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Such a conception is bound to conflict with the mani- which they, like ali sciences and also philosophy, origi-
festly "transcendental" project of Sein und Zeit to artic- nale. This genus ofsciences currently includes COMMU-
ulate the general, i.e., the presumably timeless and tran- NICOLOGY, ECONOMICS, ETHNOLOGY, GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY,
shistorical, structures of human existence. This leads POLITIC AL SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY, and SOCIOLOGY as sin-
Heidegger, not long after the publication ofthat work, gle disciplines, but human or cultural sciences are also
to what most interpreters see as an abandonment of increasingly included in multidisciplines such as EHI-
phenomenology, at least in any form that could appear NIC STUDIES and those re}ated to ECOLOGY, FEMINISM,
continuous with Husserl or even with the phenomen- RELIGION, and TECHNOLOGY. The rise of sciences of this
ological tradition in FRANCE. And it may be largely the kind, which ha ve their prehistories in the medieval and
influence ofthis !ater Heidegger in France that leads to ancient worlds and were accelerated through the ex-
the decline of phenomenology in that country during panding contact with non-European societies in recent
the POSTMODERN phase. It remains to be seen whether centuries, is as much a distinctive feature ofthe modern
phenomenology will be done in by a conception ofhis- Western wor}d as the rise ofthe NATURAL SCIENCES.
tory that originally arose from phenomenology itself. Beyond such chiefly theoretical disciplines there
are what can be called normative, evaluative, or axi-
otic disciplines, which are concerned with ARCHITFC-
Carr, David. Phenomenology and the Prohlem of History: A and there are also practica/ disciplines, such as ED-
Studv o{ Husserl:~ Transcendental Philosophy. Evanston,
- . Time, Narrative, and Historv. Bloomington, IN: Indiana and PSYCHIATRY. A broader category, CULTURAL DISCI-
University Press, 1986. PLINES, has been called for and theoretical, axiotic,
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Gesammelte Schnjien. 5th ed. Voi. 7. Ed.
Bernard Groethuysen. Stuttgart: Teubncr, 1968. and practica! species might then be recognized within
Gadamcr, Hans-Georg. Wahrheit und Methode. Tiibingen: it, although many cultural "sciences" already include
Mohr, 1962; 7htth and Method. Trans. Garrct Barden and practica! components, e.g., the way psychotherapy is
John Cumming. New York: Seabury Press, 1975.
Hohl, Hubcrt. Lehenswelt und Geschichte. Freiburg: Karl often considered part of psychology. Practica! action
Alber, 1962. always has cognitive foundations within it and when
Janssen, Paul. Geschichte und Lehenswelt. The Hague: Mar- these foundations are scientific, scientific technologies
linus Nijhoff, 1970.
Landgrebe, Ludwig. "Wilhelm Diltheys Theorie der and technigues can be spoken of. There are also eval-
Gcisteswissenschaften." Jahrhuch fiir Philosophie und uational foundations in, e.g., social work, that make
phănomenologische Forschung 9 ( 1928), 237-367. nontheoretical disciplines normative.
Misch, Georg. Lehensphilosophie und Phănomenologie.
Bonn: Cohen, J930; 2nd. ed. Leipzig: Teubner, J93 J The mentioned non-philosophical disciplines have
Olafson, Frederick. The Dialectic o{Action. Chicago: Uni- not only been reflected upon from standpoints in
versity of Chicago Press, J 978. phenomenological philosophy, but also increasingly
Soffer, Gail. Husserl and the Prohlem o{ Relativism. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. have phenomenological tendencies within them. Non-
philosophical contributors to disciplines affected by or
DAVID CARR convergent with philosophical phenomenology include
Emory Universi(v the psychiatrists LUDWIG BINSWANGER and KARL JASPERS
and the SOCioJogists GEORG SIMML'L and MAX WERER. Dis-
tinguishing philosophy as such from human science is
among the problems of the philosophy of the human
HUMAN SCIENCES Also called the "eul- sciences.
tura! sciences," the human sciences (die Geisteswis- A human scientific discipline can be said to be
senschaften, les sciences humaines) are special or pos- phenomenological, first, if it is devoted to basing
itive theoretical sciences that are concerned in various knowledge on the best possible EVIDENCE ofthe matters
ways with aspects of human cultural life and cultural themselves in the relevant region. This evidence can
worlds. These disciplines are related to practica! appli- occur with respect to the ancient Hellenic world, for
cations as well as to the everyday prescientific life from example, not only through the study of texts, but also

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, Jose Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

through considering depictions and artifactual and non- back to the Geschichte des Hellenismus (History of
artifactual remains, the last mentioned including, e.g., Hellenism, 1843) of Johann Droysen ( 1808~1884 ), but
the remains of wild animals, such as fish bones, that Dilthey made it prominent. The human sciences for
were available as food in the ecosystem of an ancient Dilthey include the more humane disciplines that study
society. the arts, the more socially oriented sciences, such as po-
Second, it is characteristic of phenomenology in litica! theory, and the more normative disciplines such
general for matters, persons and communities included, as AESTHETICS and ETHICS, and his broad title for these
tobe taken as they present themselves to and are dealt disciplines played a certain role in the administrative
with in the cultural life reflected upon, in which case structure ofthe Imperial German university.
the belief systems, value systems, and systems of ends Dilthey is best known for defending the indepen-
and means correlative to the habitual believing, valu- dence ofthe human sciences from the natural sciences,
ing, and willing discernible in that culturallife can be but he also recognized that the world of spirit or eul-
reflectively observed and analyzed from the theoretical ture is never separable from nature and that both kinds
standpoint of a cultural science. The approach is then of science have a common base in our prescientific
reflective, and such an approach is not alien to human understanding of life. The difference for him is that
sciences and philosophy prior to and independent of the human sciences never Iose sight of the need to un-
the rise of phenomenology. derstand the original wholeness, connectedness, and
Third, an approach that is phenomenological distin- purposefulness of life, while the natural sciences be-
guishes description of what phenomena are from the gin with separated partial elements whose connections
explanation ofthem in terms ofpsychological motives, must be explained by hypothetical generalizations.
historical influences, etc., and emphasizes both empir- Against the neo-Kantians Wilhelm Windelband
ica! descriptions and the a priori descriptions attain- (1848~1915) and Heinrich Rickert (1863~1936) ~
able through EIDFTIC METIIOD (most cultural scientific who were concerned to distinguish psychology from
description and explanation is, however, in terms of transcendental philosophy, considered it a natural sci-
empirica! types). ence, and excluded it from the Kulturwissenscha{ten
Phenomenological phi losophy and phenomenologi- ~ Dilthey included psychology in the Geisteswis-
cal human science are not distinguished, however, in senschaften. His position became widely accepted
these three respects, which they share. Some phenome- in Germany; furthermore, these two titles are inter-
nologists distinguish philosophical and cultural scien- changeable in Cassirer's final writings and also in
tific phenomenology in terms ofthe transcendental vs. those of ALFRED SCHUTZ. The !ater Dilthey relied in-
the mundane attitude, others in terms ofthe ontologica! creasingJy on the interpretation of expressions and ob-
vs. the ontic, and yet others in terms of o ne worldly dis- jectivations of experience and Lebensphilosophie und
cipline, phenomenological psychology or PHILOSOPHI- Phanomenologie ( 1930), by Dilthey's follower GFORG
CAL ANTHROPOLOGY, on which the other disciplines are MISCH, was widely read. Dilthey considered EDMUND
founded. HUSSERL 's Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-190 1) sup-
There is an early history ofthe philosophy ofthe hu- port for his project and Husserl came to acknowl-
man sciences that goes back to Hume's Treatise ( 1739) edge considerable influence on him by Dilthey. In
and Mill's Logic (1843), where the title "moral sci- "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" ( 1911 ), Husserl
ences" is used, if not to Vico, Hegel, Aristotle, Plato, objected to considering philosophy a worldview be-
and especially to the Sophists. The history, however, of cause that led to historicism, RELATIVISM, and skep-
this part ofphilosophy ofscience was foca! for the neo- ticism. But after correspondence with Dilthey, study
Kantians, most recently ERNST CASSIRER, as well as for of others such as Windelband and Rickert, and his
various phenomenologists, and began in relation to WIL- own investigations of the constitution of the cultural
HELM DILTHl'Y's Ein/eitung in die Geisteswissenschaften world in the ldeen zu einer reinen Phanomeno/ogie
(lntroduction to the Human Sciences, 1883). und phanomenologischen Phi/osophie Il [ 1912~ 15)
The expression Geisteswissenscha{t, currently ren- and elsewhere, he accepted Dilthey's problematics and
dered in English as "human science," has been traced advocated the phenomenological philosophy ofthe hu-

man sciences, which is also evident in Die Krisis der interpreti ve methods within HERMENEUTIC AL PHENOMEN-
europăischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale OLOGY and for the enduring phenomenological con-
Philosophie ( 1936). cerns with HISTORY, LANGUAGE, and TECHNOLOGY, which
Husserl distinguished sciences in the "personal- ha ve been carried further by IIANS-GEORG GADAMER, DON
istic attitude" from those in the naturalistic attitude IHDE, .IOSEPII .1. KOCKELMANS, and PAUL RICCEUR.
of the natural sciences and recognized both a natu- In Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (The
ral scientific psychology and a human scientific psy- meaningful structure of the social world, 1932) and
chology, in the latter respect also adopting the strat- Collected Papers ( 1962-96), Alfred Schutz began phi-
egy ofproceeding from a human scientific psychology losophizing about the social world and the specifi-
to how the social and historical world is constituted. cally social sciences, particularly Weberian-style so-
In Phănomenologische Psychologie [ 1925] he praised ciology and Austrian-school economics. doing so in
Dilthey's psychology as a true phenomenological psy- the perspective of a CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
chology and advocated a way to transcendental pheno- TIIE NATURAL ATTITUDE; this effort has been contin-
menology from Dilthey's universal human science as ued by MAURICE NATANSON and others. Subsequent
an alternative to his own Cartesian way that began, by contributors to transcendenta[ CONSTITUTIVE PHENOMEN-
contrast, in complete emptiness of content. This alter- OLOGY of the cultural or human sciences include ARON
native path begins from the LIFEWORLD and ultimately GURWITSCII and THOMAS M. SEEBOHM. In FRANCE, the
Besides the view of the lifeworld as cultural, MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY's "Les sciences de ['homme
Husserl 's own contributions are especially related to IN- et la phenomenologie" ( 1961 ). His student, GEORGES
TERSUB.IECTIVITY and TIME-consciousness. Dilthey's dis- GUSDORF, wrote lntroduction aux sciences humaines
tinction between elementary understanding and higher ( 1960). Ricceur's hermeneutica[ phenomenology carne
understanding can be used to refine Husserl's analyses. !ater. Non-phenomenologists in France, such as MICHEL
The former is immediate and does not usually require FOUCAULT, and in GERMANY, such as Jiirgen Habermas,
methodical interpretation, while the latter, founded ha ve also been interested in the philosophy of the hu-
upon it, requires empathic activities of reliving the man sciences. lnterest in the philosophy of the hu-
social, historical, and personal contexts of life expres- man sciences as such in the UNITED STATES is chiefly
sions as structured wholes. Husserl 's phenomenology phenomenological, but there is also interest in them
ofthe cultural world chiefly pertains to systematic hu- in STRUCTURALISM, CRITIC AL THEORY, and even ANALYTIC
man sciences such as economics, sociology, jurispru- PHILOSOPHY.
dence, and politica! science. Dilthey's concern with the Systematically speaking, the philosophy of the hu-
historical and philological human sciences and their man or cultural sciences has a vast and complex subject
methods, i.e., HERMENEUTICS, is, however, missing in matter. Natural matters- including those with psy-
Husserl, but can be supplied. ches, genetic endowments, and ecosystems-are rela-
Husserl 's students LUDWIG LANDGREBE and FRITZ tively easy to distinguish, classify, and re late, while the
KAUFMANN wrote dissertations that were explicitly con- types of human persons, communities, and traditions
cerned with Dilthey in relation to phenomenology, and approached in the cultural sciences are more numerous
EDITII STEIN and GERDA WALTHER earlier published es- and have more aspects amenable to thematization, as
says in Husserl 's Jahrbuch on topics pertinent to the the disciplines and multidisciplines listed at the outset
human sciences. MAX scHELER offered relevant insights of this entry already indicate. And unlike the natural
on empathy, group solidarity, VALUE THEORY, and the sciences, the human sciences are prone to a reflexiv-
sociology of knowledge. ity whereby there can be a sociology of psychology,
Philosophical reflections especially on the WORLD an economics of sociology, a history of historiogra-
as historical and on history as a science of it are to phy, etc., and also an overlapping of provinces, which
be found in MARTIN HEIDEGGER's work, beginning with hardly simplifies their tasks.
Sein und Zeit ( 1927). Heidegger is also chiefly respon- Nevertheless, the human sciences can, upon reflec-
sible for beginning the post-Diltheyan discussions of tion, be seen to approach the cultural world in one or an-

other ofthree species ofperspectives. This is analogous losophy of the human sciences is often narrowed into
to the sorting of naturalistic sciences into the physical a philosophy ofthe social sciences.
and the biologica!. The most popular approach begins Yet there are also what are best called historical
with a reflective-experiential thematization of individ- sciences, species of which include politica! history,
ual or personal human life, and then proceeds through economic history, history oftechnology, history ofart,
social psychology to approach the social and then the military history, etc., whether or not these particulars
historical world. Since there are actually severa! disci- are recognized as distinct disciplines with separate de-
plines ~ e.g., child psychology, geriatrie psychology, partments in universities. Archaeology, for example,
and psychology of learning ~ within the psychologi- is properly understood as a historical human science,
cal perspective, it seems best to speak in the plural of but, at least in most American universities, it is inter-
psychological human sciences. estingly combined with ethnology under the heading of
Alfred Schutz bcgins with the constitution ofmean- "cultural anthropology" and placed among the social
ingful behavior within an abstractly nonsocial individ- sciences. The historical sciences nonetheless ha ve it in
ual life and then divides the world of others or social common to thematizc the cultural world not only as it
world in a broad signification into directly encountered is lived communally, but also in a diachronic way, i.e.,
"consociates," indirectly encountered but also simul- to emphasize continuities and changes over time.
taneously alive "contemporaries," and then the "pre- The human sciences have in general been much in-
decessors" and the "successors," who are of course fluenced by NATURALISM during the past two centuries.
deceased or yet to be born, respcctively. Consociates This is manifest in the positivistic attempt to imi tate the
and contcmporaries make up the social world in a nar- natural sciences by treating cultural objects as natural
rower signification. There is interes! in the constitution objects, if not physical things, and resorting to math-
of groups in these regions, but Schutz's emphasis is on ematics whenever possible. Opponents of positivistic
the individuals and their social actions, interactions, tendencies within the human sciences and the philoso-
and relationships. phy ofthem often reject mathematical methods, which
As Dilthey showed in Die Aufbau der geschicht- seems unfortunate, in order to emphasize sheerly qual-
lichen Welt in den Geisteswissenscha(ten [The con- itative and interpreti ve methods. It is also important to
struction ofthe historical world in the human sciences, recognize that cultural situations and worlds are formed
191 0], it is also possible, however, to begin in the phi- of objects with cultural characteristics, i.e., the values
losophy of the cultural sciences not with individual or and uses whereby objects are good and bad and ends
personal life, but rather with collective or communal and means.
life. This can be done in two ways. In social sciences Some phenomenologists emphasize the considera-
such as linguistics and politica] science, the function- tion of cultural characteristics not only as what distin-
ing of communal life in relation to language or to the guishes the region of the cultural sciences, but also as
politica! system is considered synchronically, i.e., with what justifies the contention that the latter ha ve prior-
great emphasis on how these systems are structured at ity over the former, which, phenomenologically, would
a given time, usually the present. To be sure, histor- seem to require an abstraction for the derivation of
ical considerations are not absolutely excluded when their naturalistic regions. When acceptance of the val-
such aspects of the cultural world at one time are in- ues and uses of cultural objects is not abstracted from
vestigated, but they are subordinated. Because social for the sake of natural science, there can bea tendency
scientific results often ha ve practica! applications in the of researchers to identify with ( or oppose) the cultural
current situation, the articulation of social science into worlds they research.
particular sciences and academic departments and the Besides the questions of the generic, specific, and
numbers of scientists in them are considerably greater particular subject matters and scienccs thematized in
than in the psychological and historical sciences. For the phenomenological philosophy ofthe human or cul-
this reason and others, such as the current traditional tural sciences ~ and the questions of the relations
academic classifications ofpsychology as a natural sci- between such sciences and the natural and formal sci-
ence and of history as part of the humanities, the phi- ences, on the one hand, and also between them and

thc everyday life from which they arise and in which types phenomenologically. Schutz holds that the cul-
their results are employed for practica! purposes, on tural sciences differ from the natural in that the latter
the other hand- there are long stand ing methodolog- rely on primary constructs about natural objects that
ica/ prob/ems that have interested phenomenological are not pre-interpreted, while the former are conversant
philosophers. with secondary constructs, which are constructs about
In the background of such problems are the prob- the constructs in ordinary languagc and everyday life.
lems in early 20th century neo-Kantianism concerning In other words, he is emphatic that the subjective mean-
the social vs. the historical sciences in terms of distinc- ing or insider interpretations of individuals and groups
tions between generalizing and nomothetic vs. partic- are what the constructs of outsiders, theoreticians and
ularizing and idiographic disciplines, which have also philosophers included, are about.
been of concern to LOGICAL POSITIVISM, but ha ve not yet Whether or not comrnonsense interpretation some-
held much interest for phenomenologists. how includes the pre-prcdicative constitution of val-
Stemming chiefly from the historical sciences, there ues and uses for Schutz is not always clear. But where
is first of ali the methodology of interpretation and cri- the idealizing construction of the models used in the
tique oftcxts and traces, which is called HERMENEUTICS cultural sciences for selves, others, actions, interac-
and which drew much renewed attention by figures in tions, relationships, motives, human products, and so-
Gcrmany from Heinrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) cial groups are concerned, his contributions are enor-
to Wilhelm Dilthey. This classical modern hermeneu- mous and also do not seern incompatible with the re-
tics has been adapted creatively into what became sults of methodological reflections on hermeneutica!
hermeneutica! phenomenology by Heidegger and oth- and also structuralist and semiotic efforts. The over-
ers; atternpts have also been madc by THOMAS M. laps and complementarities have begun to be studied,
SEEBOHM to disclose the transcendental phenornen- e.g., by RICHARD LANIGAN.
ological grounds of hermeneutica! method and by Whilc individual personal life is treated in the his-
RUDOLF MAKKREEL to clarify its transcendental reflec- torical and social sciences as at best derivative from
tive grounds. It is not clear, however, that the rneth- comrnunallife in the socio-cultural world, psycholog-
ods for the interpretation of nonlinguistic data, which ical human science begins with personal life and, as
Dilthey called "rnonurnents," ha ve been appreciated as mentioned, works out from there to the rest of the
well as the herrneneutics of texts. Such nonlinguistic world. Its methods include interpretation and other ap-
data are fundamental for archaeology and LESTER EM- proaches taken toward personal documents and other
BREE has attempted to clarify how they are accessed representations, but it can most effectively rcly on self-
pre-predicatively. observation and reflection on others. In the latter ap-
In the social sciences, STRUCTURALISM is a prominent proach, it does proceed on the basis of somatie indi-
method that addresses the structures of cultural objects cations such as gait, gesture, posture, intonation, and
in language and in nonlinguistic representations such as visage, and thus has a prominent place for the pheno-
pictures. These stern largely from Ferdinand de Saus- meno1ogy ofthe BODY.
sure ( 18 5 7-1913) and are extended by Roland Barthes Because of the need to know a good deal not only
(1915-1980), MICHEL FOUCAULT, Jacques Lacan ( 190 ]- about the current states but also the histories of the
), and Claude Levi-Strauss. Although many concepts actual practices of observation and theorizing in the
and rnost terminology are different and also some of wide variety ofhuman sciences- as well as, e.g., de-
the concerns, e.g., those with unconscious processes, it partmental structures within the academy- there is a
is not clear that semiotic and structuralist methods are tendency among ali philosophers, and thus not merely
substantially incornpatible with those of phenomen- phenomenologists, to emphasize either particular cul-
ology, but most of the work of showing overlaps and tural sciences, e.g., sociology, or species of cultural
complementarities has yet to be done. science, e.g., the social sciences, and not the human
The other mcthodological concern stemming from or cultural sciences in general. But social science is a
reflection on chiefly social science occurs in Schutz species of human or cultural science just as physical
when he attempts to develop Weber 's method of ideal science is a species rather than the genus of natural sci-

ence. Phenomenological reflection on this entire family gins and impacts of the cultural sciences, e.g., how
of sciences is as difficult as it is desirable. everyday thinking in some communities has come to
Once the multiplicity of cultural worlds as opposed be affected by MARXIST politica[ theory or PSYCHOANAL-
to the allegedly one natural world are understood to YSJS? And, most philosophically, can RELATIVISM and
be the common theme, the perspectives, thematized thus skepticism be avoided once one begins to re-
aspects, and methodologies of particular cultural sci- flect on how objects and theories present themselves to
ences and their species can be approached, as can the and are dealt with by socio-historical groups and indi-
basic question of the difference between and relations viduals, scientists and philosophers included? In other
of the human and natural sciences. Further questions words, are non-trivial and non-relative truths, values,
concern how the knowledge gained in the theoretical and purposes attainable or not?
human sciences is used in cultural disciplines of the
axiotic and practica! sorts. Included in these further
questions is the already mentioned question ofthe dif-
ferences between and relations of philosophy and the Dilthey, Wilhelm. Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschajien.
cultural sciences. Versuch einer Grundlegung fur das Studium der
Gesellschafl und der Geschichte [1883]. Gesammelte
Emerging issues for the human sciences and the Schriften 1. Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 4th ed., 1959; lntro-
phenomenological philosophy of them include ecol- duction to the Human Sciences. Ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel
ogy, ethnicity, and gender. If there are major differ- and Frithjof Rodi. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1989; Introduction d l 'etude des sciences humaines.
ences between masculine and feminine worldviews in Trans. L. Sauzin. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
ali societies, earlier observation and theory is distorted 1942.
and needs to be corrected for gendered variations in Gusdorf, Georges. Introduction aux sciences humaines.
Paris: Publications de la Faculte des Lettres de 1'Universite
experience, believing, valuing, and willing, since over de Strasbourg, 1960.
half of humanity is female. Ethnic identities, groups, Makkreel, Rudolf. Dilthey, Philosopher of the Human Stud-
and conflicts may ha ve been suppressed and ignored in ies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Les sciences de l 'homme et
many nation states and empires in the past, but this is la phenomimologie. Paris: Cours de Sorbonne, 1961;
increasingly difficult to do, and like gender, ethnicity "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man." Trans. John
is a fundamental structure of human culturallife. And Wild. In his The Primacy of Perception. Ed. James M.
Edie. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1964,
while the environment might be thought, naturalisti- 43-96.
cally, to be nature in relation to organisms, it is diffi- Misch, Georg. Lebensphilosophie und Phănomenologie.
cult, upon reflection, not to consider plants, animals, Bonn: Cohen, 1930; 2nd ed. Leipzig: Teubner, 1931.
Mohanty, J. N. Phenomenology and the Human Sciences.
and ecosystems as parts ofhuman cultural worlds, i.e., Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.
as cultural matters shaped by and including values and Natanson, Maurice, ed. Phenomenology and the Social Sci-
uses for humans. ences. 2 vols. Evanston, IL: Northwestem University
Press, 1973.
Finally, there is an interesting issue for the philos- Orth, Emst Wolfgang, ed. Dilthey und die Philosophie der
ophy of the natural sciences insofar as they are now Gegenwart. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1985.
deeply interested in science as a human activity and Polkinghome, Donald. Methodology for the Human Sci-
ences. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
thus how its traditions and communities are amenable 1987.
to historical and sociologica! and other particular forms Ricceur, Paul. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Ed.
ofhuman scientific investigation. How does the natural and trans. John B. Thompson. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981.
scientific world ofphysics relate to the cultural worlds Sche1er, Max. On Feeling, Knowing. and Valuing: Selected
out of which it arises? What is the impact of physics Writings. Ed. Harold J. Bershady. Chicago: Chicago Uni-
back upon the cultural world, not only with respect to versity Press, 1992.
Schrag, Cal vin O. Radical Reflection and the Origin of the
the natural scientific technologies that it makes possi- Human Sciences. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University
ble, but also with respect to the everyday values and Press, 1980.
uses of cultural objects? How different is natural sci- Seebohm, Thomas M. Zur Kritik der hermeneutischen Ver-
nunft. Bonn: Bouvier, 1972.
ence from religion in these respects? Strasser, Stephan. Phenomenology and the Human Sciences.
Can the same questions not be asked about the ori- Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963.

Thines, Gcorges. Phenomenology and the Science of Be- form of an authentic Neo-Kantianism, connected with
haviour: An Historical and Epistemologica/ Approach. the name ofBernăt Alexander ( 1850-1927). Alexander
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977.
was a genuine thinker, yet his pedagogica! talents and
LESTER EMBREE broad knowledge of the history of phi1osophy proved
F/orida Atlantic University even more important for Hungarian philosophy. As
a professor at Budapest, he taught whole generations
of young philosophers, many of whom made impor-
tant contributions to international philosophical life
HUNGARY The emergence ofHungarian phi- (Valeria Dienes, GYORGY LUKACS, Geza Revesz, VILMOS
losophy at the beginning ofthe 19th century was inftu- SZILASI, Arnold Hauser, Menyhert Palăgyi).
enced by two factors. On the one hand, as citizens of Some of Alexander's students became connected to
the Habsburg Empire, Hungarian philosophers sought phenomenology. These were also familiar with the an-
to define a national identity by opposing speculative alytic tradition in Austrian philosophy (Bolzano, I'RANZ
philosophy of German origin and promoting the writ- BRENTANO, and the representatives of Brentanism).
ing ofphilosophy in Hungarian. This tendency, similar From the viewpoint of phenomenology, these students
to other national awakenings throughout Austrian- and of Alexander and other thinkers in this period can be
German-ruled East Central Europe, was paralleled by divided into two groups. The first includes philoso-
another tendency that aimed to absorb the results of phers who explicitly considered themselves phenome-
German philosophy, especially those of Kant and his nologists (.!ENO F.NYVV ARI, vilmos szilasi); the second
followers. Before the revolution in 1848 and the war includes significant thinkers strongly inftuenced by
ofliberation against the Habsburgs in 1849, there were phenomenology in some sense (Bela Zalai, Baron
attempts to create what was called "national philoso- Ă.kos von Pauler, Kăroly Mannheim, ANTAL scHOTz,
phy," along with a Hungarian vocabulary ofphilosoph- Săndor Sîk). Another figure, though not a phenomen-

ical terminology. The stai led development of Hungar- ologist, was Menyhert Palăgyi ( 1859-1929), who be-
ian philosophy after 1849 cannot be reduced to the came known through his attacks on EDMUND HUSSERL 's
defeat of the Magyars in their 1849 war of liberation. position in the Logische Untersuchungen ( 1900-1901 ).
The Hungarian philosophers had also proved unable In Der Streit der Psychologisten und Formalisten in
to develop an adaptable. practicable philosophical vo- der modernen Logik (The conflict of psychologizers
cabulary, or to cultivate a lasting national tradition in and formalizers in modern logic, 1903), Palăgyi up-
philosophy. holds Husserl 's rejection oflogical PSYCHOLOGISM, but
The an ti speculative tendency ofHungarian philoso- criticizes his approach as too closely resembling a Kan-
phy through the first half ofthe 19th century is likewise tian logica] formalism. Palăgyi's views on the inte-
expressed by the far greater interest and sympathy of grated character of sensation likewise inftuenced the
Hungarian scholars for politica) and legal rather than history ofphenomenology-see especially his Natur-
philosophical ideas. In this context, one could mention philosophische Vorlesungen (Lectures in nature phi-
Janos Erdelyi (18 14-1868), who saw this tendency losophy, 1924) and his Wahrnehmungslehre (Theory
as a national characteristic of the Hungarian people. ofperception, 1924), which was welcomed and devel-
The other key inftuence in Hungarian philosophy can oped by MAX SCHELER.
be clearly measured in the first systematic philoso- JENO ENYVV ARI studied at Budapest and Gottingen,
pher writing in Hungarian, Kăroly Bohm ( 1854-1911 ), and was connected first to the Bolzanian tradition,
whose work shows the inftuence, first of KANT and Kan- then to phenomenology. His understanding of pheno-
tianism, then, in the third volume of his Az ember es menology was based on Husserl's Logische Unter-
vi/aga (Man and his world, 4 vols, 1883-1942), of a suchungen; for him, the main task of phenomen-
revised yet naive kind of Fichtean subjectivism. ology was a precise description and analysis of
The inftuence of phenomenology in Hungary was the structure of human consciousness, reducing im-
preceded by a renaissance of philosophical culture at mediate consciousness data to their essential con-
the end of the 19th century. This renaissance took the tenis. In A phansikus (phaenomenologiai) adottsagok

Lester Embree, Elizabeth A. Behnke, David Carr, J. Claude Evans, lase Huertas-Jourda, Joseph J. Kockelmans, William R. McKenna,
Algis Mickunas, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Thomas M. Seebohm, Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology.
© 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.