SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. G.R. No.
G.R. No. 184836 The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in
FALLER AND FERDINAND N.
TALABONG,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
WILFREDO F. ASILO
Promulgated:
December 23, 2009
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term
of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local
Government Code)?
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive
suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public
official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should
not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
The present petition[1] seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for
three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms,
respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal
case he then faced.This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans
suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and
finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N.
Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of
candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for
three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit
rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
Significantly, this provision refers to a term as a period of time three years during
its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule
did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term
because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in
its October 7, 2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the following
ISSUES:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption
of the three-term limit rule; and
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilos preventive
suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
General Considerations
The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit provision
of the Constitution, but is the first on the effect of preventive suspension on the
continuity of an elective officials term. To be sure, preventive suspension, as an
interruption in the term of an elective public official, has been mentioned as an
example in Borja v. Commission on Elections.[2] Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a
controlling ruling; it did not deal with preventive suspension, but with the
application of the three-term rule on the term that an elective official acquired by
succession.
a. The Three-term Limit Rule: The Constitutional Provision Analyzed
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than threeconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any
difference in wording does not assume any significance in this case.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office
and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive
terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
which an official has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals,[3] a
Resolution promulgated on November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a term
connotes, as follows:
The word term in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which
the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the
term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of
the officers term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and
authority as a public officer must ipso factocease. In the law of public officers, the
most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by
the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis
supplied].
A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,[4] reiterated that [T]he term means
the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
The limitation under this first branch of the provision is expressed in
the negative no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. This
formulation no more than three consecutive terms is a clear command suggesting
the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact indication of what to
serve. . . three consecutive terms exactly connotes, the meaning is clear reference
is to the term, not to the service that a public official may render. In other words,
the limitation refers to the term.
The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any
circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public
office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected. This declaration complements the term limitation mandated
by the first branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that
voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect
continuity of service for a full term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a
pure declaratory statement of what does not serve as an interruption of service for
a full term, but the phrase voluntary renunciation, by itself, is not without
significance in determining constitutional intent.
The word renunciation carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To
renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or resign.[5] It is an act that emanates from
its author, as contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read with the
definition of a term in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch
of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short
the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word voluntary linked
together with renunciation signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderees
own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by conscious
choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not
considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid
the application of the term limitation.
The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on
the term voluntary renunciation shed further light on the extent of the term
voluntary renunciation:

MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? This
term voluntary renunciation does not appear in Section 3 [of Article VI]; it also
appears in Section 6 [of Article VI].
MR DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution. Could the
Committee please enlighten us exactly what voluntary renunciation mean? Is this
akin to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the
restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is
more general than abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.[6]
From this exchange and Commissioner Davides expansive interpretation of the
term voluntary renunciation, the framers intent apparently was to close all gaps
that an elective official may seize to defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that
voluntary renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the
three-term limit rule. Harking back to the text of the constitutional provision, we
note further that Commissioner Davides view is consistent with the negative
formulation of the first branch of the provision and the inflexible interpretation that
it suggests.
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the
circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to
make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective whose terms must be
strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less
than equal constitutional worth.We view preventive suspension vis--vis term
limitation with this firm mindset.
b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the Three-term Limit Rule
Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the
concepts within the provisions contemplation, particularly on the interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term that it speaks of.
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections[7] presented the question of whether the
disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the
public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public
official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and
executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the
disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully
served three consecutive terms) were not present. In so ruling, we said:
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent
the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is
evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a
few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to
that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
[Emphasis supplied]
Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be
exact, loss of title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.
Ong v. Alegre[8] and Rivera v. COMELEC,[9] like Lonzanida, also involved the issue of
whether there had been a completed term for purposes of the three-term limit
disqualification. These cases, however, presented an interesting twist, as their final
judgments in the electoral contest came after the term of the contested office had
expired so that the elective officials in these cases were never effectively unseated.
Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never
validly elected), the Court concluded that there was nevertheless an election and
service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule based on the
following premises: (1) the final decision that the third-termer lost the election was
without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term
of the contested office had expired; and (2) the official assumed and continuously
exercised the functions of the office from the start to the end of the term. The
Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view
that the official (referring to the winner in the election protest) would, under the
three-term rule, be considered to have served a term by virtue of a veritably
meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served the term
pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. This factual
variation led the Court to rule differently from Lonzanida.
In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who finally
lost the election contest was merely a caretaker of the office or a mere de facto
officer.The Court obeserved that Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated
and its purpose defeated when an official fully served in the same position for three
consecutive terms. Whether as caretaker or de facto officer, he exercised the
powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled him to stay on
indefinitely.
Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation
because of what they directly imply. Although the election requisite was not
actually present, the Court still gave full effect to the three-term limitation because
of the constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to service for three
terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit
rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in
favor of limitation rather than its exception.
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections[10] dealt with the effect of recall on the three-
term limit disqualification. The case presented the question of whether the
disqualification applies if the official lost in the regular election for the supposed
third term, but was elected in a recall election covering that term. The Court upheld
the COMELECs ruling that the official was not elected for three (3) consecutive
terms. The Court reasoned out that for nearly two years, the official was a private
citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the
election for the third term.
Socrates v. Commission on Elections[11] also tackled recall vis--vis the three-term
limit disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was
disqualified to run for a fourth term, he did not participate in the election that
immediately followed his third term. In this election, the petitioner Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 years after Mayor Socrates
assumed the functions of the office, recall proceedings were initiated against him,
leading to the call for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor in the recall election, but Socrates sought his disqualification on the
ground that he (Hagedorn) had fully served three terms prior to the recall election
and was therefore disqualified to run because of the three-term limit rule. We
decided in Hagedorns favor, ruling that:
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no
longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local
officials, the question asked was whether there would be no further election after
three terms, or whether there would be no immediate reelection after three terms.
xxxx
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth
term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way
in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of
office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.[12]
Latasa v. Commission on Elections[13] presented the novel question of whether
a municipal mayor who had fully served for three consecutive terms could run
as city mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the municipality into a
city. During the third term, the municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood
charter provided that the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover
capacity, continue to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held
for the new city officials. The Court ruled that the conversion of the municipality
into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government
post different from the office of the city mayor the territorial jurisdiction of the city
was the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants were the same group of
voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they were the
same inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held power and authority as
their chief executive for nine years. The Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order
to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow
petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of
the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three
consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and
inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario
sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.[14]
Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates,
that no three-term limit violation results if a rest period or break in the service
between terms or tenure in a given elective post intervened. In Lonzanida, the
petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any elective office for a few months
before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private
respondents lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months,
respectively. Thus, these cases establish that the law contemplates a complete
break from office during which the local elective official steps down and ceases to
exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit.
Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on
Elections,[15] where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the
position of vice-mayor by operation of law. The question posed when he
subsequently ran for councilor was whether his assumption as vice-mayor was an
interruption of his term as councilor that would place him outside the operation of
the three-term limit rule. We ruled that an interruption had intervened so that he
could again run as councilor. This result seemingly deviates from the results in the
cases heretofore discussed since the elective official continued to hold public office
and did not become a private citizen during the interim. The common thread that
identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the elective official vacated the
office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of
law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an interruption that effectively
placed him outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
c. Conclusion Based on Law and Jurisprudence
From all the above, we conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an
elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the
involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his
office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur.
This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to
be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no
more than three consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an example
and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is
an effective interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the
other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective
interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at
least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title,
is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by
law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the
right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render
service. The latter occurs during an office holders term when he retains title to the
office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course,
the term failure to serve cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the
right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is
really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by
structure and substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in
office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by
citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision
should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of
interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position.
The voluntary renunciation it speaks of refers only to the elective officials voluntary
relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the
temporary cessation of the exercise of power or authority that may occur for
various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of them. To
quote Latasa v. Comelec:[16]
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official
steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
[Emphasis supplied].
Preventive Suspension and the Three-Term Limit Rule
a. Nature of Preventive Suspension
Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code,[17] the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[18] or the Ombudsman Act[19] is an interim remedial
measure to address the situation of an official who have been charged
administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the
likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code when the
evidence of guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility
that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. Under
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information (that
requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in court, while under
the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman, the
evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office
may prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile,
but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that
only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled
conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the
interests of the individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes
only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the
officials office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the
preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise
of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is preventively
suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo.
That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is true
in the exercise of all powers and prerogative under the Constitution and the laws.
The imposition of preventive suspension, however, is not an unlimited power; there
are limitations built into the laws[20] themselves that the courts can enforce when
these limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of discretion is
present. In light of this well-defined parameters in the imposition of preventive
suspension, we should not view preventive suspension from the extreme
situation that it can totally deprive an elective office holder of the prerogative to
serve and is thus an effective interruption of an election officials term.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an
elective officials service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned
above, preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the people
being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power
of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective
official has served his three terms in office without any break. Its companion
concept interruption of a term on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If
preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at
all, this common point may be with respect to the discontinuity of service that may
occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and
never intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to
render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term
limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.
b. Preventive Suspension and the Intent of the Three-Term Limit Rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective
officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply
be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office
although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office
within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials
continuity in office is the absence of apermanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and
prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional
violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the
functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision
contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of
them personal and some of them by operation of law that may temporarily prevent
an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that
preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through force
majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary
examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his office
for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different
because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting such
interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of
term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in
implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service
may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may
reduce the enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly
see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.
c. Preventive Suspension and Voluntary Renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve
a voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense
that he may have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the
charge against him. From this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the
element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it
contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely involves the
temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office demands. Thus
viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of voluntary
renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery
of service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are,
by nature, different and non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more
important consideration of how they affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to
render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a
term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit
rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a
term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can
pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an
effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is
easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require
relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an
easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a
preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive
suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more
potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as
an interruption.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-
imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not
interrupt an elective officials term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal
command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to
Asilos certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the
COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by
no less than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of
law.[21]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and
accordingly NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent
Wilfredo F. Asilo is declaredDISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as
Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term. Costs against private
respondent Asilo.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201716 January 8, 2013
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr.
(Abundo) assails and seeks to nullify (1) the February 8, 2012 Resolution1 of the
Second Division, Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010
and (2) the May 10, 2012 Resolution2 of the COMELEC en banc affirming that
division’s disposition. The assailed issuances, in turn, affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010,
in Election Case No. 55 declaring Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit
rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor
of Viga, Catanduanes.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010
national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was
proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga
municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres
(Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo
protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the
winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption
of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30,
2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed
each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy3 for the mayoralty seat
relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s
disqualification to run, the corresponding petition,4 docketed as SPA Case No. 10-
128 (DC), predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010,
the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution5 finding for Abundo, who in the
meantime bested Torres by 219 votes6 and was accordingly proclaimed 2010
mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted
disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private respondent
Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto7 action before the RTC-Br. 43 in
Virac, Catanduanes, docketed as Election Case No. 55, to unseat Abundo on
essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared Abundo
ineligible to serve as municipal mayor, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring
Abelardo Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
SO ORDERED.9
In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,10 found Abundo to have
already served three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007
and 2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term.
Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared winner in the aforesaid 2004 elections
consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and actually served as Viga
mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June 30,
2007, to be exact. To the RTC, the year and a month service constitutes a complete
and full service of Abundo’s second term as mayor.
Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, his recourse docketed as EAC (AE)
No. A-25-2010.
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010, the COMELEC’s Second Division
rendered the first assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 73, Virac, Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.11
Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against Abundo on the
strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the unexpired portion of a term by
a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as service
for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule.
In time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc
per its equally assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012. The fallo of the COMELEC en
banc’s Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for
lack of merit. The Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc held in
essence the following: first, there was no involuntary interruption of Abundo’s
2004-2007 term service which would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as
he is considered never to have lost title to the disputed office after he won in his
election protest; and second, what the Constitution prohibits is for an elective
official to be in office for the same position for more than three consecutive terms
and not to the service of the term.
Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction.
Intervening Events
In the meantime, following the issuance by the COMELEC of its May 10, 2012
Resolution denying Abundo’s motion for reconsideration, the following events
transpired:
1. On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Order13 declaring its May 10, 2012
Resolution final and executory. The following day, June 21, 2012, the COMELEC
issued an Entry of Judgment.14
2. On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for Execution15 with the RTC-Br. 43 in
Virac, Catanduanes.
3. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting on Vega’s counsel’s motion16 filed a day
earlier, issued an Order17 directing the bailiff of ECAD (COMELEC) to personally
deliver the entire records to said RTC.
On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff personally delivered the entire records
of the instant case to, and were duly received by, the clerk of court of RTC-Br. 43.
4. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its receipt of the case records, the RTC-
Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes granted Vega’s Motion for Execution through an
Order18 of even date. And a Writ of Execution19 was issued on the same day.
5. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received the Writ of Execution and served
the same at the office of Mayor Abundo on the same day via substituted service.
6. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO20 enjoining the enforcement of the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
7. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court’s July 3, 2012 Resolution21 and a copy of
the TRO. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar
O. Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths of office22 as mayor and vice-
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively.
8. On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of Abundo’s Seventh (7th) Most Extremely
Urgent Manifestation and Motion23 dated June 28, 2012 praying for the issuance of
a TRO and/or status quo ante Order. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M.
Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes––who had taken their oaths of office
the day before—assumed the posts of mayor and vice-mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes.24
9. On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion (To Admit Attached
Manifestation)25 and Manifestation with Leave to Admit26 dated July 5, 2012 stating
that the TRO thus issued by the Court has become functus officio owing to the
execution of the RTC’s Decision in Election Case No. 55.
10. On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his Comment/Opposition with Leave to the
Petitioner’s Prayer for the Issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order27 reiterating the
argument that since Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O.
Cervantes already assumed the posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes, then a Status Quo Ante Order would serve no purpose.
11. On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most Urgent Manifestation and Motion to
Convert the July 3, 2012 TRO into a Status Quo Ante Order (In View of the
Unreasonable and Inappropriate Progression of Events).28
It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Abundo was dislodged from his
post as incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. To be sure, the speed which
characterized Abundo’s ouster despite the supervening issuance by the Court of a
TRO on July 3, 2012 is not lost on the Court. While it is not clear whether Vice-
Mayor Tarin and First Councilor Cervantes knew of or put on notice about the TRO
either before they took their oaths of office on July 4, 2012 or before assuming the
posts of mayor and vice-mayor on July 5, 2012, the confluence of events following
the issuance of the assailed COMELEC en banc irresistibly tends to show that the
TRO––issued as it were to maintain the status quo, thus averting the premature
ouster of Abundo pending this Court’s resolution of his appeal––appears to have
been trivialized.
On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment on Abundo’s petition, followed
not long after by public respondent COMELEC’s Consolidated Comment.29
The Issues
Abundo raises the following grounds for the allowance of the petition:
6.1 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared the arguments in Abundo’s motion
for reconsideration as mere rehash and reiterations of the claims he raised prior to
the promulgation of the Resolution.
6.2 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has consecutively served
for three terms despite the fact that he only served the remaining one year and one
month of the second term as a result of an election protest.30
First Issue:
Arguments in Motion for Reconsideration Not Mere Reiteration
The COMELEC en banc denied Abundo’s motion for reconsideration on the basis
that his arguments in said motion are mere reiterations of what he already brought
up in his appeal Brief before the COMELEC Second Division. In this petition,
petitioner claims otherwise.
Petitioner’s assertion is devoid of merit.
A comparison of Abundo’s arguments in the latter’s Brief vis-à-vis those in his
Motion for Reconsideration (MR) reveals that the arguments in the MR are
elucidations and amplications of the same issues raised in the brief. First, in his
Brief, Abundo raised the sole issue of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to consider the
quo warranto case since the alleged violation of the three-term limit has already
been rejected by the COMELEC First Division in SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), while in
his MR, Abundo raised the similar ground of the conclusiveness of the COMELEC’s
finding on the issue of his qualification to run for the current term. Second, in his
Brief, Abundo assailed RTC’s reliance on Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued
that the Court’s pronouncement in Aldovino, Jr., which dealt with preventive
suspension, is not applicable to the instant case as it involves only a partial service
of the term. Abundo argued in his Brief that his situation cannot be equated with
the case of preventive suspension as held in Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he
argued before that the almost two years which he did not sit as mayor during the
2004-2007 term is an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term.
Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the issues in the MR are a rehash of those
in the Brief.
Core Issue:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms
The pivotal determinative issue then is whether the service of a term less than the
full three years by an elected official arising from his being declared as the duly
elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for
purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local
officials.
On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of what
otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous mayorship was
effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title
to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after
due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the
electorate.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found
in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. —
xxxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis Ours.)
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the
aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.31
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the
different factual milieus, has its complicated side. We shall revisit and analyze the
various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the Court on the matter.
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of
the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official
for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service for three consecutive
terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official concerned was elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however, the
Court stated the observation that the law "does not textually state that voluntary
renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect
‘continuity of service for a full term’ for purposes of the three-term limit rule."32
As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections,33 the principle behind the three-
term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution
prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Put a bit differently, an elective local official
cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth
term,34albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position after the
election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by
reason of the prohibition.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the
official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official
does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic
law is unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected." This qualification was
made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-
term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a
voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be
brought about by certain events or causes.
While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a
host of disputes resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local officials
who were elected and served for three terms or more, but whose terms or service
was punctuated by what they view as involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them
to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term. Involuntary
interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or
assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the
defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest, declaration of the
proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest, proclamation of a
non-candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the official by operation
of law, and other analogous causes.
This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein such
consecutive terms were considered or not considered as having been "involuntarily
interrupted or broken."
(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr.35 (1998) and
Montebon v. Commission on Elections36 (2008), the Court delved on the effects of
"assumption to office by operation of law" on the three-term limit rule. This
contemplates a situation wherein an elective local official fills by succession a
higher local government post permanently left vacant due to any of the following
contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.37
In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January
18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco became
mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja.
Capco was then elected and served as mayor for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.
When Capco expressed his intention to run again for the mayoralty position during
the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then also a candidate for
mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification for violation of the three-term limit rule.
Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the disqualification rule to apply, "it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply."38 There was, the Court ruled, no
violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was not elected to the office of the
mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of
law"39 when a permanent vacancy occurred in that office.
The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case of Montebon. There,
Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of
Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January
2004, or during his second term, Montebon succeeded and assumed the position of
vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon
filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor, a petition for
disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. The Court
ruled that Montebon’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an
interruption of his continuity of service as councilor. The Court emphasized that
succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an
involuntary severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to
vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vice-mayor, his occupation
of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation
of his position as councilor.
(2) Recall Election
With reference to the effects of recall election on the continuity of service,
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections40(2002) and the aforementioned case of
Socrates (2002) provide guidance.
In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected and served as mayor of Lucena
City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost
to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended, a recall
election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired
term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy
was challenged on the ground he had already served as mayor for three
consecutive terms for violation of the three term-limit rule. The Court held therein
that the remainder of Tagarao’s term after the recall election during which Talaga
served as mayor should not be considered for purposes of applying the three-term
limit rule. The Court emphasized that the continuity of Talaga’s mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat during the 1998 elections.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Socrates. The petitioners in that
case assailed the COMELEC Resolution which declared Edward Hagedorn qualified
to run for mayor in a recall election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been elected
and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-
1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle,
Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in
which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates
faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the
former’s unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification
under the three-term limit rule.
In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled:
x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private
citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes
over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of
Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a
private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s
service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition.41
The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an elective local official cannot
seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the
next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term and, hence, any subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer covered
x x x."42
(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City
On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute
an interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity of service. The Court said so in
Latasa v. Commission on Elections43 (2003).
Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and
served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-1995,
1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During his third term, Digos was converted into a
component city, with the corresponding cityhood law providing the holdover of
elective officials. When Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy as mayor for the
2001 elections, the Court declared Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of Digos
City for violation of the three-term limit rule on the basis of the following
ratiocination:
This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal
mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion.
However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also
assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for
even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never
ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never ceased
from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
(Emphasis supplied.)
(4) Period of Preventive Suspension
In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused the doctrine that the period
during which a local elected official is under preventive suspension cannot be
considered as an interruption of the continuity of his service. The Court explained
why so:
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective
official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply
be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office
although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office
within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s
continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.44 (Emphasis supplied.)
(5) Election Protest
With regard to the effects of an election protest vis-à-vis the three-term limit rule,
jurisprudence presents a more differing picture. The Court’s pronouncements in
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections45 (1999), Ong v. Alegre46 (2006), Rivera III v.
Commission on Elections47 (2007) and Dizon v. Commission on Elections48 (2009), all
protest cases, are illuminating.
In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However,
his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was eventually
declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of
elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998
elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and
writ of execution it issued. Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder
of the term. In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of
candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the
ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same
post. The Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must
concur for the three-term limit to apply: "1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that
he has fully served three consecutive terms."49
In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent in the
case of Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having
been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections since his assumption of
office as mayor "cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but
by reason of a void proclamation." And as a corollary point, the Court stated that
Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having been ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the term, a situation which amounts to an
involuntary relinquishment of office.This Court deviated from the ruling in
Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre50 owing to a variance in the factual situations attendant.
In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and served as mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004. During the 1998
mayoralty elections, or during his supposed second term, the COMELEC nullified
Ong’s proclamation on the postulate that Ong lost during the 1998 elections.
However, the COMELEC’s decision became final and executory on July 4, 2001,
when Ong had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already
starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San
Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position as
mayor, which his opponent opposed for violation of the three-term limit rule.
Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he could not be considered as
having served as mayor from 1998-2001 because he was not duly elected to the
post and merely assumed office as a "presumptive winner." Dismissing Ong’s
argument, the Court held that his assumption of office as mayor for the term 1998-
2001 constitutes "service for the full term" and hence, should be counted for
purposes of the three-term limit rule. The Court modified the conditions stated in
Lonzanida in the sense that Ong’s service was deemed and counted as service for a
full term because Ong’s proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the term.
The Court noted that the COMELEC decision which declared Ong as not having won
the 1998 elections was "without practical and legal use and value" promulgated as
it was after the contested term has expired. The Court further reasoned:
Petitioner Francis Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the
1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less
than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation as the duly elected mayor in the 1998
mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise
of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as
service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern.
Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would – under the three-term rule - be
considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral
protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation
made in due course after an election.51 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and ruled that the case of Ong was
different, to wit:
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For
one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the
stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence thereof, the
proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for
him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a
result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the
continuity of service.52 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ong’s slight departure from Lonzanida would later find reinforcement in the
consolidated cases of Rivera III v. Commission on Elections53 and Dee v.
Morales.54 Therein, Morales was elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the
following consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004. In relation to
the 2004 elections, Morales again ran as mayor of the same town, emerged as
garnering the majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor for term
commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo warranto was later
filed against Morales predicated on the ground that he is ineligible to run for a
"fourth" term, having served as mayor for three consecutive terms. In his answer,
Morales averred that his supposed 1998-2001 term cannot be considered against
him, for, although he was proclaimed by the Mabalacat board of canvassers as
elected mayor vis-à-vis the 1998 elections and discharged the duties of mayor until
June 30, 2001, his proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and
his closest rival, Anthony Dee, proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Pursuing his
point, Morales parlayed the idea that he only served as a mere caretaker.
The Court found Morales’ posture untenable and held that the case of Morales
presents a factual milieu similar with Ong, not with Lonzanida. For ease of
reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong, in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like
Morales, had served the three-year term from the start to the end of the term.
Hence, the Court concluded that Morales exceeded the three-term limit rule, to
wit:
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001.
He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for
the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest
case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as
held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in
serving the full term.
xxxx
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of
Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month,
by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous
years.55 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being belatedly ousted, i.e., after the
expiry of the term, cannot constitute an interruption in Morales’ service of the full
term; neither can Morales, as he argued, be considered merely a "caretaker of the
office" or a mere "de facto officer" for purposes of applying the three-term limit
rule.
In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on Elections,56 the Court would again
find the same Mayor Morales as respondent in a disqualification proceeding when
he ran again as a mayoralty candidate during the 2007 elections for a term ending
June 30, 2010. Having been unseated from his post by virtue of this Court’s ruling in
Rivera, Morales would argue this time around that the three-term limit rule was no
longer applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This time, the Court ruled in his
favor, holding that for purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term limit rule was
no longer a disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court wrote:
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office
with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May
2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice
mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor
from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the
office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted
Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of
1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.57 (Emphasis supplied)
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting
consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely
assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his
service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be
treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and
statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term
limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his
assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation
of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not
seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a
recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he
had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall
election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to
a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of
service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s
continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of
suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during
this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes
office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted
from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the
unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida
and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or
for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time,
provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service
(Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes
final after said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the
election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve
the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted
in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came
after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
The Case of Abundo
Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling that he had
already served three consecutive terms and is, thus, barred by the constitutional
three-term limit rule to run for the current 2010-2013 term. In gist, Abundo
arguments run thusly:
1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former dealt with
preventive suspension which does not interrupt the continuity of service of a term;
2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be interrupted so
as to remove him from the reach of the constitutional three-term limitation;
3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of "term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its
reliance on a mere portion of the Decision and not on the unified logic in the
disquisition;
4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida58 and Rivera III
v. Commission on Elections.59
5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no interruption in
the service of Abundo since what he considered as an "interruption" of his 2004-
2007 term occurred before his term started; and
6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation was
adjudged invalid was interrupted while that of the protestant (Abundo) who was
eventually proclaimed winner was not so interrupted is at once absurd as it is
illogical.
Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of
Aldovino, Jr. finds application in the instant case. The COMELEC ruled that Abundo
did not lose title to the office as his victory in the protest case confirmed his
entitlement to said office and he was only unable to temporarily discharge the
functions of the office during the pendency of the election protest.
We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an election
protest, for which the rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera and Dizon appear to be
more attuned than the case of Aldovino Jr., the interrupting effects of the
imposition of a preventive suspension being the very lis mota in the Aldovino, Jr.
case. But just the same, We find that Abundo’s case presents a different factual
backdrop.
Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals
subject of disqualification were candidates who lost in the election protest and
each declared loser during the elections, Abundo was the winner during the
election protest and was declared the rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike
Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both unseated toward the end of
their respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and
had assumed the remainder of the term.
Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s pronouncements in the past as
instructive, and consider several doctrines established from the 1998 case of Borja,
Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving at
this Court’s conclusion.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the
"monopolization of political power" and prevent elected officials from breeding
"proprietary interest in their position"60 but also to "enhance the people’s freedom
of choice."61 In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "while people should be
protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should be
taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed."62
In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that
the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor
should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case
from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term
starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor. Otherwise how
explain his victory in his election protest against Torres and his consequent
proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the first requisite for the
application of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the official
has been elected is satisfied.
This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had served for
"three consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically understood, as mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes immediately before the 2010 national and local elections. Subsumed
to this issue is of course the question of whether or not there was an effective
involuntary interruption during the three three-year periods, resulting in the
disruption of the continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July
2004-June 2007 term.
There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the
enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed
the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or
for a period of a little over one year and one month. Consequently, unlike Mayor
Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was
able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals,63 means, in a legal sense, "a fixed
and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an
office."64 It also means the "time during which the officer may claim to hold office
as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another."65 It is the period of time during which a duly elected official
has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of
Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local elected officials is three (3) years starting from
noon of June 30 of the first year of said term.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30,
2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that
he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to
the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple:
during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume
the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner.
Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor
only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected
candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one
month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected
officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-
2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent
actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption
of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the
context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term threshold.67
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of
interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of service. The word interruption
means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension.68 To interrupt is to
obstruct, thwart or prevent.69 When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of
interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of the service
by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or
giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word
"renunciation" connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To
renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or resign.70 Voluntary renunciation of the
office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title
to the office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official
is entitled to.
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, applying Aldovino, Jr.,71 held:
It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which jurisprudence
deems an exception to the three-term limit rule, implies that the service of the
term has begun before it was interrupted. Here, the respondent did not lose title to
the office. As the assailed Resolution states:
In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to the office. On
the contrary, he actively sought entitlement to the office when he lodged the
election protest case. And respondent-appellant’s victory in the said case is a final
confirmation that he was validly elected for the mayoralty post of Viga,
Catanduanes in 2004-2007. At most, respondent-appellant was only unable to
temporarily discharge the functions of the office to which he was validly elected
during the pendency of the election protest, but he never lost title to the said
office.72(Emphasis added.)
The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that the actual
length of service by the public official in a given term is immaterial by reckoning
said service for the term in the application of the three-term limit rule, thus:
As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this formulation—no more than three
consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible
rule." Therefore we cannot subscribe to the argument that since respondent
Abundo served only a portion of the term, his 2004-2007 "term" should not be
considered for purposes of the application of the three term limit rule. When the
framers of the Constitution drafted and incorporated the three term limit rule, it is
clear that reference is to the term, not the actual length of the service the public
official may render. Therefore, one’s actual service of term no matter how long or
how short is immaterial.73
In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of the
actual service of the term is immaterial in his case as he was only temporarily
unable to discharge his functions as mayor.
The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not
commend themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot simply find its way clear
to understand the poll body’s determination that Abundo was only temporarily
unable to discharge his functions as mayor during the pendency of the election
protest.
As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest
grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term.
Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the
2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual
service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary
interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the
full 2004-2007 term.
This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that
pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to
being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004
elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years
or from July 1, 2004—the start of the term—until May 9, 2006 or during which his
opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen
warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if
declared later as having the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004,
such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election
protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to
said position.
Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondent’s cause of action, or to
COMELEC’s resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the Court succinctly defines
what temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective
office means, thus:
On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions
of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective
interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at
least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title,
is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by
law.74
We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply
to the instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was
temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective post. For
one, during the intervening period of almost two years, reckoned from the start of
the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty
office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the
legal right to assume and serve such elective office. For another, not having been
declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one
cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all
intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in the election protest accords
him title to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not entitled
to the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his
favor.1âwphi1
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed
effective interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and served barely February 8, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections Second Division and
over a year of the remaining term. At this juncture, We observe the apparent May 10, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-
similarities of Mayor Abundo’s case with the cases of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and 25-2010 and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes,
Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn were not proclaimed Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55, are hereby REVERSED and
winners since they were non-candidates in the regularelections. They were SET ASIDE.
proclaimed winners during the recall elections and clearly were not able to fully
serve the terms of the deposed incumbent officials. Similar to their cases where the Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of
Court deemed their terms as involuntarily interrupted, Abundo also became or was Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is
a private citizen during the period over which his opponent was serving as mayor. If accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. Withal, Emeterio
M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes are ordered to immediately vacate the positions of
in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanida’s service
Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively, and shall revert to their
because of his subsequent defeat in the election protest, then with more reason,
original positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor, respectively, upon receipt of
Abundo’s term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted since he was not
this Decision.
proclaimed winner after the 2004 elections and was able to assume the office and
serve only for a little more than a year after winning the protest.
The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED.
As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the "law
This Decision is immediately executory.
contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from
office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the SO ORDERED.
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit."75 Applying the said
principle in the present case, there is no question that during the pendency of the
election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good
people of Viga, Catanduanes.
Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be G.R. No. 207851, July 08, 2014
considered as a rest period or break in his service because, as earlier stated, prior to
ANGEL G. NAVAL, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B.
the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundo’s opponent, Torres, who was
JULIA,Respondents.
exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.
DECISION
As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case differs from other cases involving
the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was, in the final reckoning, REYES, J.:
the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to
serve his constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of an imperfect A politician thinks of the next election –
election system. While admittedly the Court does not possess the mandate to a statesman of the next generation.
remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority - James Freeman Clarke, American preacher and author
to establish a fortress against the injustices it may bring.
In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and cause grave
injustice to Abundo––an elected official who was belatedly declared as the winner The Case
and assumed office for only a short period of the term. If in the cases of Lonzanida
and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of a losing candidate––or the person who was
A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more than three
adjudged not legally entitled to hold the contested public office but held it anyway–
consecutive terms. But then, the Court is now called upon to resolve the following
–We find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant who, by
questions. First. What are the consequences to the provincial board member’s
popular vote, deserves title to the public office but whose opportunity to hold the
eligibility to run for the same elective position if the legislative district, which
same was halted by an invalid proclamation.
brought him or her to office to serve the first two consecutive terms, be
Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the injustice reapportioned in such a way that 8 out of its 10 town constituencies are carved out
that may likewise be committed against the people of Viga, Catanduanes by and renamed as another district? Second. Is the provincial board member’s election
depriving them of their right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of the to the same position for the third and fourth time, but now in representation of the
Constitution, We bear in mind that We "cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right to renamed district, a violation of the three-term limit rule?
decide what the people want"76 and hence, should, as much as possible, "allow the
people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance
curtail the power when it overreaches itself."77 For democracy draws strength from of a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction1 filed under
the choice the people make which is the same choice We are likewise bound to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to assail the following resolutions of the public
protect. respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC):
(a) Resolution2 (first assailed resolution) issued by the Second Division on District.
March 5, 2013, in SPA No. 13-166 (DC), granting the petition filed by Nelson
B. Julia (Julia), seeking to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy3 (COC) as In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur (Sanggunian) the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.
of Angel G. Naval (Naval), who is allegedly violating the three-term limit
imposed upon elective local officials as provided for in Article X, Section In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of
84of the 1987 Constitution, and Section 43(b)5 of the Local Government the Sanggunian, Third District.
Code (LGC); and
Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the
(b) En Banc Resolution6 (second assailed resolution) issued on June 5, 2013, 2013 elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus
denying Naval’s Motion for Reconsideration7 to the Resolution dated Election Code (OEC) and filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due
March 5, 2013. Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy11 of Naval. Julia posited that Naval
had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms
as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected
Antecedents from. The three-term limit rule’s application is more with reference to the same
local elective post, and not necessarily in connection with an identical territorial
jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as aSanggunian member for the fourth time is
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the
member of theSanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. LGC, which must be strictly construed.12
On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716,8 which The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur in the following
manner:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the first assailed resolution issued on March 5, 2013, the COMELEC Second
Division cancelled Naval’s COC on grounds stated below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
District Before the Enactment of After the Enactment of
R.A. No. 9716 R.A. No. 9716 [W]hen a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is eligible for the
elective posts he seeks, while, in reality, he knowingly lacks the necessary
1st Libmanan, Minalabac, Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi, requirements for eligibility, he commits a false material misrepresentation
Pamplona, Pasacao, San Sipocot, Cabusao cognizable under Section 78 of the [OEC].
Fernando, Del Gallego, Ragay,
Lupi, Sipocot, Cabusao xxxx
disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive
political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to
perpetuate his tenure in office. The framers also considered the necessity of the
enhancement of the freedom of choice of the electorate by broadening the
selection of would-be elective public officers. By rendering ineligible for public
office those who have been elected and served for three consecutive terms in the
same public elective post, the prohibition seeks to infuse new blood in the political
arena.
xxxx
x x x [T]he new Third District where [Naval] was elected and has served is composed
of the same municipalities comprising the previous Second District, absent the
towns Gainza and [Milaor]. The territorial jurisdiction [Naval] seeks to serve for the
term 2013-2016 is the same as the territorial jurisdiction he previously served. The
electorate who voted for him in 2004, 2007 and 2010 is the same electorate who
shall vote for him come May 13, 2013 Elections. They are the same group of voters
who elected him into office for three consecutive terms.
The resolution of this Commission in the case of Bandillo, et al[.] v. Hernandez (SPA
No. 10-078)13 cannot be applied in the case at bar. Hernandez who then hailed from
Libmanan belonged to the First District of Camarines Sur. With Republic Act 9716,
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao and San Fernando, all originally
belonging to the First District, were merged with Gainza and Milaor to form the
Second District. With the addition of the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor, it
cannot be said that the previous First District became the Second District only by
name. The voters of Gainza and Milaor added to the electorate of the new Second
District formed a different electorate, different from the one which voted for
Hernandez in the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections. In the case at bar, the
municipalities comprising the new Third District are the same municipalities that
consisted of the previous Second [District], absent Milaor and Gainza.

The Supreme Court[,] in the case of Lonzanida v. [COMELEC][,] detailed the The Supreme Court, in Latasa v. [COMELEC], ruled that the conversion of the
2nd Naga City, Pili, Ocampo, Libmanan, Minalabac,
important components of [Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution]: municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local
Camaligan, Canaman, Pamplona, Pasacao, San
government post different from the office of the city mayor[.]
Magarao, Bombon, Fernando, Gainza, Milaor
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
Calabanga,9Gainza, Milaor
must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive x x x x14 (Citations omitted)
terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
3rd Caramoan, Garchitorena, Goa, Naga City, Pili, Ocampo,
consecutive terms. It stated:
Lagonoy, Presentacion, Sangay, Camaligan, Canaman,
San Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac, Magarao, Bombon, Calabanga To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to The Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
Siruma the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
In the second assailed resolution issued on June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en
4th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan, Bato, Caramoan, Garchitorena, Goa, terms in an elective local office[;] he must also have been elected to the same
banc denied Naval’s Motion for Reconsideration to the above. The COMELEC
Buhi, Bula, Nabua Lagonoy, Presentacion, Sangay, position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. x x x
pointed out that absent the verification required under Section 3, Rule 19 of the
San Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac,
x x x The first requisite does not only describe a candidate who has been elected for COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Naval’s motion was instantly dismissible.
Siruma
public office for three consecutive terms. The candidate must have been elected in Nonetheless, the COMELEC proceeded to discuss the demerits of Naval’s
the same local government post. This connotes that the candidate must have been motion, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
5th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan, Bato,
in the same elective position serving the same constituency who elected him to
Buhi, Bula, Nabua The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in the
office for three consecutive terms.
instant case as the records clearly establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th time
for the same government post. To put things in a proper perspective, it is
xxxx
Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the imperative to review and discuss the salient points in the case of Latasa v.
present Third District. The present Second District is composed of the two [COMELEC]. The case involves the question of whether or not a municipal mayor,
The three-term limit rule was designed by the framers of the Constitution to
remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First having been elected and had already served for three (3) consecutive terms, can
prevent the monopoly of power centered only on a chosen few. The said
run as city mayor in light of the conversion of the municipality to a city. In applying
the three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out that the conversion of the
municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local
government post different from the office of the city mayor. The Court took into
account the following circumstances: (1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city
was the same as that of the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same
group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for three (3) consecutive terms;
and (3) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters [over] whom he held
power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
Anchoring from the said case, it is therefore clear that the position to which [Naval]
has filed his candidacy for the 13 May 2013 x x x Elections is the same position for
which he had been elected and had served for the past nine (9) years.
xxxx
x x x The following circumstances establish that the subject posts are one and the
same: First, the territorial jurisdictions of the two (2) districts are the same except
for the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor which were excluded by R.A. No. 9716;
Second, the inhabitants of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur, where [Naval] is
presently running as member of the [Sanggunian], are the same voters who elected
him for the past three (3) consecutive terms; and Lastly, the inhabitants of the [3rd]
District are the same group of voters whom [Naval] had served as member of the
[Sanggunian] representing the 2nd District.
x x x The enactment of R.A. No. 9716 did not convert [Naval’s] post [into one]
different from [w]hat he [previously had]. As correctly ruled by the Commission
(Second Division), [Naval] ha[d] already been elected and ha[d] already served in
the same government post for three consecutive terms, x x x[.]
x x x x.15 (Citations omitted)
Unperturbed, Naval is now before the Court raising the issues of whether or not
the COMELEC gravely erred and ruled contrary to law and jurisprudence:
I. IN FINDING THAT NAVAL HAD ALREADY SERVED FOR THREE
CONSECUTIVE TERMS IN THE SAME GOVERNMENT POST;16
II. IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT SANGGUNIAN MEMBERS ARE ELECTED BY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS;17 and
III. WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PROHIBITION CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 8,
ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 43(B) OF THE LGC
APPLIES TO NAVAL.18
The Arguments of the Contending Parties
In support of the instant petition, Naval alleges that the First, Second and Third
Legislative Districts of Camarines Sur are not merely renamed but are composed of
new sets of municipalities. With the separation of Gainza and Milaor from the other
eight towns which used to comprise the Second District, the voters from the Third
Legislative District are no longer the same ones as those who had elected him to
office in the 2004 and 2007 elections.
Naval further invokes Article 9419 of Administrative Order No. 270 prescribing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the LGC to argue that Sanggunian members
are elected by districts. Thus, the right to choose representatives in
the Sanggunian pertains to each of the districts. Naval was elected
as Sanggunian member in 2004 and 2007 by the Second District. In 2010 and 2013,
it was the Third District, which brought him to office. Essentially then, Naval’s
election in 2013 is merely his second term as Sanggunian member for the Third
District.
Naval likewise cites Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC20 to point out that for the disqualification
on the ground of the three-term limit to apply, it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, but it is also required
that he or she had been elected to the same position for the same number of
times.21
Naval also assails as erroneous the COMELEC’s interpretations of the rulings
in Latasa v. COMELEC22and Bandillo, et al. v. Hernandez.23 In Latasa, the Court
applied the three-term prohibition only because notwithstanding the conversion of
the Municipality of Digos into a city, the mayor was to serve the same territorial
jurisdiction and constituents. Naval asserts that the same does not hold true in his
case. Naval further avers that in Bandillo, which finds more application in the
instant petition, the COMELEC ruled that the three-term limit cannot be invoked in
a situation where the legislative districts have been altered. An extraction or an
addition both yields a change in the composition of the voters.
Naval further emphasizes that he garnered the majority of the votes from his
constituents, whose will and mandate should be upheld. Besides, Julia’s counsel
already withdrew his appearance, indicating no less than his client’s lack of interest
in still pursuing Naval’s ouster from office.24
In its Comment,25 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the denial of the
instant petition. The OSG contends that Naval had been elected and had fully
served the same local elective post for three consecutive terms. Naval thus violated
Section 78 of the OEC when he filed his COC despite knowledge of his ineligibility.
Naval’s reliance on Bandillo is also misplaced since in the said case, two towns were
instead added to form a new district. Apparently then, in Bandillo, there was a new
set of voters. The OSG also alleges that Naval is not entitled to the issuance of
injunctive reliefs by this Court. No clear and unmistakable right pertains to Naval
and it is his eligibility to be elected asSanggunian member for the Third District
which is the issue at hand.
Ruling of the Court
The Court denies the petition.
As the issues are interrelated, they shall be discussed jointly.
The case before this Court is one of first impression. While the contending parties
cite Latasa, Lonzanida v. COMELEC,26 Borja, Aldovino, Jr. v.
COMELEC,27 and Bandillo, which all involve the application of the three-term limit
rule, the factual and legal circumstances in those cases are different and the
doctrinal values therein do not directly address the issues now at hand.
In Latasa, the issue arose as a result of the conversion of a municipality into a city.
The then municipal mayor attempted to evade the application upon him of the
three-term limit rule by arguing that the position of a city mayor was not the same
as the one he previously held. The Court was not convinced and, thus, declared that
there was no interruption of the incumbent mayor’s continuity of service.
In Lonzanida, a candidate ran for the mayoralty post and won in three consecutive
elections. While serving his third term, his opponent filed an election protest.
Months before the expiration of the mayor’s third term, he was ousted from office.
He ran again for the same post in the immediately succeeding election. A petition
was thereafter filed assailing his eligibility to run as mayor on the ground of
violation of the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that the mayor could not be
considered as having served a full third term. An interruption for any length of time,
if due to an involuntary cause, is enough to break the elected official’s continuity of
service.
In Borja, the mayor of Pateros died and was succeeded in office by the vice mayor.
In the two immediately succeeding elections, the latter vied for and won the
mayoralty post. When he ran for the same position for the third time, his
disqualification was sought for alleged violation of the three-term limit rule. The
Court ruled that when he assumed the position of mayor by virtue of succession,
his service should not be treated as one full term. For the disqualification to apply,
the candidate should have been thrice elected for and had served the same post
consecutively.
In Aldovino, preventive suspension was imposed upon an elected municipal
councilor. The Court ruled that the said suspension did not interrupt the elective
official’s term. Although he was barred from exercising the functions of the position
during the period of suspension, his continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected.
In Bandillo, a case decided by the COMELEC, Gainza and Milaor were added to five
of the ten towns, which used to comprise Camarines Sur’s old First District, to form
the new Second District. The COMELEC declined to apply the three-term limit rule
against the elected Provincial Board member on the ground that the addition of
Gainza and Milaor distinctively created a new district, with an altered territory and
constituency.
In the case before this Court, the task is to determine the application of the three-
term limit rule upon local elective officials in renamed and/or reapportioned
districts. In the process of doing so, it is inevitable to discuss the role of elections
and the nature of public office in a democratic and republican state like ours.
The Role of Elections in our
Democratic and Republican
State, and the Restraints Imposed
Upon Those Who Hold Public Office
The Court begins with general and undeniable principles.
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.28
Then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the character of a republican
state and a public office, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people.
It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The
essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the
citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the
people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they
are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican
government is a responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their
position as a public trust and shall, according to the Constitution, ‘at all times be
accountable to the people’ they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican
government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare
according to the will of the people themselves.29 (Emphasis ours and italics in the
original)
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,30 Justice Puno likewise characterized the role of the
electoral process in the following wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and republican
framework because it is through the act of voting that government by consent is
secured. Through the ballot, people express their will on the defining issues of the
day and they are able to choose their leaders in accordance with the fundamental
principle of representative democracy that the people should elect whom they
please to govern them. Voting has an important instrumental value in preserving
the viability of constitutional democracy. It has traditionally been taken as a prime
indicator of democratic participation.31(Citations omitted and italics ours)
The importance of elections cannot therefore be over emphasized. Thus,
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise
of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. x x
x.32 (Italics ours)
Hence, while it is settled that in elections, the first consideration of every
democratic polity is to give effect to the expressed will of the majority, there are
limitations to being elected to a public office.33Our Constitution and statutes are
explicit anent the existence of term limits, the nature of public office, and the
guarantee from the State that citizens shall have equal access to public
service.34Section 8, Article X of our Constitution, on term limits, is significantly
reiterated by Section 43(b) of the LGC. Moreover, the Court has time and again
declared that a public office is a public trust and not a vested property right.35
The Deliberations of the Members
of the Constitutional Commission on the
Three-Term Limit’s Application to Local
Elective Officials
Following are entries in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission regarding the
exchanges of the members on the subject of the three-term limit rule imposed on
local elective officials:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
VOTING ON THE TERMS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
With respect to local officials, Mr. Nolledo, informed that the Committee on Local
Governments had not decided on the term of office for local officials and suggested
that the Body decide on the matter.
xxxx
On Mr. Bacani’s inquiry regarding local officials, Mr. Davide explained that local
officials would include the governor, vice-governor and the members of the
provincial board; the city mayor, city vice-mayor and members of the city board;
and the municipal mayor, municipal vice mayor and members of the municipal
council. He stated that barangay officials would be governed by special law, to
which Mr. Nolledo agreed.
xxxx
MOTION TO VOTE ON THE PROPOSALS RELATIVE TO ALTERNATIVE NO. 3
In reply to Mr. Guingona’s query on whether the Committee had decided on the
interpretation of “two reelections”, Mr. Davide suggested that the matter be
submitted to a vote.
Thereupon, Mr. Romulo moved for a vote on whether Alternative No. 3 as
proposed by Mr. Garcia, would allow a local official three terms, after which he
would not be allowed to seek any reelection; or whether, as interpreted by Mr.
Davide, it would mean that after two successive reelections or a consecutive
period of nine years, he could run for reelection after the lapse of three years.
xxxx
RESTATEMENT OF THE PROPOSALS
Mr. Garcia reiterated that the local officials could be reelected twice, after which,
they would be barred from ever running for reelection.
On the other proposal, Mr. Davide, on behalf of the Committee, stated that local
officials after two reelections would be allowed to run for reelection after the
lapse of three years.
xxxx
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed
to the consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives and local officials,
namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms),
and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms).
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. GARCIA ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 1
Mr. Garcia stated that he was advocating Alternative No. 1 on four grounds: 1) to
prevent monopoly of political power because the country’s history showed that
prolonged stay in public office could lead to the creation of entrenched
preserves of political dynasties; 2) to broaden the choice so that more people could
be enlisted to the cause of public service; 3) no one is indispensable in running the
affairs of the country and that reliance on personalities would be avoided; and 4)
the disqualification from running for reelection after three terms would create a
reserve of statesmen both in the local and national levels.
He added that the turnover in public office after nine years would ensure the
introduction of new ideas and approaches. He stressed that public office would no
longer be a preserve of conservatism and tradition, and that public service would
no longer be limited to those directly holding public office, but would also include
consultative bodies organized by the people.
INQUIRY OF MR. REGALADO
In reply to Mr. Regalado’s query whether the three terms need not be served
consecutively, Mr. Garcia answered in the affirmative.
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. MONSOD ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 2
Mr. Monsod stated that while the new Constitution would recognize people power
because of a new awareness, a new kind of voter and a new kind of Filipino, at the
same time, it pre-screens the candidates among whom the people would choose
by barring those who would have served for nine years from being reelected. He
opined that this would actually require an additional qualification for office to a
certain number of people.
He stressed that, while the stand of the Commission is to create a reserve of
statesmen, their future participation is actually limited to some areas and only for a
certain period of time. He added that it is not for the Commission to decide on the
future of our countrymen who may have more years ahead of them to serve the
country.
xxxx
INQUIRY OF MR. OPLE
xxxx
Thereupon, speaking in support of Mr. Monsod’s manifestation, Mr. Ople
expressed apprehension over the Body’s exercise of some sort of omnipotent
power in disqualifying those who will have served their tasks. He opined that the
Commission had already taken steps to prevent the accumulation of powers and
prequisites that would permit officials to stay on indefinitely and to transfer them
to members of their families. He opined, however, that perpetual disqualification
would deprive the people of their freedom of choice. He statedthat the Body had
already succeeded in striking a balance on policies which could ensure a
redistribution of opportunities to the people both in terms of political and
economic power. He stated that Philippine politics had been unshackled from the
two-party system, which he said was the most critical support for the perpetuation
of political dynasties. Considering that such achievement is already a victory, Mr.
Ople stated that the role of political parties should not be despised because the
strength of democracy depends on how strong political parties are, that a
splintering thereof will mean a great loss to the vitality and resiliency of democracy.
Mr. Ople reiterated that he was against perpetual disqualification from office.
x x x x.
MR. GARCIA’S RESPONSE TO MR. OPLE’S STATEMENTS
Mr. Garcia stated that there are two principles involved in Alternative No. 1: 1 )
therecognition of the ambivalent nature of political power, and 2) the recognition
of alternative forms of public service. He stated that it is important to remember
the lessons learned from the recent past; that public service is service to the people
and not an opportunity to accumulate political power, and that a prolonged stay in
public office brings about political dynasties or vested interests. Regarding political
parties, he stated that it will encourage the constant renewal of blood in party
leadership, approach, style and ideas. He opined that this is very healthy for a
pluralist and multi-party democracy.
On the recognition of alternative forms of public service, Mr. Garcia stressed that
public service could be limited to public office since many good leaders who were in
the streets and in jail fought against the dictatorship. He stressed that public service
would also mean belonging to consultative bodies or people’s councils which
brought about new forms of service and leadership.
REMARKS OF MR. ABUBAKAR
Mr. Abubakar stated that in any democracy the voice of the people is the voice of
God. He stated that if the people want to elect a representative to serve them
continuously, the Commission should not arrogate unto itself the right to decide
what the people want. He stated that in the United States, a Senator had served for
30 years.
xxxx
REMARKS OF MS. AQUINO
Ms. Aquino stated that she differs from the views advanced by Mr. Garcia and Ms.
Tan, although she stated that they spoke of the same premises. She stated that she
agrees with them that leaders need not be projected and developed publicly in an
election as leaders are better tempered and tested in the various forms of mass
struggles and organized work. She stated that if the people are to be encouraged
to have their own sense of responsibility in national leadership, what ultimately
matters is the political determination of the citizenry to chart their own national
destiny. She opined that the Body should allow the people to exercise their own
sense of proportion and imbibe the salutary effects of their own strength to
curtail power when it overreaches itself. She stressed that in the final analysis, the
Commission cannot legislate into the Constitution the essence of new politics as it
is a chastening experience of learning and unlearning. Adverting to Mr. Garcia’s
statement that politics is an imperfect art, she stated that the Commission could
correct politics with all its imperfections and flaws by a constitutional provision. She
opined that perpetual disqualification cannot provide the cure. She maintained that
perpetual disqualification is, at best, a palliative which could also be counter-
productive, in the sense that it could effectively foil the possibilities of real public
service.
REMARKS OF MR. BACANI
Mr. Bacani stated that when the Body granted the illiterates the right to vote and
that proposals were made to empower the people to engage in the legislative
process, the Body presupposed the political maturity of the people. He observed
that in this instance, political maturity is denied with the constitutional bar for
reelection. He opined that the Body should stick to the premise that the people are
politically mature.
REJOINDER OF MR. GARCIA
By way of rejoinder to Mr. Bacani’s statements, Mr. Garcia stated that the
proposal was basically premised on the undue advantage of the incumbent in
accumulating power, money, party machine and patronage and not on lack of
trust in the people.
Mr. Garcia stated that politics is not won by ideals alone but by solid organized
work by organizations. He stated that with three terms, an official would have
served the people long enough.
xxxx
VOTING ON THE TWO ALTERNATIVES
Thereafter, the Body proceeded to vote by ballot on the two alternatives.
xxxx
RESULT OF THE VOTING
The result of the voting was as follows:
Alternative No. 1 (no further election after three successive terms) — 17 votes
Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms) — 26
votes
With 17 votes in favor of Alternative No. 1 and 26 in favor of Alternative No. 2, the
Chair declared Alternative No. 2 approved by the Body.36 (Emphasis and italics ours)
The Constitution mandates the
strict implementation of the
three-term limit rule.
The Court notes that in the process of drafting the Constitution, the framers
thereof had not discussed with specifity the subject of the three-term limit rule’s
application on reapportioned districts.
From the above-cited deliberations, however, the divergent stances of the
members of the Constitutional Commission on the general application of the three-
term limit rule show. On one side were those who espoused the stern view that
perpetual disqualification to hold public office after three consecutive terms would
ensure that new blood would be infused into our political system. More choices for
the voters would give fuller meaning to our democratic institutions. On the other
side of the fence were those who believed that the imposition of term limits would
be tantamount to squandering the experience of seasoned public servants and a
curtailment of the power of the citizens to elect whoever they want to remain in
office.
In the end, 26 members of the Commission cast their votes in favor of the proposal
that no immediate re-election after three successive terms shall be allowed. On the
other hand, 17 members stood pat on their view that there should be no further
reelection after three successive terms.
Clearly, the drafters of our Constitution are in agreement about the possible
attendant evils if there would be no limit to re-election. Notwithstanding their
conflicting preferences on whether the term limit would disqualify the elected
official perpetually or temporarily, they decided that only three consecutive
elections to the same position would be allowed. Thereafter, the public official can
once again vie for the same post provided there be a gap of at least one term from
his or her last election. The rule answers the need to prevent the consolidation of
political power in the hands of the few, while at the same time giving to the people
the freedom to call back to public service those who are worthy to be called
statesmen.
The compromise agreed upon by the drafters of our Constitution was a result of
exhaustive deliberations. The required gap after three consecutive elections is
significant. Thus, the rule cannot be taken with a grain of salt. Nothing less than its
strict application is called for.
Ratio legis est anima.37
“A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated
to effect that purpose.”38
In Aldovino, the Court describes the
three-term limit rule as inflexible.
In Aldovino, a local elective official pleaded exemption from the application of the
three-term limit on the ground that there was an interruption in his service after
the penalty of suspension was imposed upon him. Although not in all four with
Naval’s case, there are principles enunciated therein which undeniably hold
true, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office
and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive
terms. This is thefirst branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a “term” as a period of time – three years –
during which an official has title to office and can serve. x x x[.]
xxxx
The “limitation” under this first branch of the provision is expressed in
the negative—“no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms.” This formulation—no more than three consecutive terms—is a clear
command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. x x x.
xxxx
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the
circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to
make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective whose terms must be
strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less
than equal constitutional worth. x x x.
xxxx
x x x [T]he Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule.
Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor
of limitation rather than its exception.
xxxx
[In] Latasa v. Commission on Elections x x x[,] [t]he Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order
to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. x x x.
xxxx
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X—both by
structure and substance—fixes an elective official’s term of office and limits his stay
in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by
citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. x x x.39 (Citations
omitted, italics and emphasis in the original and underscoring ours)
Reapportionment and its Basis
Reapportionment is “the realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of
equality of representation.”40 The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize
population and voting power among districts.41 The basis for districting shall be the
number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of registered
voters therein.42
R.A. No. 9716 and the Reappor-
tioned Districts of Camarines Sur
Sections 1 to 3 of R.A. No. 9716 provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1. The composition of the current First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur is hereby reapportioned in order to create
an additional legislative district to commence in the next national elections after
the effectivity of this Act.
Section 2. In furtherance of the reapportionment mandated by this Act, the
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao and San Fernando of
the current First (1st) Legislative District are hereby consolidated with the
municipalities of Gainza and Milaor of the current Second (2nd) Legislative District,
to comprise the new legislative district authorized under this Act.
Section 3. The result of the reapportionment described in this Act are summarized
as follows:
a) First District – The remaining municipalities in the current First (1st)
Legislative District shall continue to be designated as the First (1st)
Legislative District, composed of the following municipalities: Del Gallego, Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 9716 used the word “rename.” Although the qualifier
Ragay, Lupi, Sipicot and Cabusao; “without a change in its composition” was not found in Section 3(c), unlike in
Sections 3(d) and (e), still, what is pervasive is the clear intent to create a sole new
b) Second District – This new legislative district shall be composed of the district in that of the Second, while merely renaming the rest.
municipalities enumerated in Section 2 hereof;
The following statutory construction rules surface:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
c) Third District – The current Second (2nd) Legislative District shall be
renamed as the Third (3rd) Legislative District, composed of the following: First, the general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that, in
Naga City and the municipalities of Pili, Ocampo, Camaligan, Canaman, the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain,
Magarao, Bombon and Calabanga; ordinary and common usage meaning; the words should be read and considered in
their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted usage, and without resorting to forced
d) Fourth District – The current Third (3rd) Legislative District, without any
or subtle construction. Words are presumed to have been employed by the
change in its composition, shall be renamed as the Fourth (4th) Legislative
lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and acceptation.
District, composed of the following municipalities: Caramoan,
Garchitorena, Goa, Lagonoy, Presentacion, Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon,
Second, a word of general significance in a statute is to be taken in its ordinary and
Tinambac and Siruma; and
comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given a
e) Fifth District – The current Fourth (4th) Legislative District, without any different or restricted meaning; what is generally spoken shall be generally
change in its composition, shall be renamed as the Fifth (5th) Legislative understood and general words shall be understood in a general sense.44 (Citations
omitted)
District, composed of the following: Iriga City and the municipalities of
Baao, Balatan, Bato, Buhi, Bula and Nabua. (Italics and emphasis ours)
The Court looks to the language of the document itself in our search for its
As a result of the reapportionment made by R.A. No. 9716, the old Second District meaning.45
of Camarines Sur, minus only the two towns of Gainza and Milaor, is renamed as
the Third District and now configured as follows:43 In Naval’s case, the words of R.A. No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second
District is to be created,but the Third District is to be renamed. Verba legis non est
recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
Before the Enactment of After the Enactment of that the framers mean what they say.46
RA 9716 RA 9716
The verb create means to “make or produce something new.”47 On the other hand,
the verb renamemeans to “give a new name to someone or something.”48 A
2nd District 3rd District
complete reading of R.A. No. 9716 yields no logical conclusion other than that the
Population: 474,899 Population: 439,043
lawmakers intended the old Second District to be merely renamed as the current
Gainza Naga
Third District.
Milaor Pili
Naga Ocampo
It likewise bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old
Pili Canaman
Second District from that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of
Ocampo Camaligan
Canaman Magarao the population of the latter. This numerical fact renders the new Third District as
essentially, although not literally, the same as the old Second District. Hence, while
Camaligan Bombon
Magarao Calabanga Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members are elected by district, it
Bombon does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for the third and fourth
Calabanga time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007.
The application upon Naval of the
three-term limit rule does not
R.A. No. 9716 created a new Second undermine the constitutional
District, but it merely renamed the requirement to achieve equality
other four. of representation among districts.
The Court notes that after the reapportionment of the districts in Camarines Sur, The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve
the current Third District, which brought Naval to office in 2010 and 2013, has a equality of representation among the districts.49 It is with this mindset that the
population of 35,856 less than that of the old Second District, which elected him in Court should consider Naval’s argument anent having a new set of constituents
2004 and 2007. However, the wordings of R.A. No. 9716 indicate the intent of the electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.
lawmakers to create a single new Second District from the merger of the towns
from the old First District with Gainza and Milaor. As to the current Third District, Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does
not undermine the right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines
Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set
of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another eligible person.
The presumed competence of
the COMELEC to resolve matters
falling within its jurisdiction is
upheld.
“Time and again, the Court has held that a petition for certiorari against actions of
the COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to patent and substantial denial of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed
to be most competent in matters falling within its domain.”50
“In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden rests on the petitioner to prove
not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned
order, decision or resolution.”51 “Grave abuse of discretion arises when a court or
tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.”52
In the case at bar, the Court finds the COMELEC’s disquisitions to be amply
supported by the Constitution, law and jurisprudence.
Conclusion
In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by
Naval. For the Court to declare otherwise would be to create a dangerous
precedent unintended by the drafters of our Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716.
Considering that the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive elections is a
result of a compromise among the members of the Constitutional Commission, no
cavalier exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be
allowed. Aldovino affirms this interpretation. Further, sustaining Naval’s arguments
would practically allow him to hold the same office for 15 years. These are the
circumstances the Constitution explicitly intends to avert.
Certainly, the Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public, the
real sovereign, so to speak. However, let all the candidates for public office be
reminded that as citizens, we have a commitment to be bound by our Constitution
and laws. Side by side our privileges as citizens are restrictions too.
Einer Elhauge, a faculty member from Harvard Law School, wrote an article entitled
“What Term Limits Do That Ordinary Voting Cannot.”53 In the article, Greek
mythology was tapped to make a tempting analogy. The gist of the story follows.
In Odyssey Book XII, the goddess Circe warned Odysseus of the Sirens who seduce
all men approaching them with their voices. Those who fell into the Sirens’ trap
never returned home to their wives and children. A clever strategy was thus
hatched to secure safe passage for Odysseus and his men. The men were to plug
their ears with wax to muffle the songs of the Sirens. Odysseus, on the other hand,
was to be tied to the mast of the ship so he could still listen to the songs, which
may contain clues on how they can get home. When the wind died down, Odysseus
heard beautiful voices calling out to them. The voices were incomparable to
anything he had ever heard before. Even when Odysseus knew that the irresistible
voices were coming from the Sirens, he struggled with all his strength to free
himself from the ropes, but was unable to do so. The voices became fainter as the
men continued to row. When the voices can no longer be heard, Odysseus realized
how he had nearly been beguiled. They had made it through safely and Odysseus
was untied. It was their clever plan which kept them all alive.54
The same lesson holds true in the case before this Court. The drafters of the
Constitution recognized the propensity of public officers to perpetuate themselves
in power, hence, the adoption of term limits and a guarantee of every citizen’s
equal access to public service. These are the restrictions statesmen should observe
for they are intended to help ensure the continued vitality of our republican
institutions.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions
dated March 5, 2013 and June 5, 2013 of the Commission on Elections in SPA No.
13-166 (DC) are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004]
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B.
HONASAN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5
June 2001 (Resolution No. 01-005) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July
2001 (Resolution No. 01-006) of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14
May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared official and final the
ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
The Facts
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator
Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator
Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed
Resolution No. 84 (Resolution No. 84) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the
Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special
election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001.
Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
election.[1] Resolution No. 84 further provided that the Senatorial candidate
garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term
of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004.[2]
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the
provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005
provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-
005 also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6)
years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3)
years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-
President.[3] Respondents Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan)
ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica (petitioners), as
voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, impleading only
COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming
with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as
the winner in the special election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly,
petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes
a proclamation to such effect.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without
jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled
in the special election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 (R.A.
No. 6645);[4] (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their
certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular
elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881;[5] and,
consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet thecandidates
seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly
required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 (R.A. No.
6646).[6] Petitioners add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all
the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without
distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held
simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.[7]
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a
regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the
canvassing of their results.To support their claim, petitioners cite the special
elections simultaneously held with the regular elections of 13 November 1951 and
8 November 1955 to fill the seats vacated by Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P.
Garcia, respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their tenures in the
Senate.[8] Petitioners point out that in those elections, COMELEC separately
canvassed the votes cast for the senatorial candidates running under the regular
elections from the votes cast for the candidates running under the special
elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the winners in each of those
elections.[9]
Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the
pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, we required COMELEC to Comment on the
petition.
On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the provinces, it
issued Resolution No. 01-006 declaring official and final the ranking of the 13
Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. The 13 Senators took their oaths of
office on 23 July 2001.
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to
file an amended petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents.
Petitioners accordingly filed an amended petition in which they reiterated the
contentions raised in their original petition and, in addition, sought the nullification
of Resolution No. 01-006.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special election
to fill the seat vacated by Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May
2001. COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of
the petition and on petitioners standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the
petition, which seeks the nullity of his proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo
warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. For
his part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to this
case because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of the
13th placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.
The Issues
The following are the issues presented for resolution:
(1) Procedurally
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate
Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate
seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Nature of the Petition and the Courts Jurisdiction
A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public
officer in the exercise of his office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is
not well-founded.[10] Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the
members of the Senate.
A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however, that
what petitioners are questioning is the validity of the special election on 14 May
2001 in which Honasan was elected. Petitioners various prayers are, namely: (1) a
declaration that no special election was held simultaneously with the general
elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as having
won in the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 in
so far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the special
election. Petitioners anchor their prayers on COMELECs alleged failure to comply
with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of that special election. Clearly
then, the petition does not seek to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his
office as Senator. Petitioners prayer for the annulment of Honasans proclamation
and, ultimately, election is merely incidental to petitioners cause of action.
Consequently, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the instant petition.
On the Mootness of the Petition
COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and its
subsequent confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators render
the instant petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and
academic.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board
to desist from committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[11] Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already
done.[12] However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a
question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[13] Thus,
in Alunan III v. Mirasol,[14] we took cognizance of a petition to set aside an order
canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) on 4 December
1992 despite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election had already
taken place. We noted in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the order
sought to be annulled is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the question
may not be decided before the date of such elections, the mootness of the petition
is no bar to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case. The
question of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation
to COMELECs failure to comply with requirements on the conduct of such special
election is likely to arise in every such election. Such question, however, may not be
decided before the date of the election.
On Petitioners Standing
Honasan questions petitioners standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers
and voters because petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public
funds. Neither do petitioners claim that they sustained personal injury because of
the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006.
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the
challenged governmental act.[15] The requirement of standing, which necessarily
sharpens the presentation of issues,[16] relates to the constitutional mandate that
this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.[17] Thus, generally, a party will
be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[18]
Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the instant
petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of the special
election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a generalized
grievance. This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a
large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election.[19] Neither have
petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due
course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 tax
money [was] x x x extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protections against abuses of legislative power or that there [was] misapplication of
such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any improper
purpose.[20]
On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our
discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage.[21] Also,
in the recent case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[22] we gave the
same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). The IBP questioned the validity of a Presidential directive
deploying elements of the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines in
Metro Manila to conduct patrols even though the IBP presented too general an
interest. We held:
[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP
asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP
of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is
not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest
which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x x x.
Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a
suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount
interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on
the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order
are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo,
undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal
controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us
in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing
and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as
voters since they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering
that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again.
Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill
any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives in the manner
prescribed by law, thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special
election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only
for the unexpired term. (Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645,
which provides in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in
the House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election
for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a
resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall
hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official
communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the
President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election,
which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days
from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the
office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a
general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645, as follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. x x x In case a permanent
vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year
before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special
election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety
(90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in
the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of
the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a
special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier
than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy
but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to
the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the
14 May 2001 regular elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6645?
A survey of COMELECs resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001
elections reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance,
either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions[24] or even in its press releases[25] did
COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term
Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did
COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial
candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election.
The controversy thus turns on whether COMELECs failure, assuming it did fail, to
comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended,
invalidated the conduct of the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and
accordingly rendered Honasans proclamation as the winner in that special election
void. More precisely, the question is whether the special election is invalid for lack
of a call for such election and for lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the
manner by which the winner in the special election is to be determined. For reasons
stated below, the Court answers in the negative.
COMELECs Failure to Give Notice
of the Time of the Special Election Did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its
occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty
to give such call, is indispensable to the elections validity.[26] In a general election,
where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by
the body charged to administer the election.[27]
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly
provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections
fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for
that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not
invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the
election failed to do so.[28] This is because the right and duty to hold the election
emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some
authority[29] and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place
of the election.[30]
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special
election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the
happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice
is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.[31]
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy
in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill
the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-
President in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law
charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to
give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much
less invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special election
to fill a vacancy in the House of Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the
special election is subject to a condition precedent, that is, the vacancy should take
place at least one year before the expiration of the term. The time of the election is
left to the discretion of COMELEC subject only to the limitation that it holds the
special election within the range of time provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended, for COMELEC to call x x x a special election x x x not earlier than 60 days
nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy and give notice of the
office to be filled. The COMELECs failure to so call and give notice will nullify any
attempt to hold a special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh
impossible for the voters in the congressional district involved to know the time
and place of the special election and the office to be filled unless the COMELEC so
notifies them.
No Proof that COMELECs
Failure to Give Notice of the Office
to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special
Election Misled Voters
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to
give notice of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in
misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special
election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who
wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a
small percentage of voters would be void.[32]
The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election
covers two matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant
single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections
scheduled on the same date. Second, that COMELEC will proclaim as winner the
senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special
election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELECs failure to give
this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result
of the special senatorial election or led them to believe that there was no such
special election.
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to give such
notice, no special election took place. This bare assertion carries no value. Section 2
of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, charged those who voted in the elections of 14 May
2001 with the knowledge that the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator
Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 was to be filled in the
next succeeding regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the absence of formal
notice from COMELEC does not preclude the possibility that the voters had actual
notice of the special election, the office to be voted in that election, and the
manner by which COMELEC would determine the winner. Such actual notice could
come from many sources, such as media reports of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645
and election propaganda during the campaign.[33]
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who
stands most prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise
those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELECs omission
prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate the
holding of the special election. Indeed, this Court is loathe to annul elections and
will only do so when it is impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what
are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatever, or that the great body of
the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation, and threats from
exercising their franchise.[34]
Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the electorates will and let the
results of the election stand, despite irregularities that may have attended the
conduct of the elections.[35] This is but to acknowledge the
purpose and role of elections in a democratic society such as ours, which is:
to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in
determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding some question of
public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted,
unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done and no frauds
have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the election should not be
declared null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the
affairs of their government for mere irregularities on the part of the election
officers, for which they are in no way responsible. A different rule would make
the manner and method of performing a public duty of greater importance than
the duty itself.[36] (Emphasis in the original)
Separate Documentation and Canvassing
not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
Neither is there basis in petitioners claim that the manner by which COMELEC
conducted the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because
COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately
the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist in our election
laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC fix the
date of the election, if necessary, and state, among others, the office or offices to
be voted for. Similarly, petitioners reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the
filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the
printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced.
These provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate
documentation of candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular
and special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in conducting the special election
on 14 May 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in
Resolution No. 84.Initially, the original draft of Resolution No. 84 as introduced by
Senator Francisco Tatad (Senator Tatad) made no mention of the manner by which
the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the
suggestion of Senator Raul Roco (Senator Roco), the Senate agreed to amend
Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that the senatorial candidate
garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. Senator Roco
introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates
needless expenditures and the voters further inconvenience, thus:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now consider Proposed Senate
Resolution No. 934 [later converted to Resolution No. 84].
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion
is approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is now in order. With the
permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title and text of the
resolution.
T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 entitled
RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN THE SENATE AND
CALLING ON THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) TO FILL UP SUCH
VACANCY THROUGH ELECTION TO BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR
ELECTION ON MAY 14, 2001 AND THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED TO SERVE ONLY FOR
THE UNEXPIRED TERM
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of
the Philippines in 1998 for a term which will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been confirmed by a majority
vote of all the members of both House of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of
the Philippines on February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12)
Senators, all elective Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective
provincial city and municipal officials shall be held on the second Monday and every
three years thereafter; Now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to certify, as it hereby certifies,
the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with
the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senator thus elected to serve only for
the unexpired term.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD
Senator
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmea is recognized.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will the distinguished Majority
Leader, Chairman of the Committee on Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a
few questions?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President. [Laughter]
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). What a way of flattery. [Laughter]
Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or 1953, there was a special
election for a vacant seat in the Senate. As a matter of fact, the one who was
elected in that special election was then Congressman, later Senator Feli[s]berto
Verano.
In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested the seat. In other words,
the electorate had to cast a vote for a ninth senator because at that time there
were only eight to elect a member or rather, a candidate to that particular seat.
Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after the EDSA revolution, twice
there were 24 candidates and the first 12 were elected to a six-year term and the
next 12 were elected to a three-year term.
My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in this election? Is the
candidate with the 13th largest number of votes going to be the one to take a three-
year term? Or is there going to be an election for a position of senator for the
unexpired term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics
to the Commission on Elections. But personally, I would like to suggest that
probably, the candidate obtaining the 13thlargest number of votes be declared as
elected to fill up the unexpired term of Senator Guingona.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to conduct
such an election? Is it not the case that the vacancy is for a specific office? I am
really at a loss. I am rising here because I think it is something that we should
consider. I do not know if we can No, this is not a Concurrent Resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic Act No. 6645,
what is needed is a resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the need for the
holding of a special election to fill up the vacancy created, in this particular case, by
the appointment of our colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the particular
candidate to fill up would be that reserved for Mr. Guingonas unexpired term. In
other words, it can be arranged in such a manner.
xxxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to
the effect that in the simultaneous elections, the 13th placer be therefore deemed
to be the special election for this purpose.So we just nominate 13 and it is good for
our colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It is also less expensive because the
ballot will be printed and there will be less disfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to be
such a special election, maybe, we satisfy the requirement of the law.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th placer of the forthcoming
elections that will be held simultaneously as a special election under this law as we
understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe it will be
better, Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I do
not believe that there will be anyone running specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and campaigning
nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13th candidate
will be running with specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent of this
resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if there will
be no other amendment, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
xxxx
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934
If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any
objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.[37]
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to
conduct the special election within the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to
adopt the Senates proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84. This Court has
consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELECs wide latitude of discretion in
adopting means to carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest
elections subject only to the limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal or
do not constitute grave abuse of discretion.[38] COMELECs decision to abandon the
means it employed in the 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 special
elections and adopt the method embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but a legitimate
exercise of its discretion. Conversely, this Court will not interfere should COMELEC,
in subsequent special senatorial elections, choose to revert to the means it
followed in the 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 elections. That COMELEC
adopts means that are novel or even disagreeable is no reason to adjudge it liable
for grave abuse of discretion. As we have earlier noted:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a
distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its
functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully
warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err,
so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means
and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it
was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its
choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of
discretion, this court should not interfere.[39]
A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the
electorate of necessary information regarding a special election, are central to an
informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to the
present case have led us to conclude that COMELECs failure to so call and give
notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May
2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future elections. We remind COMELEC
to comply strictly with all the requirements under applicable laws relative to the
conduct of regular elections in general and special elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25554 October 4, 1966
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY and JOSE VELASCO, respondents.
Roman Ozaeta and Felixberto Serrano for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The Philippine Constitution Association, a non-stock, non-profit association duly
incorporated and organized under the laws of the Philippines, and whose members
are Filipino citizens and taxpayers, has filed in this Court a suit against the former
Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress
of the Philippines, duly assigned thereto by the Auditor General as his
representative, seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from
authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by
Republic Act No. 4134 (approved June 10, 1964) to the Speaker and members of
the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. Subsequently, Ismael
Mathay, present Auditor General, was substituted for Amable M. Aguiluz, former
Acting Auditor General.
Section 1, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 4134 provided, inter alia, that the
annual salary of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall be P40,000.00 each; that of the Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, P32,000.00 each (thereby increasing their present
compensation of P16,000.00 and P7,200.00 per annum for the Presiding officers
and members, respectively, as set in the Constitution). The section expressly
provided that "the salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution". Section 7 of the same Act provides "that the
salary increase of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall take effect on the effectivity of the salary increase of
Congressmen and Senators.
The Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1965, to June 30, 1966
(Republic Act No. 4642) contained the following items for the House of
Representatives:
SPEAKER
1. The Speaker of the House of Representatives at P16,000 from July 1 to December
29, 1965
and P40,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966 . . . P29,129.00
MEMBERS
2. One hundred three Members of the House of Representatives at P7,200 from
July 1 to December 29, 1965
and P32,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966 2,032,866.00
while for the Senate the corresponding appropriation items appear to be:
1. The President of the Senate . . . . . . . . P 16,000.00
2. Twenty-three Senators at P7,200 . . . . 165,600.00.
Thus showing that the 1965-1966 Budget (R.A. No. 4642) implemented the increase
in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by
Republic Act 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Section
14, of the Constitution, as amended in 1940, that provides as follows:
SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall,
unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven
thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or
allowances, and exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their respective
districts in the case of Members of the House of Representatives, and to and from
their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the
Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such, increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each
receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
The reason given being that the term of the eight senators elected in 1963, and
who took part in the approval of Republic Act No. 4134, will expire only on
December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated
in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
From the record we also glean that upon receipt of a written protest from
petitioners (Petition, Annex "A"), along the lines summarized above, the then
Auditor General requested the Solicitor General to secure a judicial construction of
the law involved (Annex "B"); but the Solicitor General evaded the issue by
suggesting that an opinion on the matter be sought from the Secretary of Justice
(Annex "C", Petition). Conformably to the suggestion, the former Acting Auditor
General endorsed the PHILCONSA letter to the Secretary of Justice on November
26, 1965; but on or before January, 1966, and before the Justice Secretary could
act, respondent Aguiluz, as former Acting Auditor General, directed his
representative in Congress, respondent Velasco, to pass in audit and approve the
payment of the increased salaries within the limits of the Appropriation Act in
force; hence the filing of the present action.
The answer of respondents pleads first the alleged lack of personality of petitioners
to institute the action, for lack of showing of injury; and that the Speaker and
Members of the House should be joined parties defendant. On the merits, the
answer alleges that the protested action is in conformity with the Constitutional
provisions, insofar as present members of the Lower House are concerned, for they
were elected in 1965, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act 4134. Their stand,
in short, is that the expiration of the term of the members of the House of
Representatives who approved the increase suffices to make the higher
compensation effective for them, regardless of the term of the members of the
Senate.
The procedural points raised by respondent, through the Solicitor General, as their
counsel, need not give pause. As taxpayers, the petitioners may bring an action to
restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law (Cf. PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez, L-23326, December 18, 1965;
Tayabas vs. Perez, 56 Phil. 257; Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works L-10405,
December 29, 1960; Pelaez vs. Auditor General, L-23825, December 24, 1965; Iloilo
Palay & Corn Planters Association vs. Feliciano, L-24022, March 3, 1965). Moreover,
as stated in 52 Am. Jur., page 5:
The rule that a taxpayer can not, in his individual capacity as such, sue to enjoin an
unlawful expenditure or waste of state funds is the minority doctrine.
On the alleged non-joinder of the members of the Lower House of Congress as
parties defendants, suffice it to say that since the acts sought to be enjoined were
the respondents' passing in audit and the approval of the payment of the
Representatives' increased salaries, and not the collection or receipt thereof, only
respondent auditors were indispensable or proper parties defendant to this action.
These preliminary questions out of the way, we now proceed to the main issue:
Does Section 14, Art. VI, of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the
members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase
must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective? Or, on the contrary,
as respondents contend, does it allow the payment of the increased compensation
to the members of the House of Representatives who were elected after the
expiration of the term of those House members who approved the increase,
regardless of the non-expiration of the terms of office of the Senators who,
likewise, participated in the approval of the increase?
It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is to place "a legal bar to the
legislators yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the
power to provide for higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of time
that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor
to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt" (Tañada & Fernando,
Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 867).
Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the
increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional
provision refers to "all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives" in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that
the provision speaks of the "expiration of the full term" of the Senators and
Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the
plural, despite the difference in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four
for Representatives thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both
houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use
of the word "term" in the singular, when combined with the following phrase "all
the members of the Senate and of the House", underscores that in the application
of Article VI, Section 14, the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office
of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or
Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can
become operative. Such disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the whole,
accords in turn with the fact that the enactment of laws rests on the shoulders of
the entire Legislative body; responsibility therefor is not apportionable between the
two chambers.
It is also highly relevant, in the Court's opinion, to note that, as reported by Aruego
(Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, p. 296, et. seq.), the committee on legislative
power in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, before it was decided that the
Legislature should be bicameral in form, initially recommended that the increase in
the compensation of legislators should not take effect until the expiration of the
term of office of all members of the Legislature that approved the increase. The
report of the committee read as follows:
The Senator and Representatives shall receive for their services an annual
compensation of four thousand pesos including per diems and other emoluments
or allowances and exclusive of travelling expenses to and from their respective
residences when attending sessions of the National Legislature, unless otherwise
fixed by law: Provided, That no increase in this yearly compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the terms of office of all the Members of the Legislature
that approved such increase.(Emphasis supplied) .
The spirit of this restrictive proviso, modified to suit the final choice of a unicameral
legislature, was carried over and made more rigid in the first draft of the
constitutional provision, which read:
Provided, That any increase in said compensation shall not take effect until after
the expiration of the term of office of the Members of the National Assembly who
may be elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. (Aruego, 1, p. 297)
As recorded by the Committee on Style, and as finally approved and enacted,
Article VI, section 5, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, provided that:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of the Members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to the
approval of such increase.
Finally, with the return to bicameralism in the 1940 amendments to our
fundamental law, the limitation assumed its present form:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase.
It is apparent that throughout its changes of phraseology the plain spirit of the
restriction has not been altered. From the first proposal of the committee on the
legislative power of the 1934 Convention down to the present, the intendment of
the clause has been to require expiration of the full term of all members of the
Legislature that approved the higher compensation, whether the Legislature be
unicameral or bicameral, in order to circumvent, as far as possible, the influence of
self-interest in its adoption.
The Solicitor General argues on behalf of the respondents that if the framers of the
1940 amendments to the Constitution had intended to require the expiration of the
terms not only of the Representatives but also of the Senators who approved the
increase, they would have just used the expression "term of all the members of the
Congress" instead of specifying "all the members of the Senate and of the House".
This is a distinction without a difference, since the Senate and the House together
constitute the Congress or Legislature. We think that the reason for specifying the
component chambers was rather the desire to emphasize the transition from a
unicameral to a bicameral legislature as a result of the 1940 amendments to the
Constitution.
It is also contended that there is significance in the use of the words "of the" before
"House" in the provision being considered, and in the use of the phrase "of the
Senate and of the House" when it could have employed the shorter expression "of
the Senate and the House". It was grammatically correct to refer to "the members
of the Senate and (the members) of the House", because the members of the
Senate are not members of the House. To speak of "members of the Senate and the
House" would imply that the members of the Senate also held membership in the
House.
The argument that if the intention was to require that the term of office of the
Senators, as well as that of the Representatives, must all expire the Constitution
would have spoken of the "terms" (in the plural) "of the members of the Senate
and of the House", instead of using "term" in the singular (as the Constitution does
in section 14 of Article VI), has been already considered. As previously observed,
the use of the singular form "term" precisely emphasizes that in the provision in
question the Constitution envisaged both legislative chambers as one single unit,
and this conclusion is reinforced by the expression employed, "until the expiration
of the full term of ALL the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase".
It is finally urged that to require the expiration of the full term of the Senators
before the effectivity of the increased compensation would subject the present
members of the House of Representatives to the same restrictions as under the
Constitution prior to its amendment. It may well be wondered whether this was
not, in fact, the design of the framers of the 1940 constitutional amendments. For
under either the original limitation or the present one, as amended, as maximum
delay of six (6) years and a minimum of four (4) is necessary before an increase of
legislators' compensation can take effect.
If that increase were approved in the session immediately following an election,
two assemblymen's terms, of 3 years each, had to elapse under the former
limitation in order that the increase could become operative, because the original
Constitution required that the new emolument should operate only after expiration
of the term of assemblymen elected subsequently to those who approved it (Art. VI,
sec. 5), and an assemblyman's term was then 3 years only. Under the Constitution,
as amended, the same interval obtains, since Senators hold office for six (6) years.
On the other hand, if the increase of compensation were approved by the
legislature on its last session just prior to an election, the delay is reduced to four
(4) years under the original restriction, because to the last year of the term of the
approving assemblymen the full 3-year term of their successors must be added.
Once again an identical period must elapse under the 1940 amendment: because
one-third of the Senators are elected every two years, so that just before a given
election four of the approving Senators' full six-year term still remain to run.
To illustrate: if under the original Constitution the assemblymen elected in, say,
1935 were to approve an increase of pay in the 1936 sessions, the new pay would
not be effective until after the expiration of the term of the succeeding
assemblymen elected in 1938; i.e., the increase would not be payable until
December 30, 1941, six years after 1935. Under the present Constitution, if the
higher pay were approved in 1964 with the participation of Senators elected in
1963, the same would not be collectible until December 30, 1969, since the said
Senators' term would expire on the latter date.
But if the assemblymen elected in 1935 (under the original Constitution) were to
approve the increase in compensation, not in 1936 but in 1938 (the last of their 3-
year term), the new compensation would still operate on December 30, 1941, four
years later, since the term of assemblymen elected in November of 1938
(subsequent to the approval of the increase) would end in December 30,1941.
Again, under the present Constitution, if the increase is approved in the 1965
sessions immediately preceding the elections in November of that year, the higher
compensation would be operative only on December 30, 1969, also four years later,
because the most recently elected members of the Senate would then be Senators
chosen by the electors in November of 1963, and their term would not expire until
December 30, 1969.
This coincidence of minimum and maximum delays under the original and the
amended constitution can not be just due to accident, and is proof that the intent
and spirit of the Constitutional restriction on Congressional salaries has been
maintained unaltered. But whether designed or not, it shows how unfounded is the
argument that by requiring members of the present House to await the expiration
of the term of the Senators, who concurred in approving the increase in
compensation, they are placed in a worse position than under the Constitution as
originally written.
The reason for the minimum interval of four years is plainly to discourage the
approval of increases of compensation just before an election by legislators who
can anticipate their reelection with more or less accuracy. This salutary precaution
should not be nullified by resorting to technical and involved interpretation of the
constitutional mandate.
In resume, the Court agrees with petitioners that the increased compensation
provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when
the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20,
1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for such increased
compensation may not be disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic
Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the
increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution
and must be held null and void.
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and
the items of the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No.
4642) purporting to authorize the disbursement of the increased compensation to
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives even prior to December
30, 1969 are declared void, as violative of Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor General and
the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, are prohibited and enjoined from
approving and passing in audit any disbursements of the increased compensation
authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 for Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, before December 30, 1969. No costs.
G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974
BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V. VELASCO, Auditor, Congress of the
Philippines,respondents.
Maximo A. Savellano, Jr. for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, for respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court dismisses the petition for review and thereby affirms the Auditor-
General's decision that petitioner as a Congressman whose term of office expired
on December 30, 1969 and qualified for retirement benefits by virtue of a minimum
of twenty years of government service is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on
the salary actually received by him as a member of Congress of P7,200.00 per
annum. To grant petitioner's contention that the retirement gratuity of members of
Congress; such as himself whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 should be
computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum under
Republic Act 4134 which could only by operative with incoming members of
Congress whose terms of office would commence on December 30, 1969, by virtue
of the Constitutional mandate that such salary increases could take effect only
upon the expiration of the full term of all members of Congress that approved on
June 20, 1964 such increased salary, (since petitioner and other outgoing members
of Congress were constitutionally prohibited from receiving such salary increase
during their term of office) would be a subtle way of going around the
constitutional prohibition and increasing in effect their compensation during their
term of office and of doing indirectly what could not be done directly.
Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of
the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span
from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the
salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national
government" was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July
1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were
increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act
expressly provided that said increases "shall take effect in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution." (section 1)
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30,
1969) but was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such
third term by virtue of this Court's unanimous decision in Philconsa vs.
Mathay 1 "that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969when the full term of all members of the
Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of
the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which
provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase."
Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his
term having expired on December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which
provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective,
with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are
continuous on the basis therein provided "in case of employees based on
the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as
provided by law." 2
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum
of P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress which he never received
during his incumbency and which under this Court's above-quoted decision
inPhilconsa vs. Mathay could become operative only on December 30, 1969 with
the expiration of the full terms of all members of Congress that approved on June
20, 1964 such increased salary.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant, however,
pending resolution by the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former
Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as Congressman likewise expired
on December 30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to
return the warrant and its supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement
claim, enclosing therewith copy of the Auditor General's adverse decision on ex-
Congressman Singson's claim for retirement gratuity as computed on the basis of
the salary increase of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under
Republic Act No. 4134.
Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied in due course on January 20,
1972, by the Auditor General through respondent Auditor who further advised
petitioner and furnished him with copy of the 2nd indorsement of June 29, 1971, of
the Office of the President, dismissing the appeal of Congressman Singson from the
Auditor General's adverse decision disallowing the claim for retirement gratuity,
computed on a salary basis of P32,000.00 per annum.
Hence the present petition for review by way of appeal from the adverse decision
of the Auditor General.
The thrust of petitioner's appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed
on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of
Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency
which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that
such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to
serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed,
because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of
Congress "as provided by law" (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00
per annum.
Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:
1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress
under Republic Act 4134 could be operative only from December 30, 1969 for
incoming members of Congress when the full term of all members of Congress
(House and Senate) that approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have
expired, by virtue of the constitutional mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935
Constitution, it is self-evident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for
members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as petitioner must
necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the compensation they received "as provided
by law" and the Constitution during their term of office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on
December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their
term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect
increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to
receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor General in his decision
in the similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, "(S)uch a
scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited
result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what can not be done
directly." 3
The Auditor-General further aptly observed that "(I)t should not escape notice that
during his entire tenure as Congressman (Dec. 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969)
comprising the last four years of his government service, the herein claimant-
retiree was unable to receive the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for
Members of Congress precisely because of the ,constitutional ban. To allow him
now to collect such amount in the guise of retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor
does it stand to reason that while he could not legally receive such rate as salary
while still in the service, he would now be allowed to enjoy it thereafter by virtue of
his retirement." 4
3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
was already operative when his retirement took effect on December 30, 1969, his
retirement gratuity should be based on such increased salary cannot be sustained
as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office
ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a
retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the
Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and "other emoluments" to
their salary as provided by law.
This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez. 5 In striking down Republic Act
No. 3836 as null and void insofar as it referred to the retirement of members of
Congress and the elected officials thereof for being violative of the Constitution,
this Court held that "it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another
species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one
possessing any office" and that "Republic Act No. 3836 provides for anincrease in
the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take
effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement
benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of
the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in
Article VI, section 14 of the Constitution." 6
It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o allow petitioner a
retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a
subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving
indirectly what he could not obtain directly."
4. The other ancillary contentions of petitioner in pressing his claim were amply
refuted by the Office of the President in dismissing the appeal in the similar case of
ex-Congressman Singson and therefore likewise serve to show the untenability of
petitioner's stand in this appeal, mutatis mutandis, as follows:
It is evident, therefore, that the increased compensation of P32,000 is the rate of
pay prescribed by Republic Act No. 4134 for Mr. Singson's successor in office, while
Mr. Singson and his colleagues of the same term are limited to the annual
compensation of P7,200 fixed in the Constitution. To compute his retirement
gratuity at the rate of P32,000 per annum after the expiration of his term of office
would effectively give him the benefits of increased compensation to which he was
not entitled during his term, thereby violating the constitutional prohibition against
increased compensation of legislators during their term of office (Sec. 14, Art. VI,
Const.) which was presumably in the mind of Congress when it stated in Republic
Act No. 4134 that "the salary increases herein fixed shall be in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Neither an argument of logic nor a judicial pronouncement supports the
proposition that, as Mr. Singson's retirement legally started simultaneously with
the beginning of the term of his successor and the effective rate of pay of his
successor and all incoming members of Congress was already the new rate of
P32,000 per annum, it is this new rate of pay that should be made the basis in
computing his retirement gratuity. Suffice it to say that P7,200 per annum is Mr.
Singson's authorized compensation during his term of office and, therefore, the
rate of pay prescribed by law for him on his retirement, while P32,000 per annum is
the allowable compensation of incoming members of Congress during their term
and, hence, the rate of pay prescribed by law for them on their retirement. There
is, then, no basis for equating a constitutionally prohibited compensation for Mr.
Singson with a statutory prescribed rate of pay for his successor in computing his
retirement gratuity.
It is likewise contended by Mr. Singson that the new rate of pay (P32,000)
authorized him Republic Act No. 4134 would be used in the instant case, not to
compensate him for services during the constitutionally prohibited period, but
would simply serve as basis for computing his retirement gratuity for services
rendered by him not only as a member of Congress but in other branches of the
government as well. The foregoing contention carries its own refutation.
Retirement benefit is compensation for services rendered (PHILCONSA VS.
GIMENEZ, supra). Since Mr. Singson applied for retirement as an "elected official,"
it is evident that he seeks compensation not only for services rendered in other
branches of the Government but also for his services as member of Congress using
P32,000, an amount prohibited for him but allowed for his successor, in the
computation of his retirement gratuity." 7
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-
appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who
is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape
on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts[1] is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are
called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation
of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellants "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member
of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that
1. Accused-appellants reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be
rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest not even the
police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation
without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his
suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to him by the
people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to
be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions
of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a
co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of
accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when
allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states
that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him
as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he
has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant
with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it
cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending
criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the
exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government
and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted
by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-
executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an
unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high
government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of
general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a
position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience
rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption
as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms.
It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning
from the same; xxx.
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted
under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary
immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all
persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no
immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to
confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding
portion of the provision, to wit:
xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the
custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or
for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation
of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also
been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in
session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress function to attend
sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states
that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellants reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos[2], which states,
inter alia, that
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It
is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule
the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-
quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public officer for acts done priorto his present term of office. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same
way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not
removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise,
disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final
conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an
example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,[3] it is the injury to
the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to
the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be
denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.[4]
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into
office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual
punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place
of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants arrest was issued, he
fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the
authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which
accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined
Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the States penal
system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail,
for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan
Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the
House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in
Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati
City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-
appellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the
prison premises, to wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1)
establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP
reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his
own vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his place of
confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart
condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of
Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5)
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the
following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:[5]
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy
considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have
members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience.
Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it
comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a
privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for
a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no
dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the
criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated
like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it
that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the
prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to
the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around
an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would
constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of
course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each
and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga
del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona
fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary
detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he
has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave
jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the
House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at
Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan
Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress.
Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at
the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends
to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention,
he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving
his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has
been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative
consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a
detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison
authorities at the National Pentientiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did
so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if
voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness,
they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws."[6] This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither
partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the
duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the
President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular
duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty
of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A
doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular
affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer
must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained
by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.[8]
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.[9]
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class.[10]
Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a
person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion.[11]
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of ones liberty.
As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is
personal to the accused.[12]The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty
of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free
action according to his own pleasure and will.[13]Imprisonment is the detention of
another against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion[14] and it "[is]
something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint
within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."[15]
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an
individuals status in society.[16] Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless
job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of
attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the
social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and
elimination of certain rights.[17]
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellants
claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest,
including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE
ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL.
LUCIARDO OBEÑA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers
led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion.1 A series of negotiations quelled the teeming
tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant
soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident,"
petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup
d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784,
"People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,2 threw his hat
in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing
at noon on June 30, 2007.3
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with
the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests"4(Omnibus Motion).
Among his requests were:
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the
Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in
session, and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee
hearings, committee meetings, consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of
legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally held at the Senate of
the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually from
Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine
Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop
computer and the appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line
and internet access) in order that he may be able to work there when there are no
sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session.
The costs of setting up the said working area and the related equipment and utility
costs can be charged against the budget/allocation of the Office of the accused
from the Senate;
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his
place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig City, at reasonable times of the day particularly during working days for
purposes of meetings, briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the
latter may be able to assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of his duties
as a Senator of the Republic;
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or
opinions to the press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the
country and the public while at the Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his
duties as Senator to help shape public policy and in the light of the important role
of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks and balance between the three
(3) co-equal branches of Government;
(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians,
to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of
the media who may wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions
and/or opinion at his place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks
Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions,
meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session; and
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of
the Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of
23 July 2007 at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center,
Pasay City.5
By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus
Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in
paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three.7The trial court just the
same denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007.8
Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial
court, and for prohibition andmandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the
Senate staff, resource persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting
business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to allow
him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests and permit him to
attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily
prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to
convene his staff, resource persons and guests9 at the Marine Brig.
Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff,
Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy’s Flag Officer-in-Command,
Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines’ Commandant, Major Gen.
Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col.
Luciardo Obeña (Obeña).
Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since
November 30, 2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Custodial Center following the foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel10 the
day before or on November 29, 2007.
Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as
against the above-named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation
to them had ceased to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination
thereof would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile, against those not
made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this
Court.11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police officers
currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily
show that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former
custodians.12
Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in
his Motion for Reconsideration filed with the trial court:
I.
THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY
INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A.
UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY
CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE,
ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS
THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;
B.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2) COUNTS OF
STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH
THE OFFENSE OF "COUP D’ETAT", A CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS
A POLITICAL OFFENSE;
C.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEING
ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE
AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;
II.
GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE
BRIG’S COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE
SESSIONS;
III.
ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR
SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE
REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK
AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;
- AND -
IV.
MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT OF
DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP" ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR MISUARI.13
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner
chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted,
albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to
petitioner’s Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner.
He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption
of innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral
turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness,
whereas he is indicted for coup d’etat which is regarded as a "political offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in
expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice
of graft and corruption in the AFP.
In sum, petitioner’s first ground posits that there is a world of difference between
his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of
filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability
of Jalosjos.14
A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement
in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.15
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for
purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.16 (Underscoring supplied)
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,17 or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.18
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being
punishable by reclusion perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as
to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for
release on recognizance was denied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt
is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail21 or imported
from a trial court’s judgment of conviction,22 justifies the detention of an accused as
a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso
that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the
criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of
public self-defense23 applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or
convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to draw a line
between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining
jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights
upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than
those of the public.
The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed
placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail
so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be
detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized
by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all
prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office,
elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest
and detention.26 (Underscoring supplied)
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent
that confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement.
It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month
after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish
legislative results.27
The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does
not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the
presumption of innocence during the period material to the resolution of their
respective motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of
innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on appeal
of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of final
conviction is made, the constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence
prevails.28
In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied
nor disputed his agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to
him should cease after his proclamation by the Commission on Elections.29
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is
not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such
can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of
detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well
when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason
and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The
account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident,"30 proves that petitioner’s
argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither
remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in
ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of
bail.31 In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that
it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.32
Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for
leeway because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano
Montano, who was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder,34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu
dignum is this Court’s pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is authorized in
capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant
would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury."35 At
the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were non-bailable
where evidence of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the obvious reason that "one
who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to
flee."37 Petitioner’s petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely
on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him out.
Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, Esperon did not
overrule Obeña’s recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions.
Petitioner cites the Comment38 of Obeña that he interposed no objection to such
request but recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms
with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that
Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioner’s
duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was the
setting up of a political office inside a military installation owing to AFP’s apolitical
nature.39
The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid
objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial
detention.40 The officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake
such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent
the escape of the detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention
officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial
court in the same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.
Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him
to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as
Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing
him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying the
people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the mandate of the
people.
Petitioner’s contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public
official can not be removed foradministrative misconduct committed during
a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the
officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor."42
The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in
nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases,43 the Court
categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal
cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a
criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when
the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the
limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines
of prison."44
In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,45 it is opportune to
wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of
the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the
Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of
law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the
duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those others who are validly restrained by
law.46 (Underscoring supplied)
Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention
prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former
President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to
attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more
serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged
violation of the equal protection clause.
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention
prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential
treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or house arrest,47 yet
he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.48 That this
discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court
previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his
certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be
proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a
seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of
taking a complete turn-around,50 petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to
him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone,
petitioner’s case fails to compare with the species of allowable
leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:
x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with
all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.51
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L.
Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an
allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being
summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the
letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs
interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged
communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant
was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any
other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the
aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or
debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of
their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast
in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to
the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines,
dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and
defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus
causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the
President, the communication began with the following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had
nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks
against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-
mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public
attention to certain vital information which, under the present circumstances, I feel
it my solemn duty to our people to expose.1äwphï1.ñët
It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans
under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian
political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the
second paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive
political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by
propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a
candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have
adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in
the Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological
warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and
Amelioration Fund" — the letter says — are "available to adequately finance a
political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col.
Nicanor Jimenez of NICA,(2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN)
of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological
Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office,
DND. To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief
of MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col.
Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological
Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was
relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon
Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link
in the intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned
above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the
heading "other operational technique the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas
to talk on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters — "typed in two
(2) typewriters only" — to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary
Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an
attempt to pack key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men
belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression
that they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine
the administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had
gone no further than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in
abeyance and subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the
President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen.
Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in
an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and
civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign;
(2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the
Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that
no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to
resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in
the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence
agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they
were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably,
they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now
serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by
provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva
Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions
throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify
themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup
d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs'
action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of
the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been
handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to
the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that
"it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they
may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon
which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely
unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting
tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the
plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they
are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of
the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in
question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include
these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by
the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs'
reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and
to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions
which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the
same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in
their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly
meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they
were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the
defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of
said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on
their part, of said "planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO
TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE
PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA,
TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No.
59,respondents.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres Ziga in their own
behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a
verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by
House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground
of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said
members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with
it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his
charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he
must show cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of
which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr.,
Member of the House of Representatives from the Second District of the province
of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a
speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District
of Cebu stated the following:.
xxx xxx xxx
The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your
unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the government are
now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that
regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be
bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I
am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice
that your administration is dispensing. . . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made
maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a
serious assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President,
which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would
expose said office to contempt and disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen
Members to be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to
investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made
by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and for
such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio Osmeña, jr., to appear
before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena
duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of
pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so to
require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The
special committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings and
recommendations before the adjournment of the present special session of the
Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution
violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered
in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after
his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business,
and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has
intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not
be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of
action and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further,
and required respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction.
Evidently aware of such circumstance with its implications, and pressed for time in
view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the special committee
continued to perform its talk, and after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to
defend himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman
guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House
approved on the same day—before closing its session—House Resolution No. 175,
declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen
months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen
De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer,
challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the
power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House
Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having
ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee—whose members are the sole
respondents—had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered
before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President
which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to produce before the
House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such
imputations. There is also no question that for having made the imputations and for
failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House,
suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly
behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59,
adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous,
malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of the
Philippines in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and
degraded the dignity of the House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmeña,
Jr., be, as he hereby is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .
As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution
gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House,
he ought not to be questioned; (20 that his speech constituted no disorderly
behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be
questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because
it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he
takes the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the
Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be
questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause
1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision
has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or
civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule
XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words
spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as
the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of
the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that
he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to
whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come to
this country from the practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the
Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt
in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But
is does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress, Congressman
Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following language on the
floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many
infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799).
Two other congressmen were censured for employing insulting words during
debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was
summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked his
parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-
124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or
could be censured, committed to prison3, even expelled by the votes of their
colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attest to the consensus of informed
opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to
take disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or
expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign
country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a
senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the
parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a
supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action
against me, he argues, because after my speech, and before approving Resolution
No. 59, it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59
was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted to a
suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice
may done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of
its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action
which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws4 extending the period of limitation of
actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court
of the United States has upheld such laws as against the contention that they
impaired vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any rate,
court are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them."5 And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a
particular measure."6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of
Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held
that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive
their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as
security against hasty action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433;
Holtvs. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595,
78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280;
Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543,
12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888;
McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting
Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of
Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of
Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was
presented, the House approved the resolution, despite the argument that other
business had intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp.
799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive
constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, many
arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House
is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter
depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which
can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the
Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether
Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed
appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a
coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to
interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is well established
that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference
by the judicial department with the legislature since each department is equally
independent within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to
intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated
Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not review its action
or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p.
902.) [Emphasis Ours.].
The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case
of Clifford vs. French.7 In 1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State
Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel
reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to
make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of
California declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even
the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house
thereof, taking in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department
by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even in the absence of
an express provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested
the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member
for any cause which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am.
Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is inherent
in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its
high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-
protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the
exigency which may justify and require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision
authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house
of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative
department and therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the
senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or
either house thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise
legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion
emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion,
they may as well be applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the
case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to
interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation
due to discovery of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber.
Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional
functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity,
we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles and/or
episodic illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the United States
taking the position upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the
Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders.8 And in
several instances, it took action against offenders, even after other business had
been considered.9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the
Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate,
suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of
the that Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a debate.
The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity of the
resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had
no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on
to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12
months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was
then functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like
Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may
punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds votes, expel an electivemember (sec. 18). Note particularly the word
"elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint
"without consent of the Senate and without restriction as to residence senators . . .
who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one
appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension
deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded
any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be understood to
refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected party and
who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth
District and maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of the
Governor-General, who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those
power which were granted to it by the Jones Law10; whereas now the Congress has
the full legislative powers and preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as
restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court
reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then
exercised—the power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the
Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension11 which the
Constitution did not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate
suspended a Senator for 12 months in 1949.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such
limitations are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to
be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine
Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.,
192, 212 .)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's
representation can not be more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the
case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power in
proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to
prevent the Special Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No.
59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed
its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The
House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It
would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or
academic.13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new
pleadings to include all members of the House as respondents, ask for
reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most probable outcome
of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as
in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of
political law, the Court thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions on
such issues as were deemed relevant and decisive.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.
DANTE V. LIBAN, G.R. No. 175352
REYNALDO M. BERNARDO,
and SALVADOR M. VIARI,
- versus - Promulgated:
RICHARD J. GORDON, July 15, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having
forfeited his seat in the Senate.
The Facts
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari
(petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having
Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of
the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,[1] he
was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the
PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of
the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the
Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC,[2] which held that the PNRC is a
government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting
and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v.
Drilon,[3] which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts
upon their appointment to another government office.
In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this
petition which appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges
that respondent committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground
for forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the
Senate office of respondent. Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, only a person claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or
unlawfully held by another may bring an action for quo warranto in his own
name. If the petition is one for quo warranto, it is already barred by prescription
since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the action should be
commenced within one year after the cause of the public officers forfeiture of
office. In this case, respondent has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the
past 40 years. Respondent was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors
when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected Chairman in 2003
and re-elected in 2005.
Respondent contends that even if the present petition is treated as a taxpayers suit,
petitioners cannot be allowed to raise a constitutional question in the absence of
any claim that they suffered some actual damage or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal act of respondent. Furthermore, taxpayers are allowed to sue
only when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public
money is being diverted to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results in wastage of public
funds.
Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as one for declaratory
relief, this Court would have no jurisdiction since original jurisdiction for declaratory
relief lies with the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution
does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an
office nor an employment.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is neither an action for quo
warranto nor an action for declaratory relief. Petitioners maintain that the present
petition is a taxpayers suit questioning the unlawful disbursement of funds,
considering that respondent has been drawing his salaries and other compensation
as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his office. Petitioners point out that
this Court has jurisdiction over this petition since it involves a legal or constitutional
issue which is of transcendental importance.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or
controlled corporation;
2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case
of respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the
Senate;
3. Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant
to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution; and
4. Whether petitioners may legally institute this petition against respondent.[4]
The substantial issue boils down to whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation
for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition without merit.
Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition
A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto.
Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation
of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision of law,
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being
legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners allege in their petition that:
4. Respondent became the Chairman of the PNRC when he was elected as such
during the First Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the Board of Governors of the PNRC
held on February 23, 2006, the minutes of which is hereto attached and made
integral part hereof as Annex A.
5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, during his
incumbency as a Member of the House of Senate of the Congress of the Philippines,
having been elected as such during the national elections last May 2004.
6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, which position
he duly accepted, respondent has been exercising the powers and discharging the
functions and duties of said office, despite the fact that he is still a senator.
7. It is the respectful submission of the petitioner[s] that by accepting the
chairmanship of the Board of Governors of the PNRC, respondent has ceased to
be a Member of the House of Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution, x x x
xxxx
10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting the position of Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the PNRC on February 23, 2006, respondent has
automatically forfeited his seat in the House of Senate and, therefore, has long
ceased to be a Senator, pursuant to the ruling of this Honorable Court in the case
of FLORES, ET AL. VS. DRILON AND GORDON, G.R. No. 104732, x x x
11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator, respondent continues to act as
such and still performs the powers, functions and duties of a senator, contrary to
the constitution, law and jurisprudence.
12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will continue to falsely act and
represent himself as a senator or member of the House of Senate, collecting the
salaries, emoluments and other compensations, benefits and privileges
appertaining and due only to the legitimate senators, to the damage, great and
irreparable injury of the Government and the Filipino people.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the
PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the
Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against
respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a
ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo
warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party
plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may
commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly
usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name. The
person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be
able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be
dismissed at any stage.[6] In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled
to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the
present petition.
Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a
taxpayers suit, the petition would still fail on the merits.
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No.
95,[7] otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-
funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely,
effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable
without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political
affiliation.[8] The PNRC provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster
Management, Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and
Voluntary Service.[9]
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established
the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva
Convention of 27 July 1929.[10] The Whereas clauses of the PNRC Charter read:
WHEREAS, there was developed at Geneva, Switzerland, on August 22, 1864, a
convention by which the nations of the world were invited to join together in
diminishing, so far lies within their power, the evils inherent in war;
WHEREAS, more than sixty nations of the world have ratified or adhered to the
subsequent revision of said convention, namely the Convention of Geneva of July
29 [sic], 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of
Armies in the Field (referred to in this Charter as the Geneva Red Cross
Convention);
WHEREAS, the Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages the establishment in each
country of a voluntary organization to assist in caring for the wounded and sick of
the armed forces and to furnish supplies for that purpose;
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July
4, 1946 and proclaimed its adherence to the Geneva Red Cross Convention on
February 14, 1947, and by that action indicated its desire to participate with the
nations of the world in mitigating the suffering caused by war and to establish in
the Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose as contemplated by the
Geneva Red Cross Convention;
WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a Charter of the American
National Red Cross which must be terminated in view of the independence of the
Philippines; and
WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in the other countries which
have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Red Cross Convention assist in promoting
the health and welfare of their people in peace and in war, and through their
mutual assistance and cooperation directly and through their international
organizations promote better understanding and sympathy among the peoples of
the world. (Emphasis supplied)
The PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement (Movement), which is composed of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies (International Federation), and the National Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies (National Societies). The Movement is united and guided by
its seven Fundamental Principles:
1. HUMANITY The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a
desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield,
endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate
human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health
and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding,
friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.
2. IMPARTIALITY It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs,
class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being
guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of
distress.
3. NEUTRALITY In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement
may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a
political, racial, religious or ideological nature.
4. INDEPENDENCE The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while
auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the
laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that
they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the
Movement.
5. VOLUNTARY SERVICE It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any
manner by desire for gain.
6. UNITY There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one
country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout
its territory.
7. UNIVERSALITY The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in
which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in
helping each other, is worldwide. (Emphasis supplied)
The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of reference for all
members of the Movement. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the
Movement, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the
Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to
be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of
the Movement.[11]
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring
belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the
PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In
the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist
rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled, and
neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as
instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will
treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the wounded in the
battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral
and independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the
Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency
that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and
cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross Society.[12] It is
imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in
relation to the State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC
cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine
government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets
and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.[13] The PNRC
is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities
obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors, as
provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter:
SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine National
Red Cross shall be financed primarily by contributions obtained through
solicitation campaigns throughout the year which shall be organized by the Board
of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in their respective
jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns shall be conducted independently of
other fund drives by other organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as
amended, only six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors are
appointed by the President of the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four members, or
four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors are not appointed by the
President. Section 6 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, provides:
SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a Board of
Governors composed of thirty members, six of whom shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected by chapter delegates in
biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be selected by the twenty-four
members of the Board already chosen. x x x.
Thus, of the twenty-four members of the PNRC Board, eighteen are elected by the
chapter delegates of the PNRC, and six are elected by the twenty-four members
already chosena select group where the private sector members have three-fourths
majority. Clearly, an overwhelming majority of four-fifths of the PNRC Board are
elected or chosen by the private sector members of the PNRC.

The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC,
elects the PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC. The incumbent
Chairman of PNRC, respondent Senator Gordon, was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen
are elected, by a private sector-controlled PNRC Board four-fifths of whom are
private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the
President or by any subordinate government official.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,[14] the President appoints all
officials and employees in the Executive branch whose appointments are vested in
the President by the Constitution or by law. The President also appoints those
whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under this Section 16, the
law may also authorize the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards to appoint officers lower in rank than such heads of departments, agencies,
commissions or boards.[15] In Rufino v. Endriga,[16] the Court explained
appointments under Section 16 in this wise:
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three
groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom
the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose
appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. x x x
xxx
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not
authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-
ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is vested in
the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In
a commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head
is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not
also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to
appoint lower-ranked officers.
xxx
The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked
officers specifically in the heads of the specified offices, and in no other person. The
word heads refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to
their members, for several reasons.
The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head
of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC
Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive
branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a
government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a
government office or employment.
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,[17] the President exercises control
over all government offices in the Executive branch. If an office is legally not under
the control of the President, then such office is not part of the Executive
branch. In Rufino v. Endriga,[18] the Court explained the Presidents power of control
over all government offices as follows:
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive,
Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the independent
constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial body or local government unit.
Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and
constitutional basis for its existence.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The
CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a
quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the
Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency not
placed by law or order creating them under any specific department falls under the
Office of the President.
Since the President exercises control over all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices, the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an
office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President shall have control of
all executive . . . offices, Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the
independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of control. There is
no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-
judicial functions.
The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in
the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the
President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The
power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a
subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. There can be no
instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside
the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one
President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive
branch.Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the
President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional
basis. (Emphasis supplied)
An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector
individuals elected to the PNRC Board by the private sector members of the
PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is
controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are
not reviewable by the President. The President cannot reverse or modify the
decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or
modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that
can review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This
proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a
government office.
Although the State is often represented in the governing bodies of a National
Society, this can be justified by the need for proper coordination with the public
authorities, and the government representatives may take part in decision-making
within a National Society. However, the freely-elected representatives of a National
Societys active members must remain in a large majority in a National Societys
governing bodies.[19]
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the
thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under
the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC
are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and
65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon
contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year.[20] Even foreigners,
whether residents or not, can be members of the PNRC. Section 5 of the PNRC
Charter, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1264,[21] reads:
SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross shall be open to the entire
population in the Philippines regardless of citizenship. Any contribution to the
Philippine National Red Cross Annual Fund Campaign shall entitle the contributor to
membership for one year and said contribution shall be deductible in full for
taxation purposes.
Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable
organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v.
NLRC,[22] which ruled that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation. In ruling that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation, the simple test used was whether the corporation was created by its
own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under
the general corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter,
the Court then ruled that it is a government corporation. However,
the Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a government-owned
or controlled corporation as provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized
as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government
directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in
the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its
capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be
further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission,
and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their
respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such
corporations.(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the
government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital
stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by
analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials holding
such membership by appointment or designation by the government. Under this
criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC.
The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the
Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by
special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as
amended,reads:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are
owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof.
The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar provisions prohibiting
Congress from creating private corporations except by general law. Section 1 of the
PNRC Charter, as amended, creates the PNRC as a body corporate and politic, thus:
SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a body
corporate and politic to be the voluntary organization officially designated to
assist the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the obligations set forth in the
Geneva Conventions and to perform such other duties as are inherent upon a
National Red Cross Society. The national headquarters of this Corporation shall be
located in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis supplied)
[23]
In Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, the Court explained the constitutional
provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations in this wise:
We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental law. The
Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private
corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned
or controlled corporations created by special charters. Section 16, Article XII of the
Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or
controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the
interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except
by general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision
is to ban private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave
certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.
In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special
charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may
exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily
exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a
general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law
is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the
incorporation of cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled
corporations through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have
special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with special
charters only if such corporations are government-owned or
controlled.[24] (Emphasis supplied)
In Feliciano, the Court held that the Local Water Districts are government-owned or
controlled corporations since they exist by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198,
which constitutes their special charter. The seed capital assets of the Local Water
Districts, such as waterworks and sewerage facilities, were public property which
were managed, operated by or under the control of the city, municipality or
province before the assets were transferred to the Local Water Districts. The Local
Water Districts also receive subsidies and loans from the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA). In fact, under the 2009 General Appropriations Act,[25] the
LWUA has a budget amounting toP400,000,000 for its subsidy
requirements.[26] There is no private capital invested in the Local Water
Districts. The capital assets and operating funds of the Local Water Districts all
come from the government, either through transfer of assets, loans, subsidies or
the income from such assets or funds.
The government also controls the Local Water Districts because the municipal or
city mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints all the board directors of the Local
Water Districts. Furthermore, the board directors and other personnel of the Local
Water Districts are government employees subject to civil service laws and anti-
graft laws. Clearly, the Local Water Districts are considered government-owned or
controlled corporations not only because of their creation by special charter but
also because the government in fact owns and controls the Local Water Districts.
Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created through a special
charter. However, unlike the Local Water Districts, the elements of government
ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the PNRC is
created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or
controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and
control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress
was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition
against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides no
exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC
Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it
corporate powers,[27] is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections
1,[28] 2,[29] 3,[30] 4(a),[31] 5,[32] 6,[33] 7,[34] 8,[35] 9,[36] 10,[37] 11,[38] 12,[39] and 13[40] of the
PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.
The other provisions[41] of the PNRC Charter remain valid as they can be considered
as a recognition by the State that the unincorporated PNRC is the local National
Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and thus
entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set forth in the PNRC Charter.
The other provisions of the PNRC Charter implement the Philippine Governments
treaty obligations under Article 4(5) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement, which provides that to be recognized as a National
Society, the Society must be duly recognized by the legal government of its country
on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and of the national legislation as a
voluntary aid society, auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian field.
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or
an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the
PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the
PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act
No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because
they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 175352 January 18, 2011
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, Intervenor.
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration1 filed on
August 10, 2009 by respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision
promulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009 (the Decision), the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration2 filed on August 27, 2009 by movant-intervenor Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC), and the latter’s Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached
Position Paper3 filed on December 23, 2009.
In the Decision,4 the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the
Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as
"the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution."5 The Decision, however, further
declared void the PNRC Charter "insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation" and consequently ruled that "the PNRC should incorporate under the
Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it
wants to be a private corporation."6 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act
No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because
they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.7
In his Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration, respondent raises the
following grounds: (1) as the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 95
was not raised by the parties, the Court went beyond the case in deciding such
issue; and (2) as the Court decided that Petitioners did not have standing to file the
instant Petition, the pronouncement of the Court on the validity of R.A. No. 95
should be considered obiter.8
Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue; therefore, it
was unnecessary for the Court to decide on that question. Respondent cites Laurel
v. Garcia,9 wherein the Court said that it "will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of
on some other ground" and goes on to claim that since this Court, in the Decision,
disposed of the petition on some other ground, i.e., lack of standing of petitioners,
there was no need for it to delve into the validity of R.A. No. 95, and the rest of the
judgment should be deemed obiter.
In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, PNRC prays that the Court sustain the
constitutionality of its Charter on the following grounds:
A. THE ASSAILED DECISION DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95
AS AMENDED DEPRIVED INTERVENOR PNRC OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS.
1. INTERVENOR PNRC WAS NEVER A PARTY TO THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY.
2. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95, AS AMENDED WAS NEVER
AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE.
B. THE CURRENT CHARTER OF PNRC IS PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1264 AND NOT
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1264 WAS NOT A CREATION OF
CONGRESS.
C. PNRC’S STRUCTURE IS SUI GENERIS; IT IS A CLASS OF ITS OWN. WHILE IT IS
PERFORMING HUMANITARIAN FUNCTIONS AS AN AUXILIARY TO GOVERNMENT, IT
IS A NEUTRAL ENTITY SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL,
YET IT DOES NOT QUALIFY AS STRICTLY PRIVATE IN CHARACTER.
In his Comment and Manifestation10 filed on November 9, 2009, respondent
manifests: (1) that he agrees with the position taken by the PNRC in its Motion for
Partial Reconsideration dated August 27, 2009; and (2) as of the writing of said
Comment and Manifestation, there was pending before the Congress of the
Philippines a proposed bill entitled "An Act Recognizing the PNRC as an
Independent, Autonomous, Non-Governmental Organization Auxiliary to the
Authorities of the Republic of the Philippines in the Humanitarian Field, to be
Known as The Philippine Red Cross."11
After a thorough study of the arguments and points raised by the respondent as
well as those of movant-intervenor in their respective motions, we have
reconsidered our pronouncements in our Decision dated July 15, 2009 with regard
to the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC
Charter, R.A. No. 95, as amended.
As correctly pointed out in respondent’s Motion, the issue of constitutionality of
R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in
the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have
reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality
in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,12 thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis
mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such
question will be unavoidable.13
Under the rule quoted above, therefore, this Court should not have declared void
certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264
and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial
restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which
the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most
adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even
originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the
Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after
more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
Its existence as a chartered corporation remained unchallenged on ground of
unconstitutionality notwithstanding that R.A. No. 95 was enacted on March 22,
1947 during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, which provided for a
proscription against the creation of private corporations by special law, to wit:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are
owned and controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof. (Art. XIV, 1935 Constitution.)
Similar provisions are found in Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution and
Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The latter reads:
SECTION 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned
or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the
interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on
June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue
of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The
passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding
the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private
corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a
private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not
just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official
status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit
in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis.
The PNRC succeeded the chapter of the American Red Cross which was in existence
in the Philippines since 1917. It was created by an Act of Congress after the
Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July 6, 1946 and
proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its adherence to the Convention of Geneva of July
29, 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies
in the Field (the "Geneva Red Cross Convention"). By that action the Philippines
indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the
suffering caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization
for that purpose and like other volunteer organizations established in other
countries which have ratified the Geneva Conventions, to promote the health and
welfare of the people in peace and in war.14
The provisions of R.A. No. 95, as amended by R.A. Nos. 855 and 6373, and further
amended by P.D. Nos. 1264 and 1643, show the historical background and legal
basis of the creation of the PNRC by legislative fiat, as a voluntary organization
impressed with public interest. Pertinently R.A. No. 95, as amended by P.D. 1264,
provides:
WHEREAS, during the meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on 22 August 1894, the
nations of the world unanimously agreed to diminish within their power the evils
inherent in war;
WHEREAS, more than one hundred forty nations of the world have ratified or
adhered to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces in the Field and at Sea, The
Prisoners of War, and The Civilian Population in Time of War referred to in this
Charter as the Geneva Conventions;
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July 4,
1946, and proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its adherence to the Geneva
Conventions of 1929, and by the action, indicated its desire to participate with the
nations of the world in mitigating the suffering caused by war and to establish in
the Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose as contemplated by the
Geneva Conventions;
WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a chapter of the American
National Red Cross which was terminated in view of the independence of the
Philippines; and
WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in other countries which have
ratified or adhered to the Geneva Conventions assist in promoting the health and
welfare of their people in peace and in war, and through their mutual assistance
and cooperation directly and through their international organizations promote
better understanding and sympathy among the people of the world;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do
hereby decree and order that Republic Act No. 95, Charter of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) as amended by Republic Acts No. 855 and 6373, be
further amended as follows:
Section 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a body
corporate and politic to be the voluntary organization officially designated to assist
the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva
Conventions and to perform such other duties as are inherent upon a national Red
Cross Society. The national headquarters of this Corporation shall be located in
Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis supplied.)
The significant public service rendered by the PNRC can be gleaned from Section 3
of its Charter, which provides:
Section 3. That the purposes of this Corporation shall be as follows:
(a) To provide volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armed forces in time of
war, in accordance with the spirit of and under the conditions prescribed by the
Geneva Conventions to which the Republic of the Philippines proclaimed its
adherence;
(b) For the purposes mentioned in the preceding sub-section, to perform all duties
devolving upon the Corporation as a result of the adherence of the Republic of the
Philippines to the said Convention;
(c) To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accordance with the authorities of
the armed forces as a medium of communication between people of the Republic
of the Philippines and their Armed Forces, in time of peace and in time of war, and
to act in such matters between similar national societies of other governments and
the Governments and people and the Armed Forces of the Republic of the
Philippines;
(d) To establish and maintain a system of national and international relief in time of
peace and in time of war and apply the same in meeting and emergency needs
caused by typhoons, flood, fires, earthquakes, and other natural disasters and to
devise and carry on measures for minimizing the suffering caused by such disasters;
(e) To devise and promote such other services in time of peace and in time of war
as may be found desirable in improving the health, safety and welfare of the
Filipino people;
(f) To devise such means as to make every citizen and/or resident of the Philippines
a member of the Red Cross.
The PNRC is one of the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which,
together with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the IFRC and
RCS, make up the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the
Movement). They constitute a worldwide humanitarian movement, whose mission
is:
[T]o prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found, to protect
life and health and ensure respect for the human being, in particular in times of
armed conflict and other emergencies, to work for the prevention of disease and
for the promotion of health and social welfare, to encourage voluntary service and
a constant readiness to give help by the members of the Movement, and a
universal sense of solidarity towards all those in need of its protection and
assistance.15
The PNRC works closely with the ICRC and has been involved in humanitarian
activities in the Philippines since 1982. Among others, these activities in the country
include:
1. Giving protection and assistance to civilians displaced or otherwise affected by
armed clashes between the government and armed opposition groups, primarily in
Mindanao;
2. Working to minimize the effects of armed hostilities and violence on the
population;
3. Visiting detainees; and
4. Promoting awareness of international humanitarian law in the public and private
sectors.16
National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of
their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services
including disaster relief and health and social programmes.
The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies (RCS)
Position Paper,17 submitted by the PNRC, is instructive with regard to the elements
of the specific nature of the National Societies such as the PNRC, to wit:
National Societies, such as the Philippine National Red Cross and its sister Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies, have certain specificities deriving from the 1949
Geneva Convention and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement (the Movement). They are also guided by the seven
Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Humanity,
Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and Universality.
A National Society partakes of a sui generis character. It is a protected component
of the Red Cross movement under Articles 24 and 26 of the First Geneva
Convention, especially in times of armed conflict. These provisions require that the
staff of a National Society shall be respected and protected in all circumstances.
Such protection is not ordinarily afforded by an international treaty to ordinary
private entities or even non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This sui generis
character is also emphasized by the Fourth Geneva Convention which holds that an
Occupying Power cannot require any change in the personnel or structure of a
National Society.National societies are therefore organizations that are directly
regulated by international humanitarian law, in contrast to other ordinary private
entities, including NGOs.
xxxx
In addition, National Societies are not only officially recognized by their public
authorities as voluntary aid societies, auxiliary to the public authorities in the
humanitarian field, but also benefit from recognition at the International level. This
is considered to be an element distinguishing National Societies from other
organisations (mainly NGOs) and other forms of humanitarian response.
x x x. No other organisation belongs to a world-wide Movement in which all
Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping
each other. This is considered to be the essence of the Fundamental Principle of
Universality.
Furthermore, the National Societies are considered to be auxiliaries to the public
authorities in the humanitarian field. x x x.
The auxiliary status of [a] Red Cross Society means that it is at one and the same
time a private institution and a public service organization because the very
nature of its work implies cooperation with the authorities, a link with the State.
In carrying out their major functions, Red Cross Societies give their humanitarian
support to official bodies, in general having larger resources than the Societies,
working towards comparable ends in a given sector.
x x x No other organization has a duty to be its government’s humanitarian partner
while remaining independent.18 (Emphases ours.)
It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has
remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947
under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and
the 1987 Constitution.
The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged
on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
In the Decision, the Court, citing Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,19 explained that
the purpose of the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating
private corporations was to prevent the granting of special privileges to certain
individuals, families, or groups, which were denied to other groups. Based on the
above discussion, it can be seen that the PNRC Charter does not come within the
spirit of this constitutional provision, as it does not grant special privileges to a
particular individual, family, or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve the
common good.
Furthermore, a strict and mechanical interpretation of Article XII, Section 16 of the
1987 Constitution will hinder the State in adopting measures that will serve the
public good or national interest. It should be noted that a special law, R.A. No.
9520, the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, and not the general corporation
code, vests corporate power and capacities upon cooperatives which are private
corporations, in order to implement the State’s avowed policy.
In the Decision of July 15, 2009, the Court recognized the public service rendered by
the PNRC as the government’s partner in the observance of its international
commitments, to wit:
The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization,
whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian
assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race,
religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC provides six major
services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community Health
and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established
the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva
Convention of 27 July 1929. x x x.20 (Citations omitted.)
So must this Court recognize too the country’s adherence to the Geneva
Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its
treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law.21 Under
the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.22 This constitutional provision must
be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution,
instead of using the latter to negate the former.
By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other
private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special
status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
Although the PNRC is called to be independent under its Fundamental Principles, it
interprets such independence as inclusive of its duty to be the government’s
humanitarian partner. To be recognized in the International Committee, the PNRC
must have an autonomous status, and carry out its humanitarian mission in a
neutral and impartial manner.
However, in accordance with the Fundamental Principle of Voluntary Service of
National Societies of the Movement, the PNRC must be distinguished from private
and profit-making entities. It is the main characteristic of National Societies that
they "are not inspired by the desire for financial gain but by individual commitment
and devotion to a humanitarian purpose freely chosen or accepted as part of the
service that National Societies through its volunteers and/or members render to
the Community."23
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither "be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to
lose its character of neutrality" as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as
an auxiliary of the State.24
Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now sufficiently
established.1âwphi1 Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
of the government, nor a government-owned or -controlled corporation or a
subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so much
so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position
as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion
does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a "private corporation" within the
contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under
the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui
generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC
on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under
international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its
existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was
never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to
almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a
substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely
and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who
depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects
on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the
PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Richard J. Gordon’s Motion for
Clarification and/or for Reconsideration and movant-intervenor PNRC’s Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of the Decision in G.R. No. 175352 dated July 15, 2009 are
GRANTED. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 95, as amended, the charter of the
Philippine National Red Cross, was not raised by the parties as an issue and should
not have been passed upon by this Court. The structure of the PNRC is sui generis¸
being neither strictly private nor public in nature. R.A. No. 95 remains valid and
constitutional in its entirety. The dispositive portion of the Decision should
therefore be MODIFIED by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G.
PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L.
LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities &
Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M.
BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and
ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against
the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to
intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and
allegations are being given and made:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe
Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled
that the following were elected as Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the
Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the
management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) quo warrantoproceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC
Case), questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the
stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with
respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as
counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional
grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided
that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body",
and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was
maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition
being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for
respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from
Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought
to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman
Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the
SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in
litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez'
ownership of the said ten shares. 1 It is this Order allowing intervention that
precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior —
De Maas and respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of
Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case,
Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior In L-51928,
we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a case
originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the Court would be
one "without appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation
as an intervenor, of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the
proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the
stand of the latter in allowing intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6,
1979, resolved to consider the Comment as an Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a
then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which, as amended, now reads:
SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court
without appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with,
or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may
be called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case,
Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before
an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez
cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf
of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His
appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10)
shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the
petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected
counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of
stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired
them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of
Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25,
1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the
SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C.
Acero, 2 but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of
the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in
the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the
Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant
Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has
been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in
our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The
"intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to
enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an
unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear
as counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision
ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative
body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then
"intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may
not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to
accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. 3
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747
falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of the
constitutional prohibition against members of the Batasan, allowing any
stockholder, or any number of stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any
controversy before the SEC relating to intra-corporate matters. A resolution of that
question is not necessary in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A.
Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside.
The temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ
REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER
ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M.
DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and
HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial
Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH
ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the
complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the system‘s
conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional
challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage
may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a
multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine
feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their
well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American
legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the
advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in
reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and
constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily
to bring money to a representative's district.7 Some scholars on the subject further
use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later
discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds
appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval.
Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 312 provides that the sums
appropriated for certain public works projects13"shall be distributed x x x subject to
the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. "The committee from each House may also authorize one of its
members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section
provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of
the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution,
transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any
other item hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation
broadened from the areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project
identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was modified
to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the
law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they ‘being the
representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with
local officials or civil leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel process
commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing
to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated
formed part of a legislator‘s allocation, and the amount each legislator would
eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was
then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public
Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of
Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law
by the President – the Public Works Act.17 In the 1960‘s, however, pork barrel
legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of
Representatives and the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in
1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man controlled the
legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa
had already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called
the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National
Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the
practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each
assemblyman receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would
communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management
for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the
Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or
municipal treasurers in the assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported
that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not
only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft
projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the
categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine
democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao
Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund" which were created with
lump-sum appropriations of P480 Million and P240 Million, respectively, for the
funding of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has
been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon
legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide
Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial
funding ofP2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and other priority
community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval
of the President, to be released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject
to the submission of the required list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs
from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations of the individual
legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it has been
reported26 that by 1992, Representatives were receivingP12.5 Million each in CDF
funds, while Senators were receiving P18 Million each, without any limitation or
qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such
as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF
funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities
identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF
Article included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives
were allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, P18 Million each, and the
Vice-President, P20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project
identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition,
however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to
submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in
consultation with the implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to
the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their respective CDF
allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President and the
Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations, in the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the
remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same
article also stated that the project list, which would be published by the
DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated
herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list herein required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required
lists and endorsements were reproduced, except that the publication of the project
list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that
time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and
inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to
perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political agenda.37 It has been articulated that
since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they
were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the
lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the
implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the
insertions.38Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School
Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the
El Niño Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School
Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had
the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate
forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa
Mahihirap Program Fund,"44and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure
Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a special provision requiring "prior
consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF)
appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective
Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the
implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article.
Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed,
with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and
other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in
view of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a
single special provision ordering the release of the funds directly to the
implementing agency or local government unit concerned, without further
qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same single provision was present,
with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign. Nevertheless,
the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public Works and
Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of
Congress on the aspects of implementation delegation and project list submission,
respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority
programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the national government and
shall be released directly to the implementing agencies." It also introduced the
program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of general programs and
implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently
chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and
hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept
was consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the
specific amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their
participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In
contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School
Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly
required prior consultation with the concerned Member of Congress61anent certain
aspects of project implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal
participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation of
government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with
respect to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged
to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at least P250
Million of the P500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of school
buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-
Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School"
program, with capability and proven track records in the construction of public
school buildings x x x."62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the
2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the
Government Procurement Policy Board64(GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007
dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules
and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to
include, as a form of negotiated procurement,67 the procedure whereby the
Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of
agreement with an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance
earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the
201170 PDAF Article included an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated
for individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were given P70
Million each, broken down into P40 Million for "hard projects" and P30 Million for
"soft projects"; while P200 Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-
President, with a P100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects."
Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the
qualification that it may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the
Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior and
Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works
and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a)
realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the
original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been
obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with
the concurrence of the legislator concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of
projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list,
standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list
requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator
who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in
the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which
was pegged at P200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the
2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if
they have the technical capability to implement the projects.77 Legislators were also
allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients
and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the
written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by
the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds, modification
and revision of project identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were
all required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent
controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term‘s usage has
expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under
Section 880 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos
recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and
development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to
the energy-related activities of the government in the Malampaya natural gas field
in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special
fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title
IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983.
More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD
1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands,
the Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility
managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which
the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not
funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in
the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased
tremendously,89 owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used
the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the
first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City
Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the
lid on the huge sums of government money that regularly went into the pockets of
legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘
(standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19
percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything
from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school
buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds
intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail
became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996,
accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories,
including those about congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers,
including P3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the
PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack
of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress,"
the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
began its probe into allegations that "the government has been defrauded of
some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork
barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost
projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles
(Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the
NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers
declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts.97 Thus, after
its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before
the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three
(3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are
some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other
officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs
set up by Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-
year audit investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009,
or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the
audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the
Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the
application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate
implementing agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled
corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted
to P8.374 Billion in PDAF and P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%,
respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been
made nationwide during the audit period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings
contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP),"
were made public, the highlights of which are as follows:103
● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators
significantly exceeded their respective allocations.
● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring
members of the Lower House.
● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under
the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having
been turned over to the government.
● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s
endorsement and without considering their mandated functions, administrative
and technical capabilities to implement projects.
● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the
implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent
legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any
appropriation law or ordinance.
● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy
two (772) projects amount to P6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or
submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in
part their utilization of the Funds.
● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and
services reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900
Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA
Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one
consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that
the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant
procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the
Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their
respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House
of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating
funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may
be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara
Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L.
Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose
M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently
embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF,
and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void
for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court
issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary
Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent
Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any
expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the
foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete
schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years
2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the
recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of
the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x
x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and
all pertinent data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary
deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary
funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and
remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno),
filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the
PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued
restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary
Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their
release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development
Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the
Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of
Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic Development
Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a)
consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment on the
consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the
DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting
under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members
of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase
"for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant
to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government‖ under
the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on
October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking the
lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and
medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing
petitioners to reply to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the
Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated
September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a
Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013,
Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be
observed by the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In
view of the technicality of the issues material to the present cases, incumbent
Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with
him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who
would be able to competently and completely answer questions related to, among
others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA
Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear
before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the
Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within a period of
seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are
the main issues for the Court‘s resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual
and justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are
matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to
sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105,
113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987,
entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the
"Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties;
and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social
Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In
addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the
present cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided
by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case
law states that the first two are the most important119 and, therefore, shall be
discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.120 This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is
one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional
scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself
as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon
constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to
resolve hypothetical or moot questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also,
the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the
challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013
GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational;
hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto
had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents.
A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the
parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing
from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item
budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful
purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and
not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally
effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already
"abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the
Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul
its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law
may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the
Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the
following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio)
and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the
law,127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General
Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for
example of the PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face
of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will
continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now,
whether or not that … (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project,
he has the power to stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is
Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at
most the President can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF is
unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific
case of the PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities
and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you
have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising precisely
the duty ….
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are
anomalies, you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does
that mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress
passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases
supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that
"the moot and academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise
moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third,
when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of
petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect
to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative
power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the
interests involved
– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public
funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a
situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest.
The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws
have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA
Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own
recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the
importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘
claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight
accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v.
CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of irregularly
disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the
proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise
of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to
the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative
authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not
only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the
decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x
x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to
be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical
need for a definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the
Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of
disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in
the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
(Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the
courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles
relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases,
but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds
should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that
the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional
imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before
the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The
evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the
course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same
dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a previous course of
action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception
in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137The situation similarly
holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in
which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time,
are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖
carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a
restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation
of Baker v. Carr,139applies when there is found, among others, "a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents
submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform
budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of
their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this
stage."140
The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but
legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers
to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but
rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act
upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task
that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely
because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present
Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power
but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v.
Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution
and its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political
question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on
the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater
prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the
Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the
executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms
undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force
that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed
intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede
the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of
change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest
of the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere,
contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the
problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea
for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of
his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-
taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of
the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing
to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes
they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as
taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if
the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a
claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement
given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral
Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but
a "complete breakdown of controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-
discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import
than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid
statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et
movere (or simply, stare decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not
disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law principles which both
deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent
cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles
in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment
on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists
an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.151 This required
identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively
involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF
Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the
entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based
on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits – in that
petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that,
indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who
actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary
support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the
Court up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every
law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the standing
pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res
judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot
apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The
principle, entrenched under Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule
that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice
that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be
decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have
been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-
litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel
provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly
understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the
Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded
by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said
power in an appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the
proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the
repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the
Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the
following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of
appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of
appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be
funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress
wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of
Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa
resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically
on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members
of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination
of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other,
formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-
relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF
Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also
to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the
broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a
powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis
principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with
inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full
resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case,
Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and
identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect
of the power of appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress.
From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify
projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of
legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress
which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such
authority must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and,
hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such
authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be
merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case sums
up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for
Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be
minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in
whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court
now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among
others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in
Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of
Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory.
This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply
excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative."
Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v.
Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-
enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of powers principle.
These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in
greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural
technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current
application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not
apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must
first define the terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and
"Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the
Legislative and Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public
funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its
distribution as political largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make
up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the
appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and
broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or expended; (c) the
guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague,
overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite
constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of
the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that
the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds:
first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the
PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the
Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993.159
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal
history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and
practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds,
primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its
members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary
funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of
lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively
organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the
fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In
particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as
Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that
allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of
lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner
of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit the use of such
term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the
substantive issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of
the three fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice
Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the "Constitution has
blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government."163 To
the legislative branch of government, through Congress,164 belongs the power to
make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the
President,165belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of
government, through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because
the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this
respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the
legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no
authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or
execute the law."168 The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of
autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government
must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the
other branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must
be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of
independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence
would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or
self-interest assertions of another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when
one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US
Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be
violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the
other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively,
the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more
properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the
principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption
of another department‘s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is
indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the
Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.),
the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various
operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as
well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution
cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus,
unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should
exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of
the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation
law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of
its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget
since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in
Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it
deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress,
"in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act
precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that
no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an
appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law
-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of
implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional
boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for
implementation by the Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where
the Court held that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of
law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the
restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of
checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear
that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-
measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or
assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation.1âwphi1 In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to
the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among
others, the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between
the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere
"way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is
passed."179 They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report
provide "an illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators
wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional
principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the
Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual
legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually
dictate their implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not
been violated since the President maintains "ultimate authority to control the
execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the
legislators‘ proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the
constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify
projects so long as such proposal and identification are recommendatory."183 As
such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article
follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the
post-enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or
program menus187 – have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to
identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork
Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of
legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of
Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To
elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as
evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF
projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general program listed in
the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing
agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more
detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing
agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same provision further
authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the
representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special
Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by
legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of
projects identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4
requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be
submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee
on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as
the case may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously
doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority to identify
PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded
post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the
2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of
fund release through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5
which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by
the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the
case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund
realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which
explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted
to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance
for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case
may be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes
the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government,
Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and
Development and Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one
project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to
among others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of
the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of
budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of
powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada,
cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision
of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa
which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same
is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters
altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to
substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of
recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the
statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments – have admitted that
the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his
PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of
the said act to the entire budget execution process:192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the
project, can the PDAF of the legislator be utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by
the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and
then there is no identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was
implemented without the identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have
no specific examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement,
there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by
an identification from the legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were
replying to a question, "How can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF
Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your
Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his
district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor.
(Emphases supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article
as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any
form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices,
through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of
budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional
treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly
observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As
pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during
the Oral Arguments of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2)
Houses of Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen
the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor
Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they
were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as
the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is
surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that
what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice
that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they
are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether
through formal measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized
in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the
Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be
exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same.
In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that
only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no
other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power,
and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative
power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate
on purely local matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the
authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, 197 or fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to
delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of
either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-
making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent
rule-making).199 The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making
were explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of
legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation"
calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined
to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules
that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it
confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates
the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is
lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only
through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular
Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting
apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal
lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund
would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators
have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms
of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification
feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept
separate and distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s
power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill
submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein
he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought
and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the
Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the
"submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect
as law after the required publication."205
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the
legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the
Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill,
commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented
to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature
must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the
government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department.
The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the
negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of
the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the
Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of
strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The
courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the
same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally
passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)
The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy
goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the
legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary
process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme
Court characterized the President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the
legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions,
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to
influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the
chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste,
inadvertence, or design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there
exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in
the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized
an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a
specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens
to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the
President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific
appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for
parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item
characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified
singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-
item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition
as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may
discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing
Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations
which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as
"line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it
must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into
component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or
value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to
be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed
out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by
accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE
(maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes
shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto
power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square
with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule
on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it
must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that
the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended,
and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein."
Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines
as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely
provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for
multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further
determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of
the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in
the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific
appropriation of money‖ and hence, without a proper line-item which the President
may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its
purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not
to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that
such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the
implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual
amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the
foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to
appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative
prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is
a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects after the
passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later
on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President
mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress
cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-
given power of the President useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions
a process which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and,
as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations
which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of
the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed
and textually-grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and
could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their
own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only
after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the
actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of
lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As
petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to
decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without
knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent
with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all
other legislators with legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the
2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate
as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular,
the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source
allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions,
assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads,
flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
President‘s power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as
the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data
and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said
Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or
amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing
agency."217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article,
as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be
unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of
flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what
the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that
unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it renders
Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out
that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest
in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from
fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."219 They also claim that the system
has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective
officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as
such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of
senators.‘"220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which
states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every
instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in
accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters
of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence,
the various mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact
accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of
public funds may be checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned
in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a)
scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and
monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on
congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-
enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to
become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring
the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of
oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally
appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment
authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow
him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and
a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF
for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular
facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational
proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the former‘s
post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter
largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork
Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of
judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and
violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public
accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who
are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves
in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution225 which
states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service,
and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not
self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this
respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive
action.226Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the
policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on
this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely
speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel
System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and
Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been
more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment
of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the local government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units,
nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the
community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of
the State to empower local government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately,
become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy. As
explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate
Appellate Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to
the policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and
encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self -
reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the
small republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of
local governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and
more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public
affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue
interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best
resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we
reach today conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the
spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes
against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows district
representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing
public funds for local development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and
that "it is also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the
President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about
the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each
project."231Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified
its existence by stating that "the relatively small projects implemented under the
Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national development goals to
the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked
by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his
August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms,
President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally
established for a worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify
projects for communities that the LGU concerned cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in
the system which actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal the
unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account
the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this
regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of
equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis
gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural
province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To
add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List
Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not
represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent
which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become
personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them
on the sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF
and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils
(LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian
in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are
instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local
affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor
duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-
making authority except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on
local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was
succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and
initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this
type of personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to
the overall development of the district, but has even contributed to "further
weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local
matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well
as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns
to the substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now,
amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have
the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from
the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an
appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation
of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund
incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869
is neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social
Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is
the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the
foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law
allowing for their proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a
determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a
particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and
purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means
"to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if
written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists.
As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be
made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to
Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the
intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in the case of
Guingona, Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular
form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the
authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other
words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by
past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by
enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be
made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may
be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special
provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds
for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation
measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from
the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the
past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to
the designated purpose. The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or
apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the
constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public
purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention
to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the
appropriation must be the "primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a
valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a
determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a
particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes
apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an
"appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including
receipts from service contracts and agreements such as application and processing
fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from
concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under
the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties,
rentals, production share on service contracts and similar payments on the
exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a
Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate
gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than P150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the
General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
(Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be
concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of
"all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all
sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified
public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which
similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR,
or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00" (also a
determinable amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects
and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines"
(also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly
deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely
because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively
create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations
are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by
individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such,
the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is
not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment
determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences
outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an
"appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual
legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-
discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President
"unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be
used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of
ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to
other purposes related "to energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular
public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law
must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making
authority to the Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the
law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining
facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-
making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative
guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called
the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On
the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test."
Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.247To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority,
announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section
8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does
not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use
the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That
the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of
ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to
include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the
phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government" states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated
as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase "for such
other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government;250 and, third,
the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy
related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own
position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may
have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is
clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law should
nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it
must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of
the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting.
Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but
an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be used –
only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the
parties‘ submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision
may be readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court
proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second
indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the
Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities,
the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the
same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily,
the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development
projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the
same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad
of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. This may
be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework
of a system, especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools,
bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as
economic and residential development."253In fine, the phrase "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as
unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of
PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869,
as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional –
as the Court did so in the context of its pronouncements made in this Decision –
petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to
release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators
who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying
the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals,
and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and
all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is
grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to
file a petition for mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be
discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be
made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment
of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of
agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public
right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set
forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in
this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of
the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been
clarified that the right to information does not include the right to compel the
preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was
stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain
legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to
perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court
cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent portions of
Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a
right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries
and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the
applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded
and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The
corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear
and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203;
Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on
the part of respondent to prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of
mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive
Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and
Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or
administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish
them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information
be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been
impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to
be allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to
the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes that the
information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to
ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to
unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained
to deny petitioners‘ prayer on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus
case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate
petition.
It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘
plea to be furnished with such schedule/list and report and not in any way deny
them, or the general public, access to official documents which are already existing
and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid
statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in
Valmonte, while the Court denied the application for mandamus towards the
preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed
access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the
custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans
granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may
promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that
damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the
duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other
persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The
petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by
petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners,
i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of
the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary
deliberations with the Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum,
discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya
Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social
Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter
which is generally left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.
Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this
score.
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM
to the concept of released funds. In response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013
TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013,
the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular
2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has
been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may
continually be implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies
concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued
implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered
by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing
agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the
SARO does not yet involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only
triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF
disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased
and unobligated allotments." They explain that once a SARO has been issued and
obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the
same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they cannot be considered
as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the
TRO by the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present
Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has
the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent
one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining
PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.
The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must,
nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical impact on the execution of the
current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or not
PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated,
may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental
reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under
legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is
"aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding
a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover
expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or
regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent
authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence
of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does
not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control
of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain
circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand,
the actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is
subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements
of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the
agencies to obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already
the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the amounts
obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal
for the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the
payees depending on the projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that
the SAROs issued are withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds
which have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013
PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any
corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be
enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general
fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article,
the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already
obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an
unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds
which have been obligated but not released – meaning, those merely covered by a
SARO – under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced
from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as
unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the general fund
as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes
not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the
unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all
other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1)
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be
treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or
executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience
and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in
the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before
it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity.
It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be
no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the
language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘"268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the
chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork
Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within
which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in
varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget
execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as
it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting
wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the
prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the
power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional
oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect
of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has
equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who
are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the
existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local
autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other
purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad
classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more
transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious
unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should
never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by any
semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think
that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court
urges the people and its co-stewards in government to look forward with the
optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest
and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today,
while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost,
guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may
heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the
Court‘s bounden duty and no other‘s.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional
violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of
past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and
CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators
– whether individually or collectively organized into committees – to intervene,
assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget
execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification,
modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund
realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous
PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red
personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of
similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1)
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No.
1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient
standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby
declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF
funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds
sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12
of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993,
which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash
Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether
obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this
permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the
unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for their
respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the
Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary
and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the
public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports
related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases.
Petitioners‘ access to official documents already available and of public record
which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely
subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory
prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus
case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a
separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject
of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter
left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to,
within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all
government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses
related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all
funds under the Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998]
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners,
vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches
of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within
its own constitutionally allocated sphere.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the
Senate. Where no provision of the Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the
Senate is clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave
abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their
competence and authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it
will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad
instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of
Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of
the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the
respondents and the solicitor general to file COMMENT thereon within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice.On August 25, 1998, both
respondents and the solicitor general submitted their respective Comments. In
compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners
filed their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this
Court gave due course to the petition and deemed the controversy submitted for
decision, without need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent
jurisdiction[1] to hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts
impels a filing of such petitions in the lower tribunals.[2] However, for special and
important reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the
present case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine.[3] In fact, original
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of
legislative officers like the Senate President[4] and the Speaker of the House[5] have
been recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The Facts
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer,
convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. At
the time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as
follows:[6]
10 members -Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members - Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim
Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)
1 member - Liberal Party (LP)
1 member - Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member - Peoples Reform Party (PRP)
1 member - Gabay Bayan
2 members - Independent
----------
23 - total number of senators[7] (The last six members are all classified by
petitioners as independent.)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F.
Ople to the position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco
S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defensor
Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2,[8] Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected
President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and
Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of
minority leader. He explained that those who
had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had
voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority.
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate minority, Sen. Juan M.
Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party --
numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Guingona as
the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The
following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators
Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the
Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a
letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators,[9] stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the
Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject
petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader,
a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for
resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
The Courts Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings[10] and a careful deliberation on the
arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or
grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into
office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
First Issue: The Courts Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco[11] in arguing that this Court has
jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They
submit that the definitions of majority and minority involve an interpretation of the
Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating that [t]he Senate
shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority
vote of all its respective Members.
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in
common that the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal
matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over which the Court
cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of separation of
powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental law does
not provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature alone
has the full discretion to provide for such office and, in that event, to determine the
procedure of selecting its occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no
question involving an interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or
even the Rules of the Senate; neither are there peculiar circumstances impelling the
Court to assume jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor general adds that there
is not even any legislative practice to support the petitioners theory that a senator
who votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from becoming the
minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on
the various important cases involving this very important and basic question, which
it has ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Courts power
of judicial review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a
provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of
Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the
validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the
tribunal finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies.[12]
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of
who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy
falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for
reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) in the light
of subsequent events which justify its intervention; and (2) because the resolution
of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
presence of a quorum to hold a session[13] and therein elect a Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: [I] concur with
the majority that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present x x x so as to
establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well.[14]
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of
Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has
already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has created a
veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from
any quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for
an effective settlement are pinned.[15]
x x x This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide
if this Court should refuse to decide them.[16]
x x x The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered.[17]
In Taada v. Cuenco,[18] this Court endeavored to define political question. And we
said that it refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the]
legality, of a particular measure.[19]
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members
did not depend on the Senates full discretionary authority, but was subject to
mandatory constitutional limitations.[20] Thus, the Court held that not only was it
clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings,
but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia,[21] Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
wrote that the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the
factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the
writ [of habeas corpus]. This ruling was made in spite of the previous
pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker[22] and Montenegro v. Castaeda[23] that the
authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege x x x) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon
the courts and upon all other persons. But the Chief Justice cautioned: the function
of the Court is merely to check -- not to supplant --- the Executive, or to
ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, notto exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of
his act.
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive
Secretary:[24]
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character
are justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the
non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of separation of
powers -- characteristic of the presidential system of government -- the functions of
which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories,
namely, 1) those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative
department; 2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of
judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the
executive department; and 3) those dealing with the settlement of disputes,
controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally
demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its
own sphere -- but only within such sphere each department is supreme and
independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach
upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but
also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed,
measures taken or decisions made by the other departments -- provided that such
acts, measures or decision are within the area allocated thereto by the
Constitution."
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to
limitations, the issue of whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions
have been met, or the limitations respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux
of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its
wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations -- particularly
those prescribed by the Constitution -- would be set at naught. What is more, the
judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of
the courts of justice under the presidential form of government adopted in our
1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic
predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to
decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation -- made
particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest
Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution -- to settle it. This
explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that
courts have a duty, rather than a power, to determine whether another branch of
the government has kept within constitutional limits.
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the
scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the
courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.[25]
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements
of the Court. Daza v. Singson,[26] Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.[27] and Guingona Jr. v.
Gonzales[28] similarly resolved issues assailing the acts of the leaders of both houses
of Congress in apportioning among political parties the seats to which each
chamber was entitled in the Commission on Appointments. The Court held that the
issue was justiciable, even if the question were political in nature, since it involved
the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on
Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution.
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara,[29] wherein the
petitioners sought to nullify the Senates concurrence in the ratification of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: Where an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over
petitions questioning an act of the political departments of government, it will not
review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down only
on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of
discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives[30] (HRET), the
Court refused to reverse a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that
said tribunal had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had been conferred upon the
electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the Senate as sole
judges of all contests relating to
the election, the returns, and the qualifications of their respective members. Such
jurisdiction is original and exclusive.[31] The Court may inquire into a decision or
resolution of said tribunals only if such decision or resolution was rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.[32]
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia,[33] was asked to reexamine the
enrolled bill doctrine and to look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives that the bill, which was later enacted as Republic Act
8240, was properly approved by the legislative body. Petitioners claimed that
certain procedural rules of the House had been breached in the passage of the
bill. They averred further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House
rules was a violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of
concerned the internal procedures of the House, with which the Court had no
concern. It enucleated:[34]
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department
for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks
the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in
the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a
roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of
grave abuse of discretion were it to do so. x x x In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather
than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners -- one of whom is Senator Santiago, a
well-known constitutionalist -- try to hew closely to these jurisprudential
parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not
been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the
Courts expanded judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint
or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief
asserted.[35] In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this
Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction
of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of
their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial
question: In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did
the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the
Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the
constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President by majority
vote of all its members carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of
majority and minority, as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue that
majority in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of
senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted
committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee
and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to
determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent
Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he voted for Respondent
Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not belong to the minority,
having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear
support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from
practices of the Upper House.
The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to
a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater
than half or more than half of any total.[36] The plain and unambiguous words of the
subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain
the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it
thereby delineate who comprise the majority, much less the minority, in the said
body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind
other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it
does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso
facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily,
no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become
the minority leader.
[37]
The Comment of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents,
which were not contested in petitioners Reply. During the eighth Congress, which
was the first to convene after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
nomination of Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a
member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada.[38] During the ninth regular
session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a
consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators,
including those belonging to the minority.[39] This practice continued during the
tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was allowed to chair a
committee.[40] History would also show that the majority in either house of
Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers
belonged, while the minority normally referred to a party with a lesser number of
members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms majority and minority. Majority may
also refer to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,[41] not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
contrast, minority is a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority.[42] Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising
a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the
lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal
groupings, it is not as easy to say which is theminority entitled to select the leader
representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as
in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several
minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the dominant
minority party for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition
of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many
minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to
select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and
a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress.All that the Charter says is that [e]ach House
shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.[43] To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by
this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to
determine the rules of its proceedings.[44] Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated
and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs.[45] Pertinent to the instant
case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
SECTION 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President,
a President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of
their duties.
Rule II
ELECTION OF OFFICERS
SEC. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its
Members. Should there be more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal
vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such
offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders
thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually
extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules,
this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of
the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of
separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its
work.[46] Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of
the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion
and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.[47]
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints
of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver atthe pleasure of the body adopting
them.[48] Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to
the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body[49] at
will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide
for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and
discretion to prescribe the
parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to
interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul
of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty
that justifies the Courts being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for
the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the
internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor
a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and
majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to
judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the
practice of the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the
legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of Congress or its
officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion.[50] This is the plain
implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers
upon the judiciary the power and the duty not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but likewise to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part:[51]
xxx the powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others.Because of that supremacy[,
the] power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of
justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government
or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions,
first, of Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of
power[52] by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law
thereto.[53] A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the
right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment.[54] The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public
prosecutor[55] or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.[56] The action shall be brought
against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding or
exercising such office.[57]
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must
show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise
the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent.[58] In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in
determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down
by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been
vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or
irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers
of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion
has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernans Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government is
restricted only by the definition and confines of the term grave abuse of discretion.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility.[59]
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his
discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the
Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this
party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate
President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least
two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to
articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be
accused of capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.Where no provision of the
Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to
have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot
be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno and Lorenzo M.
Tañada for respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines & Navarro; Felixberto M.
Serrano and Vicente del Rosario as amici curiae.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against
four resolved to deny the petition.
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now
written briefly to explain the principal grounds for the denial.
The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañadare
quested that his right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to
formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His
request was approved.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Tañada and
Senator Tañada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the
Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President and
ordering the investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the
Senate session hall at the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was
already in his office, said petitioner delayed his appearance at the session hall until
about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately
open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution
submitted by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he
read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with
his colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally
called the meeting to order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital
and Senator Confesor who is in the United States, all the Senator were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be
dispensed with, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of
a premeditated plan of petitioner and his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics
to prevent Senator Tañada from delivering his privilege speech. The roll was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading
of the minutes, but this motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David,
evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes,
Senator Tañada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour
privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding, continuosly ignored him; and
when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada instead on being recognized
by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of any
senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the
while, tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously
shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for
recognition of Senator Tañada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by
pre-arrangement. At about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the
petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment
of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to
muzzle Senator Tañada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and
this opposition was seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of
adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also
reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of
Senator David be submitted to a vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly
walked out of the session hall followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres,
Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator
Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators present
took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made —
that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent
upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the
Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be
designated to preside over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously.
the respondent thereupon took the Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was
appointedActing Secretary, because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting
as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.
Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver
his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of
said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the
same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the
respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67,
entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate
and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the
Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting
president of the Philippines Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to
declare him the rightful President of the Philippines senate and oust respondent.
The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that
these are the crucial points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of
powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83;
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which
power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused
to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the
suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A
fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer
affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies
in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that
our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things
has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful
and law-abiding citizens. And we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a
rash action inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial
deliberations.
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other reasons,
the situation is not where two sets of senators have constituted themselves
into two senates actually functioning as such, (as in said Werts case), there being no
question that there is presently one Philippines Senate only. To their credit be it As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the
recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected themselves petition. Without costs.
into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been
duly elected in his place in the same one Philippines Senate.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to
the respondent makes it advisable, more than ever, to adopt the hands-off policy
[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997]
wisely enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature.
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E.
The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the
TAADA, and RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA,
so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty
RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that
AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the
present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they do, that the Court has no DECISION
jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those
four on those sub-questions. MENDOZA, J.:
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic
session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue
minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture
senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. and sale of beer and cigarettes.
The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
less.
against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive
constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the constitutionally mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Constitution.
Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country
of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was
twelve three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September
House" shall constitute aquorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third
reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri
Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo
the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech,
believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they
after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to
could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had
interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack
been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco
of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head
would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for
count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence
Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
of a quorum.[1] Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was
defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical
proceeded.
situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate
deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order,
support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it
following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In
would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of
question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never
the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of
did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session
that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session
on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress
hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy
in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
arising from the divergence of opinion here aboutquorum and for the benefit of all
concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference
could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt. committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know
what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for
approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next
week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House
of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of
this portion of Rep. Arroyos interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound
recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session
adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C.
Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the
Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep.
Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of
November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on
November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version
abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to
wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word approved, which appears on line 13
in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on
November 21, 1996 the word no on line 17 appears only once, while in the other
versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not contain
the sentence (Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of
the quorum, which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is
no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to
expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the
correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree
that for purposes of this proceeding the word approved appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners principal argument is
that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House; that these rules embody the constitutional mandate in Art. VI, 16(3) that
each House may determine the rules of its proceedings and that, consequently,
violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend
that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is
false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule
XVII, 103 of the rules of the House,[2] the Chair, in submitting the conference
committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked
for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning
the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112,[3] the Chair deliberately
ignored Rep. Arroyos question, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? and did not repeat
Rep. Albanos motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97,[4] the Chair
refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albanos
motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX,
121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109,[5] the Chair suspended the session
without first ruling on Rep. Arroyos question which, it is alleged, is a point of order
or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyos query should have been
resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the
parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the
resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent
petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and
asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of
the House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Courts power
under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other
departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance,[6] which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view
of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition,
respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents defense is
anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine.
They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules
of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill
doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by
each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought
in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as
that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all
events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240,
the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of
conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification
of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule,
the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the
House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996,
shows that On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved
the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198.[7] This Journal was
approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep.
Lagman.[8]
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No.
8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated
in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the
House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art.
VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some
maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings[9] and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin
with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases,[10] the
constitutional provision that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings
was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of
autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference
by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking
judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there
was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In
Osmea v. Pendatun,[11] it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently,
mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken
by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[12] the rule was stated thus: The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all
matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a
different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to
make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
In Crawford v. Gilchrist,[13] it was held: The provision that each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere
formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary
legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when
exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a
determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as
it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in
the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution.
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,[14] the Supreme Court of Ohio
stated: The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is
therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having made the
rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of
judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and
also by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared
invalid for noncompliance with rules.
In State v. Savings Bank,[15] the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared
itself as follows: The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the
rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the
Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants
of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when
the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an
unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative department for the
court to set aside such action as void because it may think that the House has
misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure.
In McDonald v. State,[16] the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: When it appears that
an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two
houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure
upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is
conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of
the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself,
or the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at
will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them.
Schweizer v. Territory[17] is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes
of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be
passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an
emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of
the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing
gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly
passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had
not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the
State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill
in any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit,
either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making
any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for
the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its
entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The
failure of the legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through
the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding
his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a
rule which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no
reason for the courts refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a
majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The
courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance
with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v.
State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N. W. 187; State v.
Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S. E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief
Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to
determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other
than members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial
in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.[18]
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this
Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House
than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no
violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has
its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate
balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our
system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to
enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must
accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcions sponsorship
in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, nothing involving
abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review.[19] Implicit in this statement of the
former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this
Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5 and,
therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can
adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to
national security,[20] it has not altogether done away with political questions such as
those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under
Art. VIII, 1, this Courts function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a
different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent
error.[21]
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it
follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction so as to call
for the exercise of our Art. VIII, 1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was
railroaded. They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when
the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections
to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same
time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that . . .
Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albanos
motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have been
stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have been
taken. They say that the method used in this case is a legislators nightmare because
it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the
report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires
that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the
Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the
other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a
unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference
committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991
and the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs
Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the
House. The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his
answer became the ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. Tolentino. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent
since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that
if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting
comes in.
....
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I
wonder what his attitude is now on his point of order. I should just like to state that
I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule
invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a
substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the
vote by saying Is there any objection? and nobody objects, then the Chair
announces The bill is approved on second reading. If there was any doubt as to the
vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not
presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is
substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can
always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many
are against.[22]
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate and even more just.[23] The advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial
consideration.[24] In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court cannot
provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the
deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors,
our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional
command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us
from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem.[25]
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members
be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following
instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill,[26] at the request of one-fifth of
the Members present,[27] and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President.[28] Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the
votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been
sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly
as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the
session.[29] It would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the
parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day
Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore.While it is true that the Majority Leader
moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep.
Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The
fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House
shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session
adjourned until four oclock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its
approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners predicament was largely of their own making.
Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners
insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyos question as an obstacle to the passage of
the bill. But Rep. Arroyos question was not, in form or substance, a point of order
or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep. Arroyos
question were so, Rep. Albanos motion to adjourn would have precedence and
would have put an end to any further consideration of the question.[31]
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing
the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted
with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has a settled meaning in the
jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to
lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision,
the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, 1 extends to cases where a branch of
the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.[32]
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the
House with which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not
that there was no quorumbut only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for
lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence
of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when
the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.[33] Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the
sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.[34]
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to
be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are
questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198
was approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to
the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did not
participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings.[35] Rep. Lagman
and Rep. Zamora objected to the report[36] but not to the manner it was approved;
while it is said that, if voting had been conducted, Rep. Taada would have voted in
favor of the conference committee report.[37]
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker
of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996
are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the
separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this
doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT
cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a
conclusive presumption. In one case[38] we went behind an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had
been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the
certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly
passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-
fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not
been obtained, because a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute
verity and is binding on the courts.[39] This Court quoted from Wigmore on
Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic
theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at
any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for
this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But
they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an
inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate
legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent
ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands
on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
government.[40]
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the
President contained provisions which had been surreptitiously inserted in the
conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have
not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference
Committee surreptitiously inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we
should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard
the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other
two departments of our government.[41]
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution that upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed. [42]
In other cases,[43] this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise
than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with
approval by text writers here and abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests on the
following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an
enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was
passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.[45]
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive
teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the
rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three
new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the
enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and
Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and
their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima,
Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in
the membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed
by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was
approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the
Constitution. Art. VI, 16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and
the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by
the Constitution to be recorded therein.[46] With respect to other matters, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded
conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,[47] this Court spoke of the
imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as public memorials of the
most permanent character, thus: They should be public, because all are required to
conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the
faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at
some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals. As
already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence
its due enactment has been duly proven.
___________________
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department
for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks
the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in
the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a
roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of
grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case[48] may
instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new
law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather
than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.[49]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, G.R. No. 170338
Petitioner,
- versus -
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION,
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS,
Respondents.
X----------------------X
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D.
AGCAOILI,
Petitioners,
Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
- versus - (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the
wiretapped conversation emerged.But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House
THEPHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE Committees seven alleged original tape recordings of the supposed three-hour
G.R. No. 179275 taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee
SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL
VILLAR, members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were
eventually played in the chambers of the House.[2]
Respondent.
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the
X----------------------X hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports
based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.[3]
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction[4] docketed as G.R. No.
Petitioner-in-Intervention.
170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from
using these tape recordings of the illegally obtained wiretapped conversations in
their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the
X----------------------X said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the
inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further
using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.[5]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the Garci
NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, tapes abruptly stopped.
PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA,
M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the
TRILLANES, Promulgated: slumbering issue with a privilege speech, The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness. In
his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public the whole
Respondents-Intervenors. December 23, 2008 unvarnished truth the whats, whens, wheres, whos and whys of the alleged
wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of
telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons speech was referred to
the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator
DECISION
Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills[6] seeking to regulate the sale,
purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.[7]
NACHURA, J.:
In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic
purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of Act (R.A.) No. 4200[8] if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter.
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege
public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the
legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near- use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the Hello Garci tapes.
collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the Hello However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the
Garci tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.[9]
presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated
legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired
Congress.[1] justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Preliminary Injunction,[10] docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate
Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, Tale of Two Tapes, and set from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the
in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on
intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution.[11]
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public
hearings on the Hello Garci tapes on September 7,[12] 17[13] and October 1,[14] 2007.
Intervening as respondents,[15] Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy
C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S.
Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment[16] on the petition
on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.[17]
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of
the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings,
moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.[18]
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and
179275.[19]
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the Hello Garci recordings, they
have different objectivesthe first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in
the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second
seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R.
No. 179275.
-I-
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on
the parties standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v.COMELEC,[20] we explained that [l]egal standing or locus standi refers
to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x, thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[21]
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[22]
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court,
in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo[23] articulates that a liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary
citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions
involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.[24] The
fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales[25] even permitted a non-member of the broadcast
media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to
challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications
Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that this
Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as
impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly
impact on public interest, in keeping with the Courts duty under the 1987
Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have
not abused the discretion given to them.[26]
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition
by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the Hello Garci tapes. Further, his was
publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees as one of the
voices in the recordings.[27] Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be
directly injured by the House committees actions and charges of electoral fraud.
The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging
that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of
the firm conviction that any attempt to use the Hello Garci tapes will further divide
the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will
necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the
continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to
abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries
purportedly in aid of legislation.[28]
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is
summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his
rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins
the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and
wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned
hearings.[29]
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the
laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due
process,[30] they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,[31] we
find sufficient petitioners Ranadas and Agcaoilis and intervenor Sagges allegation
that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.[32] It should be noted that
in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been
injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet
the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they
invariably invoked the vindication of their own rightsas taxpayers, members of
Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the
legal professionwhich were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed
unconstitutional acts.[33]
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners
and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues
are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to
the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.[34]
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has
shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court
recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor
Sagge.
- II -
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic.
Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this
Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual
cases and controversies.[35] By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate
or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the
decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial
inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.[36] Neither will the Court determine a moot
question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot
when its purpose has become stale.[37] It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have
any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.[38]
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as
aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent
House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in
their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the
records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were
already played in the House and heard by its members.[39] There is also the widely
publicized fact that the committee reports on the Hello Garci inquiry were
completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent
committees.[40] Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has
to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive
remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to
provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.[41]
- III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot
be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate
or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process.[42] Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.[43] What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides that [l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines.[44]
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995
and in 2006.[45] With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however,
of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort
was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their
session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v.
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,[46] we
said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees
likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the
inquiry be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure. We quote the
OSGs explanation:
The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of every Congress
to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because
every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections
are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may
thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules
of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the
14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this
ruling with the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative
body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected
every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators
expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into
the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a
majority of Senators to constitute a quorum to do business. Applying the same
reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a
continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next
Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by
the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.[47]
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution[48] (On the Motion
for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a continuing body, this Court sees fit to issue a
clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is
continuing, as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change
in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day
business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the
Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it
states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next
session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one
(1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the
first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed
bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminatedupon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely
optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and
practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the
succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of
the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the
Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with
respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed
terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite
nature of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the
Senate (i.e. the Senates main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding
elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to
the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented
at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the
Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall
remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new
composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment
or revision of the Rules at the start ofeach session in which the newly elected
Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are
intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or
repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply
state (t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation. The latter does not explicitly provide for the
continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of
the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be
presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next
Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its
legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry
be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is
categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative
inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that
the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to
be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same
language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.[49]
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot
justify the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the
Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any
distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice
or tradition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by the respondents is
illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in
pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the
rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation, precluding any other form of publication. Publication in
accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement
because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person who violates
the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,[50] otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes.[51] In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic
data messages and/or electronic documents.[52] It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry
subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by
the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent
publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the
instant petitions.Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative
investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent
Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention
of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other
issues raised in the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R.
No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of
the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any
inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the Hello Garci tapes.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184849 February 13, 2009
SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (Ret.) and MARIA FE C. DELA
PAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS and the SENATE SERGEANT-AT-
ARMS JOSE BALAJADIA, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
filed on October 28, 2008 by petitioners-spouses General (Ret.) Eliseo D. dela Paz
(Gen. Dela Paz) and Mrs. Maria Fe C. dela Paz (Mrs. Dela Paz) assailing, allegedly for
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the orders of respondent Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(respondent Committee), through its Chairperson, Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago (Senator Santiago), (1) denying petitioners’ Challenge to Jurisdiction with
Motion to Quash Subpoenae and (2) commanding respondent Senate Sergeant-at-
Arms Jose Balajadia, Jr. (Balajadia) to immediately arrest petitioners during the
Senate committee hearing last October 23, 2008. The petition thus prays that
respondent Committee be enjoined from conducting its hearings involving
petitioners, and to enjoin Balajadia from implementing the verbal arrest order
against them.
The antecedents are as follow –
On October 6, 2008, a Philippine delegation of eight (8) senior Philippine National
Police (PNP) officers arrived in Moscow, Russia to attend the 77th General
Assembly Session of the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO)-INTERPOL
in St. Petersburg from October 6-10, 2008. With the delegation was Gen. Dela Paz,
then comptroller and special disbursing officer of the PNP. Gen. Dela Paz, however,
was to retire from the PNP on October 9, 2008.
On October 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at
the Moscow airport departure area for failure to declare in written form the
105,000 euros [approximately P6,930,000.00] found in his luggage. In addition, he
was also found to have in his possession 45,000 euros (roughly equivalent
to P2,970,000.00).
Petitioners were detained in Moscow for questioning. After a few days, Gen. Dela
Paz and the PNP delegation were allowed to return to the Philippines, but the
Russian government confiscated the euros.
On October 21, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz arrived in Manila, a few days after Mrs. Dela
Paz. Awaiting them were subpoenae earlier issued by respondent Committee for
the investigation it was to conduct on the Moscow incident on October 23, 2008.
On October 23, 2008, respondent Committee held its first hearing. Instead of
attending the hearing, petitioners filed with respondent Committee a pleading
denominated Challenge to Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash Subpoena.2 Senator
Santiago emphatically defended respondent Committee’s jurisdiction and
commanded Balajadia to arrest petitioners.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners argue that respondent Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to
investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state
relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of
Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim that respondent Committee violated
the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest without the required
signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee. They likewise
assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required
by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation
involving them relative to the Moscow incident.
Respondent Committee filed its Comment3 on January 22, 2009.
The petition must inevitably fail.
First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:
"Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary
authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation
of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from
judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.4
The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised
by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter
that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a
political question that, in Tañada v. Cuenco,5 was characterized as a question which,
under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to this
constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules,
the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit,
subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.
Thus, it is not for this Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of policy, an
issue dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senate’s action.
Second. Even if it is within our power to inquire into the validity of the exercise of
jurisdiction over the petitioners by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we are
convinced that respondent Committee has acted within the proper sphere of its
authority.lawphil.net
Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules provides:
12) Committee on Foreign Relations. – Fifteen (15) members. All matters relating to
the relations of the Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and
consular services; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the United Nations
Organization and its agencies; multi-lateral organizations, all international
agreements, obligations and contracts; and overseas Filipinos.
A reading of the above provision unmistakably shows that the investigation of the
Moscow incident involving petitioners is well within the respondent Committee’s
jurisdiction.
The Moscow incident could create ripples in the relations between the Philippines
and Russia. Gen. Dela Paz went to Moscow in an official capacity, as a member of
the Philippine delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in St. Petersburg, carrying a
huge amount of "public" money ostensibly to cover the expenses to be incurred by
the delegation. For his failure to comply with immigration and currency laws, the
Russian government confiscated the money in his possession and detained him and
other members of the delegation in Moscow.
Furthermore, the matter affects Philippine international obligations. We take
judicial notice of the fact that the Philippines is a state-party to the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime. The two conventions contain provisions dealing
with the movement of considerable foreign
currency across borders.6 The Moscow incident would reflect on our country’s
compliance with the obligations required of state-parties under these conventions.
Thus, the respondent Committee can properly inquire into this matter, particularly
as to the source and purpose of the funds discovered in Moscow as this would
involve the Philippines’ commitments under these conventions.
Third. The Philippine Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be jointly
conducted by the respondent Committee and the Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee).
Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon
Committee may conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance,
misfeasance and nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the
government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions and instrumentalities, and on any
matter of public interest on its own initiative or brought to its attention by any of
its members. It is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon Committee can
investigate Gen. Dela Paz, a retired PNP general and member of the official PNP
delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in Russia, who had with him millions which
may have been sourced from public funds.
Fourth. Subsequent to Senator Santiago’s verbal command to Balajadia to arrest
petitioners, the Philippine Senate issued a formal written Order7 of arrest, signed by
ten (10) senators, with the Senate President himself approving it, in accordance
with the Senate Rules.
Fifth. The Philippine Senate has already published its Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in two newspapers of general circulation.8
Sixth. The arrest order issued against the petitioners has been rendered ineffectual.
In the legislative inquiry held on November 15, 2008, jointly by the respondent
Committee and the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Gen. Dela Paz voluntarily
appeared and answered the questions propounded by the Committee members.
Having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Senate Committees, there was
no longer any necessity to implement the order of arrest. Furthermore, in the same
hearing, Senator Santiago granted the motion of Gen. Dela Paz to dispense with the
presence of Mrs. Dela Paz for humanitarian considerations.9 Consequently, the
order for her arrest was effectively withdrawn.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being moot and
academic.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 22041 September 11, 1924
JOSE ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL., respondents.
Araneta & Zaragoza for petitioner.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner in this original proceeding in mandamus and injunction is Jose
Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Governor-General to represent the Twelfth
Senatorial District. The respondents are Manuel L. Quezon, President of the
Philippine Senate; Isabelo de los Reyes, Santiago Fonacier, Alejo Mabanag, Bernabe
de Guzman, Ramon Fernandez, Emiliano T. Tirona, Antero Soriano, Juan B. Alegre,
Vicente de Vera, Jose Ma. Arroyo, Francisco Enage, Tomas Gomez, Sergio Osmeña,
Celestino Rodriguez, Francisco Soriano, Jose A. Clarin, Hadji Butu, Espiridion
Guanco, Hermenegildo Villanueva, Jose Hontiveros, Teodoro Sandiko, and Santiago
Lucero, all members of the Philippine Senate; Faustino Aguilar, Secretary of the
Philippine Senate; Bernabe Bustamante, Sergeant-at-arms of the Philippine Senate,
and Francisco Dayaw, Paymaster of the Philippine Senate.
The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the
respondent Senators, on February 5, 1924, depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one year
from the first of January, 1924. The resolution reads as follows:
Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be,
as he is hereby declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the
privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente
de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of the debate regarding the
credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino;
Resolved, further: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino be, as he is hereby, deprived
of all of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments as such Senator during one
year from the first of January, nineteen hundred and twenty-four;
And, resolved, lastly: That the said Honorable Jose Alejandrino, being a Senator
appointed by the Governor-General of these Islands, a copy of this resolution be
furnished said Governor-General for his information.
The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the resolution above quoted is
unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court: (1)
To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from
executing the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null
and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ
of mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize
the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he enjoy all of
his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing
the petitioner from exercising the rights of his office, and from carrying the order of
suspension, into effect. By special appearance, the Attorney-General, in
representation of the respondents, has objected to the jurisdiction of the court,
and later, by demurrer, has pressed the same point.
In order that an obvious angle to the case may not subsequently embarrass us, we
desire first of all to say that looking through the form of the action to the
substance, this is, in effect, a suit instituted by one member of the Philippine
Senate against the Philippine Senate and certain of its official employees. May the
Supreme Court of the Philippines Islands by mandamus and injunction annul the
suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate
him in his official position? Without, therefore, at this time discussing any of the
other interesting questions which have been raised and argued, we proceed at
once to resolve the issue here suggested.
There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of the Government of
the Philippine Islands, which are familiar to students of public law. It is here only
necessary to recall that under our system of government, each of the three
departments is distinct and not directly subject to the control of another
department. The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to
abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly
restrain the others.
It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the
Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a
department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of
legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this
extent, do the courts restrain the other departments.
With these sound premises in mind, we are not at all surprised to find the general
rule of mandamus to be, that the writ will not lie from one branch of the
government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is
inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its
members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in
their character which therefore pertain to their legislative, functions and over
which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect
without a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that there where a
member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power,
irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to
compel his reinstatement. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 222, 515; 18 R. C. L., 186,
187; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 190; French vs. Senate [1905], 146 Cal.,
604; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass., 468; Ex parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698;
State vs. Bolte [1889], 151 Mo., 362; De Diego vs. House of Delegates [1904], 5
Porto Rico, 235; Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. vs. Routt [1892], 17 Colo., 156;
State ex rel. Cranmer vs. Thorson [1896], 33 L. R. A., 582; People ex rel.
Billings vs. Bissell [1857], 19 Ill., 229; People ex rel. Bruce vs. Dunne [1913], 258 Ill.,
441; People ex rel. La Chicote vs. Best [1907], 187 N. Y., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924],
45 Phil., 612.)
The authorities which support the doctrines above announced are numerous and
instructive. They are found among the decisions of our own court, of the United
States Supreme Court, and of other jurisdictions. If some of these cases relate to
the chief executive rather than to the legislature, it is only necessary to explain that
the same rules which govern the relations of the court to the chief executive
likewise govern the relations of the courts to the legislature.
The controlling case in this jurisdiction on the subject is Severino vs. Governor-
General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros ([1910], 16 Phil., 366). This was
an original application made in this court praying for a writ ofmandamus to the
Governor-General to compel him to call a special election as provided by law. The
Attorney-General demurred to the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
and the court, after an elaborate discussion, reached the conclusion that "we have
no jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of these Islands, as the head
of the executive department, in the performance of any of his official acts." The
demurrer was accordingly sustained and the complaint dismissed. It is noted that in
this decision reliance was placed on the cases of Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord
([1867], 4 Wall., 475, and Sutherland vs. Governor ([1874], 29 Mich., 320), which we
will now proceed to notice.
State of Mississippi vs. Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, supra,
concerned a bill praying the United States, Supreme Court to enjoin and restrain
Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, and E. O. C. Ord, General
Commanding in the District of Mississippi and Arkansas from executing certain Acts
of Congress. Mr. Chief Justice Chase delivering the opinion of the court said the
single point which required consideration was this: Can the President be restrained
by injunction from carrying into effect an Act of Congress alleged to be
unconstitutional? He continued:
The Congress is the Legislative Department of the Government; the President is the
Executive Department.Neither can be restrained in its action by the Judicial
Department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject
to its cognizance.
The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon consideration of its
possible consequences.
Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If the President refuse
obedience, it is needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce its
process. If, on the other hand, the President complies with the order of the court
and refuses to execute the Acts of Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur
between the Executive and Legislative Departments of the Government? May not
the House of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal? And in that
case could this court interfere in behalf of the President, thus endangered by
compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United
States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be
offered to the public wonder of an attempt by this court to arrest proceedings in
that court?
These questions answer themselves.
xxx xxx xxx
We are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be
received by us.
It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer that, if the relief sought cannot
be had against Andrew Johnson, as President, it may be granted against Andrew
Johnson, as a citizen of Tennessee. But it is plain that relief as against the execution
of an Act of Congress by Andrew Johnson, is relief against its execution by the
President. . . .
Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan, supra, well known to the legal fraternity on
account of being written by Judge Cooley, related to an application
for mandamus to the Governor to compel him to perform a duty imposed upon him
by statute. Judge Cooley, in part, said:
. . . Our government is on whose powers have been carefully apportioned between
three distinct departments, which emanate alike from the people, have their
powers alike limited and defined by the constitution, are of equal dignity, and
within their respective spheres of action equally independent.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that neither of the departments can operate in all respects independently
of the others, and that what are called the checks and balances of government
constitute each a restraint upon the rest. . . . But in each of these cases the action
of the department which controls, modifies, or in any manner influences that of
another, is had strictly within its own sphere, and for that reason gives no occasion
for conflict, controversy or jealousy. The Legislature in prescribing rules for the
courts, is acting within its proper province in making laws, while the courts, in
declining to enforce an unconstitutional law, are in like manner acting within their
proper province, because they are only applying that which is law to the
controversies in which they are called upon to give judgment. It is mainly by means
of these checks and balances that the officers of the several departments are kept
within their jurisdiction, and if they are disregarded in any case, and power is
usurped or abused, the remedy is by impeachment, and not by another department
of the government attempting to correct the wrong by asserting a superior
authority over that which by the constitution is its equal.
It has long been a maxim in this country that the Legislature cannot dictate to the
courts what their judgments shall be, or set aside or alter such judgments after they
have been rendered. If it could, constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if
the Legislature could in like manner override executive action also, the government
would become only a despotism under popular forms. On the other hand it would
be readily cancelled that no court can compel the Legislature to make or to refrain
from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any action
whatsoever, though the duty to take it be made ever so clear by the constitution or
the laws. In these cases the exemption of the one department from the control of
the other is not only implied in the framework of government, but is indispensably
necessary if any useful apportionment of power is to exist.
xxx xxx xxx
It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of the relators that any other course
than that which leaves the head of the executive department to act independently
in the discharge of his duties might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts, if not to
something worse, should the courts undertake to enforce their mandates and the
executive refuse to obey. . . . And while we should concede, if jurisdiction was
plainly vested in us, the inability to enforce our judgment would be no sufficient
reason for failing to pronounce it, especially against an officer who would be
presumed ready and anxious in all cases to render obedience to the law, yet in a
case where jurisdiction is involved in doubt it is not consistent with the dignity of
the court to pronounce judgments which may be disregarded with impunity, nor
with that of the executive to place him in position where, in a matter within his
own province, he must act contrary to his judgment, or strand convicted of a
disregard of the laws.
We only take space to notice on more case, which concerns specifically the right of
the judiciary to control bymandamus the action of the legislature. French vs. Senate
of the State of California, supra, was an original proceeding in mandamus brought
by the petitioners who were duly elected senators of the state to compel the
Senate of California to admit them as members thereof. It was alleged that the
petitioners had been expelled without hearing or opportunity for defense. The writ
was denied, Mr. Justice Shaw delivering the opinion of the court, saying:
Even if we should give these allegations their fullest force in favor of the pleader,
they do not make a case justifying the interposition of this court. Under our form of
government the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary
and unfair action of the legislative department, or of their house thereof, taken in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the
constitution. . . .
There can be noted as specific corroborative authority, State vs. Bolte, supra,
Abueva vs. Wood, supra, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Mellon,
Secretary of the Treasury ([1923], 262 U. S., 447), the latest expression of opinion
by the United States Supreme Court. The record discloses that it was the firm
opinion of the late Chief Justice that the court should not assume jurisdiction of the
proceedings.
So as to be perfectly fair to the petitioner, it is but proper to state that the
principles laid down in some of the preceding authorities have been the subject of
adverse criticism. It is said that the fallacy of the argument lies in the statement
that the three departments of the government are independent of each other.
"They are independent in so far as they proceed within their legitimate province
and perform the duties that the law requires; yet it has never been held that the
executive was the sole judge of what duties the law imposes upon him, or the
manner in which duties shall be exercised. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the
judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive department may be said to be
dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the
person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but the nature of the thing to be
done, by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined." (2 Bailey
on Mandamus, pp. 926-927.) But these were arguments which should have been
presented years ago in this court, and which when recently presented by counsel in
his argument for the petitioner in the case of Perfecto vs. Wood, R. G. No. 20867, 1
met with no favorable response from the court. It is now too late to go back and
revise previous decisions and overturn them; in fact this would be not only
impracticable but impossible since at least two decision of the United States
Supreme Court seem to us to be controlling.
No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold that it possesses
the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature or a branch thereof to
take any particular action. If a court should ever be so rash as to thus trench on the
domain of either of the other departments, it will be the end of popular
government as we know it in democracies.
It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with reference to the
right of the Supreme Court to issuemandamus directed to the Philippine Senate,
yet we would be justified in having our mandate run not against the Philippine
Senate or against the President of the Philippine Senate and his fellow Senators but
against the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the
Senate. But this begs the question. If we have no authority to control the Philippine
Senate, we have no authority to control the actions of subordinate employees
acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and
disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act
independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, we might
have the spectable presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-
arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the
Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing. The writ of mandamus should
not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has
the absolute power to execute it. (Turnbull vs. Giddings [1893], 95 Mich., 314;
Abueva vs. Wood,supra.)
The question of jurisdiction is invariably one of perplexing difficulty. On the one
hand, no consideration of policy or convenience should induce this court to exercise
a power that does not belong to it. On the other hand, no consideration of policy or
convenience should induce this court to surrender a power which it is its duty to
exercise. But certainly mandamus should never issue from this court where it will
not prove to be effectual and beneficial. It should not be awarded where it will
create discord and confusion. It should not be awarded where mischievous
consequences are likely to follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which
might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts or which might be disregarded with
impunity. This court should offer no means by a decision for any possible collision
between it as the highest court in the Philippines and the Philippine Senate as a
branch of a coordinate department, or between the Court and the Chief Executive
or the Chief Executive and the Legislature.
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes
the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine
representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature.
These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the Governor-
General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine
Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively,
is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either
House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither
House may expel an appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power
to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to the two
Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power
granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither
is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two
Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an
appointive member of the Legislature.
It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United States has not in all its long history
suspended a member. And the reason is obvious. Punishment by way of reprimand
or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the
constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates
the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to
elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without
that district being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension,
the seat remains filed but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is
equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.
It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands to
exercise its functions in any other way than that prescribed by the Organic Law or
by local laws which conform to the Organic Law. This was, in effect, our holding in
the comparatively recent case of Concepcion vs. Paredes ([1921], 42 Phil., 599),
when we had under particular consideration a legislative attempt to deprive the
Chief Executive of his constitutional power of appointment. What was there
announced is equally applicable to the instant proceedings.
While what has just been said may be unnecessary for a correct decision, it is
inserted so that the vital question argued with so much ability may not pass entirely
unnoticed, and so that there may be at least an indication of the attitude of the
court as a restraining force, with respect to the checks and balances of government.
The Supreme Court, out of respect for the Upper House of a coordinate branch of
the government, takes no affirmative action. But the perfection of the entire
system suggests the thought that no action should be taken elsewhere which would
constitute, or even seem to constitute, disregard for the Constitution.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for
disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend on appointive member from
the exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by
the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ
prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does
not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any
particular action. If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner without a
remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all
power. It would hardly be becoming for the judiciary to assume the role of either a
credulous inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes down the
halls of legislation and of administration giving heed to those who have grievances
against the Legislature and the Chief Executive.
We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly
controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The
court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must
be sustained. As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of
action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So
ordered.
[G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E.
GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS
PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can
go, in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for
alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID
Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
investigating panel, that took over the case from Investigator Gualberto dela Llana
after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon
petitioners request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to
the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his
Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the
appropriate informations against petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the
Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three
informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted
thusly:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of the stay of the
following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting,
Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui
Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Quiu, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @
Mary Go Xu Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu
Shi Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin,
Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo
Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan,
So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in
violation of Executive Order no. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the
legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are
disqualified, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the
Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused.[1]
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and no. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis
E. Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen
Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos.Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for
physical appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a
vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June
1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in
court. Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able
to come unaided to his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order
setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that
she be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with
Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-
90, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No.
16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her
arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition issued a temporary
restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus, informed, issued an order deferring petitioners
arraignment and the consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until
further advice from the court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and
lifting the temporary restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioners intention to
accept a fellowship from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University, the Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the
country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
Garchitorena from the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her
motion to inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed
G.R. No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars
with the Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose
applications she purportedly approved and thereby supposedly extended undue
advantage were conspicuously omitted in the complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to
reset petitioners arraignment not later than five days from receipt of notice
thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan
a motion to admit thirty-two amended informations. Petitioner moved for the
dismissal of the 32 informations. The court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution,
denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and directed her to post bail on
the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition
for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution
of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well
as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended Informations, and
seeking the nullification thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice
Garchitorena to cease and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing
the 11th March 1993 resolution ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32
amended informations, and from proceeding with her arraignment on 12 April 1993
until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved by the Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP
and Ombudsman to consolidate the 32 amended informations. Conformably
therewith, all the 32 informations were consolidated into one information under
Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Redetermine probable
Cause and to dismiss or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this
incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one
Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled on 15 September
1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the
31st July 1995 motion for the prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for
reconsideration of its 03rd August 1995 order which would allow the testimony of
Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the Sandiganbayan, was elevated to the
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs.
Sandiganbayan, docketed G.R. No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution
to suspend her. On 25 January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under
consideration and hereby suspends the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from
her position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from any other
government position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her suspension
shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take effect immediately upon notice.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate
President, Senate of the Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through
the Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the implementation of the suspension herein
ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this court of the action taken
thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of
implementation of the suspension order as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day
thereof so that the same may be lifted at the time.[2]
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan
to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government position, and
furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of
the suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute
provides:
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated
from the service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute
the same to the Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982).
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan,[3] the Court reiterated:
The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended --- treating of the
suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer --- may no longer be put at
issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a
valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or
permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career
service.[4]
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before
it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is
bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be
no ifs and buts about it.[5] Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the
Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan[6] observed:
x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial
proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension.[7]
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely
adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted
before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned
must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the
acts with which he has been charged.Thus, it has been held that the use of the
word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged
may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands
accused.[8]
En passan, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as
the validity of the information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing,
there is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct thereof. It has been said that-
x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it
to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to
challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him, e.g. that he
has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for
which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic
Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the revised Penal Code which would warrant
his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may
present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided for in
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on
the ground that the acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of
Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the
right to present a motion to quash the information on any other grounds provided
in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that
the acts for which the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the
provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the revised Penal
Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal
proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a),
section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of
the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether
the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the
elements of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery
of the Revised Penal Code.[9]
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-
suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of
culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not
his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records an other evidence before the court could have a
valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it
secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or
regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded
the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not
constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal
on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal procedure.[10]
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioners case
before the Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions,
the Court has been called upon the resolve several other matters on the
subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez,[11] petitioner sought to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal case No. 16698 for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez,[12] petitioner sought the
nullification of the hold departure order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a Motion
to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer
for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with
Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs.
Garchitorena,[13] petitioner sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03
March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and
to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena disqualified from acting in said criminal
case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed as filed the 32
amended informations against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs.
Sandiganbayan,[14] petitioner assailed the denial by the Sandiganbayan of her
motion for her reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the
testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases,[15] the Court declared:
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving
Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has
not explained why she failed to raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary
investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. A
piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-
defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense
punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts
complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the
Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of
approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of
qualified aliens even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31
1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to
quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in
the information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner
admitted hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her
official functions.
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.[16]
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against
petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith
issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which
provides that each-
x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.[17]
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its resolution
in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr., vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[18] the Court affirmed
the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his
protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of
congress. The Court ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which
deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all
its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when
imposed, should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite
distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the
latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House
of Representatives.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have
effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its
sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its
own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding
into the internal affairs of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the
1987 Constitution, empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also in the determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into
any possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any government
instrumentality has evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it
malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu. In its normal
concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When
the question, however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the
Executive, the Court subscribes to the view[19] that unless an infringement of any
specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign
substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of
government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional
precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention. If any
part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs,
it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed
by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been
decided by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999,
acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to
render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
RODOLFO C. FARIAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO
A. AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS
TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS
OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners, vs. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 152161. December 10, 2003]
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No.
9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or
local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C.
Farias, Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of
filing of the petition, the petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the
House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the Executive Secretary,
then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the
Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin,
then also a member of the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is
the COMELEC.
Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices, is a consolidation of
the following bills originating from the House of Representatives and the Senate,
respectively:
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR
ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, AS
AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;[1]
Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE,
ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION
PRACTICES.[2]
A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the
Senate[3] and sixteen (16) members of the House of Representatives,[4] was formed
to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its
Report,[5] signed by its members, recommending the approval of the bill as
reconciled and approved by the conferees.
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001,
Rep. Jacinto V. Paras proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P. Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting
that the House could no longer submit an amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F.
Apostol thereupon moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral
Conference Committee in view of the proposed amendment thereto. Rep.
Dilangalen expressed his objection to the proposal. However, upon viva
voce voting, the majority of the House approved the return of the report to the
Bicameral Conference Committee for proper action.[6]
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew
its conferees[7] to the Bicameral Conference Committee.[8] Then again, for unclear
reasons, upon the motion of Rep. Ignacio R. Bunye, the House elected another set
of conferees[9] to the Bicameral Conference Committee.[10]
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives,
Rep. Bunye moved that the House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee
Report on the contrasting provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep.
Dilangalen observed that the report had been recommitted to the Bicameral
Conference Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral Conference Report
was a new one, and was a result of the reconvening of a new Bicameral Conference
Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine the new
report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the approval of the report
until the other members were given a copy thereof.[11]
After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the
Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No.
9000 and SB No. 1742.The House approved the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3
negative votes and no abstention. In explaining their negative votes, Reps. Farias
and Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider. Even Rep.
Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts on the
constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed
that no senator signed the Bicameral Conference Committee Report and asked if
this procedure was regular.[12]
On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report on the contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.
Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. and then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R.
Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B.
Barbo and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives Robert P.
Nazareno as the consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742, and
finally passed by both Houses on February 7, 2001.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February
12, 2001.
The Petitioners Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be
expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They
point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one
hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No.
9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an
office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering
them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not
embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the
Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar
limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive
officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other
than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in
public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective
position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on
appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as
irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof,
should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that
[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law
before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a
good law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of
the Court inDimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
is based on the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers:[14]
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of
Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in
the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom,
upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
The Respondents Arguments
For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge
this Court to dismiss the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners
have no legal standing to institute the present suit. Except for the fact that their
negative votes were overruled by the majority of the members of the House of
Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that they have suffered harm as a
result of the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest
as taxpayers since the assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of
its taxing or spending power.
Invoking the enrolled bill doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners
allegations that irregularities attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The
signatures of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the
bill and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of
Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, An Act
to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections
through Fair Election Practices, is so broad that it encompasses all the processes
involved in an election exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by
elective officials.
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep.
Act No. 9006 as expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely
terminating the term of an elective official by his filing of a certificate of candidacy
for an office other than the one which he is permanently holding, such that he is no
longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The legislature, by including the
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006, has
deemed it fit to remove the unfairness of considering an elective official ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for
another elective office. With the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are now
placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their respective terms even if
they run for any office, whether the presidency, vice-presidency or other elective
positions, other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity.
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
need not be expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is
not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. It must be
deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include
the general subject which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and
every means necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to its subject to find
expression in its title. Mere details need not be set forth.
According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals
Section 67, leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective,
does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains
to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A substantial
distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their
office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive
officials are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly
treated as the former. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.
Further, Section 16, or the Effectivity clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run
afoul of the due process clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary
deprivation of life, liberty and property. Specifically, the section providing for
penalties in cases of violations thereof presume that the formalities of the law
would be observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would be
entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In
any case, the issue about lack of due process is premature as no one has, as yet,
been charged with violation of Rep. Act No. 9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary
General of the House of Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in not excluding from the Rolls those members thereof who ran for the Senate
during the May 14, 2001 elections. These respondents merely complied with Rep.
Act No. 9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared otherwise by
the Court.
The Courts Ruling
Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the
procedural issue raised by the respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the
legal standing or locus standi to file the petitions at bar.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the
House of Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement.[15] The rationale for requiring a party who
challenges the constitutionality of a statute to allege such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy is to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.[16]
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving
issues of overarching significance to our society,[17] had adopted a liberal stance on
standing. Thus, in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,[18] this Court
brushed aside the procedural requirement of standing, took cognizance of, and
subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then Senator Francisco
Tatad and several members of the House of Representatives assailing the
constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes).
The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the
House of Representatives which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a
provision of Rep. Act No. 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao) in Chiongbian v. Orbos.[19] Similarly, the Court took cognizance of the
petition filed by then members of the Senate, joined by other petitioners, which
challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law)
in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance.[20]
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court
to challenge the validity of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government
agencies or instrumentalities in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation,[21] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,[22] Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez,[23] Albano v. Reyes,[24]and Bagatsing v. Committee on
Privatization.[25]
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo[26] as deriving its
existence from the constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has
been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of overarching
significance that justifies this Courts adoption of a liberal stance vis--vis the
procedural matter on standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven
months away, it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the
same forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is quite apropos:
... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering,
therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent
multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its]
constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be added that the exceptional
character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the
undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections beings barely six months
away, reinforce our stand.[27]
Every statute is presumed valid.[28] The presumption is that the legislature intended
to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may
be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.[29]
It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the
Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted
by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law.[30] And
where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the Constitution,
it is the judiciarys solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same.[31]
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial
issues raised by the petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 9006 Is Not a Rider[32]
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No.
9006, which provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a
consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders,
rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier,
reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or
local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-
rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression
in its title.[33]
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid
down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should
not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set
forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.[34]
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.
Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration of principles but also the
objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for
the operation of media of communication or information to guarantee or ensure
equal opportunity for public service, including access to media time and space, and
the equitable right to reply, for public information campaigns and fora among
candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free
from any form of harassment and discrimination.[35]
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the
Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content.[36]
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one
they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the
one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.[37]
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter
are particularly instructive:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
So all were looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the
would cover this provision [referring to the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public
Election Code], is that correct? Thats all. Because I believe ... I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put service through fair election practices?
it, that it is covered in the Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): bill. And therefore, I hope that the House contingent would agree to this so that we REP. PICHAY:
can finish it now. And it expressly provides for fair election practices because ...
We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature Fair election practices?
or title. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
REP. MACARAMBON:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are
looking for a title that is more generic so that then we have less of an objection on Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ...
Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term constitutionality. I think thats the theory. So, there is acceptance of this.
fair election practice, it really covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco, THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
those conditions inserted earlier seemed unfair and it is an election practice and, Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say
Wala nang practices nga.
therefore, I think, Im very comfortable with the title Fair Election Practice so that the special provision on elected officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ...
we can get over with these things so that we dont come back again until we find REP. PICHAY:
the title. I mean, its one provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem REP. MARCOS:
like a limitation but this limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices Wala nang practices.
I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.
as the title implies.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.
Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ...
Yes.
(Informal discussions)
REP. MARCOS:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
REP. PICHAY:
What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed...
So I would want to beg the House contingent, lets get it over with. To me, ha, its
not a very touchy issue. For me, its even a very correct provision. I feel very Approve na iyan.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
comfortable with it and it was voted in the Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
to the ... para matapos na, then we come back as a Bicam just for the title Is that O, sige, fine, fine. Lets a brainstorm. Equal...
what youre ...? Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be Fair Election Act.
REP. PADILLA:
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): The rest wala nang problema ano?
Mr. Chairman, why dont we use An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly,
Its not the title per se, its the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. Im honest, peaceful and credible elections, amending for the purpose Batasang VOICES:
happy that there is already one comfortable senator there among ... several of us Pambansa known as the Omnibus Election Code?
were also comfortable with it. But it would be well that when we rise from this Wala na.
Bicam that were all comfortable with it. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
REP. MACARAMBON:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Why dont we remove fair and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act?
Wala na iyong practices?
Yes. Anyway, lets listen to Congressman Marcos. REP. PICHAY:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
REP. MARCOS: Thats not an election practice. Thats a limitation.
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
of provisions deals with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the O, wala na? We will clean up.
Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
complete title is actually one that indulge full coverage. It says An Act to enhance
REP. MARCOS:
the holding of free, orderly, honest ... elections through fair election practices. But REP. MARCOS:
as you said, we will put that aside to discuss later one. Title?
The Fair Election.
Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
perfectly adequate in that it says that it shall ensure candidates for public office THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
that may be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. The short title, This Act ...
O, Fair Election Act.
Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Election Code is a form of harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the REP. MACARAMBON:
effort at leveling the playing field, we can cover this and it should not be considered Youre back to your No. 21 already.
a rider.
REP. MARCOS:
The full title, the same?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Iyon na nga. The full title is An Act to enhance the holding ... Thats the House
version, eh, dahil pareho, hindi ba? Then the short title This Act shall be known as
the Fair Election Act.[38]
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of
harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The
executive department found cause with Congress when the President of
the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and
in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would
encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the
Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches
of the government.[39] It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of
legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to
achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its
prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the
judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to
bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.[40] Congress is not precluded
from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo
v. Mitra[41] upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the
same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find
it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby
enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly
election of truly deserving members of Congress is achieved.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a
bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the
nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters
which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the
public.[42] In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of
the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and
comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the
petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their
reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the
legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution[43]
The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against
the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is
tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other.[44] The Court has explained the nature of the
equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike,under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.[45]
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions.[46] On the other hand, appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and
are entitled to security of tenure[47] while others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority.[48]
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as
officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in
any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the
same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices,
are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.[49]
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with
respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of
candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not
within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected
officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant
distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly
treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
the petitioners insist that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that
irregularities attended the passage of the said law particularly in the House of
Representatives catalogued thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by
the House during its session on February 5, 2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill
submitted by the BCC on November 29, 2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the
floor without copies thereof being furnished the members;
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it
was not signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its senator-members
at the time it was presented to and rammed for approval by the House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged
Report was instantly made and passed around for the signature of the BCC
members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that
convened on November 23, 2000;
g. The Effectivity clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were
couched in terms that comply with the publication required by the Civil Code and
jurisprudence, to wit:
...
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in 16, R.A. No.
9006, with the provision that This Act shall take effect immediately upon its
approval;
h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished
the members during its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same
16 as it now appears in RA No. 9006, but 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB
1742, reasons for which no objection thereto was made;
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did
not contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or
amendments to the subject measure; and
j. The disappearance of the Cayetano amendment, which is Section 12 of the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the purported
proposed amendment to the compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in
paragraph 7 hereof. The said provision states, thusly:
Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. Any elected official who runs for president
and vice-president shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of the certificate of candidacy.[50]
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The
Court is not persuaded. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the
Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. A review of cases[51] reveals the Courts consistent adherence to the
rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where
the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of
Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the
House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal
rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.[52] Whatever
doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved
in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia,[53] viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there
was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: At any rate, courts have declared
that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been
said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the
courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate
the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.
The Effectivity Clause
Is Defective
Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that
it shall take effect immediately upon its approval, is defective. However, the same
does not render the entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera,[54] this Court laid down
the rule:
... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.[55]
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code[56] and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep.
Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after
its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in
constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into
the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative
branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on
constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it
transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power.[57] No such
transgression has been shown in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and
EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON.
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of
Bureau of Customs, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law
intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least
six months of service, regardless of employment status.4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and
Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund
and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the
excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the
Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the
Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or
his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their
Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and
a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.6
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing
from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the
target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the
Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other
functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual
report to Congress.7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked
to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335,8 to be
approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as
they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of
rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix
revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter.
While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be
dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at
least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved.
Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without
sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic
and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on
the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment
and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee
permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
question the petition for being premature as there is no actual case or controversy
yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the
exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that
public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this
case. They assert that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries
is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction
with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the
BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other
government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient
standard that will guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions.
Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law
enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of
the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on
the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court
finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality
in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed.
Actual Case And Ripeness
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication.10 A closely related
requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a
constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being
challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.11 Thus, to be
ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the
outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable
decision of the Court.12
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial
controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt
act,13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to
demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show
a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this
account, their petition is procedurally infirm.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional
issues raised by petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a
cloud on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an
action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute.14
Accountability of
Public Officers
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead modest lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own
personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By
demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have the
duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and
employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize
their revenue-generation capability and collection.15
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It
cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners
would have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to
advance a declared public policy.
Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC
officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without
any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.16 To invalidate RA 9335 based on
petitioners’ baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be
rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for
exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of
public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty,
industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government
personnel.
In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which
awards to officers of the customs as well as other parties an amount not exceeding
one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws against
smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court said:
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward
their zeal and industry in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties
and taxes.
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a
reward when, as a consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs
laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards
to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of "bounty
hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of
official duties. One of these precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the
law:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. – The
officials, examiners, and employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act
or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail
to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held
liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or taxpayer as a
result of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to
exercise extraordinary diligence.
Equal Protection
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same
conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not
similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial
differences in relation to the object to be accomplished.19When things or persons
are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.
InVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,20 this Court declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another
in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that
is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis
and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws
over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range
of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or
marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the
classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification
may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection
guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or
harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.21 (emphasis
supplied)
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification
that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect
to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of
the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC,
the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the
said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they
have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. – The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which
shall be headed by and subject to the supervision and control of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues
collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its
functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.24
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:
Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. – The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed
and subject to the management and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who
shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary[of
the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the following
functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and
penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within
all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of
vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its
jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.25
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the
special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises
one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully
satisfy the demands of equal protection.
Undue Delegation
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it
sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.27 To be sufficient, the standard must
specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.28
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the
law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing"29 the delegated
power to the President to fix revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. – A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter
referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the
BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in
the following percentages:
Excess of Collection of the Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to Accrue to
Excess the Revenue Targets the Fund
30% or below – 15%
More than 30% – 15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the remaining
excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately
following the year when the revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be
released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected
of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to
Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the
agencies’ revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the
BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected
respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC
and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress.30 Thus, the
determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also
undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and
identifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the
service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven and
a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the
level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this
Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions
shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two
years in operation, as has no historical record of collection performance that can be
used as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the
middle of the period under consideration unless the transfer was due to
nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue
targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered
by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic
difficulties brought about by natural calamities orforce majeure or economic causes
as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after
careful and proper review by the Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding
paragraph: Provided, That such decision shall be immediately executory: Provided,
further, That the application of the criteria for the separation of an official or
employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the
application of other relevant laws on accountability of public officers and
employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers
and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an
employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those
provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee.31 In the case
of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all
relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to
inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for
disciplinary action under civil service laws.32 The action for removal is also subject
to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and
procedural due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public
interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity,
economy and welfare."33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with
public interest.
Separation Of Powers
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby created a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate
and seven Members from the House of Representatives. The Members from the
Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two senators
representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall
be appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority.
After the Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to
exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the
purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by
the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its
alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the
law may be considered moot and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront
the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of
congressional oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34 is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over
the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-
enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic
compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are
properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative
power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. x x x x x x x x x
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency
to check the perceived "exponential accumulation of power" by the executive
branch. By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress has delegated an enormous
amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the administrative
agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the
administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated to
them. x x x x x x x x x
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may
be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to
administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and
efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative
scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of
government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of
the agency involved.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts
that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense
digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by
the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxx
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight
power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and
informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding executive
operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and
investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence
future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to
scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to
retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power.
It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive
agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions
require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress,
which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes
effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation
will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress
does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less
frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if
Congress affirmatively approves it.
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of
power between the legislative and the executive branches of government as it
offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive branch or to
independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of
such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They
contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides
legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One
proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply
embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of
modern government have often led Congress-whether by actual or perceived
necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory
standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive
officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the
judgment of parties who may or may not have participated in or agreed with the
development of those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances
the reverse of our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the
Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new
legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of overseeing post
enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to
determine whether its policies have been implemented in accordance with
legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon
the executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures
undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the separation of
powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend that legislative veto
constitutes an impermissible evasion of the President’s veto authority and intrusion
into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of government.
Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers as it
prevents the executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too
much power. They submit that reporting requirements and congressional
committee investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only the exercise of
delegated law-making authority. They do not allow Congress to review executive
proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for
ongoing and binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative
veto permits Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of
"subordinate law" or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a
delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a
necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside
its chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative veto
"is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the
evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute."
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court
resolved the validity of legislative veto provisions. The case arose from the order
of the immigration judge suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant to §
244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States House of
Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to § 244(c)(2)
authorizing either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of
the executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United
States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement
the House order and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration
Appeals dismissed the alien’s appeal, holding that it had no power to declare
unconstitutional an act of Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth
Circuit held that the House was without constitutional authority to order the alien’s
deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine on separation
of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the
Court shied away from the issue of separation of powers and instead held that the
provision violates the presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the one-
house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to
the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a
majority of both Houses and presentment to the President. x x x x x x x x x
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision,
two lower court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1980. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes containing
legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions required the approval
of both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism requirement of Article I.
Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even exercised.35(emphasis
supplied)
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional
oversight and considering the nature and powers of a constitutional body like the
Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in RA 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee.
The committee was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the implementation of
the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by
the Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the
constitutional independence of the Commission on Elections.36
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the
separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the
executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the
legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on
Congress.37 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must
follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures"
specified under the Constitution,39 including the procedure for enactment of laws
and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined
to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of confirmation40 and
(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.42
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or
"power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such,
a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form
of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other
than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers.43 It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within
the broad horizons of its legislative competence.45 It can itself formulate the details
or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary
managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.46 In the latter case, the
law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the
hands of the legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the
concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations
implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain
facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).48
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are
entitled to respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a
statute50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As
such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate
case by a competent court.51 Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an
overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of
approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the
Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335,
Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this
Court by the Constitution.
Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga
Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to
approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment.52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the
extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
(emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws)53 is
vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two
chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the
validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a
congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he
shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to
the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-
thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the
votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days
after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had
signed it. (emphasis supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or
veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress
can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of
the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid
legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment
even if approved by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be
approved by both Houses of Congress.54 Second, it must be presented to and
approved by the President.55 As summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz56 and Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate
except for some measures that must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and
its referral by the Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee for
study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval,
with or without amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held
thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all be
consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage
that the bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when
desired. The second reading is the most important stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof
are distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the third reading,
the members merely register their votes and explain them if they are allowed by
the rules. No further debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also
undergo the three readings. If there are differences between the versions approved
by the two chambers, a conference committee58 representing both Houses will
draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the House of
Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter
authenticated with the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the
Secretaries of their respective chambers…59
The President’s role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes
effect as law after the required publication.60
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has
enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must
be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it
becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights
and obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute.
Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process
clause,61 the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative
of Congress.62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and
the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law.
Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is
limited to approving or vetoing the law.63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its
members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken
effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its
members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive
branch charged with the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as
unconstitutional. While there may be similar provisions of other laws that may be
invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from invalidating
them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case
assailing those provisions is brought before us.64
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of
Section 12 of RA 9335 on the other provisions of the law? Will it render the entire
law unconstitutional? No.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a
competent court, the remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such
declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and effect.
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the
following rules:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a
statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather
than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be
so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not
constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually
dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended
them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of
the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature
intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if
one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other
provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate
and detach any invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter may
continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently of the
invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a
complete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC
by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and
Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers
of general circulation66 and became effective 15 days thereafter.67 Until and unless
the contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335
creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing
rules and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA
9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions
remain in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-11530 August 12, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The information in this case reads:
The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the
crime of illegal importation of opium, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together
and plotting among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the
steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of
opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine currency; and that, then and there, the
said accused, also conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did receive
and conceal the said quantity of opium and aided each other in the transportation,
receipt and concealment of the same after the said opium had been imported,
knowing that said drug had been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally
introduced into the Philippine Islands from a foreign country; an act committed in
violation of law."
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto
Lasarte had not yet been arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime charged
and sentenced accordingly, the former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the
period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of the costs.
The same penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was sentenced to
pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the
judgment as to him has become final.
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five assignments of error) and
are greatly multiplied by their reiteration in a somewhat changed form of
statement under the many propositions embraced in the elaborate printed brief,
but their essence, when correctly understood, are these: The court erred (a) in
denying this appellant's motion, dated May 6, 1915, and reproduced on July 27,
1915, and (b) in finding that the legal evidence of record establishes the guilt of the
appellant, Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last
day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of
February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty,
was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year;
and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not
otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special session was,
under the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is
charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is
the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others,
namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or
extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the
journals. These questions will be considered in the reversed order.
Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall perform the
duties which would properly be required of the Recorder of the Commission under
the existing law. And rules 15 and 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine
Commission provides, among other things, "that the proceedings of the
Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated on the journal," and that it shall
be the duty of the Secretary "to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the
Commission." On page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission Journal for the ordinary
and special sessions of the Third Philippine Legislature, the following appears:
The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was approved. Adjournment sine
die of the Commission as a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature. The hour of
midnight having arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a
Chamber of the Philippine Legislature, adjourned sine die.
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other things, in
section 7, that the Philippine Assembly "shall keep in journal of its proceedings,
which shall be published . . . ." In obedience to this mandate, the journal of the
Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of 1914 was duly published and it appears
therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock
midnight on February 28, 1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the
"official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United
States and of the Philippine Islands ... shall be judicially recognized by the court
without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of
the subjects in this section states, when it shall find it necessary for its own
information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or
evidence." And section 313 [as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same
Code also provides that:
Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .
(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that
may be provided for the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by
copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order:Provided, That in
the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature when
there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and the secretaries of
said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Act and of the due
enactment thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question
whether the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well
settled in the United States that such journals may be noticed by the courts in
determining the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The State
ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited therein.) The result is that
the law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the
legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These
journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the
adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned
sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by
authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will
inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of
determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit.
From the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch
of legal science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. On the one
hand, it is maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at
midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged
fact may be established by extraneous evidence; while, on the other hand, it is
urged that the contents of the legislative journals are conclusive evidence as to the
date of adjournment. In order to understand these opposing positions, it is
necessary to consider the nature and character of the evidence thus involved.
Evidence is understood to be that which proves or disproves "any matter in
question or to influence the belief respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that
which establishes the fact, as in the instance of conclusive presumptions."
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq.) Counsel for the appellant, in order
to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or
recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the
Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of
the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the
veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have
said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in
his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on
February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion
of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in
order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time
fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in
direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact,
stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with
that of altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making
the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by
death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long,
long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the
rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to
be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of
the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that
afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning
comparatively trifling matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.)
Upon the same point the court, in the State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348),
decided in 1886, said:
Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various cases upon this
question; and, out of a multitude of citations, not one is found in which any court
has assumed to go beyond the proceedings of the legislature, as recorded in the
journals required to be kept in each of its branches, on the question whether a law
has been adopted. And if reasons for the limitation upon judicial inquiry in such
matters have not generally been stated, in doubtless arises from the fact that they
are apparent. Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of
laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character. They
should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that right acquired to-day upon the faith of what has been declared to
be law shall not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of time, by
facts resting only in the memory of individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous
decisions of the various states in the American Union in support of the rule therein
laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where the
rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover
the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those
of the Federal Government and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow the
courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the
question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail steamer Lopez y
Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain, bringing, among other cargo, twenty-five
barrels which were manifested as "wine" and consigned to Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino
Beliso had been, prior to the arrival of this cargo, engaged in the business of a wine
merchant, with an office and warehouse located at 203 Calle San Anton in this city.
The shipper's invoice and bill of lading for the twenty-five barrels were delivered to
Gregorio Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. These documents were indorsed as
follows: "Deliver to Don Gabino Beliso" and signed "Jacinto Lasarte." Cansipit
conducted the negotiations incident to the release of the merchandise from the
customhouse and the twenty-five barrels were delivered in due course to the
warehouse of Beliso at the aforementioned street and number. Beliso signed the
paper acknowledging delivery. Shortly thereafter the custom authorities, having
noticed that shipments of merchandise manifested as "wine" had been arriving in
Manila from Spain, consigned to persons whose names were not listed as
merchants, and having some doubt as to the nature of the merchandise so
consigned, instituted an investigation and traced on the 10th of April, 1915, the
twenty-five barrels to Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the customs registry
number of the shipment, the entry number, and the serial number of each barrel. It
was found that the twenty-five barrels began to arrive on bull carts at Beliso's
warehouse about 11 o'clock on the morning of April 9. Before the merchandise
arrived at that place, the appellant, Juan Pons, went to Beliso's warehouse and
joined Beliso in the latter's office, where the two engaged in conversation. Pons
then left and shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were unloaded in
Beliso's bodega. He called one of his employees, Cornelius Sese, and directed him
to go out and get a bull cart. This Sese did and returned with the vehicle. Beliso
then carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment of twenty-five and told Sese
to load these five on the cart and to deliver them to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle
General Solano. This order was complied with by Sese and the barrels delivered to
Pons at the place designated. Pursuing their investigation, which started on the
10th, the customs secret service agents entered Beliso's bodega on that date
before the office was opened and awaited the arrival of Beliso. Sese was found in
the bodega and placed under arrest. The agents then proceeded to separate the
recent shipment from the other merchandise stored in the warehouse, identifying
the barrels by the customs registry and entry numbers. Only twenty of the twenty-
five barrels could be found on Beliso's premises. Upon being questioned or
interrogated, Sese informed the customs agents that the five missing barrels had
been delivered by him to Pons at 144 Calle General Solano by order of Beliso. The
agents, accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano and here
found the five missing barrels, which were identified by the registry and entry
numbers as well as by the serial numbers. The five barrels were empty, the staves
having been sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five empty tins, each
corresponding in size to the heads of the five barrels, were found on the floor
nearby. The customs officers noticed several baskets of lime scattered about the
basement of the house and on further search they found 77 tins of opium in one of
these baskets. There was no one in the house when this search was made, but
some clothing was discovered which bore the initials "J. P." It then became
important to the customs agents to ascertain the owner and occupant of house No.
144 on Calle General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The owner was
found, upon investigation, to be Mariano Limjap, and from the latter's agent it was
learned that the house was rented by one F. C. Garcia. When the lease of the house
was produced by the agent of the owner, the agents saw that the same was signed
"F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons." After discovering these facts they returned to the
house of Beliso and selected three of the twenty barrels and ordered them
returned to the customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each was found to
contain a large tin fitted into the head of the barrel with wooden cleats and
securely nailed. Each large tin contained 75 small tins of opium. A comparison of
the large tins taken out of the three barrels with the empty ones found at 144 Calle
General Solano show, says the trial court, "that they were in every way identical in
size, form, etc."
While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse of Beliso on the
morning of April 10, Pons, apparently unaware that anything unusual was going on,
arrived there and was placed under arrest, and taken to the office of Captain
Hawkins, chief of the customs secret service, and according to Hawkins, voluntarily
confessed his participation in the smuggling of the opium. He maintained, however,
that the 77 tins of opium found at 144 Calle General Solano represented the entire
importation. Pons, being at the customhouse under arrest at the time the three
barrels were opened and the customs officers appearing to be no doubt as to which
end of the barrels contained the opium, Pons showed the officers how to open the
barrels and pointed out that the end of the barrel, which had the impression of a
bottle stamped in the wood, contained the opium. On seeing the 195 tins of opium
taken from the three barrels, Pons further stated that he had delivered some 250
tins of opium of this shipment to a Chinaman at 7.30 a. m. on the morning of April
10, following the instructions given him by Beliso. On being further questioned,
Pons stated that he and Beliso had been partners in several opium transactions;
that the house at No. 144 Calle General Solano had been leased by him at the
suggestion of Beliso for the purpose of handling the prohibited drug; and that he
and Beliso had shared the profits of a previous importation of opium. Sese testified
that he had delivered a previous shipment to 144 Calle General Solano. The
customs agents then went with Pons to his house and found in his yard several
large tin receptacles, in every way similar to those found at 144 Calle General
Solano and those taken from the barrels at the customhouse. At first Pons stated
that F. C. Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling in the between the Provinces of
Isabela and Cagayan, and later he retracted this statement and admitted that
Garcia was a fictitious person. But during the trial of this case in the court below
Pons testified that Garcia was a wine merchant and a resident of Spain, and that
Garcia had written him a letter directing him to rent a house for him (Garcia) and
retain it until the arrival in the Philippine Islands of Garcia. According to Pons this
letter arrived on the same steamer which brought the 25 barrels of "wine," but that
he had destroyed it because he feared that it would compromise him. On being
asked during the trial why he insisted, in purchasing wine from Beliso, in receiving a
part of the wine which had just arrived on the Lopez y Lopez, answered, "Naturally
because F. C. Garcia told me in this letter that this opium was coming in barrels of
wine sent to Beliso by a man the name of Jacinto Lasarte, and that is the reason I
wanted to get these barrels of wine."
The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court and these fats
establish the guilt of the appellant beyond any question of a doubt,
notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show that the opium as shipped to him from
Spain by a childhood fried named Garcia. The appellant took a direct part in this
huge smuggling transaction and profited thereby. The penalty imposed by the trial
court is in accordance with la and the decisions of this court in similar cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of
Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila,
MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA,
JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO,
PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER,
AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO
TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO
VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE
VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of the
Municipal Board,respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas and Associates
for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of
Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P.
de Castro, Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for
respondents The Executive Secretary and Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which
became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the
Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten
and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise
Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the
House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without
amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its
concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal
Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee
favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator
Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the
Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's
incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May
20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo
Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the
Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of
Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May
20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the
amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the
Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The
House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as
sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies
were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the
Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four
printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his
signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became
Republic Act No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted
by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who
on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No.
9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the
bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments
introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate
President, through the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11,
1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House
Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding
officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered
his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter
dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by the
Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature
appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he
and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding
officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in view of the
circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 9266
(which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would
be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually
approved by the two Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to
the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the
owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to
disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the
Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been
assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A.
Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the
Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer
and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic
Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law
since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the
journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the
resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad
on an official trip, this Court issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining
the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of
an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the
so-called Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor
under any other law until further orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as
Vice-Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with
previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and
highly enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally
decisions of United States Federal and State Courts, have been submitted on the
question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should
be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this Court and
elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March
5, 1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the
"enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to
rest and that the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress
proposing an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an
ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had been passed by "a vote
of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices
Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case
involved a political question which was not within the province of the judiciary in
view of the principle of separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled bill"
theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question,
the reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of
respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the
judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino
Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented,
and affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy of the resolution and the
legislative journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section 313 of Act
190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old
Code of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the
"enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may
be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the
journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order;
provided, that in the case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts
and of the due enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both
Houses, namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding officers and
secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It has been held that this
procedure is merely a mode of authentication, 3 to signify to the Chief Executive
that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is
ready for his approval or rejection. 4 The function of an attestation is therefore not
of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses.
Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are
divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence
would render the statute invalid. 5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be
in effect giving the presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong
argument to the contrary 6 There is less reason to make the attestation a requisite
for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even provide that the
presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the
presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly
authenticated enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due
enactment. 7 Another case however, under the same circumstances, held that the
enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence. 8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark, 9 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill,
although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The
authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs.
Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President
of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the
two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the
two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus
attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when
a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives,
its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete
and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed
by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the
official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the
Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to
coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to
accept, as having passed Congress, all billsauthenticated in the manner stated."
Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the
same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the
journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the
logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10although they are silent as to
whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding
officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment
of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said
Constitution does contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy;
and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed
and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar
days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the
necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no
amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to
a co-equal department of the government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact
that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued
a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill
he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration
should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which
it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification
made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The
lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and
the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already
present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the
signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution
says that "[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be
presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of
Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the
same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows
that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding
officer, of the proof that it has "passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional
requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that
the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly
made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect
the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would
remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's
inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its
absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent
such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no
enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the
bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be
consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this
case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do
this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved
by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President
and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into
the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed
both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew
their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and
subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive,
for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and
holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction
and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called
Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR
HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF
THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did
not become law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby
made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
U.S. Supreme Court
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892)
Field v. Clark
Nos. 1052, 1049, 1050
Argued November 30, December 1-2, 1891
Decided February 29, 1892
143 U.S. 649
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
Syllabus
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two
Houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress, and when the bill thus attested
receives the approval of the President and is deposited in the Department of State
according to law, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress is complete
and unimpeachable.
Page 143 U. S. 650
It is not competent to show from the journals of either House of Congress that an
act so authenticated, approved and deposited, did not pass in the precise form in
which it was signed by the presiding officers of the two Houses and approved by
the President.
Congress cannot, under the Constitution, delegate its legislative power to the
President.
The authority conferred upon the President by section 3 of the Act of October 1,
1890, to reduce the revenue and equalize duties on imports, and for other
purposes, 26 state, c. 1244, pp. 567, 612, to suspend by proclamation the free
introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides when he is satisfied that any
country producing such articles imposes duties or other exactions upon the
agricultural or other products of the United States which he may deem to be
reciprocally unequal or unreasonable, is not open to the objection that it
unconstitutionally transfers legislative power to the President (FULLER, C.J., and
LAMAR, J., dissenting), but even if it were, it does not follow that other parts of the
act imposing duties upon imported articles are inoperative.
The Court does not decide whether the provision in that act respecting bounties
upon sugar (schedule E, Sugar, 26 Stat. 583) is or is not constitutional, because it is
plain from the act that these bounties do not constitute a part of the system of
customs duties imposed by the act, and it is clear that the parts of the act imposing
such duties would remain in force even if these bounties were held to be
unconstitutionally imposed. Unless it be impossible to avoid it, a general revenue
statute should never be declared inoperative in all its parts because a particular
part, relating to a distinct subject, may be invalid.
These were suits by importers to obtain a refund of duties claimed to have been
illegally exacted on imported merchandise under the Tariff Act approved October 1,
1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244.
Marshall Field & Co. proceeded against John M. Clark, the collector of the port of
Chicago, to recover duties paid on woolen dress goods, woolen wearing apparel,
and silk embroideries.
Boyd, Sutton & Co. proceeded against the United States and J. B. Erhardt, collector
of the port of New York, to recover duties paid upon an importation of silk and
cotton laces.
H. Herrman, Sternbach & Co, proceeded against the United States to recover duties
paid upon colored cotton cloths.
The main issue in all the cases was whether that act, which purports to repeal the
previous Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 488, c. 121, had itself the force of law.
Page 143 U. S. 651
The facts which were presented in support of the contention that the bill never
became a law in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution were three.
(1) That in engrossing the bill, a clause known as section 30, relating to a rebate of
taxes on tobacco, which was shown by the journals of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate to have been regularly passed by both Houses of
Congress, was omitted, and that the engrossed act, as attested by the Vice-
President and the Speaker of the House, as approved by the President and as
deposited with the Secretary of State, was not the act which passed the two Houses
of Congress, and was therefore not a statute of the United States in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution.
(2) That the first five paragraphs of Schedule E, section 1, of the act, providing for
bounties to producers of American sugar (paragraphs 231 to 235) were
unconstitutional and void, no power to enact legislation of this character having
been vested in Congress by the Constitution.
(3) That section 3 of said act was unconstitutional and void in that it delegates to
the President the power of laying taxes and duties, which power, by Sections 1 and
8 of Article I of the Constitution, is vested in Congress.
As the Court, in its opinion, post, has set forth these several matters objected to at
length, it is sufficient to refer to it for further details.
The judgment in each case of the court below was against the importer. In this
Court, the three cases were argued together, but by separate counsel for the
appellants in each case, each brief covering the whole case. In order not to go over
the same ground three times, the arguments for appellants reported are: In No.
1052 on point (1); in No. 1049 on point (2); and in No. 1050 on point (3), that being
the order in which the cases stand in the opinion of the Court.
Page 143 U. S. 662
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Duties were assessed and collected, according to the rates established by what is
known as the "Tariff Act of October 1,
Page 143 U. S. 663
1890," on woolen dress goods, woolen wearing apparel, and silk embroideries,
imported by Marshall Field & Co., on silk
Page 143 U. S. 664
and cotton laces imported by Boyd, Sutton & Co., and on colored cotton cloths
imported by Herman, Sternbach & Co. 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, § 1.
Page 143 U. S. 665
The importers severally protested against the assessment upon the ground that the
act was not a law of the United
Page 143 U. S. 666
States. Upon appeal to the Board of General Appraisers under the Act of June 10,
1890, known as the "Customs Administrative Act," the decision of the collector in
each case was approved, c. 407, secs. 14, 15, pp. 131, 137. The
Page 143 U. S. 667
judgment of the board having been affirmed by the circuit courts of the United
States in the respective districts in which these matters arose, the cases have been
brought here for review.
The appellants question the validity of the Act of October 1, 1890, upon three
grounds, to be separately examined.
First. The seventh section of Article I of the Constitution of the United States
provides:
"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills. Every bill which
shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if the approve,
he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in
which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their
journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of
that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections,
to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and, if approved by
two-thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases, the votes of
both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons
voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house,
respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a
law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment
prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law."
"Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House
of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall
be presented to the President of the United States, and, before the same shall take
effect, shall be approved by him, or, being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by
two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and
limitations prescribed in the case of a bill."
The Revised Statutes provide that
"Whenever a bill, order, resolution, or vote of the Senate and House of
Representatives,
Page 143 U. S. 668
having been approved by the President or not having been returned by him with his
objections, becomes a law or takes effect, it shall forthwith be received by the
Secretary of State from the President, and whenever a bill, order, resolution, or
vote is returned by the President with his objections, and, on being reconsidered, is
agreed to be passed, and is approved by two-thirds of both houses of Congress, and
thereby becomes a law or takes effect, it shall be received by the Secretary of State
from the President of the Senate, or Speaker of the House of Representatives, in
whichsoever house it shall last have been so approved, and he shall carefully
preserve the originals."
Sec. 204.
The original enrolled act in question, designated on its face "H.R. 9416," was
received at the Department of State October 1, 1890, and, when so received, was
attested by the signatures of Thomas B. Reed, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Levi P. Morton, Vice-President of the United States and
President of the Senate, and had thereon these endorsements:
"Approved October 1, 1890 BENJ. HARRISON"
"I certify that this act originated in the House of Representatives."
"EDW. MCPHERSON, Clerk"
It is made the duty of the Secretary of State to furnish to the congressional printer
"a correct copy of every act and joint resolution as soon as possible after its
approval by the President or after it has become a law, in accordance with the
Constitution, without such approval."
That duty was performed by the Secretary of State with respect to the act in
question, and the act appears in the volume of statutes published and distributed
under the authority of the United States. Rev.Stat. §§ 210, 3803, 3805, 3807, 3808.
The contention of the appellants is that this enrolled act, in the custody of the
Secretary of State and appearing upon its face, to have become a law in the mode
prescribed by the Constitution, is to be deemed an absolute nullity in all its parts,
because -- such is the allegation -- it is shown by the
Page 143 U. S. 669
congressional records of proceedings, reports of committees of each house, reports
of committees of conference, and other papers printed by authority of Congress,
and having reference to House Bill 9416, that a section of the bill, as it finally
passed, was not in the bill authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers
of the respective houses of Congress and approved by the President. The section
alleged to have been omitted was as follows:
"SEC. 30. That on all original and unbroken factory packages of smoking and
manufactured tobacco and snuff, held by manufacturers or dealers at the time the
reduction herein provided for shall go into effect, upon which the tax has been
paid, there shall be allowed a drawback or rebate of the full amount of the
reduction, but the same shall not apply in any case where the claim has not been
presented within sixty days following the date of reduction, and such rebate to
manufacturers may be paid in stamps at the reduced rate, and no claim shall be
allowed or drawback paid for a less amount than five dollars. It shall be the duty of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury, to adopt such rules and regulations, and to prescribe and furnish such
blanks and forms, as may be necessary to carry this section into effect. For the
payment of the rebates provided for in this section there is hereby appropriated
any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated."
The argument, in behalf of the appellants, is that a bill, signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, presented to and
approved by the President of the United States, and delivered by the latter to the
Secretary of State, as an act passed by Congress, does not become a law of the
United States if it had not in fact been passed by Congress. In view of the express
requirements of the Constitution, the correctness of this general principle cannot
be doubted. There is no authority in the presiding officers of the House of
Representatives and the Senate to attest by their signatures, not in the President to
approve, nor in the Secretary of State to receive and cause to be published, as a
legislative act, any bill not passed by Congress.
Page 143 U. S. 670
But this concession of the correctness of the general principle for which the
appellants contend does not determine the precise question before the Court, for it
remains to inquire as to the nature of the evidence upon which a court may act
when the issue is made as to whether a bill, originating in the House of
Representatives or the Senate, and asserted to have become a law, was or was not
passed by Congress. This question is now presented for the first time in this Court.
It has received, as its importance required that it should receive, the most
deliberate consideration. We recognize, on one hand, the duty of this Court, from
the performance of which it may not shrink, to give full effect to the provisions of
the Constitution relating to the enactment of laws that are to operate wherever the
authority and jurisdiction of the United States extend. On the other hand, we
cannot be unmindful of the consequences that must result if this Court should feel
obliged, in fidelity to the Constitution, to declare that an enrolled bill, on which
depend public and private interests of vast magnitude, and which has been
authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of
Congress, and by the approval of the President, and been deposited in the public
archives as an act of Congress, was not in fact passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate, and therefore did not become a law.
The clause of the Constitution upon which the appellants rest their contention that
the act in question was never passed by Congress is the one declaring that
"Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, except such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy, and the yeas
and nays of the members of either house on any question shall at the desire of one-
fifth of those present, be entered on the journal."
Article I, Section 5. It was assumed in argument that the object of this clause was to
make the journal the best, if not conclusive, evidence upon the issue as to whether
a bill was in fact passed by the two houses of Congress. But the words used do not
require such interpretation. On the contrary, as Mr. Justice Story has well said,
"the object of the whole clause is to insure publicity
Page 143 U. S. 671
to the proceedings of the legislature and a correspondent responsibility of the
members to their respective constituents. And it is founded in sound policy and
deep political foresight. Intrigue and cabal are thus deprived of some of their main
resources by plotting and devising measures in secrecy. The public mind is
enlightened by an attentive examination of the public measures; patriotism and
integrity and wisdom obtain their due reward, and votes are ascertained, not by
vague conjecture, but by positive facts. . . . So long as known and open
responsibility is valuable as a check or an incentive among the representatives of a
free people, so long a journal of their proceedings and their votes, published in the
face of the world, will continue to enjoy public favor and be demanded by public
opinion."
2 Story on the Constitution §§ 840, 841.
In regard to certain matters, the Constitution expressly requires that they shall be
entered on the journal. To what extent the validity of legislative action may be
affected by the failure to have those matters entered on the journal we need not
inquire. No such question is presented for determination. But it is clear that in
respect to the particular mode in which, or with what fullness, shall be kept the
proceedings of either house relating to matters not expressly required to be
entered on the journals; whether bills, orders, resolutions, reports, and
amendments shall be entered at large on the journal, or only referred to and
designated by their titles or by numbers -- these and like matters were left to the
discretion of the respective houses of Congress. Nor does any clause of that
instrument either expressly or by necessary implication prescribe the mode in
which the fact of the original passage of a bill by the House of Representatives and
the Senate shall be authenticated or preclude Congress from adopting any mode to
that end which its wisdom suggests. Although the Constitution does not expressly
require bills that have passed Congress to be attested by the signatures of the
presiding officers of the two houses, usage, the orderly conduct of legislative
proceedings, and the rules under which the two bodies have acted since the
organization of the government require that mode of authentication.
Page 143 U. S. 672
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested,
has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government
and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that
all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus
attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its
authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the
official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face
a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to
accept as having passed Congress all bills authenticated in the manner stated,
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the
act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution.
It is admitted that an enrolled act thus authenticated is sufficient evidence of itself -
- nothing to the contrary appearing upon its face -- that it passed Congress. But the
contention is that it cannot be regarded as a law of the United States if the journal
of either house fails to show that it passed in the precise form in which it was
signed by the presiding officers of the two houses and approved by the President. It
is said that under any other view, it becomes possible for the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the President of the Senate to impose upon the people as a
law a bill that was never passed by Congress. But this possibility is too remote
Page 143 U. S. 673
to be seriously considered in the present inquiry. It suggests a deliberate conspiracy
to which the presiding officers, the committees on enrolled bills, and the clerks of
the two houses must necessarily be parties, all acting with a common purpose to
defeat an expression of the popular will in the mode prescribed by the Constitution.
Judicial action based upon such a suggestion is forbidden by the respect due to a
coordinate branch of the government. The evils that may result from the
recognition of the principle that an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, attested by the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of
Congress and the approval of the President, is conclusive evidence that it was
passed by Congress according to the forms of the Constitution would be far less
than those that would certainly result from a rule making the validity of
congressional enactments depend upon the manner in which the journals of the
respective houses are kept by the subordinate officers charged with the duty of
keeping them.
The views we have expressed are supported by numerous adjudications in this
country, to some of which it is well to refer. In Pangborn v. Young, 32 N.J.Law 29,
37, the question arose as to the relative value as evidence of the passage of a bill of
the journals of the respective houses of the legislature and the enrolled act,
authenticated by the signatures of the speakers of the two houses and by the
approval of the governor. The bill there in question, it was alleged, originated in the
House and was amended in the Senate, but as presented to and approved by the
governor did not contain all the amendments made in the Senate. Referring to the
provision in the Constitution of New Jersey requiring each house of the legislature
to keep a journal of its proceeding -- which provision is in almost the same words as
the above clause quoted from the federal Constitution -- the court, speaking by
Chief Justice Beasley, said that it was impossible for the mind not to incline to the
opinion that the framers of the Constitution, in exacting the keeping of the journals,
did not design to create records that were to be the ultimate and conclusive
evidence of the conformity of
Page 143 U. S. 674
legislative action to the constitutional provisions relating to the enactment of laws.
In the nature of things, it was observed, these journals must have been constructed
out of loose and hasty memoranda made in the pressure of business and amid the
distractions of a numerous assembly. The Chief Justice said:
"Can anyone deny that if the laws of the state are to be tested by a comparison
with these journals, so imperfect, so unauthenticated, that the stability of all
written law will be shaken to its very foundation? Certainly no person can venture
to say that many of our statutes, perhaps some of the oldest and most important,
those which affect large classes of persons or on which great interests depend, will
not be found defective, even in constitutional particulars, if judged by this criterion.
. . . In addition to these considerations, in judging of consequences, we are to
remember the danger, under the prevalence of such a doctrine, to be apprehended
from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It is scarcely too
much to say that the legal existence of almost every legisaltive act would be at the
mercy of all persons having access to these journals, for it is obvious that any law
can be invalidated by the interpolation of a few lines or the obliteration of one
name and the substitution of another in its stead. I cannot consent to expose the
state legislature to the hazards of such probable error or facile fraud. The doctrine
contended for on the part of the evidence has no foundation, in my estimation, on
any considerations of public policy."
The conclusion was that, upon grounds of public policy as well as upon the ancient
and well settled rules of law, a copy of a bill bearing the signatures of the presiding
officers of the two houses of the legislature and the approval of the governor, and
found in the custody of the Secretary of State, was conclusive proof of the
enactment and contents of a statute, and could not be contradicted by the
legislative journals or in any other mode. These principles were affirmed by the
New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals in Freeholders of Passaic v. Stevenson, 46
N.J.Law 173, 184, and in Standard Underground Co. v. Attorney General, 46 N.J.Eq.
270, 276.
Page 143 U. S. 675
In Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253, 276, the whole subject was carefully considered.
The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sawyer, said:
"Better, far better, that a provision should occasionally find its way into the statute
through mistake, or even fraud, than that every act, state and national, should at
any and all times, be liable to be put in issue and impeached by the journals, loose
papers of the legislature, and parol evidence. Such a state of uncertainty in the
statute laws of the land would lead to mischiefs absolutely intolerable. . . . The
result of the authorities in England and in the other states clearly is that at common
law, whenever a general statute is misrecited, or its existence denied, the question
is to tried and determined by the court as a question of law -- that is to say, the
court is bound to take notice of it and inform itself the best way it can; that there is
no plea by which its existence can be put in issue and tried as a question of fact;
that if the enrollment of the statute is in existence, the enrollment itself is the
record, which is conclusive as to what the statute is, and cannot be impeached,
destroyed, or weakened by the journals of Parliament or any other less authentic or
less satisfactory memorials, and that there has been no departure from the
principles in the United States except in instances where a departure has been
grounded on, or taken in pursuance of, some express constitutional or statutory
provision requiring some relaxation of the rule in order that full effect might be
given to such provisions, and in such instances the rule has been relaxed by judges
with great caution and hesitation, and the departure has never been extended
beyond an inspection of the journals of both branches of the legislature."
The provisions of the California Constitution, in force when the above case was
decided relating to the journals of legislative proceedings, were substantially like
the clause upon that subject in the Constitution of the United States. The doctrines
of the above case were reaffirmed in People v. Burt, 43 Cal. 560. But it should be
observed that at a subsequent date, a new Constitution was adopted in California
under which the journals have been examined to impeach an
Page 143 U. S. 676
enrolled bill. County of San Mateo v Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 13 F. 722.
A case very much in point is Ex Parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512, 527, 532. The validity of a
certain act was there questioned on the ground that although signed by the
presiding officers of the two houses of the legislature and approved by the
governor, it was not law because it appeared from the journals of those bodies,
kept in pursuance of the constitution, that the original bill, having passed the
house, was sent to the senate, which passed it with numerous amendments, in all
of which the house concurred, but the bill as approved by the governor did not
contain certain amendments which bore directly upon the issues in the case before
the court. The court, in a vigorous opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Campbell, held
that the enrolled act, signed by the president of the senate and the speaker of the
house of representatives and the governor, is the sole exposition of its contents,
and the conclusive evidence of its existence according to its purport, and that it is
not allowable to look further to discover the history of the act or ascertain its
provisions. After a careful analysis of the adjudged cases, the court said:
"Every other view subordinates the legislature and disregards that coequal position
in our system of the three departments of government. If the validity of every act
published as law is to be tested by examining its history, as shown by the journals
of the two houses of the legislature, there will be an amount of litigation, difficulty,
and painful uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and multiplying a hundred-
fold the alleged uncertainty of the law. Every suit before every court where the
validity of a statute may be called in question as affecting the right of a litigant will
be in the nature of an appeal or writ of error or bill of review for errors apparent on
the face of the legislative records, and the journals must be explored to determine
if some contradiction does not exist between the journals and the bill signed by the
presiding officers of the two houses. Where the law is to be declared by the court,
it must inform itself as best it can what is the law. If it may go beyond the enrolled
and signed bill, and try its validity by
Page 143 U. S. 677
the record contained in the journals, it must perform this task as often as called on,
and every court must do it. A justice of the peace must do it, for he has as much
right, and is as much bound, to preserve the Constitution and declare and apply the
law as any other court, and we will have the spectacle of examination of journals by
justices of the peace, and statutes declared to be not law as the result of their
journalistic inquiry, and the circuit and chancery courts will be constantly engaged
in like manner, and this court, on appeal, have often to try the correctness of the
determination of the court below as to the conclusion to be drawn from the
legislative journals on the inquiry as to the validity of the statutes thus tested. . . .
Let the courts accept as statutes, duly enacted, such bills as are delivered by the
legislature as their acts, authenticated as such in the prescribed mode."
In Weeks v. Smith, 81 Me. 538, 547, it was said:
"Legislative journals are made amid the confusion of a dispatch of business, and
therefore much more likely to contain errors than the certificates of the presiding
officers to be untrue. Moreover, public policy requires that the enrolled statures of
our state, fair upon their faces, should not be put in question after the public have
given faith to their validity. No man should be required to hunt through the journals
of a legislature to determine whether a statute, properly certified by the speaker of
the house and the president of the senate and approved by the governor, is a
statute or not. The enrolled act, if a public law, and the original, if a private act,
have always been held in England to be records of the highest order, and, if they
carry no 'death wounds' in themselves, to be absolute verity, and of themselves
conclusive."
To the same general effect are Brodnax v. Commissioners, 64 N.C. 244, 248; Nevada
v. Swift, 10 Nev. 176; Evans v. Browne,30 Ind. 514; Edger v. Randolph County
Comm'rs, 70 Ind. 331, 338; Pacific Railroad v. Governor, 23 Mo. 353, 362, et seq.;
Lottery Co. v. Richoux, 23 La.Ann. 743. There are cases in other state courts which
proceed upon opposite grounds from those we have indicated as proper. But it will
be found upon
Page 143 U. S. 678
examination that many of them rested upon constitutional or statutory provisions
of a peculiar character, which, expressly or by necessary implication, required or
authorized the court to go behind the enrolled act when the question was whether
the act, as authenticated and deposited in the proper office, was duly passed by the
legislature. This is particularly the case in reference to the decisions in
Illinois. Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill, 297; Turley v. County of Logan, 17 Ill. 151; Prescott
v. Canal Trustees, 19 Ill. 324; Supervisors v. People, 25 Ill. 181; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill.
160; People v. Baranes, 35 Ill. 121. In the last-named case, it was said:
"Were it not for the somewhat peculiar provision of our constitution, which
requires that all bills, before they can become laws, shall be read three several
times in each house and shall be passed by a vote of a majority of all the members-
elect, a bill thus signed an approved would be conclusive of its validity and binding
force as a law. . . . According to the theory of our legislation, when a bill has
become a law, there must be record evidence of every material requirement, from
its introduction until it becomes a law. And this evidence is found upon the journals
of the two houses."
But the court added:
"We are not, however, prepared to say that a different rule might not have
subserved the public interest equally well, leaving the legislature and the executive
to guard the public interest in this regard, or to become responsible for its neglect."
The case of Gardner v. Collector, 6 Wall. 499, 73 U. S. 511, was relied on in
argument as supporting the contention of the appellants. The question there was
as to the time when an act of Congress took effect, the doubt upon that point
arising from the fact that the month and day, but not the year, of the approval of
the act by the President appeared upon the enrolled act in the custody of the
Department of State. This omission, it was held, could be supplied in support of the
act from the legislative journals. It was said by the Court:
"We are of opinion, therefore, on principle as well as authority, that whenever a
question arises in a court of law of the existence of a statute,
Page 143 U. S. 679
or of the time when a statute took effect, or of the precise terms of a statute, the
judges who are called upon to decide it have a right to resort to any source of
information which in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind a clear
and satisfactory answer to such question, always seeking first for that which in its
nature is most appropriate, unless the positive law has enacted a different rule."
There was no question in that case as to the existence or terms of a statute, and
the point in judgment was that the time when an admitted statute took effect, not
appearing from the enrolled act, could be shown by the legislative journals. It is
scarcely necessary to say that that case does not meet the question here
presented.
Nor do the cases of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260; Walnut v. Wade, 103 U.
S. 683, and Post v. Supervisors, 105 U. S. 667, proceed upon any ground
inconsistent with the views we have expressed. In each of those cases, it was held
that the question whether a seeming act of the legislature became a law in
accordance with the Constitution was a judicial one, to be decided by the courts
and judges, and not a question of fact to be tried by a jury, and without considering
the question on principle, this Court held, in deference to the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Illinois interpreting the constitution of that state, that it was
competent for the court, in determining the validity of an enrolled act, to consult
the legislative journals.
Some reliance was also placed by appellants upon section 895 of the Revised
Statutes, providing that
"Extracts from the journals of the Senate, or of the House of Representatives, and
of the executive journal of the Senate when the injunction of secrecy is removed,
certified by the Secretary of the Senate or by the Clerk of the House of
Representatives, shall be admitted as evidence in the courts of the United States,
and shall have the same force and effect as the originals would have if produced
and authenticated in court."
But referring now only to matters which the Constitution does not require to be
entered on the journals, it is clear that this is not a statutory declaration that the
journals are the highest evidence of the
Page 143 U. S. 680
facts stated in them, or complete evidence of all that occurs in the progress of
business in the respective houses, much less that the authentication of an enrolled
bill by the official signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses and of the
President, as an act which has passed Congress and been approved by the
President, may be overcome by what the journal of either house shows or fails to
show.
We are of opinion, for the reasons stated, that it is not competent for the
appellants to show, from the journals of either house, from the reports of
committees, or from other documents printed by authority of Congress, that the
enrolled bill, designated "H.R. 9416," as finally passed, contained a section that
does not appear in the enrolled act in the custody of the State Department.
Second. The third section of the Act of October 1, 1890, c. 1244, § 3, is in these
words:
"SEC. 3. That with a view to secure reciprocal trade with countries producing the
following articles, and for this purpose, on and after the first day of January,
eighteen hundred and ninety-two, whenever and so often as the President shall be
satisfied that the government of any country producing and exporting sugars,
molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, raw and uncured, or any of such articles, imposes
duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United
States, which in view of the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea,
and hides into the United States he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and
unreasonable, he shall have the power, and it shall be his duty, to suspend, by
proclamation to that effect, the provisions of this act relating to the free
introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, the production of such
country, for such time as he shall deem just, and in such case and during such
suspension duties shall be levied, collected, and paid upon sugar, molasses, coffee,
tea, and hides, the product of or exported from such designated country, as
follows, namely:"
"All sugars not above number thirteen Dutch standard in color shall pay duty on
their polariscopic tests as follows namely: "
Page 143 U. S. 681
"All sugars not above number thirteen Dutch standard in color, all tank bottoms,
syrups of cane juice or of beet juice, melada, concentrated melada, concrete and
concentrated molasses, testing by the polariscope not above seventy-five degrees,
seven-tenths of one cent per pound, and for every additional degree or fraction of a
degree shown by the polariscopic test, two-hundredths of one cent per pound
additional."
"All sugars above number thirteen Dutch standard in color shall be classified by the
Dutch standard of color, and pay duty as follows, namely: all sugar above number
thirteen and not above number sixteen Dutch standard of color, one and three-
eights cent per pound."
"All sugars above number sixteen and not above number twenty Dutch standard of
color, one and five-eighths cents per pound."
"All sugars above number twenty Dutch standard of color, two cents per pound."
"Molasses testing above fifty-six degrees, four cents per gallon."
"Sugar drainings and sugar sweepings shall be subject to duty either as molasses or
sugar, as the case may be, according to polariscopic test."
"On coffee, three cents per pound."
"On tea, ten cents per pound."
"Hides, raw or uncured, whether dry, salted, or pickled, Angora goatskins, raw,
without the wool, unmanufactured, asses' skins, raw or unmanufactured, and skins,
except sheepskins, with the wool on, one and one-half cents per pound."
26 Stat. 567, 612.
The plaintiffs in error contend that this section, so far as it authorizes the President
to suspend the provisions of the act relating to the free introduction of sugar,
molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, is unconstitutional as delegating to him both
legislative and treatymaking powers, and, being an essential part of the system
established by Congress, the entire act must be declared null and void. On behalf of
the United States it is insisted that legislation of this character is sustained by an
early decision of this Court and by the practice of the government
Page 143 U. S. 682
for nearly a century, and that even if the third section were unconstitutional, the
remaining parts of the act would stand.
The decision referred to is The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch 382, 11 U. S. 388. What was
that case? The nonintercourse Act of March 1, 1809, c. 24, secs. 4, 11, forbidding
the importation, after May 20, 1809, of goods, wares, or merchandise from any
port or place in Great Britain or France, provided that
"The President of the United States be, and he hereby is, authorized, in case either
France or Great Britain shall so revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall cease
to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, to declare the same by
proclamation,"
after which the trade suspended by that act and the act laying an embargo could
"be renewed with the nation so doing." 2 Stat. 528. The act of 1809 expired on the
1st of May, 1810, on which day Congress passed another act, c. 39, § 4, declaring
that in case either Great Britain or France, before a named day, so revoked or
modified her edicts
"as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States,
which fact the President of the United States shall declare by proclamation, and if
the other nation shall not"
within a given time revoke or modify her edicts in like manner, then certain
sections of the act of 1809
"shall, from and after the expiration of three months from the date of the
proclamation aforesaid, be revived and have full force and effect, so far as relates
to the dominions, colonies, and dependencies, and to the articles the growth,
produce, or manufacture of the dominions, colonies, and dependencies of the
nation thus refusing or neglecting to revoke or modify her edicts in the manner
aforesaid. And the restrictions imposed by this act shall, from the date of such
proclamation, cease and be discontinued in relation to the nation revoking or
modifying her decrees in the manner aforesaid."
2 Stat. 605, 606. On the 2d of November, 1810, President Madison issued his
proclamation declaring that France had so revoked or modified her edicts as that
they ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United States. In the argument
of that case, it was contended by Mr. Joseph R. Ingersoll that
Page 143 U. S. 683
Congress could not transfer legislative power to the President, and that to make the
revival of a law depend upon the President's proclamation was to give that
proclamation the force of a law. To this it was replied that the legislature did not
transfer any power of legislation to the President; that they only prescribed the
evidence which should be admitted of a fact, upon which the law should go into
effect. Mr. Justice Johnson, speaking for the whole Court, said:
"We can see no sufficient reason why the legislature should not exercise its
discretion in reviving the Act of March 1, 1809, either expressly or conditionally, as
their judgment should direct. The nineteenth section of that act, declaring that it
should continue in force to a certain time, and no longer, could not restrict their
power of extending its operation without limitation upon the occurrence of any
subsequent combination of events."
This certainly is a decision that it was competent for Congress to make the revival of
an act depend upon the proclamation of the President showing the ascertainment
by him of the fact that the edicts of certain nations had been sorevoked or modified
that they did not violate the neutral commerce of the United States. The same
principle would apply in the case of the suspension of an act upon a contingency to
be ascertained by the President and made known by his proclamation.
To what extent do precedents in legislation sustain the validity of the section under
consideration, so far as it makes the suspension of certain provisions and the going
into operation of other provisions of an act of Congress depend upon the action of
the President based upon the occurrence of subsequent events, or the
ascertainment by him of certain facts, to be made known by his proclamation? If
we find that Congress has frequently, from the organization of the government to
the present time, conferred upon the President powers, with reference to trade
and commerce, like those conferred by the third section of the Act of October 1,
1890, that fact is entitled to great weight in determining the question before us.
During the administration of Washington, Congress, by an Act approved June 4,
1794, c. 41, authorized the President, when Congress was not in session, and for a
prescribed period,
Page 143 U. S. 684
"whenever in his opinion the public safety shall so require, to lay an embargo on all
ships and vessels in the ports of the United States, or upon the ships and vessels of
the United States, or the ships and vessels of any foreign nation, under such
regulations as the circumstances may require, and to continue or revoke the same
whenever he shall think proper."
1 Stat. 372.
Congress passed, and President Adams approved, the Act of June 13, 1798, c. 53, §
5, suspending commercial intercourse between the United States and France and
its dependencies, and providing that if the government of France, and all persons
acting by or under its authority, before the then next session of Congress,
"shall clearly disavow, and shall be found to refrain from, the aggressions,
depredations, and hostilities which have been and are by them encouraged and
maintained against the vessels and other property of the citizens of the United
States, and against their national rights and sovereignty, in violation of the faith of
treaties and the laws of nations, and shall thereby acknowledge the just claims of
the United States to be considered as in all respects neutral, and unconnected in
the present European war, if the same shall be continued, then and thereupon it
shall be lawful for the President of the United States, being well ascertained of the
premises, to remit and discontinue the prohibitions and restraints hereby enacted
and declared, and he shall be, and is hereby, authorized to make proclamation
thereof accordingly."
1 Stat. 565, 566. A subsequent Ac, approved February 9, 1799, c. 2, § 4, further
suspending commercial intercourse with France and its dependencies, contained
this section:
"That at any time after the passing of this act, it shall be lawful for the President of
the United States, if he shall deem it expedient and consistent with the interest of
the United States, by his order to remit and discontinue for the time being the
restraints and prohibitions aforesaid either with respect to the French Republic or
to any island, port, or place belonging to the said republic, with which a commercial
intercourse may safely be renewed, and also to revoke such order whenever in his
opinion the interest of the United States shall require,
Page 143 U. S. 685
and he shall be, and hereby is, authorized to make proclamation thereof
accordingly."
1 Stat. 613, 615. Under the latter act, the President issued, June 26, 1799, and May
21, 1800, proclamations declaring it lawful for vessels departing from the United
States to enter certain ports of San Domingo. Life and Works of John Adams, vol. 9,
pp. 176, 177.
By an Act of Congress approved April 18, 1806, c. 29, it was made unlawful to
import, after November 15, 1806, into the United States from any port or place in
Great Britain or Ireland, or in any of the colonies or dependencies of Great Britain,
articles of which leather, silk, hemp, flax, tin, or brass was the material of chief
value, woolen cloths whose invoice prices exceeded five shillings sterling per square
yard, woolen hosiery, manufactures of glass, silver and plated wares, hats, nails,
spikes, ready-made clothing, millinery, beer, ale, porter, pictures, and prints. 2 Stat.
379. The operation of this act was suspended by the subsequent Act of December
19, 1806, c. 1, § 3, until July 1, 1807. But the last act contained this section:
"That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized further to
suspend the operation of the aforesaid act if in his judgment the public interest
should require it, provided that such suspension shall not extend beyond the
second Monday in December next."
2 Stat. 411. Both of these acts received the approval of President Jefferson.
An Act of March 3, 1815, c. 77, approved by President Madison, provided that so
much of the several acts imposing duties on the tonnage of ships and vessels and
on goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United States, as imposed a
discriminating duty on tonnage between foreign vessels and vessels of the United
States, and between goods imported into the United States in foreign vessels and
vessels of the United States, be repealed so far as the same respected the produced
or manufacture of the nation to which such foreign ships or vessels belonged, such
repeal to take effect in favor of any foreign nation
"whenever the President of the United States shall be satisfied that the
discriminating or countervailing duties of such foreign nation, so far as they operate
to the disadvantage of the United States,"
had been abolished.
Page 143 U. S. 686
3 Stat. 224. Satisfactory proof having been received by President Monroe from the
Free City of Bremen that from and after the 12th of May, 1815, all discriminating or
countervailing duties of the said city, "so far as they operated to the disadvantage
of the United States," had been abolished, he issued, July 24, 1818, his
proclamation stating that the acts of Congress upon that subject were repealed so
far as the same related to the produce and manufacture of that city. Similar
proclamations were issued by him in respect to the produce and manufactures of
Hamburg, Lubeck, Norway, and the Dukedom of Ogdenburg. 3 Stat.App. 1.
By an Act approved March 3, 1817, c. 39, prohibiting the importation into the
United States, in any foreign vessel, from and after July 4 of that year, of plaster of
Paris, the production of any country or its dependencies from which the vessels of
the United States were not permitted to bring the same article, it was provided that
the act should continue in force five years from January 31, 1817, provided
"that if any foreign nation or its dependencies which have now in force regulations
on the subject of the trade in plaster of Paris prohibiting the exportation thereof to
certain ports of the United States shall discontinue such regulations, the President
of the United States is hereby authorized to declare that fact by his proclamation,
and the restrictions imposed by this act shall, from the date of such proclamation,
cease and be discontinued in relation to the nation, or its dependencies,
discontinuing such regulations."
3 Stat. 361. Proclamations in execution of this act were issued by President
Monroe, relating to our trade with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. 3 Stat.App. 1.
By an act concerning discriminating duties of tonnage and impost approved January
7, 1824, c. 4, § 4, it was provided that
"Upon satisfactory evidence being given to the President of the United States by
the government of any foreign nation that no discriminating duties of tonnage or
impost are imposed or levied within the ports of the said nation upon vessels
wholly belonging to citizens of the United States or upon merchandise, the produce
or manufacture thereof imported in
Page 143 U. S. 687
the same, the President is hereby authorized to issue his proclamation declaring
that the foreign discriminating duties of tonnage and impost within the United
States are, and shall be, suspended and discontinued so far as respects the vessels
of the said nation and the merchandise of its produce or manufacture imported
into the United States in the same, the said suspension to take effect from the time
of such notification being given to the President of the United States and to
continue so long as the reciprocal exemption of vessels belonging to citizens of the
United States, and merchandise as aforesaid, thereon laden shall be continued, and
no longer."
4 Stat. 3. A similar section was embodied in the Act of May 24, 1828, c. 111, relating
to the same subject, and is substantially preserved in section 4228 of the Revised
Statutes. 4 Stat. 308. In execution of these acts, proclamations were issued by the
Presidents of the United States as follows: Adams, July 1, 1828, 4 Stat.App. 815;
Jackson, May 11, 1829, June 3, 1829, September 18, 1830, April 28, 1835, and
September 1, 1836, 4 Stat.App. 814, 815, 816; 11 Stat.App. 781, 782; Polk,
November 4, 1847, 9 Stat.App. 1001; Fillmore, November 1, 1850, 9 Stat.App. 1004;
Buchanan, February 25, 1858, 11 Stat.App. 795; Lincoln, December 16, 1863, 13
Stat.App. 739; Johnson, December 28, 1886, and January 29, 1867, 14 Stat.App.
818, 819; Grant, June 12, 1869, November 20, 1869, February 25, 1871, December
19, 1871, September 4, 1872, and October 30, 1872, 16 Stat.App. 1127-1137, 17
Stat.App. 954-957; and Hayes, November 30, 1880, 21 Stat. 800.
A subsequent statute of May 31, 1830, c. 219, repealed all acts and parts of acts
which imposed duties upon the tonnage of ships and vessels of foreign nations,
provided the President of the United States should be satisfied that the
discriminating or countervailing duties of such foreign nations, "so far as they
operate to the disadvantage of the United States," had been abolished. 4 Stat. 425.
This provision is preserved in section 4219 of the Revised Statutes.
Pursuant to the Act of Congress of August 5. 1854, c. 269, § 2, carrying into effect
the Treaty between the United States and
Page 143 U. S. 688
Great Britain of June 5, 1854, President Pierce issued his proclamation, December
12, 1855, declaring that grain, flour, breadstuffs of all kinds, and numerous other
specified articles should be admitted free of duty from Newfoundland, he having
received satisfactory evidence that that province had consented, "in a due and
proper manner," to have the provisions of the above treaty extended to it, and to
allow the United States the full benefits of all its stipulations, so far as they were
applicable to Newfoundland. 10 Stat. 587; 11 Stat.App. p. 790.
By an Act of Congress approved March 6, 1866, c. 12, the importation of neat cattle
and the hides of neat cattle from any foreign country into the United States was
prohibited, the operation of the act, however, to be suspended as to any foreign
country or countries, or any parts of such country or countries, whenever the
Secretary of the Treasury should officially determine, and give public notice
thereof, that such importation would not tend to the introduction or spread of
contagious or infectious diseases among the cattle of the United States. The same
act provided that
"The President of the United States, whenever in his judgment the importation of
neat cattle and the hides of neat cattle may be made without danger of the
introduction or spread of contagious or infectious disease among the cattle of the
United States, may by proclamation, declare the provisions of this act to be
inoperative, and the same shall be afterwards inoperative, and the same shall be
afterwards inoperative and of no effect from said proclamation."
14 Stat. 3. These provisions constituted sections 2493 and 2494 of the Revised
Statutes until the passage of the Act of March 3, 1883 22 Stat. 489, c. 121, § 6. And
by the Tariff Act of 1890, the importation of neat cattle and the hides of neat cattle
from foreign countries was prohibited, but authority is given to the Secretary of the
Treasury to suspend the operation of the act as to any country whenever he
determined that such importation will not lead to the introduction or spread of
contagious or infectious diseases among the cattle of the United States. 26 Stat.
616, c. 1244, § 20.
In execution of section 4228 of the Revised Statutes,
Page 143 U. S. 689
President Arthur issued a proclamation declaring that on and after the first day of
March, 1884, so long as the products of, and articles proceeding from, the United
States, imported into the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, should be exempt from
discrimination customs duties, any such duties on the products of, and articles
proceeding from, Cuba and Porto Rico under the Spanish flag, should be suspended
and discontinued. 23 Stat. 835. President Cleveland, by proclamation of October 13,
1886, revoked this suspension upon the ground that higher and discriminating
duties continued to be imposed and levied in the ports named upon certain
produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported into them from the United States
and from foreign countries, in vessels of the United States, than were imposed and
levied on the like produce, manufactures, or merchandise carried to those ports in
Spanish vessels. 24 Stat. 1028.
By the 14th section of the Act of June 26, 1884, c. 121, removing certain burdens on
the American merchant marine and encouraging the American foreign carrying
trade, certain tonnage duties were imposed upon vessels entering the United
States from any foreign port or place in North America, Central America, the West
India Islands, Bahama Islands, Bermuda Islands, Sandwich Islands, or
Newfoundland, and the President was authorized to suspend the collection of so
much of those duties, on vessels entering from certain ports, as might be in excess
of the tonnage and lighthouse dues, or other equivalent tax or taxes, imposed on
American vessels by the government of the foreign country in which such port was
situated, and should upon the passage of the act,
"and from time to time thereafter, as often as it may become necessary by reason
of changes in the laws of the foreign countries above mentioned, indicate by
proclamation the ports to which such suspension shall apply, and the rate or rates
of tonnage duty, if any, to be collected under such suspension."
23 Stat. 57. In execution of that act, Presidents Arthur and Cleveland issued
proclamations suspending the collection of duties on goods arriving from certain
designated ports. 23 Stat. 841, 842, 844.
Page 143 U. S. 690
It would seem to be unnecessary to make further reference to acts of Congress to
show that the authority conferred upon the President by the third section of the
Act of October 1, 1890, is not an entirely new feature in the legislation of Congress,
but has the sanction of many precedents in legislation. * While some of these
precedents are stronger than
Page 143 U. S. 691
others, in their application to the case before us, they all show that, in the
judgment of the legislative branch of the government, it is often desirable, if not
essential, for the protection of the interests of our people against the unfriendly or
discriminating regulations established by foreign governments in the interest of
their people, to invest the President with large discretion in matters arising out of
the execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations. If the
decision in the case of The Brig Aurora had never been rendered, the practical
construction of the Constitution, as given by so many acts of Congress and
embracing almost the entire period of our national existence, should not be
overruled unless upon a conviction that such legislation was clearly incompatible
with the supreme law of the land. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 5 U. S. 309; Martin
v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 14 U. S. 351; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299,53
U. S. 315; Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 111 U. S. 57; The Laura, 114 U. S.
411, 114 U. S. 416.
The authority given to the President by the Act of June 4, 1794, to lay an embargo
on all ships and vessels in the ports of the United States, "whenever, in his opinion,
the public safety shall so require," and under regulations to be continued or
revoked "whenever he shall think proper," by the Act of February 9, 1799, to remit
and discontinue, for the time being, the restrains and prohibitions which Congress
had prescribed with respect to commercial intercourse with the French republic, "if
he shall deem it expedient and consistent with the interest of the United States,"
and "to revoke such order whenever, in his opinion, the interest of the United
States shall require;" by the Act of December 19, 1806, to suspend, for a named
time, the operation of the nonimportation, act of the same year, "if in his judgment
the public interest should
Page 143 U. S. 692
require it;" by the Act of May 1, 1810, to revive a former act, as to Great Britain or
France, if either country had not, by a named day, so revoked or modified its edicts
as not "to violate the neutral commerce of the United States;" by the Acts of March
3, 1815, and May 31, 1830, to declare the repeal, as to any foreign nation, of the
several acts imposing duties on the tonnage of ships and vessels, and on goods,
wares, and merchandise imported into the United States, when he should be
"satisfied" that the discriminating duties of such foreign nations, "so far as they
operate to the disadvantage of the United States," had been abolished; by the Act
of March 6, 1866, to declare the provisions of the act forbidding the importation
into this country of neat cattle and the hides of neat cattle, to be inoperative
"whenever in his judgment" their importation "may be made without danger of the
introduction or spread of contagious or infectious disease among the cattle of the
United States," must be regarded as unwarranted by the Constitution if the
contention of the appellants, in respect to the third section of the Act of October 1,
1890, be sustained.
That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the Constitution. The Act of October 1, 1890, in the
particular under consideration, is not inconsistent with that principle. It does not in
any real sense invest the President with the power of legislation. For the purpose of
securing reciprocal trade with countries producing and exporting sugar, molasses,
coffee, tea, and hides, Congress itself determined that the provisions of the Act of
October 1, 1890, permitting the free introduction of such articles, should be
suspended as to any country producing and exporting them that imposed exactions
and duties on the agricultural and other products of the United States which the
President deemed -- that is, which he found to be -- reciprocally unequal and
unreasonable. Congress itself prescribed in advance the duties to be levied,
collected, and paid on sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, or hides, produced by or
exported from such designated
Page 143 U. S. 693
country while the suspension lasted. Nothing involving the expediency or the just
operation of such legislation was left to the determination of the President. The
words "he may deem," in the third section, of course, implied that the President
would examine the commercial regulations of other countries producing and
exporting sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides and form a judgment as to
whether they were reciprocally equal and reasonable, or the contrary, in their
effect upon American products. But when he ascertained the fact that duties and
exactions reciprocally unequal and unreasonable were imposed upon the
agricultural or other products of the United States by a country producing and
exporting sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, or hides, it became his duty to issue a
proclamation declaring the suspension, as to that county, which Congress had
determined should occur. He had no discretion in the premises except in respect to
the duration of the suspension so ordered. But that related only to the
enforcement of the policy established by Congress. As the suspension was
absolutely required when the President ascertained the existence of a particular
fact, it cannot be said that in ascertaining that fact, and in issuing his proclamation
in obedience to the legislative will, he exercised the function of making laws.
Legislative power was exercised when Congress declared that the suspension
should take effect upon a named contingency. What the President was required to
do was simply in execution of the act of Congress. It was not the making of law. He
was the mere agent of the lawmaking department to ascertain and declare the
event upon which its expressed will was to take effect. It was a part of the law
itself, as it left the hands of Congress, that the provisions, full and complete in
themselves, permitting the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and
hides from particular countries should be suspended in a given contingency, and
that in case of such suspension, certain duties should be imposed.
"The true distinction," as Judge Ranney, speaking for the Supreme Court of Ohio,
has well said,
"is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
Page 143 U. S. 694
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
Cincinnati, Wilmington &c. Railroad v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 88. In Moers v. City
of Reading, 21 Penn.St. 202, the language of the court was:
"Half the statutes on our books are in the alternative, depending on the discretion
of some person or persons to whom is confided the duty of determining whether
the proper occasion exists for executing them. But it cannot be said that the
exercise of such discretion is the making of the law."
So, in Locke's Appeal, 72 Penn.St. 491:
"To assert that a law is less than a law because it is made to depend on a future
event or act is to rob the legislature of the power to act wisely for the public
welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed or
to things future and impossible to fully know."
The proper distinction, the court said, was this:
"The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to
delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop
the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful
legislation must depend which cannot be known to the lawmaking power, and must
therefore be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of
legislation."
What has been said is equally applicable to the objection that the third section of
the act invests the President with treatymaking power.
The Court is of opinion that the third section of the Act of October 1, 1890, is not
liable to the objection that it transfers legislative and treatymaking power to the
President. Even if it were, it would not by any means follow that other parts of the
act, those which directly imposed duties upon articles imported, would be
inoperative. But we need not, in this connection, enter upon the consideration of
that question.
Third. The Act of October 1, 1890, c. 1244, sec. 1, par. 231, "Schedule E -- Sugar,"
provides that
"On and after July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, and until July first,
Page 143 U. S. 695
nineteen hundred and five, there shall be paid, from any moneys in the Treasury
not otherwise appropriated, under the provisions of section three thousand six
hundred and eighty-nine of the Revised Statutes, to the producer of sugar testing
not less than ninety degrees by the polariscope, from beets, sorghum, or sugar cane
grown within the United States, or from maple sap produced within the United
States, a bounty of two cents per pound, and upon such sugar testing less than
ninety degrees by the polariscope, and not less than eighty degrees, a bounty of
one and three-fourths cents per pound, under such rules and regulations as the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury, shall prescribe."
26 Stat. 567, 583.
Appellants contend that Congress has no power to appropriate money from the
Treasury for the payment of these bounties, and that the provisions for them have
such connection with the system established by the act of 1890 that the entire act
must be held inoperative and void. The question of constitutional power thus raised
depends principally, if not altogether, upon the scope and effect of that clause of
the Constitution giving Congress power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,
and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States." Article I, Section 8. It would be difficult to suggest a
question of larger importance, or one the decision of which would be more far-
reaching. But the argument that the validity of the entire act depends upon the
validity of the bounty clause is so obviously founded in error that we should not be
justified in giving the question of constitutional power, here raised, that extended
examination which a question of such gravity would under some circumstances
demand. Even if the position of the appellants with respect to the power of
Congress to pay these bounties were sustained, it is clear that the parts of the act in
which they are interested -- namely those laying duties upon articles imported --
would remain in force. "It is an elementary principle," this Court has said,
"that the same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional,
and that, if the parts are wholly independent
Page 143 U. S. 696
of each other, that which is constitutional may stand, while that which is
unconstitutional will be rejected."
Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80, 103 U. S. 83. And in Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U.
S. 97, 120 U. S. 102, MR. JUSTICE FIELD, speaking for the Court, said:
"It is only when different clauses of an act are so dependent upon each other that it
is evident the legislature would not have enacted one of them without the other --
as when the two things provided are necessary parts of one system -- that the
whole act will fall with the invalidity of one clause. When there is no such
connection and dependency, the act will stand though different parts of it are
rejected."
It cannot be said to be evident that the provisions imposing duties on imported
articles are so connected with or dependent upon those giving bounties upon the
production of sugars in this country that the former would not have been adopted
except in connection with the latter. Undoubtedly the object of the act was not
only to raise revenue for the support of the government, but to so exert the power
of laying and collecting taxes and duties as to encourage domestic manufactures
and industries of different kinds, upon the success of which, the promoters of the
act claimed, materially depended the national prosperity and the national safety.
But it cannot be assumed, nor can it be made to appear from the act, that the
provisions imposing duties on imported articles would not have been adopted
except in connection with the clause giving bounties on the production of sugar in
this country. These different parts of the act, in respect to their operation, have no
legal connection whatever with each other. They are entirely separable in their
nature, and in law are wholly independent of each other. One relates to the
imposition of duties upon imported articles; the other, to the appropriation of
money from the Treasury for bounties on articles produced in this country. While in
a general sense both may be said to be parts of a system, neither the words nor the
general scope of the act justifies the belief that Congress intended they should
operate as a whole, and not separately for the purpose of accomplishing the
objects for which they were respectively designed. Unless it be impossible to avoid
Page 143 U. S. 697
it, a general revenue statute should never be declared inoperative in all its parts
because a particular part relating to a distinct subject may be invalid. A different
rule might be disastrous to the financial operations of the government and produce
the utmost confusion in the business of the entire country.
We perceive no error in the judgments below, and each is
Affirmed.
* For instance, as to another subject, by the Treaty of May 7, 1830, 8 Stat. 408, it
was provided that
"If litigations and disputes should arise between subjects of the Sublime Porte and
citizens of the United States, the parties shall not be heard, nor shall judgment be
pronounced, unless the American Dragoman be present . . and even when they
may have committed some offense, they shall not be arrested and put in prison by
the local authorities, but they shall be tried by their minister or consul, and
punished according to their offense, following in this respect the usage observed
towards other Franks."
On the 22d June, 1860, an act was passed to carry into effect this and other treaties
of like character, "giving certain judicial powers to consuls or other functionaries of
the United States in those countries, and for other purposes." 12 Stat. 72, c. 179.
Under this act, the consuls of the United States in Egypt exercised judicial powers
over citizens of the United States. Dainese v. Hale, 91 U. S. 13.
On the 23d of March, 1874, an act was passed which provided, 18 Stat. 23, c. 62,
"that whenever the President of the United States shall receive satisfactory
information that the Ottoman government or that of Egypt has organized other
tribunals on a basis likely to secure to citizens of the United States, in their
dominions, the same impartial justice which they now enjoy there under the
judicial functions exercised by the minister, consuls, and other functionaries of the
United States pursuant to the Act of Congress approved the twenty-second of June,
eighteen hundred and sixty, . . . he is hereby authorized to suspend the operations
of said acts as to the dominions in which such tribunals may be organized so far as
the jurisdiction of said tribunals may embrace matters now cognizable by the
minister, consuls, or other functionaries of the United States in said dominions, and
to notify the government of the Sublime Porte, or that of Egypt, or either of them,
that the United States, during such suspension, will as aforesaid accept for their
citizens the jurisdiction of the tribunals aforesaid, over citizens of the United States,
which has heretofore been exercised by the minister, consuls, or other
functionaries of the United States."
This statute was the response made by the United States to a suggestion coming
from the Egyptian government through the Turkish government, that mixed
tribunals should be established in Egypt with jurisdiction of "disputes in civil and
commercial matters between natives and foreigners, and between foreigners of
different nationalities." 2 Foreign Relations, 1873, pp. 1100-1104. The scheme was
successful. Codes were adopted (Codes Egyptiens, Alexandrie, 1875), the
proclamation of suspension contemplated by the Act of March 23, 1874, was issued
by President Grant on the 27th of March, 1876, 19 Stat. 662; the quota of foreign
judges assigned to the United States was filled by the Khedive upon the nomination
of the President, and United States citizens became justiciable by this mixed
tribunal. [Reporter.]
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, with whom concurred MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, dissenting
from the opinion but concurring in the judgment of the Court.
The Chief Justice and myself concur in the judgment just announced. But the
proposition maintained in the opinion that the third section, known as the
"Reciprocity Provision," is valid and constitutional legislation, does not command
our assent, and we desire to state very briefly the ground of our dissent from it. We
think that this particular provision is repugnant to the first section of the first article
of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that "All legislative powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." That no part of this legislative
power can be delegated by Congress to any other department of the government,
executive or judicial, is an axiom in constitutional law, and is universally recognized
as a principle essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the Constitution. The legislative power must remain in the
organ where it is lodged by that instrument. We think that the section in question
does delegate legislative power to the executive department, and also commits to
that department matters belonging to the treatymaking power, in violation of
paragraph two of the second section of Article II of the Constitution. It reads thus:
"§ 3. That with a view to secure reciprocal trade with countries producing the
following articles, and for this purpose, on and after the first day of January,
eighteen hundred and ninety-two,
Page 143 U. S. 698
whenever and so often as the President shall be satisfied that the government of
any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, raw
and uncured, or any of such articles, imposes duties or other exactions upon the
agricultural or other products of the United States, which in view of the free
introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides into the United
States he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the
power, and it shall be his duty, to suspend, by proclamation to that effect, the
provisions of this act relating to the free introduction of such sugar, molasses,
coffee, tea, and hides, the production of such country, for such time as he shall
deem just, and in such case, and during such suspension, duties shall be levied,
collected, and paid upon sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, the product of or
exported from such designated country, as follows, namely."
26 Stat. 612.
We do not think that legislation of this character is sustained by any decision of this
Court or by precedents in congressional legislation numerous enough to be
properly considered as the practice of the government. One of the instances
referred to as legislation analogous to this section is that embodied in the acts of
Congress of 1809 and 1810, known as the "Non-Intercourse Acts," pronounced by
this Court to be valid in the case of The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch 383. The Act of March
1, 1809, forbidding any importation after May 20, 1809, from Great Britain or
France, provided that
"The President of the United States be, and he hereby is, authorized, in case either
France or Great Britain shall so revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall cease
to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, to declare the same by
proclamation,"
after which the trade suspended by that act and the act laying an embargo could be
renewed with the nation so doing. 2 Stat. 528, § 11. That act having expired,
Congress on the first of May, 1810, passed an act (2 Stat. 605, § 4) which enacted
"That in case either Great Britain or France shall, before the third day of March to reimpose revenue duties on them, upon his own judgment as to what
next, so revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall cease to violate the neutral constitutes in the policy of other countries a fair and reasonable reciprocity, such
commerce of the United States, which fact legislative precedents cannot avail as authority against a clear and undoubted
principle of the Constitution. We say "revenue policy" because the phrase
Page 143 U. S. 699 "agricultural or other products of the United States" is comprehensive, and
embraces our manufacturing and mining as well as agricultural products, all of
the President of the United States shall declare by proclamation, and if the other
which interests are thus entrusted to the discretion of the President, in the
nation shall not, within three months thereafter, so revoke or modify her edicts in
adjustment of trade relations with other countries, upon a basis of reciprocity.
like manner,"
While, however, we cannot agree to the proposition that this particular section is
the restrictions of the embargo act
valid and constitutional, we do not regard it as such an essential part of the tariff
"shall, from and after the expiration of three months from the date of the act as to invalidate all its other provisions, and we therefore concur in the judgment
proclamation aforesaid, be revived, and have full force and effect, so far as relates of this Court affirming the judgments of the court below in the several cases.
to . . . the nation thus refusing or neglecting to modify her edicts in the manner
aforesaid. And the restrictions imposed by this act shall, from the date of such
proclamation, cease and be discontinued in relation to the nation revoking or
modifying her decrees in the manner aforesaid."
These enactments, in our opinion, transferred no legislative power to the President.
The legislation was purely contingent. It provided for an ascertainment by the
President of an event in the future -- an event defined in the act and directed to be
evidenced by his proclamation. It also prescribed the consequences which were to
follow upon that proclamation. Such proclamation was wholly in the nature of an
executive act, a prescribed mode of ascertainment, which involved no exercise by
the President of what belonged to the lawmaking power. The supreme will of
Congress would have been enforced whether the event provided for had or had not
happened, either in the continuance of the restrictions of the one hand, or, on and
other, in their suspension.
But the purpose and effect of the section now under consideration are radically
different. It does not, as was provided in the statutes of 1809 and 1810, entrust the
President with the ascertainment of a fact therein defined upon which the law is to
go into operation. It goes further than that, and deputes to the President the power
to suspend another section in the same act whenever "he may deem" the action of
any foreign nation producing and exporting the articles named in that section to be
"reciprocally unequal and unreasonable," and it further deputes to him the power
to continue that suspension, and to impose revenue duties on the articles named,
"for such time as he may deem just." This certainly extends to the executive the
exercise of those discretionary powers which the Constitution has vested in the
lawmaking
Page 143 U. S. 700
department. It unquestionably vests in the President the power to regulate our
commerce with all foreign nations which produce sugar, tea, coffee, molasses,
hides, or any of such articles, and to impose revenue duties upon them for a length
of time limited solely by his discretion, whenever he deems the revenue system or
policy of any nation in which those articles are produced reciprocally unequal and
unreasonable in its operation upon the products of this country.
These features of this section are in our opinion in palpable violation of the
Constitution of the United States, and serve to distinguish it from the legislative
precedents which are relied upon to sustain it as the practice of the government.
None of these legislative precedents save the one above referred to has as yet
undergone review by this Court or been sustained by its decision. And if there be
any congressional legislation which may be construed as delegating to the
President the power to suspend any law exempting any importations from duty, or