JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the
1. Hacienda Luisita vs PARC GR 171101 Nov 22 2011
Facts:
In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at
redistributing public and private agricultural lands to farmers and
farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is the
Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential
expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was
bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development
Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuanco
Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an
expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed
to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to
surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the government’s case against
TADECO. The CA dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the
condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm worker
beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its
implementation.
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two
alternative modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the
stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO, it organized a
spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate
stock acquisition by the farmers.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary
Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution
89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the
farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently contested by two groups
representing the interests of the farmers – the HLI Supervisory Group and the
AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR
asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA. They
claimed that they haven’t actually received those benefits in full, that HLI
violated the terms, and that their lives haven’t really improved contrary to the
promise and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review
the terms of the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and
the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the
PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of
Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition scheme. Consequently,
the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands
covered by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme under the
CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.
On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31
of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP
compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land
transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be
annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform
ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
1

Issue: W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over
the constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657
Held:
No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenged the
constitutionality of RA 6657, Sec 31 at the earliest possible
opportunity. It should have been raised as early as Nov 21, 1989,
when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a reasonable
time thereafter.
Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of
this case. Before the SC, the lis mota of the petitions filed by the HLI
is whether or not the PARC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the original positions of
the groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis
mota is the non-compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the the
SDP may be revoked. Such issues can be resolved without delving
into the constitutionality of RA 6657.
Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the
constitutionality of acts of the executive or legislative departments
have not been met in this case.
2. Daza v Singson 180 SCRA 496
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/dec1989/gr_86344_1989.ht
ml
FACTS: The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized
resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its
representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat
occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member.
Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which
consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by
Singson. Daza questioned such replacement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment
validly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: As provided in the constitution, “there should be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the
House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of
proportional representation” of the political parties therein, this necessarily
connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the
requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also
subsequently thereto NOT the court.
3. Mantruste Systems v CA 179 SCRA 136
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/nov1989/gr_86540_41_198
9.html
FACTS: MSI entered into an 4 interim lease agreement with DBP,
owner of Bayview Plaza Hotel, where it would operate the hotel for a
minimum of 3 months or until such time that the said properties are
sold to MSI or other 3rd parties by DBP. The Bayview Hotel was
subsequently identified for privatization under Proclamation No. 50
and was consequently transferred from DBP to Asset Privatization
Trust for disposition. The DBP notified MSI that it was terminating
the interim lease agreement to effect the disposition of the property.
The APT granted the President of MSI's condition an extension of 30
days within which to effect the delivery of the Bayview Hotel to
APT.
2
 However, MSI sent a letter to APT stating that in their
opinion, having leased the property for more than 1 year the ISSUE: WoN the CA erred in not declaring unconstitutional Sec. 31
agreement is long term in character and MSI have acquired of Proclamation No. 50, prohibiting the issuance of a writ of
preference in buying the property, while emphasizing that MSI has a preliminary injunction by the TC.
legal lien on the property because of its advances for the hotel
operations and repairs which amounted to P12 Million. RULING: Sec 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any
APT answered MSI saying that there was no agreement to provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power
that effect. The bidding took place but MSI did not participate. of courts to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable
Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation were and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
awarded the property as the highest bidder for P85 Million. MSI grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
filed a complaint with injunction on awarding and transfer of the on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government". (Sec
property to the winning bidders. Trial court granted, but the CA 1 Art. VIII). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the
reversed the trial court ruling for being violative to Sec 1 of jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the legislature, except
Proclamation No. 50: "No court or administrative agency shall issue that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over
any restraining order or injunction against the trust in connection cases enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec.
with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it. Nor 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Courts may not substitute their
shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser of judgement for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the
assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in
possession of any assets purchased by him." connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets
The CA rejected the TC's opinion that said proclamation is transferred to it. There can be no justification for judicial
unconstitutional, rather it up held that it continues to be operative interference in the business of an administrative agency, except when
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by virtue of Section 3 it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse
Art.XVIII. It also noted that MSI has not been deprived of its of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.
property rights since those rights are non-existent and its only
property right was the alleged reimbursable advances made to DBP, 4. Malaga v Penachos 213 SCRA 516
which it may sue to collect in a separate action. It further held that
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-
the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by the lower court
qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication
against APT may not be justified as a valid exercise of judicial
in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an
power for MSI does not have a legally demandable and enforceable
Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at
right of retention over the said property.
3
ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-
qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would
be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE
Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-
qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2,
1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5,
1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as
their documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC
against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept
them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They
sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance
of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been
conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending
resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting
PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants
filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is
prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of
P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become
moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and
closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be
constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government
falling within the coverage of the subject law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the
provisions of PD 1818?
RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5)
Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a
special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities
and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12)
Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and
is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government
instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries
development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to
effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state
college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on
Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and
offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it,
upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment,
or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without
4
serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M
had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was
also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college
would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the
prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding
the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding
and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
5. PACU v Secretary of Education
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1955/oct1955/gr_l-
5279_1955.html
Facts: The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU)
assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075
and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the
ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that
a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a
person may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This
also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards
that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary
of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental
approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to
censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law
and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary
of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon
which the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban
books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented.
PACU did not show that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the
Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of
schools. The Constitution provides for state control of all educational
institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all
education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline,
civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of
citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the
organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are
offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the power of control and
regulation by the State over all schools.
6. Mariano Jr v COMELEC 242 SCRA 211
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/mar1995/gr_118577_1995.
html
FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig
suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854
(“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). Another
petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was
5
also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned
citizen.
ISSUES:
1.Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of
the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical
descriptions
2.Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with
Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new corporate
existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more
than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution
3.Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special
law
HELD/RULING:
1.Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be
converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of
Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the
present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan
Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast
by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of
Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of
Manila.
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously
covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the
requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the
establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the
territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig
over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming a
sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators
felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.
1.Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective
officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials
of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions
until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected
officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices:
Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The
appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise
continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.
6
Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
provide the following:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the
premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events.
Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners
is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue.
1.Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that
the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty
members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment
of the law.
Judicial Department (Article VIII)
7. Macasiano v. NHA, 224 SCRA 211
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28
and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his locus standi on his
being a consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation for Removal
of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain
(executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the
Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first, he
alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening
controversy that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding
demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to
continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and
faithfully carried out in the past."
As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed."
On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He
maintains that, the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with
the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving
7
the constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual case or
controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the
petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the
proper party to question the Act as he does not state that he has property
"being squatted upon" and that there is no showing that the question of
constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that Sections 28
and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing
HELD:
It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of
an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that,
question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is
necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality
must be very lis mota presented.
To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper
property, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity,
and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
decision of the case.
A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. It is
easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental
requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner
does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the
petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a
consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the
assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the
said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the
"right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants.
"Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs
against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
8. Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 586
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/aug1993/gr_96541_1993.html
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a
Consignment Agreement with Christie’s of New York, selling 82 Old
Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of
the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Prior to the auction sale,
COA questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was already opposition
to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds
of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an
agreement with Christie’s of New York for the sale of the artworks
RULING:
On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise
judicial review
8
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity
of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless
there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that
the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual
case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most
important are the first two (2) requisites.
Standing of Petitioners
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an
action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which
provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of
the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs.
The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be
personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayer’s Suit:
some third and related party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions
to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to
procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right
recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of
a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply
concerned with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic
wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive
Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the
artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art.
XIV, Sections 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The
Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the
preservation and disposition of national and important cultural properties.
Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and
silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the
people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that
with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have
been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law in
violation of the Constitution.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law.
They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons
from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to
9
promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was former First
Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On
this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation
or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given
the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed
on exhibit.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were
given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign
countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to
them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary
government, these paintings and silverware were taken from Malacañang and
the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank
Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration
however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these
paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying
with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just
compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government,
any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent
disposition must be raised only by the proper parties — the true owners
thereof — whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights
which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show
that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have
become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right
whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned
citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, this Court laid down the rule that a writ of
mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be
enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocally set forth in
the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of
a positive duty required of respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution.
What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally
infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and
appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is
unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.
When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action
filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done
by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental
acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory
that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose
of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously,
petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but
the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note
that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired
from
Actual private
Controversysources and not with public money.
10
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case
of controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion
of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not
be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations
not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic
when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the
purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials
from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date — 11
January 1991 — which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have
become moot and academic.
At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public
interest is involved. We find however that there is no such justification in the
petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.
9. Legaspi v. Civil Serv. Commission
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/may1987/gr_l_72119_1987.html
FACTS:
a.
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of
public concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted
by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil
b.
service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that
he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the
information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said
information.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to give due
course to this Petition. He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the
ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of
the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He
calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual
interest in securing this particular information. He further argues that there is
no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner
with the information he seeks.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is obliged to produce the
information regarding the eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City?
Whether or not the petitioner has a standing to assert the right to
information?
11
RULING:
a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having
custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does
not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case
of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that
the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the
guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As
aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to
marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law
Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of
access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the
courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of
Mandamus.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern
there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public
interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the
courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of
interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
b. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of
eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service
Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are
not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names
of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and
licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public.
Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable.
And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be
civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify
their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern,
and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the
register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person
occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its
register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the
civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said
position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
10. Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 403
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1980/jan1980/gr_52245_1980.html
FACTS:
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already
retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits
therefrom.
12
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that
retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office.
Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of
the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr.
These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan
are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52
regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the
campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from
running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere
filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action?
HELD:
No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should
have never been merged. Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They have
separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d
be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed
in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of
an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised
at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional
question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes
may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them
and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office
as null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65
years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require
that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they
assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable
classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy
of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our
political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more
than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be
retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a
good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has
retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired,
as provided for in the challenged provision.
13
11. Bugnay Const. & Development Corp. v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 prohibit and restrain the implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by
the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in
FACTS: connection with the on-line lottery system, also know as lotto.

1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on
executed for the use of a city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area. the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said
Subsequently, the City filed a case to rescind the contract due to the failure of contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P.
P&M to comply with the lease contract conditions. Blg. 42.

2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the lease of said lot to the Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the
petitioner Bugnay Construction for the establishment of a Magsaysay Market Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and
building. As a result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial
City assailing the validity of the lease contract between the petitioner and the reviews; and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit.
city. Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case.
ISSUES:
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the
Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest? instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.
HELD: HELD:
As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural
NO. technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted
the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of
The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations
no disbursement of public funds involved in this case since it is the to initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of
petitioner, a private party which will fund the planned construction of the laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or
market building. instrumentalities.

12. Kilosbayan v. Guingona Jr., 232 SCRA 110
FACTS:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for
a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the
contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an
independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or
designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be
gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus homini est anima
scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
14

Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease
is hereby declared contrary to law and invalid.
JUDICIAL
13. ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C.
NOGRALES
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as
concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House
Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of
Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or
Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of
Congress.” Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would
warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII,
which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.
The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from
the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate
of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the
Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.”
Issue:
Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the
HR1109.
Held:
No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent
Assembly and adopt some Rules for proposing changes to the charter. The
House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval
and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent
Resolution convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners
have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act
complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of
Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing
amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet
transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposal has
yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of
discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a
quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet
performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.
Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury.
The petitions were dismissed.
14. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMELEC
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the
League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and
Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws
and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
FACTS:
Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for
violating Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Respondents filed a
petition for reconsideration which was denied by the Honorable Court. A
15
second motion for reconsideration was also denied until on the 18th of
November 2008, the judgement became final and executory.
The Court then on the 19th of December 2009, unprecedentedly reversed its
decision upholding the constitutionally of the Cityhood Laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court could reverse the decision it already rendered.
RULING:
Yes, The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an
unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional
law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law,
prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter
of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or
modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional
law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the
Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of
the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the
payment of salaries and supplies by the “new cities” or their issuance of
licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and
effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they
remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these
unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play
to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the
Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of their unconstitutionality.
15. Venancio Inonog vs. Judge Francisco Ibay
FACTS
The administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Venancio P. Inonog, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
135, Makati City with gross abuse of authority. The complaint involved an
incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for which respondent
judge cited complainant in contempt of court because complainant parked his
superior's vehicle at the parking space reserved for respondent judge.
Respondent judge blamed the usurpation of the said parking space for the
delay in the promulgation of the decision in 4 criminal cases scheduled at
8:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005 because the latter had a hard time looking for
another parking space. That same day, respondent judge issued another order,
finding complainant guilty of contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross abuse of authority.
RULING:
YES.The Supreme Court held that power to punish for contempt is inherent
in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well as to
uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the power of
contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as
a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise. Thus,
judges have, time and again, been enjoined to exercise their contempt power
judiciously, sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in view of
utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court,
not for retaliation or vindication. Respondent judge's act of unceremoniously
citing complainant in contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of
the authority vested upon him by law.
16

Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must
exhibit that hallmark of judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. Respondent judge
himself has characterized this incident as a "petty disturbance" and he should
not have allowed himself to be annoyed to a point that he would even waste
valuable court time and resources on a trivial matter.
Respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay was found guilty of grave abuse of
authority. He was ordered to pay a FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00).
16. Biraogo vs. Phils Truth Commission of 2010
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC
has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body
as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less
order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from
such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information
in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the
PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of
the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth
Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested
the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and
argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include the
inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
17
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds
because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of
the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a
quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the
latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question
E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public
offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must
be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as
a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus,
they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their
mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation
of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in
interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the
plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official
action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that
he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
“citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s
assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional
18
issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific
powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to
specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The
amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing
auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will
complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable
cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to
be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited
to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause
enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class
are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate
and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
19
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
17. Atty Romulo Macalintal vs Pres. Electoral Tribunal
Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme
Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s
decision dismissing the former’s petition and declaring the establishment of
the respondent PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art
VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it
violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm
footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the
sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under
par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not PET is constitutional.
Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional
Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas
categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of
the 1987 Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial
power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary.
And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction
bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the
means necessary to carry it into effect.
No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” The
set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the
Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking,
courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered
to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial
power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section
2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the
Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution
Section 3
18. BENGZON V. DRILON
On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme
Court and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the
20
President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for
retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of
the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of
Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the
General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension
that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no
power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither
does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by
her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or
items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an
item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.
Judicial Department.
Sec. 4 (No.19) Limketkai Sons Milling Inc v CA, et al. September 5, 1996
(250SCRA 523)
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/sept1996/118509.htm
FACTS:
(1) Motion of petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc., for reconsideration of
the Court's resolution of March 29, 1996, which set aside the Court' s
December 1, 1995 decision and affirmed in toto the Court of Appeals'
decision dated August 12, 1994.
(2) Petitioner questions the assumption of Chief Justice Narvasa of the
chairmanship of the Third Division and arrogantly rams its idea on how each
Division should be chaired, i.e., the First Division should have been chaired
by Chief Justice Narvasa, the Second Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the
next senior Justice, and the Third Division by Mr. Justice Regalado, the third
in line. We need only to stress that the change in the membership of the three
divisions of the Court was inevitable by reason of Mr. Justice Feliciano's
retirement. Such reorganization is purely an internal matter of the Court to
which petitioner certainly has no business at all.
(3) In this Manifestation, petitioner merely moved for the inhibition of the
Chief Justice on the ground that the Chief Justice previously acted as counsel
for one of the respondents, which allegation the Chief Justice vehemently
denied by saying that the information upon which the petitioner relied "it
utterly without foundation in fact and is nothing but pure speculation or
wistful yearning".
(4) Counsel for the petitioner additionally insinuates that the ponente
employed a "double standard" in deciding the case and professes
bewilderment at the ponente's act of purportedly taking a position in the
ponencia contrary to ponente' s act of purportedly taking a position in the
ponencia contrary to ponente' s standing his book.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be referred to Court En banc.
HELD:
ACCORDINGLY, petitioner's motion for reconsideration and motion to refer
the case to the Court En Banc are hereby DENI ED WITH FINALI TY,
without prejudice to any and all appropriate actions that the Court may take
not only against counsel on record for the petitioner for his irresponsible
remarks, but also against other persons responsible for the reckless publicity
anent this case calculated to maliciously erode the people's faith and
confidence in the integrity of this Court.
xxx
21
Source: http://victormorvis.blogspot.com/2014/11/limketkai-sons-milling-
inc-v-ca.html
**************************************************************
********************
Additional Notes (Portion of the SC Resolution on this case):
In this motion for reconsideration, the Court* is called upon to take a
second hard look on its December 1, 1995 decision reversing and setting
aside respondent Court of Appeals judgment of August 12, 1994 that
dismissed petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling Inc.s complaint for specific
performance and damages against private respondents Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) and National Book Store (NBS). Petitioner Limketkai Sons
Milling, Inc., opposed the motion and filed its Consolidated Comment, to
which private respondent NBS filed a Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed its
Manifestation and Motion for the voluntary inhibition of Chief Justice
Andres R. Narvasa from taking part in any subsequent deliberations in this
case. The Honorable Chief Justice declined. The Court is swayed to
reconsider.
Nos. 19-23 to Sec. 4 (No. 19)
19. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS, City of Iloilo
represented by Mayor Jerry P. Trenas and as tax payer, et al.,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, et al., petitioners-in-intervention.
G.R. Nos.: 176951, 177499, 178056, December 21, 2009
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/apr2011/gr_176951_2011.html
The Facts: During the 11th Congress (June 1998 to June 2001), Congress
enacted into law 33 bills (out of 57 bills) converting 33 municipalities into
cities. On the 12th Congress, it enacted into law Republic Act No.
9009,which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of
the Local Government Code (LGC) by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to
P100 million. The Cityhood Laws directed the COMELEC to hold
plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of the 16 laws and seek to enjoin the
COMELEC from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws. By
decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, agreed
with the petitioners and nullified the 16 cityhood laws, deviating as they do
from the uniform and non-discriminatory income criterion prescribed by the
LGC of 1991.
Subsequently, respondent Local Government Units (LGU) moved
for reconsideration. After a circumspect reflection, the Court was disposed to
reconsider.
Issue: Whether the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution (Sec 6 and 10,
Article X) and violate the equal protection clause.
Ruling: The Court stated that it has the power to suspend its own rules when
the ends of justice would be served thereby. A deadlocked vote on
resolutions did not reflect the “majority of the Members” contemplated in
Sec. 4(2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution. As to the equal protection clause
invoked in the original petition, favoring the 16 bills, it was cleared by the
Court that such clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and
acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes if based on
reasonable classification. Classification to be reasonable, must (1) rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be
22
limited to existing conditions only; (4) apply equally to all members of the
same class.
By constitutional design, and as matter of long-established principle,
the power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in
character. But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law,
create, divided, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a
province, city, or municipality. In these cases, the legislative intent of the
Senate was to exempt those pending bills for cityhoodprior to RA 9009 per
Senate Journal on January 29, 2007, p.1240.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court abandoned and set
aside the Decision of November 18, 2008 subject of reconsideration and
declared the cityhood laws valid and constitutional.
20. Inonog vs. Judge Ibay. July 28, 2009
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/RTJ-09-2175.htm
Facts: Complainant alleged that he is the security-driver of the Chief of the
Business Permit Division of Makati City. He parked the vehicle that he
drives for his boss in a numbered vacant parking space at the basement of
the Makati City Hall because the slot where he usually parked was already
occupied. Thereafter, complainant notified his superior that he will not be
reporting for work for the rest of that day because he was not feeling
well. Thus, he left the vehicle in the said basement parking area and went
home to Tanay, Rizal. Later that morning, complainant received a call from
his brother, also an employee of the City Government of Makati, informing
him that he should appear before the sala of respondent judge at 10:30 a.m.
to explain/show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court for
parking his vehicle at the space reserved for respondent judge. He was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00). A warrant for his arrest was also issued.
Issue: Whether a Judge can charge Contempt of Court over a parking space.
Ruling: Contempt of court has been defined as a defiance of the authority,
justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority
and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation (Halili vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 57). Under the Rules of Court, contempt is
classified into direct and indirect. Direct contempt, which is summary, is
committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness,
or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so
(Section 1, Rule 71). Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is not committed
in the presence of the court and can be punished only after notice and hearing
(Zarate v. Balderian, 329 SCRA 558).Undoubtedly, Judge Ibay cited the
complainant for indirect contempt of court since the subject incident
transpired not in the courts presence.
In the instant case, there was no defiance of authority on the part of
the complainant when he parked his vehicle at the spot reserved for the
respondent judge. The incident is too flimsy to be a basis of a contempt
proceedings. At most, the act resulted to a minor inconvenience on the part of
the respondent but it was unlikely that it delayed the administration of
justice. Besides, it was not shown that complainant parked his vehicle at the
spot intentionally to show disrespect to Judge Ibay. Respondent Judge Ibay
acted precipitously in citing complainant in contempt of court in a manner
which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than upholding of the courts
honor. Records failed to show that complainant was properly notified of
Judge Ibays order directing the former to appear and explain why he should
not be cited in contempt of court. The hearing was set at 10:30 A.M. or only
about two and a half hours after respondent judge found that his parking
space was occupied. The lack of notice accounts for the complainants failure
23
to appear at the hearing. Verily, complainant was not given a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of his defense. The
power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order
in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The
courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal
because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the
functions they exercise. Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law,
a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark of judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge.
This is not the first time respondent judge was charged with grave abuse of
authority in connection with his misuse of his contempt power. These were
Panaligan v. Ibay, Macrohon v. Ibay, and Nuez v. Ibay. WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay is found
guilty of grave abuse of authority. He is ordered to pay a FINE of Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
21. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010; December 7,
2010
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/december2010/192935.htm
Facts: President Aquino signed E.O. No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) of 2010 dated July 30, 2010. As a mere ad hoc body
formed under the Office of the President, its primary task was to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Issue: Whether or not the PTC is unconstitutional and is violative of the
equal protection clause.
Ruling: The Court declared E.O. No. 1 unconstitutional in view of apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III
of the Constitution. Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. The purpose of which is to secure every person
within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits
a valid classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the
law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of
the same class.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class
of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction.
Wherefore, the petitions were granted. E.O. No. 1 was declared
unconstitutional insofar as it was violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
24
22. Macalintal vs PET. November 23, 2010
Facts: This is an undesignated petition filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal,
that questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as
an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution:
Issue: WHETHER x x x THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS OF THE
SUPREME COURT AS MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A
VIOLATION OF SECTION 12, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.6
Held: A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals
a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein,
although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is
not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any
limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme
Court’s method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the
subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to “promulgate
its rules for the purpose.”
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is
equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). XXX
Petitioner still claims that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power and, thus,
its members violate the proscription in Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which reads: SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and
of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.”
Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of
“dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving
rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable” is
apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution,
judicial power was expanded to include “the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The power was expanded, but
it remained absolute.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes
the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial
power. XXX City, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and
senatorial — exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC
and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which
are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts
of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which
involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit
constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the
COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET,
and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to
judicial review — via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party — if
there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. XXX
The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the
task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full
25
authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative
of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided
in the Constitution.
23. Bengzon vs. Drilon. April 15, 1992
FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the
Supreme Court and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed
by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for
appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided
for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court,
and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional
Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the
General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension
that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no
power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither
does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by
her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or
items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an
item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.
NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed
Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto
power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the
President to communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30
days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of
releasing veto messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also
avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force.
When is it allowed?
The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution
which grants the President power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the
item or items to which he does not object.
XXX.
Judicial Department
Section 5
24. DRILON vs LIM 235 SCRA 135
Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187of
the Local Government Code. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of
four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila
Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to
law and public policy. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and
sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional
because it vest on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation
of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constituion. The Secretary
argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinance as specified in the Local
Government Code had indeed not been observed.
26
Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of Sec 187 of the LGC
HELD: Yes. BP 129 vests in the RTC jurisdiction over all civil cases in
which the subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts
in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. In the exercise
of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the
utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a
declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no
less than on the doctrine of separation of powers.
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with
the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on
the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the
executive and legislative depart ments and determined by them to
be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality
can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an
infraction of the Constitution.
Issue: WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional
Held: Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if
warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters
or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute
his own judgment for the judgment of the local government
that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue
Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should
be. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the
said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions
in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code.
As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. An
officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re
done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision
does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have
the discretion to modify or replace them.
Judicial Department
Section 5
25. Larranaga vs CA G.R. No. 130644 March 13, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and
was detained without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of
arrest. Petitioner, represented by his mother, Margarita G. Larranaga, filed
with this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs
of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.
27
 Petitioner alleged that he was denied the right to preliminary
investigation and sought to annul the informations as well as the warrant of
arrest issued in consequence thereof. In the alternative, petitioner prayed that
a preliminary investigation be conducted and that he be released from
detention pending the investigation. Petitioner filed a supplemental petition
for habeas corpus or bail.
On October 20, 1997, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and
motion in lieu of comment submitting that petitioner should have been given
a regular preliminary investigation before the filing of the informations and
the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The Solicitor General recommended
that petitioner be accorded his right to preliminary investigation and that he
be released from detention during the pendency thereof.
On October 27, 1997, we issued a resolution holding that petitioner was
deprived of his right to preliminary investigation when the City Prosecutor of
Cebu insisted that he was only entitled to an inquest investigation. Ordering
among other things the immediate release of petitioner pending his
preliminary investigation.
On October 30, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC of Cebu an
urgent ex parte motion praying for his immediate release pursuant to our
October 27 resolution.
The following day, Judge Martin A. Ocampo, Presiding Judge of RTC
Branch 7, Cebu City, issued an order deferring the resolution of petitioner’s
motion. It stated that it would be premature to act on the motion since the
trial court has not yet received an official copy of our October 27 resolution
and that said resolution has not yet attained finality. Furthermore, Judge
Ocampo called the Courts attention to the fact that petitioner has been
arraigned on October 14, 1997 and waived his right to preliminary
investigation.
Issues: 1.Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular
preliminary investigation.
2. WON petitioner should be released from detention pending
investigation.
Held:1.Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been
arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is that the righ t to
preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it
before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case,
has been actively demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before
he was charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during the
arraignment because there was a pending case in this Court regarding his
right to avail a regular preliminary investigation.
Clearly, the acts of the petitioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a
waiver. Preliminary Investigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot
be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed.
2. NO. The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against
a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least
deny him the right to be released because of such defect. The original
warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the
RTC lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue
of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the
other accuses in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to
be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Judicial Department
Section 5
28
26. First Lepanto Ceramics Inc vs CA 237 SCRA 519
Facts: Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art.
82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the
jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies
such as the Board of Investments (BOI).
BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend
its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered
product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed
a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-
Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal
therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a
petition for review with CA.
CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO
lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without
respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have
jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the
Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987.
Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129
and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of
Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and
Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to
respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs
contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from
decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.
While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been
between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for
appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court,
which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O.
226 was enacted.
Issue: WON the Court is correct in sustaining the appellate jurisdiction of
the CA in decisions from the Board of Investments.
Held: Yes. The SC, pursuant to its Constitutional power under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation
of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to
the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax
Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions
and confusing rules of procedure. Contrary to petitioner's contention,
although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force
and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by
Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right which, under the
Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the
exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it seems.
Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of
appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it
also provided where and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These
latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the
power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.
29
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of
the BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of
enforcing the substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words,
the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226
remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the
venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of
Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from
notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to appeal.
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial
agencies found in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not
mean that said circular does not apply to appeals from final orders or
decision of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly
states that "(T)hey shall also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions
of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute
to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute.
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O.
226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from
decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI,
which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the
Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
Judicial Departent
Section 5
27. ARUELO vs CA
Facts: Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 11, 1992
elections for the office of the Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas,
Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won over Aruelo. Aruelo filed with the
(COMELEC) a petition seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the
ground of "fraudulent alteration and tampering" of votes in the tally sheets
and the election returns.
On June 2, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17,
Malolos, Bulacan, a petition protesting the same election. He, however,
informed the trial court of the pendency of the pre-proclamation case before
the COMELEC.
On June 10, 1992, Gatchalian was served an Amended Summons from the
trial court, giving him five days within which to answer the petition. Instead
of submitting his answer, Gatchalian filed a Motion to Dismiss.
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
gives the respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within
which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this
five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to
him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is
prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of
the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his
answer.
Issue: WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file
his pleading beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13,
Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Held: No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court,
whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
30

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not
applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated
by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing
of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings
brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all
actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI
shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by
courts of general or limited jurisdiction.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not
allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular
courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the
filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate
rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested
on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
Section 5
28. JAVELLANA vs. DILG 212 SCRA 2475
Facts: This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a
publicofficial to engage inthe practice of his profession while employed inthe
Government. Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of
Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October 5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C.
Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for:
(1) Violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum
Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No.
6713, otherwise known as the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees,” and (2) Oppression, misconduct and abuse
of authority.
Divinagracia’s complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent
member of the City Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a
lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law
without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director,
Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of
the same department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio
Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C.
Divinagracia of Bago City for “Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with
Damages” putting him in public ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as
counsel in several criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior authority
of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 80-38.
A formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo City in which
the complainant, Engineer Divinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor
Javellana, presented their respective evidence. Meanwhile, on September 10,
1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his practice of
law for the reasons stated in his letter-request.
On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth guidelines for the practice of
professions by local elective officials. In an order dated May 2, 1991,
31
Javellana’s motion to dismiss was denied by the public respondents. His Held:No. Petitioner’s contention that Section 90 of the Local Government
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article
VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the
Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court’s power and
Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Section 90 of which provides: authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government
Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
those instances where the law allows it. S
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against
sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not: lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the
professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90explicitly provides that
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any
government unit or any office, agency, or occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." If there are
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee
of the national or local government is professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office; affect, the area of public service
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings
involving the local government unit of which
he is an official; and Judicial Department
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the Section 5
sanggunian member concerned is defending
the interest of the Government. 29. RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF
THE GSIS FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.
Issue: WON DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are A.M. No. 08-2-01-0 February 11, 2010
unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive
authority to regulate the practice of law FACTS: The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed
on GOCCs under Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the ROC. The said
provision states:

32
 SEC. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees
provided in this Rule. Local government corporations and government-
owned or controlled corporations with or without independent
charter are not exempt from paying such fees. xx
The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS
Act of 1997):
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial solvency
of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times
and that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act
shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members
of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to
impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution
rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly,
notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues
including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all
taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions
shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment
against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.
Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or
jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are
hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without
legal force and effect. Xx
Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition, the OSG maintains that the
petition should be denied. On this Court’s order, the Office of the Chief
Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation on the petition of
the GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the
claim of the GSIS for exemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal
basis.
ISSUE: WON the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by
the Court on GOCCs and LGUs
HELD: NO. The petition of the GSIS for recognition of its exemption from
the payment of legal fees imposed under Sec 22 of Rule 141 of the ROC on
GOCCs and LGUs was denied. Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the ROC was
promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers under
Sec 5(5), Art VIII of the Constitution:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged.
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the ROC is
an integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its
rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution.
In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a
jurisdictional requirement. Since the payment of legal fees is a vital
component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by
Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.
33
Judicial Department
Section 6
30 Maceda v Vasquez 221 SCRA 464
Facts:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda.
Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate
of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and
decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner
Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal
cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that
petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue:
Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all
inferior courts
Held:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the
SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court
with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and
court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge
or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
- In the absence of any administrative action taken against a person by the
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
- Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to the Court for determination whether said
Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative
duties.
34
Section 6
31 Raquiza v Judge Castaneda, Jr. 81 SCRA 235
Facts:
Petition to order the transfer of Special Proceedings No. 6824 of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga (Testate Estate of the late Don Alfonso Castellvi)
from the sala of respondent judge, Hon. Mariano Castañeda to another
branch and administrative complaint against the same judge for "(1) violation
of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) rendering decision knowing it to be unjust and
illegal (3) extortion by means of oppression; and (4) bribery.
After respondent judge had filed his comment on said petition and
administrative complaint, the Court resolved on August 3, 1976 to refer the
administrative complaint to Justice Jose G. Bautista of the Court of Appeals
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge should be disciplined for grave
misconduct or any graver offense.
Held:
The rules even in an administrative case demands that if the respondent
Judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the
evidence presented against him should be competent and derived from direct
knowledge. The judiciary, to which respondent belongs, no less demands that
before its member could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation
and based on competent proofs, no less. This is all the more so when as in
this case the charges are penal in nature.
The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charge on which the removal is
sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc.
The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials
apply.
Parenthetically, under Count I and II, 'misconduct' also implies a wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment'. It results that even if respondent
were not collect in his legal conclusions, his judicial actuations cannot be
regarded as grave misconduct, unless the contrary sufficiently appears. And
undersigned finds, as above discussed, that complainant's evidence is
wanting in this respect.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the charges against the
respondent be dismissed for lack of merit.
Section 10
32 Nitafan v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 152 SCRA 284
Facts:
The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management
and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from
salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the
judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December
1987.
Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over
Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial
Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
35
salaries. With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the
issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter
administratively.
Issue:
Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.
Held:
NO.
Intent to delete express grant of exemption of income taxes to members of
Judiciary
The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income
tax applied to all taxpayers. This intent was somehow and inadvertently not
clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and ratified
in February 1987. Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure
to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any
public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment
of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the
deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the
Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the
Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the
ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David.
The 1973 Constitution has provided that “no salary or any form of
emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional
officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax (Section 6, Article
XV)” which was not present in the 1987 Constitution. The deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII (The
salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased), negate the
contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of
“non-diminution” of salaries of judicial officers.
Equality of branches of government effected by modifications in provision
The term “diminished” be changed to “decreased” and that the words “nor
subjected to income tax” be deleted so as to give substance to equality among
the three branches in the government. A period (.) after “decreased” was
made on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax. With
the period, the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David is
understood not to applyanymore. Justices and judges are not only the citizens
whose income have been reduced in accepting service in government and yet
subjected to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet membersand all other
employees.
Constitutional construction adopts the intent of the framers and people
adopting the law. The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that
the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers. In the case at bar, Section 10, Article
VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing
another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be
higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if
lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It
would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption
from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
36
Section 11
33 De La Llana v Alba 112 SCRA 294
Facts:
In 1981, BP 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds therefore and for Other Purposes", was passed. De la Llana was
assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that
would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such
law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the
security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can
remove judges NOT Congress.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature
by such statute (BP 129).
Held:
The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered "to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members,
order their dismissal." Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges.
Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue
of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is
an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment
of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of
inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no
distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the
judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it
would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this
Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No
fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of
law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its
say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments.
Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter
has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains
in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no
departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather
what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of
reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded.
The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even
one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the
basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would
save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred.”
37
Section 11
34 People v Judge Gacott, Jr. 246 SCRA 52
Facts:
For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent
RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by
the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a
fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made
by the Second Division of the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to
administratively discipline respondent judge.
Held:
To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a
conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission of which Regalado was also a member.
The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly
shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first
clause which states that “the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts,” is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary
power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by,
the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative
disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it
would result in an absurdity.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein
and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the
other hand that the Court en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted therein.” In this instance, the administrative case
must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power
to the Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to
be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary,
disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period
of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all
administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or
imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the
adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since
even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the
Court en banc.
Section 12
34 In Re: Manzano
Facts:
As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government.
Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the
solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly
society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice,
RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the
landable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may
be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
38
 Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by
Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte
provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He
petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount
to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX,
RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.
Issue:
What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as
administrative functions are concerned?
Held:
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members
of the Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative
functions (Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain
from participating in the work of any Administrative Agency which
adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its
jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct & affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence. “Administrative functions” as used in Sec. 12
refers to the Government’s executive machinery and its performance of
governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and
orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make
government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision
or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence “we can readily see that membership in the
Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any
quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the
judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration
of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the
speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy
litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members,
and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by
those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function
involved in their implementation.
Judicial (Section 14) No. 36
Nicos Industrial Corporation v CA
GR No. 88709 February 11, 1992
FACTS:
(1) The order is assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it
violates the aforementioned constitutional requirement of Article 8 Section
14 of the
Constitution. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision an
39
d does not clearly and RATIO:
distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. Petitioners co
(1) The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and
mplain that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their
violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the
21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement that
Constitution.
the sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative
suit. There was therefore no adequate factual or legal basis for the decision (2) It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation b
that could justify its review and affirmance by the Court of Appeals. e informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and
legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply
(2) January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of
say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at
P2,000,000.00 from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and to
that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party
secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of
is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if
land located at Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the
permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed.
supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held on July 11,
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for
law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it
the auction was
was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who
changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor.
is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review
(3) CA decision: We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the by a higher tribunal.
court a quo while leaving much to be desired, substantially complies with the
(3) Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be
rules.
substituted for substance. As the ruling on this second ground was
ISSUE: unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the failure to state the factual and
legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.
Whether or not the trial court’s decision is unconstitutional
Judicial (Section 14) No. 37
HELD:
KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.) INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis. This case is G.R. No. 127682 April 24, 1998
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10,
FACTS:
for revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6, 1986,
conformably to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Before the Court is pleading filed on March 4, 1998 in behalf of
Constitution, subject to the appeal thereof, if desired, in accordance with petitioner and denominated as a Motion for Leave to file Incorporated
law. Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of September 10,

40
1997. This resolution does not in the least depart from or enervate the
specific prohibition against second motions for reconsideration[1] Which are
applicable thereto. Considering however, the increasing practice by defeated
parties of conjuring scenarios which they blame for their debacle instead of
admitting the lack of merit in their cases, the Court is constrained to once
again express its displeasure against such unethical disregard of the canons
for responsible advocacy, with the warning that this insidious pattern of
professional misconduct shall not hereafter be allowed to pass with impunity.
Indeed, petitioner has gone to the extent of attributing supposed errors
and irregularities in the disposition of this case to both the Court of Appeals
and this Court, with particular allusions amounting to misconduct on the part
of counsel for respondent private corporation and with specific imputations
against retired Justice Teodoro Padilla in connection therewith. These will
hereafter be discussed in light of the records of this Court and the vigorous
disclaimer of counsel for said private respondent
Issue:
whether or not issuance of Minute Resolutions is valid under
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
Held:
“Resolutions” are not “decisions” within the above constitutional
requirements; they merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained. And the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need
to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law
are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ decision.
The constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases “submitted
for decision,” i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or
memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due
course, with the resolution therefor stating the legal basis thereof. Thus,
when the Supreme Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent
pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the
questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent
court’s decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.
Judicial (Section 14) No. 38
PRUDENTIAL BANK V CASTRO 158 SCRA 604
Facts:
Acting on the letter-appeal, dated June 6, 1988, filed on behalf of respondent
Judge by his children, seeking clarification of the Decision of June 5, 1986,
on whether or not the Order of this Court forfeiting all of said Judge's
retirement benefits and pay "exclude the monetary value of his accumulated
leave credits which he earned during his thirty six (36) years of service in the
government, the last eleven (11) years of which were spent in the Judiciary,"
and praying that the same be so excluded considering their need for funds for
the continuing medication of respondent Judge, now afflicted with liver
cancer on its terminal stage, the Court RESOLVED, out of humanitarian
considerations, and following the precedent in Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd.
vs. Hon. Romillo, Jr., 143 SCRA 396 [1986]),
Issue:
Whether or not the said Judge is entitled for all retirement benefits
Held:
Respondent Judge is hereby ordered dismissed from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay and with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
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instrumentalities. He may, however, enjoy all vacation and sick leave
benefits that he has earned during the period of his government service. This
decision is immediately executory.
Judicial (Section 14) No. 39
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. CA
G.R. No. 114323 July 23, 1998
Facts:
The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the
Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The present
conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent has its roots in a
contract entered into by and between both parties on February 26, 1983
whereby the private respondent undertook to supply the petitioner FOUR
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement
RTC ruled that the arbitration proceedings was null and void because
the submission of the dispute to the arbitrator was a mistake of law or fact
amounting to want of jurisdiction. It then concluded that petitioner acquired
no enforceable right under the foreign courts judgment because of the invalid
adoption of the arbitrators award.[7] On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial courts ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the
dispute and that the full text of the foreign courts judgment did not contain
any findings of facts and law but merely a simplistic decision containing
literally, only the dispositive portion[8] in contravention of the
Constitution.[9] The appellate court ruled further that the dismissal of the
private respondents objections for non-payment of the required legal fees,
without the foreign court first replying to the private respondents query as to
the amount of legal fees to be paid, constituted want of notice or violation of
due process. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the arbitration
proceeding was defective because the arbitrator was appointed solely by the
petitioner, and the fact that the arbitrator was a former employee of the latter
gives rise to a presumed bias on his part in favor of the petitioner.[10]
Issue:
whether or not Memorandum Decisions are violative of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution
Held:
No. The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of “memorandum
decisions” which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of
law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
Even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if
only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower
courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is
particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and
thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at.
Judicial (Section 14) No. 40
Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc vs Tan Tiong Bio,
GR 186652, October 6, 2010
Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials including
its Corporate Secretary, herein respondent. Petitioner denies the allegations.
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The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the
Secretary of Justice, motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there
was no showing of any reversible error.
The CA set aside the DOJ Secretary’s resolution holding that it committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondent’s
petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts
on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution (No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based).
Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that the
requirement in Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions
of “courts of justice”, and it does not extend to decisions or rulings of
executive departments such as the DOJ.
Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to
courts as it extends to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to
preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals.
Issue:
1. Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power.
2. Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
1. No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rule-making powers.
A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, but is
merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor does not determine the guilt of
innocence of the accused. While the prosecutor makes the determination
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause,
he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused.
2. No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or
resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-
judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Sec 14,
Art. VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by
the DOJ Secretary.
Judicial (Section 16) Case no. 41
Valdez vs CA
Facts:
A complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio and Venida
Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella.Without an
y color of title whatsoever occupied
the said lot.The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a
decision in favor of the
petitioners, ordering private respondents to vacate the propertyThe Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. It held that
petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because
they failed to show that they had given the private respondents the right to
occupy the premises
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
CLEARLY MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
43
Held:
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the
cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer.If the entry is
illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible ent
ry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illega
l, the case is unlawful detainer.The jurisdictional facts must appear on the fac
e of the complaint. The
evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the
inception. Cleary,
defendant’s entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without
the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as
possession by stealth which is forcible entry An examination of the complain
t reveals that key jurisdictional allegations
that will support an action for ejectment are lacking.

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