong materials built thereon. She executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the Standard Oil Co.
of New York conveying the leasehold interest in the said lot and the building.
Standard Oil Co. of New York presented the document to Joaquin Jamarillo as the Register of
Deeds of the City of Manila to be recorded in the book of chattel mortgages.
Upon examination of the document, Jamarillo refused to register it because it did not appear to
be a personal property within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
Issue:
Whether or not Jamarillo as the Register of Deeds has the authority to deny the registration of a
chattel mortgage.
Held:
No, Jamarillo as the Register of Deeds do not have the authority in respect to the "qualification"
of chattel mortgage. His duties in respect to such instruments are ministerial only.
It is unnecessary here to determine whether or not the property described in the document in
question is real or personal. Of course, if the mortgaged property is real instead of personal the
chattel mortgage would no doubt be held ineffective as against third parties, but this is a
question to be determined by the courts of justice and not by the register of deeds.
Jun
22
Serg's Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 137705 (August 22, 2000) Case
Digest
Real Properties
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI) filed a complaint for a sum of money with an application of
writ of replevin. The judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the
machinery and equipment to PCI.
Serg filed a motion for special protective order praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer the
enforcement of the writ of replevin contending that the machines were not proper subjects of
the writ because they are in fact real property defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code.
ART. 415. The following are immovable property:
xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
xxx
PCI opposed the motion on the ground that Section 12.1 of their Lease Agreement clearly
provided that the machines were to be considered as personal property.
2.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding
that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed
or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any building
thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent.
Issue:
Whether the machinery is considered a real or personal property.
Held:
The machinery is considered personal property.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped
from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily
precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
Hence, Serg is estopped from denying the characterization of the machinery as personal
property, which are proper subjects of Writ of Seizure.
TUMALAD vs. VICENCIO, G.R. No. L-30173, September 30, 1971

TUMALAD V. VICENCIO
41 SCRA 143
FACTS:
Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs Tumalad over their
house, which was being rented by Madrigal and company. This was executed to guarantee a
loan, payable in one year with a 12% per annum interest.
The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure to pay the loan. The house was sold at
a public auction and the plaintiffs were the highest bidder. A corresponding certificate of sale
was issued. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an action for ejectment against the defendants,
praying that the latter vacate the house as they were the proper owners.
ISSUE:
W/N the chattel mortgage was null and void ab initio because only personal properties can be
subject of a chattel mortgage.
HELD:
Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are immovable
property such as when through stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal property
those by their nature would be real property. This is partly based on the principle of estoppel
wherein the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house as chattel, a
conduct that may conceivably stop him from subsequently claiming otherwise.
In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as
personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property through chattel mortgage
could only have meant that defendant conveys the house as chattel, or at least, intended to
treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand
by claiming otherwise.
PIANSAY V. DAVID, G.R. No. L-19468, October 30, 1964
PIANSAY V. DAVID
12 SCRA 227
FACTS:
David secured a loan from Vda. De Uy Kim, and to secure the payment, he executed a chattel
mortgage over a house in favor of Kim. Due to failure to pay, the CM was foreclosed and Kim
was the highest bidder in the public auction. Kim then sold the house to Mangubat. The latter
then filed charges against David for the collection of loan and praying that the deed of sale
issued by Kim in favor of Piansay be declared null and void. The trial court held David liable to
Mangubat but dismissed the complaint with regard Kim and Piansay.
Kim and Piansay then filed charges against David and Mangubat. Due to the civil case, David
demanded from Piansay the payment of rentals for the use of the house, which the latter claims
to be his property.
ISSUE:
W/N the chattel mortgage constituted in favor of Mrs. Uy Kim is valid.
HELD:
Regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a chattel mortgage on a house, as between

the parties to the said contract, the same cannot and doesn’t bind third persons who aren’t
parties to the aforementioned contract or their privies. As a consequence, the sale of the house
in question in the proceedings for the sale of the house in question in the proceedings for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of said chattel mortgage, is null and void insofar as Mangubat is
concerned and didn’t confer upon Kim as buyer in said sale, any dominical right in and to said
house.
MAKATI LEASING AND FINANCE CORP. V. WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS, INC.
Parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature is a real
property, as long as no interest of 3rd party would be prejudiced.
FACTS:
To obtain financial accommodations from Makati Leasing, Wearever Textile discounted and
assigned several receivables under a Receivable Purchase Agreement with Makati Leasing. To
secure the collection of receivables, it executed a chattel mortgage over several raw materials
and a machinery – Artos Aero Dryer Stentering Range (Dryer).
Wearever defaulted thus the properties mortgaged were extrajudicially foreclosed. The sheriff,
after the restraining order was lifted, was able to enter the premises of Wearever and removed
the drive motor of the Dryer. The CA reversed the order of the CFI, ordering the return of the
drive motor since it cannot be the subject of a replevin suit being an immovable bolted to the
ground. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether the dryer is an immovable property

HELD: NO
The SC relied on its ruling in Tumalad v. Vicencio, that if a house of strong materials can be the
subject of a Chattel Mortgage as long as the parties to the contract agree and no innocent 3rd
party will be prejudiced then moreso that a machinery may treated as a movable since it is
movable by nature and becomes immobilized only by destination. And treating it as a chattel by
way of a Chattel Mortgage, Wearever is estopped from claiming otherwise.
DAVAO SAW MILL vs. APRONIANO G. CASTILLO and DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC. G.R. No. L-
40411 August 7, 1935
Facts:
Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government of the
Philippine Islands. However, the land upon which the business was conducted belonged to
another person. On the land the sawmill company erected a building which housed the
machinery used by it. Some of the implements thus used were clearly personal property, the
conflict concerning machines which were placed and mounted on foundations of cement. In the
contract of lease between the sawmill company and the owner of the land there appeared the
following provision: That on the expiration of the period agreed upon, all the improvements and
buildings introduced and erected by the party of the second part shall pass to the exclusive
ownership of the lessor without any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said
improvements and buildings; which do not include the machineries and accessories in the
improvements.
In another action wherein the Davao Light & Power Co., Inc., was the plaintiff and the Davao,
Saw, Mill Co., Inc., was the defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in that
action against the defendant; a writ of execution issued thereon, and the properties now in
question were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. No third party claim was filed for such
properties at the time of the sales thereof as is borne out by the record made by the plaintiff
herein
It must be noted also that on number of occasion, Davao Sawmill treated the machinery as
personal property by executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. One of such is the
appellee by assignment from the original mortgages.
The lower court rendered decision in favor of the defendants herein. Hence, this instant appeal.
Issue:
whether or not the machineries and equipments were personal in nature.
Ruling/ Rationale:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by
the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any
person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
STAR TWO (SPV-AMC), INC., V PAPER CITY CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS
For review is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
now substituted by Star Two (SPV-AMC), Inc.
Respondent Paper City is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of paper products.
Paper City applied for and was granted loans and credit accommodations in peso and dollar
denominations by RCBC secured by 4 Deeds of Continuing Chattel Mortgages on its machineries
and equipments found inside its paper plants.
However, a unilateral Cancellation of Deed of Continuing Chattel Mortgage on Inventory of

Merchandise/Stocks-in-Trade was executed by RCBC over the merchandise and stocks-in-trade
covered by the continuing chattel mortgages.
RCBC, Metrobank and Union Bank (creditor banks with RCBC instituted as the trustee bank)
entered into a Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI) with Paper City. In the said MTI, Paper City
acquired an additional P170, 000,000.00 from the creditor banks in addition to the previous loan
from RCBC amounting to P110, 000,000.00.
The old loan of P110,000,000.00 was partly secured by various parcels of land situated in
Valenzuela City. The new loan obligation of P170,000,000.00 would be secured by the same five
(5) Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage and additional real and personal properties described in an
annex to MTI, Annex "B" which covered the machineries and equipments of Paper City.
Annex "A"
Office Building
Building 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
Boiler House
Workers’ Quarter/Restroom
Canteen
Guardhouse, Parking Shed, Elevated Guard
Post and other amenities
Pollution Tank Nos. 1 and 2.
Reserve Water Tank and Swimming Pool
Waste Water Treatment Tank
Elevated Concrete Water Tank
And other Improvements listed in Annex "A"

Power Plants Nos. 1 and 2
Fabrication Building
Various Fuel, Water Tanks and Pumps
Transformers
Annex "B"
D. Material Handling Equipment
Paper Plant No. 3
The MTI was later amended to increase the contributions of the RCBC and Union Bank. As a
consequence, they executed a Deed of Amendment to MTI but still included as part of the
mortgaged properties by way of a first mortgage the various machineries and equipments
located in and bolted to and/or forming part of buildings.
A Second Supplemental Indenture to the MTI was executed to increase the amount of the loan
secured against the existing properties composed of land, building, machineries and equipments
and inventories described in Annexes "A" and "B."
Finally, a Third Supplemental Indenture to the MTI was executed to increase the existing loan
obligation with an additional security composed of a newly constructed two-storey building and
other improvements, machineries and equipments located in the existing plant site.
Paper City was able to comply with its loan obligations but economic crisis ensued which made it
difficult for Paper City to meet the terms of its obligations leading to payment defaults.
Consequently, RCBC filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure.
The petition was for the extra-judicial foreclosure of eight parcels of land including all
improvements thereon which were sold in favor of the creditor banks RCBC, Union Bank and
Metrobank as the highest bidders.
This foreclosure sale prompted Paper City to file a Complaint against the creditor banks alleging
that the extra-judicial sale of the properties and plants was null and void due to lack of prior
notice and attendance of gross and evident bad faith on the part of the creditor banks.
Acting on the said motion, the trial court issued an Order denying the prayer and ruled that the
machineries and equipments were included in the annexes and form part of the MTI.
Paper City filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was favorably granted by the trial court
with justification that the disputed machineries and equipments are chattels by agreement of
the parties through their inclusion in the four Deeds of Chattel Mortgage and the deed of
cancellation executed by RCBC was not valid because it was done unilaterally and without the
consent of Paper City.
The CA affirmed the Order.

ISSUE
Whether the subject machineries and equipments were included in the mortgage, extrajudicial
foreclosure and in the consequent sale.
RULING
Yes. By contracts, all uncontested in this case, machineries and equipments are included in the
mortgage in favor of RCBC, in the foreclosure of the mortgage and in the consequent sale on
foreclosure also in favor of petitioner.
Repeatedly, the parties stipulated that the properties mortgaged by Paper City to RCBC are
various parcels of land including the buildings and existing improvements thereon as well as the
machineries and equipments, which as stated in the granting clause of the original mortgage,
are "more particularly described and listed that is to say, the real and personal properties listed
in Annexes ‘A’ and ‘B’.”
The plain language and literal interpretation of the MTIs must be applied. The petitioner, other
creditor banks and Paper City intended from the very first execution of the indentures that the
machineries and equipments enumerated in Annexes "A" and "B" are included. Obviously, with
the continued increase in the amount of the loan, totaling hundreds of millions of pesos, Paper
City had to offer all valuable properties acceptable to the creditor banks.
The MTIs did not describe the equipments and machineries as personal property. Notably, while
"personal" appeared in the granting clause of the original MTI, the subsequent Deed of
Amendment specifically stated that:
x x x The machineries and equipment listed in Annexes "A" and "B" form part of the
improvements listed above and located on the parcels of land subject of the Mortgage Trust
Indenture and the Real Estate Mortgage.
Considering that the Indenture which is the instrument of the mortgage that was foreclosed
exactly states through the Deed of Amendment that the machineries and equipments listed in
Annexes "A" and "B" form part of the improvements listed and located on the parcels of land
subject of the mortgage, such machineries and equipments are surely part of the foreclosure of
the "real estate properties, including all improvements thereon" as prayed for in the petition.
The real estate mortgage over the machineries and equipments is even in full accord with the
classification of such properties by the Civil Code of the Philippines as immovable property.
Thus:
Article 415. The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
xxxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
CONCLUSION
The petition is GRANTED.
Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076 (January 13, 2009) Case Digest
Personal Property
Facts:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) filed a complaint for theft under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code against Baynet Co., Ltd. (Baynet) for stealing its business. PLDT
alleged that Baynet offered phone cards to people in Japan to call their friends and relatives in
the Philippines using PLDT's facilities and equipment.
Issue:
Whether or not the PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services is a personal

property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
No, PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services is not a personal property under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Personal property under the Revised Penal Code covers both tangible and intangible properties
but must be considered with the word "take" in the law. There is "taking" of personal property,
and theft is consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires possession of personal
property even if for a short time; or if such property is under the dominion and control of the
thief. The statutory definition of "taking" clearly indicates that not all personal properties may
be the proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that only movable properties, which have
physical or material existence and susceptible of occupation by another are proper subjects of
theft. Movable properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code should be distinguished
from the rights or interest to which they relate to. While the rights or interests are properties,
they are not considered personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
PLDT's business is intangible and cannot be taken by another and not the proper subjects of
theft because they are without form or substance.
SIBAL v. VALDEZ
For the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage
Law, "ungathered products" have the nature of personal property.
FACTS:
(this case has a lot of confusing facts, just read the original if this digest fails to compress
everything) The Deputy Sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued
by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J.
Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land. Included
also in those attached were real properties wherein 8mout of the 11 parcels of land, house and
camarin which was first acquired by Macondray & Co and then later on bought by Valdez in an
auction. First Cause for petitioner: That Within one year from the date of the attachment and
sale the plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the
amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments
or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding
thereto and that Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the
plaintiff. Second Cause for petitioner: That Valdez was trying to harvest palay from four out of
seven parcels of land. Petitioner filed for preliminary injunction to stop defendant from 1)
distributing the lands 2) harvesting and selling the sugar canes, and 3) harvesting and selling the
palay. The writ was issued which prevented defendant from planting and harvesting the lands.
Defendant later appealed claiming that he was the owner of many of the alleged land thus he
also owns the crops of it. The court awarded the defendant 9,439.08 because the petitioner
unduly denied the defendant to plant in his land thus preventing him to profit thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether the sugar cane is personal o real property? (The relevance of the issue is with regards
to the sugar cane of the Petitioner which came from the land that now belongs to the
defendant)
RULING:
It is contended that sugar cane comes under the classification of real property as "ungathered
products" in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code. Said paragraph 2 of article 334
enumerates as real property the following: Trees, plants, and ungathered products, while they
are annexed to the land or form an integral part of any immovable property." That article,
however, has received in recent years an interpretation by the Tribunal Supremo de España,
which holds that, under certain conditions, growing crops may be considered as personal
property.
In some cases "standing crops" may be considered and dealt with as personal property. In the
case of Lumber Co. vs. Sheriff and Tax Collector (106 La., 418) the Supreme Court said: "True, by
article 465 of the Civil Code it is provided that 'standing crops and the fruits of trees not
gathered and trees before they are cut down . . . are considered as part of the land to which
they are attached, but the immovability provided for is only one in abstracto and without
reference to rights on or to the crop acquired by others than the owners of the property to
which the crop is attached. . . . The existence of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by
anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop movable quoad the right
acquired therein. Our jurisprudence recognizes the possible mobilization of the growing crop."
For the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage
Law, "ungathered products" have the nature of personal property. SC lowered the award for
damages to the defendant to 8,900.80 by acknowledging the fact that some of the sugar canes
were owned by the petitioner and by reducing the calculated expected yield or profit that
defendant would have made if petitioner did not judicially prevent him from planting and
harvesting his lands.
MINDANAO BUS COMPANY v. THE CITY ASSESSOR & TREASURER and the BOARD OF TAX
APPEALS of Cagayan de Oro City
G.R. No. L-17870 September 29, 1962
FACTS:
Petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor
trucks. It owns a land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor trucks; a repair
shop; blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with machineries placed therein, its TPU trucks are
made; body constructed; and same are repaired in a condition to be serviceable in the TPU land
transportation business it operates.
The machineries have never been or were never used as industrial equipment to produce
finished products for sale, nor to repair machineries, parts and the like offered to the general
public indiscriminately for business or commercial purposes.
Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4,400 petitioner’s above-
mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board of Tax
Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. The Board of Tax Appeals of the City
sustained the city assessor, so petitioner herein filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for
the review of the assessment.
The CTA held the petitioner liable to the payment of the realty tax on its maintenance and repair
equipment mentioned above. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Should the tools and equipment in the petitioner company’s repair shop be considered
immovable taxable real properties?
DOCTRINE:
NO. Movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be “essential
and principal elements” of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be
“unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established.” The tools
and equipment are not essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner’s business of
transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals — acquired as
movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. The
transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling
equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another.
CALTEX PHIL INC. VS BOARD OF ASSESMENT APPEALS 114 SCRA 297
Facts:
Caltex loaned machines and equipment to gas station operators under a lease agreement, which
stipulated that upon demand, the operators shall return to Caltex the machines and equipment.
The lessor of the land does not become the owner of the machines and equipment. Caltex
retains their ownership.
The City Assessor characterized the said machines and equipment as taxable realty. However,
the City Board of Tax Appeals ruled that they are personalty. The Assessor appealed to the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
The Board held that the said machines are real property within the meaning of Sec. 3(k) & (m)
and 38 of the Real Property Tax Code, PD 464, and that the Civil Code definitions of real and
personal property in Articles 415 and 416 are not applicable in this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the said machines and equipment are real property subject to realty tax?
Held:
The said machines and equipment are considered real property.

Section 2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due "on real property, including
land, buildings, machinery, and other improvements" not specifically exempted in section 3
thereof.
This provision is reproduced with some modification in the Real Property Tax Code which
provides:
SEC. 38. Incidence of Real Property Tax.— There shall be levied, assessed and collected in all
provinces, cities and municipalities an annual ad valorem tax on real property, such as land,
buildings, machinery and other improvements affixed or attached to real property not
hereinafter specifically exempted.
The Code contains the following definitions in its section 3:
k) Improvements — is a valuable addition m
ade to property or an amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or
replacement of waste, costing labor or capital and intended to enhance its value, beauty or
utility or to adapt it for new or further purposes.
m) Machinery — shall embrace machines, mechanical contrivances, instruments, appliances and

apparatus attached to the real estate. It includes the physical facilities available for production,
as well as the installations and appurtenant service facilities, together with all other equipment
designed for or essential to its manufacturing, industrial or agricultural purposes (See sec. 3[f],
Assessment Law).
The machines and equipment are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without
them the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to
the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the
meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
Therefore, the machines and equipment are real property subject to realty tax.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS
114 SCRA 273
FACTS:
Petitioner owns two oil storage tanks, made of steel plates wielded and assembled on
the spot. Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisted of compacted earth, sand pad as
immediate layer, and asphalt stratum as top layer. The tanks merely sit on its foundation.
The municipal treasurer of Batangas made an assessment for realty tax on the two tanks, based
on the report of the Board of Assessors. MERALCO wished to oppose this assessment as they
averred that the tanks are not real properties.
HELD:
While the two storage tanks are not embodied in the land, they may nevertheless be
considered as improvements in the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the
oil industry.
For purposes of taxation, the term real property may include things, which should generally be
considered as personal property. it is familiar phenomenon to see things classified as
real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle may be considered as
personal
property.
PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY V. JARQUE
FACTS:
Plaintiff Philippine Refining Co. and defendant Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor
vessels Pandan and Zargazo. The documents were recorded as transfer and encumbrances of
the vessels for the port of Cebu and each was denominated a chattel mortgage.
The first two mortgages did not have an affidavit of good faith. A fourth mortgage was executed
by Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz over motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the Chattel Mortgage
Registry on May 12, 1932, within the period of 30 days prior to the foreclosure/institution of the
insolvency proceedings.
Jose Curaminas filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition praying that Francisco Jarque be declared an
insolvent debtor. This was granted and Jarque’s properties were then assigned to Curaminas.
A problem arose when Judge Jose Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the
mortgages, and instead, ruled that they were defective because they did not have affidavits of
good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgages of the vessels are governed by the Chattel Mortgage Law
Whether or not an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce achattel mortgage on a vessel
RULING:
Yes. “Personal property” includes vessels. They are subject to the provisions of the Chattel
Mortgage Law. The Chattel Mortgage Law says that a good chattel mortgage includes an
affidavit of good faith. The absence of such affidavit makes mortgage unenforceable against
creditors and subsequent encumbrances. The judge was correct.
Note: A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages. The only difference
between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that the
first must be noted in the registry of the register of deeds.
NVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER V. RAMIREZ (GR 18700, 26 September 1922)
FACTS:
The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity & Surety
Co. on 10 March 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of property, while another
mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered also in the
registry. Raised in the lower court, the trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co.
entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by Concepcion
Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez did.
ISSUE:
Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property
RULING: Yes.
1. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to the nature of the property
mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a personal property
capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties in articles 335
of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage. All personal property may be mortgaged.
(Sec. 7, Act 1508.)
2. Description of mortgage property sufficient The description contained in the document is

sufficient. The law (sec. 7, Act 1508) requires only a description of the mortgaged property shall
be such as to enable the parties to the mortgage, or any other person, after reasonable inquiry
and investigation, to identify the same. In the case at bar, “his half interest in the drug business
known as Antigua Botica Ramirez, located at Calle Real Nos. 123 and 125, District of Intramuros,
Manila Philippine Islands" is sufficient.
3. Article 1922 (1-3) of the Civil Code applicable only to mortgage property in possession
Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of the article 1922 of the Civil Code are not applicable as neither the
debtor, nor himself, is in possession of the property mortgaged, which is, and since the
registration of the mortgage has been, legally in possession of the surety company
4. Stipulation about personal property not a mortgage upon property - In no way can the
mortgage executed be given effect as of the date of the sale of the store in question; as there
was a mere stipulation about personal security during said date, but not a mortgage upon
property, and much less upon the property in question.
Bachrach Motor Co v. Lacson Ledesma (1937)
G.R. No. L-42462 August 31, 1937
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-negotiable Character of Certificate of Stock (Corporate Law)
FACTS:
June 30, 1927: CFI favored Bachrach Motor Co., Inc (Bachrach) against Mariano Lacson Ledesma
Ledesma mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc shares
September 29, 1928: PNB brought an action against Ledesma and his wife Concepcion Diaz for
the recovery of a mortgage credit
January 2, 1929: PNB amended its complaint by including the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., as party
defendant because they claim to have rights to some of the subject matters of this complaint
January 30, 1929: Bachrach field a gen. denial
CFI: favored PNB
December 20, 1929: Bachrach brought an action in the CFI against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,
Inc., to recover P13,850 against the bonus or dividend w/c, by virtue of the resolution of
December 22, 1923, Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., had declared in favor of Ledesma as
one of the owners of the hacienda which had been mortgaged to the PNB to secure the
obligation of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. in favor of said bank
CFI: favored Bachrach
ISSUE: W/N shares of stock are personal property and therefore can be subject to pledge or
chattel mortgage
HELD: YES. AFIRMED

section 4 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, in so far as it provides that a chattel mortgage shall not
be valid against any person except the mortgagor, his executors or administrators, unless the
possession of the property is delivered to and retained by the mortgagee or unless the mortgage
is recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the province in which the mortgagor resides.
pledge of the 6,300 stock dividends is valid against the Bachrach because the certificate was
delivered to the creditor bank, notwithstanding the fact that the contract does not appear in a
public instrument
Certificates of stock or of stock dividends, under the Corporation Law, are quasi negotiable
instruments in the sense that they may be given in pledge or mortgage to secure an obligation
certificates of stock, while not negotiable in the sense of the law merchant, like bills and notes,
are so framed and dealt with as to be transferable, when property endorsed, by mere delivery,
and as they frequently convey, by estoppel against the corporation or against prior holders, as
good a title to the transferee as if they were negotiable, and inasmuch as a large commercial use
is made of such certificates as collateral security, and it is to the public interest that such use
should be simplify and facilitated by placing them as nearly as possible on the plane of
commercial paper, they are often spoken of and treated as quasi negotiable, that is as having
some of the attributes and partaking of the character of negotiable instruments, in passing from
hand to hand, especially where they are accompanied by an assignment and power of attorney,
executed in blank, to transfer them to anyone who may obtain possession as holders, even
though such assignment and power are under seal.
PIANSAY v. DAVID
As it may be true that the parties who agreed to attach the house in a chattel mortgage may be
bound thereto under the doctrine of estoppel, the same does not bind third persons.
FACTS:
Conrado S. David received a loan of P3,000 with interest at 12% per annum from Claudia B. Vda.
de Uy Kim, one of the plaintiffs, and to secure the payment of the same, Conrado S. David
executed a chattel mortgage on a house situated at 1259 Sande Street, Tondo, Manila. The
mortgage was foreclosed and was sold to Kim to satisfy the debt. 2 years later after the
foreclosure, the house was sold by Kim to Marcos Magubat. The latter then filed to collect the
loan from David and to declare the sale issued by Kim in favour of Piansay null and void. (It
appears that Kim sold the house to two people, namely Piansay and Magubat) The trial court
approved of the collection of the loan from David but dismissed the complaint regarding the
questioned sale between Kim and Piansay, declaring the latter as rightful owner of the house
and awarding damages to him. CA reversed the decision making David the rightful owner and
ing him and his co-defendant, Mangubat, to levy the house. Now Petitioners are trying to
release the said property from the aforementioned levy by claiming that Piansay is the rightful
owner of the house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale between Kim and Piansay was valid?
RULING:
Since it is a rule in our law that buildings and constructions are regarded as mere accesories to
the land (following the Roman maxim omne quod solo inaedificatur solo credit) it is logical that
said accessories should partaked of the nature of the principal thing, which is the land forming,
as they do, but a single object (res) with it in contemplation of law. A mortgage creditor who
purchases real properties at an extra-judicial foreclosure sale thereof by virtue of a chattel
mortgage constituted in his favor, which mortgage has been declared null and void with respect
to said real properties acquires no right thereto by virtue of said sale Thus, Mrs. Uy Kim had no
right to foreclose the alleged chattel mortgage constituted in her favor, because it was in reality
a mere contract of an unsecured loan. It follows that the Sheriff was not authorized to sell the
house as a result of the foreclosure of such chattel mortgage. And as Mrs. Uy Kim could not have
acquired the house when the Sheriff sold it at public auction, she could not, in the same token, it
validly to Salvador Piansay. Conceding that the contract of sale between Mrs. Uy Kim and
Salvador Piansay was of no effect, we cannot nevertheless set it aside upon instance of
Mangubat because, as the court below opined, he is not a party thereto nor has he any interest
in the subject matter therein, as it was never sold or mortgaged to him At any rate, regardless of
the validity of a contract constituting a chattel mortgage on a house, as between the parties to
said contract, the same cannot and does not bind third persons, who are not parties to the
aforementioned contract or their privies. As a consequence, the sale of the house in question in
the proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of said chattel mortgage, is null and void insofar
as defendant Mangubat is concerned, and did not confer upon Mrs. Uy Kim, as buyer in said
sale, any dominical right in and to said house, so that she could not have transmitted to her
assignee, plaintiff Piansay any such right as against defendant Mangubat. In short plaintiffs have
no cause of action against the defendants herein.
Usero v CA Digest
Facts:
This is a consolidated petition
assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA). Petitioners and the
private respondent are registered
owners of neighboring parcels of
land wherein between the lots is a
low-level strip of land with stagnant
body of water. Whenever there is a
storm or heavy rain, the water
therein would flood thereby causing
damage to houses of the Polinars
prompting them to build a concrete

wall on the bank of the strip of land
about 3meters from their house and
riprapped the soil in that portion.
The Useros claimed ownership of the
strip, demanded the halt of the
construction but the Polinars never
heeded believing that the strip is part
of a creek. However, the Polinars
offered to pay for the land. As the
parties still failed to settle, both filed
separate complaints for forcible
entry. The Municipal Trial Court ruled
in favor of the petitioner, while the
regional trial court reversed and
ordered the dismissal of the
complaint and confirmed the
existence of the creek between the
lots.
Issue
Whether or not the disputed strip of
land is part of the creek hence part of
public domain
Held:
YES. Art. 420 of the Philippine New
Civil Code (NCC) provides for
properties which are part of public
domain. A creek is included in the
phrase "and others of similar
character". A creek, which refers to a

recess or arm of a river is a property belonging to the public domain, therefore not susceptible
of private ownership. Being a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens system
under the name of any individual.
Republic vs Naguiat
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land
having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest
who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her
knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any
person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not
established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to
alienable and disposable property.
ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain?
HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the
parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The
classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
HINUNANGAN VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. vs Judge Pascual Bercilles
In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu was excluded in the city’s development plan
hence the council declared it as abandoned and was subsequently opened for public bidding.
Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. was the highest bidder at P10,800.00. Cebu Oxygen applied
for the land’s registration before CFI Cebu but the provincial fiscal opposed it, so did the court
later through Judge Pascual Bercilles, as it was ruled that the road is part of the public domain
hence beyond the commerce of man.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cebu Oxygen can validly own said land.
HELD: Yes. Under Cebu’s Charter (RA 3857), the city council “may close any city road, street or
alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be
used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be
lawfully used or conveyed.” Since that portion of the city street subject of Cebu Oxygen’s
application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary
contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property
of the State.”
Manila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of Appeals
- September 29, 2012
FACTS:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim
a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The act
provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila, and the city is
authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the
same. Later, the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then
Petitioner sold the land, together with all the improvements, to the Tarlac Development
Corporation (TDC).
ISSUE:
W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila.
HELD:
The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to analyze all the
provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant
made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature.
Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous
donation of public money or resources, which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In
the case at bar, the area reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government
and without cost to the City of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to
exclude matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of legislation.
JUANITA ERMITANO VS PAGLAS
CASE DIGEST: LEONARDO NOTARTE, GUILLERMO NOTARTE, REGALADO NOTARTE AND HEIRS OF
FELIPE NOTARTE,Petitioners, v. GODOFREDO NOTARTE, Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioners Leonardo, Guillermo, Regalado, all surnamed Notarte, and the heirs of Felipe
Notarte were co-owners of a 263,233-square meter land covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 48098.
On October 15, 1984, respondent Godofredo Notarte (Godofredo) bought a portion of the said
land from Patrocenia Nebril-Gamboa (Patrocenia), cousin of Felipe Notarte. Thereafter,
Godofredo filed a complaint before the MTC to correct and remove the overlapping of
boundaries of the lots originally covered by OCT No. 48098. He averred that the said parcel of
land is no longer undivided as it had been physically segregated into the designated shares of
the registered owners.
Leonardo, et al. countered that the land was never validly partitioned since there was neither
extrajudicial nor judicial partition executed. They claimed that their respective areas of
possession were just orally assigned to each one of them.
ISSUE:
Is an oral partition of co-owned property valid?
HELD: We sustain the RTC and CA in finding that the property covered by OCT No. 48098 had
already been partitioned long before respondent purchased his lot. Under Article 1082 of the
Civil Code, every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to
be a partition even though it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any other transaction.
Partition may thus be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the
presumption. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. In another case, we have
held that after exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the contested
estate, petitioners are estopped from denying the existence of an oral partition.
On this point, this Court has ruled that: "on general principle, independent and in spite of the
statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or
partly performed. Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and
enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been
consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the
parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and
the rights of the parties thereunder."
PARTLY AFFIRMED
CALUB V. CA
Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and
considered in the custody of the law. A replevin case against the State, without its consent,
cannot prosper.
FACTS:
Petitioner from DENR apprehended two vehicles carrying illegally sourced lumber and thereafter
confiscated them. The owners of the vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover the vehicles.
They won in the trial court on the ground that petitioner did not act in accordance with the law.
So petitioner appeals on the ground that the replevin in this case is a suit against the State and is
therefore valid.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not a replevin may be instituted for recovery of property under custodia legis.
2) Whether or not replevin in this case is a suit against the State
RULING:
1) No! Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process
and considered in the custody of the law.
2) Yes! This suit is not valid because the State may not be sued without its consent or when the
public official acted in bad faith in the discharge of his duties. It has been established that the
DENR acted within its authority. Hence, its action is the action of the State.
BEATRIZ GALANG, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
NO.L-17248.January 29, 1962
FACTS:
Plaintiff Beatriz Galang and Rodrigo Quinit were engaged, but Rodrigo’s parents were strongly
opposed to their marriage. They lived as husband and wife in the house of one Adolfo Dagawan
until Rodrigo left and never returned. The evidence on other pertinent facts is however
conflicting. Plaintiff tried to prove that she and Rodrigo were engaged despite the opposition of
the latter’s mother and that the father of Rodrigo agreed to give dowry and defray the expenses
of the marriage. The father even took them to the house of Dagawan for them to stay as
husband and wife. However when Rodrigo was not able to secure a marriage license for lack of a
residence certificate, he went back to his hometown to get such certificate but never returned.
On the other hand, the defendants sough to establish that he and plaintiff were engaged but his
parents were opposed to the marriage. Rodrigo was agreeable to marry the plaintiff after his
graduation but the latter was impatient and wanted the marriage to take place sooner. Because
of continued relationships with the plaintiff, Rodrigo’s parents told him to leave the parental
home. He later told this to plaintiff. The plaintiff convinced him to go to Dagawan’s house where
she followed and stayed thereafter. Because of his continued refusal to marry the plaintiff, the
latter’s relatives, accompanied by policemen and constabulary soldiers intimidated him. He was
allowed to go home and was then placed under the custody of a town mayor by his parents. He
refused to acknowledge the marriage application, which was provided by Dagawan for him to
sign, when he did not appear before a notary public.
Plaintiff filed an action against Rodrigo and his father Maximo Quinit to recover damages for
breach of promise on the part of Rodrigo to marry her. The trial court rendered judgment in
favor of plaintiff, which on appeal, was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff may recover damages for breach of promise to marry.
RULING:
It is urged by the plaintiff that said Court had erred in not awarding moral damages to her. She
insists that moral damages for breach of promise to marry are collectible under our laws, but
this question has already been settled adversely to plaintiff’s pretense in Hemosisima vs. Court
of Appeals. Moral damages for breach of promise to marry are not collectible.
JARALVE
decision
Although the survey and certification were done declaring certain portions of the public domain
situated in Cebu City as alienable and disposable, an actual copy of such classification, certified
as true by the legal custodian of the official records, was not presented in evidence.
Unfortunately, respondents were not able to discharge the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land they sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Gloria Jaralve (deceased), substituted by Alan Jess Jaralve-
Document, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 175177. October 24, 2012
G.R. No. 175177
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the June 28, 2006 Decision[2] and October
27, 2006 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78633, which affirmed the
November 15, 2002 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cebu City, in Land
Registration Case No. 1421-N/LRA Rec. No. N-67272.
On October 22, 1996, Gloria Jaralve,[5] Edgardo Jaralve, Serafin Uy, Jr., Shella Uy, Nimfa
Lagnada, Pantaleon Saya-Ang, Starglad International and Development Corporation, Annie Tan,
Teotimo Cabarrubias, Jessica Daclan, and Ma. Emma Ramas filed an Application[6] with Branch
20 of the RTC of Cebu City, for the registration in their names of Lot Sgs-07-000307 (subject
property), under Presidential Decree No. 1529. On November 29, 1996 and November 7, 1997,
they filed their Amended[7] and Second Amended[8] Applications, respectively, to conform to
the procedural requirements of the law, as per Order[9] of the RTC, and to join Danilo Deen and
Eric Anthony Deen as applicants[10] (for brevity, we will refer to all the foregoing applicants as
respondents). This was docketed as LRC Case No. 1421-N/LRA Rec. No. N-67272.
In their original and amended applications, respondents declared that they were the co-owners
in fee simple of the subject property, a parcel of land with an area of 731,380 square meters,
belonging to Cadastral Lot 18590, and situated in Barangay Quiot, City of Cebu, and all the
improvements thereon. They alleged that they occupied the subject property and to the best of
their knowledge, there was no mortgage or encumbrance affecting it, and no one was in
possession thereof.[11] Respondents further averred that the subject property was not covered
by any certificate of title or any pending case before the RTC of Cebu City.[12] Respondents also
identified the names and complete postal addresses of the owners of the adjoining lots.[13]
The respondents claimed that they had acquired ownership over the subject property by way of
purchase from predecessors-in-interest who had been in continuous, open, adverse, public,
uninterrupted, exclusive, and notorious possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years, or
from June 12, 1945.[14]
In support of their application, respondents submitted the following:
Sepia Plan;[15]
Blue Print Copy of Survey Plan;[16]
Technical Description of SGS-07-000307;[17]
Geodetic Engineer's Certificate (of the survey of the subject property);[18]
Certificate of Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) dated March 20,
1996, signed by CENR and Provincial Environmental and Natural Resources [PENR] Officers
(CENRO Certificate) that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable portion of
Lot 18590;[19]
Deeds of Sale;[20]
Tax Clearances;[21] and
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7 Certification that subject
property is not covered by any subsisting land application.[22]
The respondents' application was opposed by the following parties:
Gertrudes N. Tabanas-Singson, Lourdes N. Tabanas, Francisco N. Tabanas, Vicente N. Tabanas,

Heirs of Enrique N. Tabanas, Heirs of Mercedes N. Tabanas-Raganas, and Heirs of Primitiva N.
Tabanas-Nadera, who claimed that they owned portions of the subject property, containing an
area of 406,810 square meters, as described and bounded under Tax Declaration No. 97GR-11-
075- 00581, issued in the name of their father Agaton Tabanas; and that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of their alleged property since time immemorial. They prayed that
the respondents' application be dismissed with respect to the portion they were claiming, and
that their title be confirmed (Opposition was filed on March 3, 1997).[23]
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, who argued that: a)
neither the respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945
or prior thereto; b) that the muniments of title and/or the tax declarations and tax payment
receipts submitted in evidence appeared to be of recent vintage and did not constitute
competent and sufficient proof of a bona fide acquisition of the subject property; c) that the
period for an application based on a Spanish title or grant had already lapsed; and d) that the
subject property was part of the public domain, which belonged to the State and not subject to
private appropriation (Opposition was filed on March 4, 1997).[24]
The Aznar Brothers Realty Co. and Aznar Enterprises, Inc., that opposed the application insofar
as it might affect the fifteen hectare portion they claimed and owned (Opposition was filed on
March 7, 1997).[25]
Ponciano Tabanas Ybiernas, for himself and for the other heirs of Esteban Tabanas and Ciriaca
Gabuya, who alleged that he, his co-owners, and their predecessors-in-interest, had been
occupying portions of the subject property in the concept of owners, exclusively, openly,
continuously, and peacefully for many years. He prayed that the respondents' application for
registration be denied with respect to the portions he and his co-owners claimed (Opposition
was filed on March 10, 1997).[26]
Rufina and Julia Ragasajo, who contended that the respondents' application was without legal
basis as the respondents were not the true owners of the subject property, which also
encroached on their own land (Opposition was filed on March 10, 1997).[27]
The National Power Corporation (NPC), that opposed the respondents' application with respect
to a six-hectare portion of the subject property. NPC alleged that it was in the process of
finalizing with DENR its permit/grant to occupy as a substation office, six hectares of the subject
property, which was a public forest land in Antuanga Hills, Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City. NPC added
that the grant of respondents' application would cause the government great prejudice
(Opposition was filed on March 11, 1997).[28]
Amelia and Delia Dionaldo, who opposed the respondents' application on the ground that they
had interests in the subject property (Opposition was filed on March 11, 1997).[29]
Jeremias L. Dolino, in his official capacity as Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Region VII,
Banilad, Mandaue City, who averred that the subject property fell within Timberland Block 3-C
and was within the Cebu City Reforestation project, formerly known as the Osmeña
Reforestation Project.[30] Dolino said that there was an implied admission on the part of the
respondents of this assertion as their predecessors-in-interest had previously filed a Petition for
Reclassification of Land[31] of the subject property before the DENR. Dolino added that the
CENRO Certificate relied on by the respondents was discovered to have been inadvertently and
erroneously issued as it was based on a mistaken projection (Opposition was filed on April 10,
1997).[32] The CENRO Certificate was subsequently recalled, cancelled, and revoked by the
Regional Executive Director of DENR via a Memorandum dated March 12, 1998.[33]
RTC
During the trial, respondents presented the testimony of the following witnesses in support of
their application: Estanislao Nacorda, Leoncio Llamedo, Rodolfo Amancia, Melecio Joboneita,
Regino Gabuya, Constancio Llamedo, Teotimo Cabarrubias, Andres Alfanta, Efren Binolirao,
Sergio Paran, Gloria Jaralve, Ma. Emma Ramas, Shella Uy Coca, Danilo Deen, and Edgardo
Jaralve.[34]
The foregoing witnesses testified on how the respondents acquired their respective portions of
the subject property and how they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, open,
continuous, exclusive, peaceful, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property in the concept of owners since before the war and for more than 30 years.[35]
The respondents also presented Forester III Anastacio Cabalejo, a duly licensed and registered
forester connected with the CENRO, and Geodetic Engineer Celso P. Mayol, the CENRO-DENR
Chief of Survey Unit to testify that upon the request of Carmelina Cuizon, one of the
predecessors-in-interest of the respondents, they, with other members of the Land Evaluation
Party of the Bureau of Forestry, using Administrative Order No. 4-642 and the Bureau of
Forestry Land Classification Map No. 2124 as references, conducted an actual survey of
Cadastral Lot 18590 on November 4, 1995, and found that the subject property was within its
alienable and disposable portion.[36]
Engineer Mayol further testified that in connection with the foregoing survey, he had prepared a
plan,[37] which was the subject of the CENRO Certificate made at its dorsal side.
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-642 dated July 31, 1957 declared certain portions of the
public domain situated in Cebu City under Project No. 3-C as alienable and disposable lands. The
Bureau of Forestry Land Classification Map No. 2124[38] contains the bearings and distances of
the areas in Cebu City declared as alienable and disposable lands.[39] Finding the testimonial
and documentary evidence of the respondents sufficient to show that they had acquired
ownership over the subject property, the RTC ruled in their favor in its Decision dated November
15, 2002. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing undisputed facts supported by oral and documentary
evidence, the Court finds and so holds that the applicants have a registerable title to the parcel
of land herein applied for original registration of title, and thereby confirming the same and
ordering its registration under CA 141, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 over the
land, denominated as SGS-07-000307, in accordance with the respective technical descriptions
of herein applicants.(DECISION BY RTC)
Once this decision becomes final, let the decree and original certificate of title be issued in the
names of the applicants as follows:
Names
[addresses deleted]
Extent of Interest in
Lot Sgs-07-000307
1. GLORIA JARALVE
………74,940 square meters;
2. EDGARDO JARALVE
3. SERAFIN UY, JR.
4. SHELLA UY
5.NIMFA LAGNADA
6. PANTALEON SAYA-ANG
7. ATTY. DANILO DEEN AND ZENAIDA DEEN
8. ERIC ANTHONY DEEN
9. MA. EMMA RAMAS

10. STARGLAD INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
11. ANNIE TAN
12. TEOTIMO CABARRUBIAS
……… 5,000 square meters;
13. MA. EMMA RAMAS
14. JESSICA DACLAN
………10,000 square meters[.][40]
The RTC held that according to jurisprudence and under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
1[41] or the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 194241 and Republic Act No.
3872,[42] "alienable public land held by a possessor personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for the prescribed period of 30 years x x x is
converted to private property by mere lapse or completion of said period ipso jure, and without
need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property."[43]
The RTC also granted Starglad International and Development Corporation's application despite
the constitutional prohibition on acquisition of public lands of private corporations or
associations, explaining that such prohibition does not apply when the corporation's
predecessors-ininterest had satisfied the requirements in acquiring ownership over public lands
before such land was transferred to the corporation.[44]
The RTC stated that the private oppositors were not able to present any convincing evidence
and/or approved survey plan that clearly identified the portions of the subject property they
were claiming.[45] Likewise, the RTC held that the DENR Region VII failed to controvert the fact
that the subject property was within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
The RTC added that its witnesses did not even conduct an actual relocation or verification survey
of the subject property to determine its relative position to the timberland area. Thus, the RTC
stated, the DENR Region VII's conclusion with respect to the subject property's position was
inaccurate and unreliable.[46] In giving more credit to respondents' evidence, particularly the
CENRO Certificate, the RTC explained:
As against the approved plan of [the subject property] which has been thoroughly verified under
the Land Classification Map No. 2124 (Exhibit J-NAMRIA) and which merely conformed to the
actual verification/relocation surveys (Exhibits K, K-1) of the Land Evaluation Party of CENRO and
PENRO, specifically conducted by CENRO Chief of Survey Unit Engr. Celso Mayol and the Chief of
the Land Evaluation Party Anastacio Cabalejo and Forester Justicio Nahid (Exhibits L, L-1), the
relocation survey and map prepared by Engineer Icoy are simply undeserving of any weight.
DENR-7 Regional Executive Director Jeremias Dolino and Director Estanislao Galano of the
Regional Management Services of DENR-7, themselves, admitted that the task of determining
whether a parcel of land is within the alienable and disposable area of the public domain falls
within the Land Evaluation Party of the Forest Management Services of CENRO and PENRO of
the DENR. In this case, the CENRO/PENRO Land Evaluation Party headed by Forester Anastacio
Cabalejo, together with the Chief of the Survey Unit of CENRO, Engr. Celso Mayol, actually
conducted a segregation survey of Cadastral Lot 18590 on November 4, 1995 to determine the
alienable and disposable portion of Cadastral Lot 18590 and on the ground that they located
three (3) Forest Reserve (FR) monuments marked as FR 67, FR 69 and FR 70. Thus, after the said
verification survey, a survey plan was prepared by Engr. Celso Mayol and at the back portion
thereof, he certified to the following, x x x.
xxxx
The [CENRO Certificate], having been issued by the proper government officers tasked with the
duty of certifying as to land classifications in the region, the same should be given weight and
believed, especially so that the results of the actual ground survey of November 4, 1996 were
re-verified and re-checked upon the order of PENRO Isabelo Montejo.[47]
The CENRO Certificate relied on by the respondents and given much weight by the RTC reads as
follows:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICE
Cebu City
CENRO, Cebu City/Lands Verification
CARMELINA CUIZON, et al. (Cebu City) March 20, 1996
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that per projection and verification conducted by Forester Anastacio C.
Cabalejo, a tract of land lot No. 18590, Cebu Cadastre 12 Extension, situated at Quiot, Pardo,
Cebu City. As shown and described in the Plan at the back hereof, as surveyed by Geodetic
Engineer Celso P. Mayol for Carmelina Cuizon, et al. The same was found as hereunder
indicated:
Lot A
containing an area of SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY[-] SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIVE (737,
305) square meters, more or less, is within the Alienable and Disposable, block-1, land
classification project 3-C, per Map 2124 of Cebu City. Certified under Forestry Administrative
Order No. 4-642 dated July 31, 1957.
Lot B
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY[-]TWO (206,552)
square meters, more or less, is within the Timberland block-C, land classification project 3-C, per
Map 2124 of Cebu City. Certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-642 dated July 31,
1957.
This certification is issued upon the request of the interested party for the purpose of
ascertaining the land classification status only and does not [entitle] him/her preferential
priority rights of possession until determine[d] by competent authorities.
[signed]
[signed]
ILUMINADO C. LUCAS
ISABELO R. MONTEJO
Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer
Provincial Environment and
Officer Natural Resources
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SWORNSTATEMENT
I, Anastacio C. Cabalejo, forest officer, after having been duly sworn to under oath according to
the law do hereby depose and say that I personally projected and verified the area and the
result is the basis of the aforementioned certification.
[signed]
ANASTACIO C. CABALEJO
FORESTER III
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 12[th] day of April 1996, at Cebu City, Philippines.
[signed]
ILUMINADO C. LUCAS
Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer[48]
Aggrieved, the petitioner and three of the private oppositors appealed the decision of the RTC
to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78633, positing the following assignment of errors:
1. Raised by private oppositors Gertrudes N. Tabanas-Singson, Lourdes N. Tabanas, Francisco N.

Tabanas, and Vicente N. Tabanas (Heirs of Agaton Tabanas):
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPLICANTS HAVE A REGISTERABLE TITLE TO THE
PARCEL OF LAND HEREIN APPLIED FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF TITLE AND CONFIRMING
THE SAME AND ORDERING ITS REGISTRATION UNDER CA 141, AS AMENDED BY P.D. 1529 OVER
THE LAND DENOMINATED AS SGS-07-000307, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESPECTIVE
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ONCE THE DECISION BECOMES FINAL, THE
DECREE AND ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE BE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE APPLICANTS x x
x.[49]
2. Raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GRANTING [RESPONDENTS'] APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION

DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE AREA COVERED BY THE APPLICATION IS CLASSIFIED AS
TIMBERLAND AND THEREFORE UNALIENABLE.[50]
3. Raised by private oppositors Heirs of Ponciano Ybiernas:
Error No. 1 That the trial court erred in disposing all the area of Lot 18590 to the [respondents],
but none to the oppositors-applicants, contrary to the Magsaysay Credo: THAT THOSE WHO
HAVE LESS IN LIFE SHOULD HAVE MORE IN LAW;
Error No. 2 That under Art. 24 of the Civil Code, judges are enjoined by law to protect the
underdog, which provides as follows:
"Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness,
tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection."
Error No. 3 That none of the [respondents] have complied with the requirement as alluded to in
Error No. 1, which is the procurement of a permit from the government agency in charge of
issuance of such permit, to occupy a public land, duly endorsed by the DENR official, but
PONCIANO YBIERNAS has duly complied with all the requirements, plus possession of more than
30 years of the land applied for by him, and yet PONCIANO YBIERNAS, the poorest among all the
oppositorsapplicants, was not given a single square meter by the trial court. Hence this shows
that money talks.[51]
4. Raised by private oppositors Aznar Enterprises, Inc. and Aznar Brothers Realty Co.:
I.
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT [RESPONDENTS] HAVE
REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND DESCRIBED AS LOT SGS-07-000307,
PORTION OF LOT 18590 AND ORDERING ITS REGISTRATION IN THE NAMES OF THE APPLICANTS
UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141 AS AMENDED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529.
II.
THE LOWER COURT HAS GRAVELY ERRED IN INCLUDING THE PORTIONS OF 41.2092 HECTARES
OF THE LOT WHICH BELONGS TO THE APPELLANTS AZNAR ENTERPRISES, INC. AND AZNAR
BROTHERS REALTY CO., IN ITS DECISION AND ORDERING ITS REGISTRATION IN THE NAMES OF
THE [RESPONDENTS].
III.
THE LOWER COURT HAS GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FILED BY [THE] AZNARS
DATED MARCH 31, 1998, TO ALLOW THEM TO RELOCATE THE PORTION THEY CLAIMED OUT OF
THE AREA APPLIED FOR BY THE [RESPONDENTS].[52]
Finding for the respondents, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in its Decision dated June
28, 2006.
The Court of Appeals stated that the private oppositors failed to prove that the parcels of land
they were claiming were identical to the respective portions of the subject property the
respondents sought to register.[53]
As for the petitioner's appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC's findings that the
petitioner failed to controvert the fact that the subject property was within the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain. It added that it was a great blunder that petitioner's
own witness, for his failure to conduct an actual relocation or verification survey, could not even
categorically identify the relative position of the subject property to the timberland area.[54]
Undaunted, the Heirs of Agaton Tabanas,[55] Aznar Enterprises, Inc. and Aznar Brothers Realty
Co.,[56] and the petitioner[57] each moved to have the Court of Appeals reconsider its Decision.
The Court of Appeals, however, denied these motions on October 27, 2006 for lack of merit.[58]
The same oppositors filed their separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari before this Court, to
wit:
( SC)
Private oppositors Aznar Enterprises, Inc. and Aznar Brothers Realty Co.'s Petition for Review on
Certiorari was docketed as G.R. No. 175568 and was denied by this Court in its February 26,
2007 Resolution[59] for the following reasons:
as the petition was filed beyond the extended period pursuant to Section 5[a], Rule 56;
for failure to accompany the petition with a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true
copy of the assailed resolution in violation of Section[s] 4[d] and 5, Rule 45 in relation to Section
5[d], Rule 56; and
for insufficient or defective verification, the same being based "on knowledge and belief" in
violation of Section 4, Rule 7, as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-2-10-SC.
In any event, the petition failed to sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any
reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise by this
Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction and the issues raised therein are factual in
nature.
This Court likewise denied with finality the Motion for Reconsideration[60] of Aznar Enterprises,
Inc. and Aznar Brothers Realty Co. in a Resolution[61] dated July 2, 2007.
Private oppositors Heirs of Agaton Tabanas's Petition for Review on Certiorari[62] was docketed
as G.R. No. 175397 and in a Resolution[63] dated March 14, 2007, was denied by this Court "for
[the Heirs'] failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error
in the challenged decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise of this Court's discretionary
appellate jurisdiction[,]" and for raising issues, which were factual in nature.
This Court similarly denied with finality the Heirs of Agaton Tabanas's Motion for
Reconsideration[64] in a Resolution dated June 18, 2007.[65]
On October 1, 2007, this Court denied for lack of merit the Heirs of Agaton Tabanas's motion to
file a second motion for reconsideration, and added that no further pleadings would be
entertained.[66]
The Petition for Review on Certiorari[67] now before us is the one filed by the petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, which presented the following ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE JUDGMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE SUBJECT LOTS ARE ALIENABLE LAND DESPITE THE CLEAR
EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.[68]
The petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals ignored the longstanding rule that in land
registration proceedings, the applicants have the burden of overcoming the presumption that
the land sought to be registered is inalienable land of the public domain when it affirmed the
RTC's decision to grant the respondents' application for original registration over the subject
property despite their failure to prove that it was alienable and disposable.[69]
The petitioner argues that the CENRO Certificate the respondents relied on was erroneously
issued; thus, it did not afford them any vested right. The petitioner adds: "[a]t any rate, being
the government department charged with the duty to conduct survey and classification of lands,
the DENR's recall of the certification that the subject [property] is alienable and disposable
should have been accorded respect."[70]
The respondents, in their Comment,[71] contend that the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, that the subject property falls within the alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain, is duly supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, they asseverate, that
the issue posed by the petitioner is a factual issue, which had been thoroughly discussed and
resolved by the lower courts.
Issue
The crux of the controversy in the case at bar boils down to whether the grant of respondents'
application for registration of title to the subject property was proper under the law and
jurisprudence.
This Court's Ruling
This Court finds the petition to be meritorious.
Procedural Issue: Nature of Issue
At the outset, this Court would like to address respondents' concern that the petition involves
an issue purely factual in nature; thus, it cannot be subject of a petition for review under Rule
45.
This Court, in New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.), Inc. v. Abad,[72] reiterated the distinction
between a question of law and a question of fact, viz:
We reiterate the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of law
exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to
a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. (Citation omitted.)
The petitioner herein is not calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of
the evidence presented.[73] What it wants to know is whether the lower courts correctly
applied the law and jurisprudence when they granted the respondents' application for
registration of title to the subject property.
Main Issue: Nature and Character
of Subject Property
Going to the merits of the case, this Court agrees with the petitioner that the respondents failed
to prove in accordance with law that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain. The Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141, until this day,
is the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain, except for timber and mineral lands. "Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our
Constitution, land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase, grant,
or any other mode recognized by law, belongs to the State as part of the public domain."[74]
Thus, it is indispensable for a person claiming title to a public land to show that his title was
acquired through such means.[75]
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,[76]
provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12,
1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree, likewise
provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Based on the foregoing parameters, applicants for registration under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 must sufficiently establish the following:
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[77]
Land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It must be proved.[78] To prove that

the subject property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain, respondents
presented the CENRO Certificate dated March 20, 1996 signed by CENR Officer Iluminado C.
Lucas and PENR Officer Isabelo R. Montejo, and verified by Forester Anastacio C. Cabalejo.
However, this Court, in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,[79] ruled that a CENRO or PENRO
Certification is not enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. (Emphasis ours.)
Although the survey and certification were done in accordance with Forestry Administrative
Order No. 4-642, issued by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources declaring
certain portions of the public domain situated in Cebu City as alienable and disposable, an actual
copy of such classification, certified as true by the legal custodian of the official records, was not
presented in evidence. This was a crucial mistake. What was presented was the certification[80]
of Nicomedes R. Armilla, the Land Evaluation Party Coordinator, that the Cebu CENRO had on
file a certified photocopy of the administrative order. In fact, one of the private oppositors
objected to its submission in evidence for violating the best evidence rule.[81]
Moreover, DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20 dated May 30, 1988,[82] delineated the
functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under Section G(1) of the above DAO,
CENROs issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. For those
falling above 50 hectares, the issuance of such certificates is within the function of the PENROs,
as per Section F(1) of the same DAO. This delineation, with regard to the offices authorized to
issue certificates of land classification status, was retained in DAO No. 38[83] dated April 19,
1990.[84]
In the case at bar, the subject property has an area of 731,380 square meters or 73.138
hectares. Clearly, under DAO No. 38, series of 1990, the subject property is beyond the authority
of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.[85]
It is undisputed that while PENR Officer Montejo's signature appears on the CENRO Certificate, it
was under the CENRO that the survey of the subject property was conducted. The certificate
was likewise issued under the CENRO, and not the PENRO. The respondents admit and even
emphasize that it was the CENRO that was involved in the conduct of the survey and issuance of
the certification with respect to the land classification status of the subject property.
In Republic v. Medida,[86] this Court said:
This Court x x x holds that the alienability and disposability of land are not among the matters
that can be established by mere admissions, or even the agreement of parties. The law and
jurisprudence provide stringent requirements to prove such fact. Our Constitution, no less,
embodies the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. The courts are then empowered, as we
are duty-bound, to ensure that such ownership of the State is duly protected by the proper
observance by parties of the rules and requirements on land registration.
Unfortunately, respondents were not able to discharge the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land they sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 28, 2006 Decision and October 27, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78633, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
respondents' application for registration and issuance of title to Lot SGS-07- 000307, Cebu Cad.
12 Extension, Barangay Quiot, Cebu City, in Land Registration Case No. 1421-N/LRA Rec. No. N-
67272 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20 is accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, CJ., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 191667 Case Digest
G.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013
Land Bank of the Philippines
vs Eduardo M. Cacayuran
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe
Facts:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari of the CA affirming the RTC in declaring the nullity of
the loan agreements entered into by Land Bank and the Municipality of Agoo, La Union.
Agoo SB passed a certain resolution to implement a redevelopment plan to redevelop the Agoo
Public Plaza. To finance the plan, SB passed a resolution authorizing then Maor Eriguel to obtain
a loan from Land Bank, incidental to it, mortgaged a portion of the plaza as collateral. It has also
authorized the assignment of a portion if the IRA and monthly income in favor of Land Bank to
secure the payment. 10 Kiosks were made at the plaza, then were rented out. Later, a
commercial center on the Plaza lot was built too, with a loan from Land Bank, posting the same
securities as the first loan.
The commercial loan was opposed by some residents of the municipality embodied in a
manifesto launched through a signature campaign by the residents and Cacayuran. Invoking his
right as taxpayer, Cacayuran filed a complaint against the officials and Land bank assailing the
validity of the loans on the ground that the Plaza lot used as collateral is property of public
dominion and therefore beyond the commerce of man.
RTC Ruling: declared the nullity of the subject loans, saying that the oans were passed in a highly
irregular manner, as such, the Municipality is not bound by the same.
Aggrieved, Land Bank filed notice of appeal.
Ruling of CA: affirmed with modification the RTC's ruling, excluding the Vice Mayor from any
personal liability arising from the subject loans. Cacayuran has locus standi as resident and
taxpayer in the municipality and the issue involves public interest. The plaza cannot be a valid
collateral to a loans for it is of public dominion.
Land Bank filed this instant petition.
Issues:
(1) whether Cacayuran has locus standi (2) whether the subject resolutions were validly passed
and (3) whether the subject loans are ultra vires. [The doctrine in the law of corporations that
holds that if a corporation enters into a contract that is beyond the scope of its corporate
powers, the contract is illegal.]
SC Ruling:
(1) Taxpayer is allowed to sue if: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a
political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is
committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.
In the case, the proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds
by the Municipality’s receipt thereof. Funds coming from private sources become impressed
with the characteristics of public funds when they are under official custody. Public plaza
belongs to public dominion, Cacayuran need not to be a privy to the loans, as long as taxes are
involved, people have a right to question the contracts entered into by the government.
(2) While ordinances are laws and possess a general and permanent character, resolutions are
merely declarations of the sentiment or opinion of a law making body on a specific matter and
are temporary in nature. As opposed to ordinances, "no rights can be conferred by and be
inferred from a resolution." In this accord, it cannot be denied that the SB violated Section
444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC altogether. Noticeably, the passage of the Subject Resolutions was also
tainted with other irregularities, such as (1) the SB’s failure to submit the Subject Resolutions to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union for its review contrary to Section 56 of the LGC; and
(2) the lack of publication and posting in contravention of Section 59 of the LGC.
(3) Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a corporation is
created as defined by the law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred
upon it by law.43 There are two (2) types of ultra vires acts. There is a distinction between an
act utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and the irregular exercise of a
basic power under the legislative grant in matters not in themselves jurisdictional. The former
are ultra vires in the primary sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only in a secondary sense
which does not preclude ratification or the application of the doctrine of estoppel in the interest
of equity and essential justice.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the Subject Loans belong to the first
class of ultra vires acts deemed as void. Records disclose that the said loans were executed by
the Municipality for the purpose of funding the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial
center pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan. However, the conversion of the said plaza is
beyond the Municipality’s jurisdiction considering the property’s nature as one for public use
and thereby, forming part of the public dominion. Accordingly, it cannot be the object of
appropriation either by the State or by private persons. Nor can it be the subject of lease or any
other contractual undertaking.
Hinunangan (Municipality of) v. Director of Lands [G.R. No. 7054. January 20, 1913.] First
Division, Moreland (J): 5 concur
Facts: Land in question is situated in Hinunangan, Leyte, and contains an area of 10, 328.8 sq. m.
it is bounded on the northwest by the maritime zone; on the southeast by North America Street;
on the southwest by Manalili Street, and on the northwest by San Isidro Labrador Street. Upon
this lot is built a stone fort which has stood there from time immemorial and was in times past
used as a defense against the invasion of the Moros. Petitioners applied for the registration of
the title to the lands so described. The Court of Land Registration ordered said registration in
favor of the petitioners. The Insular Government appealed as to the registration of the title of
one of the parcels of land only.
Property, 2003 ( 88 )
Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in relation to the parcel of land described, and
dismissing the petition as to that parcel of land; but affirming the judgment in all other respects.
1. Defense of national territory rests upon the state and not upon towns and villages The
defense of the national territory against invasion by foreign enemies rested upon the state and
not upon the towns and villages and for this reason all of the defenses were constructed by the
National Government.
2. Fortresses and its land property of the State; Legal anchors In volume 2, book 3, title 7, law 1
of the Laws of the Indies, it was stated that “we command that all the ground roundabout the
castles and fortresses be clear and unoccupied, and if any building is erected within 300 paces of
the wall or other building so strong that ever at a greater distance it would prejudice the
defenses, it shall be torn down, and the owner of the same shall be paid from the Royal Treasury
for the damages caused him.” Book 4, title 7, law 12, reads as “We order that, for the security
and defense of the cities as is now assured by the castles and fortresses, no building shall be
erected within 300 paces of the walls or stockades of the new cities.” Article 399 of the Civil
Code, in part, provides that “that which belongs privately to the state, which is not for public use
and which is destined for the public good or to increase the national riches, such as walls,
fortresses and other constructions for the defense of the country, and the mines as long as no
concession in regard to them is made” is public property. Article 341 of the Civil Code provides
that “public property, when it ceases to be used for the public use and which is destined for the
necessities of the defense of the country, becomes a part of the property of the state.” It is clear
thus that the fortress in question was erected for the national defense and was a part of the
property of the state destined and used for that purpose; and as a result, the land which it
stands on is also dedicated to that purpose.
3. Fortress not being in use does not deprive the state of its ownership The fact that said fortress
may not have been used for many years for the purposes for which it was originally built does
not of necessity deprive the state of its ownership therein. The Civil Code provides that, when
the fortress ceases to be used for the purpose for which it was constructed, it becomes the
property of the state in what may be called the private sense.
4. Presumption of grant by the state to municipality may be invoked only is property is used
distinctly for public purposes The Court has ruled where the municipality has occupied lands
distinctly for public purposes (such as for the municipal court house, the public school, the
public market, or other necessary municipal building) and in the absence of proof to the
contrary, presume a grant from the state in favor of the municipality. Still, the rule may be
invoked only as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes; and cannot be applied
against the state when occupied for any other purpose. In the present case, the evidence does
not disclose that the municipality has used the land for purposes distinctly public, but has that it
has exercised acts of ownership over the land by permitting it to be occupied and consenting to
the erection of private houses thereon.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5011 December 17, 1952
CATALINO GALANG and OTRO, demandantes-apelados,
vs.
MANUEL UYTIEPO, demandado,
PEDRO GAMBOA, mocionante-apelante.
Los hechos aparecen relacionados en la decision del Tribunal.
Sres. Amado B. Pareño y Geronimo R. Flores en representacion de los apelados.
Sres. Hilado, Coruña, Lalisan y Jose G. Arroyo en representacion del apelante.
PABLO, J.:
En 16 de mayo de 1949 Catalino Galang y Micaela Aggabao presentaron una demanda contra
Manuel Uytiepo para recobrar la posesion del lote No. 2305 del Catastro de Escalante, Negros
Occidental, con daños y perjuicios, causa civil No. 1328. Vista la causa, el Juzgado dicto sentencia
en 6 de febrero de 1951, condenando al demandado a entregar a los demandantes la posesion
del lote con danos y perjuicios, montantes a P46,398.70 y costas. Contra esta decision ha
apelado el demandado.
Los demandantes presentaron una mocion ex-parte pidiendo el nombramiento de un

depositario, y en 10 de marzo del mismo año el Juzgado nombro depositario al abogado
Geronimo R. Flores. En 31 de mayo el depositario presento una mocion urgente en la que alega
que Pedro Gamboa, reclamando ser arrendatario del lote, mando a la centra moler caña
cosechada en unas siete hectareas del lote, y que el acto cometido por el no solamente
constituye delito sino tambien desacato al Juzgado, y pidio que fuera ordenado a comparecer
para que exponga sus razones por que no debia ser condenado por desacato. En 1.º de junio
Pedro Gamboa presento una mocion de aplazamiento aleganto que, como Secretario-Tesorero
de "The Planters Association of the Central Azucarera de Danao", tenia que estar presente en la
junta que se celebraria al dia siguiente, 2 de junio; dicha mocion fue denegada en dicho dia por
el Juez Teodoro, quien ordeno su arresto. En 7 de junio Pedro Gamboa presento una mocion
urgente pidiendo la revocacion de la orden de arresto por la razonde que el Juzgado no habia
adquirido jurisdiccion sobre el porque no era parte en la causa No. 1328 en que se expedio dicha
orden. Como en la vista de esta mocion, senalada para el 7 de junio, el Hon. Juez Teodoro, que
expidio la orden de arresto, estaba en Manila, el Hon. Juez Enriquez, que presidic la 3.a Sala del
mismo Juzgado, ordeno la libertad provisional del mocionante bajo fianza de P500. El 12 de
junio, el Hon. Juez Teodoro ordeno la comparecencia del apelante en 16 del mismo mes para
manifestar sus razones por que no debia ser condenado por desacato. Despues de oir las
explicaciones de Pedro Gamboa, el Hon. Juez Teodoro dicto una orden, fechada en 25 de junio,
cuya parte dispositiva es la siguiente:
WHEREFORE, this court fines Pedro Gamboa guilty of contempt of court, and sentences him to
pay a fine of P200; he is hereby directed to pay said amount to the clerk of court within 24 hours
from the receipt of this order; Pedro Gamboa is hereby ordered to make arrangement with the
Central Azucarera del Danao to segregate from the sugar milled and registered in his name
within 24 hours from receipt of their order, 60 per cent of 800 piculs of sugar in the form of
quedans or warehouse receipts in the name of the receiver, Geronimo R. Flores; the
management of the Central Azucarera del Danao through the committee on distribution of cars
(reparto) is hereby ordered to give facilities to the receiver to mill the remaining standing
sugarcanes in the property under receivership in order that said sugarcanes may not be
damages or destroyed if not milled on time. The Provincial Fiscal is hereby ordered to
investigate charges for theft filed by the receiver and to file the corresponding criminal action
against Pedro Gamboa, as the facts of the investigation may warrant
Pedro Gamboa apelo contra esta orden.
El 28 de junio el depositario presento una mocion urgente pidiendo la condena del apelante por
desacato por no haber cumplido la orden del Juzgado del 25 de junio. En 30 del mismo mes
Pedro Gamboa presento una mocion urgente pidiendo que se fijase la fianza de apelacion, con
la condicion de que si se decidia en contra suya se obligaria a cumplir la orden. Actuando sobre
las dos peticiones, el Juzgadi, en 30 del mismo mes, dicto una orden requiriendo al apelante que
compareciera en 3 de julio a las 8:30 de la mañana para exponer sus razones por que no debe
ser condenado por desacato otra vez. Cuando Pedro Gamboa comparecio en el dia fijado, el
Hon. Juez ordeno verbalmente al Sheriff de la provincia su arresto y detencion en la carcel
provincial hasta que cumpla la orden del 25 de junio, y acto seguido dicto otra orden
permitiendo la apelacion en cuanto a la parte que la imponia P200 de multa; pero denego su
apelacion en cuanto a la parte en que se le requeria entregar al depositario Geronimo R. Flores
el 60 per ciento de los 800 picos de azucar en la Central Azucarera de Danao.
En virtud de la orden verbal del Juzgado, Pedro Gamboa fue recluido en la carcel provincial; en la
tarde del mismo dia Gamboa presento una mocion de reconsideracion, que no fue actuada por
el Juez, por cuyo motivo en 5 de julio presento ante este Tribunal un recurso de certiorari con
interdicto y habeas corpus (G. R. No. L-4893), pidiendo una orden de interdicto prohibitorio
preliminar; en 7 del mismo mes este Tribunal expidio la orden solicitada, y visto el recurso, este
Tribunal, en 13 de mayo de 1952, declaro nulas las ordenes del Hon. Juez Teodoro de 3 de julio
de 1951, haciendo definitiva la orden de interdicto preliminar.
La cuestion a resolver es la apelacion de Pedro Gamboa contra la orden del Hon. Juez Teodoro
de 25 de junio.
Los hechos que dieron lugar a que dicho juez dictase la condena de desacato son: que el
depositario envio una carta a la Central Azucarera de Danao y a Manuel Uytiepo dandoles
cuenta de su nombramiento como tal depositario; que no constituyo en la oficina de la Central
Azucarera de Danao para pedir que le proporcionasen carros suficientes para la transportacion
de caña para la molienda; que en dicha ocasion el depositario se encontro con Pedro Gamboa,
quien le informo que el era arrendatario del lote No. 2305, y que seria injusto que el depositario
mandase moler la caña, pues el habia gastado mucho dinero en el cultivo y abono del terreno;
que el depositario le dijo que no podian hacer ningun arreglo, porque su obligacion era tomar
posesion del terreno y recibir las rentas; que Pedro Gamboa, sin el conocimiento ni
consentimiento del depositario, mando moler la caña que cosecho en unas siete hectareas del
terreno.
Si es verdad la contencion de Pedro Gamboa que habia obtenido el arrendamiento del terreno
antes de la presentacion de la demanda en la presente causa por medio del Exhibit "1" (cuya
admision fue denegada por el Juez en la vista dela mocion), la presuncion — a menos que se
pruebe lo contrario — es que era poseedor legal del mismo y tenia derecho a cosechar sus
frutos, o moler la caña sembrada por el.
La Regla 39, articulo 44 (b), dispone que la sentencia dictada por un tribunal en Filipinas
respecto a la materia sobre la cual recayo es "concluyente entre las partes y sus
derechohabientes por titulo subsiguiente al comienzo de la accion . . . que litiguen sobre la
misma cosa, bajo el mismo titulo y en la misma capacidad." Pedro Gamboa, segun, el obtuvo el
arrendamiento antes de la presentacion de la accion.lawphil.net
El la presente causa entre Catalino Galang y Micaela Aggabao, demandantes, contra Manuel
Uytiepo, demandado, Pedro Gamboa no ha sido parte; por tanto, la sentencia afecta y uytiepo
solamente y no puede afectar a Gamboa. En causa de desahucio o sobre posesion de terreno, la
accion es in personam y, como tal, solamente es obligatoria la sentencia para las partes y no
para los extranos. Si una persona, que no fue parte en la causa, es poseedora de buena fe de la
finca en cuestion, la sentencia dictada en dicha causa no puede ejecutarse validamente contra
ella. Omaña contra Gatulayao, 140 Off. Gaz., 2277; Santiago contra El Sheriff de Manila, 244 Off.
Gaz., 863; Gozon contra Juez de la Rosa, 344 Off. Gaz., 1225.
La decision dictada en esta causa no ordena a Pedro Gamboa a que entregue los productos del
terreno a los demandantes o al depositario; ordena solamente a Uytiepo que entregue a los
demandantes la posesion del lote y que pague a los mismos la cantidad de P46,398.70 en
concepto de daños y perjuicios, con las costas; no contiene ninguna orden que prohiba a Pedro
Gamboa cosechar la cana que sembro en el terreno. Pedro Gamboa no puede cometer desacato
por el simple hecho de cosechar, sin el conocimiento ni consentimiento del depositario, la cana
sembrada en un terreno legalmente arrendado por el. De acuerdo con la doctrina enunciada en
las tres causas citadas, la sentencia contra Uytiepo no obliga a Pedro Gamboa. Consecuencia
forzosa: (1) Gamboa no puede ser lanzado del terreno; (2) no puede ordenarsele que entregue
los frutos del mismo. Carece de base, por tanto, la condena de desacato impuesta a el y la orden
de que entregue al depositario el 60 por ciento de los 800 picos de azucar, que equivale en
esencia a una ejecucion. Los demandantes deben probar, en un juicio ordinario y no en una
mocion de desacato, que tienen mejor derecho que Pedro Gamboa sobre el 60 por ciento de los
800 picos de azucar o sobre el producto liquido del terreno. Ordenar a Pedro Gamboa que
entregue al depositario dicha cantidad de azucar sin permitirsele apelar siquiera, es privarle del
producto de su trabajo (que es parte de sus bienes) sin el debido proceso legal: es una
expoliacion judicial sin precedentes.1awphil.net
Se revoca la orden apelada con costas contra los apelados.
Paras, Pres., Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo y Labrador, JJ., estan
conformes.
Footnotes
1 73 Phil., 66.

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China Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals G.R. NO. 140687

November 20, 2011

ISSUE: Who is the owner of the building?

ART. 415. The following are immovable property:

Whether the machinery is considered a real or personal property.

The machinery is considered personal property.

TUMALAD vs. VICENCIO, G.R. No. L-30173, September 30, 1971

PIANSAY V. DAVID, G.R. No. L-19468, October 30, 1964

W/N the chattel mortgage constituted in favor of Mrs. Uy Kim is valid.

Regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a chattel mortgage on a house, as between

MAKATI LEASING AND FINANCE CORP. V. WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS, INC.

Whether the dryer is an immovable property

whether or not the machineries and equipments were personal in nature.

However, a unilateral Cancellation of Deed of Continuing Chattel Mortgage on Inventory of

Guardhouse, Parking Shed, Elevated Guard

Post and other amenities

Pollution Tank Nos. 1 and 2.

Reserve Water Tank and Swimming Pool

Waste Water Treatment Tank

Elevated Concrete Water Tank

And other Improvements listed in Annex "A"

Various Fuel, Water Tanks and Pumps

D. Material Handling Equipment

Paper Plant No. 3

The CA affirmed the Order.

The petition is GRANTED.

Whether or not the PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services is a personal

G.R. No. L-17870 September 29, 1962

CALTEX PHIL INC. VS BOARD OF ASSESMENT APPEALS 114 SCRA 297

The said machines and equipment are considered real property.

The Code contains the following definitions in its section 3:

k) Improvements — is a valuable addition m

m) Machinery — shall embrace machines, mechanical contrivances, instruments, appliances and

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS

114 SCRA 273

PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY V. JARQUE

NVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER V. RAMIREZ (GR 18700, 26 September 1922)

Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property

2. Description of mortgage property sufficient The description contained in the document is

Bachrach Motor Co v. Lacson Ledesma (1937)

G.R. No. L-42462 August 31, 1937

Lessons Applicable: Quasi-negotiable Character of Certificate of Stock (Corporate Law)

January 30, 1929: Bachrach field a gen. denial

CFI: favored PNB

CFI: favored Bachrach

HELD: YES. AFIRMED

This is a consolidated petition

assailing the decision of the Court of

Appeals (CA). Petitioners and the

private respondent are registered

owners of neighboring parcels of

land wherein between the lots is a

low-level strip of land with stagnant

body of water. Whenever there is a

storm or heavy rain, the water

therein would flood thereby causing

damage to houses of the Polinars

prompting them to build a concrete

about 3meters from their house and

riprapped the soil in that portion.

The Useros claimed ownership of the

strip, demanded the halt of the