Freedom?

The Anthropological Concepts in

Luther and Melanchthon Compared*
Oswald Bayer
Eberhard-Karls-Universität, Tübingen, Germany

Sigmund Freud speaks of three offenses against the human love of self. The
first blow is "cosmological" and is associated with the name Copernicus. The sec-
ond blow is "biological" and conjures up the name Darwin. Freud himself performs
the "psychological blow," which is directed at human narcissism. This "psycho-
logical blow" follows from the fact that "mental processes are in themselves
unconscious and only reach the ego and come under its control through incom-
plete and untrustworthy perceptions." These discoveries "amount to a statement
that the ego is not master in its own house."1
Kant speaks of the mastery over self in terms contrary to Freud. "But two things
are required for inner freedom: being one's own master in a given case {animus sui
compos), and ruling oneself (imperium in semetipsum), that is, subduing one's
affects and governing one's passions."2 Freud's insight, however, unmasks Kant's
understanding of freedom as an illusion, yet psychoanalysis is not the first disci-
pline to articulate the discovery that the I is not master in its own house. Freud

*I would like to thank Thomas Reinhuber for the intense conversations that inspired many
ideas used in this lecture. Christine Helmer translated the article.
Sigmund Freud, "A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis," m idem, The Standard Edition
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol 17 1917-1919 An Infantile Neu-
rosis and Other Works (trans, and ed James Strachey, Anna Freud, Alix Strachey, and Alan Tyson;
London Hogarth and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1962) 137-44, especially 143
2
Immanuel Kant, "Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue," in idem, The Metaphysics of
Morals (trans and ed Mary Gregor, Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1996) 166.

HTR91. 4 ( 1 9 9 8 ) 3 7 3 - 8 7
374 H A R V A R D T H E O L O G I C A L REVIEW

knows that he is not the first person to make this discovery and alludes to
3
Schopenhauer in the context of this discussion. Much earlier though, the Psalms
4
articulated the "unconscious mental processes." The psalmist says in Ps 19:12
(RSV), "But who can discern his errors? Clear thou me from hidden faults [the
faults of which I am not aware]." Ps 90:8 states that light is only shed on the
unknown sins before God. "Thou hast set our iniquities before thee, our secret sins
in the light of thy countenance."
This insight and experience ultimately determines Melanchthon's understand­
ing of humankind. (Similarly, Luther looks to scripture for an understanding of the
subject matter.) In Article XI of the Augsburg Confession, Melanchthon gives his
reason for the fact that it is not necessary to count all sins in individual confession.
He refers to Ps 19:12, stating that it is impossible to recall all one's sins.5
The impossibility of recalling all our sins is owing to the fact that we do not
know ourselves at our most crucial determination. Humans do not know them­
selves in the intellectual sense of the Socratic adage, "We know that we do not
know." More importantly, this lack of self-knowiege comes from an elementary
incapacity of the will. In the spirit of the Psalms quoted above, Jeremiah asks,
"The heart. . . who can understand?"6 For Melanchthon and Luther, the prophet's
question unlocks the door to understanding the nature of humanity. Stated more

3
Freud, ' Ά Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis," 143
4
Ibid
5
" I t is taught among us that private absolution should be retained and not allowed to fall
into disuse However, in confession it is not necessary to enumerate all trespasses and sins,
for this is impossible, Ps 19· 12, 'Who can discern his errors 9 '" Translation from the German
text of the Augsburg Confession, Article XI, in The Book of Concord The Confessions of the
Evangelical Lutheran Church (trans and ed Theodore G Tappert, Philadelphia Fortress,
1987) 34 The text cited in Book of Concord is equivalent to Die Bekenntnisschriften der
evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche (3d ed , Gottingen Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1956) 66 The
Augsburg Confession XXV states, "Concerning confession we teach that no one should be
compelled to recount sins in detail, for this is impossible As the psalmist says, 'Who can
discern his errors [Ps 19:12] 9 ' Jeremiah [Jer 17:9] also says, 'The heart is desperately corrupt,
who can understand it?'" (Book of Concord, 62 [= Bekenntnisschriften, 98 27-99 4]) The
Apology to Augsburg Confession XI states, "It is certain that we neither remember nor under­
stand most of our sins, according to the statement (Ps 19 12), 'Who can discern his errors 9 '"
Book of Concord, 181 [= Bekenntnisschriften, 251 47-49]. In the "Instructions for the Visi­
tors of Parish Pastors in Electoral Saxony (1528)," Luther writes, "The papal kind of confes­
sion is not commanded, namely, the recounting of all sins This, furthermore, is impossible,
as we read in Ps 19 [.13], 'But who can discern his errors 9 Clear thou me from hidden faults ' "
In Luther's Works American Edition (55 vols . ed Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut Τ Lehmann,
St Louis and Philadelphia Concordia and Fortress, 1958-86) 40 296 This text is a transla­
tion of "Unterricht der Visitatoren an die Pfarrherrn," in WA 26 220, 2-4. Compare the
Smalcald Articles (Bekenntnisschriften 440.25-441 13, 452 9-20, 453 8-9)
6
Jer 17 9 In a letter to Johann Gotthelf Lindner from March 10, 1759, Johann Georg
Hamann writes, "Our heart is the greatest deceiver, and woe to him, who trusts his own [heart]
 O S W A L D BAYER 375

precisely, the question is concerned with the very mystery of human nature. In a
loose paraphrase of Jer 17:9, Luther captures the intention of this passage in order
to expose the Augustinian understanding of sin as superbia and desperatio: "The
heart is both a defiant and despairing thing; who can understand it?"7 By this para-
phrase, Luther means the following: Humans elude themselves, are hidden from
themselves. Humans are neither masters of themselves nor of their own conscious-
ness, not to mention mastery of the unconscious. We humans are neither masters
of our conscience nor of the visions and dreams that fascinate and terrify us. We
are, rather, radically unfree. Who can fathom the ground of his or her own heart,
that is "deeper than anything else?"8 Whoever aims to reach the bottom {Grund)
will fall into an abyss {Abgrund)\

U Free Will?
The biblical texts and their interpreters, Luther and Melanchthon, witness to
human self-experience. Melanchthon asks, "Who can find his way through the
labyrinth of the human heart? Who can find his way out of it?"9 Even before the
Reformation turn of his life and his theology, Luther had had a similar experience
and had come to a similar realization. The talk of free will, when focused on the

In spite of this born liar, God, however, remains faithful. Our heart may deceive us as it will,
like a self-interested Laban God, however, is greater than our heart Our heart may condemn
and scold us as it will, is the heart God, that it can judge us 9 " Johann Georg Hamann. Briefwechsel
(7 vols.; ed Walther Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel, Wiesbaden Insel, 1955) 1. 297 11-16 See
1 425.30-426 12.
7
"Es ist das Herz ein trotzig und verzagt Ding, wer kann es ergrunden 9 " The RSV does not
capture Luther's translation "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately corrupt,
who can understand it 9 " The translation from the Hebrew text by Martin Buber and Franz
Rosenzweig is, in German "Schiichereich ist das Herz / mehr als alles / und sehrend wund ist
es, / wer kennt es aus 9 " (Die Schrift, verdeutscht von Martin Buber gemeinsam mit Franz
Rosenzweig, vol. 3 Bucher der Kundung [8th ed , Stuttgart Deutsche Bibel Gesellschaft,
1992]) For the passage in the LXX, see the next footnote. The passage in the Vulgate reads
as follows: "pravum est cor omnium et inscrutabile." Melanchthon cites this passage in his
Loci from 1521 "And Jeremiah the prophet says that the heart of man is 'deceitful . . and
desperately corrupt (Jer. 179) ' " Philipp Melanchthon, Loci communes theologici (1521), in
Wilhelm Pauck, ed , Melanchthon and Bucer (LCC 19; Philadelphia Westminster, 1969) 2 9 -
30. This text is equivalent to the Loci communes rerum theologicarum seu Hypotyposes theologicae
(1521) in Philipp Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521 Lateinisch-Deutsch (trans and anno-
tated Horst Georg Pohlmann; ed Lutherisches Kirchenamt of the VELKD, Gütersloh Mohn,
1993)63 See also Loci communes theologici 34 on Gen 6 5 "Gen 6.5 'Every imagination
of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.'" 2 34 (= Loci communes theologici
(1521) 2. 36: "Omne desidenum cogitationum cordis humani vanum et pravum").
8
Jer 17:9 (LXX) βαθεία ή καρδία παρά πάντα
9
This passage is a translation of Bayer's paraphrase of Melanchthon's understanding of
sin "For who is able to penetrate the labyrinth of the human heart 9 " Loci communi theologici,
376 H A R V A R D T H E O L O G I C A L REVIEW

founding or ultimately on the grounding of the human being's being, is a naked

term that is covered with nothing 10
Luther's insight assassinated the anthropological concept of humanists as
represented by Erasmus of Rotterdam According to Erasmus, the human be-
ing is divided into three parts spirit, soul, and body As Erasmus writes m his
Enchiridion mihtis Christian^ the spirit opens up the possibility of becoming gods
The body, with its desires and lower passions, opens up the possibility of becoming
animals The soul is located between the spirit and the body The soul is indifferent,
it is undecided It can turn downward to the animal-like or upward to the divine u

36 [= Loci communes (1521) 2 47 [de peccato] 47 "Quis enim labynnthum humani cordis
possit explicare 9 "]
10
"Free will, after the fall, exists in name only, and as long as it does what it is able to
do, it commits a mortal sin" (Heidelberg Disputation [1518], in Luther's Works, 31 40
[thesis 13] [= WA 1 354 5-6]) The text is also found in Luthers Werke in Auswahl (8 vols ,
3d ed ed Otto Clemen, Berlin de Gruyter, 1963) 5 378 21-22 This thesis is condemned
in the papal bull, "Exsurge Domine" from 15 June 1520 See DS 776 Compare with Martin
Luther, "Assertio omnium articulorum M Lutheri per Bullam Leonis X novissimam
damnatorum (1520)," art 36 (= WA 7 142 22-149, 7, idem, "Defense and Explanation of
All the Articles of Dr Martin Luther which were Unjustly Condemned by the Roman Bull
[1521]," art 36 and 37 m Luther's Works 32 92-97 [= WA 7 445 30-451 7]) An opposing
and conservative position is represented by, for example, Nicolaus Herborn, "Locorum
communium adversus hums tempons haereses enchiridion, 1529" (CCath 12 128 25-131,
16 132 24-36)
n
"Therefore the spirit makes us gods, the flesh makes us brute animals The soul consti-
tutes us as human beings, the spirit makes us religious, the flesh irreligious, the soul neither
the one nor the other The spirit seeks heavenly things, the flesh seeks pleasure, the soul what
is necessary The spirit elevates us to heaven, the flesh drags us down to hell, the soul has no
charge imputed to it Whatever is carnal is base, whatever is spiritual is perfect, whatever
belongs to the soul as life-giving element is in between and indifferent " Desidenus Erasmus,
The Handbook of the Christian Soldier, in Charles Fantazzi, ed , Collected Works of Erasmus
(86 vols, ed John W O'Malley, Toronto University of Toronto Press, 1988) 66 52 In his
treatise, "On the Dignity of Man (I486)," Giovanni Pico della Mirandola titanically empha-
sizes the freedom to choose In "God's Speech to Man," della Mirandola has God say, '"We
have given to thee, Adam, no fixed seat, no form of thy very own, no gift peculiarly thine, that
thou mayest feel as thine own, have as thine own, possess as thine own the seat, the form, the
gifts which thou thyself shalt desire A limited nature in other creatures is confined within the
laws written down by Us In conformity with thy free judgment, m whose hands I have placed
thee, thou art confined by no bounds, and thou wilt fix limits of nature for thyself I have
placed thee at the center of the world, that from there thou mayest more conveniently look
around and see whatsoever is in the world Neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor
immortal have We made thee Thou, like a judge appointed for being honorable, art the molder
and maker of thyself, thou mayest sculpt thyself into whatever shape thou dost prefer Thou
canst grow downward into the lower natures which are brutes Thou canst again grow upward
from thy soul's reason into the higher natures which are divine ' O great liberality of God the
Father' O great and wonderful happiness of man' It is given him to have that which he chooses and
to be that which he wills " ("On the Dignity of Man," in Charles Glenn Wallis, trans , On the
 O S W A L D BAYER 377

The possibility of turning in either direction means that the soul is able to
make a decision for either good or evil 12 The soul possesses free will, free-
dom On the basis of this freedom, the human being can fight against the
flesh for the spirit
By describing his concept of humanity in this way, Erasmus intends to refer to
the apostle Paul Paul really does speak of a war between spirit and flesh,n but he
means something entirely different than what Erasmus has in mind Paul under-
stands the war between spirit and flesh as "the whole person is both spirit and
flesh, and fights with himself or herself until he or she becomes wholly
spiritual " u Faith and unbelief, God and idol are at war with one another In his
interpretation of Paul, Luther appropriates Augustine, particularly the latter's anti-
Pelagian writings Luther makes use of his understanding of Paul in order to
criticize both Scholastic theologians and the humanism of scholars like Erasmus

IÎ Predestination?
In 1518, Melanchthon went from Tubingen to Wittenberg and was immediately
won over to the Reformation He took Luther's side and began his Loci communes
rerum theologicarum of 1521 with a section on the human being entitled, "The
anthropological capacities, especially free will " With this section, Melanchthon
showed immediately his true colors by claiming that a human being is not master
m its own house 15 One cannot deny, however (nor is it necessary to deny), that "a
kind of freedom with respect to external works"16 lies within the capacity of hu-

Dignity of Man On Being and the One Heptaplas (intro Paul J W Miller, Library of Liberal
Arts Series, Indianapolis Bobbs-Mernll, 1965) 4 - 5 Compare ibid , 7 ' I n order for us to
understand that after having been born in this state so that we may be what we will to be "
12
See Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica I Q 19, A 10 'liberum arbitrium est facultas
rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum et malum ehgitur "
13
"For the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and the desires of the Spirit are against
the flesh, for these are opposed to each other" (Gal 5 17 [RSV], see also Rom 7 23)
14
Martm Luther, "Preface to the Epistle of St Paul to the Romans," in Luther's Works, 35
377 (translation modified)
15
Loci communes theologici, 22-30 [= Loci communes (1521), 1 1-70] Melanchthon
expanded and placed this section before the other loci in his Loci communes (1521) only after
the publication of Luther's, "Assertio omnium articulorum " (see η 10) and their confir­
mation that the will is unfree Wilhelm Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus
und Reformation (2 vols , Gottingen Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969) 2 141
16
"It cannot be denied that there is in it a certain freedom in outward works" Loci com­
munes theologici, 26 [= Loci communes (1521) 1 42] The Augsburg Confession XVIII states,
"It is also taught among us that humanity possesses some measure of freedom of the will which
enables them to live an outwardly honorable life and to make choices among the things that
reason comprehends" (Book of Concord, 39 [= Bekenntnisschriften 73 2-5]) Melanchthon
stresses the aliqua throughout his career, as his answer to the Bavarian Inquisition m 1558
378 H A R V A R D T H E O L O G I C A L REVIEW

man reason. Melanchthon continues, "you yourself have experienced that it is in

your power to greet or not to greet him, to put on this coat or not to put it on, to eat
or not to do s o . . . . By contrast, internal affections are not in our power."17 "For by
experience and habit we find that the will {voluntas) cannot in itself control love,
hate, or similar affections, but affection is overcome by affection."18 Whoever as-
sumes "that the will {voluntas) by its very nature opposes the affections, or that it
is able to lay an affection aside whenever the intellect so advises or warns"19 is the
victim of an illusion. Humankind is not free in its innermost being, in its heart, in
the center of its will, that "fount of the affections."20 "Nothing is less in his power
than a human heart."21 Only when the heart is converted by the Spirit of God is it
free to think and to do the good.
Now, experience and knowledge show that nothing is less subject to control
than one's own heart. This insight is self-evident, despite all sorts of philo-
sophical teachings coming from Greco-Roman Antiquity,22 from Scholastic
theologians,23 and from neo-Stoic philosophers of modernity.24 Melanchthon
also explicitly makes this point in his Loci of 1521.25 Everyone can appreciate
Freud's insight, even when he explains this insight as a psychological offense
against human love of self and human vanity, by which humans assume that
they have the innate capacity to be master in their own house. The insight into
the human being's unfree will is not peculiar to the theological sphere (as
Schleiermacher and his followers would have it, claiming that the feeling of
absolute dependence is nothing other than a pure and passive element consti-
tuting both existence and meaning; with this claim, they think that they have
adequately represented Luther's talk about the unfree will).

shows. "Etiam in homme non renato est ahqua libertas voluntatis, quod attinet ad externa
opera facienda." In "De XXII Articulo: An redant in homine esse liberum arbitrium?" of the
"Responsiones ad artículos inquisitionis Bavanae [1558]," in Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl
(1 vols , ed Robert Stupperich, Gütersloh Bertelsmann, 1951) 6. 310, 6-7
11
Loci communes theologici, 26-27 [= Loci communes (1521), 1 44]
n
Loci communes theologici, 27 [= Loci communes (1521), 1. 44].
19
Loci communes theologici, 27 [= Loci communes (1521), 1 46]
20
Ibid ; also "For since God judges hearts, the heart and its affections must be the highest
and most powerful part of man" (Loci communes theologici, 2g [= Loci communes (1521), 1
57])
21
Loci communes theologici, 30 [= Loci communes (1521), 1 65]
22
Plato Tim 70a-d.
23
Duns Scotus Sent III, Dist 37, Q 2, Sent III, Dist 25, Qu un, William Ockham Sent
III, Q. 9; Gabriel Biel Sent II, Dist. 28, Q. and A 3.
24
In this respect, Kant can be said to belong to the neo-Stoic philosophers of modernity
(see n. 2).
25
"[F]or by experience and habit we find that the will (voluntas) cannot in itself control
love" (Loci communes theologici, 27 [= Loci communes (1521), 1. 44]).
 O S W A L D BAYER 379

The insight into the unfree will is, as I have said above, not peculiar to the
theological sphere—at least it is not necessarily a particular form of theological
insight. It is impossible to overlook this problem regarding the introductory chap-
ter of Melanchthon's earlier Loci.
Melanchthon asks the question, "whether will {voluntas) is free and to what
extent it is free."26 He answers the question once, as I have already stated, by
giving an anthropological argument for the power of the affections; the affec-
tions, and not reason, steer the will.27 On the other hand, Melanchthon also answers
that question by referring abruptly to the divine will, to freedom and predestina-
tion. Without offering an extended argument, Melanchthon states, "All things
that happen, happen necessarily according to divine predestination."28

I " Synergism?
One can detect a plainly deterministic element in Melanchthon's mode of
argumentation.29 The appearance of this deterministic strand is remarkable be-
cause he later turned away from these early treatments of the problem and
moved in the opposite direction, which is, again, highly dubious. The later
discussion of the will is situated in the context of justification that through
faith alone occurs on behalf of Christ. In this context, Melanchthon names the
human will as the third cause of justification alongside both the Word and the
Spirit of God. The will accepts and does not resist the word of God.30

26
Loci communes theologici, 24 [= Loci communes (1521), 1. 18].
27
In his Loci communes (1521), Melanchthon does not clarify whether it is the will that
guides the affections or whether it is the affections that guide the will On this problem, see
Karl-Heinz zur Mühlen, "Melanchthons Auffassung vom Affekt in den Loci communes von
1521," in Michael Beyer, Günther Wartenberg, and Hans-Peter Hasse, eds , Humanismus und
Wittenberger Reformation Festgabe anläßlich des 500 Geburtstages des Praeceptor Germamae,
Philipp Melanchthon, am 16 Februar 1997, Helmar Junghans gewidmet (Leipzig Evangelische
Verlagsanstalt Leipzig, 1996) 327-36.
28
*'Since all things that happen, happen necessarily according to divine predestination, our
will (voluntas) has no liberty " Loci communes theologici. 25 [= Loci communes (1521), 1
19].
29
Loci communes (1521), 1 19 (see η 28); 1 26-28, 30, 34
30
"'Audire verbum, non repugnare, sed assentiri verbo Dei" (Philipp Melanchthon, "Loci
praecipue theologici nunc denuo cura et diligentia, summa recogniti multisque in locis copiose
illustrati [1559]," in Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl, 2 1 244 10-11) "Cumque ordimur a
verbo, hic concurrunt tres causae bonae actionis, verbum Dei, Spiritus sanctus et humana
voluntas assentiens nec repugnans verbo Dei Posset enim, excutere, ut excutit Saul sua sponte
Sed cum mens audiens ac se sustentans non répugnât, non indulget diffidentiae, sed adiuvante
etiam Spintu sancto conatur assentiri, in hoc certamine voluntas non est otiosa" (Ibid., 243
14-21). "Liberum arbitrium in homme facultatem esse apphcandi se ad gratiam, id est, audit
promissionem et assentiri conatur et abiicit peccata contra conscientiam Taha non fiunt in
Diabolis Discrimen igitur inter Diabolos et genus humanum consideretur. Fient autem haec
380 H A R V A R D T H E O L O G I C A L REVIEW

Melanchthon published this view of the subject matter in the third version of his
Loci, two years after Luther died31
Luther would have protested with all his might against the claim that the human
being could somehow cooperate in the event of justification He would have pro-
tested all the more against Melanchthon's explanation of the third cause, which
literally reproduces the thesis that Erasmus brought into the conversation Accord-
ing to Erasmus, the free will of human beings is capable of turning itself toward
grace32 Erasmus did m no way attribute to humans the capacity to redeem them-
selves For him, everything is attributed to grace creation, redemption, and
consummation of the world All these works rest solely in God's hand 33 The afore-
mentioned free will of humanity as the capacity to turn toward grace can only be
considered to be just a petpusillum34 in this wide and large ocean of grace Free
will is only a minute triviality, only one small point, that Erasmus wants to hold
onto as the capacity and work of humans, namely, the ability to accept the word of

lllustnora considerata promissione Cum promissio sit universalis nee sint in Deo
contradictonae voluntates, necesse est in nobis esse ahquam discriminis causam, cur Saul
abnciatur, David recipiatur, id est, necesse est ahquam esse actionem dissimilem in his
duobus Haec dextre intellecta vera sunt, et usus in exercitiis fidei et in vera consolatione,
cum acquiescunt animi in Filio Dei monstrato in promissione, ìllustrabit hanc copulationem
causarum, verbi Dei, Spiritus sancti et voluntatis" (Ibid , 245 30-246 8) This line of the
argument has already been foreshadowed in the Scholia on Colossians (1527, see Wilhelm
Maurer, Art "Melanchthon," RGG, vol 4, col 837) and in Secunda Aetas, Corpus
Reformatorum (ed Carolus Gottlieb Bretschneider and Henncus Ernestus Bindseil, 27
vols , Halle Schwetscke, 1834-59) 21 375-78, esp 376 Here, however, the ductus is
different Concerning the Tertia aetas (Corpus Reformatorum 21 567-70, 597-98), com-
pare Martin Seils, Glaube (Handbuch systematischer Theologie 13, Gütersloh Gutersloher
Verlagshaus, 1996) 134-35
31
The version quoted above (η 30) was probably elaborated by Melanchthon in 1544, he
published it after Luther' s death (Corpus Reformatorum 21 570 4) "Hie locus, Luthero mortuo,
ab auctore additus "
32
"Liberum arbitnum in homme facultatem esse apphcandi se ad gratiam" (Melanchthon,
Loci [1559], in Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl, 2 1 245 30-31 [see η 31]) In his Dia­
tribe II a 11, Erasmus writes, "Furthermore, one finds the opinion, that it is within our
power to turn our will toward or away from grace—just as it is our pleasure to open or close
our eyes against light " Erasmus, "A Diatribe or Sermon Concerning Free Will," in Ernst F
Winter, trans and ed , Erasmus Luther Discourse on Free Will (Milestones of Thought in
the History of Ideas Series, New York Ungar, 1961) 29 In Diatribe I b 10, Erasmus
writes, "By freedom of the will we understand in this connection the power of the human
will whereby man can apply to or turn away from that which leads unto eternal salvation"
(Ibid , 20) For Luther's contrary position, see WA 18 667 29-668 3 [= Luthers Werke in
Auswahl 3 157 29-38]
33
Erasmus, Diatribe II a 11, 31
34
"Since it is very little [perpusillum] that the free will can effect, and even that comes
from divine grace which has at first created free will and then redeemed and healed it" (Ibid
IV 8 86) On the context of IV 8, compare Diatribe II a 11 with III c 4
 O S W A L D BAYER 3 8 1

grace and not resist it If one did not hold onto this tiny speck, then Erasmus ar­
gues, the responsibility of humankind and thereby every type of ethics would be
abolished Moreover, the evil that people do must then be attributed to God The
denial of that tiny cooperation of humans in their own salvation would both take
away their responsibility for their actions and destroy the concept of God as being
entirely good and gracious
As one can see, it is not possible to speak about what humans are and are not
capable of doing without having the most difficult questions regarding the doctrine
of God break into the discussion Luther identifies these questions when he chal­
lenges Erasmus with heartfelt passion and his razor-sharp intellect He asks, if God
alone, m omnipotence, works all in all, then does God work not only salvation, but
also damnation9 Not only faith, but also unbelief9 Not only good, but also evil 9 Or is
God, rather, to be held at a distance from evil, to be held free from it 9 3 5 Should not
evil be attributed only to the human will9 According to Erasmus, at least a small bit
of every person must be free persons must have the freedom, either to choose good
or to choose evil In this way, Erasmus locates himself in a long chain of the philo­
sophical36 and theological37 tradition, a chain that always finds its proponents38

S No Certainty of Salvation Without the Unfree Will

Luther contradicts the position represented by Erasmus with utmost sharpness
The will's capacity to be turned toward salvation and faith is in no way the work of
the human being It is solely God's work,39 just as the divine promise that creates
faith is solely God's work No one can hinder40 the divine work of fulfilling and
consummating the divine promise, because God is omnipotent 41 God does not

15
Diatribe I a 8, 12
36
Boethius "Consolation of Philosophy," in Trost der Philosophie Lateinisch und Deutsch
(ed and trans Ernst Gegenschatz and Olof Gigon 3d ed , Zurich Artemis, 1981) 5 6p (pp
262-74)
37
Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica I Q 19, A 10 (see η 12), Q 19, A 8, idem Summa
contra gentiles I 67
38
The traditional distinction between the nécessitas consequentiae and the nécessitas
consequents only serves, as Luther astutely observes, to carve out a space for that tiny bit of
human freedom (see Luther's Works 33 39-41 [= WA 18 616 13-618 18, = Luthers Werke
in Auswahl, 3 109 10-110 24])
39
"Faith, however, is a divine work in us which changes us and makes us to be born anew
of God, John 1 [ 12-13]" (Luther, "Preface to Romans", Luther s Works, 33 370, see η 14)
40
In vs 4 of his hymn, "Befiehl du deine Wege," Paul Gerhardt writes "dein Werk kann
niemand hindern, / dein Arbeit darf nicht ruhn / wenn du, was deinen Kindern / ersprießlich
ist, willst tun " In Evangelisches Gesangbuch Ausgabe fur die Evangelische Landeskirche in
Württemberg, no 361
^Luther's Works 33 3 9 - 4 2 (= WA 18 618 19-620 12, = Luthers Werke in Auswahl 3
110 25-111 33) "For if you doubt or disdain to know that God foreknows all things, not
382 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

merely desire to fulfill promises; God can also keep promises. An uncertainty would
sneak in if salvation were not entirely and solely in God's hand, if I had only the
tiniest bit to say and to work in the matter, if I were left to my own devices in this
single point—which, of course, is the Archimedic point. This uncertainty would
destroy the certainty of salvation. Accordingly, at the end of his controversy with
Erasmus, Luther summarizes the aim of his entire treatise in the form of a confes-

For my own part, I frankly confess that even if it were possible, I

should not wish to have free choice given to me, or to have anything
left in my own hands by which I might strive toward salvation. For, on
the one hand, I should be unable to stand firm and keep hold of it
amid so many adversities and perils and so many assaults of demons,
seeing that even one demon is mightier than all men, and no man at
all could be saved, and, on the other hand, even if there were no perils
or adversities or demons, I should nevertheless have to labor under
perpetual uncertainty and to fight as one beating the air, since even if I
lived and worked to eternity, my conscience would never be assured
and certain how much it ought to do to satisfy God. For whatever work
might be accomplished, there would always remain an anxious doubt
whether it pleased God or whether he required something more, as the
experience of all self-justifiers proves, and as I myself learned to my
bitter cost through so many years But now, since God has taken my
salvation out of my hands into his, making it depend on his choice and
not mine, and has promised to save me, not by my own work or
exertion but by his grace and mercy [Rom 9.16], I am assured and
certain both that he is faithful and will not he to me, and also that he
is too great and powerful for any demons or any adversities to be able
to break him or snatch me from him "None," he says, "shall snatch
them out of my hand, because my father who has given them to me is
greater than all" [John 10:28-29]. So it comes about that, if not all,
some and indeed many are saved, whereas by the power of free choice
[of humankind] none at all would be saved, but all would perish to-
gether. Moreover, we are also certain and sure that we please God, not
by the merit of our own working, but by the favor of his mercy prom-

contingently, but necessarily and immutably, how can you believe his promises and place a
sure trust and reliance on them9" (Luther's Works 33 42 [= WA 18 619 1-3, = Luthers Werke
in Auswahl 3 110. 30-33])
42
The discrete arguments in "De servo arbitrio" can be critically evaluated from the per-
spective offered by the "confession" at the end of the treatise Luther himself (Luther's Works
33. 39 [= WA 18 616 n. 1]) defines the use of the word nécessitas as follows (in the Jena
edition) "I could wish indeed that another and a better word had been introduced into our
discussion than this usual one, 'necesssity,' which is not rightly applied either to the divine
or the human will "
 O S W A L D BAYER 383

ísed to us, and that if we do less than we should or do it badly, he does

not hold this against us, but in a fatherly way pardons and corrects us.
Hence the glorying of all the saints in their God. 4 3

; How Humans Are Involved in the Event of Justification

Melanchthon agrees with Luther's sharpened focus on the certainty of salva-
tion. From the early Loci and throughout his entire life, Melanchthon strongly
emphasizes the certainty of salvation in the context of the theme of the will's free-
dom.44 Melanchthon views the final goal of theology as the comforting of the
conscience. When the conscience is attacked, it is comforted by God's justifying
promise on behalf of Christ in the Holy Spirit.45 Against the backdrop of
Melanchthon's lifelong emphasis on the certainty of salvation, his interest in the
involvement of human beings in the event of justification appears to be all the
more remarkable. I have already mentioned Melanchthon's view of a type of hu-
man cooperation.46 In the debate that ensued, faithful disciples of Luther opposed
Melanchthon; Melanchthon's followers defended him. The debate came to a head
in the "synergistic" controversy that was settled in the Formula of Concord.47 The
controversy is concerned with the question of how humans are involved in receiv-
ing salvation. God encounters humans in ways other than God encounters a stone
or trunk.48 Human faith is no mechanical echo, but God alone creates faith entirely

"Luther's Works 33 288-89 [= WA 18. 783, 17-39, = Luthers Werke in Auswahl 3 288.
16-289]
44
Melanchthon's response to the Bavarian Inquisition still treats the theme of the certainty
of salvation This theme is later documented in the text, "Corpus doctnnae (1560) " Melanchthon
concentrates on the decisive point of the certainty of salvation in order to polemicize sharply
against the Council of Trent "Hanc consolationem Papistae delent, qui îubent manere in
dubitatione" ("Responsiones ad artículos inquisitionis Bavariae [1558]," in Melanchthons
Werke in Auswahl, 6 320. 25-26, compare 327 8-24) On the Council of Trent, see DS 802
45
0n the "finis ultimus" of theology according to Melanchthon, see Oswald Bayer, Theologie
(Handbuch systematischer Theologie 1; Gütersloh Gutersloher Verlagshaus, 1994) 152-55
46
Seenn 30-31
47
The second article of the Formula of Concord is on free will (Book of Concord, 469-72)
See also Walter Spara, "Begründung und Verwirklichung. Zur anthropologischen Thematik
der lutherischen Bekenntnisse," in Martin Brecht and Reinhard Schwarz, eds., Bekenntnis und
Einheit der Kirche. Studien zum Konkor dienbuch (Stuttgart Calwer Verlag, 1980) 129-53
^Bekenntnisschriften, 896. 6 4 - 6 8 (Formula of Concord II) "quod Deus ahum modum
agendi habeat in homine, utpote in creatura rationah, et ahum modum in alia ahqua irrationah
creatura, vel in lapide aut trunco", but compare ibid , 879. 20-882 5 "sacrae htterae hominis
non renati cor duro lapidi . item rudi trunco comparant in spiritualibus et divinis
rebus, quae ad animae salutem spectant, homo est similis trunco et lapidi " This has been
contradicted by the Augsburg Interim, Article VI (De modo per quem homo ìustificationem
accipit): "Deus misericors non agit hic cum homme, ut cum trunco, sed trahit eum volentem"
(Das Augsburger Interim. Nach den Reichstagsakten deutsch und lateinisch [ed Joachim
384 H A R V A R D T H E O L O G I C A L REVIEW

as a free response49 It must now be asked what concern Melanchthon brings into
the discussion when he thematizes this kind of freedom If faith is, as Luther sees
it, the forgetfulness of self, then such an interest would not be an issue at all
One could ask if Melanchthon's interest is located in the context of his use of the
causal scheme50 One could also ask if it is associated with a new determination of the
relationship between knowing and willing Melanchthon articulates this relationship in
his later years In a way differing from the 1521 Loci, the later Melanchthon, especially
in the Liber de anima (1553),51 tends to appropriate a Platonist and Stoic assertion
concerning the domination of reason over the will In direct contradiction to the 1521
Loci,52 the text now says53 that the will does not reign like a tyrant but obeys insight
Melanchthon's later appropriation of this philosophical concept must not
necessarily be taken to mean a claim concerning the power of humans to master inner-
most thoughts, their heart It could simply be taken to mean that a person m his or her
rationality has the freedom to act with respect to external matters that concern life m
this world On this latter interpretation, Melanchthon would remain loyal to the trajec-
tory in which he came to be located beginning m 152154

Mehlhausen, 2d ed , Neukirchen Neukirchener Verlag, 1996] 49) Compare the Leipzig In-
terim (Corpus Reformatorum, 7 51) "The merciful God does not deal with man as with a
block, but pulls him in such a way that his will cooperates "
49
Bekenntnisschriften, 897 64-67 (Formula of Concord II) "Haec autem agitatio spintus
sancti non est coactio, sed homo con versus sponte bonum operatur", compare ibid , 69-71
"tunc per virtutem spintus sancti cooperan possimus ac debeamus "
50
If Melanchthon had conceived of the third cause (besides God's word and spirit), the
affirmative human will, as of a causa materiahs "—which he, in fact did not do—or if he
had understood it the way Klaus Haendler ( Wort und Glaube bei Melanchthon Eine Untersuchung
über die Voraussetzungen und Grundlagen des melanchthomschen Kirchenbegriffes [Gütersloh
Gutersloher Verlagshaus, 1968] 553-54) supposes, then he would have wanted to refer to
nothing else but mere human passivity, as Luther did when speaking of the "aptitudo passiva"
(WA 18 636 19-20) The context, however, hardly allows this interpretation
51
An interpretation of Melanchthon's treatise, Liber de anima is offered by Gunter Frank,
"Philipp Melanchthons 'Liber de anima' und die Etablierung der fruhneuzeithchen Anthropologie,"
in Beyer, Wartenberg, and Hasse, eds , Humanismus und Wittenberger Reformation, 313-26
52
Loci communes (1521), 1 13 "Nam pennde, ut in república tyrannus, ita m homme
voluntas est, et ut senatus tyranno obnoxius est, ita voluntan cognitio, ita ut, quamquam bona
moneat cognitio, respuat tamen earn voluntas feraturque affectu suo "
53
Liber de anima (1553) (Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl, 3 364 31-33) "voluntas est praestantior,
quia velut rex ehgit deliberata aut rencit, tamen non habet tyrannicum Imperium, sed recto ìudicio
obtemperare debet" (compare Loci communes theologici, 22 [= Loci communes (1521), 1 13])
54
See also Augsburg Confession XVIII Freedom of the Will "It is also taught among us that
man possesses some measure of freedom of the will which enables him to live an outwardly
honorable life and to make choices among the things that reason comprehends But without the
grace, help, and activity of the Holy Spirit man is not capable of making himself acceptable to God,
of fearing God and believing in God with his whole heart, or of expelling inborn evil lusts from
his heart" (Book of Concord, 39)
 O S W A L D BAYER 385

S Law and Gospel

Melanchthon's aforementioned thematization of human involvement in the
event of justification itself, together with the claim of a human capacity to turn
toward or away from the divine grace that is offered, is difficult to understand.
It is even inconsistent because the distinction between law and gospel aims to
distinguish between divine works and human works. Melanchthon himself de-
cisively asserted this distinction throughout his life.55 He should never have
spoken of a cooperation of these three causes in the process of justification,
because he thus ascribed one and the same level to divine and human acts.
In the realm of the law, however, even the sinner can act with respect to
external matters in order that the works would serve human life in community.
As external works, they are to be called good, although they, before God, do
not amount to anything. In distinction to what human eyes see, God looks at
the heart.56 The claim that one's external works do not amount to anything in
God's sight means in this context that they cannot ground or justify one's own
existence.

S Primus usus legis

Both Luther and Melanchthon held in high regard the realms of the law, of
worldly justice, of the fair balance of interests in marriage and the family, and
of economy and state. The high estimation of these realms represents a major
characteristic of the Reformers' concept of the human being. A human being
has the freedom to order his or her own life. He or she carries responsibility for
the way in which this occurs. A Christian acts in the realm of worldly justice
together with those who are not Christians. In this realm, God preserves the
reason and freedom of both Christians and non-Christians.
This explains why the Reformers held in high esteem the concept of humanity

55
An autobiographical statement appears in Melanchthon's testament: "Ago autem
gratias Reverendo D. Doctori Martino Luthero, primum, quia ab ipso Evangelium didici"
(Corpus Reformatorum, 3. 827 [1539]). This text must be interpreted according to its
emphatic sense that includes the learning of the distinction between law and gospel
Only one excerpt from the Liber de anima is cited here to show that Melanchthon con-
tinued to hold the position on the absolute necessity of the distinction between law and
gospel from his early Loci communes (1521) until the Liber of 1553. "Necesse est omnibus
in conspectu esse discrimen legis et Evangelii. Hic si quis recte didicit hanc puerilem
doctrinam, seit legem notitias esse nobiscum nascentes, sicut aliarum artium principia
et demonstrationes. Sed Evangelium dissimilimam vocem esse, ac nequáquam nobiscum
nasci, sed singulari revelatione a Deo îllustribus testimonus patefactum esse" (Corpus
Reformatorum, 13. 7).
56
1 Sam 16:7.
386 H A R V A R D T H E O L O G I C A L REVIEW

as it was articulated in Greco-Roman antiquity, especially by Cicero, to whom

Melanchthon, in particular, was greatly indebted. One can see this by merely glanc-
ing at the Reformer's numerous teaching manuals, and not only those on rhetoric,
dialectics, and ethics.
Both Luther and Melanchthon cannot praise Cicero highly enough in his role as
public speaker, philosopher, and politician. They do not, however, praise Cicero
when he praises himself and says: "I have done it."57 According to the Reformers,
Cicero's merits are themselves discredited by this self-praise. By praising himself,
Cicero exposes his desire to be his own creator and judge; he misjudges himself
and denies his createdness.
On the one hand, Luther and Melanchthon perceive, with gratefulness, a view of
common humanity. The common humanity of both Christians and non-Christians is
perceived as a gift of God's hidden, active, and preserving grace. On the other hand,
both Reformers oppose common humanity wherever and whenever it attempts to
grasp the absolute. They see the human being as the one who cannot achieve the
justification of his or her existence alone. The human being cannot ground its heart
by itself, cannot forgive its own guilt by itself, and who cannot free itself from the
fear of the future by itself. The human being must be freed from this care and con-
cern for self-justification, he or she must be freed from what accompanies this care:
its despair and its hybris, its presumption by which humanity misjudges its own
finitude. Freedom from self-justification is, however, not accomplished through the
law. It is achieved solely through the gospel by which God's Spirit turns the heart
around in faith and renews it. The renewal effected by the gospel frees a person so
that he or she is able to live in such a secularity {Weltlichkeit), which is fitted to his or
her finitude. This secularity is no longer burdened and crushed by the desire for
eternity and the demands of salvation.
To stubborn and blind persons, this freedom appears to be a blow to one's own self-
love. This is really the case if it can be considered according to the sense in which
Elisabeth Cruciger, who lived in Wittenberg at the times of Luther and Melanchthon,
prayed: "mortify the old man, in order that the new can live."58

51
Loci communes theologici, 38 [= Loci communes (1521), 2. 34] A representative text by
Luther makes the same point as Melanchthon "Haec ego feci. Ex hoc· feci, vere fiunt feces"
(WA 40/III, 222 34-35 [Der 127 Psalm ausgelegt, 1532/33, to verse 1]). On Luther and
Melanchthon's criticism of Cicero, see Oswald Bayer, Freiheit als Antwort Zur theologischen
Ethik (Tübingen Mohr [Siebeck], 1995) 141-42
58
"Den alten Menschen kranke, daß der neu' leben mag " Elisabeth Kreuziger, "Herr Christ,
der einig Gotts Sohn," in Evangelisches Gesangbuch, no. 67, verse 5, lines 3 - 4 , translator's
note Only the first four verses of Kreuziger's hymn appear in the translation of Arthur Τ
Russell, in Lutheran Book of Worship (Minneapolis- Augsburg and Board of Publication,
Lutheran Church in America, 1990) no 86.
 OSWALD BAYER 387

IS The Distinction between Faith and Works

The new person can distinguish between faith and works. Faith is the certainty
that God cares for me. My work is the activity by which I must care for myself "as
if there were no God." 59 From the perspective offered by the distinction between
faith and works, the labor of psychoanalysis or of a psychotherapeutic conversa­
tion, for example, can and may be taken and appreciated as a work. According to
this perspective, one must not expect human reason, the god λόγος alone to shed
light on the unconscious as Freud did.60 The enlightening of the unconscious may
be located in faith, because the human God "came to his own home" (John 1:11;
RSV). Here, it is no offense, but the most wonderful freedom not to be the master
of one's own house. Here, even when sometimes in tears and with the cry of com­
plaint, I can wait until I know myself, as I am already known now by God.

59
" I n general, they should proceed as if there were no God and they had to rescue them­
selves and manage their own affairs" (Luther, "Exposition of Psalm 127, For the Christians
at Riga m Livonia [1524]," in Luther's Works 45 331 [= WA 15 373 3])
60
Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion (trans, and ed , James Strachey; New York-
Norton, 1961) 54.
 ^ s
Copyright and Use:

As an ATLAS user, you may print, download, or send articles for individual use
according to fair use as defined by U.S. and international copyright law and as
otherwise authorized under your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement.

No content may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the
copyright holder(s)' express written permission. Any use, decompiling,
reproduction, or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a
violation of copyright law.

This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS collection with permission
from the copyright holder(s). The copyright holder for an entire issue of a journal
typically is the journal owner, who also may own the copyright in each article. However,
for certain articles, the author of the article may maintain the copyright in the article.
Please contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific
work for any use not covered by the fair use provisions of the copyright laws or covered
by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement. For information regarding the
copyright holder(s), please refer to the copyright information in the journal, if available,
or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s).

About ATLAS:

The ATLA Serials (ATLAS®) collection contains electronic versions of previously

published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission. The ATLAS
collection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association
(ATLA) and received initial funding from Lilly Endowment Inc.

The design and final form of this electronic document is the property of the American
Theological Library Association.