Explain

Proof beyond reasonable doubt

Proof beyond reasonable doubt – which is required for conviction of an accused in criminal
case, means that which is the logical and inevitable result of the evidence on record, exclusive
of any other consideration, of the moral certainty of the guilt of the accused or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required (People vs. Bacalso, 191 SCRA 557 [1991]) .

Preponderance of evidence

Preponderance of evidence – which is the degree of evidence required in civil cases, means
that which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to
it. It is considered as synonymous with the terms “greater weight of evidence” or “greater
weight of credible evidence.” It means probably the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto
(Republic vs. CA, 204 SCRA 160 [1991]) .

Substantial evidence

Substantial evidence – is that which is required to reach a conclusion in administrative

proceedings or to establish a fact before administrative e and quasijudicial bodies. Substantial
evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence
on record, direct or circumstantial (Velasquez vs. Nery, 211 SCRA 28 [1992]). It means more
than a scintilla but may be somewhat less than preponderance, even if other reasonable minds
might conceivably opine otherwise (Manalo vs. Roldan - Confessor, supra) .
Clear and convincing evidence

Clear and convincing evidence – refers to that measure or degree of proof which will produce
in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be
established; it is more than preponderance but not to the extent of such moral certainty as is
required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5 th Ed.,
1979). It is often said that to overcome a disputable presumption of law, clear and convincing
evidence is required. For instance, to contradict the presumption of validity and regularity in
favor of a notarial or public document, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and
more than preponderant (Yturalde vs. Azurin, 2 8 S C R A 4 0 7 [ 1 9 6 9 ] ) . The presumption
that law enforcers have regularly performed their duties requires that proof of frame-up, which
can be made with ease, must be strong, clear and convincing ( P e o ple v s . Tranca, 235 SCRA
455 [1994]) . An accused who invokes self-defense must prove it by clear and convincing
evidence (People vs. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700 [1990]) .

Can Rules of Evidence be used in non-judicial proceedings?

The rules of evidence, being parts of the Rules of Court, apply only to judicial proceedings
(Sec. 1 Rule 128)
*Sec.4. In what cases not applicable. – These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land
registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceeding, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient.
Requisites for admissibility of evidence

(1) In order that evidence may be admissible, two requisites must concur, namely: (a) That it
is relevant to the issue; and (b) That it is competent, that is, that it does not belong to that class
of evidence which is excluded by the law or the rules. (2) Admissibility is determined, first, by
relevancy—an affair of logic and not of law; second, but only indirectly, by the law of evidence
which, in strictness, only declares whether matter which is logically probative is excluded
(Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 Harv. L. Rev. 13 - 14) . (3) Relevant evidence –
evidence which has a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence; evidence which tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue.

Ex. Not applicable in Administrative bodies, CSC, Petition for naturalization, labor cases

Distinction between Best Evidence and parol Evidence

Best Evidence Rule Parol Evidence Rule

1. Establishes a preference for the Presupposes the original is available
original document over secondary evidence
thereof.
2. Precludes the admission of secondary Precludes the admission of other evidence to
evidence if the original document is prove the terms of a document other than the
available. contents of the document itself for the
purpose of varying the terms of the writing.
3. Can be invoked by any litigant to an Can be invoked only by the parties to the
action whether or not said litigant is a party document and their successors in interest.
to the document involved.
Applies to all forms of writing Applies only to written contracts and wills.

XIII.

Police officers arrested A in a buy-bust operation and confiscated from him 10 sachets
of shabu and several marked genuine peso bills worth P5,000.00 used as the buy-bust money
during the buy-bust operation.

At the trial of A for violation of R.A. No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act
of 2002), the Prosecution offered in evidence, among others, photocopies of the confiscated
marked genuine peso bills. The photocopies were offered to prove that A had engaged at the
time of his arrest in the illegal selling of dangerous drugs.

Invoking the Best Evidence Rule, Atty. B, the defense counsel, objected to the
admissibility of the photocopies of the confiscated marked genuine peso bills.
 Should the trial judge sustain the objection of the defense counsel? Briefly explain your
answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the trial judge should not sustain the objection that invokes the best evidence rule.

The Supreme Court has held that the best evidence rule applies only to documentary
evidence, not to object or testimonial evidence.

Here the marked money is object not documentary evidence since it is being offered to
prove not its contents but its existence and use in the buy-bust operation. [People v. Tandoy,
192 SCRA 28 (1990)]

XV.

In an attempt to discredit and impeach a Prosecution witness in a homicide case, the

defense counsel called to the stand a person who had been the boyhood friend and next-door
neighbor of the Prosecution witness for 30 years. One question that the defense counsel asked
of the impeaching witness was: "Can you tell this Honorable Court about the general
reputation of the prosecution witness in your community for aggressiveness and
violent tendencies?"

Would you, as the trial prosecutor, interpose your objection to the question of the
defense counsel? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, I as the trial prosecutor, would interpose my objection to defense counsel’s question
on the ground of improper impeachment.

Under the Law on Evidence, an adverse party’s witness may be properly impeached by
reputation evidence provided that it is to the effect that the witness’s general reputation for
honesty, truth, or integrity was bad. [S11 R132] The reputation must only be on character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness. [Cordial v. People, 166 SCRA 17]

AA, a twelve-year-old girl, while walking alone met BB, a teenage boywho befriended her.
Later, BB brought AA to a nearby shanty where he raped her. The Information for rape filed
against BB states: “On or about October 30, 2015, in the City of S.P. and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, a minor, fifteen (15) years old with lewd
design and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with AA, a minor, twelve (12) years old
against the latter’s will and consent.” At the trial, the prosecutor called to the winess stand AA
as his first witness and manifested that he be allowed to ask leading questions in conducting
his direct examination pursuant to the Rule on the Examination of a Child Witness. BB’s
counsel objected on the ground that the prosecutor has not conducted a competency
examination on the witness, a requirement before the rule cited can be applied in the case. (A)
Is BB’s counsel correct? (3%) In order to obviate the counsel’s argument on the competency
of AA as prosecution witness, the judge motu propio conducted his voir dire examination on
AA. (B) Was the action taken by the judge proper? (2%) After the prosecution had rested its
case, BB’s counsel filed with leave a demurrer to evidence, seeking the dismissal of the case
on the ground that the prosecutor failed to present any evidence on BB’s minority as alleged in
the Information. Answer: (A) No. BB’s counsel is not correct. Every child is presumed
qualified to be a witness (Sec. 6, RECW) . To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed
by a child, the burden of proof

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lies on the party challenging his competence. Here, AA, a 12-year old child witness who is
presumed to be competent, may be asked leading questions by the prosecutor inconducting his
direct examination pursuant to the RECW and the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (Peopl
e vs. Santos, GR No. 171452, 10/17/2008) . (B) Yes. The judge may motu propio conduct his
voir dire examination on AA. Under the Rules on Examination of Child Witness, the court
shall conduct a competency examination of a child, motu propio or on motion of a party, when
it finds that substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember,
communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appropriate the duty to tell the truth in court
(Sec. 6, AM No. 006 - 07 - SC) .

2003 Bar: X and Y were charged with murder. Upon application of the prosecutor, Y was
discharged from the Information to be utilized as a state witness. The prosecutor presented Y
as witness but forgot to state the purpose of his testimony much less offer it in evidence. Y
testified that he and X conspired to kill the victim but it was X who actually shot the victim.
The testimony of Y was the only material evidence establishing the guilt of X. Y was
thouroughly cross-examined by the defense counsel. After the prosecution rested its case, the
defense filed a motion for demurrer to evidence based on the following grounds: (6%) The
testimony should be excluded because its purpose was not initially stated and it was not
formally offered in evidence as required by Section 34, Rule 132. Rule on the motion. Answer:
The demurrer to evidence must be denied because: The testimony of Y should not be excluded
because the defense counsel did not object to his testimony despite the fact that the prosecutor
forgot to state its purpose or offer it in evidence. Moreover, the defense counsel thoroughly
cross-examined Y and thus waived the objection.

For over a year, Joella had been estranged from her husband Jaime because of the latter’s
suspicion that she was having an affair with Jpse, a barangay kagawad who lived in nearby San
Pablo City. Joella lived in the meantime with her sister in Gina. One day, the house of Joella’s
sister inexplicably burned almost to the ground. Joella and her sister were caught inside the
house but Joella survived as she fled in time, while her sister tried to save belongings and was
caught inside when the house collapsed. As she was running away from the burning house,
Joella was surprised to see her husband also running away from the scene. Dr. Cris, Jaime’s
psychiatrist who lived near the burned house and whom Jaime medically consulted after the
fire, also saw Jaime in the vicinity some minutes before the fire. Coincidentally, Fr. Abraham,
the parish priest who regularly hears Jaime’s confession and who heard it after the fire, also
encountered him not too far away from the burned house. Jaime was charged with arson and at
his trial, the prosecution moved to introduce the testimonies of Joella, the doctor and the priest-
confessor, who all saw Jaime at the vicinity of the fire at about the time of the fire.

May the testimony of Joella be allowed over the objection of Jaime?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. Joella may not be allowed to testify against Jaime. Under the
Marital Disqualification Rule, during their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other
or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (Section 22, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence). The
foregoing exceptions cannot apply since it only extends to a criminal case of one spouse against
the other or the latter’s direct ascendants or descendants. Clearly, Joella is not the offended
party and her sister is not her direct ascendant or descendant for her to fall within the exception.

b. May the testimony of Dr. Cris, Jaime’s psychiatrist, be allowed over Jaime’s objection?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: B) Yes. The testimony of Jaime’s psychiatrist may be allowed. The
privileged communication contemplated under Sec. 24 (c) Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
involves only persons authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. It does not include
a Psychiatrist. Moreover, the privileged communication applies only in civil cases and not in a
criminal case for arson. Besides, the subject of the testimony of Dr. Cris was not in connection
with the advice or treatment given by him to Jaime, or any information he acquired in attending
to Jaime in a professional capacity. The testimony of Dr. Cris is limited only to what he
perceived at the vicinity of the fire and at about the time of the fire.

May the testimony of Fr. Abraham the priest-confessor, be allowed over Jaime’s objection?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: C) Yes. The Priest can testify over the objection of Jaime. The
disqualification requires that the same were made pursuant to a religious duty enjoined in the
course of discipline of the sect or denomination to which they belong and must be confidential
and penitential in character, e.g., under the seal of confession. (Sec. 24 (d) Rule 130, Rules on
Evidence) Here, the testimony of Fr. Abraham was not previously subject of a confession of
Walter or an advice given by him to Walter in his professional character. The testimony was
merely limited to what Fr. Abraham perceived “at the vicinity of the fire and at about the time
of the fire.” Hence, Fr. Abraham may be allowed to testify

Discuss the "chain of custody" principle with respect to evidence seized under R.A. 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

In prosecutions involving narcotics and other illegal substances, the substance itself constitutes
part of the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment
of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the
evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized
drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court. (People
vs Sitco, G.R. No. 178202, May 14, 2010, Velasco, Jr., J.). Ergo, the existence of the dangerous
drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction. (People v. De Guzman Y Danzil, G.R. No.
186498, March 26, 2010 Nachura J.).

The failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the seized items has
been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is enough to engender
reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused (People vs. De Guzman Y Danzil).

Nonetheless, non-compliance with the procedure shall not render void and invalid the seizure
and custody of the drugs when: (1) such non-compliance is attended by justifiable grounds;
and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team. There must be proof that these two (2) requirements were met before such
non-compliance may be said to fall within the scope of the proviso. (People v. Dela Cruz, G.R.
No. 177222, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 273).