Introduction

The Concept of Sunna and

Its Status in Islamic Law
Adis Duderija*

The concept of sunna, as one of the two normative fountainheads of the

Islamic tradition, is of fundamental importance in understanding nearly
all the branches of Islamic knowledge, including Islamic law and politics.
It is, however, a contested concept that—like the Qur’an—has been used
by many Muslim groups throughout history to both discredit the views of
their opponents as being misguided (or even heretical) and bolster their
own credentials as followers of the “true” Islamic teachings.1
The purpose of this book is to equip readers with a better understand-
ing of the nature and scope of the concept of sunna, in both premodern
and modern Islamic discussions on the topic. In this context, the discus-
sion often focuses on the conceptual, epistemological, and hermeneutical
relationship between the concepts of Sunna and a sound (aīh) adīth,
which was considered by many classical schools of thought (madhāhib)—as
documented in this volume—as the Sunna’s only vehicle of embodiment
and transmission, thereby conceptually conflating the two concepts. Some
scholarship exists, however, that points to the fact that during the formative
period, this conceptual conflation of sunna and adīth did not exist.2
Although a number of authors have examined the concept of sunna from
various perspectives during the formative period of Islamic thought,3 none
of these studies, outside the context of the Mālikī school of thought,4 have
systematically explored the issue of the exact nature and scope of the con-
cept of sunna, its evolution, and its role in authenticating adīth. What this
book proposes to do is exactly that.

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 2 Adis Duderija

As evident in its massive exegetical corpus, the Qurʾān, as a text

(muaf ), is in need of elucidation and interpretation. Recognizing this,
Muslim scholars developed a theory regarding the hermeneutic and exe-
getical necessity of sunna at an early date.5 During the first three centu-
ries Hijri (AH), the concept of sunna seems to have been understood as
a general, unsystematically defined ethico-behavioral practice of the early
Muslim community that had been formulated, preserved, and transmitted
either orally and/or through the practices of the Prophet’s Companions.6
Guraya, who investigated the concept of sunna in the early Mālikī school of
thought, for example, has argued that during this period, sunna was a con-
cept based on “recognized Islamic religious norms and accepted standards
of conduct derived from the religious and ethical principles introduced by
the Prophet.”7 I refer to this concept of sunna as the non-adīth-dependent
concept of sunna.
However, before the end of the first century AH, Muslims began to sys-
tematically document the events surrounding Prophet Muhammad’s life in
the form of traditions known as adīth (aādīth).8 One reason behind the
initiation of this process was to utilize this body of knowledge for the grow-
ing legal, religious, political, and social needs of the ever-expanding Muslim
empire. Another factor was the rise of the Abbasids’ dynasty (132/750)
and their claim to be the legitimate custodians of the Prophet’s sunna,9 the
religious importance of which was increasingly recognized by the Muslim
masses. This situation created an ever-greater impetus for a systematic search
for, and collection of, the events surrounding the life of the Prophet, espe-
cially in its written form of aādīth.10 This entire process of documentation
of the Prophet’s life, over time, in turn, gave rise to the formulation and
consolidation of adīth sciences (ʿulūm al-adīth). These included branches
of knowledge pertaining to the collection, assessment, and evaluation of
aādīth based upon methodological principles and mechanisms designed to
ensure their authenticity. I refer to this broader process as the traditional-
ization of Islamic thought and the “adīthification” of sunna. In a broader
sense, this process refers to those social, political, and jurisprudential mech-
anisms that contributed to the following phenomena throughout the latter
half of the first and the entire second and third centuries AH:

● the continued growth and proliferation of adīth;

● the increasing importance given to adīth at the cost of what I have
termed the non-adīth-dependent concept of sunna that was prevalent
in the first two centuries of Islam as explained above;
● the articulation of non-verbally based aspects11 of sunna into an indi-
vidual, sound (aih) adīth;

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 Introduction 3

● the increased application of adīth to Qurʾān and sunna sciences such

as jurisprudence (fiqh), Qurʾānic exegesis (tafsīr), and legal hermeneu-
tics (uūl al-fiqh);
● the development of hierarchical, legal, hermeneutical models that were
entirely text-based (i.e., based on Qurʾān and adīth) and the margin-
alization of non-text-based epistemological and methodological tools
of sunna (and Qurʾān) such as raʾy (reason-based opinion), ijtihād,
istisān; and
● the idea that Sunna (and the Qurʾān) are conceptually coterminous
with certain ethical values or principles, such as justice or righteous
conduct, including the expression sunna ʿādila that was employed by
Muslims in the second century AH.12

By “adīthification” of sunna, I refer to the idea that the written adīth-

based body of knowledge became sunna’s only vehicle of transmission/embodi-
ment leading to adīth-dependent methodology of derivation of sunna.13
At the beginning of the second century AH, there was a rapid increase
in the number of adīth collections, in different formats. These emerging
collections were considered by some sections of the Muslim community to
be a truer reflection of the Prophet’s legacy (sunna) than the epistemologi-
cally and methodologically adīth-independent concept of sunna that was
held by other groups. By the second half of the second century AH, the
former became known as the ahl al-adīth and the latter as ahl al-raʾy.14 The
ahl al-adīth considered adīth to be the sole and complete depository of
Sunna and the only vehicle of its perpetuation. This adīth-based approach
to sunna came into conflict with how the ahl al-raʾy conceptualized sunna
and the role of raʾy in interpreting the Islamic tradition.15 The ahl al-adīth
insisted that all law had to be traced back to the Qurʾānic text and adīth-
based sunna, and that raʾy was either an illegitimate methodological tool
for the derivation of law16 or that its use had to be constrained to those
cases in which Qurʾān and adīth texts offered no help at all.17 According
to Melchert, ahl al-adīth considered the Qurʾān and aih al-adīth as the
only religiously legitimate basis of Islamic law, ethics, and theology. The
ahl al-adīth preferred to rely on weak traditions, aʿīf al-adīth over prin-
ciples generally deduced from the Qurʾān or through analogical reasoning
(qiyās).18 According to the ahl al-adīth, jurisprudence should be based on
adīth. As such, the ahl al-adīth dealt with juridical problems by refer-
ring exclusively to and reciting relevant adīth reports. In ninth-century
Baghdad, the ahl al-adīth group was associated with the followers of the
eponym of the anbalī madhhab Amad Ibn anbal (d. 241/855). By con-
trast, the ahl al-raʾy, called “semi-rationalists” by Melchert, considered fiqh

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 4 Adis Duderija

as a separate field from adīth sciences. This school of jurisprudence was pri-
marily associated with the emerging Mālikī and Shāfiʿī schools of thought of
the second and third century AH.19 The two designations ahl al-raʾy and ahl
al-adīth can thus be considered to have “[o]riginally referred to branches
of legists occupied with the investigation of Islamic law: the former were
concerned with the study of transmitted sources (i.e. adīth) and the latter
with the practical aspects of the law.”20
As the influence of adīth-based concept of sunna gained more credence
in the second and third centuries AH, the ahl al-raʾy, which at this point
had crystallized into several regional and, subsequently, personal schools
of thought (madhāhib),21 took steps to accommodate and award more
legitimacy to the adīth-based concept of sunna in their overall Qurʾān-
sunna hermeneutic. Thus, a process of synchronism and cross-pollination
between the ahl-raʾy, the precursors of the madhāhib, and ahl al-adīth
took place, resulting in the formation of what are today are the four extant
Sunnī madhāhib.22 The anafīs were generally considered closer to the ahl
raʾy legal hermeneutic. The anbalī madhhab is generally regarded as the
successor of the ahl al-adīth approach.23 The Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs stood
in the middle, evolving over time. However, the concept of sunna accord-
ing to the madhāhib was still independent of adīth, both epistemologi-
cally and methodologically. This adīth-independent concept of sunna was
evident, for example, in the writings of the eighth-century Iraqi scholars
such as Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798), who referred to it as al-sunna al-mafūa
al-maʿrūfa, the preserved and well-known sunna, or those of the Medinian
scholar Mālik Ibn Anas (d. 178/ 795) who referred to it primarily as sunna
māiya / ʿamal.24
According to D. Brown, however, the madhāhib “had given assent in
theory to the importance of adīth whilst resisting its thorough applica-
tion,” thus creating a tension between ahl-adīth’s definition of sunna and
“the actual doctrine of the madhhab.” Increasingly, the ahl-adīth move-
ment questioned the systematically constructed Qurʾān-sunna hermeneuti-
cal doctrine of the madhāhib as not being based on “true” sunna.25 This
opened the doors for the argument of iyāʾ al-sunna—the revivification
of, and the return to, “true” prophetic sunna. This revival of the “true”
sunna was to be achieved by insisting that only the adherence to the body
of “authentic adīth,” as defined by ahl al-adīth, constitutes iyāʾ al-sunna.
Thus, the main purpose behind the call for iyāʾ al-Sunna was to under-
mine the madhhab-based approach to conceptualizing and interpreting the
Islamic tradition, especially their concept of the nature and the scope of the
concept of sunna.26
There has always been tension between, on the one hand, the episte-
mologically and methodologically adīth-dependent concept of sunna of the

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 Introduction 5

adīth specialists following the ahl al-adīth understanding of sunna (in

addition to some Islamic jurists who subscribed to the same) and, on the
other hand, the Muʿtazila27 and some of the anafī28 and Mālikī29 legal
theoreticians (uūliyyūn) whose understanding of sunna was closer to how
sunna was understood prior to the process of adīthification of sunna and
traditionalization of Islamic thought described above. These differences
in the relative status and the nature of the concepts of sunna and adīth
as sources of legal authority also gave rise to differences among Muslims
as to sunna’s and adīth’s respective hermeneutical relationship with the
Qurʾān. This is especially true with respect to the issue of whether sunna is
to be considered as part of Revelation (way) on par with the Qurʾān. If the
answer to this question were in the affirmative, it would mean that sunna
(and therefore the adīth for the ahl al-adīth,) could be employed as an
independent and self-sufficient source of Islamic law and theology, in addi-
tion to being utilized as a legitimate exegetical and hermeneutical tool.30
While stressing the uniqueness and inimitability of the Qurʾān as
Revelation par excellence, the classical Muslim scholarship, partly as the
result of what I described as the processes of adīthification of sunna and the
traditionalization of Islamic thought, developed a theory of recited (way
matlū) and un-recited revelation (way ghayr matlū) applying the former
to the Qurʾān and the latter to the Sunna/adīth. Ibn azm (d. 456/1064)
describes this theory in a following manner:

The Revelation (way) from God Almighty to His Messenger (s.) comes
in two forms: One of the two is recited (in ritual) revelation (way matlū)
which takes form of the Qurʾān, which is an inimitably organized written
masterpiece. The other form of revelation consists of transmitted sayings, the
reports that originated from God’s Messenger (s.). These sayings do not con-
stitute an inimitably arranged written composition and, although this form
of revelation is read, it is not used in ritual recitation (lā matlū).31

The inherent tension between the traditional doctrine of Qurʾān’s inimi-

tability (iʿjāz) and the theory of two forms of revelation (way) has been
noted by D. Brown as follows:

This antinomy that the Qurʾān is unparalleled but that sunna is nevertheless
equal to it in status was enshrined in the classical formulate which defines
sunna as un-recited revelation (way ghayr matlū) and differentiated it from
recited revelation (way matlū), which is only found in the Qurʾān. The dis-
tinction made here is one of form and not of substance. Sunna is not a differ-
ent mode of revelation but it is used differently and transmitted differently.
This formula maintains the superiority of the Qurʾān in the realm of ritual
and devotion while asserting the equal status of sunna as a source of legal

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 6 Adis Duderija

authority. In the Qurʾān, words and commands are of divine provenance,

in the sunna only the intent of command is trustworthy, for the text itself is
liable to corruption.32

Put succinctly, the majority of jurists adopted the view33 that “[t]he
sunna rules over the Qurʾān (qāiya ʿalā al-kitāb) and the Qurʾān does not
rule over the sunna”,34 or that the Book [ Qurʾān] [often] takes form in
general sentences whose preciseness the adīth specifies (yakshifuhā ) and
with succinctness (wa-ʾkhtiār) whose details are indicated (tadullu) by the
sunna (i.e. al-kitāb Qurʾān [] yaʾtī bi-l-jumal yakshifuhā al-adīth wa-ʾkhtiār
tadullu ʿalayhī al-Sunna),35 thereby conferring onto sunna36 / adīth37 a qua-
si-status of revelation which can elaborate on, specify (takhī)38 or as held
by some scholars even abrogate the Qurʾānic text.39 As a corollary, Sunna/
adīth, as demonstrated in this volume, became recognized as a legitimately
hermeneutical tool to be employed in Qurʾānic hermeneutics and Islamic
legal theory, in the form of either adīth saih (as in case of mainstream clas-
sical Islam) or in the form of sunna mutawātira/ sunna ʿamaliyya (as in case
of the Muʿtazila and some anafī and Mālikī uūliyyūn), and as an indepen-
dent source of Islamic law and less so theology.
This book revisits and aims to shed more light on these debates, espe-
cially how they played themselves out in the pre-modern Islamic legal tradi-
tions. Moreover, in order to contextualize the discussion in broader terms
this volume examines the concept of sunna in early historical works in gen-
eral and those pertaining to the life of the Propthet (sīra) in particular, the
canonical Sunnī adīth literature and the short lived gender known as the
principles of sunna (uūl al-sunna). To demonstrate the continued signifi-
cance and various continuities and discontinuities between the pre-modern
and the modern discussions on the topic, the final chapter includes the
views of some of the most prominent modern scholars who have developed
some innovative arguments and ideas regarding the question of the relative
status of the sunna and adīth as sources of legal authority vis-à-vis the
Qurʾān and their normative role in Qurʾānic interpretation.
Although the book, which for a number of reasons had a difficult birth,
was unable to encompass all of the major Sunnī and Shīʿī schools of jurispru-
dence as it originally had intended, it is hoped that the presented material will
stimulate further academic studies on this important topic in the future.

Chapter Outlines

In the first chapter Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort offers a detailed com-
parative analysis of the meaning and the nature of the concept of sunna in

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 Introduction 7

historical and sīra works that cover the first three centuries of Islam. Among
the most important and interesting findings of the study is the fact that
eight different kinds of sunna existed; that half of the terms referring to the
sunna of the Prophet appear in combination with the Qurʾān in the phrase
“the book of God and the practice of His Prophet”; and finally, that the lat-
est sources contain the most variances of the concept of sunna.
Ahmet Temel investigates the conceptual development of the term
uūl al-sunna, especially the manner in which it was employed by the ahl
al-adīth. Temel argues that the followers of the ahl al-adīth attempted
to monopolize the term sunna as it was employed in the concept of uūl
al-sunna in order to delineate what they considered to be the boundaries of
orthodoxy and orthopraxy of Islam. The term uūl al-sunna was employed
to refer to the agreed upon tenets among ahl al-adīth, mostly in the field of
theology. As a name of a short-lived genre, Temel concludes, uūl al-sunna
was considered as a genuine alternative to the scientific study of kalām by
the followers of ahl al-adīth.
Usman Ghani’s (full name is needed) chapter focuses on the concept of
sunna in Muʿtazilite thought and its development from the formative to the
classical period. Ghani demonstrates how the nature of the discussions of
the concept of Sunna in Muʿtazilite thought were primarily in relation to
the question of the role of reason in authenticating the content of adīth
in contrast to those of the traditionalists that focused on the isnād. Hence,
the discussions on Sunna took place primarily in relation to the meaning
of terms such as mutawātir and khabar al-wāid and their respective pro-
bity power in authenticating the adīth. Ghani concludes that it is difficult
to talk about a singular approach to and understanding of the concept of
sunna in Muʿtazilite thought, since significant shift in thinking about the
concept occurred from the formative to the classical period due to the fact
that most Muʿtazilite theologians became affiliated with a major school of
law and had to adjust their views accordingly.
Aisha Musa’s chapter shows how Sunnī adīth literature developed in
the service of fiqh and the ways in which that literature solidified both
what Musa terms the “Sunnīfication of adīth” and the “adīthification
of sunna.” Methodologically, the employment of the concept of sunna is
analyzed at two levels: the structure, organization, and content, and the
appearance of the term in the titles of adīth collections themselves. Musa
demonstrates how the various features of the Sunnī adīth adīth literature
including the size and scope of collections, the specific reports the compil-
ers include, the subject headings under which reports are placed, and the
arrangement of sections and subsections are clearly indicative of the process
of adīthification of both sunna and knowledge and the primacy of the
Prophet Muhammad as the originator of sunna. Importantly, Musa also

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 8 Adis Duderija

shows that a preliminary and non-exhaustive analysis of the occurrence of

the term sunna and its related verbs in the texts (mutūn) of individual adīth
reports often conflicts with the above given features of the Sunnī adīth
literature, including the titles.
Ersilia Francesca’s contribution examines the evolution of the concept
of sunna in the Ibāī madhhab. Franscesa shows that in the early Ibāī
tradition, collections in the vast majority of cases sunna refers to both the
“living tradition” (of the early Ibāī Baran authorities and from Omani
jurists ) and the traditions arising from the Prophet’s closest followers such
as Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Alī, ‘Ā’isha, Ibn ‘Abbās, and Jābir b. ‘Abd Allāh but
not the third caliph ‘Uthmān who is considered as having abandoned the
sunna of God’s Messenger. Francesca also explains the mechanisms and
factors responsible for adīthtification of Sunna in the Ibāī madhhab
as evident in the works by the Omani encyclopedists at the end of the
fifth/eleventh and the beginning of the sixth/twelfth centuries. Finally,
Francesca finds that on the question of the status and the position of legal
authority of the sunna (in the form of sunnat al-nabī) with respect to the
Qur’an, the views of the Ibāī mirror those of other Sunnī treatises on
this subject.
Ali Altaf Mian’s chapter studies the meanings of the word sunna in
several core texts of early and medieval anafī law and legal theory. Mian
shows how anafī jurists conceptualized sunna in terms of epistemological
categories for specific reasons pertaining to the nature of legal authority and
religious normativity. In this context, Mian argues that the anafī concep-
tion of certainty-yielding sunna served as the master-discourse for inter-
preting sacred law. This epistemological conception of sunna also enabled
post-formative anafī jurists to authenticate and defend the legal positions
of their School’s founding fathers.
Gavin Picken’s chapter investigates the concept of sunna in early Shāfiʿī
madhhab. Picken focuses on the work of Shāfiʿī and, apart from sketch-
ing a useful overview of his life and works, Picken unpacks Shāfiʿī’s theory
of bayān as part of what Picken terms Shāfiʿī’s “revelatory matrix” and its
implications on the hermeneutical relationship between the Qur’an, sunna
and adīth. In this context, Picken describes Shāfiʿī’s disagreement with his
former teacher Mālik and his concept of sunna embedded in the idea of
ʿamal ahl al-Madīna. In the final section, Picken discusses how the work of
Shāfiʿī was received in what eventually crystalized into what we today know
as the Shāfiʿī madhhab. Here Picken highlights the efforts and the contribu-
tion of one of Shāfiʿī’s most important students, al-Buway ī, who, in many
ways, played a very important role in the establishment of this school of
law. For the purposes of this volume, one of al-Buway ī’s most important

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 Introduction 9

contributions is in further consolidating Shāfiʿī’s adīth-based sunna legal

hermeneutic that resembled more that of the traditionalists such as Ibn
anbal.
Harith bin Ramli, in his comprehensive overview of the anbalī legal
tradition, discusses the concept of sunna in this school of thought including
its hermeneutical position in relation to the Qur’an and the epistemological
status of mutawātir, āād and non-adīth saīh. Ramli paints a complex
picture of these issues as they emerged in anbalī madhhab. In this context,
Ramli demonstrates how the anbalī legal tradition arose as a result of the
efforts by traditionist-jurists to supplant localized raʾy-based traditions with
an entirely text-based tradition that not only included the corpus of sound
prophetic aādīth, but also the example of companions, successors and the
fatwās of leading figures of later generations. In doing so they resisted the
influence of Shāfiʿī whose concept of aīh al-adīth meant that lot of space
for analogical reasoning was created, something that anbalī, at least in
theory, were very suspicious of. Hence, according to this view the concept
of sunna was a “living tradition” embodied by those who were considered
to be most erudite about it and best exemplified its spirit in their belief
and practice.” Importantly, argues Ramli, the idea that decisions regarding
what constituted sunna must be based on textual grounds as much as pos-
sible implied that in the anbalī legal tradition the mere knowing of the
transmitters of the sunna was conceptually equivalent to the knowledge of
the sunna itself.
Amr Osman’s contribution examines the concept of Sunna in the now
extinct
āhirī school of thought from the perspective of all legal theory and
the kind of debates that were taking place at the time under discussion.
Amr focuses on the works of Ibn azm the main theoretician and codifier
of
āhirī school of thought, and the kind of arguments he proffered for
defending a adīth-based concept of Sunna in contrast to those of Mālikīs
and anafīs. Osman demonstrates that Ibn azm ’s concept of sunna rep-
resents the culmination of the view that the Prophetic Sunna is one and the
same as that of adīth.
Adis Duderija shifts the discussion from pre-modern Islam to that of
modern times to demonstrate the continuities and discontinuities of the
issues under discussion. He examines the views of several prominent mod-
ernist Muslim scholars who have developed some innovative arguments and
ideas regarding the question of the relative status of the Sunna and adīth
as sources of legal authority vis-à-vis the Qurʾān and their normative role
in Qurʾānic interpretation. They include Javed Ghāmidī, Fazlur Rahman,
Muammad Sharūr and Ghulām Parwez. He also briefly provides his own
understanding of the concept of sunna.

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 10 Adis Duderija

Notes
* I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Abdessamad Belhaj for reading through
this introduction and offering his helpful comments.
1. Adis Duderija, Constructing Religiously Ideal “Believer” and “Muslim Woman”
Concepts: Neo-Traditional Salafi and Progressive Muslim Methods of Interpretation
(Manāhij) (Palgrave, New York, 2011).
2. D. Brown, Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996); W. A. Graham, Divine Word and Prophetic
Word in Early Islam—a Reconsideration of the Sources, with Special References
to the Divine Saying or Hadith Qudsi (Hague: Mouton, 1977); F. Rahman,
Islamic Methodology in History (Lahore, Central Institute of Islamic Research,
1965); Adis Duderija, “The Evolution in the Canonical Sunni Hadith Body of
Literature and the Concept of a Sound Hadith during the Formative Period of
Islamic Thought as based on Recent Western Scholarship,” Arab Law Quarterly,
23(4) (2009a): 1–27; Adis Duderija, “The Evolution in the Concept of Sunnah
during the First Four Generations of Muslims in Relation to the Development of
the Concept of an Authentic Hadith as based on Recent Western Scholarship,”
Arab Law Quarterly, 26(4) (2012): 393–347.
3. See Z. I. Ansari, “Islamic Juristic Terminology before Shafi’i : A Semantical
Analysis with Special Reference to Kufa,” Arabica, 19 (1972); M. M. Bravmann,
The Spiritual Background of Early Islam-Studies in Ancient Arab Concepts (Leiden:
E.J.Brill, 1972); P. Crone and M. Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in
the First Centuries of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986);
N. Calder, Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1993); M. Al Azami, Studies in Early Hadith Literature (Beirut: Al-Maktab al-
Islami, 1968); I. Ahmed, The Significance of Sunna and Hadith and their Early
Documentation, Edinburgh University, Ph.D. Thesis, 1974; G. H. A. Juynboll,
“Some New Ideas on the Development of Sunna as a Technical Term in Early
Islam,” in Studies on the Origins and Uses of Islamic Hadith, ed. G. H. A. Juynboll
(Variorum: Ashgate, 1996); B. M. Wheeler, Applying the Canon in Islam—the
Authorization and Maintenance of Interpretive Reasoning in Hanafi Scholarship
(SUNY Press, 1996). See also chapter 1 of this volume, which summarizes this
body of scholarship.
4. M. Guraya, “The Concept of Sunna in the Muwatta of Malik b. Anas,” McGill
University, unpublished PhD Thesis, 1969. U.F Abd-Allah, Malik and Medina-
Islamic Reasoning in the Formative Period (Leiden: Brill, 2013). Hence, this
study will not include a chapter on Mālikī school of thought.
5. Duderija, “The Evolution in the Concept of Sunnah”; Duderija, “The Evolution
in the Canonical Sunni Hadith.”
6. Ibid.
7. Guraya, “The Concept of Sunna.” Montreal, Introduction. Cf. U. Abd-
Allah, Malik’s Concept of ‘Amal in the Light of Maliki Legal Theory, PhD the-
sis, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, University of
Chicago, Chicago, 1978.

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 Introduction 11

8. See Jonathan Brown, Hadith: Muhammad’s Legacy in the Medieval and Modern
World (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009).
9. In contrast to the Sunna of others such as that of the “rightly guided caliphs.”
See Duderija, “The Evolution in the Canonical Sunni Hadith Body of
Literature.”
10. N. Abbott, Studies in Arabic literary papyri, Qurʾānic Commentary and Tradition,
Vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 56.
11. Such as the idea that Sunna represented certain abstract ethico-religious princi-
pals and norms. See discussion below.
12. Duderija, Constructing, 29.
13. Being methodologically dependent on the adīth implies that Sunna compli-
ance (or otherwise) of certain (legal, ethical, or theological) practices or prin-
ciples is, and can only be, determined by sifting through numerous narratives
reportedly going back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad via an authentic
chain of narrators (isnād ).
14. Ch. Melchert, “Ibn Mujāhid and the Establishment of Seven Qurʾānic
Readings,” Studia Islamica, 91 (2000): 5–22. For a more complex picture of
the ahl al-adīth vs. ahl al-raʾy divide, see A. Osman, The History and the
Doctrine of the Zahiri Madhhab. Ph.D. thesis, Department of near Eastern
Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, 2010, 106–161.
15. I. Goldziher. Muslim Studies. Vol. 2. Translated by C. R. Barber and S. M.
Stern (London: Allen &Unwin, 1971), 81; J. Schacht, “Ahl al-Hadith,”
in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1960), 258. Edited by:
M. Th.Houtsma, T. W.Arnold, R.Basset and R.Hartmann
16. Such as in the case of the ashwiyya or Nābita, which were often given the
epithet ahl al-adīth. See Ed, “ashwiyya,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second
Edition, edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel,
W. P. Heinrichs (Brill Online, 2014).
17. Sh. Jackson, “Literalism, Empiricism, and Induction: Apprehending and
Concretizing Islamic Law’s Maqâsid al-Sharîa,” Mich. St. L. Rev. (2006):
1469–1486.
18. M. Abū Zahra, Taʾrīkh al-madhāhib al-islāmiyya (Cairo: Dār al Fikr al-‘Arabī
n.p.), 458.
19. Melchert, “Ibn Mujahid,” 6.
20. I. Goldziher, The Zahiris- Their Doctrine and Their History (Leiden: E.J.Brill,
1971), 3.
21. Ch. Melchert. The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law in the 9th-10th
Centuries (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
22. Goldziher, The Zahiris, 3; W. Hallaq. The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 122–128. Hallaq refers to
this as the “Great Synthesis.”
23. Goldziher, The Zahiris, 4–5.
24. Duderija, “The Evolution in the Concept of Sunna.”
25. D. Brown. Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 20.
26. Ibid.

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 12 Adis Duderija

27. R. El-Omari. “Accommodation and Resistance: Classical Muʿtazilites on

adīth,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 71(2) (2012): 231–256.
28. V. Stodolsky, A New Historical Model and Periodization for the Perception of
the Sunnah and his Companions. Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Near Eastern
Languages and Civilizations, University of Chicago, Chicago, 2012, 2.
29. On Mālikī madhhab see Abd-Allah, Malik and Medina.
30. Duderija, Constructing.
31. A. Ibn azm, Al Ikām fi uūl al-akām, Vol. 1, edited by Amad Shākir (Cairo:
Ma baʿat al-Imām, 1987), 87.
32. Brown, Rethinking Tradition, 16.
33. For an excellent in-depth discussion of theories of legal hermeneutics and their
theoretical presuppositions that were developed by classical Muslim scholars,
and some of which were supportive of this function of Sunna, see D. Vishanoff,
The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a
Revealed Law (New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society, 2011.)
34. A. Al-Baghdādī, Al-Kifāya fī ‘ilm al-riwāya (Hayderabad Deccan: Dā’irat
al-Ma‘ārif al-‘Uthmāniyya, 1938), 14.
35. See A. Ibn Qutayba. Ta’wil Mukhtalif al- adīth, edited by M. Z. al-Najjār
(Beirut: n.p. 1972), 87.
36. For those who had a adīth-independent concept of Sunna as outlined above.
37. For those who had a adīth-dependent concept of Sunna as outlined above.
38. Which means the ability to restrict the application of a general command of the
Book of God in any measure.
39. See the discussions in the chapters of this volume for details.

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 Chapter 1

The Concept of sunna Based on

the Analysis of sīra and Historical
Works from the First Three
Centuries of Islam*
Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort

Muslims commonly refer to the beginning of Islam as the golden era of

their religion, both in terms of piety and preeminence. This period com-
prised the career of the Prophet Muammad and the subsequent first four
leaders of the Islamic community, known as the “rightly guided caliphs.”
According to Islamic Tradition, the Qurʾān was put into writing during this
period, which is also the nascent stage in the transmission of the sayings
and actions of the Prophet and his companions, transmitted by generations
of Muslims and still considered authoritative today. To many Muslims, the
period of the Prophet and the first four caliphs is normative and, therefore,
the most important part of their history. The primary source of informa-
tion for Muslims is the Qurʾān, immediately followed by the sunna of the
Prophet, that includes his deeds, sayings, and tacit approval, preserved by
consecutive generations of Muslims. How did the concept of sunna develop
within the formative period of Islam? Was it derived from the exemplary
behavior of the Prophet or is it a mixture of different manifestations of
sunna, for example, the living tradition of the Muslim community, the
exemplary behavior of the companions of the Prophet, or caliphs with the
pre-Islamic concept of sunna?

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 14 Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort

The present article will contribute to the discussion about the develop-
ment of sunna by comparing the concept of sunna in historical and sīra works,
that is, works dealing with the biography of the Prophet Muammad, from
the first three centuries of Islam. However, since these works cover differ
periods of time, the analysis of the concept of sunna is limited to those tra-
ditions or their parts that deal with the lifetime of the Prophet Muammad
and the reigns of the first four caliphs of the Islamic empire, Abū Bakr
(r. 11–13/632–634), ʿUmar b. al-Kha āb (r. 13–23/634–644), ʿUthmān b.
ʿAffān (r. 23–35/644–656), and ʿAlī b. Abī ālib (r. 35–40/656–661). The
terms under scrutiny are the noun sunna, its plural sunan, and derivatives
of the verb sanna.
The first part of this article is dedicated to the discussion about the ori-
gin and the development of the concept of sunna from pre-Islam to the end
of the second Islamic century, as well as the relationship between the sunna
of the Prophet and the “living tradition,” or the generally agreed practice, of
the community. The second part consists of an analysis of the three above-
mentioned terms in the source material followed by a discussion of the dif-
ferent types of sunna as represented by the terms sunna, sunan, and sanna in
the sīra and historical works of the first three centuries of Islam.

The Debate About the Development of

Prophetic sunna
The classical Islamic view on the development of prophetic sunna during
the first three centuries of Islam is that already, during the lifetime of the
Prophet Muammad, Muslims imitated the Prophet’s conduct. The sub-
sequent generations continued this custom and preserved the Prophet’s
sunna in oral or written tradition. While Islamic scholars certainly played
an important role in the preservation of the sunna, the ordinary Islamic
community was also instrumental in the preservation of practices.1
Joseph Schacht was not the first to oppose the classical Islamic view on
the origin and the development of the sunna of the Prophet, but his study
of the concept of sunna in the work of the Islamic legal scholar al-Shāfiʿī
(d. 204/819) brought about many scholarly publications by Muslims as well
as non-Muslims.2 Schacht coined “living tradition” as a collective name for
several concepts of sunna in the ancient school of laws, ranging from “gener-
ally agreed-upon practice” to the original pre-Islamic meanings of “precedent”
or “way of life.”3 He argues that sunna originally denoted the normative prac-
tice of the community and was, from the time of al-Shāfiʿī onward (i.e. from

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 The Concept of sunna Based on the Analysis of sīra 15

the end of the second Islamic century), formalized and eventually restricted to
the normative behavior of the Prophet Muammad.4
According to Zafar Ansari, the idea of sunna as the normative behav-
ior of the Prophet Muammad (sunnat al-nabī) existed already during the
lifetime of the Prophet and this concept was continued by the following
generations.5 Although the Qurʾān does not make mention of the expres-
sion sunnat al-nabī, Ansari refers to Q.33:21 to show that the idea of the
Prophet’s normative behavior is present in the Qurʾān, “Certainly you have
in the Messenger of Allāh a good example.”6 The expression sunnat al-nabī
has been attributed to Prophet himself sometimes, and it appears in tradi-
tions describing events in the first Islamic century. According to Ansari, in
each case, sunnat al-nabī refers to the normative behavior of the Prophet.7
Furthermore, he argues that several instances of an inadvertent substitution
of the word sunna with sunnat al-nabī in some traditions was proof that
already, in the first half of the second Islamic century, sunna as a replace-
ment for sunnat al-nabī was a well-established expression, which point to a
lengthy period of identifying the authority of the normative sunna with the
Prophet. During the second Islamic century, the expression sunnat al-nabī
was increasingly used.8
Until the last quarter of the second Islamic century, the term sunna was
not yet exclusively reserved for the Prophet, but also used to refer to 1) the
sunna of the companions, in which the normative behavior of the first four
caliphs, in particular, played an important role—a concept of sunna well
established in approximately 75/694; 2) the sunna proper or the sunna of
the “virtuous people” or the sunna māiyya, which is a well-known and
well-established practice that originated during the time of the Prophet or
his companions. Ansari also substitutes the expression sunna of the virtuous
people with “good example,” but he stresses that it is not the same as “actual
practice,” since it is either based on practice that originated in the time of
the Prophet and his companions, or reflects the teachings of the Prophet,
both authenticated by consensus;9 and, 3) the sunna of the jurists, that is
“adīth (NV: traditions) transmitted by trustworthy people and supported
by those noted for their proficiency in fiqh (legal understanding),” although
of a lesser authority than the sunna of the Prophet or his companions.10
According to Meïr Bravmann, the concept of imitating the example of
a person can be traced back to pre-Islamic times, when the practice of an
individual—but sometimes also of a specific group—was adopted by others
from the same tribe, which thus became sunna and the “customary practice
of the community.”11 Consequently, sunna, or its plural sunan, refers to the
practices established by individuals, and not to some anonymous commu-
nal practice. This applies to pre-Islamic as well as early Islamic times.12

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 16 Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort

From a very early period, the Muslims started to follow the practice of
the Prophet. During the time of the succession of Caliph ʿUmar, his practice
had already formed its normative character, distinct from the behavior of
Abū Bakr and ʿUmar.13 This practice consisted of the Prophet’s concrete,
personal behavior, which could sometimes be derived from earlier practices.
It is possible, according to Bravmann, that the early Muslims may have con-
sidered the latter type of practices as part of the Prophet’s sunna, because the
Prophet acted according to them in certain situations.14 Bravmann opposes
the view of Schacht that the sunna of the Prophet originated from the anon-
ymous practice of the community and was later on ascribed to the Prophet
to provide these practices with authority.15
Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds share Schacht’s view, although they
do agree with Bravmann that the concept of sunna as normative behavior
originated from pre-Islamic customs and that it was restricted to tribes.16
However, while the Prophet was likely seen as a source of exemplary behav-
ior by his followers, they do not agree with the classical Muslim view that
he was the only source of piety.17 The sunna or practice of the Prophet
was rather “good practice in general and that of caliphs and prophets in
particular,” without a fixed set of rules. This lasted until the end of the first
Islamic century.18 During the last quarter of the Umayyad caliphate (ended
in 132/750), the sunna of the Prophet became distinguished from, and an
alternative to caliphal sunna, although this happened mainly among Islamic
scholars and was not supported within the Umayyad caliphal court and its
employees.19
The first ʿAbbāsid caliphs who reigned the Islamic empire after the fall of
the Umayyads claimed to rule the empire according to the Qurʾān and the
sunna of the Prophet. This sunna was still to mean only good or acceptable
practice.20 Around the middle of the second Islamic century, the specific
behavior of the Prophet, as illustrated in adīth became an autonomous
source of law.21 According to Crone and Hinds, the first ʿAbbāsid caliph to
use this “newly developed sunna” or “new concept of sunna” in his speeches
was al-Mahdī (r. 158–169/775–785).22 By the end of the second Islamic
century, sunna was restricted to a narrow set of rules preserved in adīth
by the hands of Islamic scholars. The ʿAbbāsid caliphs no longer had the
authority to establish new sunna.23
Gualtherus Juynboll agrees that toward the end of the lifetime of the
Prophet, the idea of his behavior as exemplary and normative may well have
existed because of his prestige among his followers, but it appeared along-
side the exemplary behavior of what Juynboll calls “his (Muammad’s) most
devoted followers.” He argues that after the death of the Prophet, the sunna
of the first three caliphs was considered as authoritative as the sunna of the
Prophet and the Qurʾān, although in a more political and administrative

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 The Concept of sunna Based on the Analysis of sīra 17

sense. Even during the Umayyad period, sunna could refer to the Prophet
as well as to other persons or institutions. He notices that while the earliest
sources mention sunnat al-nabī sometimes, usually, sunna or al-sunna are
used. The context does not reveal whether it refers to the Prophet, one of
his companions, the community as a whole, or to a specific region. Until
the middle of the second Islamic century, the sunna of people other than the
Prophet outnumbered the Prophetic sunna in reports from sources other
than adīth.24 Henceforth, the narrow concept of sunna exclusively relating
to the sunnat al-nabī began (i.e. the exemplary behavior of the Prophet).
Juynboll notes that due to al-Shāfiʿī’s influence, the occurrence of al-sunna
in writings of the third Islamic century and onward can, in general, be iden-
tified with sunnat al-nabī.25
Based on his study of Mālik b. Anas’ (d. 179/795) legal work
al-Muwaaʾ, Yasin Dutton distinguishes four categories of sunna. The first
is the normative practice of the Prophet Muammad, the “living embodi-
ment” of the Qurʾān. The second is the practices of Muammad’s com-
panions. The third is the general practices of the people in Medina. To
Mālik, this sunna is intrinsically and perpetually linked to the practices of
the Prophet. While Juynboll considers the sunna of the Prophet and the
sunna of his companions as different practices, to Dutton, the sunna of the
Medinans originated from the practices of the Prophet and thus represents
the same continuous normative practice of Muammad, implemented by
the companions and then preserved by the Medinans until the time of
Mālik. During Mālik’s period, as well as in previous generations, the sunna
was not only preserved by the ʿulamāʾ (religious scholars) of Medina, but
by the whole community of Medina. Dutton furthermore distinguishes
a fourth category of sunna in Mālik’s work—the sunna of the Muslims,
constituting the practices generally accepted by the Muslim community
as a whole. Similar to the practices of Medina, he considers this to be,
among Muslims, generally agreed upon as the sunna that is sanctioned by
the scholars. Dutton disagrees with Schacht and Burton in considering
this kind of sunna to be theoretical or “idealistic” instead of as an actual
existing practice.26
The discussion about the development of the concept of sunna and,
in particular, the sunna of the Prophet Muammad as the normative
behavior for later generations of Muslims from the first Islamic centuries
among present-day scholars, shows that while the majority agree that,
during the lifetime of the Prophet Muammad, Muslims probably fol-
lowed his example in certain spheres of behavior, they disagree about the
direct link between the sunna of the Prophet during his lifetime and the
concept of the prophetic sunna, as formulated by the end of the second
Islamic century.

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 18 Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort

The Sources
The present study of the concept of sunna in historical and sīra works dur-
ing the first three centuries of Islam relies on the main sources for the biog-
raphy of the Prophet Muammad, namely, al-Wāqidī’s Kitāb al-Maghāzī,
Ibn Hishām’s al-Sīra al-Nabawiyya, Ibn Saʿd’s al-abaqāt al-Kubrā, and
al-abarī’s Taʾrīkh. These sources are complemented by Yūnus b. Bukayr’s
Sīrat Ibn Isāq, al-Yaʿqūbī’s Tārīkh, and the Kitāb al-Maghāzī from ʿAbd
al-Razzāq’s al-Muannaf.
The Muannaf of ʿAbd al-Razzāq (d. 211/826) contains one of the
earliest sources for the biography of the Prophet Muammad, the Kitāb
al-Maghāzī of Maʿmar b. Rāshid (d. 153/770). The entire chapter exists
almost completely of the material of ʿAbd al-Razzāq’s student Maʿmar,
which describes the most important events during and after the life of the
Prophet Muammad until the caliphate of Muʿāwiya (r. 41–61/661–80).
Less than 7 percent of the traditions are not attributed to Maʿmar.27 In
this regard, the chapter deviates remarkably from the other chapters of the
Muannaf.28 Although Maʿmar is known as the author of a work titled Kitāb
al-Maghāzī, it does not necessarily mean that the chapter in the Muannaf
is identical to that work. Previous studies have shown that the latter does
not contain all Maʿmar’s maghāzī material.29 Still, it is one of the largest
collections of Maʿmar’s maghāzī material and consequently, a very valuable
and early source of information for the initial period of Islam and for the
development of the concept of sunna in the formative period of Islam.
One of Maʿmar’s contemporaries, the famous Medinan scholar
Muammad b. Isāq (d. 150/767), had composed a chronological biog-
raphy of the Prophet Muammad titled Sīra. His work is available to us
today in several editions. Two editions, al-Sīra al-Nabawiyya of Ibn Hishām
(d. 218/833) and Sīrat Ibn Isāq of Yūnus b. Bukayr (d. 199/815), are used
as primary sources for this article. Although both contain material attrib-
uted to Ibn Isāq, they are not identical, as the present study will also show.
The most popular and commonly used source is the Sīra of Ibn Hishām.
His work is an abridged and modified edition of Ibn Isāq’s work, to which
he added his own commentary.30 He places his description of the life of
the Prophet within the wider history of Southern Arabia and the Prophet’s
ancestors. His chronological description of the biography ends with the
death and burial of the Prophet in 11/632. Compared with Ibn Hishām’s
work, Yūnus’ edition of Ibn Isāq’s work is smaller, contains the material of
other scholars, and does not describe the history of Southern Arabia. The
content and wording of traditions that are present in both works could
differ.

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 The Concept of sunna Based on the Analysis of sīra 19

Al-Wāqidī (d. 207/823) was a younger contemporary of Ibn Hishām.

His Kitāb al-Maghāzī contains material from Ibn Isāq, but the latter is not
cited as a source because either al-Wāqidī received that material from other
transmitters or he omitted the name of Ibn Isāq in order to obscure his
involvement.31 Al-Wāqidī’s work focuses on the last 11 years of life of the
Prophet in Medina.32
Al-abaqāt al-Kubrā of Ibn Saʿd (d. 230/845) consists of two parts. The
first part is a description of the previous prophets, as well as the life of
the Prophet from his early childhood until his burial. He draws mainly
on the material of his teacher al-Wāqidī. The second part deals with the
Prophet’s companions, their Successors, the generation of the so-called
tābiʿūna, and the following generations of the second Islamic century.33
Al-Yaʿqūbī’s (d. 284/897) historical work Taʾrīkh al-Yaʿqūbī describes
the history of the world from Adam and his descendants until the ʿAbbāsid
caliph al-Muʿtamid (d. 279/892).34 In contrast to the other sources, his
work only occasionally consists of traditions preceded by a chain of trans-
mitters. In general, he gives a continuous account of the different periods.
The last source is al-abarī’s (d. 310/923) monumental work titled
Tārīkh al-abarī. It relates the history of the world from its creation until
the year 302/915 of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate. He gives parallel accounts of
different authorities without trying to harmonize them, including material
from Ibn Isāq and al-Wāqidī.35

The Occurrence of sunna in

Historical and sīra Works
Before we begin with the analysis of the variant uses of sunna in historical
and sīra works, we should take a look at sunna in the Qurʾān. The words
sunna or sunan occur 1636 times in the Qurʾān. They roughly refer either
to God’s way of handling unbelievers or to the behavior of unbelievers
who oppose God’s messengers.37 See for example, “[This has been] God’s
way (sunna) with those who went before . . . ” (sunnat Allāh fī alladhīna
khalaw min qablu . . . ) in Q.33:62,38 and “ . . . unless the practice (sunna)
of previous men should come upon them . . . ” ( . . . illā an taʾtiyahum sun-
nat al-awwalīna . . . ) in Q.18:55, respectively. Even though the concept of
sunna in the sense of the exemplary conduct of the Prophet Muammad is
not connected with the term sunna in the Qurʾān, classical Islamic scholars
trace the idea of the sunna of the Prophet to Q.33:21: “Certainly you have
in the Messenger of God a good example . . . ” (laqad kāna lakum fī rasūl
Allāh uswa asana . . . ) among others.39

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 20 Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort

A first glance at a comparison of the appearance of the words sunna,

sunan, and sanna in the seven works of Maʿmar, Yūnus, al-Wāqidī, Ibn
Hishām, Ibn Saʿd, al-Yaʿqūbī, and al-abarī reveals that these terms are far
less prevalent in the sīra and maghāzī works than in the historical works
(see table 1.1). Sunna, sunan, and sanna in the four sīra and maghāzī books
take up only 12 percent of the total number of words in all complete works
(45 out of 37140). The problem is that the seven selected historical and
sīra works cover different periods of time. For example, al-Wāqidī’s Kitāb
al-Maghāzī only describes events from the last decade of the life of the
Prophet Muammad, while al-abarī’s Taʾrīkh begins with Creation and
ends with year 302/915. Therefore, only those parts of the above-mentioned
works that describe events from the lifetime of the Prophet Muammad and
the reigns of the first four caliphs of the Islamic empire will be discussed
here. The terms have also been omitted from the selection when found in
verses of the Qurʾān or in lines of poetry. Although both sources are very
valuable for the study of the concept of sunna in the initial period of Islam,
they require a different methodological approach that is outside the scope
of this article.
Even when we take stock of only those words that are present in descrip-
tions of the lifetime of the Prophet and the rightly guided caliphs, the dif-
ference between the number of terms in historical and sīra works is slightly
reduced. The number of appearances of the three words in the works of
Maʿmar, Yūnus, al-Wāqidī, and Ibn Hishām still account for only 20 per-
cent of the total number within the selected period (36 out of 180). The
commonality between these four works is that they belong to a different
genre (sīra/maghāzī instead of historical/abaqāt) and are the oldest sources,
which might be a reason for the deviation.
Another interesting conclusion that can be drawn from table 1.1 is that
in all the works, except for the Kitāb al-Maghāzī of al-Wāqidī, the word
sunna is the most frequently used term. In contrast with the other works,
al-Wāqidī’s book mentions the plural sunan in most cases (6 out of 9). At
first glance, it seems as if the singular form sunna was more commonly used
in the third Islamic century than in the second, specifically, in historical
works relating the Golden Period of Islam. This result seems to fit in with
the acceptance of the sunna of the Prophet and the Qurʾān as the most
important sources for Islamic law and the way of life at the end of the sec-
ond Islamic century. However, it might also be the result of the difference
in genre.41 We will have to more closely evaluate how, where, when, and to
whom the word sunna was applied, as well as to the use of the plural sunan
and the verb sanna.
When the period is divided into smaller units and we distinguish
between the periods of the Prophet’s pre-Islamic ancestors, the lifetime

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 The Concept of sunna Based on the Analysis of sīra 21

Table 1.1 The Number of sunna, sunan, and sunna in sīra and Historical Works

Collector and Date of sunna sunan sanna Total in Total in

title work death selection complete
work

Maʿmar, Kitāb 153/770 3 – 1 4 4

al-Maghāzī
Yūnus, Sīra 199/815 3 2 – 5 5
al-Wāqidī, Kitāb 207/823 2 6 1 9 12a
al-Maghāzī
Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra 218/833 12 4 2 18 23b
al-Nabawiyya
Ibn Saʿd, al-abaqāt 230/845 14 6 7 27 68c
al-Kubrā
al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh 284/897 18 5 5 28 58d
al-abarī, Tārīkh 310/923 71 6 12 89 >200e
Total 123 29 28 180 >371
a
The word sunna appears twice in a tradition in the same verse of the Qurʾān (Q.48:23) (sunnat Allāh
allatī qad khalat min qablu wa-lan tajida li-sunnat Allāh tabdīlan) and refers to the practice of God. The
third word is present in a poem of assān b. Thābit. See al-Wāqidī, Kitāb al-Maghāzī, 434–435 (Ghazwat
al- udaybiya) and 648 (Baʿthat rasūl Allāh () al-muaddaqīna), respectively.
b
Ibn Hishām mentions two Qurʾānic verse (Q.8:38 fa-qad maat sunnat al-awwaliyīna and Q.3:138 qad
khalat min qablikum sunan). According to Ibn Isāq sunnat al-awwaliyīna refers to the enemies of the
Prophet who died during the battle at Badr in 2/624. See Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra al-Nabawiyya, II, 285 (Nuzūl
sūrat al-anfāl) and III, 102 respectively. Furthermore, variants of the word—sunna twice and sunan once—
are mentioned three times in a poem, ibid., I, 207 (Mubādaʾat rasūl Allāh () qawmahu wa-mā kāna min-
hum), IV, 53 (Dhikr fat Makka), and 179 (Qudūm wafd Banī Tamīm).
c
My selection of Ibn Saʿd’s al-abaqāt encompasses his description of the life of the Prophet and his direct
ancestors as well as the entries about the Prophet’s Companions.
d
The selection of al-Yaʿqūbī’s Tārīkh is restricted to the life of the Prophet Muammad and his direct ances-
tors as well as his description of the reigns of the four rightly guided caliphs. The three occurrences of sunna
and sunan in poems are left out of the selection. See al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, I, 216 (twice) and II, 84 (once).
e
The selection of al-abarī’s Taʾrīkh is the same as al-Yaʿqūbī’s. Three occurrences of the words sunna (twice)
and sunan (once) in poems cited in this period are omitted from the selection. See al-abarī, Taʾrīkh, III,
205, IV, 251 and V, 260. The total number of appearances of the words sunna, sunan, and sanna in the
Taʾrīkh is an estimate. I counted the occurrences of the words in volumes 1–5 completely and in volume 6
until the chapter on the pledge of allegiance to al-asan b. ʿAlī after the death of his father, which marks the
end of my selected period. The total number of these words until this chapter is 107. The remaining part of
volume 6 and the volumes 7–12 contain at least 100, but possibly more, references. I marked them, but I
did not count them anymore, so the estimate of (at least) 200 is well founded.

of the Prophet, and the reign of the first four caliphs, a slightly different
picture emerges (see table 1.2).
In the collections of Yūnus b. Bukayr and al-Wāqidī, the distribution
of the terms sunna, sunan, and sanna remains the same. Al-Wāqidī’s Kitāb

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9781137376459_03_ch01.indd 22
Table 1.2 The Distribution of the Terms in Descriptions About Pre-Islamic Ancestors, the Lifetime of the Prophet, and the Reign
of the First Four Caliphs

Ancestors Lifetime Prophet Period 4 caliphs

sunna sunan sanna sunna sunan sanna sunna sunan sanna

Maʿmar – – – – – – 1 1 3 – – 3
Yūnus – – – – 3 2 – 5 – – – –
al-Wāqidī – – – – 2 6 1 9 – – – –
Ibn Hishām 1 1 1 3 10 3 1 14 1 – – 1
Ibn Saʿd – – 2 2 11 2 2 15 3 4 3 10
al-Yaʿqūbī 1 – 2 3 4 3 2 9 13 2 1 16
al-abarī – – 3 3 11 1 – 12 60 5 9 74
Total 2 1 8 11 41 17 7 65 80 11 13 104

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 The Concept of sunna Based on the Analysis of sīra 23

al-Maghāzī does not, of course, contain traditions from the period before the
birth of the Prophet. Maʿmar’s Kitāb al-Maghāzī and Yūnus’ Sīra have tradi-
tions about the Prophet’s ancestors, but the three terms are not mentioned
in them. In Maʿmar’s work, only the verb sanna forms part of one tradition
about the lifetime of the Prophet Muammad and, as the next section will
show, it is not connected with the Prophet but rather refers to the establish-
ment of a habit by one of his companions. The singular form sunna is used in
three traditions describing events during the last year of the reign of Caliph
ʿUmar in the year 23/644. Ibn Hishām’s Sīra is the only work belonging to
the sīra/maghāzī genre that uses the words sunna, sunan, and sanna in all
three periods. In the period of the first four caliphs, the term sunna is pres-
ent in one tradition from the last year of the caliphate of ʿUmar in the year
23/644. This tradition, detailing a conversation involving the Caliph ʿUmar
during his last pilgrimage, is also part of Maʿmar’s work. The majority of the
terms included by Ibn Hishām, in particular, the singular form sunna, are
mentioned in traditions relating events during the lifetime of the Prophet.
The distribution of the terms over the three periods within the histori-
cal works shows that Ibn Saʿd’s al-abaqāt looks similar to Ibn Hishām.
The majority of the terms, and the term sunna in particular, are used in
traditions relating the period of the Prophet’s lifetime. The two works of
al-Yaʿqūbī and al-abarī differ from the other texts in that they mention the
terms in all three periods and that the majority of the terms are connected
to the period of the four caliphs. They both date from the second half of
the third Islamic century, while the other works are from the second Islamic
century or the first quarter of the third Islamic century at the latest. The
difference may also derive from the variation in focus. The early works,
including the abaqāt of Ibn Saʿd, focus on the lifetime of the Prophet
Muammad, while in the works of al-Yaʿqūbī and al-abarī, the description
of the life of the Prophet is part of a more general description of the history
of the world from the time of the first prophets (e.g. Adam) to the third
Islamic century. It still remains remarkable that in the two latest historical
works, the majority of the terms, and the word sunna, in particular, are
mentioned in the part on the caliphs.
When we divide the period of the first four caliphs into separate periods
and compare the three historical works, an even more interesting picture
arises (see table 1.3).
In the work of Ibn Saʿd, the majority of the three terms are present in tra-
ditions relating events during the reign of Caliph ʿUmar, and in al-abarī’s
work during the caliphate of ʿAlī—although the period of ʿUmar has nearly
the same number of occurrences of the terms. The three terms are almost
evenly spread out over the period of the last three caliphs in the Taʾrīkh
of al-Yaʿqūbī, where he makes no mention of any term in the traditions

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 24 Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort

Table 1.3 The Distribution of the Terms in Descriptions in the Period of the
First Four Caliphs

Abū Bakr ʿUmar ʿUthmān ʿAlī unknown

Ibn Saʿd sunna – 2 – 1 – 3

sunan 1 2 (+1)47 (+1)47 – 1a 4
sanna 1 2 – – – 3
Total 2 6 – 1 1 10
al-Yaʿqūbī sunna – 6b 2 5 – 13
sunan – – 2 – – 2
sanna – 1 – – – 1
Total – 7 4 5 – 16
al-abarī sunna 3 19 10 28 – 60
sunan – 3 1 1 – 5
sanna 1 3 5 – – 9
Total 4 25 16 29 – 74
a
I could not assign the word sunan in one tradition of Ibn Saʿd to one of the caliphates in particular, but the
terms derive from a tradition about this period. In this tradition, it is said that after the death of the Prophet
ʿUmar and ʿUthmān used to ask her about his sunan (practices). The term is therefore connected with the
caliphate of ʿUthmān at the latest. Ibn Saʿd, al-abaqāt al-Kubrā, II, 286 (ʿĀʾisha zawj al-nabī (lʿm)).
b
The term sunnat al-nabī appears five times in the tradition on the consultation council dealing with the
succession to caliph ʿUmar. Al-Yaʿqūbī places this tradition in the chapter about ʿUthmān, but I place them
under ʿUmar. See al-Yaʿqūbī, II, 112 (Ayyām ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān).

about the caliphate of Abū Bakr. In general, where the traditions are about
the caliphate of Abū Bakr in the historical as well as the sīra works, the
three terms seldom appear. Abū Bakr’s reign was the briefest and lasted
only two years (r. 11–13/632–634). The short span of his caliphate might
explain the relatively low number of occurrences of the terms in compari-
son with the reigns of the other caliphs. Furthermore, after the death of
the Prophet, the Muslim community started to break apart into separate
tribes. Abū Bakr had to spend a lot of time and effort in reuniting the
Muslims under his authority. During this time, he also began with the con-
quest of the northern regions of the Arabian peninsula. Perhaps all this left
little room for the establishment of sunan or the assignment of any term
in the period of his reign, although in traditions relating later events, the
exemplary behavior of Abū Bakr (in general) is mentioned, as the following
analysis of the different kinds of sunna will show.
In all the works that contain the words sunna, sunan, and sanna during
the period of the first four caliphs, one or more terms are present in tradi-
tions about the caliphate of ʿUmar, including the works of Maʿmar and
Ibn Hishām, but in the two later Taʾrīkh works, the majority of the terms

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 The Concept of sunna Based on the Analysis of sīra 25

occur in traditions about the caliphate of ʿUmar and ʿAlī (al-abarī 73% and
al-Yaʿqūbī 75% of the terms).

The Variant Uses of sunna in sīra and

Historical Works
Finally, we will discuss the variant uses of sunna found in the seven sources.
Table 1.4 offers an overview of with whom or what the terms sunna, sunan,
and sanna are connected, that is, who established a specific sunna. In the
seven sīra and maghāzī works, the two most frequently used concepts of
sunna are the sunna of the Prophet and the undefined sunna, followed by
the sunna from a companion.
Table 1.4 shows that in later works, more varied concepts of sunna
appear. Whereas in the books of Maʿmar and Yūnus, three different types
of sunna can be distinguished, al-Wāqidī’s and al-Yaʿqūbī’s work contains
five different types, Ibn Hishām’s and Ibn Saʿd’s contain six, and al-abarī’s
work is composed of 8 variations of the word. In the following part, the
different types of sunna are discussed.

The Sunna of God

The sunna of God is the only type of sunna that is present in the Qurʾān
and roughly refers either to God’s way of handling unbelievers or to the
behavior of unbelievers who oppose God’s messengers.42 In the seven
works, it is seldom seen and appears in single traditions, without variants
in any of the other six works. The earliest source that contains a reference
to the sunna of God is the Kitāb al-Maghāzī of al-Wāqidī: “I (the Prophet)
leave with you, in your hands, what will not lead you astray, the book of
God and His practice” (wa-qad taraktu fīkum mā in akhadhtum bihi lam
taillū: kitāb Allāh wa-sunnatuhu bi-aydīkum). Al-Wāqidī notes that some
mention instead “the book of God and the practice of His Prophet” (kitāb
Allāh wa-sunnat nabiyyihi).43 All references to the sunna of God appear in
formal situations, either as a speech to a group of people (al-Wāqidī and
once in al-abarī), a pledge of allegiance (Ibn Saʿd), or in a letter (once
in al-abarī).44 Based on the inclusions of this type in the seven sīra and
historical works, the use of the concept of sunna of God is dated to the
end of the second Islamic century at the earliest and only occurs in formal
situations.

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 Table 1.4 The Variant Uses of Sunna in the sīra/maghāzī Sources

God Pre-Isl. Group ajj Pre-Islamic Companion Prophet None Total

group Muslims individual

9781137376459_03_ch01.indd 26
Maʿmar – – – – – 1M 2Um a 1Um 4
Yūnus – – – 2M – – 2M 1M 5
al-Wāqidī 1M 2M – – – 1M 2M 3M 9
Ibn Hishām – 2M – 4M 1An 1M 5M 4M 18
1Um
Ibn Saʿd 1Um 1M – – 2An 1M 6M 7M 27
3Um 2AB 1Um/Uth
1Um 1Um
1A
al-Yaʿqūbī – 1M – – 3An 1M 1M 4M 28
2M 1Um 5Um 1Um
1Uth 3Uth 3A
1A 1A
al-abarī 2A 1Um 1AB 2M 3An 1M 6M 3M 89
4Uth 5Um 2AB 1AB
2A 1Uth 7Um 12Um
1A 3Uth 8Uth
11A 13A
Total 4 7 7 8 11 19 59 65 180
a
A = reign caliph ʿAlī. AB = reign caliph Abū Bakr. An = pre-Islamic period. M = lifetime of the Prophet Muammad. Um = reign caliph ʿUmar. Uth = reign caliph
ʿUthmān.

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 The Concept of sunna Based on the Analysis of sīra 27

The Sunna of Pre- and Non-Islamic Groups

This type of sunna is present in all works, except for the books of Maʿmar
and Yūnus. It refers to the examples set by two groups of people from
the past, which have been followed by others. The first group consists of
the prophets before Muammad and is present in al-abaqāt of Ibn Saʿd,
where it is mentioned that “it is the custom of the prophets” (fa-inna sun-
nat al-anbiyāʾ). We also find mention of this type of sunna in al-Yaʿqūbī’s
Taʾrīkh, which makes reference to “four customs of the Messengers” (arbaʿ
min sunan al-mursalīna).45
The second group consists of pagans. In al-Wāqidī’s tradition about
the tree called Dhāt al-Anwā , the Prophet reprimanded a group of newly
converted Muslims in his company who asked him to permit them to
perform heathen rituals around the tree. He says, “Indeed they are cus-
tomary practices (sunan), customary (sanan) to those who were before
you” (innahā li-l-sunan sanan man kāna qablakum).46 The same tradition
appears in a slightly different version in Ibn Hishām’s Sīra from Ibn Isāq
from al-Zuhrī, while al-Wāqidī traces his account to Maʿmar from al-Zuhrī.
The phrase found in the Sīra is, “You would follow the customs (sunan)
of those who were before you” (innahā l-sunan la-tarkabanna sunan man
kāna qablakum).47 While these references are part of traditions relating
events during the lifetime of the Prophet, al-abarī’s single reference to
this concept takes place during the caliphate of ʿUmar: “and he treated
them (the Persians) in the way of those who were before them from the
people of their religion” (wa-manaahum sunan man kāna qablahum min
ahl dīnihim).48

The Sunna of a Group of Muslims

The seven references to the sunna from a group of Muslims are present in
the same source—the Tārīkh of al-abarī—and are all part of traditions
relating events after the lifetime of the Prophet. In a tradition about the
caliphate of Abū Bakr, the military leader Khālid b. al-Walīd compares the
behavior of a man to that of women (innahā la-sunna ka-annahā sunnat
al-nisā’). Twice, the example of Muslims in general is mentioned during
the caliphate of ʿAlī (sunnat al-muslimīna). The most interesting tradition
is, however, the one about ʿUmar’s speech after he became caliph. In this
speech, he promises to follow three different types of sunna: the sunna of the
Prophet (sunnat nabiyyiīhi), the sunna originating from consensus among
Muslims (fīmā jtamaʿtum ʿalayhi wa-sanantum), and the sunna of pious and
virtuous men (wa-sunna sunnat ahl al-khayr).

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 28 Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort

The Sunna of the Hajj

The sunna or sunan of the major pilgrimage (ajj) in the works of Yūnus,
Ibn Hishām, and al-abarī are part of three different traditions, in which
the meaning is either ritual(s) or custom(s). In the first tradition, it refers to
the ritual(s) of the pilgrimage (sunan ajjihi) as ordained by God. God gave
Muammad the customs (sunan) of His pilgrimage (wa-sharaa lahu sunan
ajjihi) and the ritual (sunna) of the ajj to Arafāt49 (fī sunnat al-ajj ilā
Arafāt).50 The Prophet is said to have imparted his knowledge to those pres-
ent during his Farewell Pilgrimage, “and [the Prophet] taught them the cus-
toms (sunan) of their ajj” (wa-alamahum sunan ajjihim).51 Alternatively,
the Prophet dispatched one of his companions as an instructor; in this case,
he ordered ʿAmr b. azm, among others, in a letter to, “teach men the rites
of the pilgrimage, its customs (sunna) and its obligation” (wa-yuallima
al-nās maālim al-ajj wa-sunnatahu wa-farīatahu).52 All of these tradi-
tions are derived from Ibn Isāq. The earliest connection between the word
sunna with the pilgrimage, across these seven works, can therefore be dated
to the second quarter of the second Islamic century.

The Sunna of Pre-Islamic Individuals

Four ancestors of the Prophet Muammad are mentioned in traditions of

the selected period as the originators of a specific custom. The first two are
mentioned by al-abarī in the lineage of the Prophet, namely, ʿAtr al-ʿAtāʾir
who was the “first to establish the practice of the sacrificial lamb” (wa-huwa
awwal man sanna al-atīra), and Ibn Shūā, who was the first to establish
the practice of the sacrifice of a sheep or goat during Rajab (wa-huwa awwal
man sanna al-rajabiyya). Both remain continued practices of the Arabs.53
Four different sources contain information about the institution of the cus-
tom of the winter and summer caravan of the Quraysh by Muammad’s
great-grandfather, Hāshim b. ʿAbd Manāf. The formulation of the informa-
tion in this instance is slightly different within each source:

● Ibn Hishām: wa-kāna Hāshim—fīmā yazamūna—awwal man sanna

l-rilatayni li-Quraysh: rilatay l-shitāʾ wa-l-ayf 54
● Ibn Saʿd: wa-kāna (Hāshim) awwal man sanna l-rilatayni li-Qurasyh
taralu idāhumā fī l-shitāʾ ilā al-Yaman (to Yemen) wa-ilā l- abasha
ilā l-Najāshī (to Ethiopia to the Negus)55
● Al-Yaʿqūbī: wa-kāna (Hāshim) awwal man sanna l-rilatayni: rilat
al-shitāʾ ilā l-Shām (to Syria) wa-rilat al-ayf ilā l- abasha ilā
l-Najāshī (to Ethiopia to the Negus)56

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 The Concept of sunna Based on the Analysis of sīra 29

● Al-abarī: wa-dhukira anna Hāshiman huwa awwal man sanna

l-rilatayni li-Quraysh: rilat al-shitāʾ wa-l-ayf 57

The general content of the information is the same, but the versions
of Ibn Saʿd and al-Yaʿqūbī contain more details about the two caravan
journeys.
Several customs are ascribed to Hāshim’s son, ʿAbd al-Mu alib, the
grandfather and protector of the Prophet. Ibn Saʿd and al-Yaʿqūbī both
mention that he established the custom of the blood money consisting of
100 camels (Ibn Saʿd: wa-Abd al-Mualib awwal man sanna diyat al-nafs
miʾa min al-ibil; and al-Yaʿqūbī, wa-ārat al-diya min al-ibil alā mā sanna
Abd al-Mualib).58 The majority of the customs that he instituted were
revealed in the Qurʾān (wa-sanna sunanan nazala al-Qurʾān bi-aktharihā).
The persons who followed his example belonged to his tribe.59

The Sunna of a Companion

In the sīra works, the only occurrence of the exemplary behavior of a

companion is Khubayb’s performance of two cycles of prayer (rakʿatāni)
before his execution by the Quraysh in 4/625. In the Kitāb al-Maghāzī
of Maʿmar, Khubayb’s sunna is the only type of sunna that is present in a
tradition about an event that takes place during the lifetime of the Prophet.
Khubayb’s performance of two rakas before his execution is transmitted
in two different versions. One version is derived from the Medinan scholar
al-Zuhrī (d. 124/742), which is present in the works of Maʿmar, al-Wāqidī,
and al-abarī.60 The other one is from Ibn Isāq from the Medinan scholar
ʿĀim b. ʿUmar b. Qatāda (d. between 119–29/737–47), and is mentioned
by Ibn Hishām.61 The tradition of Ibn Saʿd is a mixture of both versions.62
While the wording of the variant versions differs, the substantive content
is the same:

Maʿmar: fa-kāna awwal man sanna l-rakʿatayni inda -qatl huwa

al-Wāqidī: awwal man sanna l-rakatayni inda l-qatl Khubayb
al-abarī: fa-jarat sunna li-man qutila abran an yualliyya rakatayni
Ibn Hishām: fa-kāna Khubayb b. Adī awwal man sanna hātayni l-rakatayni
inda l-qatl li-l-muslīmīna

The general content of the traditions from al-Zuhrī, Ibn Isāq, and
ʿĀim are similar, but the details and the wording differ considerably.
Although Ibn Isāq was a student of al-Zuhrī and ʿĀim was a contem-
porary of al-Zuhrī—both living in Medina—these two versions should be

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 30 Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort

considered as different stories that circulated in Medina at the beginning of

the second Islamic century.63 Both versions agree that Khubayb’s behavior
before his execution established an example for Muslims to follow. This
means that by the beginning of the second Islamic century, the behavior
of a companion was considered exemplary for other Muslims if they found
themselves in similar situations.
In historical works, other companions are mentioned who became, or
were already considered, an exemplary model for other Muslims. The per-
son most mentioned is Caliph ʿUmar, individually on seven separate occa-
sions and in combination with Caliph Abū Bakr twice. Examples of the
reference to the sunna of ʿUmar are “he is the first to establish the custom
of passing the nights of Ramaān in prayer” (wa-huwa awwal man sanna
qiyām shahr Ramaān)64 and “Now it was ʿUmar’s practice and habit to”
(wa-kāna min sunnat Umar wa-sīratihi an).65 The combination of the
sunna of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar appears in particular in the description of
formal situations dealing with the conduct of a caliph, for example when
the wife of Caliph ʿUthmān encourages him to follow the conduct of his
two predecessors (wa-tatbau sunnat āibayka min qablika).66 These sunan
take place after the death of the Prophet. Only al-Yaʿqūbī includes one
tradition in which he describes the establishment of a custom by Fā ima,
the daughter of the Prophet, during his lifetime. The Prophet orders her
to prepare a meal, which she did across three days. It became custom-
ary among the Banū Hāshim to do the same (fa-anaat lahum aāman
thalātha ayyām fa-ārat sunna fī Banī Hāshim).67 It is debatable whether
this is a sunna of Fā ima or the Prophet. Since the Prophet did not men-
tion the period of three days, I consider it reasonable to conclude that it
was her sunna.

The Sunna of the Prophet Muammad

The sunna of the Prophet constitutes, together with the undefined sunna,
the largest part of the terms in traditions dealing with Muammad’s ances-
tors, his lifetime, and the reign of the rightly guided caliphs in the seven
sīra and historical works (i.e. 69%, or 124 out of 180). In the historical
works, the sunna of the Prophet takes up 33 percent—in al-Yaʿqūbī’s work
as much as 36 percent—of the total number of references to the concepts of
sunna. Even more astonishing is the fact that in the seven books, the term
sunna takes up 85 percent of the total number of words connected with the
sunna of the Prophet (50 out of 59). Furthermore, more than half—32 out
of 59—of the references to the sunna of the Prophet appear in combina-
tion with the book of God (i.e. kitāb Allāh wa-sunna nabiyyihi/rasūl Allāh),

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 The Concept of sunna Based on the Analysis of sīra 31

in which the sunna of the Prophet is presented as an additional source of

information for the conduct of a Muslim.
An example of this is the tradition about the consultation council estab-
lished in 23/644 and comprising six people tasked with the responsibility
of selecting Caliph ʿUmar’s successor. In the version of Maʿmar, one of the
candidates, ʿUthmān, is asked whether he will act in accordance with the
book of God, the practice of His Prophet, and the example of the two previ-
ous caliphs (Abū Bakr and ʿUmar) ([ . . . ] an tamala bi-kitāb Allāh wa-sun-
nat nabiyyihi wa-bimā amila bihi al-khalīfatāni min badihi).68 Al-abarī
mentions a similar account in his description of the council without speci-
fying his informants for this part. The question is first directed to ʿAlī and
then to ʿUthmān: “Will you indeed act in accordance with God’s book, the
practice of His Messenger and the example of the two caliphs after him?”
(la-tamalanna bi-kitāb Allāh wa-sunnat rasūlihi wa-sīrat al-khalīfatayni
min badihi?)69 According to this tradition, following the sunna (practice)
of the Prophet is one of the requisites when establishing the candidacy of a
prospective caliph of the Islamic empire.
The other occurrences of this type of sunna include either the terms
sunan or sanna, for example, al-Wāqidī mentions the tradition that “the
best practices are the practices of Muammad” (wa-khayr al-sunan sunan
Muammad), or the undefined term sunna or al-sunna. The context shows
that the practice is derived from the Prophet. For example, in the Sīra of
Yūnus it is mentioned that “then the Messenger of God performed four
prayers, which became a custom” (thumma allā rasūl Allāh lm arbaan
fa-ārat sunna).70 Yūnus, Ibn Hishām, and al-abarī also include the tradi-
tion that the Prophet intentionally refrained from some acts in order to
avoid establishing a sunna (i.e. a practice that is followed by others, after
him). Guillaume remarks that it is possible that the words “sunna min
badī” have been added to the text, because they show an anticipation of
the later authority of his behavior. If that is the case, Ibn Isāq would be
responsible for the addition, because the three collections all contain a vari-
ant version of his tradition with this sentence.71 Ibn Isāq’s tradition on
the avoidance of the establishment of a sunna can be dated to the second
quarter of the second Islamic century.

The Undefined Sunna

Similar to the concept of sunna of the Prophet and a companion, the histor-
ical sources contain the most references to the undefined sunna. Undefined
means that it is not clear who established the custom in contrast with the
types of sunna discussed before. Fifty seven percent of the terms are found

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 32 Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort

in the selected sections of al-abarī’s Tārīkh (37 out of 65). It constitutes
42 percent of all terms in his work (37 of 89). Only a few undefined terms
are present in traditions relating events from the lifetime of the Prophet or
the reign of Abū Bakr. I will here discuss several occurrences of the unde-
fined sunna in the earliest sources.
The Kitāb al-Maghāzī of Maʿmar contains one instance of the word
al-sunna in a tradition about Caliph ʿUmar describing the last year of his
reign in 23/644. According to this tradition, ʿUmar becomes angry when
he is informed that an anonymous person (fulān in the text) is suggested
to succeed him after his death. He wanted to address the people of Mecca,
but his advisors urged him to wait until he returned to Medina, because
“it is the house of the sunna and the migration” (wa-lākin amhil yā amīr
al-muʾminīna attā taqdima al-Madīna fa-innahā dār al-sunna wa-l-hijra).
Sunna may refer to the practice of the Prophet, but it can also refer to the
practice of the community of Medina or practice in general. ʿAbd al-Razzāq’s
tradition is traced back to Maʿmar—al-Zuhrī—ʿUbayd Allāh b. ʿAbd Allāh
b ʿUtba—Ibn ʿAbbās. Ibn Hishām and al-abarī mention a similar phrasing
with the same chain of transmitters from al-Zuhrī. Respectively:72

Ibn Isāq: al-Madīna fa-innahā dār al-sunna

Al-abarī: al-Madīna fa-innahā dār al-hijra wa-l-sunna

The comparison of the expression in the traditions reveals a slight vari-

ance in wording of the expression dār al-sunna wa-l-hijra. The description
of the advice to Caliph ʿUmar and the reason for the advice are similar in
content as well as formulation in all traditions, which indicates that they
have a common source, that is, al-Zuhrī according to all chains of trans-
mitters. This means that al-Zuhrī’s reference to Medina as the house of
the migration and the sunna can be dated to the first quarter of the second
Islamic century.
Yūnus’ Sīra also mentions an undefined term of sunna on one occasion.
The word sunan seems to refer to the practices revealed in the Qurʾān after
the hijra, the flight from Mecca to Medina in 1/622 (wa-mā kāna min
al-farāʾi wa-l-sunan fa-innamā nazala bi-l-Madīna). It is not clear whether
they include the complete practices as shown by the Prophet or only the
references in the Qurʾān.73 To my knowledge, there exists no variant of this
tradition.
The undefined sunna also appears in combinations. Whereas in the
combination discussed in the previous paragraph the sunna of the Prophet
is clearly mentioned by the words nabī or rasūl Allāh (kitāb Allāh wa-sunnat
nabiyyihi), in the combinations arranged under the undefined type of
sunna, the sunna could exist in the form of the sunna of the Prophet, or the

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 The Concept of sunna Based on the Analysis of sīra 33

community of Muslims, or of a mixture of several sunan. See, for example,

“The Messenger of God commanded them to read the Qurʾān to them and
teach them the practices’” (wa-amarahum rasūl Allāh an yuqriʾūhum al-Qurʾān
wa-yuallimūhum al-sunan), or “to teach them the practices and the jurispru-
dence” (yuallimuhum al-sunan wa-l-fiqh).74 Furthermore, the sentence, “the
best practices are the practices of Muammad” (wa-khayr al-sunan sunan
Muammad), discussed before in the paragraph on the sunna of the Prophet,
is proof that other practices or practices of other people (individuals or
groups) did exist, but were considered—according to this tradition—as less
authoritative practices.75

Conclusion

The two questions raised at the beginning of this article were how did the
concept of sunna develop within the formative period of Islam, and was it
derived from the exemplary behavior of the Prophet or is it a mixture of
different concepts of sunna? In order to provide an answer to these ques-
tions, seven sīra and historical works originating in the first three centuries
of Islam were analyzed with a comparative study of the occurrence of the
terms sunna, sunan, and the derivatives of the verb sanna, coupled with a
study of the types of sunna they represent.
A first glance at the manifestations of the three terms in the seven works
showed that the historical works contain far more terms in the selected
period than the sīra works (80% versus 20%). The word sunna is mentioned
most frequently, except in the work of al-Wāqidī, and it seems that it was
more commonly used in the third Islamic century than in the second, par-
ticularly in the historical works. In the Sīra of Ibn Hishām and the abaqāt
of Ibn Saʿd, the majority of the terms, specifically, the term sunna, are preva-
lent in traditions about the period during which the Prophet Muammad
lived. In the later works of al-Yaʿqūbī and al-abarī, the majority of the three
words—and particularly the word sunna—are connected with the period of
the four rightly guided caliphs. Generally speaking, in the traditions about
the caliphate of Abū Bakr, both in the historical and the sīra works, the
three terms seldom appear—although in traditions relating later events, the
exemplary behavior of Abū Bakr, in general, is mentioned.
The analysis of the different concepts of sunna reveals eight different
kinds of sunna: God, a non-Islamic group, a group of Muslims, ajj, a pre-
Islamic individual, a companion, the Prophet Muammad, and the unde-
fined sunna. Among these sunan, the sunna of God, although mentioned
in the Qurʾān, is the least frequently used type of sunna in the selected

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 34 Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort

period of the seven sīra and historical works. It appears in formal situations,
such as official letters, a pledge of allegiance, or a speech. The sunna of the
Prophet constitutes—together with the undefined sunna—the largest part
of the different types of sunna. The most frequently used word to describe
the practices of the Prophet is the word sunna (85%). Furthermore, almost
half of the terms referring to the sunna of the Prophet appear in combina-
tion with the Qurʾān in the phrase “the book of God and the practice of
His Prophet.”
Overall, the latest sources contain the most variances of the concept
of sunna. Even though some scholars argue that the sunna of the Prophet
became authoritative and substituted the other types of sunna, the analysis
of the different concepts of sunna in the seven sira and historical works have
shown that the sīra works do not contain many references to sunna of the
Prophet and, in fact, contain very few references to any kind of sunna at all.
Furthermore, in the (later) historical sources, the words sunna, sunan, and
sanna appear more frequently, culminating in the late work of al-abarī.
Finally, the analysis has shown that the later historical works—perhaps
against the expectations—have preserved a wide range of different types
of sunna and contain even more varied types of sunna than the (earlier)
sīra works, although the sunna of the Prophet is one of the most frequently
used concepts. An explanation of these results could be that the discussion
among jurists about the status of the exemplary behavior of the Prophet
Muammad in the second Islamic century caused an increasing interest in
the general concept of sunna among scholars of history.

Notes

* I would like to thank Adam Walker for his careful revision of the English text and
for his valuable suggestions to improve this article. Any inaccuracy or mistake is, of
course, my fault.
1. Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First
Centuries of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 58. Yasin
Dutton, The Origins of Islamic Law: The Qurʾān, the Muwaaʾ and Madinan
ʿAmal (Richmond: Curzon, 1999), 164–165.
2. Earlier studies before Schacht who oppose the classical Islamic view are Ignaz
Goldziher’s, “The Principles of Law in Islam,” in The Historians’ History of the
World: VIII The History of Parthia, the Arabs, and the Crusades, 294–304, http://
www.unz.org/Pub/WilliamsHenry-1908v08-00294 and David S. Margoliouth,
The Early Development of Mohammedanism: Lectures delivered in the University
of London May and June 1913 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1914).

9781137376459_03_ch01.indd 34 8/6/2015 5:36:10 PM

 The Concept of sunna Based on the Analysis of sīra 35

3. Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: At the

Clarendon Press, 1979), 58.
4. Ibid., 2 and 58.
5. Zafar I. Ansari, “Islamic Juristic Terminology before Šāfiʿī: A Semantic Analysis
with Special Reference to Kūfa,” Arabica 19 (1972): 262 and 279–280.
6. Ibid., 263.
7. Ibid. Examples of traditions with the terminology sunnat al-nabī that Ansari
gives are the tradition about the death of ʿUmar in 23/644 and two letters of
al-asan al-Barī and ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿIbād to the Umayyad Caliph ʿAbd al-Malik
b. Marwān (reigned 65–86/685–705).
8. Ibid., 265 and 267.
9. Ibid., 273, 274, 281 and 282.
10. Ibid., 280 and 281.
11. Meïr M. Bravmann, The Spiritual Background of Early Islam: Studies in Ancient
Arab Concepts (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), 155, 160, 164, and 165–166.
12. Ibid., 164, 167–168.
13. Ibid., 163.
14. Ibid., 129 and 175.
15. Ibid., 129, 163 and 175.
16. Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph, 58–59.
17. Ibid., 58–59.
18. Ibid., 54–55, 64, 66–68.
19. Ibid., 72. Crone and Hinds admit that the Umayyad Caliph ʿUmar II (reigned
99–101/717–720) is possibly an exception. However, they doubt the authen-
ticity of the ascription of many traditions to him. See 73–74 and 80.
20. Ibid., 83, 85.
21. Ibid., 85.
22. Ibid., 87–88.
23. Ibid., 91.
24. In his earlier publication Muslim Tradition, Gualtherus H. A. Juynboll dates the
narrowing down of the concept of sunna to the end of the first Islamic century,
but in his article “Some New Ideas” he argues that the concept of sunnat al-nabī
did not overshadow the sunnas of other persons before the middle of the second
Islamic century. See Muslim Tradition: Studies in Chronology, Provenance and
Authorship of Early adīth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 30
and “Some New Ideas on the Development of Sunna as a Technical Term in
Early Islam,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 10 (1987): 101.
25. Juynboll, Muslim Tradition, 30–34 and “Some New Ideas,” 99–103.
26. Dutton, The Origins, 157 and 162–167.
27. The chapter Kitāb al-Maghāzī of ʿAbd al-Razzāq’s al-Muannaf contains one
reference to the word sunna in a tradition that is not attributed to Maʿmar. The
Prophet says in a tradition about the marriage of his daughter Fā ima, “I gave
my daughter in marriage to my nephew. I would like that it will be the habit
of my community (sunnat ummatī) to give food at a wedding” (innī zawwajtu
bnatī ibn ʿammī wa-anā uibbu an yakūna min sunnat ummatī iʿām al-aʿām

9781137376459_03_ch01.indd 35 8/6/2015 5:36:11 PM

 36 Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort

ʿinda al-nikā). I did not include it in my selection, because the tradition is not
traced back to Maʿmar and is therefore not part of Maʿmar’s work. The chain of
transmitters is ʿAbd al-Razzāq—Yayā b. al-ʿAlāʾ—Shuʿayb b. Khālid—anzala
b. Samura b. al-Musayyab—his father—his grandfather—Ibn ʿAbbās. See
ʿAbd al-Razzāq, al-Muannaf, V, 486–487 no. 9782. See Nicolet Boekhoff-van
der Voort, “The Kitāb al-Maghāzī of ʿAbd al-Razzāq b. Hammām al-Sanʿānī:
Searching for Earlier Source-Material,” in Transmission and Dynamics of
the Textual Sources of Islam: Essays in Honour of Harald Motzki, eds. Nicolet
Boekhoff-van der Voort, Kees Versteegh, and Joas Wagemakers (Leiden and
Boston: Brill, 2011), 29–30.
28. Boekhoff-van der Voort, “The Kitāb al-Maghāzī,” 29. The information on
the other chapters of the Muannaf is based on Harald Motzki’s analysis of
this work. See for more information Harald Motzki, “The Muannaf of ʿAbd
al-Razzāq al- anʿānī as a Source of Authentic Aādīth of the First Century
A.H.,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 50 (1991) and The Origins of Islamic
Jurisprudence: Meccan Fiqh before the Classical Schools (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
29. See particularly Maher Jarrar, Die Prophetenbiographie im islamischen Spanien:
Ein Beitrag zur Überlieferungs- und Redaktionsgeschichte (Frankfurt am Main:
Peter Lang, 1989), 28–29.
30. Rizwi Faizer and Andrew Rippin, Introduction to The Life of Muammad:
Al-Wāqidī’s Kitāb al-Maghāzī, ed. Rizwi Faizer (London and New York:
Routledge, 2011), xv; Jarrar, Die Prophetenbiographie, 35–36 and 85. Ibn
Hishām received Ibn Isāq’s material from Ziyād al-Bakkāʾī (d. 183/799), who
heard the Sīra twice from him. Ibn Hishām edited and transmitted the work
of al-Bakkāʾī. Jarrar, Die Prophetenbiographie, 82–83 and Alfred Guillaume,
Introduction to The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul
Allah (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), xvii.
31. Faizer and Rippin, Introduction to The Life, xiv; Guillaume, Introduction to
The Life, xxxii.
32. Faizer and Rippin, Introduction to The Life, xii.
33. Guillaume, Introduction to The Life, xxxii.
34. Muhammad Q. Zaman, “Al-Yaʿūbī,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam: Second Edition,
eds. P. Bearman,Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs, Brill
Online, http://www.brillonline.nl/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/al-yakubi
-SIM_7970.
35. Franz Rosenthal, General introduction to The History of al-abarī: Volume I:
General Introduction and From the Creation to the Flood (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1989), 132–133; Guillaume, Introduction to
The Life, xxxiii.
36. Juynboll counts 18 appearances of sunna and sunan in the Qurʾān, while Ansari
and Badawi count them 16 times. Ansari, “Islamic Juristic Terminology,” 261;
Elsaid M. Badawi and Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of
Qurʾanic Usage (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2008), 460; Gualtherus H. A.
Juynboll, “Sunna,” in Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe,
Brill Online, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of
-the-quran/sunna-SIM_00408.

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 The Concept of sunna Based on the Analysis of sīra 37

37. Ibid.
38. The translation of Q.33:62 is from Badawi and Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English
Dictionary, 460.
39. Ansari, “Islamic Juristic Terminology,” 262.
40. See footnote 46 where I explain how I estimated the total number of these three
terms in al-abarī’s Taʾrīkh.
41. It could be argued that the amount of text might also cause a difference in the
number of terms, but al-Yaʿqūbī’s work is of a similar size as al-Wāqidī’s Kitāb
al-Maghāzī and Ibn Hishām’s Sīra.
42. See pages 8–9.
43. Al-Wāqidī, Kitāb al-Maghāzī, 409. The translation is taken from Faizer, The
Life, but I changed his translation of “kitāb Allāh wa-sunnatuhu” “the book of
God and its practices” to “the book of God and His practice.”
44. Ibn Saʿd, al-abaqāt, VII, 89–90 no. 2999 (ʿUmayr b. ʿA iyya al-Laythī).
Al-abarī, Tārīkh, V, 285 and VI, 4.
45. Ibn Saʿd, al-abaqāt, VIII, 78 no. 4131 (Umm abība bt. Abī Sufyān).
Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, 73.
46. Al-Wāqidī, Kitāb al-Maghāzī., 595. The translation is from Faizer, The Life, 438.
47. Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra, IV, 74 (Ghazwat unayn); Guillaume, The Life, 569.
48. Al-abarī, Tārīkh, IV, 174.
49. The rituals of the pilgrimage to ʿArafāt, a mountain on a small plain near
Mecca, take place on the ninth day of the twelfth Islamic month Dhū l-ijja.
The rituals consist of the “standing” [before God] (wuqūf) at ʿArafāt from noon
until shortly after sunset, preceded by a sermon. Without this “standing” the
pilgrimage is legally not considered valid. Uri Rubin, “ʿArafāt,” in Encyclopaedia
of Islam: Three, eds. Gudrun Krāmer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and
Everett Rowson, Brill Online, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries
/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/arafat-COM_22903.
50. Yūnus, Sīra, 90 no. 117. Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra, I, 150 ( adīth al- ums).
51. Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra, IV, 217. Al-abarī, Tārīkh, III, 223. The translation is
from Guillaume, The Life, 650.
52. Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra, IV, 209 (Islām Banī ārith b. Kaʿb). Al-abarī, Tārīkh, III,
211. The translation is from Guillaume, The Life, 647.
53. Al-abarī, Taʾrīkh, II, 204. The translation of the terms al-ʿatīra and al-rajabi-
yya are based on the information found in W. Montgomery Watt and M. V.
McDonald, trans., The History of al-abarī: Volume VI: Muammad at Mecca
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988), 40 footnote 53.
54. Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra, I, 104 ( ilf al-Fuūl).
55. Ibn Saʿd, al-abaqāt, I, 62 (Dhikr Hāshim b ʿAbd Manāf). The Negus was the
emperor of Ethiopia at that time.
56. Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, I, 207.
57. Al-abarī, Taʾrīkh, II, 190.
58. Ibn Saʿd, al-abaqāt, I, 72 (Dhikr nadhr ʿAbd al-Mualib an yanura bnahu).
Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, I, 215.
59. Respectively, al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, 8 and I, 214. In the latter, ʿAbd al-Mu alib
is warned that a certain act could become an example for his tribe (Yā Abā

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 38 Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort

l- ārith! Innaka in faʿalta dhālika ārat sunna fī qawmika). For more informa-
tion on the practices of ʿAbd al-Mu alib that are also revealed in the Qurʾān
Uri Rubin, “ʿAbd al-Mu alib b. Hāshim,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam: Three,
eds. Gudrun Krāmer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas and Everett Rowson,
Brill Online, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of
-islam-3/abd-al-muttalib-b-hashim-SIM_0156.
60. ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Muannaf, V, 355 no. 9730. Al-Wāqidī, Kitāb al-Maghāzī, 269
(Ghazwat al-Rajīʿ). Al-abarī, Taʾrīkh, III, 83 (Ghazwat al-Rajīʿ).
61. Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra, III, 159 (Dhikr yawm al-Rajīʿ).
62. See my discussion of these traditions in Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort, “The
Raid of the Hudhayl: Ibn Shihab al-Zuhri’s Version of the Event,” in Analysing
Muslim Traditions: Studies in Legal, Exegetical and Maghazi Hadith, eds. Harald
Motzki with Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort, and Sean Anthony, (Leiden and
Boston, MA: Brill, 2010).
63. See my detailed discussion of this account in Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort,
Between History and Legend: The Biography of the Prophet Muammad
by Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī, Ph.D. diss., Radboud University Nijmegen, 2012,
39–112.
64. Ibn Saʿd, al-abaqāt, III, 313 (Dhikr istikhlāf ʿUmar). See also al-Yaʿqūbī,
Taʾrīkh, II, 96.
65. Al-abarī, Tārīkh, V, 36. The translation is from G. Rex Smith, trans., The
History of al-abarī: Volume XIV: The Conquest of Iran (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1994), 51.
66. Al-abarī, Tārīkh, V, 161.
67. Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, 43.
68. ʿAbd al-Razzāq, al-Muannaf, V, 477 no. 9775.
69. Al-abarī, Taʾrīkh, V, 80 (23 AH—Qiat al-shūra). The translation is from
Rex Smith, The History, XIV, 152.
70. Al-Wāqidī, Kitāb al-Maghāzī, 671. Yūnus, Sīra, 117 no. 172.
71. Yūnus, Sīra, 314 no. 518. Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra, III, 88 (Ghazwat Uud).
Al-abarī, Tārīkh, III, 76. Guillaume, The Life, 387, footnote 1.
72. ʿAbd al-Razzāq, al-Muannaf, V no. 9758. Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra, IV, 273 (Amr
Saqīfa Banī Sāʿida). Al-abarī, Taʾrīkh, III, 255 ( adīth al-shaqīfa).
73. Yūnus, Sīra, 256 no. 423.
74. Al-Wāqidī, Kitāb al-Maghāzī, 620 and 594, respectively. The first translation
is from Faizer, The Life, 457. Faizer translated the second sentence with “to
inform them of the practice and jurisprudence of Islam,” 437. I decided to stay
close to the Arabic phrase.
75. Al-Wāqidī, Kitāb al-Maghāzī, 681.

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 Chapter 2

Uūl al-sunna: The Tenets of Islamic

Orthodoxy and Orthopraxy According
to the Traditionalists (Ahl al-adīth)
Ahmet Temel

Introduction

This chapter explores the meaning of uūl al-sunna in pre-classical and early
classical period and its interrelation with the conceptual development of
the term “uūl” during this period, within larger discussions on the use of
the same. The term uūl was used in multiple Islamic intellectual traditions
by diverse groups of the time. However, this study argues that the different
renderings of the term had a common purpose of representing orthodoxy
and the principles of establishing normativity in Islam. Any use of uūl
entails a claim of representing the correct understanding of Islam to which
everyone should adhere, or a normative and common role in the topics to
which this concept is attached. The concept of uūl al-sunna, in this regard,
was not an exception. This term was employed by the traditionalists, also
known as ahl al-adīth, to show the fundamental principles of “true Islam”
based on adhering to the corpus of sunna embodied in adīth texts that
passed their chain-based criteria of authenticity. In order to demonstrate the
nature of this relationship, I will begin my analysis by exploring the lexi-
cal meaning of the word uūl and the relationship between uūl and furū‘.
This is followed by an examination of the different renderings of the term

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 40 Ahmet Temel

uūl in various religious sciences. Lastly, I will deal with the concept of uūl
al-sunna in detail as it appeared in the relevant literature.

Uūl vs. Furū‘

Uūl is the plural of al, which means the lower part of something, the
foundation and root upon which something else is based. Furū‘ is the plural
of far‘, which means the upper part of something or a branch.1 In parallel
with the lexical meanings, two kinds of relationships between the words
uūl and furū‘ seem to have been considered, and were used sometimes
slightly differently and sometimes vaguely interchangeably during the early
classical period, namely, constitutive and hierarchical. In the constitutive
relationship, uūl is understood as things that are needed for the existence of
furū‘. In other words, things that are furū‘ emanate from other things that
are uūl. In this kind of relationship, the English equivalent of uūl would
be “sources” or “causes” and of furū‘ would be “outcomes” or “results”. For
example, when he describes his work Kitāb uūl al-futyā wa-al-akām,
al-Jāi underscores this meaning by claiming that the differences in subor-
dinate (furū‘) and specific rulings (akām) depend on the divergent views
on the sources of legal opinions (uūl al-futyā).2
The second type of relationship between uūl and furū‘ is conceptualized
in terms of priorities between different entities. Accordingly, the uūl are
“primary” and furū‘ are “secondary.” In this sense, however, secondary things
(furū‘) are not necessarily based on the primary entities. In other words, the
secondary entities do not originate from primary entities, because they have
a hierarchical relationship, but not a constitutive relationship. In this mean-
ing, uūl can be translated as “fundamentals” or “essentials,” and furū‘ as
“subordinates” and “details.” For instance, al-Mātūrīdī explains uūl al-dīn
through the categories of belief, the kinds of rituals, the rulings on certain
punishments and rights, and good ethics. According to his account, the
Qurʾān explains these uūl that are primary and general, while the prophet
explains other kinds of details that are furū‘.3
Both usages might implicitly entail the claim of significance; however,
sometimes, the term uūl might refer only to significant things in the sense
of priorities, without implying a constitutive relationship whatsoever or vice
versa. Be that as it may, one thing is common for all these nuances in using
these two words, namely: the conviction that uūl and furū‘ should be inter-
related with each other. If there is a constitutive relationship between uūl
and furū‘, furū‘ should not contradict the uūl; and if there is a hierarchical
relationship, furū‘ should not precede uūl. However, I argue that through

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 Uūl al-sunna 41

what Pierre Hadot calls a process of creative mistakes and misrepresenta-

tions, scholars confused the ideas of constitutive relationship between uūl
and furū‘ with the idea of a hierarchical relationship throughout the early
development of Islamic intellectual history.4 This resulted in looking for an
assumed dependence between those things that are deemed primary and
those that are secondary, although they may or may not have that kind of
relationship. For instance, the efforts to represent fiqh and kalām as having
such constitutive relationship, I argue, can be explained in the same way.
In the remaining part of this chapter, I trace the usage of the term uūl in
diverse intellectual traditions of Islam during the early classical period.

Uūl al-Dīn

Now, I turn to the conceptual history of uūl in the intellectual disciplines of

Islam. The word uūl in the literature of religious sciences was used in four
main phrases during the early classical period, highlighting either a type of
relationship based on dependence, or sequence. First, the phrase uūl al-dīn
was used in multiple contexts. It was used in the sense of multiple primary
and general topics of religion. As pointed out earlier, al-Māturīdī uses this
concept when he mentions an interpretation of the verse “This book was
sent down for explaining everything (tibyānan li kulli shay’in)” by explaining
the generality of the meaning of the verse in terms of uūl al-dīn. In this
sense, he uses uūl al-dīn to include belief (īmān), kinds of rituals (anwā‘
al-‘ibādāt), the rulings on certain punishments and rights (al-akām ma‘a
al-udūd wa-al-uqūq), and good ethics (makārim al-akhlāq). According to
this interpretation, these topics of uūl al-dīn are explained by the Qurʾān,
while other topics outside of uūl al-dīn are explained by the prophet.5
Along similar lines, uūl al-dīn was used to mean significant primary top-
ics of religion about which a Muslim should necessarily be informed. Abū
Ja‘far al-Naās (338/950), for instance, uses the phrase uūl al-dīn with
this meaning in the context of defining the words “islām” and “īmān” where
he mentions a pilgrimage (ajj); these are things about which, according to
him, one must not be ignorant.6
The third sense in which the concept of uūl al-dīn has been employed
was as a synonym for kalām, in reference to Islamic theology. This usage
of the concept is seen increasingly after the late third century hijri.7 For
example, al-Jaā uses the same concept for religious beliefs upon which
disagreement is not acceptable, and are complementary to those found in
pre-Qur’anic monotheistic revelations such as the Torah.8 In this sense, uūl
al-dīn meant the principles of belief in religion, which are primary vis-a-vis

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 42 Ahmet Temel

the rulings (akām), which are secondary. The principles of belief (i‘tiqād)
were regarded as the most important aspects of religion on which per-
son’s salvation depended. However, there was no constitutive relationship
between belief, which is more important, and practical matters of religion,
such as fiqh for example.9
The last meaning used for the concept of uūl al-dīn during the early
classical period is the meaning of uūl al-dīn as the sources of religion. For
instance, al-Mala ī (377/987), a Shāfi‘ī jurist, mentions ijmā‘ as one of the
sources of religion (alun min uūl al-dīn).10

Uūl al-Tawīd

The second use of the term uūl in relation to the religious sciences of Islam
was uūl al-tawīd. This term was strictly used with regard to theology.
Despite the fact that the more common term for theology during that time
was kalām, the principles of belief in Islam were also identified by categories
termed ‘ilm al-tawīd or ma‘rifat al-tawīd. Keeping this in mind, a con-
cept such as uūl al-tawīd can be identified in certain texts of the time. In
the introduction to his work Akām al-qur’ān, al-Jaā uses this concept to
refer to “significant topics of ma‘rifat al-tawīd that everyone should know.”
Unfortunately, although the main text of this work is available, there are no
known extant manuscripts of its introduction.11 Before al-Jaā, al-Qāsim
b. Ibrāhim al-Rassī devoted a treatise to Uūl al-‘adl wa-al-tawīd, in which
he uses the concept of uūl to refer to “the agreed upon components of the
sources of truth.” According to him, uūl refers to the agreed upon part of
the sources of ‘aql, kitāb, and the reports from the prophet (adīth) based on
ijmā‘ and furū‘ refers to the disagreed upon matters in these sources, which
should be regulated by uūl. In other words, al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm argues
that ijmā‘ must be the litmus test to distinguish the “primary” (uūl.) from
secondary (furū‘ ) components from secondary components. The primary
components are those matters of agreement upon which there is consen-
sus (ijmā‘).12 This consensus based distinction between uūl and furū‘ and
the claim of evaluating furū‘ based on uūl are the most crucial factors for
understanding the origins of the concept of uūl. It appear that this idea was
circulating in the late second and early third centuries as an important pro-
posal of reason-based theologians and scholars for establishing normativity
and minimizing disagreements, as opposed to the proposal of ahl al-adīth
that argues for independent authority of the transmitted reports of reliable
narrators over all other sources.13

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 Uūl al-sunna 43

Uūl al-Futya/Uūl al-Fiqh

Another context in which, the term uūl was used was with respect to fiqh
in the form of uūl al-fiqh or uūl al-futyā during the pre-classical and early
classical period. Here the concept of uūl refers to the fundamental topics of
fiqh such as prayer and alms giving (zakāt) in the usage of uūl al-fiqh, or
to certain common and distinct aspects and/or maxims among these rul-
ings in uūl al-futyā. Ibn al-Nadīm, for instance, uses uūl al-fiqh to refer
to certain topics of fiqh when he attributes certain texts to scholars. For
example, he mentions a book of punishments and contracts in uūl al-fiqh
“kitāb al-udūd wa-al-‘uqūd fi uūl al-fiqh.”14 Abū Yūsuf uses this phrase
after mentioning ablution (wuū’) and sitting in prayer (tashahhud) in the
sense of well-known topics of fiqh. The same meaning is found in al-Shāfi‘ī,
who cites Abū Yūsuf in his al-Umm.15 The Mālikī scholar Muammad b.
al-ārith al-Khushanī (361/971) wrote a book with the title of “uūl al-
futya fī fiqh ‘alā madhhab Mālik” in which he tries to show common and
differing aspects between certain topics in fiqh of Mālikī school as well as
disagreements among the followers of the madhhab, a new type of writing
for his time that combined what later became distinct genres known as
furūq or khilāf or al-ashbāh wa-al-naā’ir.16 For instance, in the topic of
zakāh al-fir, al-Khushanī makes the following statement:

The overarching principle in zakāth al-fi r is that it is obligatory for the man
to give for himself and his dependent family members. According to Ibn
al-Qāsim the deadline for this charity is the dawn of the first day of Ramadān
feast. According to Ashhab and Ibn al-Majishūn the deadline is the sunset of
the last day of Ramaān.

Even though these uses of uūl in relation to fiqh were not referring to
“theoretical discussions on the sources of fiqh” as they came to be known
at the beginning of the fourth hijrī century, they did imply some kind of
general approach of reason-based scholars (ahl-ra’y) in distinguishing pri-
mary components from the secondary ones and the relation of dependence
between the two. Also, it should be mentioned that al-Jāi’s lost work Kitāb
uūl al-futyā wa-al-akām did include certain theoretical topics of the sci-
ence of uūl al-fiqh as the direct causes of disagreements in the details of fiqh.
In that sense, uūl al-futyā might have entailed a meaning encompassing uūl
al-fiqh in its technical meaning of the classical period as a scientific field.
All these three different uses of uūl, in uūl al-dīn, uūl al-tawhid, and
uūl al- fiqh refer to a common meaning of agreement or, more precisely,

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 44 Ahmet Temel

a claim for things that are subject to agreement. In the case of uūl al-dīn,
uūl has this meaning of that which is minimally agreed on in relation to
the most fundamental elements of religion (al-dīn). In the case of uūl
al-tawīd, uūl refers to certain principles of belief that should be accepted
unanimously. With respect to uūl al-futyā, by the word uūl, certain com-
mon aspects of differing topics are implied. Lastly, in uūl al-fiqh, as it was
employed in pre-classical and early classical period, uūl refers to the main
topics of fiqh that all jurists implicitly agree to discuss among the topics
of fiqh.
In the rest of our investigation, we will discuss whether this common
meaning exists in the use of uūl al-sunna and what it really means in that
particular use.

Uūl al-Sunna

The term sunna was probably one of the main multivalent terms of the
first centuries of Islam that underwent different stages and was fixed with
the authority of the prophet in religion and the reports representing this
authority. The term uūl al-sunna, therefore, was primarily used by the tra-
ditionalists (ahl-adīth) of the early periods who focused on collecting the
reports about the prophet, either in oral or written form. However, this use
was unrelated to the later use of uūl al-adīth, which refers to the science
dealing with the methods and principles of adīth criticism.
Uūl al-sunna appears to have been used by the traditionalists in the
sense of theoretical principles of religion based largely on the topics related
to belief that are filtered through the normativity apprehended via chained
reports. This meaning was an alternative employed by the ahl-adīth to
that of uūl al-dīn and uūl al-tawīd by their adversaries, who were mostly
Mu‘tazila and Murji’a. The concept of uūl al-sunna, over time, became a
name for a distinct genre alternative to that of kalām, and, in addition to
adding a legal dimension to it. The works produced in this genre used the
title of uūl al-sunna, or only sunna. This section will analyze the works
titled with uūl al-sunna, but the other works with similar contents hav-
ing the title “al-sunna” can be also considered belonging to this genre such
as Abd Allah b. Amad b. anbal’s (290/903) al-Sunna,17 al-Muzanī’s
(264/878) treatise Shar al-sunna,18 Abū Bakr al-Khallāl’s (311/923) al-
Sunna,19 al-Barbahārī’s (329/914) Sharh al-sunna,20 and Ibn Abī ‘Āim’s
(287/900) al-Sunna.21
The concept of sunna in the phrase uūl al-sunna signifies a particular
group of scholars who had a distinct approach in understanding religion

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 Uūl al-sunna 45

with its all fields such as beliefs, laws, ethics, and asceticism, rather than its
terminological meaning as the exemplar of the prophet and/or the com-
panions per se. This approach defines religion as a phenomenon that was
perfectly embodied in its entirety in the past during the age of the prophet
and his companions. This is why the practices and traditions that emerged
within the first few generations of Muslims represent the true religion. In
order to follow the true religion, therefore, the people who come any time
after the first generation should imitate (ittibā‘) these early Muslims by
sticking to the sound narrations (aī adīth) that reportedly go back to
them regarding what they believed and how they practiced all the aspects
of Islam. In addition to being the main characteristic of the traditional-
ist ahl al-adīth, this approach significantly influenced what later became
“Sunnī sect” (ahl al-sunna) and also the considerably Shi‘a, especially the
akhbārīs,22 as well as various Islamic movements of following centuries
until the present time.23 The rest of this section will analyze how the phrase
uūl al-sunna was used in its own extant genre of the pre-classical and the
early classical periods to point out the distinct principles to be followed,
in order to be considered a member of “sunna group,” which was claimed
to be the only true representation of Islam.24 Then it will deal with non-
extant titles on uūl al-sunna in the bio-bibliographical accounts. Lastly,
the uses of this phrase in the diverse genres of Islamic intellectual literature
are explored.

Uūl al-Sunna in the Genre of Uūl al-Sunna

The first known work with a title using the phrase uūl al-sunna is attributed
to Abū Bakr al-umaydī (219/834), who was known as a pupil of Sufyān b.
Uyayna (198/814) and who was one of the teachers of al-Bukhārī.25 In his
treatise, al-umaydī covers the following topics:

● belief (īmān) in predestination (qadar),

● increase and decrease in belief,
● respect for all of the companions,
● the nature of the Qurʾān as the word of God,
● the vision of God in the hereafter,
● the proof of the attributes of God,
● the difference between ahl al-sunna and al-khawārij on the excom-
munication of a major sinner,
● the pillars of Islam and the situation of abandoning them,
● and theological opinions of Sufyān b. Uyayna on the nature of the
Qurʾān and belief.

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 46 Ahmet Temel

Based on its content and the fact that this treatise follows al-Humaydī’s
al-Musnad, it is clear that, by uūl al-sunna, al-umaydī refers to the most
significant topics of belief that everyone should accept through the lens of trans-
mitted reports.
The second work on uūl al-sunna is attributed to the famous tradition-
alist Amad b. anbal. Even though he does not provide a definition for the
term, the components in his description of uūl al-sunna clearly refer to the
main theoretical principles in religion according to ahl al-adīth as he iden-
tified them. Amad b. anbal states that “according to us, the principles of
the sunna (uūl al-sunna) are:

● Adhering to the practice and the way of the companions of the prophet
and following them.
● Abstaining from innovation (bid‘a) which is aberration (alāla), and
from debating in the matters of religion.
● The sunna that entails the signs of the Qurʾān explains the Qurʾān
● There is no qiyās in sunna as it cannot be used a source of analogy,
[since] there is no role for reason, or personal desire [hawa]in it,
because it [sunna] is just something to be obeyed and for which per-
sonal desire should be put aside.
● In order to be considered as belonging to the people of sunna it is nec-
essary to believe in destination (qadar), both its evil and good and to
confirm the reports about it. If one does not accept or believe all these
reports, one does not deserve to be associated with sunna.
● This belief should be without asking why and how[bi la kayfa]. And
confirming belief-related reports is enough for those who do not know
the explanation of reports and cannot grasp them. They are only
obliged to confirm these reports such as those about predestination or
vision of God (ru’yat Allah).
● One cannot reject even a letter of a report as long as it is transmitted
by reliable narrators [aī], regardless of the content [matn].
● It is condemned and prohibited to debate or to learn dialectics of
kalām for the topics listed above (predestination, the vision of God,
and the Qurʾān).
● One cannot be from ahl al-sunna unless one believes in sound reports
[aī adīth]and refrains from dialectics.”26

This quotation clearly indicates that what Ahmad b. anbal meant by

uūl al-sunna was not about adīth criticism and it was not limited to the
realm of belief. Rather, it was used to refer to theoretical principles of religion
based on the acceptance of soundly transmitted reports [saih adīth] as the
overarching principle. It is a well-known fact to the scholars of early Islamic

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 Uūl al-sunna 47

intellectual history that the Mu‘tazila named themselves ahl al-tawīd wa-
al-‘adl, and ahl al-adīth referred to themselves as ahl al-sunna. It should not
be a coincidence that these two concepts were also the most salient aspects
of religion according to these groups respectively. Mu‘tazila based their the-
ology on the belief in tawīd and ‘adl and, as discussed above, ahl al-sunna
uses the concept of sunna in their general approach to all topics of religion,
including the tenets of belief. It seems to have been one of the few agree-
ments between the two camps that the realm of faith is more significant
than other components of religion to the extent that in this field believers
should not disagree. This is why we see such emphasis on belief-related top-
ics by both groups. Ibn Qutayba (276/889), a well-known member of ahl
al-adīth, articulates this clearly by emphasizing that “fiqh is a field in which
disagreements of people are permissible, but the disagreements among ahl
al-kalām fall into the realm of belief (tawīd), the attributes of God (ifāt),
and alike about which even a prophet would not know anything without
revelation.”27
Another work that has uūl al-sunna in its title was al-Zāhī fī uūl al-
sunna ‘alā madhhab al-Imām Mālik b. Anas, written by an eminent Mālikī
jurist in Mir (roughly, present day Egypt) Muammad b. al-Qāsim b.
Sha‘bān Ibn al-Qur ī (355/966).28 The original title of the book that was
given by the author was al-Sha‘bānī al-Zāhī. Most of bibliographical works
record it under this title, albeit a reversed version as al-Zāhī al-Sha‘bānī, or
just as Kitāb al-Zāhī, or as al-Zāhī fī al-fiqh.29 Even though the published
copy has the title with uūl al-sunna, according to Muammad Farīd, the
editor of the manuscript, the first page of the manuscript indicates the title
as al-Zāhī fī uūl al-sunan.30 The word sunan was a common usage for fiqh
topics in the works of traditionalists during that period. However, in the
electronic copy of the manuscript that I possess, the title is al-Zāhī fī uūl
al-sunna, in the singular. In the description of the manuscript that exists in
the library of Markaz Jum‘at al-Mājid in Dubai with the number 5951, it is
stated that the manuscript was probably copied in the late fifth or early sixth
hijrī century based on a note on the sixteenth folio. Therefore, the title as
al-Zāhī fī uūl al-sunna goes back to the sixth hijrī century at the latest.
According to the introduction of al-Zāhī, the author explains how he
titled the book originally as al-Sha‘bānī al-Zāhī as follows:

I have seen that many of his [Imām Mālik] followers disagree with one
another on the transmissions of certain cases (al-masā’il) related from him
outside of al-Muwa ā. However, they do not disagree on what they nar-
rated in it [al-Muwa ā] about the discussions, save some additional letters or
omission of some letters that do not change the meaning. Therefore, I have
documented what I selected among his disagreements by comparing them to

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 48 Ahmet Temel

their agreements in writing my book. Since it is supplemented to my own

selection from these discussions including those which they did not attribute
to the imām [Mālik], but can be considered in his madhhab, I entitled it with
my nisba [noun of relation] as al-Sha‘bānī al-Zāhī.

If we look at the contents of the work, despite it being based on an

incomplete manuscript, it consists of the topics of fiqh as ahāra (purifica-
tion), salāh (prayer), zakāh (alms-giving), iyām (fasting), ajj (pilgrimage),
jihād (just war), nudhūr wa-al-aymān (vows and oaths), aāyā (sacrifice),
and nikā (marriage) and alāq (divorce).
The reason for titling a book containing fiqh topics with the concept of
sunna might have had to do with the general inclination of traditionalist
scholars of the period in describing these topics with sunna or more com-
monly sunan. Yet, the reason for using the concept of uūl remains vague.
Taking into account how Ibn Qāsim describes his own book, the method
he used throughout the book, and the topics existing in the book altogether,
it lead us to conclude that the concept of uūl was used either by the trans-
mitter of the book Abū Ja‘far Amad b. Muammad, or by the scribe in the
early sixth hijrī century to indicate that the book has the claim of combin-
ing agreed upon matters in the fiqh of Imam Mālik and matters that can be
classified under his madhhab. Therefore, this use of the phrase uūl al-sunna
also has a claim of combining what constitute the normative teachings of
Mālik and a call for affirming the authority of this text with respect to the
opinions of Mālik and Mālikism as a madhhab to those who adhere to the
jurisprudence of Imam Mālik, or the followers of Mālikī madhhab for that
matter.
Ibn Ba a al-‘Ukbarī (387/997), an early anbalī contemporary of
al-Jaā, wrote a book known by its abbreviated title al-Ibāna al-sughrā.
However, the full title is al-Shar wa-al-ibāna ‘ala uūl al-sunna wa-al-
diyāna.31 Ibn Ba a explains in his introduction to the book that his reason
for writing it is the increase of disagreements based on predilections andin-
novations and the need for adherence to sunna, as represented by transmit-
ted reports, to prevent these disagreements.32 He also describes the content
of the work, in which, as he hints by using the term uūl in the title, he
identifies the agreed upon (ijmā‘ al-a’imma) topics that every Muslim nec-
essarily has to know about and follow in order to be considered belonging
to ahl al-sunna. After introducing the necessity of following the sunna that
is embodied in reports, Ibn Ba a first presents belief (kalām) topics and
then ethico-legal (fiqh and adab) topics with a sub-section beginning with
the phrase “it is from sunna that” (min al-sunna). He ends the book with
a section dealing with the things that are bid‘a (innovation). Ibn Ba a uses
sunna as the opposite of bid‘a throughout the work.

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 Uūl al-sunna 49

Ibn Abī Zamanayn (399/1008), an Andalusian-Mālikī scholar, wrote

another work that has the phrase uūl al-sunna in its title during that peri-
od.33 In the opening chapter of the work, Ibn Abī Zamanayn argues for
the necessity of adherence to sunna. He defines sunna as follows: “Indeed
sunna is the proof of the Qurʾān. It cannot be understood based on qiyās
and cannot be taken through ‘aql. It is to follow the leaders (a’imma) and
the way on which the majority of this umma (jumhūr hādhihi al-umma)
walked.”34 It should be noticed that Ibn Abī Zamanayn remarkably
emphasizes the majoritarian agreement in the very definition of sunna,
which underlines the relationship with agreement and orthodoxy, a point
repeated throughout this chapter. In the final paragraphs of the book, Ibn
Abī Zamanayn refers to uūl al-sunna by saying “Now I taught you the
opinions of the guiding scholars (a’imma al-hudā) and the experts of reli-
gious sciences (arbāb al-‘ilm) of the questions you asked and some other
questions that may be asked about uūl al-sunna with which the diverting
people of predilection (ahl al-ahwā’ al-muilla) differed.” It is evident from
this quote that Ibn Abī Zamanayn thinks that the topics he covered in
this book are the topics of uūl al-sunna. Most of this work examines the
belief-related topics and the problem of imāma from the perspective of ahl
al-adīth. Only some topics, which appeared also in certain works exam-
ined earlier above relate to the realm of law and politics, such as going to
jihād and pilgrimage with rulers and giving zakāh to them. It appears that
these topics were considered among the topics of uūl al-sunna as well as
kalām of the time.
The last extant work on uūl al-sunna belongs to Abū al-Qāsim al-Lālakā’ī
(418/1027), a prominent adīth scholar and a member of ahl al-adīth dur-
ing the late fourth and early fifth centuries.35 The title of the book appears
in various sources differently such as Sunna, Shar al-sunna, Uūl al-sunna,
and Shar i‘tiqādi ahl al-sunna. The manuscript has been published with
the last title. Since it was referred to with the phrase uūl al-sunna, it might
be useful to investigate why this title was used for this work. Al-Lālakā’ī was
a loyal member of ahl al-adīth and he repeatedly argues for the characteris-
tic principles of ahl al-adīth in his work. His use of the term uūl becomes
clear when he explains the reason for writing this book:

I was repeatedly asked by some scholars to write on “explaining the belief of

the view of ahl al-adīth” [shar i‘tiqād madhāhib ahl al-adīth], may Allah
bless their souls and make our remembrance of them a means for their for-
giveness. I have replied to them with this book, because I have seen fruitful
benefit and total sunnaic [sunniyya] gain in it, especially these days when
the contemporary scholars began to forget the foundations of the thoughts
[madhhāhib] of ahl al-sunna by turning away from them to the recently

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 50 Ahmet Temel

emerged new sciences. This caused the loss of old fundamental sources [al-uūl
al-qadīma] upon which sharī‘a was established. The predecessor scholars were
calling to these old fundamental sources and were guiding others based on
their method [arīq]. I have renewed this method, in order to make it available
for people to grasp its meanings and proofs and not to confine themselves to
hearing the title of this method superficially instead of its foundations.36

To my knowledge, this work was not only the last work bearing this
title in that specific period, but also was the last in the entire Islamic intel-
lectual history. In other words, the specific genre around the concept of
uūl al-sunna ceased to be used in the fifth hijrī century except in a few
commentaries [shar] and concise summaries [mukhtaar]. The reason for
this might have been due to lack of interest in such efforts among the tradi-
tionalist circles, or wide acceptance of kalām and uūl al-fiqh as new genres
of religious sciences.
In this context, Ibn Taymiyya argues that writing on uūl al-sunna
appeared as a response to the theologians[mutakallimun] and a kind of
alternative to the science of kalām. The theologians Ibn Taymiyya asserts,
talked about reasoning (naar), dalīl (proof), and ‘ilm (knowledge) and even-
tually argued for the temporality of attributes (hudūth al-a‘rā) based on
the temporality of objects (udūth al-ajsām) which led to things like the
idea of the createdness of the Qurʾān and invisibility of Allah in the hereaf-
ter. The second group emerged, in response to the theologians, and wrote
books with the titles of “uūl al-sunna” and “uūl al-sharī‘a” and alike, in
which they relied on the Qurʾān, sunna, and the words of salaf, but used rea-
son-based methods and proofs to back up the texts in these sources.37 Ibn
Taymiyya criticizes the latter for using these sources only for their transmit-
ting (ikhbārī) character and mixing sound reports with weak ones to prove
these report-based knowledge by using reason-based proofs. According to
Ibn Taymiyya both of these groups failed in their efforts, because they oper-
ated on the assumption that the Qurʾān and sunna, and the companions did
not contain the reason-based proofs.
After analyzing all the works having the title of uūl al-sunna, I now turn
my attention to first non-extant works bearing this title that is mentioned
in biobibliographical accounts. Then, I move on to how the concept was
employed within the body texts of various other works in diverse genres
during the early classical period.

Non-Extant Texts in the Genre of Uūl al-sunna

In his al-Tanbīh, al-Mala ī (377/987) relates from Muammad b. ‘Ukkāsha

(249/863), to whom a work with the title uūl al-sunna38 was attributed

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 Uūl al-sunna 51

and in which he discusses this concept as encompassing some 20 theologi-

cal, legal, and political principles as follows:

In what is certainly related from Muammad b. ‘Ukkāsha, he said: The

uūl al-sunna upon which the jurists and scholars39 agreed are “satisfaction
with the decree of Allah, submission to the command of Allah, patience to
the judgment of Allah, sticking to what Allah ordered and abstaining from
what he prohibited, the sincerity in action for the sake of Allah, belief in
the predestination including its harm and benefit, refraining from argu-
ments, disputes, and animosities in religion, wiping over leather socks, jihād
together with ahl al-qibla, funeral prayers for the deaths of ahl al-qibla is
sunna, imān increases and decreases, and it is the word (al-qawl) and the
deed (al-‘amal) together, the Qurʾān is the word of Allah, patience under the
rule of a leader regardless if he is righteous or tyrant, not to revolt against
leaders by power even if they are tyrants, not to assign anyone from mono-
theists (ahl al-tawīd) to the paradise or hell, not to excommunicate anyone
from them even if they commit grave sins, and not to speak foully about
the Companions of the Prophet. The order of virtue among them is Abū
Bakr, ‘Umar, Uthmān, and ‘Alī respectively, may Allah have mercy upon all
of them.40

The list of all these topics found in the above cited quote fortifies the the-
sis of this chapter regarding the relationship between uūl al-sunna with the
principles—mostly theological but also at times legal and political—which
shape the identity process of ahl al-adīth that had a distinct approach to
religion centered in adīth reports.”
It is reported that Ibn Sālim al-Barī (297/909) wrote a book titled Uūl
al-sunna wa-al-tawīd. This work has not been discovered yet. However,
there is a short excerpt from his book available in Ibn Taymiyya’s Dar’u
ta‘āru al-‘aql wa-al-naql.41 There Ibn Sālim argues that fira is the nature a
human being that was created in such a manner that it recognizes the one-
ness (wadāniyya) and divinity (rubūbiyya) of God, but this pre-knowledge
does not make one a monotheist or a denier. He refutes the idea of jabr (the
belief in forcing destiny) by his arguments on “the creation of the created
on this nature [coded with divine guidance]” based on certain verses and
adīth reports. Despite not having the entire book at our disposal, based on
this quote, we can safely argue that this work was similarly written on heav-
ily kalām topics from the lenses of adīth texts.
Abū ‘Abd Allah al-asan b. āmid al-Warrāq al-anbalī (403/1013)
is reported to have produced a work on uūl al-sunna.42 Another anbalī
scholar Abū ‘Alī al-Baghdādī (471/1078) is credited with a work titled
Mukhtaar uūl al-sunna, whose title implies that it might have been a con-
cise version of Amad b. anbal’s Uūl al-sunna.43

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 52 Ahmet Temel

The Meaning of Uūl al-Sunna in Different Genres

In the classical period, uūl al-sunna appears to have been used mainly
to refer the obvious principles of belief that are “almost” unanimously
agreed based on adīth reports in various genres. For example, the famous
Andalusian Mālikī scholar al-Qāī Ibn al-‘Arabī (543/1148) refers to uūl
al-sunna when he mentions the grave punishment (‘adhāb al-qabr), and
states that the grave punishment is an “al of uūl al-sunna” which no
one can deny except the one who is blockheaded (ghabī) or an infidel
(mulid).44
In parallel to the claim of representing the true religion with uūl al-
sunna, these principles also serve to distinguish what is considered to be
sunna from what are considered to be innovations. Another Andalusian
scholar Ibn Qurqūl (569/1174) points out uūl al-sunna as a litmus test to
determine which type of innovation is praised (mamūd) and which type of
it should be considered an aberration (alāla) based on qiyās of innovation
to uūl al-sunna. For example, he relates the famous report from ‘Umar
as “what a beautiful innovation (bid‘a) this is” about praying tarāwī in
congregation and then Ibn Qurqūl asserts, “This is innovation, because
innovation is any practice that did not have preceding example. Such action
becomes praiseworthy, if it coincides with uūl al-sunna through analogy.
And it becomes aberration, if it contradicts uūl al-sunna.”45
Ibn Taymiyya (728/1328) also uses the concept in this meaning when
he claims that Ibn Kullāb (240/854) and al-Ash‘arī (324/936) fell into the
trap of accepting certain Mu‘tazilī points of view by submitting themselves
to their methods, even though they concurred with ahl al-sunna when it
comes to the topics related to the main principles of sunna (yuwāfiqūn ahl
al-sunna fī jumal uūl al-sunna).46
Another use of uūl al-sunna in a different meaning than above appears
to be about more significant sunna-based practices in a specific rite. For
example, al-Ghazālī (505/1111) mentions uūl al-sunna as the commonly
known and more important prophetic practices within prayer. He states that
to sit for the purpose of pausing when rising up from prostration (sujūd)
to standing (qiyām), which is known as jalsa al-istirāa, is not part of uūl
al-sunna in prayer.47

Conclusion

After investigating the different uses of the concept of uūl in the intellec-
tual disciplines of Islam and the use of uūl al-sunna in the literature of the

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 Uūl al-sunna 53

period, the following conclusions become clear about the meaning of and
the purpose of using the concept of uūl al-sunna.
The concept of uūl refers to the foundations of religion and the sources
one should consult to verify anything supplementary in religion (furū‘). It
was in this context that the understanding of the normativity in religion
based on the dichotomy of uūl and furū‘ developed. The concept of uūl
al-sunna was invented by the traditionalists to respond to the critiques of
their interlocutors about the apparent diverse disagreements among the tra-
ditionalists, who claim that normativity can be established with adīth texts
only, as well as to back up their points of view in the matters of theology.
The operating logic was to show that the traditionalist salafī approach in
understanding religion is the only correct way with respect to all fields and
topics of religion including theology, law, ethics, and politics.
Another dimension of discussion pertaining to the concept of uūl al-
sunna was related to the problem of consistency based on one of the mean-
ings of uūl. The term uūl was also employed by ahl al-adīth to explain
apparent contradictions seen in the adīth reports. In this context, uūl
refers to the agreed upon principles embodied in the corpus of the adīth
texts. According to ahl al-adīth, the contradictions in particular topics
(furū‘) can be understood correctly in light of these principles (uūl).
This analysis explored the conceptual development of uūl al-sunna. In
this developmental process, the word sunna as a part of this concept was
employed by ahl al-adīth to indicate first their distinct approach to religion
that gives precedence to the adīth texts embodying the exemplar of salaf.
They eventually used the word sunna in the concept of uūl al-sunna as the
title for themselves, with the claim of having certain tenets deducted from
these adīth texts representing the true religion. These tenets are referred
to with uūl al-sunna within its own genre and various other genres, and
implies the tenets that one must accept to be considered a member of ahl
al-adīth, and, hence, to be considered within the orthodoxy and orthop-
raxy of Islam. These tenets, in addition to the effect on the identity of ahl
al-adīth, influenced significantly what later became the Sunnī sect of Islam
(ahl al-sunna), as well as many other movements in the history of Islam,
some of which still can be observed in the present time.

Notes

1. al-Khalīl ibn Amad, Kitāb al-‘Ayn, edited by Mahdī Makhzūmī and Ibrāhīm
Sāmarrā‘ī (Beirut: Dār wa-Maktabat al-Hilāl, 1986). “a--l”, VII, 156, and
“f-r-‘”, II, 126; Ibn Sīdah al-Mursī, ‘Alī ibn Ismā‘īl, al-Mukam wa-al-muī

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 54 Ahmet Temel

al-a‘am, edited by ‘Abd al-amīd Hindāwī (Bayrūt: Manshūrāt Muammad

‘Alī Bayūn: Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmīyah, 2000), “a--l”, VIII, 352; al-Fīrūzābādī,
Muammad Ibn-Ya‘qūb, al- Qāmūs al-muī, edited by Muammad Na‘īm
al-‘Irqsūsī (Bairūt: Mu’assasat ar-Risāla, 8th edition, 2005), 961; al-Fīrūzābādī,
Muammad Ibn-Ya‘qūb, Tāj al-‘arūs min jawāhir al-Qāmūs, n.p.: Dār al-hidāya,
n.d. ,“a--l”, XXVII, 447 and “f-r-‘”, XXI, 480; Ibn Manūr, Muhammad ibn
Mukarram, Lisān al-‘arab (Bayrūt: Dār ādir, 3rd edition, 1996), “a--l”, XI, 16
and “f-r-‘”, VIII, 246.
2. al-Jāi, Rasāʼil, I, 314.
3. al-Māturīdī, Muammad ibn Muammad, Ta’wīlāt Ahl al-Sunnah: Tafsīr
al-Māturīdī, edited by Majdī Muammad Surūr Bāsallūm (Bayrūt: Dār al-
Kutub al-‘Ilmīyah, 2005), VI, 555.
4. Pierre Hadot, “Philosophy, Exegesis, and Creative Mistakes” in Philosophy as
a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, edited by Arnold I.
Davidson and translated by Michael Chase (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1995),
71–76.
5. al-Māturīdī, Ta’wilāt ahl al-sunna, VI, 555.
6. al-Naās, Abū Ja‘far Amad ibn Muammad, I‘rāb al-Qur’ān, edited by ‘Abd
al-Mun‘im Ibrāhīm (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīyah, 2001), I, 164; al-Naās,
al-Nāsikh wa-al-mansūkh, 134. See also page 497, where al-Naās mentions
the topic of religious identities such as Mushrik, Muslim, and Munāfiq among
the topics of uūl al-dīn.
7. The earliest examples can be located in the following source. See al-aāwī,
Matn al-aāwīyya, 31. l-aāwī, Matn al-aāwīyya (Takhrīj al-‘aqīda
al-aāwiyya), edited by Nāir al-Dīn al-Albānī, Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī,
2nd ed., 1414/1993.
8. al-Jaā, Akām al-Qur’ān, II, 288, 314–315,
9. However, later on, constitutive relationship between uūl and furū‘ became
more prominent in the writings of scholars who tended to look for such depen-
dence between them and a necessity of coherence between kalām, uūl al-fiqh,
and fiqh. For example, one can recall the efforts of al-Ghazālī, who tried to
reconcile Shāfi‘ī uūl al-fiqh with Ash‘arī kalām principles, and ‘Alā al-Dīn
al-Samarqandī, who tried to remove Mu‘tazilī theology from the anafī school
of Mawarā al-nahr (Transoxiana) and replace it with the kalām of al-Māturīdī.
10. al-Mala ī, al-Tanbīh, I, 30.
11. al-Jaā, Amad ibn ‘Alī, Akām al-Qur’ān (Bayrūt: Dār Iyā’ al-Turāth
al-‘Arabī, 1985), I, 5.
12. al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm, Majmū‘, I, 631.
13. For another example supporting this argument, see the debate between al-Shāfi‘ī
and his ‘Irāqī interlocutor. See al-Shāfi‘ī, Jimā‘ al-‘ilm, 21–29. al-Shāfi‘ī,Idries
Jimā‘ al-‘ilm, n.p.: Dār al-āthār li-al-nashr wa-al-tawzī‘, 1423/2002.
14. see Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 289. Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, edited by Ibrāhīm
Ramaān, Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifa, 1417/1997.
15. See Abū Yūsuf Yaʻqūb b. Ibrāhīm al-Anārī, al-Radd ʻalā siyar al-Awzāʻī, edited
by Abū al-Wafā al-Afġānī ([al-Qāhira]: Lajnat Iyāʼ al-Maʻārif al-Nuʻmāniyya.

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 Uūl al-sunna 55

1938), 21; al-Shāfi‘ī, Muammad ibn Idrīs, al-Umm (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifa,
1990), VII, 356.
16. al-Khushanī, Muammad ibn al-ārith, Uūl al-futyā fī-al-fiqh ‘alā madhhab
al-Imām Mālik, ([Tripoli, Libya]: al-Dār al-‘Arabīyah lil-Kitāb: al-Mu’assasah
al-Wa anīyah li-al-Kitāb, 1985).
17. ‘Abd Allāh ibn Amad Ibn anbal, edited by Muammad ibn Sa‘īd ibn Sālim
Qa ānī, al-Sunnah (al-Dammām: Dār Ibn al-Qayyim, 1986).
18. al-Muzanī, Abū Ibrāhīm Ismā‘īl ibn Yayā, Shar al-sunnah: mu’taqad Ismā’īl
ibn Yayá al-Muzanī (Su‘ūdiyya: Maktabat al-ghurabā’ al-athariyya, 1992). In
parallel to the contents of the works with the title uūl al-sunna, this treatise
includes mostly theological, and some legal and political topics. The topics
cover destiny (qadar), the attributes of God, the uncreatedness of the Quran,
the determined life time (ajal), the grave interrogation, the qualities and details
of resurrection, heaven, vision of God in the hereafter, prohibition of excom-
munication for ahl al-qibla, respect for all the companions of the prophet, pro-
hibition of revolt against the rulers, the necessity to pray behind them, to go
to war, and to do pilgrimage with them, shortening the prayers and having the
option of not to fast during travel, and, lastly, the need for sticking to obliga-
tions and refraining from prohibitions. Al-Muzanī claims that all of the preced-
ing scholars agreed on these matters. See al-Muzanī, Shar al-sunnah, 89.
19. Abū Bakr Amad ibn Muammad al-Khallāl, edited by ‘A iyya al-Zahrānī, al-
Sunnah (al-Riyā: Dār al-Rāyah, 1989).
20. al-asan Ibn ‘Alī al-Barbahārī, Shar as-sunna (al-Madīna: Maktabat al-Ghurabā’
al-At̲arīya, 1993). This work shares the topics of al-Muzani’s Shar al-sunna
and covers some additional topics. Fasting and shortening the prayers during
travel, not abandoning jum‘a prayers, and going to jihād and ajj with the
imam are among the shared legal topics between al-Muzani’s Shar al-sunna
and al-Barbahārī’s Shar al-sunna.
21. Ibn Abī ‘Āim al-aāk, Amad ibn ‘Amr, edited by Muammad Nāir al-Dīn
Albānī, Kitāb al-Sunnah (Bayrūt: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1998).
22. Akhbārīs refer to the one of the two main groups in Imāmī-Shi‘īs, who argued
that religion can only be derived from the reports going back to the imāms.
This group only has a minor presence within the Shi‘ī population of the pres-
ent day. The other group, Uūlīs, argue that after the period of Occultation
(ghayba) of the last Imam, religious scholars can derive religious rulings based
on reason (‘aql/istidlāl).
23. A. Duderija, Constructing A Religiously Ideal Believer and Woman in
Islam . . .
24. See the introduction to this volume on the difference between ahl’ra’y and ahl-
hadith in relation to the concept of sunna.
25. al-umaydī, Abū Bakr ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr. Uūl al-Sunnah, edited by
Mash‘al Muammad al-addādī (Kuwait: Maktabat Ibn Athīr, 1997).
26. Amad b. anbal, Uūl al-sunna, 14–17.
27. Ibn Qutayba, Ta’wīl mukhtalaf al-hadīth, 63. Ibn Qutayba, Ta’wīl mukhtalaf
al-hadīth, Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī and Doha: Mu’assasat al-ishrāq, 2nd
ed., 1419/1999.

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 56 Ahmet Temel

28. Ibn-al-Qur ī, Abū-Isāq Muammad Ibn-al-Qāsim Ibn-Sha‘bān, edited by

Muammad Farīd Ibn-Idrīs Zaryū. az- Zāhī fī uūl as-Sunna ‘alā mad̲hab
al-imām Mālik Ibn Anas (ar-Riyā: Dār at-Tauīd, 2013).
29. al-Qāi ‘Iyā, edited by Muammad Ibn Sharīfa, Tartīb al-madārik wa-taqrīb
al-masālik li-ma‘rifat a‘lām mad̲hhab Mālik (ar-Rabā : Ma ba‘at al-Faāla, 1965–
1983), V, 275; al-Dhahabī, Muammad ibn Amad, edited by Muammad
Ayman ibn ‘Abd Allāh Shabrāwī, Siyar a‘lām al-nubalā (al-Qāhirah: Dār
al-adīth, 2006), XII, 174; Ibn ajar al-‘Asqalānī, Amad ibn ‘Alī, edited
by ‘Abd al-Fattā Abū Ghuddah, Salmān ‘Abd al-Fattā Abū Ghuddah, and
Muammad ibn Amad Dhahabī, Lisān al-Mīzān (Bayrūt: Dār al-Bashā’ir
al-Islāmīyah lil-ibā‘ah wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzī‘, 2002), VII, 452; Ziriklī,
Khayr al-Dīn, edited by Muammad Khayr Ramaān Yūsus, al-A‘lām: qāmūs
tarājim li-ashhar al-rijāl wa-al-nisā’ min al-‘Arab wa-al-musta‘ribīn wa-al-
mustashriqīn (Bayrūt, Lubnān: Dār al-‘Ilm lil-Malāyīn, 2002), VI, 335.
30. See the introduction of the book. Ibn Sha‘bān, al-Zāhī, edited by Muammad
Farīd b. Idrīs Zaryū, 28.
31. Ibn Ba a, ‘Ubayd Allah al-‘Ukbarī, Kitāb al-shar wa-al-ibāna ‘alā uūl al-
sunna wa-al-diyāna wa mujānabat al-mukhālifīn wa mubāyanat ahl al-ahwā’
al-māriqīn (Riyā: Dār al-amr al-awwal li-al-nashr wa-al-tawzī‘, 1433/2012).
32. Ibn Ba a, al-Ibāna ‘alā uūl al-sunna, 22, 23.
33. Ibn Abī Zamanayn, Muammad b. ‘Abd Allah, Uūl al-sunna, “Riyā al-
janna bi takhrīj uūl al-sunna”, edited by ‘Abd Allah b. Muhammad (Madīna:
Maktabat al-ghurabā’ al-athariyya, 1st edition, 1415/1994).
34. Ibn Abī Zamanayn, Uūl al-sunna, I, 35.
35. al-Lālakā’ī, Hibatallāh Ibn-al-asan, edited by Ahmad Ghāmidī, Shar uūl
i‘tiqād ahl as-sunna wa-‘l-jamā‘a (Ar-Riyā: Dār aiba, 2002).
36. al-Lālakā’ī, Shar usul, I, 28
37. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Majmū‘, XIX, 160–161.
38. See Ibn ʻAsākir, ʻAlī ibn al-asan, Tārīkh madīnat Dimashq: wa-dhikr falihā
wa-tasmiyat man allahā min al-amāthil aw ijtāza bi-nawāīhā min wāridīhā
wa-ahlihā, edited by ʻAmr Gharāmah ʻUmrawī (Bayrūt: Dār al-Fikr, 1995), IX,
299; LIII, 337.
39. Muammad b. ‘Ukkāsha mentions, as al-Mala ī reports, a long list of 23 scholars
including ‘Alī b. ‘Āim, Sufyān b. ‘Uyayna, Isaq b. Rāhūyah, ‘Abd al-Ramān
b. Mahdī, Yayā b. Sa‘īd al-Qa ān, Muammad b. Yūsuf al-Faryābī, Shu‘ayb,
Muammad b. ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, Shābba b. Siwār, al-Fal b. Dukayn al-Kūfī,
‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Abān al-Kūfī, ‘Abd Allah b. Dāwud, Ya‘lā b. Qabīa, Sa‘īd b.
‘Uthmān, Adhhar, Abū ‘Abd al-Ramān al-Muqrī, and so on. In a different
version of this passage in Tārīkh madina al-Dimashq, Muammad b. ‘Ukkāsha
reportedly says “the Uūl al-sunna upon which Ahl al-sunna wa-al-jamā‘a
agrees.” The shift from “the jurist and scholars” to “ahl al-sunna wa-al-jamā‘a” is
a remarkable change that shows how the identity process of ahl al-sunna under-
went different stages and how the scholars tend to identify their sources in a
more widely acknowledged way that has a preliminary credit for acceptance.
See for the second version Ibn ʻAsākir, Tārīkh madīnat Dimashq, LIV, 230.

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 Uūl al-sunna 57

40. Abū al-usayn al-Mala ī, al-Radd wa-al-tanbīh ‘alā ahl al-ahwā’ wa-al-bida‘,
edited by Zāhid al-Kawtharī (Mir: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-al-Turāth),
15–16. Abū al-usayn al-Mala ī, al-Radd wa-al-tanbīh ‘alā ahl al-ahwā’ wa-
al-bida‘, edited by Zāhid al-Kawtharī (Mir: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-al-
Turāth), 1977.
41. Ibn Taymiyya, Amad Ibn ‘Abd al-alīm, edited by Muammad Rashād
Sālim, Dar’u ta‘āru al-‘aql wa-al-naql (Riyad: Jāmi‘at Imām Muammad b.
Sa‘ūd al-Islāmiyya, 1991), VIII, 494–501.
42. al-Kha īb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Amad ibn ʻAlī, Tārīkh Baghdād wa dhuyūluhu,
edited by Mus afa ‘Abd al-Qādir ‘A ā (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmiyyah,
1417/1996), VII, 313.
43. Ibn al-Mustawfī, Sharaf al-Dīn Abū al-Barakāt, edited by Sāmī ibn al-Sayyid
Khammās aqqār, Tārīkh Irbil: al-musammá nabāhat al-balad al-khāmil bi-man
waradahu min al-amāthil (Baghdād: Dār al-Rashīd lil-Nashr, 1980), II, 458.
44. al-Qāī Ibn al-‘Arabī, al-Qabas fī shar Muwaā’ Mālik ibn Anas (Bayrūt: Dār
al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1992), I, 384.
45. Ibn Qurqūl, Ibrāhīm ibn Yūsuf, edited by Dār al-Falā lil-Bath al-‘Ilmī
wa-Taqīq al-Turāth, Maāli‘ al-anwār ‘alā iā al-āthār: fī fat mā istughliqa
min kitāb al-Muwaaʼ wa-al-Bukhārī wa-Muslim wa-īā mubham lughātihā
wa-bayān al-mukhtalif min asmāʼ ruwātihā wa-tamyīz mushkilihā wa-taqyīd
muhmalihā (Qa ar: Wizārat al-awqāf wa shu’ūni al-Islāmiyya, 2012), I,
458–59.
46. Ibn Taymiyya, Amad b. ‘Abd al-alīm, edited by Muammad Rashād
Sālim. al-Istiqāma ([al-Riyā]: Jāmi‘at al-Imām Muammad b. Su‘ūd
al-Islāmiyya, 1983), I, 212.
47. Abū āmid al-Ghazālī, Iyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifa, n.d.) I, 158.

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 Chapter 3

The Concept of Sunna in

Muʿtazilite Thought
Usman Ghani

General Features of Muʿtazilite

Thought and Epistemology
Wāil b.ʿAā (d.131AH/748CE), an associate of al- asan al-Barāī
(d.110AH/728CE), is traditionally considered, along with ʿAmr b. ʿUbayd
(d.144AH/761CE), the originator of Muʿtazilism. This account of the
beginnings of early Muʿtazilism differs from that of Watt (d.2006) who
argued that the main founders of the ᶜMuᶜtazilite school of thought were
four individuals: Muʿammar (d.215AH/830CE), Ibrahīm Al-Naām
(d.221AH/836CE), and Abu al-Hudhayl (d.226AH/841CE) in Basra, and
Bishr al-Muʿtamir (d.210AH/825CE) in Baghdad.1 The accounts of the
beginnings of the ʿMuʿtazilite School differ and there are numerous ver-
sions of it as given by Shahrastānī (d.548AH/1153CE) in his al-Milāl
wa al- Nihāl. Sometimes Amr b. ʿUbayd is mentioned in place of Wāil
Wāiland the circle from which he withdrew was not of al-asan but Qatā
da (d.117AH/735CE) and, for these reasons, Watt rejects this incident
which marks the beginnings of this school. The incident is as follows:
A discussion started between Wāil Wāiland al- asan al-Basrī asan
regarding an individual who commits a major sin whether he remains a
believer or not. Al-asan addressed this by saying that committing a sin does
not affect the individual and he remains in the fold of a believer. However,

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 60 Usman Ghani

Wāil argued that this individual is neither a believer nor a disbeliever but
he is in a position between the two “ᶜal-Manzila bayn al-manzilataynᶜ.”
Having heard Wāils view, al-asan ordered him to leave his gathering
ᶜItazil ᶜanna. And because of this reason, he and his followers were known
as Muʿtazila (withdrawers).2
However, there is an agreement that Abu al-Hudhayl (d.235AH/849CE)
developed the main early doctrines of the school. He was probably the orig-
inator of the al-Usul al-Khamsa (five principles) of Muᶜtazilism:

1. Tawhid (Gods unity and uniqueness);

2. ʿAdl (His justice);
3. al-Waᶜd wa al-Waᶜid (The promise and the threat);
4. al-Manzila bayn al-Manzilatayn (The intermediate state of the
Muslim sinner, between belief and disbelief );
5. al-ᶜAmr bi al-Maᶜruf wa al-Nahyᶜ an il Munkar (the command to
enjoin goodness and to forbid wrong);3

The foundation principle of the Muʿtazilites is the notion that God and
everything in the world can be perceived through the intellect with which
God endows human beings. This perception implies that God exists with
his many attributes and qualities that can be known through the intellect.4
Contrary to the view of the traditionalists ( ahl al-adīth), the Muᶜtazilites
believe that one can know God without the support of Scripture and
even without God sending Prophets to humanity. Also, according to the
Muʿtazilites, reason has an overwhelming power over revelation. Since rea-
son is the governing principle of the world, the contradiction between rev-
elation and reason must be solved according to reason.5
The Muʿtazilite were the first Muslim scholars who tried to develop an
epistemology that would establish a set of coherent rules as for the basis of
strong conviction. Early Islamic theological texts report that the Barahimah,
Sumaniyyah and Sophists reportedly upheld the idea current in modern
philosophy that transmitted knowledge and revelation should be rejected
on the grounds that they are subject to experience.6 In their view, anything
that remains outside the realm of human experience cannot be known.
Because religious knowledge cannot be the subject of experience, discus-
sions or statements about it do not qualify as knowledge. In defence, the
Muʿtazilites strove to establish a strong epistemological basis for religious
knowledge. Strong conviction, they argued, can be obtained only from reli-
able sources of knowledge that are not subject to doubt. Conviction must
be based on certain knowledge. In order to be accepted without doubt or
hesitation, certain knowledge must be based on evidence hujjah (authorita-
tive) or burhan (epideictic proof ). Therefore, matters of faith are expressed

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 The Concept of Sunna in Muʿtazilite Thought 61

through categorical statements such as “ʿthere is”ʿ or “ʿthere is notʿ;” God

exists, He is One, He has no partner or peer.7
According to the Muʿtazilite, humans may obtain knowledge about God
and the Universe through three methods:

1. Sense perception
2. Transmitted report
3. Reason

With regard to the transmitted report that is, a report about the past;
they are, generally speaking, accepted as the most important source of reli-
gious knowledge by the Muʿtazilite. If they were not acceptable as a source
of knowledge, then it would be necessary to reject knowledge that is both
derived from the Prophets and transmitted from them. Ultimately, senses are
the sources of knowledge about the physical world and reports are the source
of knowledge of the past. To understand the metaphysical universe, one
must have recourse to either rational inference or the report of the Prophet.
The Muʿtazilite considered these two sources as important. However, the
difference between these sources, in the view of the Muʿtazilite, is that sense
perception and reason provide direct knowledge and transmitted reports
only indirect knowledge because of an intermediary who stands in between
the report and the object. The recipient acquires this knowledge through
the intermediary (if the intermediary transmits it to him successfully) and
hence the intermediary also has to be a reliable reporter.8 However, the dif-
ferent scholars of theology developed slightly different avenues to validate
the adīth, hence the Muʿtazilite would come to understand sunna some-
what differently than the Asharites, Maturidites and the traditionalists.
It is worth mentioning at the very outset that the discussions sur-
rounding the concept of sunna and its usage within this school of thought
appear to be very minimal. One possible reason for this is that most of the
ʿMuʿtazilite scholars were affiliated jurisprudentially to a specific school of
law. For example, Al-Zamakhsharī (d.538AH/1144CE), Abu Bakr al-Ja  
ās (d.370AH/980CE) and Abu al-Husayn al-Basrī (d.477AH/1085CE) were
all affiliated to the anafiSchool of law. ʿAbd al-Jabbār(d.415AH/1025CE)
was affiliated to the Shafici school of law. These schools of law were very
clear about the sunnas place as a primary source of law, hence the discus-
sion among the Muʿtazilite scholars was not about the validity of the sunna,
but about the criteria determining the soundness of the content of adīth,
especially in relation to reason.
With regard to the concept of sunna of the Prophet, the earlier
Muʿtazilites, in particular Ibrahīm Al-Naām (d.220AH/835CE), as dis-
cussed later in this chapter, tended to reject the concept altogether, or they

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 62 Usman Ghani

imposed such strict conditions on the acceptance of sunna related practices

as documented in adīth that few of them could be accepted as authentic.
These tendencies may have arisen from the belief that the sunna got in the
way of the free exercise of ethical reason.9 This, however, does not mean that
the ʿMuʿtazilites rejected the concept of sunna in its entirety. It seems that
the sunna was understood by them to be both values and practices related.
Hence, the Muʿtazilites studied the sunna, but they held the rational sense
of the content of these reports about the Prophet to be a more important
test of their validity rather than the analysis of the chain of narrators.10 This
implies that they did consider sunna to be equivalent to the concept of a
sound adīth report to the extent that these adīth, whether mutawātir or
aad, are in conformity with reason and rationality.
One important element of understanding Muʿtazilite epistemology that
had important implications on how they conceptualized the concept of
sunna is that they had a fundamentally different approach to elaborating
the Islamic dogma (ʿaqida) to that of the traditionalists ( ahl al-adīth) and
the jurists) with whom they often engaged in lengthy polemical debates. The
Muʿtazilites argued that their opponents, the traditionalists, were brainless
literalists, clinging absurdly to transmitted reports whose true meaning they
did not understand but with whose isnads they were endlessly obsessed.
Conversely, to the traditionalist, the Muʿtazilites were seen as arrogant her-
etics who abandoned the documented precedent of the Prophet for musings
of their own frail minds. Hence, each group created its own methodology.
The Mutazilites glorified reason to determine the proper interpretations of
the sources of revelation and the traditionalists sacralized the isnad as the
only means to guarantee a pure understanding of the Prophetʿs Islam and
rise above the heresies of the human mind. For the Muʿtazilites, the Qurʾān
and human reason were the main tools for textual criticism. Moreover, it
was only the Qurʾān, being the only literal word of God, that can lay down
the legal and creedal principles necessary for determining the contours of
the faith and its community. However, Muʿtazilites did resort to employing
adīth when it supported their methodology. This is evident, for example,
in the Muʿtazilitesʿ main justification for the use of the Qurʾān as the sole
criterion in determining the validity of certain legal and theological matters
in their debates with the traditionalists as reported in the following adīth:
“When a adīth comes to you from me, compare it to the Book of God and if it
agrees with it then accept it, and if it differs with it, leave it.”11
Furthermore, discussions on sunna in Muʿtazilite thought seem to
have taken expression primarily in relation to the discussion of the mean-
ing of terms such as mutawātir and khabar al-wāid which is highlighted
further in this chapter. Hence, with respect to this, the major works for
sources on sunna discussions in ʿMuʿtazilite thought can be found in

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 The Concept of Sunna in Muʿtazilite Thought 63

the works of ʿAbd al-Jabbār(d.415AH/1025CE) and Abu al-usain

al-Barī(d.477AH/1085CE).12

The Concept of Mutawātir and Khabar

al-Wāid in Islamic Epistemology
Since the ʿMuʿtazilite discussions on Sunna and adīth were approached
primarily from an epistemological perspective, some introductory remarks
about the nature of Islamic epistemology are in order, especially as they relate
to adīth sciences. Generally speaking, the adīth of the Prophet Muhammad
regarding its category of transmission falls into two categories:

1. Mutawātir
2. Khabar al-Wāid13

The term mutawātir, which is used in different sciences of legal meth-

odology, theology and in adīth criticism, conveys two distinct meanings.
In legal methodology and theology it refers to the epistemological value
and certainty of a report, but in adīth criticism it refers to a report that
is well known and widespread, but which does not necessary yield certain
knowledge.14
Although some adīth scholars applied the term in the first sense, this
usage did not become widespread.15 The term itself was not used exten-
sively at the time of Al-Rāmahurmu ī (d.360AH/970CE) and Al-ākim
al-Naysāburī (d.405AH/1014CE) as there is no mention of this term in
their works. It was only from the seventh/thirteenth century onward that
the term began to be applied on a wider scale, albeit loosely. At time of
Ibn Salah al-Shahra ūrī (d.643AH/1245CE), the concept was studied
in more detail and the definition as to what precisely the word stood for
was refined by creating a subdivision in which tawātur lafzi, that is, the
verbatim mutawātir transmission of a text, became distinguished from
tawatur maʿnawi, that is, transmission in respect of only the gist or one
salient feature of a given text. It was generally admitted that the number
of reports transmitted maʿnawiyyan vastly outnumbered those transmitted
lafziyyan.16
The term mutawātir as a concept, is generally understood as a report
that, according to the majority of Muslim theologians, yields necessary
knowledge. For example, if reports are established as a reliable source
of knowledge, the truthfulness of a prophetʿs message follows by neces-
sity, because the truthfulness of a prophetʿs mission is established by

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 64 Usman Ghani

concomitant miracles. However, the certainty of the knowledge pro-

vided by miracles is valid only for those of the Prophets contempo-
raries who witnessed them directly. This knowledge was subsequently
transmitted through reports that are termed either khabar mutawātir or
khabar aad. mutawātir reports provide necessary knowledge and they
must be believed.17 For example, according to Muslim theologians, the
authenticity of the Qurʾān is established through mutawātir reports and
thus no one can deny this fact. A minority opinion is that the concept
of mutawātir yield acquired knowledge. For example, Abu al-  usayn
al-Barī (d.477AH/1085CE), argues that, according to some scholars,
knowledge obtained through mutawātir reports is acquired because, in
order to understand whether something is mutawātir or not, one must
begin from a particular premise, and this premise causes such a person not
to consider it as immediate knowledge.18
With regard to the term aad, it is a report that bears the possibility
of being either true or false, because the possibility of falsehood exists.19
As noted above, the Muslim theologians treat reports as a primary source
of knowledge about revelation and the Prophet because they are the only
means by which we can obtain knowledge of situations that lie outside
oneʿs individual experience. Knowledge or awareness of the past is possible
only through reports. Therefore, reports are considered the most important
source of knowledge in all religious communities.20 As mentioned earlier,
these reports were transmitted through either khabar mutawātir reports or
khabar aad reports. They are aad because they do not fulfil the conditions
of mutawātir, hence these reports fall short of providing certain knowl-
edge and having a merely probable character, they cannot be the basis of
conviction.21
Al-ʿAmidis influential work (d.630AH/1233CE) Al-Ikām fi Usūl
al-Akām offers an overview of the epistemological status of the mutawātir
and the aad adīth. In this regard, he states that the majority of the jurists
and theologians agree that the knowledge acquired from a mutawātir
report is of incontrovertible certainty.’ A minority view such as that of Abu
al-usain al-Barī(d.477AH/1085CE), as noted above, considered that the
mutawātir adīth is speculative.23
With regard to the aad report, however, there is a more significant
divergence of opinion among the theologians.24 The divergence centers
on the question of whether this knowledge amounts to certainty or just
speculation. Al-Amidi asserts that a significant group of theologians agree
that knowledge is acquired from this report. The ahl al-adīth, the
āhirī
scholars, and Ahmad b. anbal (d.241AH/855CE) according to one of his
narrations maintain that aad reports also amount certainty.’

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 The Concept of Sunna in Muʿtazilite Thought 65

Muʿtazilites Attitudes toward adīth in

the Formative Period
Rasha el-Omari explains three major positions dominated by Muʿtazilite
attitudes to adīth before the classical period. The first consisted of sim-
ply transmitting adīthThe earliest testimony of their transmission of
adīth is found in ʿAmr b. ʿUbayd (d.144/761), whose transmission of
free will adīth led to their boycott by the traditionalists (ahl al- adīth
This tendency was coupled with concern for scrutinizing the matn (text)
of the adīth. ʿMuʿtazilites rejected those adīth whose matn contradicted
what they considered to be correct doctrine and interpreted away those
positing multiple meanings. There are several lost works whose surviving
titles point to this sort of content. These include Thumāma b. Ashrass
(d.213AH/828CE) Kitāb al-Sunan, Jaʿfar b. Mubashshirs (d.234AH/848–
9CE) Kitāb al-Āthār al-Kabīr and Kitāb maʿānī al-Akhbār wa-Sharuha,
and al-Jāiʿs (d.255AH/868–9CE) Kitāb al-Akhbār wa-kayfa tai.26
The second position consisted of accepting a report if it was supported
by some form of tawātur. This position dates back to Wāil b. A āʾ, who
held that there was evidence for the veracity of a report when it had four
independent transmitters. His assumption was that there could be no agree-
ment between all transmitters in fabricating a report. Wāils acceptance of
tawātur seems to have been inspired by the juridical notion of witnesses as
proof that an event did indeed take place. Hence, the existence of a cer-
tain number of witnesses precluded the possibility that they were able to
agree on a lie, as opposed to the single report that was witnessed by one
person only, its very name meaning the “report of one individual” (khabar
al-wāid).27 Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d.227AH/841CE) continued this
verification of reports through tawātur, but proposed that the number of
witnesses required for veracity be 20, with the additional requirement that
at least one of the transmitters be a believer.28
The third position among early Muʿtazilites was skepticism toward
adīth due to its exploitation as a polemical ideological tool. This concern
was first voiced by irār b.ʿAmr (d.128AH/815CE) who expressed out-
rage at the misuse of reporting by various groups and therefore refused to
accept any kind of report. In his al-Tarīsh wa al-irjāʾ, irār is said to have
attacked the abuse of adīth by the Ahl al- adīth because of their polemical
methods. In this attitude, he preceded al-Naām (d.220AH/835CE) in
reacting to the rising power of the single report; yet, unlike al-Naām, he
approved the authority of consensus as a source of religious knowledge.29
He is known as a vehement critic of the independent authority of chained

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 66 Usman Ghani

reports before al-Naām, and is reported to have a written book on the

contradictions of adīth titled Kitab Tanaqud al- adīth. In this book, irār
argues for the invalidity of reports by pointing out the fact that there were
supporting reports for every existing group of the time within the collec-
tions of adīth.30 Al-Naām expressed the strongest statement of skepti-
cism of any source of knowledge outside of reason and the Qurʾān. For
him, both the single and the mutawātir reports could not be trusted to yield
certain knowledge. He recounted contradictory adīth and examined their
divergent content (matn) to show why they should be rejected; they relied
on both faulty human memory and bias, neither of which could be trusted
to transmit what is true. Al-Naām bolstered his strong refutation of the
trustworthiness of adīth within the larger claim that adīth circulated and
thrived to support polemical causes of various theological sects and jurists,
and that no single transmitter could by himself, be held above suspicion of
altering the content of a single report.31 Al-Naāms skepticism, therefore,
involved far more than excluding the possible verification of a report, be it
aad or mutawātir. This stance of Al- Naām also excluded the trustwor-
thiness of consensus, which proved pivotal to classical Muʿtazilite criteria
devised for verifying the single report. Indeed, his shunning of both con-
sensus and tawātur earned him a special mention for the depth and extent
of his skepticism, even among fellow Muʿtazilites.32 Al-Baghdādī(d.429AH/
CE) describes Al-Naām’s skepticism in the following manner: “ʿIt is as
if he intended to invalidate the branches of sacred law by invalidating its
roots.”ʿ33
The adīth played no significant role when Dirar b. ʿAmr
(d.195AH/810CE) established Muʿtazilism as a cosmological system. He
rejected the aad reports adduced as evidence by his transmission based
opponents in favor of the Qurʾān and reason and this position was taken
up by Abu Bakr al-Assam (d.201AH/816CE) who was of the Basran
Muʿtazilite school. But with the process of what is in this volume is termed
“adīthtification of sunna” Abu al-Hudhayl (d.200AH/915CE), another
early member of the Basran school, was forced to respond to the epistemo-
logical paradigm shift. With him, we see the ʿMuʿtazilites beginning to limit
the use of adīth to those they considered massively transmitted beyond
the scope of error (mutawātir). For a adīth to be accepted in discussion
of dogma, Abu al-Hudhayl required 20 separate transmitters to meet the
conditions of tawatur. For legal matters, he demanded only four.34 In his
footsteps, the Basran Muʿtazilite and polymath al-Jāi (d.255AH/869AH)
also required four narrations for a report to qualify as authentic.35 It can be
argued that the implication of the above is that the ʿMuʿtazilite accepted a
much smaller reservoir of aad ith which means that a narrower set of prac-
tices and values can be deemed in accordance with their concept of sunna.

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 The Concept of Sunna in Muʿtazilite Thought 67

It is because of the existence of views such as that of Al-Naām that

the traditionalist Ibn Qutayba (d.276AH/885CE) was on the defensive,
and why he wrote his Taʿwil Mukhtalif al- adīth. This is a treatise written
in response to a letter directed to Ibn Qutayba, according to which the
ʿMuʿtazilite accused the people of tradition of lying and expressing con-
tradictory statements so that divisions arose and the Muslim community
was split into sects, each claiming the truth on the basis of traditions. He
describes how the Muʿtazilites mock the ahl al-adīth for heaping acco-
lades on one another for their knowledge of different narrations of adīth
without understanding the basic meaning or even the grammar. His work
comprises a theological treatise in defence of the Prophetic adīth alongside
attempting to find acceptable interpretations for adīth that the Muʿtazilites
considered problematic.36 In his Taʿwil, Ibn Qutayba finds himself rebut-
ting four general criticisms of adīth by the Muʿtazilites:

1. A adīth contradicts the Qurʾān;

2. It contradicts other established adīth;
3. It is contradicted by rational investigation (al-nazar), which usu-
ally involves the adīth having some unacceptable legal or dogmatic
implications;
4. It is contradicted by rational proof (hujjat al-ʿaql), which generally
means it clashes with some notion of what is acceptable or possible
according to the precepts of reason or the basic tenets of the Muslim
rationalist worldview.’

One example given by Ibn Qutayba of traditions which oppose specula-

tion and rational arguments is a statement reputedly going to Prophet in
which it is stated that he ( i.e. the Prophet) is more entitled to be skeptical
than Prophet Abraham concerning Godʿs actions.38 The assumption which
lies at the basis of the argument is Muhammadʿs perfection, which could
not be impaired by doubts.
Furthermore, Muʿʿtazila asserted that some traditions do not correspond
to human experience. For instance, according to a adīth, the Prophet said
that no human being would remain on earth in the year 100AH. Now, the
ʿMuʿtazilites argue, we are in the year 300AH and the world is more popu-
lated than before.’
An additional example of an incoherent adīth put forward by the
Muʿtazilites as follows:

If one of you awakes from sleep, then he should not plunge his hand into the
water-container40 until he washes it three times (hatta yaghsilaha thalathan)-
after all, he doesnʿt know where his hand has spent the night.’

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 68 Usman Ghani

Ibn Qutaybaʿs opponents claim that the last phrase (he doesnʿt know
where his hand has spent the night) is:

(a) patently absurd, since everyone knows where their hand has been
during the night;
(b) legally inapposite, since even if one touches oneʿs genitalia while
awake, that does not vitiate oneʿs previous ablutions;
(c) Inconsistent with a general precept of the law, that involuntary acts
(e.g. those committed while sleeping) have no adverse legal conse-
quences for the person who commits them.

However, in response, Ibn Qutayba disputes point (b) and in the course
of that discussion, he says the following:

So if the ablutions for touching the genitalia are that one wash the hands,
then it is clear that Godʿs Messenger commanded the person waking up from
sleep to wash his hand before he puts it into the water- container, because
that person does not know where his hand has spent the night. Perhaps, he
says, during his sleep he touched his genitalia or his anus with it, and it can-
not be certain that a drop of urine or the remnants of semen did not get on
his hand if he had sexual intercourse before falling asleep. So if he put it into
the water-container before washing it, he would defile the water and spoil it.
He singled out the sleeping person for this because the sleeping persons hand
might fall on these places, or on his anus, without him being aware of it.42

The adīth, which are considered by the traditionalists to be an impor-

tant source of knowledge equals the Qurʾān, and on which the traditionalist
rely, is according to the rationalists, a device which cannot be relied on,
because reason and manʿs experience contradict its teachings, its nature is
self- contradictory, and it is refuted by both the Qurʾān and consensus. Ibn
Qutayba provides a defence in his Taʿwil on these traditions which conflict
with the principles of the ʿMuʿtazilites.

The Muʿtazilites Attitude toward adīth

in the Classical Period
The ʿMuʿtazilite position against the traditionalists ( ahl al-adīth) was fur-
ther weakened at the end of the Baghdad Inquisition in 234AH/848CE and
with the rise of what in this volume is termed adīthtification of sunna. It
was only during the classical period of Muʿtazilism spanning from the late

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 The Concept of Sunna in Muʿtazilite Thought 69

third/ninth century to the early fifth/eleventh century that the school had
to increasingly compromise with its opponents.43 It was during this period
the Muʿtazilites began serious study of adīth comparable to those of their
transmission-based adversaries. As an example, Muhammad b. ʿImran al-
Marzubani (d.384AH/994CE) was a Muʿtazilite and adīthscholars consid-
ered him reliable as a transmitter hence he composed a book on the adīth
of the Muʿtazila.44 Al-Dhahabī in his Tadhkirat al-Huffāz has also men-
tioned Abu Saʿid Ismaʿil b. ʿAli al-Samman (d.434AH/1042CE) of Rayy as
al-Khātib al-Baghdādīs teacher in adīth who was theologically a ʿMuʿtazilite
and jurisprudentially a follower of theanafī school of law.45
With regard to legal matters, the Basran and Baghdad schools of the
Muʿtazilites dropped their requirements for authenticating legal adīth
to two narrators at each link in the chain of narration (isnād). Abu ʿAli
al-Jubbāī (d.303AH/915AH) explicitly demanded doubling transmission
for aad adīth to be admitted in legal matters.46 Abu al-Qasim al-Balkhīi
(319AH/913CE) compromised similarly. In his Qubūl al-Akhbār, he still
demanded massively transmitted adīth (mutawātir) for theological doc-
trine and general legal indications. For deriving laws, he believed that one
need only provide a report transmitted by two or three people or two or
three upright people at each level of the chain of narration. He equates this
with the requirements for testimony in court.47
Qadi ʿAbd al-Jabbārs (d.415AH/1025CE) views in particular are repre-
sentative of a major shift in the Muʿtazilte school with regard to the posi-
tion of aad adīth in ʿMuʿtazilite thought and their concept of sunna.
While previously Muʿtazilites had generally associated with the adīth
-waryanafīschool of law, ʿAbd al-Jabbār retained his loyalty to the school of
al-Shafiʿi after embracing Muʿtazilite doctrine.48 As an adherent to the school
of al-Shafiʿi, he was obliged to accept rulings from aad adīth in matters of
law even if they lacked the multiple narrations that earlier Muʿtazilites such
as al-Balkhī and al-Jubbaī had required. In the theology of the Muʿtazilites,
in his Usūl al-Khamsa, ʿAbd al-Jabbārthus states that while discussing issues
of dogma and theology requires massively transmitted reports (mutawātir),
deriving law demands only one or two narrations.49
By the second half of the fourth century AH/tenth century CE, the
Muʿtazilite standard for authentic adīth admissible in discussions of law thus
generally demanded doubling transmission. Al-Hā imī (d.594AH/1179CE)
in his shurūt al-aʿimma al-Khamsa states that the Muʿtazila, were, in fact,
the only group to require a certain number of transmitters for the accep-
tance of aad adīth. As mentioned earlier, Al-Balkhī had stated, they based
this on the requirements for court testimony.50
One of the later Muʿtazilite Abu al-usain al-Barī(d.436AH/1044CE),
“ʿlike his teacher predecessor and teacher ʿAbd al-Jabbar”ʿ espoused

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 70 Usman Ghani

ʿMuʿtazilite theology while belonging to the Shafiʿīt school of law. His work
on legal theory, Kitab al-Muʿtamad fi usūl al-Fiqh, would become one of
the most influential works in that genre and provide a framework for many
later Shafiʿī usul books.51 Abu al-Husayns position on the epistemological
yield of aad adīth reflected the Shafiʿi position which was embraced as
the orthodox position among almost all Sunnī Muslims is that is, that such
adīth yield only probable knowledge (zann), but are nonetheless legally
compelling (mujīb al-amal).52 He further argues, that the consensus of the
umma, however, alters this completely. He explains that, “as for the aad
adīth, when the umma has come to consensus as to what it entails and
deemed it authentic, then its authenticity is epistemologically certain.”53

Conclusion

The Muʿtazilite was a distinct school of thought with its own principles and
foundations which cantered primarily on the issues of creed and theology.
With regard the position of sunna Sunna and adīth, as we have seen from
the preceding discussion, there have been significant differences within this
school from the formative period and throughout the classical period.
For example, Abu al-Qasim al-Balkhī (d.319AH/913CE), a prominent
Al-BaghdādīMuʿtazilite, in his work Qubūl al-Akhbār, a work on adīth
criticism bears testimony to this point. In it we see clear evidence that
the Muctazilites accepted sunna as an important source of Islamic theol-
ogy second only to the Qurʾān. In his introduction, Al-Balkhī explains
that the requirements for a sound adīth are that it is in accordance with
Qurʾān and the sunna that has been agreed upon (wa li sunnati rasulillah al
mujmaʿ ʿalayha) by the umma or the early Muslim community.54 Al-Jahiz
(d.255AH/868CE) knew that adīth was indispensable for jurists, but
as a Muʿtazilite he did not like it. Hence, in place of khabar/adīth, he
spoke of a “ʿsunna accepted by all”ʿ al-sunna al mujmaʿ ʿalayh.55 Perhaps
it can be argued that this concept as specified by al-Jāi informs us that
the Muʿtazilites understood the concept of sunna as most of the scholars of
their school could agree upon. Hence, in light of the above. it is difficult
to maintain that the Muʿtazilites as a school of thought were in complete
agreement on the principles regarding the sunna and especially the terms
mutawātir and aad. Sunna must have been primarily understood through
the lenses of early proto-Hanafī jurists that the Muʿtazilite followed such
as Abu anīfa.56 Also, some specific adīth may have been re-interpreted
if found not in par with rationalism as this was the main criteria for the
Muʿtazilites. However, in legal issues the sunna seems to be understood in

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 The Concept of Sunna in Muʿtazilite Thought 71

par with the majority of scholars, especially since most of the Muʿtazilites
followed Sunnī schools of jurisprudence. Only in the world of ʿilm al-kalām
not fiqh, sunna seems to be understood very differently except for that
which has been discussed in this chapter.

Notes
1. William Mongomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy & Theology (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1997).
2. Muhammad b. ’Abd al-Karim Al-Shahrastani, Al-Milal wa al-Nihal (Beirut: Dar
al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya, 2007), 38; Cf: Watt, Islamic Philosophy & Theology, 46.
3. Al-Shahrastani, Al-Milal wa al-Nihal, 38; Watt, Islamic Philosophy &
Theology, 46.
4. Abu al-Muin al-Nasafi, Tabsirat al-Adillah fi usul al-Din, edited by Huseyin
Atay (Ankara: Diyanat Isleri Baskanligi, 1993) 24; Huseyin Hansu, “Notes on
the Term Mutawatir and Its Reception in Hadith Criticism,” Islamic Law and
Society, 16 (2009): 385.
5. Benyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Tradionalism and Rationalism
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 33.
6. C. Richard Martin, Woodward and Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam:
Muctazilism from Medieval school to Modern Symbol (Oxford:Oneworld, 1997),
385.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. George F.Hourani, Islamic Rationalism (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1971), 137.
10. Richard, Woodward and Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam, 15.
11. Jonathan Brown, “How Do We Know Hadith Critics Did Matn Criticism,”
in The Hadith: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies, edited by Shah, Vol. 3
(Routledge, 2010), 190–191.
12. Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, Al-Mu’tamad fi Usul al-fiqh, Vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar al-
Kutub al-cIlmiyya, 2010), 80; ’Abd al-Jabbar, Fadl al-‘Itizal wa tabaqat al-
Mu’tazila, Vol. 2 (Al-Dar al-Tunisiyya lil-Nashr, n.d.), 185–186.
13. A Hadith that is narrated in the first three generations by one to four narrators,
or one which is narrated by people whose number does not reach that of the
mutawatir case.
Al-Khabar al-Wahid—(Isolated) is divided into three categories:
Mashhur—Popular: These are the Hadith which were originally narrated in
every generation by three or more narrators.
Al ’Aziz—Rare: A Hadith which is narrated by two people throughout the
chain of narration.
Al Gharib—Scarce, Strange: A Hadith which is narrated by one narrator
throughout the chain; Cf: Ibn Hajar Al-‘Asqalani, Nuzhat al-Nazar sharh
Nukhbat al-Fikr, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya, n.d.), 260–27; Shakir,

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 72 Usman Ghani

AQ: Please al-Ba’ith al-Hathith sharh ikhtisar ’Ulum al-Hadith, (Beirut; Dar al-
check the
highlighted
Kutub al-cIlmiyya, n.d.), 160; Al-Jazairi, Tawjih al- Nazar ila usul
page range al-Athar, (Dar al-Macrifa, n.d.), 33.
in this note. 14. A mutawatir Hadith is one reported by a large number of people at different
times that makes it impossible for any falsehood to enter it. This would make
agreement upon a lie unthinkable. This condition must be met in the entire
AQ: Please chain from its source to its end. Cf: Ibn Hajar Al-‘Asqalani, Nuzhat al-Nazar
check the
sharh Nukhbat al-Fikr, 260–27; Shakir, al-Ba’ith al-Hathith sharh ikhtisar ’Ulum
highlighted
page range in al-Hadith, 160; Al-Jazairi, Tawjih al- Nazar ila usul al-Athar, 33.
this note. 15. Abu al-Muin al-Nasafi, Tabsirat al-Adillah fi usul al-Din, edited by Huseyin
Atay, 24; Hansu, “Notes on the Term Mutawatir and Its Reception in Hadith
Criticism,” 383–384.
16. Guatier H. A. Juynboll, “(Re) Appraisal of Some Technical Terms in Hadith
Sciences,” Islamic Law & Society, 8(3) (2001): 303–349.
17. Richard, Woodward and Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam, 388.
18. Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, Al-Mu’tamad fi Usul al-fiqh, Vol. 2, 80.
19. Abu al-Muin al-Nasafi, Tabsirat al-Adillah fi usul al-Din, edited by Huseyin
Atay, 24; Hansu, “Notes on the Term Mutawatir and Its Reception in Hadith
Criticism,” 387.
20. Abu al-Muin al-Nasafi, Tabsirat al-Adillah fi usul al-Din, 24.
21. Ibid.
22. ’Ali b. Abu ’Ali Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam, Vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar al-
Kutub al-cIlmiyya, 2005), 262.
23. Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, Al-Mu’tamad fi Usul al-fiqh, Vol. 2, 80.
24. For the view of the fuqaha on this issue see chapter ? (Ali Mian) in this
volume.
25. ’Ali b. Abu ’Ali Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam, 274.
26. Racha El-Omari, “Accommodation and Resistance: Classical Mu’tazilites on
Hadīth,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 71(2) (2012): 231–256.
27. Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, Al-Mu’tamad fi Usul al-fiqh, Vol. 2, 80.
28. Muhammad b. ’Abd al-Karim Al-Shahrastani, Al-Milal wa al-Nihal, 38.
29. Ibid.
30. Ahmet Temel, The Missing Link in the History of Islamic Legal Theory: The
Development of Usul al-Fiqh between al-Shāfi’ī and al-Jassās during the 3rd/9th
and Early 4th/10th Centuries, PhD Thesis, University of California, 2014.
31. Racha El-Omari, “Accommodation and Resistance: Classical Mu’tazilites on
Hadīth,” 231–256.
32. Ibid.
33. Abu Mansur ’Abd al-Qahir b. Tahir al-Bagdadi, Al-Farq bayn al-firaq, (Beirut,
Al-Maktaba al-cAsriyya, 1995), 114
34. Josep Van Ess, “L’ autorite de la tradition prophetique dans la theologie
mu’tazilite,” in la notion d’autorite au moyen Age: Islam, Byzance, Occident,
edited by George Makdisi et al. (Paris: Presses Iniversitaires de France, c.1982),
216–217.
35. Ibid.

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 The Concept of Sunna in Muʿtazilite Thought 73

36. Brown, “How We Know Muslim Hadith Critics Did Criticism,” 191.
37. ’Abd Allah b. Muslim b. Qutayba, Ta’wil Mukhtalif al-Hadith, (Beirut:
Al-Maktaba al-Islami, 2006), 211; Gerard Lecomte, Le Traite des divergences du
Hadit d’Ibn Qutayba, (Institute Francais De Demas, 1962), 25–26.
38. When he said, “My Lord! Show me how You give life to the dead.” Allah said,
“Don’t you believe” Ibrahim said, “Yes (I believe), but (I ask) in order to be stronger
in faith.” The Prophet’s statement in the Hadith means, “We are more liable to seek
certainty.” Muhammad b. Isma’il al-Bukhari, al Jami’ al Sahih, (Riyadh: Darus
Salam, 1998) Hadith no. 4537, 248.
39. ’Abd Allah b. Muslim b. Qutayba, Ta’wil Mukhtalif al-Hadith, 211.
40. For ablution purposes.
41. ’Abd Allah b. Muslim b. Qutayba, Ta’wil Mukhtalif al-Hadith, 262.
42. Ibid. Cf: Michael Cook, “Ibn Qutayba and the Monkeys,” Studia Islamica, (89)
(1999), 43–74; Joseph Lowry, “The Legal Hermeneutics of al-Shāfi’ī and Ibn
Qutayba: A Reconsideration,” Islamic Law and Society, 11(1) (2004) 1–41.
43. Josep Van Ess, L’ autorite de la tradition prophetique dans la theologie mu’tazilite,
220. Cf: Josep Van Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology (Harvard: Harvard
University Press, 2006) 169–171.
44. Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, Tarikh Baghdad (Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya,
2011), 353
45. Muhammad b. Ahmad Al-Dhahabi, Tadhkirat al-Huffaz (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub
al-cIlmiyya, 1998) 213.
46. Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, Al-Mu’tamad fi Usul al-fiqh, Vol. 2, 80.
47. Abu al-Qasim al-Ka’bi al-Balkhi, Qubul al-Akhbar wa ma’rifat al-Rijal,, Vol. 1,
(Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya, n.d.), 11.
48. Richard, Woodward and Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam, 43.
49. Ibid., 108.
50. Al-Hazimi, Shurut al-A’immat al-Khamsa, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya,
1984), 61.
51. Jonathan Brown, The Canonization of Al-Bukhari & Muslim:The Formation and
Function of the Sunni Hadith Canon (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 178. Regarding the
reception of Al-Basri’s Al-Mu’tamad fi Usul al-fiqh see further Sabine Schmidtke
and Hasan Ansari, “The Mu’tazilī and Zaydī Reception of Abū l-Husayn
al-Basrī’s Kitāb al-Mu’tamad fī Usūl al-Fiqh,” Islamic Law and Society, 20(1–2)
(2013): 90–109.
52. Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, Al-Mu’tamad fi Usul al-fiqh, Vol. 2, 570. See also chap-
ter ? in this volume.
53. Ibid.
54. Abu al-Qasim al-Ka’bi al-Balkhi, Qubul al-Akhbar wa ma’rifat al-Rijal, Vol. 1,
11.
55. Joseph Van Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology, trans. Jane Marie Todd,
(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2006), 158.
56. See chapter 6 ? for details.

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9781137376459_05_ch03.indd 74 8/6/2015 5:37:24 PM
 Chapter 4

The Sunnification of adīth and

the Hadithification of Sunna
Aisha Y. Musa

Introduction

Today, the words adīth and sunna are nearly synonymous in the minds
of most Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Since the time of Muammad
ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiᶜī (d. 204/820), the adīth have been seen as the primary
repository of the Prophetic Sunna and an essential part of Islamic scripture.
Indeed, the Saī of al-Bukhārī is considered by many to be the second
most important text after the Qurʾān. Thus, the concept of sunna is seen by
most as inextricably linked to adīth literature. This chapter will contribute
to the work in this volume by demonstrating the ways in adīth litera-
ture developed in the service of fiqh, and the ways in which that literature
solidified both the sunnification of adīth the hadithification of sunna. The
usage of the term sunna will be examined at two levels. First, at the level of
the adīthcollections themselves; this includes how the compilers use the
word in the titles of sections and subsections and how they organize sec-
tions and subsections in relation to each other, as well as appearance of the
term in the titles of adīth collections. As the following analysis will show,
hadithification of the concept of sunna—and indeed, religious knowledge
more broadly—is clearly apparent in the evolution of adīth collections,
the internal organization of those collections, and in the composition of
the Sunni canon. The second level of analysis is of the terminology in indi-
vidual adīth reports: how and in what contexts is the word sunna and/or

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 76 Aisha Y. Musa

its related verbs used in those reports and by whom? What is described as
sunna? Who institutes a sunna? This analysis at both the level of the collec-
tions themselves and the level individual reports will help to shed light on
the evolution of the Muslim community’s understanding of the nature and
scope of sunna in the formative period.
The Arabic noun sunna is derived from the verb sanna. Among the
meanings of this verb is “he instituted, practiced, or prescribed” a custom
or practice, whether good or bad, that others followed after him.1 The noun
sunna means “a way, course, rule, mode, or manner, of acting or conduct
or life,” in particular, one “that has been instituted, or pursued, by former
people, and has become one pursued by those after them.”2 The term sunna
relates first and foremost to actions. As a technical religious term, it has
come to mean the behavior of the Prophet Muammad, and Islamic law
recognizes three categories of behavior: those things that the Prophet said
(al-sunna al-qawliyya), those things that he did (al-sunna al-fiᶜliyya), and
those things of which he tacitly approved (al-sunna la-taqrīriyya).3
Despite the common and widespread conflation of the two terms, in his
seminal work on the topic, Ignaz Goldziher notes that early Muslim schol-
ars drew a clear distinction between the terms sunna and adīth. Goldziher
cites the examples of the three early jurists4 Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778)
who was characterized as “an imam in the adīth but not in the sunna;” his
contemporary, al-Awzā’ī (d.157/774), who was described as an imam in the
sunna but not the adīth, and Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/795) “was an undis-
puted master in both” fields. Goldziher describes the authority on adīth
as having “gathered much material about the Prophet’s sayings,” while an
authority on sunna knows “what is to be taken as the traditional norm in
rights and laws.”5 Given this clear early distinction, how and when did the
two terms become linked? The linkage between the concept of sunna with
the vehicle of adīth was forged over the course of the second and third
Hijrī centuries, as the community shifted from relying on recitation and
memorization to writing as the primary means of preserving and dissemi-
nating information about the Prophet and the early community, and adīth
literature was born.6

The Importance of Stories: Forging

the Link between adīth and sunna
The importance of stories as a means for informing the ever growing, multi-
cultural Muslim umma about the practices of Muammad and the com-
munity of Medina contributed to the emergence and evolution of adīth

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 AQ: Please Sunnification of adī th 77
confirm if this
running head
is fine with you
as there is not literature, from brief personal collections, often referred to as aīfa (note-
enough space to book), ajzā’ (volume), and nuskha (copy),7 to the large formal collections
accommodate
full title. that make up the canon. Stories about the Prophet Muammad and the
earliest community of Muslims served as an important source of practical
knowledge, first orally and then in writing, as Islam spread. The use of sto-
ries for elucidation and edification is not unique to Islam or to the Qur’ān.
Stories are integral to human society and play a crucial role in all religious
traditions. Richard Bulliet, in Islam: the View from the Edge, notes the men-
tion of Muhammad’s companions (as opposed to any mention of who in
an area was the first to memorize or own a copy of the Qur’ān) in Muslim
literature as evidence of the primary importance of those companions as
sources of information for the early Muslims in newly conquered lands.
He argues that these companions used their memories of Muammad—or
what they learned from others about him—to answer questions about the
faith and practice asked by new converts in the conquered lands. He further
supports this argument with the fact that the most important collections of
adīth focus primarily on matters of practical importance in the daily lives
of Muslims.8
The Qur’ān itself sets the precedent for the role of stories in the Muslim
community by recounting stories of previous Prophets and communities as
teaching examples. The term adīth is one of the words that the Qur’ān uses
for such stories.9 The other term that the Qur’ān uses is qaa, which it uses
both alone and in combination with adīth.10 A third Arabic word khabar
(pl. akhbar), meaning report, is also used in relation to such stories. While it
does not appear in the Qur’ān, the word khabar (report) is used interchange-
ably with adīth in the works of Muammad ibn Idrīs of al-Shāfiᶜī (d. 204
AH/820 CE), who plays a critical role in forging the link between sunna
and adīth.11 In the late second/early third hijri centuries, al-Shāfiᶜī (d. 204
AH/820 CE) articulated arguments that were pivotal in defining the term
sunna as the behavior of the Prophet Muammad—rather than the behav-
ior of the early community more broadly—and in defining adīth as the
indispensable repository of sunna. By correlating the Qur’ānic term ikma,
in the phrase al-kitāb wal-ikma, with sunna, al-Shāfiᶜī laid the foundations
for arguments that would eventually grant adīththe status of a secondary
form of unrecited revelation (way ghayr matlū). It is this understanding of
the nature and role of adīth as the repository of the Prophetic sunna (as a
secondary form of revelation) that has led to the common understanding
of the terms adīth and sunna as quasi-synonyms and conferred scriptural
authority on the. adīth 12
Although they appear to be used synonymously in the Qur’ān and other
early literature due to their lexical affinity, over time, the three words came
to have distinct uses. The term qaa has come be used in the broadest sense

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 78 Aisha Y. Musa

of religious preaching,13 and khabar has come to be used for almost any type
of informative report, while adīth has generally come to be limited to those
stories that report the Prophet’s own words and deeds, that is, the Prophetic
sunna.14 The process of linkage and limitation demonstrates the sunnifica-
tion of adīth. The importance of legal concerns dominated the use of,
adīth leading to the corollary phenomenon—that in this volume is referred
to as the hadithification of sunna.

The Impact of Fiqh

Fiqh is a separate Islamic science, with a separate body of literature, and is

addressed in another chapter of this volume; however, it is discourses in fiqh
that have had perhaps the greatest impact in forging the seemingly neces-
sary and inextricably link between sunna and adīth. Muammad ibn Idrīs
al-Shāficī (d. 204 AH/820 CE) has been long been recognized for his con-
tributions to Islamic law, in particular, for defining the outlines of jurispru-
dential methodology (uūl al-fiqh). Wael Hallaq has shown that his status
as the premier theorist of Islamic jurisprudence came in later generations
rather than during his lifetime and has recognized that al-Shāficī’s greatest
contribution was establishing adīth as an indispensable source of law.15
Al-Shāficī argued that it is only through stories of the Prophet’s teachings
and behavior that Muslims can know the details of key religious obligations,
such as prayer and almsgiving.16 Widespread acceptance of al-Shāficī’s argu-
ments for adīth as the repository of sunna eventually led to the hadithifica-
tion of sunna.

Sunnī adīth Collections

Hadīth collections evolved over the course of the first two Hijri centuries
from small personal collections apparently meant as memory aids and
teaching devices to volumes arranged by legal topics or the identity of nar-
rators and, finally, to those arranged by the sunna, established by reports,
and appropriately titled “sunan” works. The most revered adīth collections
are referred to by Sunni Muslims as al-kutub or al- iā al-sitta. Over the
course of the sixth-seventh AH/twelfth-thirteenth centuries CE,17 these
came to include the two aīs of al-Bukhārī (d. 256 AH/870 CE) and
Muslim (d. 261 AH/875 CE) and the Sunan works of Abū Dawūd (d. 275
AH/888 CE), al-Tirmidhī (d. 279 AH/892 CE), al-Nasā’ī (d. 303 AH/915

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 Sunnification of adī th 79

CE), and Ibn Māja (d. 273 AH/886 CE). Of these, the Sunan of Ibn Māja
was the last to gain a place in the Sound Six.18 Thus, of al- iā al-sitta, four
are sunan works, making them the majority of the Sunnī canon.
These canonized sunan collections are:

● Sunan Abū Dawūd (d. 275 AH/888 CE)

● Sunan al-Nasā’ī (d. 303 AH/915 CE)
● Sunan al-Tirmidhī (d. 279 AH/892 CE)
● Sunan Ibn Māja (d. 273 AH/886 CE)19

While these works—together with the aīs of al-Bukhārī and Muslim—

take pride of place in the canon, there are several other collections that
are currently also treated as part of the canon. These include yet another
sunan work, the Sunan of al-Dārimī (d. 255 AH/868 CE).20 Additional
collections both predate and exist outside the canon. With the exception
of Sunan al-Dārimī, the extant Sunan collections postdate the other major
collections of adīth. This lateness, together with their predominance in
the Sunnī canon, represents the climax of hadithification of the concept of
sunna. An examination of different types of adīth literature clearly reveals
development in the community’s understandings sunna and its relation-
ship with adīth.

Muannaf Collections

Following small personal collections, topically arranged (muannaf) works

appear in the mid second/eighth century. The earliest extant muannaf work
is the Muwaa of the Medinan scholar Mālik b. Anas (d. 179 AH/795CE),
the eponymous founder of the Maliki school of Sunni jurisprudence and
teacher of Muhammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204 AH/820 CE). The
Muwaa is discussed in detail in the chapter on fiqh in this volume, but
it merits mention here because it is considered part of the Sunni adīth
canon and is evidence of both the influence of fiqh on l adīth iterature and
evidence for the evolution of that literature in service to the demands of
fiqh. The Muwaa is clearly a book of fiqh, rather than a adīthcollection,
per se. Brown notes that the Muwaa combines Prophetic reports with the
statements of his companions and their successors, as well as the opinions
of Mālik himself. Yasin Dutton has convincingly argued that the Muwaa is
representative of a time when the term sunna was not yet linked intimately
to adīth, a time when the term adīth referred to text and sunna referred to
action.21 It would be Mālik’s student, Muammad b. Idrīs al-Shaficī, whose

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 80 Aisha Y. Musa

arguments would be instrumental in making the texts of adīth integral to

the understanding of the term sunna. Although it is not technically a col-
lection of adīth proper, Mālik’s Muwaa is generally considered part of the
Sunni canon and is therefore included in the digital encyclopedia of Sunni
adīth literature (mawsūᶜat al-adīth) published online by Saudi Arabia’s
Ministry of Religious Affairs.22 What is pertinent to the current discussion
is the fact that the term sunna appears more often in the Muwaa than
in any of the other canonized collections of adīth.23 Brown describes the
Muwaa and similar early muannaf works as essentially being “transcripts
of legal debates,” the result of attempts by pious scholars to answer ques-
tions about faith and practice.24

Musnad Collections

Musnad collections are those in which the reports are arranged according
to the name of the original narrator, beginning with the first four caliphs
(khulafā’ al-rāshidūn), followed by the companions (aāba), with the
reports further subdivided according to the successors—the next genera-
tion of Muslims who came after the companions—who transmitted from
them. Emerging after the muannaf collections of the late second/eighth
and early third/ninth centuries, these collections focus on reports with
chains of narrators that go back to the Prophet, himself. Because of this,
according to Brown, they are considered adīth collections proper.25 This
focus on Prophetic reports, in preference to reports of the Prophet’s com-
panions and their successors, reveals a further refinement of the concept
of sunna as the words and deeds of the Prophet. As Brown observes, “the
testimony of Muhammad would trump all other figures of authority and
become the predominant focus of hadith collections.”26 At the same the
time musnad, which literally means supported, demonstrates an increasing
interest in determining the reliability of adīth texts. Thus, the musnad col-
lections responded to both an increasing interest in the reliability of reports
and the delineation of sunna as the example of the Prophet himself, to the
exclusion of others.
The earliest extant Musnad is that attributed Abū Dawūd al-ayālisī
(d. c. 203 AH/819 CE). Siddiqi notes, on the basis of internal evidence, that
although it is attributed to al-ayālisī, this Musnad was actually compiled
and organized by al-ayālisī’s student, Yūnus b. abīb, who had learned
the traditions from his teacher.27 Musnad collections are also attributed to a
number of others scholars of the third/ninth century as well.28 One report
found that Musnad al-ayālisī and other later collections bear particular

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 Sunnification of adī th 81

importance for the nature and scope of the term sunna. It is a report on the
authority of Jarīr b. cAbd Allāh, who quotes the Prophet as saying:

One who introduces a good sunna in Islam which is done after him will
have a reward like those who did it, without their rewards being diminished
in any way, and one who introduced an evil sunna in Islam which is done
after him will bear the burden like that those who did it without theirs being
diminished in any way.29

Although this might be understood as a sunna qawliyya—because the

Prophet reportedly said it when an unidentified man among the Anār
responded to the Prophet’s call for his followers to give whatever they
could in charity, and the people then followed the man’s example—two
factors suggest otherwise. First, not all versions of the report give the sur-
rounding context but only report the Prophet’s declaration, as is evident
in the variants found in later collections, including the most well-known
Musnad—that of Amad ibn anbal (d. 241 AH/855 CE).30 Second, this
report makes a key distinction between sunna that is good and sunna that
is bad. This report suggests that, according to the Prophet himself, sunna is
something broader than his own practices, or even those of his companions,
and in keeping with the meaning of the verb sanna, as mentioned above,
but includes good or bad practices instituted by anyone, which are followed
by others. Variations of this particular report appear across the spectrum
of adīth collections and introduce a degree of ambivalence related to the
nature of sunna as recommended attitude or behavior following the exam-
ple of Muammad himself.

Sunan Collections

The word sunan is the plural of sunna. These collections are generally given
the title of Sunan, followed by the name of the compiler. For example Sunan
Abū Dawūd, is the title of the adīth collection attributed to Abū Dawūd
al-Sijistānī (d. 275 AH/888CE). The majority of the sunan works appear
rather late as a genre of adith literature, well after the appearance of the
saīfah, muannaf, and musnad collections, and after al-Shāficī’s (d. 204/820)
arguments for linking the concept of sunna exclusively to the precedents set
by the Prophet Muammad, defining the sunna as sunnat al-nabī. Therefore,
the sunan works are perhaps the most important demonstration of the link-
age of sunna with adīth. According to Siddiqi, “the sunan works consti-
tute the richest branch of adīth literature.”31 These collections are arranged

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 82 Aisha Y. Musa

topically according to the practices (sunan) that they report, and represent
further progress in the development of adīth literature, combining a focus
on Prophetic reports with the topical arrangement needed to facilitate
addressing questions of faith and practice. A major aim of the sunan works
was to include reports that would be particularly applicable to law, ritual,
and behavior.32 Although the compilers of sunan works frequently included
useful reports that were doubtful or disputed in terms of their authenticity,
they did not do so haphazardly or carelessly. On the contrary, they carefully
noted weaknesses of and disputes about those reports.33 Among the most
important of the Sunan works are those of Abū Dawūd (d. 275 AH/888
CE), al-Tirmidhī (d. 279 AH/892 CE), al-Nasā’ī (d. 303 AH/915 CE),
Ibn Māja (d. 273 AH/886 CE), al-Dārimī (d. 255 AH/868 CE),34 and
al-Dāraqu nī (d. 385 AH/995 CE). All but the last two of these collections
are considered to be part of the al-iā al-sitta. (literally, the six authentic
collections), which together with the collections of al-Bukhārī and Muslim,
form the Sunni adīth canon. It is in the sunan works that we find the most
clear and sustained treatment of sunna and its importance
Sunan al-Dārimī is among the earliest sunans, and it provides important
insights into the compiler’s understanding of the nature and scope of sunna.
Before addressing topics of doctrine, ritual, and behavior, he begins with an
introduction that opens with a subsection on the ignorant and misguided
state of the Arabs prior to the Prophet’s call.35 He follows this with a section
on descriptions of the Prophet found in previous scriptures;36 this is followed
by subsections containing reports on the various miracles with which God
had blessed the Prophet throughout his life.37 After this, al-Dārimī includes
reports of the Prophet’s goodness, generosity, and humility, followed by
reports of his death and miracles that occurred after his death,38 including
a report of 70,000 angels surrounding his grave, beating their wings and
praying for the Prophet.39 All of these reports highlight the specialness of
the Prophet and his status, vis-à-vis believers, and build up to what follows:
a subsection on following the sunna (ittibāᶜ al-sunna). Al-Dārimī opens this
subsection with a report about the Prophet’s farewell sermon, related on the
authority of cIrbā b. Sāriya:

The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) prayed the dawn prayer with
us and then preached a sermon that brought tears to our eyes and fear to our
hearts. Then someone said: “O Messenger of God, this seems to be a farewell
sermon. So, what do you command us?” Then he [the Prophet] said: “I com-
mand you to beware God and listen and obey, even if an Abyssinian slave is
your leader after me. You will see many disputes, but and the sunna of the
rightly guided Caliphs is incumbent upon you (fa-ᶜalaykum bi-sunnatī wa
sunnat al-khulafā’al-rāshidīn al-mahdiyyin). Hold fast to it and avoid novel-
ties, for every novelty is innovation.”40

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 Sunnification of adī th 83

Here, after clearly emphasizing the Prophet’s special nature and status,
al-Dārimī gives us the Prophet’s final order to his followers regarding sunna,
which is contrasted with novelties (mudathāt). The former is incumbent
upon (ᶜalaykum) and the latter is to be avoided by (iyyākum) the audience
of the Prophet. More importantly, sunna includes both the Prophet’s own
sunna and that of the rightly guided caliphs. Al-Dārimī further empha-
sizes the importance of the sunna by quoting reports from al-Zuhrī and
al-Shaybānī on the danger of leaving aside the sunna. According to al-Zuhrī,
adhering to the sunna is salvation (al-iᶜtiām bil-sunna najāt), and accord-
ing to al-Shaybānī, religion disappears one sunna at a time (yadhhab al-dīn
sunnatan sunnatan).41
In a later subsection of his introduction, al-Dārimī deals with the pres-
ervation of adīth from the Prophet, relating a variety of reports in which
the Prophet declares that hellfire awaits anyone who attributes things to
the Prophet that he did not say.42 There are also many subsections on a
broad range of issues related to knowledge (ᶜilm), including its importance,
the status of the learned (ᶜulamā’), the importance of sincere intention in
seeking knowledge, and the question of committing adīth and ᶜilm to
writing. This shows the hadithification of the concept of ᶜilm in addition
to the hadithification of the concept of sunna, and is representative of
the strong influence that adīth came to have on all Islamic intellectual
disciplines.
Immediately following the subsection on committing knowledge to
writing is one titled “One who introduces a good or evil sunna” (man sanna
sunnatan hasanatan aw sayyi’tan).43 This subsection includes two variants
of the report found in the Musnads of al-ayālisī and Amad; one does not
give the context in which the Prophet reportedly said this, the other does.
Al-Dārimī ends his introduction with a treatise of ᶜAbbād b. Abbād b.al-
Khawwā al-Shāmī, highlighting the blessing of intellect (al-ᶜaql) and con-
trasting that with opinion (ra’y) and innovation (bid’a), which can mislead
those whose hearts are occupied with them. The answer to this problem is
following the example of the Prophet and his companions: “the Qur’ān is
the imām of God’s Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him), and God’s
Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) is the imām of his compan-
ions, and his companions are the imāms of those who come after them.”44
This brings the introduction back to the place where it began, with the idea
that this sunna is the sunna of the Prophet and his companions. Al-Dārimī’s
arrangement of section topics and the reports he includes in the various sec-
tions of the introduction suggest that the nature of sunna and its relation to
adīth texts was intimately connected with questions of religious knowledge
and adīth as the source of that knowledge. However, the inclusion of the
Prophetic reports promising heavenly rewards for anyone who introduces

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 84 Aisha Y. Musa

a good sunna that is followed by later generations again imparts a degree of

ambiguity as to who may originate a sunna.
While al-Dārimī began by building up the person and status of the
Prophet in preparation for dealing with the need to follow the sunna, the
next compiler of a Sunan, Ibn Māja, focuses immediately on the necessity
of following the Prophetic Sunna (ittibāᶜ sunnat rasūl allāh), beginning with
a report on the authority of Abū Hurayra in which the Prophet says: “Take
what I command you and abstain from what I forbid you” (mā amartukum
bihi fa-khudhū wa mā nahaytukum ᶜanhu fa-antahū).45 This report is a para-
phrase of Qur’ān 59:7, which al-Shāfiᶜī used in his arguments in support of
the obligation to follow all orders of the Prophet beyond what is contained
in the Qur’ān.46 Other reports in this section paraphrase the Qur’ānic asso-
ciation of obedience to the Prophet with obedience to God. Immediately
following the section of the book under discussion, titled “the Prophetic
Sunna,” Ibn Māja addresses the importance of Prophetic adīth and harsh-
ness against those who reject them.47 This too mirrors the earlier arguments
of al-Shāfiᶜī, who cites one such adīth in his challenge to those who ques-
tioned the authority of . adīth 48 After establishing the importance of the
Prophetic Sunna and adīthin this way, Ibn Māja continues with sections
indicating the wariness of the Prophet’s companions in relating adīth from
the Prophet and warning of the serious punishments in store for those who
lie in reporting adīth. It is only after dealing with issue related directly to
Prophetic adīth that Ibn Māja turns to the sunna of the rightly guided
caliphs. Here, he cites the two variations of ᶜIrbā b. Sāriya’s report of the
Prophet’s farewell sermon in which the Prophet mentions both his own
sunna and that of the rightly guided caliphs, as source of guidance for the
community.49 Ibn Māja also includes a subsection on “One who introduces
a good or evil sunna,” which includes three variants of that report, two
of which do not mention the context of the Prophet’s words.50 After this
is a subsection titled “One who revives a sunna that has died out,” (man
ayā sunnatan qad umītat). Here Ibn Māja includes two variant reports in
which the Prophet says: “Whoever revives a sunna of mine that has died out
after me will have a reward like that of the people who perform it, without
diminishing the reward of the people in any way.” While reports in the
previous subsection distinguish between good and evil sunna, this report
contrasts sunna with bidᶜa (innovation). Here, he cites a report that is also
found in Sunan al-Dārimī, in which there is an emphasis on the Prophetic
Sunna and the importance of adīth that is followed by Prophetic reports
that broaden the definition of sunna to include the Prophet’s companions
and anyone who introduces something that is done by others after him.
Following al-Dārimī and Ibn Māja in chronological order is the one of
the most important of the sunan collections, that of Abū Dawūd al-Sijistānī

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 Sunnification of adī th 85

(d. 275 AH/888 CE). Unlike his predecessors, Abū. Dawūd does not begin
his collection with the topics of sunna or adīth. These come much later
in the work. The section dealing with hadith comes in the middle of the
collection, in the “Book of Knowledge (Kitāb al-ᶜilm).”51 There is also a
“Book” dedicated to the topic of Sunna that comes near the end of the
collection.52 The treatment of adīth within the coverage of ᶜilm suggests
a further hadithification of knowledge, by portraying knowledge as specifi-
cally religious in nature and establishing a stronger position for adīth texts
as the primary source of religious knowledge. The explicit connection of
knowledge to adīthtexts is also clear from another section of “the Book
of Knowledge”—a section on committing adīth to writing (Bāb fī Kitāb53
al-adīth)—relating reports in which the Prophet allowed and/or encour-
aged his companions to write down what they heard him say.54 Sections
on the seriousness of attributing lies to the Prophet and speaking without
knowledge, together with sections on the proper way to learn and teach
adīth, including the disapproval of withholding them and the benefits of
making them public, further strengthen the idea of adīth as the primary
vehicle through which religious knowledge is disseminated.
Abū Dawūd situates his treatment of sunna in the context of sectar-
ian divisions, opening his book on the sunna with the report in which
the Prophet predicts his community will divide into 73 sects.55 The book
contains subsections condemning disputes over the Qur’ān and following
the allegorical verses of the Qur’ān, along with specific sections dedicated
to various sects present during Abū Dawūd’s time. The subsection on the
necessity of adhering to the sunna, makes it clear that this means accept-
ing extra-Qur’ānic reports by the Prophet’s declaration: “I have been given
the Qur’an and something like it, yet the time is coming when a satisfied
man sitting on his couch will say: ‘Keep to the Qur’an; what you find per-
mitted in it treat as permitted, and what you find prohibited in it treat as
prohibited.”56 This is a variant of a report also cited earlier by Ibn Māja
and al-Shāfiᶜī in support of adīth as the essential repository of sunna. Abū
Dawūd’s work represents a continuation and expansion on the works of his
predecessors. As in their works, there is a clear call for adherence to sunna
as a means to protect the community. While his predecessors portray the
sunna as protecting from general misguidance, Abū Dawūd portrays the
sunna as the antidote to sectarian divisions. By addressing the question of
adīth in great detail, including the question of writing and dealing with it
before and at greater length than the topic of sunna, Abū Dawūd’s Sunan
represents another stage in the development of the community’s under-
standing of the nature and scope of sunna and the increasing importance
of adīth as a necessary vehicle for knowledge of the sunna. The Sunans
of al-Tirmidhī (d. 279 AH/892 CE) and al-Nasā’ī (d. 303 AH/915 CE)

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 86 Aisha Y. Musa

complete the Sunni canon and show even further development of the rela-
tionship between sunna and adīth.
Al-Tirmidhī does not have a section dedicated specifically to the topic
of sunna and, like Abū Dawūd, the discussion of adith is dealt with in the
section on knowledge.57 Though not as long or exhaustive as those of earlier
sunan works, the section on knowledge contains a selection similar to the
selection of reports on knowledge and adīth found in the sunan works
already discussed. It includes reports that praise seeking knowledge, warn of
dire consequences for attributing lies to the Prophet, and warn against the
time when people will claim to follow only what they find in the Qur’ān. In
a subsection on taking up the sunna and avoiding innovation, al- Tirmidhī
includes a variant of ᶜIrbā b. Sāriya’s report on the Prophet’s farewell ser-
mon, in which the Prophet declares his sunna and that of the rightly guided
caliphs to be incumbent upon the community, as a safeguard against inno-
vation; al-Tirmidhī declares this adīth to be asan aī (good, sound).
Following this is a variant of the report on the reward for one who revives
a sunna that has died out, which al-Tirmidhī declares to be asan (good).58
The content and arrangement of al-Tirmidhī’s Sunan seems to summarize
the key issues dealt with at greater length and in greater detail in the earlier
collections. The latest of the canonized sunan collections, that of al-Nasā’ī
(d. 303 AH/ 915 CE) does not contain sections dedicated to the topics
of sunna, adīth, or ᶜilm, dealing only with the various details of religious
belief, practice, and law common to all sunan and muannaf collections.

The aīs of Al-Bukhārī and Muslim

Predating most of the sunan collections, the two aīs reveal key aspects
of how adīth literature meets the legal and doctrinal needs of the Sunni
Muslim community.59 The aī al-Bukhārī (d. 256 AH/870 CE) is con-
sidered the most influential and authoritative book after the Qurʾān in
Sunni Islam. A contemporary of al-Dārimī, al-Bukhārī is said to be the first
to attempt to develop a system of authentication that could serve to deter-
mine the relative reliability with which such stories might be traced back
to the Prophet. He does not describe his methodology, but later scholars
have inferred it from detailed study of al-Bukhārī’s life and works.60 It took
several centuries for his aī to become part of the emerging canon of
Sunni adīth literature. He includes a lengthy section on knowledge (Kitāb
al-ᶜilm) near the beginning of the aī, in which he presents Qur’ānic
verses and Prophetic reports that emphasize the merits of knowledge, the
permissibility of studying with a learned person, and demonstrating how

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 Sunnification of adī th 87

the Prophet taught people, either through direct admonition or in response

to their questions.61 Near the end the aī he includes a section titled
“Adhering to the Book and the Sunna” (al-iᶜtiām bil-kitāb wal-sunna).62
This section includes stories of the four rightly guided caliphs, as well as
those of the Prophet himself, which highlight the importance of the Qur’ān
and the importance of following the practices of the Prophet. Dealing with
the issue of knowledge early, immediately after sections on revelation and
faith, lays the foundation for everything that follows. Placing the discus-
sion of the Book and Sunna at the end, just before the final section on the
oneness of God, rounds out the work by putting everything that has gone
before in the context of obeying God and the Prophet.
The second work at the center of the Sunni canon is the aī of Muslim
ibn al-ajjāj (d. 261 AH/875 CE). Like al-Bukhārī, Muslim considered a
report to be sound only if it came through an unbroken chain of trustworthy
narrators. In the introduction to his aī, Muslim states directly that he
has compiled the work in response to the keen interest in a collection of the
Prophet’s sayings on “the practices and rules of the religion” (sunan al-dīn
wa akāmihi).63 The overall impression left by his introduction is that, for
Muslim, the sunna is foremost, the sunna of the Prophet and is transmitted
by reports of trustworthy narrators. The structure and organization of the
two works clearly demonstrate the hadithification of both knowledge and
sunna and highlight the primacy of the Prophet as an originator of sunna.
However, Muslim also includes, in his “Book of Knowledge,” a subsec-
tion on “one who introduces a good sunna or an evil sunna and one who
invites to guidance or error” (man sanna sunnatan asanatan aw sayyi’tan wa
ma daᶜā ilā huda aw alāla),64 in which he includes variants of the reports
found in a number of earlier and later collections. While the introduction
to Muslim’s aī seemed to clearly associate the sunna with the Prophet
and reports of his words and deeds, this subsection of the Saī introduces
ambiguity in that regard. Muslim gives no indication that he considers these
reports problematic. Indeed, given the standards he sets for himself in his
introduction, he deems these reports reliable.

The Word sunna in Specific adīth Texts

The ambivalence introduced by the man sanna sunnatan reports included

in both canonical and non-canonical collections of adīth is intensified by
an examination of the usage of the word sunna and the related verbs sanna
and istanna that appear in the texts (mutūn) of individual adīth reports,
which, given the importance of the concept, is surprisingly limited. Software

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 88 Aisha Y. Musa

advances have made it possible to search for specific words or phrases in

adīth collections on the web in both English and Arabic, and while this is
in many ways a boon to researchers, search results can be misleading. For
example, a search for the English term “sunna” at www.alim.org includes
reports in which the word “sunna” is inserted parenthetically by the transla-
tor but does not occur in the original Arabic.65 However, searching in the
original Arabic is also problematic. The most comprehensive and flexible
site for searching adith collections in Arabic is www.al-islam.com,66 a site
maintained by Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs. This site con-
tains the nine most widely recognized Sunni collections of adīth: aī
al-Bukhārī, aī Muslim, Sunan Abū Dawūd, Sunan al-Nasā’ī, Sunan
al-Tirmidhī, Sunan Ibn Māja, Sunan Dārimī, Musnad Amad, and Muwaa
Mālik, together with seven later commentaries. A search for the noun sunna,
with internal vowels and enclitic prefixes and suffixes, but without case end-
ings displays 125 pages containing nearly 1250 results. Search parameter
limitations do not allow searching only in particular collections, so this
number includes not only occurrences in the collections themselves, but
also in the later commentaries, as well as repetitions of reports throughout
the collections and repetitions of the particular words within individual
reports. A search for sunna’s closely related verbs in the various possible
conjugations presents similar challenges. The number of particular occur-
rences in the collections themselves is approximately 200. Many of these are
repetitions, where individual adīth are included multiple times in a single
collection. Although determining the precise number of discrete reports
containing the word sunna or one of its related verbs in some permuta-
tion requires a far more painstaking analysis of the data, a general analysis
reveals that the term or one of its related verbs occur in only a fraction of
the thousands of adīth in the canonized collections. An examination of the
reports that contain the word sunna or one of its associated verbs shows, not
surprisingly, that the concept relates to primarily to actions. The actions to
which concept of sunna is applied in the adīth texts fall into three general
categories: legal rulings, religious practices, and personal behaviors.
The concept of sunna in relation to ruling and governance is shown in
several ways: either quite generally67 and through stories of Muammad,68
or through references to ᶜUmar69 either querying or instructing someone
entrusted with governorship of a province on which sources to consult in
legal rulings. The sources mentioned are the Qur’ān, the sunna, and either
consensus or ijtihād. In addition to this general discussion, there are two
specific types of judgments that are described as sunna. One is the imposi-
tion of flogging as a punishment. The reports in al-Dārimī and Ibn Māja
do not specify the crime for which the flogging was imposed, but versions

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 Sunnification of adī th 89

of the report in several other collections indicate that the offense was wine
drinking. All of the reports state that the Prophet and Abū Bakr imposed
40 lashes and ᶜUmar imposed 80 and that each is sunna. According to Abū
Dawūd, Amad, and Muslim, the number imposed on the wine drinker
whose story provides the framework for the discussion of sunna, received
40 lashes. Only the report in Muslim expresses an explicit preference for 40,
which is the Prophetic sunna.70 The second specific official ruling described
as being sunna is a case in which a grandmother comes to Abū Bakr inquir-
ing about her share of inheritance. Abū Bakr informs her that the Book of
God does not give her a share, but he is unsure about the Prophet’s sunna
and asks her to return after he has had a chance to consult people. He is
informed by two other companions that the Prophet awarded grandmoth-
ers one sixth.71
In the realm of personal behaviors, a sunna may be good or evil, as reports
on the reward for instituting a sunna, discussed above, indicate. Variants of
the reports already discussed are repeated throughout the collections, either
as a general statement of the Prophet, or in relation to giving in charity, as
noted above. In addition to being included in general discussions of charity,
variants of this report are also included in the chapters on the obligatory
charity, zakat, in aī Muslim and Sunan al-Nasā’ī.72 While charity serves
as the example of a good sunna, which has been established by an unnamed
man from the Anār of Medina,73 murder serves as the example of an evil
sunna, which has been established by Cain, who is described in various
reports as “awwal man sanna al-qatl” (the first to establish the sunna of
killing).74
The most frequent use of the term sunna occurs in relation to various
details of religious rituals: prayer, charity, fasting, and pilgrimage. Of these,
the fewest reports containing the word sunna are those on fasting. These
reports identify breaking the fast while traveling as a sunna.75 Interestingly,
reports on the details of rituals include not only those things that are sunna,
but also those that are “not sunna,”76 demonstrating that the concept of
sunna is used to discourage as well as encourage particular actions. Other
issues with which the term sunna is also associated in the texts of the adīth
are personal and social matters such as the proper way to bury the deceased77
or the appropriate ways of handling marriage and divorce.78
Among the actions described as sunna within the prayer are resting the
two hands on the knees while bowing, which ᶜAbd Allah b. ᶜUmar says is
“among the sunna of prayer” (min sunnat al-alāt),79 the sitting on the heels
between prostrations, which Ibn ᶜAbbas is quoted as calling “a sunna of your
Prophet” (sunna nabīkum),80 and keeping the right foot erect while folding
the left under during the final sitting of the prayer.81 It is noteworthy that

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 90 Aisha Y. Musa

none of the reports contains a description of the Prophet’s actions dur-

ing prayer. Instead, the companions’ declarations are presented as part of
general discussions on the correct postures in prayer. Moreover, the texts of
the reports included by Abū Dawūd do not mention the placement of the
hands on the knees while bowing. Rather this information appears only in
Abū Dawūd’s section title. In addition to specific details of the prayer itself,
particular types and occasions of prayer are also identified as sunna, includ-
ing shortening the prayer when traveling,82 the witr prayer,83 praying two
rakaᶜas individually after arriving at the mosque,84 and praying two rakaᶜas
in congregation during an eclipse.85 Although it is the only the eclipse prayer
among these that is presented within a narrative describing the Prophet’s
own actions, these and other actions related to prayer are instances of al-
sunna al-fiᶜliyya, (action oriented sunna). An example that can be seen as
either action oriented sunna or verbal sunna (al-sunna al-qawliyya) related
to the ritual prayer appears in Sunan al-Nasā’ī. When Ibn Shihāb is asked
about bathing on Friday, he says it is “a sunna” and that Sālim b. ᶜAbd Allāh
told him, on the authority of ᶜAbd Allāh that “the Prophet talked about it
from the pulpit.”86
Reports in relation to oth the lesser and the greater pilgrimages are both
action oriented sunna and verbal sunna (al-sunna al-qawliyya), as they pres-
ent both the Prophet’s own actions and his instructions to his followers. For
example, the Prophet reportedly instructed that those who were prevented
from completing ajj could fulfill ᶜUmra by circumambulating the Sacred
House and going between afā’ and Marwa.87 The Prophet is also cited as
giving specific instructions on the how to properly slaughter the sacrificial
animals.88 As in the case of reports discussing the sunna of ritual prayer, the
discussions of ajj-related matters are frequently declarations that some-
thing is a sunna, rather than an actual narration of the words or actions of
the Prophet himself. For example, a report in al-Bukhārī cites Ibn ᶜUmar
as instructing a man to slaughter his sacrificial camel “standing and bound,
according to the sunna of Muammad.”89
The relationship between personal behavior and religious observance is
also highlighted in the use of the term sunna. According to one of the most
widely repeated sayings attributed to the Prophet, “whoever dislikes my
sunna is not of me” (man raghiba ᶜan sunnatī fa laysa minnī). The context
in which the Prophet is said to have uttered this declaration provides key
information about the nature of sunna. Some of the Prophet’s companions
decided to give up food during day, sleep during the night, and marital
relations, in favor of a life devoted to fasting and prayer. When the Prophet
heard of this, he said, “I stand [in prayer] and I sleep; I fast and I break fast;
and I marry women. Whoever dislikes my sunna is not of me.”90 These
reports emphasize the quality of moderation in religious observance as a

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 Sunnification of adī th 91

type of sunna, nuancing the understanding of sunna to include not only

actions, but the qualities of character those actions embody.

Conclusion

As the foregoing analysis of key texts shows, in spite of the hadithification of

sunna and the sunnification of adith that occurred over the course of the first
several Hijrī centuries, the concept of sunna was initially linked to the actions
of the Prophet and others and also to the character qualities those actions
embody, such as attitudes of charity and moderation. Over time, the Muslim
community granted higher status to the words, deeds, and attitudes of the
Prophet over those of others, developing the concept of the Prophetic Sunna
and granting that Sunna the status of a secondary form of divine inspiration,
or way. The shift from memorization and recitation to books as the means
of preserving and disseminating information that occurred in the third/ninth
century led to emergence of adīth collections. Collections arranged by topics
(muannaf), transmitters (musnad), and Prophetic practices (sunan) emerged
in order to meet the needs of scholars and jurists seeking to answer questions
of faith and practice for the Muslim community. adīth became an indis-
pensable repository of religious knowledge, in particular, knowledge of the
Prophetic Sunna. As such, adīth collections came to be the vehicle through
which later generations of Muslims access that knowledge. Together, these
factors blurred the distinction that earlier scholars had drawn between sunna
as action, in particular, the words and deeds of the Prophet Muammad, and
adīth texts, leading to the commonplace conflation of adīth and sunna in
popular consciousness. The size and scope of collections, the specific reports
the compilers include, the subject headings under which reports are placed,
and the arrangement of sections and subsections clearly demonstrate the
hadithification of both sunna and knowledge and the primacy of the Prophet
Muhammad as the originator of sunna. However, the impression given by
the limited occurrences of the word sunna and its related verbs in the texts
(mutūn) of individual adīth reports is often at odds with the impression
given by structure, organization and even titles of the collections. While the
Prophet is often designated as the originator of sunna, so are the Abū Bakr,
ᶜUmar, and the rightly guided caliphs. The greatest ambiguity, however, is
introduced by the Prophet’s declaration about “whoever establishes a sunna”
(man sanna sunnatan), found in both canonical and non-canonical collec-
tions, including Muslim’s aī. What remains consistent throughout is the
idea of sunna as precedent, whether it is a practice, character quality, or atti-
tude, that is established by someone and then emulated by others.

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 92 Aisha Y. Musa

Notes
1. Edward W. Lane and Stanley Lane Poole, An Arabic-English lexicon, Part 4
(Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1968), 1436b.
2. Ibid., 1438b
3. Aisha Y. Musa, “Hadith Studies,” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic
Studies, ed. Clinton Bennett (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 76.
4. These jurists are discussed in detail in the chapter on fiqh.
5. Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies, Vol. II, trans. C. R. Barber and S. M. Stern
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971), 24–25.
6. Gregor Schoeler, The Genesis of Literature in Islam, trans. Shawkat M. Toorawa
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 68.
7. William A. Graham, Divine Word and Prophetic Word in Early Islam: A
Reconsideration of the Sources, with Special Reference to the Divine Saying or
Hadith Qudsi. Religion and Society (Hague, Netherlands: Mouton, 1977), 7.
8. Richard W. Bulliet, Islam: the View from the Edge (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1994), 31–32.
9. Qur’ān 20:9, 51:24.
10. Qur’ān 12:3, 111.
11. Aisha Y. Musa, adīth as Scripture (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 35.
12. Aisha Y. Musa, “Al-Shafi’i, the Hadith, and the Concept of Duality of
Revelation,” Islamic Studies, 46(2) (2007): 163–215.
13. Khalil ‘Athamina, “Al-Qasas: Its Emergence, Religious Origin and Its Socio-
Political Impact on Early Muslim Society,” Studia Islamica, (76) (1992): 53–74.
14. Chase F. Robinson, Islamic Historiography (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 15–16.
15. Wael B. Hallaq, “Was Al-Shafi‘i the Master Architect of Islamic Jurisprudence?”
International Journal of Middle East Studies, (25), 4, (1993): 587–605.
16. Musa, Hadith as Scripture.
17. Muhammad Zubayr Siddiqi, Hadith Literature — Its Origin, Development &
Special Features (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1993), 73–74.
18. Ibid., 242–243.
19. Siddiqi, 73–74.
20. Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. http://hadith.al-islam.com/Loader.aspx?pageid=261.
(accessed February 2, 2014).
21. Yasin Dutton, The Origins of Islamic Law:the Qur’an, the Muwaa’ and Madinan
ᶜAmal (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 3.
22. Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. http://hadith.al-islam.com/Loader.aspx?pageid=261.
(accessed February 2, 2014).
23. A search of the term “sunna” in the adīth collections at www.alim.org reveals
65 instances in the Muwaa, less than half that number in aī al-Bukhārī and
none in the other collections. This search is limited to the actual matns of the
adīth themselves, however, and does not return results from the introductions
of compilers such as Muslim, Ibn Māja, and al-Tirmidhī who each discuss the
sunna directly, as addressed elsewhere in this chapter.

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 Sunnification of adī th 93

24. Jonathan A. C. Brown, Hadith: Muhammad’s Legacy in the Medieval and Modern
World (Oxford: Oneworld Press, 2009), 25.
25. Ibid., 28
26. Ibid., 29.
27. Muhammad Zubayr Siddiqi, Hadith Literature — Its Origin, Development &
Special Features (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1993), 45.
28. Brown, Hadith, 30.
29. Abū Dawūd al-ayālisī, Musnad Abū Dawūd al-ayālisī, ed. Muammad b.
ᶜAbd al-Musin al-Turkī (N.P.: Dār Hijr), 2:55–56.
30. Amad ibn anbal, Musnad Amad (Riyadh: International Ideas Home, 1998),
1402–1404.
31. Siddiqi, 61.
32. Goldziher et al., 230
33. Ibid., 231.
34. As Siddiqi notes, al-Dārimī’s collection is sometimes consider a musnad work;
however, Siddiqi argues convincingly in adīth Literature for it being properly
a sunan work, see Siddiqi, 68–69.
35. ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜAbd al-Ramān al-Dārimī, Musnad al-Dārimī al-maᶜrūf bi Sunan
al-Dārimī, ed. usayn Salīm Asad al-Dārānī (Riyadh: Dār al-Mughnī, 2000),
1:153–156.
36. Ibid., 1:156–163.
37. Ibid., 1:163–202.
38. Ibid., 1:202–228.
39. Ibid., 1:228.
40. Ibid., 1:229.
41. Ibid., 1:230.
42. Ibid., 1:308.
43. Ibid., 1:443–446.
44. Ibid., 1:506–507.
45. Ibn Māja, Sunan Ibn Māja, ed. idqī Jamīl al-ᶜA ār (Beirut: Dar el-Fikr, 2004), 19.
46. Musa, adīth as Scripture, 42.
47. Ibn Māja, Sunan Ibn Māja, 21–24.
48. Musa, adīth as Scripture, 53.
49. Ibn Māja, Sunan Ibn Māja, 28–29.
50. Ibid., 68–70.
51. Abū Dawūd al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abū Dawūd, ed. Muammad b. āli al-Rājī
(Riyadh: International Ideas Home, Inc., N.D.), 403.
52. Ibid., 503.
53. For a detailed discussion of the meanings of kitāb and kitāba in this context see
Gregor Schoeler’s The Oral and the Written in Early Islam (New York: Routledge,
2006).
54. Abū Dawūd, Sunan Abū Dawūd, 403.
55. Ibid., 503.
56. Ibid.
57. Abū ᶜĪsā Muammad ibn ᶜĪsā al-Tirmidhī, Sunan al-Tirmidhī, ed. idqī Jamīl
al-ᶜA ār (Beirut: Dar el-Fikr, 2005), 761–771.

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 94 Aisha Y. Musa

58. Ibid., 768.

59. Jonathan A. C. Brown, The Canonization of al-Bukhārī and Muslim: The
Formation and Function of the Sunnī adīth Canon (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
60. Ibid.
61. Muammad ibn Abū ᶜAbd Allāh ibn Ismaᶜīl al-Bukhārī, aī al-Bukhārī, ed.
Muammad b. āli al-Rājī (Riyadh: International Ideas Home, Inc., 1998),
36–52.
62. Ibid., 1387–1405.
63. Muslim b. al-ajjāj, aī Muslim (Beirut: Dar el-Fikr, 2004), 9.
64. Ibid., 1316–1317.
65. Alim.org. http://www.alim.org./search/node/sunna. (accessed May 1, 2014).
66. The information contained here is the result of Arabic searches for the noun
sunna and the verb sanna with varying declensions and conjugations, using
the advanced search options, in the collections of adīth at www.al-islam.com.
(accessed March-May 2014). The reports are identified by collection title and
adīth number.
67. Sunan Abū Dawūd 3592; Sunan al-Dārimī 168, 1167, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth.
Al-islam.com. http://hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
68. Musnad Amad 21556, Sunan al-Dārimī 2168, Sunan al-Tirmidhī 1327, in
Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May
1, 2014).
69. Sunan al-Nasā’ī 5399, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://hadith
.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
70. Musnad Amad 625, 1188, 1234; aī Muslim 1707; Sunan Abū Dawūd
4480; Sunan al-Dārimī 2312; Sunan ibn Māja 2571, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth.
Al-islam.com. http://hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
71. Musnad Amad 17519; Sunan Ibn Māja 2894; Sunan Abū Dawūd 2724; Sunan
al-Tirmidhī 2101, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://hadith.al-islam
.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
72. aī Muslim 1691; Sunan Nasā’i 2554, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.com.
http://hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
73. Abū Dawūd al-ayālisī, Musnad Abū Dawūd al-ayālisī, ed. Muammad
b. ᶜAbd al-Musin al-Turkī (N.P.: Dār Hijr), 2:55–56.
74. See for example, Musnad Amad 3623; aī al-Bukhārī 3158; Sunan ibn Māja
2616; Sunan al-Nasā’ī 3985, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://
hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
75. Sunan Abū Dawūd 2412; Sunan al-Dārimī 1713, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth.
Al-islam.com. http://hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
76. Musnad Amad 2838, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://hadith.al-
islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
77. Musnad Amad 5211, 5347, 6076; aī al-Bukhārī 1259, 1270; Sunan Abū
Dawūd 3213 3472; Sunan al-Tirmidhī 1046; Sunan Ibn Māja 1550, 1611, in
Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May
1, 2014).
78. Sunan Abū Dawūd 2245, 2248, 2186, 2187, 2308; Sunan al-Dārimī 2229;
Sunan Ibn Māja 2025, 2066, 2083; aī al-Bukhārī 4777, in Mawsūᶜat
al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).

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 Sunnification of adī th 95

79. Sunan Abū Dawūd 958, 959, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://
hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
80. aī Muslim 536; Sunan Abū Dawūd 845; Sunan al-Tirmidhī 283, in Mawsūᶜat
al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
81. aī al-Bukhārī 793; Sunan Abū Dawūd 958, 959; Sunan al-Nasā’ī 1157, 1158;
in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed
May 1, 2014).
82. Sunan al-Nasā’ī 1444, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://hadith
.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
83. Sunan al-Dārimī 1579; Sunan al-Nasā’ī 1676, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam
.com. http://hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
84. Musnad Amad 1997, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://hadith
.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
85. Sunan al-Nasā’ī 1497, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://hadith
.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
86. Sunan al-Nasā’ī 1443, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.com. http://hadith
.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
87. Musnad Amad 2224, 5172; aī Muslim 2186, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth.
Al-islam.com. http://hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
88. Sunan al-Dārimī 1909, 1914, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth, Al-islam.com. http://
hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
89. aī al-Bukhārī 1627, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. al-islam.com. http://hadith
.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).
90. Musnad Amad 6441, 13122, 13316, 13631, 22963, 25776; aī al-Bukhārī
4776; aī Muslim 2478; Sunan Abū Dawūd 1369; Sunan al-Dārimī 2169;
Sunan Ibn Māja 1846; Sunan al-Nasā’ī 3217, in Mawsūᶜat al- adīth. Al-islam.
com. http://hadith.al-islam.com. (accessed May 1, 2014).

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 Chapter 5

The Concept of Sunna in

the Ibāī School
Ersilia Francesca

Introduction

The Ibāīs are the moderate branch and the only survivors of the early
Islamic sect known as the Khārijites (Khawārij). Currently, they form the
main part of the population in Oman, in the oases of Mzab in Algeria,
Zawāra, and Jabal Nafūsa in Tripolitania, on the island of Jerba in Tunisia.
Small groups are also found on the island of Zanzibar and on the East
African coast (formerly part of the Sultanate of Oman). In this chapter, I
will analyze the development of the concept of “sunna” among the Ibāis
starting from the early beginning of the Ibāī movement in Bara.
The Ibāī school is one of the oldest surviving schools of Islamic law,
claiming Jābir b. Zayd (d. by the end of the first century H.—ca. 712) as
one of its founding figures. He enjoyed enormous prestige as a man of learn-
ing and even orthodox Muslims acknowledged his importance as an author-
ity on tradition. He was a personal friend and follower of al-asan al-Barī
and Ibn ʿAbbās, and some outstanding Sunnī traditionists were trained at
his circle, such as Qatāda b. Diʿāma, ʿAmr b. Harim, ʿAmr b. Dīnār, Tamīm
b. uway, and ʿUmāra b. ayyān. In its initial phase, the Ibāī movement
in Bara kept in close contact with the early Sunnī community, thus con-
tributing actively to the formation of Islamic law.
Jābir’s successor, Abū ʿUbayda, was the first political leader and the true
organizer of the Ibāī movement. He provided the basis for the diaspora,

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 98 Ersilia Francesca

which has allowed the survival of the sect until today, in particular, in
Maghreb and Oman. During Abū ʿUbayda’s imamate—once the attempts
at reconciliation with the Sunnī authorities had conclusively failed—there
was a progressive radicalization of the Ibāī movement. Between the first
decades and the end of the second/eighth century, the separation from the
Sunnī community was clear in the tendency to return to the authorities of
the sect and develop principles that became distinctive to the school, so that
the Ibāis’ aim to be a different group was explicit.
This became apparent in the Ibāī doctrines on the states of association
(walāya) and dissociation (barāʾa) within and outside the Ibāī community.
Walāya (friendship) should be rendered only to the true believers (i.e. other
Ibāis) in general, and to the Ibāī imāms and religious leaders who propa-
gated the true teachings of Islam, in particular. Barāʾa entailed more or less
militant behavior against the infidels (which included non-Ibāī Muslims)
and reprobate Ibāis, tyrannical rulers, and every Ibāī imām who abandons
the path of true belief. Moreover, zakāt must be given only to an Ibāī in
the state of association (walāya), in other words performing all his religious
duties and abstaining from what is forbidden.
Al-Rabīʿ b. abīb (d. between 180/796 and 190/806), who became the
key figure in the Baran Ibāī community after Abū ʿUbayda, was both a
jurist and an activist, he started to organize missionary activities in Oman,
where he moved together with Abū Sufyān (d. circa 190/806) at the end of
his life.1 In Oman, Ibadism flourished and became a unifying force in the
Omani society, thanks to its capacity of harmonizing Islamic fiqh with local
living tradition based on consensus in interpreting the law.2
From the third/ninth century onward, after the Ibāī community left
Bara and moved to Oman, the movement matured into a systematized
legal school (madhhab) thanks to the formalization of legal and doctrinal
norms in both uūl and furūʿ works, as in the Kitāb al-Jāmiʿ of Ibn Jaʿfar
(fl. third/ninth century) and in the homonimous work by Ibn Baraka (fifth/
eleventh). The intensification of this process from the fifth/eleventh to the
sixth/twelfth centuries resulted in Ibāī legal production mirroring the
structure and the legal subject matters discussed in Sunnī writings.3 During
the nineteenth century, Ibāism experienced a renaissance (naha), which
was characterized by a new ijtihād (interpretation) of the sources, a paral-
lel to the revival and reform/Salafī impulses in Sunnī Islam in that period.
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. al-ājj al-Izjinī (d. 1808) wrote a legal work considered a
fundamental work of the Ibāī renaissance in the Maghrib, the Kitāb al-Nīl,
which was expanded in a commentary (shar) by Muammad b. Yūsuf
A fayyish (d. 1914). In Oman, the Ibāī legal tradition once again flour-
ished thanks to the works by the prominent scholar ʿAbdallāh b. umayd
al-Sālimī (d. 1914).

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Ibadi School 99

Apart from some features, Ibāī law resembles that of the other schools in
that they derived their legal system from the same principal sources, namely,
the Qurʾān, the sunna, and the jurists’ legal opinions, cemented by ijmāʿ
(consensus). The differences between the Ibāī and the Sunnī schools of law
resulted either from instances in which the Ibāis based their doctrines on
traditions narrated by authorities that the other schools did not recognize,
or in which Ibāī jurists arrived at different interpretations of the sources.4

The Concept of “sunna” in the

Early ibāī Sources

The Sources

The following works are the most relevant sources for the early Ibāī
jurisprudence:

1. The Jawābāt Jābir Ibn Zayd. This is a collection of letters writ-

ten by Jābir to his friends and followers in which he gives his legal
response to several questions. This collection is the oldest Ibāī legal
document.5
2. The manuscript called thār al-Rabīʿ b. abīb which consists of the
thār and the Futyā al-Rabīʿ b. abīb.
5. The Aqwāl Qatāda b. Diʿāma, in particular, the traditions reported
by ʿAmr b. Dīnār and ʿAmr b. Harim in parts V and VI of the
manuscript.
6. The Kitāb al-alāt, narrated by abīb b. Abī abīb al-Jarmī from
ʿAmr b. Harim from Jābir, included in the last part of the Aqwāl.
7. The Kitāb al-Nikā, which is a collection of Jābir’s legal opinions on
marriage. The collator of the work is unknown, but as it is included
in the same manuscript as the Kitāb Nikā al-Shighār by ʿAbd Allāh
b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, it was presumably narrated by the latter.

The above-mentioned works, with the exception of the Jawābāt Jābir

b. Zayd, are part of a collection of Ibāī manuscripts known as al-Diwān
al-maʿrū ʿalā al-ʿulamāʾ al-ibāiyya, which is the principal source for infor-
mation on Ibāī jurisprudence in the first centuries of Islam.6 The traditions
and legal responses of Jābir have been transmitted to us through an Ibāī
line (umām b. al-Sāʾib, Abū ʿUbayda, Abū Nū āli, ayyān al-Aʿraj and
others) and a Sunnī line (Qatāda, ʿAmr b. Dīnār, ʿAmr b. Harim).

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 100 Ersilia Francesca

Among the oldest Ibāī fiqh works, there is also the Mudawwana by Abū
Ghānim Bishr b. Ghānim al-Khurāsānī, a prominent Ibāī scholar and jurist
from Khurāsān, who lived between the second half of the second/eighth
century and the early decades of the third/ninth century. The Mudawwana
gives a clear account of the development of the Ibāī jurisprudence in the
first two centuries of Hijra, presenting the early Ibāī doctrine on religious
as well as legal matters in its 14 chapters of different length.7
The themes treated in the Ibāī manuscripts reveal the evolving legal
debate during the first two centuries of Islam. This debate reflects two
opposing trends, which may be identified in the formative phase of Islamic
law: on the one hand, the continuation of local legal traditions and on
the other, the efforts of the first lawyers to find solutions that conform to
Islam.
The ancient Ibāī sources show a primitive structure: they teem with
aqwāl of certain fuqahāʾ, on occasion supported by an incomplete isnād
going back to the companions. Traditions from the Prophet appear sporadi-
cally (only five in the manuscripts attributed to al-Rabīʿ) and are supported
by an elementary isnād: “al-Rabīʿ ʿan ʿUthmān anna al-nabiyya suʾila ʿan”
(Futyā al-Rabīʿ b. abīb f. 36 l. 26) or just introduced by expressions such
as: “yuqālu inna Rasūla Allāh . . . .” The concept of sunna comprising the
exemplary behavior of the Prophet is conspicuously absent in the works
compiled by the early Ibāī jurisprudents, as in the early Sunnī sources. The
old fuqahāʾ relied on the authorities whose opinion they had arrived at; they
rarely had it from the Prophet and even in that case they mostly conveyed
what they conceived of as Prophetic wisdom.

The Concept of “Sunna” among the First Ibāī Authorities

The first Ibāī authorities—mainly the first imāms of the Baran commu-
nity, Jābir b. Zayd, Abū ʿUbayda and al-Rabīʿ b. abīb—gave life to a school
which was greatly influenced by traditions from the companions.
A great deal of information on the methods used by Jābir can be deduced
from the Jawābāt. In these, the term sunna indicates the local tradition or
a practice generally accepted by the community.8 In the correspondence of
Jābir, the term sunna occurs in a letter addressed to Mālik b. Usayd from
Oman (nr. 12) meaning “the regional custom (sunnat arikum) on which
there is a general agreement” (f. 73B l. 17). Moreover, in the letter addressed
to ʿUnayfa (nr. 5), Jābir said “whatever affair which contradicts the sunna
is not valid” referring to the imām who did not respect the rule concerning
the ritual prayer.9 In a further letter, Jābir fiercely refused to recognize the
validity of the prayer that was performed without recitation of the Qurʾān,

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Ibadi School 101

on the argument that this was against a well-founded sunna (fa-innahu qad
taraka al-sunna).10
From Jābir’s assertions, it is clear that he did not distinguish between
the legal speculation of the companions and what they passed on from the
Prophet, as the two concepts were identified in the generic sunna. The name
of the authorities on which Jābir based his judgments is only occasionally
quoted. At the end of the first century of Hijra, the concept of an authority
on which a doctrine was based was only just developing, and the learned
cited the companions of the Prophet, whom they had known personally,
or those who the local common tradition recognized as authorities.11 Jābir
cites Ibn ʿAbbās, who had been his friend and teacher, and occasionally
Ibn ʿUmar and ʿIkrima, mawlā of Ibn ʿAbbās. It is worth noting that Jābir
admitted the superiority of Ibn ʿAbbās even in cases where he was in dis-
agreement. For example, in the case of a woman divorced by a seriously ill
husband before the consummation of the marriage, the latter considered
that she had to await the recovery of the man before the recognition of
the right to her nuptial gift and inheritance. Jābir, after having related the
master’s opinion, said:

Had the question not been examined by Ibn ʿAbbās, I would have decided
that the woman should keep all her rights [both to the nuptial gift and to
the inheritance] even if she married while her husband was dangerously ill, as
long as her portion of the inheritance had not been lost.12 But the systematic
reasoning of those who have preceded us must take preference over ours.13

Jābir’s respect for the practice of the noblest companions is also attested
in his reply to ʿAbd al-Malik b. al-Muhallab. In this letter, he lists where the
Muslim community should look for the solutions to its problems and gives
priority to opinions delivered by the companions:

The juristic speculation (raʾy) of those who were before us is better than the
opinions we hold. Yet again the successor recognises the superiority of his
ancestor. The most deserving of such a right are the emigrants who accom-
panied the Prophet of God (muhājirūn) and those who followed them in
good-deeds for they have witnessed and learned. It is our duty to follow in
their footsteps and to follow their tracks.14

In the epistle by another early Ibāī scholar, Sālim Ibn Dhakwān, written
before c. 800 (but its precise date is disputed) and directed against Khārijī
extremism and Murjiʾism, sunna appears both as prophetic sunna and as
“sunna of the righteous among God’s servants” (sunnat al-āliīn min ʿibād
Allāh), meaning the “righteously guided caliphs” (al-Khulafāʾ al-Rāshidūn).15
This term is used to refer in particular to Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, whereas the

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 102 Ersilia Francesca

third caliph, ʿUthmān, is accused of having shunned the sunna of God’s

Messenger and followed a way other than that of his guidance.16
ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ibā, the alleged founder of the Ibāī movement, who
is credited with two letters addressed to the Umayyad caliph ʿAbd al-
Malik b. Marwān (65–86/661–680), and also accused ʿUthmān of having
betrayed the sunna of the Prophet by introducing innovations. Therefore,
the Ibāis did not recognize his authority and disputed the legitimacy of
his caliphate.17
In the early Ibāī sources, respecting the “sunna” means mainly follow-
ing a well-attested “precedent,” as Sālim Ibn Dhakwān states:

After consulting with the Muslim, he [Abū Bakr] appointed ʿUmar b. al-Kha āb
(to succeed him) as caliph. ʿUmar acted in accordance with the Book of God,
followed the sunna of God’s Messenger, and adopted the sunna of Abū Bakr.
But he was also confronted with cases which were not covered by Qurʾānic
pronouncements or prior sunna, whether (received) from the Messenger of
God, may God’s blessing and peace be upon him, or instituted by Abū Bakr.
[ . . . ] For many other problems, too, ʿUmar b. al-Kha āb instituted precedents
(sanna sunan) as they arose after consulting with the Muslim; and it is the duty
of every Muslim to endorse them and follow them in practice.18

In the opinion of Jābir’s successor, Abū ʿUbayda (d. toward 136/754–

158/775), as well as in Jābir’s opinion, the method for the formulation of
legal judgment was that the decision, in any legal case, should be based in
the first instance on the Qurʾān and, if there was no ruling to be derived
from the Qurʾān, recourse should be made to the sunna of the companions.
In the Risāla fī ʾl-zakāt, addressed to the Maghribī Ibāis during the imam-
ate of Abū ʾl-Kha āb (reigned 140–144), the only existing work in com-
plete form by Abū ʿUbayda, he records the opinions of Abū Bakr, ʿUmar,
ʿAlī, ʿĀʾisha, Ibn ʿAbbās and Jābir b. ʿAbd Allāh.19
He describes them as being firmly rooted in knowledge. He further says:
“We walked in their steps, followed their sayings, relied on their conduct
and emulated their methods.”20
As a theologian and lawyer, Abū ʿUbayda was a fervent supporter of
the role of tradition and vehemently opposed the use of raʾy (personal
reasoning). However, if the subjective, personal view may be contested,
he recognized the value of the lawyers’ prudent systematic reasoning and
assumed that ijmāʿ (consensus) is binding if based on it (raʾy al-jamāʿa
baʿda ijtihādihim):

In deciding they apply their prudent systematic reasoning (wa-ʾjtahidū

raʾyahum fīhi), based on what God has ordered concerning the distribution
[of the tithes] among those who he has ordered shall receive them.21

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Ibadi School 103

Abū ʿUbayda’s successor al-Rabīʿ was responsible for the first moves of
Ibadism toward the collection of the adīth. In Oman, where he went before
dying, he charged a certain Abū ʾl-Mundhir Bashīr al-Mundhir al-Nazwānī,
one of the missionaries, with the task of spreading his traditions. Al-Rabīʿ’s
traditions and legal responses, together with those of the other Ibāī author-
ities of the second/eighth century can be found in the Āthār, in the Futyā
al-Rabīʿ and in the Aqwāl Qatāda b. Diʿāma (second, third and fourth
parts). A Musnad, known as al-Jāmiʿ al-aī, which has been attributed
to al-Rabīʿ, has survived in the tartīb of Abū Yaʿqūb b. Ibrāhīm al-Warjlānī
(died 570/1174).
In the age of al-Rabīʿ, the first divided opinions on the hermeneutics of
the sources can be seen among the Ibāī lawyers. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz,
his companion Abū ʾl-Muʾarrij and others argued with al-Rabīʿ about a freer
use of rational criteria (raʾy and qiyās) and personal reasoning.22 Although
the community was dismayed by this circumstance, ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd
al-ʿAzīz’s legal responses were accepted, as the Ibāī historian al-Wisyānī
wrote: “The doctrine (qawl) of al-Rabīʿ is more balanced and wiser, but Ibn
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz’s doctrine has been accepted by most of the people.”23
In the Āthār al-Rabīʿ b. abīb, traditions from companions and suc-
cessors on legal as well as religious matters are reported in an extremely
abridged way, sometimes almost on a yes-no basis, and a reason is never
given for the opinion.
In the second part of the manuscript. (Futyā al-Rabīʿ), the style of the
work changes. It breaks into a personal style (as in the section on Abū Sufyān
on f. 13 of the Āthār): “I asked him” or “He was asked.” The source (prob-
ably Abū ufra)24 was asking al-Rabīʿ directly, and occasionally other Ibāī
jurists from the second half of the second/eighth century (Abū ʾl-Muʾarrij
ʿAmr al-Sadūsī, ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, Abū Ayyūb Wāʾil b. Ayyūb).25 In
short, the Āthār and Futyā are drawing on all Ibāī sources of Jābir’s sayings
and acts. In this respect, Abū ʿUbayda, who succeeded Jābir at the head of
the Ibāī community in Bara, appears as a minor direct source recording
Jābir’s opinion only in a few cases.
Abū ʿUbayda’s doctrine is reported in the Mudawwana as well as (less
frequently than that of the other Ibāis of the same generation, includ-
ing Abū Nū āli al-Dahhān) handed down by jurists who were his
pupils:

1. al-Rabīʿ b. abīb
2. Abū ʾl-Muʾarrij ʿAmr al-Sadūsī
3. Abū SaʿīdʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz
4. Abū Ghassān Makhlad b. al-ʿAmarrad
5. Abū ʾl-Muhājir Hāshim b. al-Muhājir

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 104 Ersilia Francesca

6. Abū Ayyūb Wāʾil b. Ayyūb al-aramī

7. ātim b. al-Manūr
8. Abū Sufyān Mabūb b. al-Raīl.

The Mudawwana follows a dialog scheme that is similar to that of Āthār

and Futyā al-Rabīʿ: legal cases are introduced by expressions like “Saʾaltu
Abā al-Muʾarrij ʿan [followed by a brief illustration of the problem]. Qāla:
saʾaltu ʿan dhālika Abā ʿUbayda fa-qāla [ . . . ].” If there is conflicting opin-
ion on the question, it is followed by: “wa-kāna al-Rabīʿ yaqūlu [ . . . ].” On
other occasions, the norms are introduced by a brief isnād: “al-Rabīʿ ʿan
Abī ʿUbayda.”
Reports tracing back to the companions or successors, and the Prophet’s
sayings, are scattered in the ancient Ibāī sources. Their opinion is quoted
without isnād as follows: “addathanī rajul min ahl Khurāsān rafaʿaʾl-adīth
ilā Anas b. Mālik,” or just “jāʾa min al-nabī,” “qāla Rasūl Allāh.” Reports
referring to Ibāī authorities are mentioned in a personal style: “I asked . . . ”
or by narrating them by hearsay. Individuals are cited over specific argument
in order to create a collective view, the consensus of the community. This
is reported in the form “qāla aābūnā.” In this formative period, sources
are still often just cited as “min al-athār” or “min al-ʿilm” and transmission
lines are accorded no importance.
Incessant labors by Ibāī scholars had resulted in statements on matters
of law and theology by which they became actively involved in the devel-
opment process of the Islamic jurisprudence. Later on, as Ibadism turned
into an increasingly hostile sect and moved toward separate centers situated
in the border areas of the Islamic world, Ibāī doctrine reflected more and
more differences with the Sunnī doctrine and sometimes, a habit of rather
acrimonious polemics.

The “Rationalization” of the ibāī School

After the third/ninth century, Ibāī law entered into a new stage of develop-
ment: works dating from this period contain records of debates and argu-
ments of individual authors concerning questions of uūl al-fiqh. A large
portion of these works debates how the accepted sources of the law might
be interpreted, discussions focuses on three broad areas of investigation:
authority, authenticity, and interpretation. These works contain description
of how God’s law has come to be known and will continue to be discovered
by the Muslim community’s expert jurists in the future. Among the earliest
surviving works on these issues there is the Kitāb al-Raf, a compendium of

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Ibadi School 105

kalām theology from an Ibāī point of view, composed—between 260/874

and 270/884—by Abū ʾl-Mundhir Bashīr b. Muammad b. Mabūb (d.
290/908), a prominent Omani scholar and the grandson of Abū Sufyān
Mabūb b. Ruayl (or Raīl), leader of the Baran community before Ibāis
moved to Oman.
The author recognizes three sources of Law: the Qurʾān, the sunna
(not just the Prophet’s), and the tradition of the Ibāī community (athār
al-muslimīn). In the chapter on the sunna, he examines the degree and the
extent of obligation arising from the practices of the Prophet and the com-
munity: the acceptance of the sunna is mandatory (far) upon every believer
and there is no need to find confirmation in the Qurʾān before following
the sunna, as it is authoritative independently of the Holy Book. The lat-
ter is considered superior in status, but the sunna outnumbers it in sheer
quantity. Moreover, the sunna explains, it integrates and can even abrogate
the Qurʾān.26
Nothing in Abū ʾl-Mundhir’s work, nor indeed in other third centuries
sources, implies that sunna was confined to the Prophet. The Kitāb al-jāmiʿ
by the highly respected Omani jurist Ibn Jaʿfar (Abū Jābir Muammad)
al-Azkawī, which is considered a major work of fiqh, quotes traditions from
the Prophet along with traditions from the companions as well as from early
Ibāī Baran authorities and from Omani jurists.27
The fourth/tenth century marked a new phase in the development of
Ibāī law, with works of uūl and furūʿ, in which the doctrine of the sect’s
authorities was expressed on the basis of a plan that reflected the struc-
ture and themes discussed in the treatises of the Sunnī school. The devel-
opment achieved by Ibāī jurisprudence is clearly visible in the work of
Muammad b. Saʿīd al-Kudamī (who lived between the end of the fourth/
tenth and the beginning of the fifth/eleventh centuries) titled al-Muʿtabar,
which was a critical edition of the Kitāb al-jāmiʿ by Ibn Jaʿfar (third/ninth
century). There, order is given to the chaotic discussion of the problems of
the sources’ hermeneutics (uūl al-fiqh) and the ʿibādāt (acts of worship)
given in Ibn Jaʿfar’s work. According to al-Kudamī, the sunna’s main func-
tion (as well as that of the community’s consensus, ijmāʿ) is interpreting the
God’s Book. Judges and jurists have to rely on these three sources (Qurʾān,
sunna and ijmāʿ) in issuing their judgments or legal opinions.28 A few years
after al-Kudamī’s treatise, the Kitāb al-jāmiʿ by ʿAbd Allāh b. Muammad
b. Baraka al-Bahlawī (second half of th fourth/tenth century) became a fun-
damental reference point for the Ibāī jurisprudence. He made a notable
contribution to the Ibāī fiqh introducing the adīth classification adopted
by the Sunnī schools. Traditions are divided into aī (sound), asan
(good), and aʿīf (weak). Dealing with the isnād, traditions are arranged
into muttail (tradition with an unbroken isnād traced back to the Prophet),

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 106 Ersilia Francesca

mawqūf (tradition going back only to a companion) and maqūʿ (tradition

going back to a successor). With reference to the numbers of transmitters,
the traditions could be mutawātir, when there is no collusion, and all trans-
mitters being known to be reliable; mashhūr, when there are more than two
transmitters, some being reliable and others not; and unique (āād), from
only one companion or from a single man at a later stage.
Ibāis find no problem with the traditions of other doctrines as long as
their chains of transmission are trustworthy and there is no other reason not
to accept them. Ibn Baraka said “we do not deny the traditions of others as
long as they are not corrupt.”29

The “Hadithication” Process in the Omani Sources

The ongoing process of hadithication in the Ibāī madhhab is evident in the

works by the Omani encyclopaedists at the end of the fifth/eleventh and
the beginning of the sixth/twelfth centuries, in particular the Kitāb al-iyāʾ
by Salma b. Muslim al-ʿAwtabī (end fifth/eleventh century, early sixth/
twelfth century), the Bayān al-sharʿ by Muammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Kindī
(died 508/1115) and the Muannaf by Abū Bakr Amad b. Mūsā al-Kindī
(died 557/1162).
As J. Wilkinson argues, al-ʿAwtabī’s opening on uūl al-fiqh in the third
book of is Kitāb al-iyāʾ shows how far Ibāis had become aligned with
Sunnī/Shāfiʿī basic criterion that sunna means mainly “the tradition of the
Prophet,” but rather than using the Sunnī criterion of adīth transmission
they rely on their own line of transmission (isnād) based on the heritage
(āthār) of the school. For al-ʿAwtabī, the reliability of a tradition lays in a
teacher-pupil line, a chain of leading scholars transmitting and elaborat-
ing the doctrine over generations, reaching back from his Rustāq school’s
predecessors30—al-Bisiyānī (middle of the fifth/eleventh century) and his
teacher Ibn Baraka—to al-Rabīʿ, Jābir b. Zayd, Ibn ʿAbbās and other com-
panions, whose authority was recognized by the Ibāī community, and
thence the Prophet. Along with traditions with a purely Ibāī line of trans-
mission al-ʿAwtabīʾ—as other contemporary authors—picked up traditions
from the Sunnī collections, very rarely with an isnād and certainly with
no critique of authenticity. This “communal” sunna was absorbed into the
Ibāī madhhab but only to emphasize certain desirable behavior (faīla),
never for determining dogma; for that Ibāī author alone were valid.31
The monumental work called Muannaf by Abū Bakr Amad b. Mūsā
al-Kindī (died 557/1162),32 which—along with the Bayān al-sharʿ by his
teacher Muammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Kindī33—is a manifestation of the ency-
clopedic process in the Ibāī school, does not reflect any significant changes

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Ibadi School 107

into the development of the principles of hermeneutics. The sunna going

back to the Prophet is a root of Law second only to the Qurʾān. Every
prophetic tradition must be respected unless it was abrogated by another/a
successive tradition. He says:

The righteous conduct in the faith is called sunna because it is the way (arīq),
the example (mithāl), the life (sīra), the purpose (wajh), the sign (ʿalāma), the
trace (rasm) from the Prophets (may God bless them). Through it they lead
their followers and bring the people to their faith. The Prophet (PBUH) said:
Whoever leaves my sunna will be cursed; that’s means that every man who
leaves my way, my conduct of life, whatever I put as example to my commu-
nity or as sign for the faith, and whatever I approved, he will be cursed.34

The cogency of the sunna is based on the Qurʾān which is its “compan-
ion” (zawj). The sunna can explain, integrate and even abrogate the Qurʾān.
Some subjects related to law and ritual are mentioned so concisely in the
Qurʾān that interpretation must be distilled from data proliferated in the
adīth; moreover previously related verses may be considered to have been
abrogated by Prophetic traditions expressing a different ruling that came
down at a later date, as is the case of the verses concerning inheritance from
unbelievers and legacy in favor of parents or relatives which have been abro-
gated by the Prophetic traditions prohibiting any hereditary relationship
between Muslims and unbelievers, and limiting the legacy to one-third of
the estate.35
The prophetic sunna is related through those jurists of the Nizwā party
who preceded him, thus demonstrating that the moderate Nizwā views
were preferred over the extremist ones of the Rustāq school. In particular
he quotes the famous Abū Saʿīd Muammad b. Saʿīd al-Kudamī al-Salūtī,
pupil of Abū ʿAbdallāh Muammad b. Raw b. ʿArabī. The line of transmis-
sion is traced back through Mabūb b. al-Raīl, a “bearer of knowledge
(ʿilm)” from Bara, al-Rabīʿ, Abū ʿUbayda, umām, Abū urr, Ibn usayn
who died (istashada ʿinda) during the ʿAbd Allāh b. Yayā (ālib al-aqq)’s
uprising, Jābir until the Prophet’s companions, in particularly Ibn ʿAbbās
and ʿĀʾisha.36

The “Hadithication” Process in the Maghribi Source

In North Africa, after the definitive collapse of the Rustamid imamate fol-
lowing the victory of the Fatimidis in 358/868–69, the Ibāī community
was forced to take refuge in the remote oases of the Algerian Mzab, on the
island of Jerba and in Jabal Nafūsa, where it managed to survive in secret
(kitmān), led by a council of elders (ʿazzāba). After the political collapse of

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 108 Ersilia Francesca

the movement and a period of stasis, there was a reflowering of the jurispru-
dence, parallel to that found in Oman. This process was characterized (as
in the Omani sources) by the assimilation of Sunnī material into the com-
munity’s āthār, partly as a result of being exposed to the regional influences
of the Mālikī school, which was dominat in the Maghreb. Nevertheless, up
to the time of al-Barrādī (eighth/fourteenth century), Ibāī scholars still
discouraged the reference to Sunnī collections of adīth: in his treatise,
al- aqāʾiq, al-Barrādī advises students as far as possible not to read them.
The sixth/twelfth century scholar Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf al-Warjlānī was the
first to mention in his work al-ʿAdl wa ʾl-ʿinsāf certain Sunnī collections of
adīth which he had probably known during his stay in Cordoba thanks
to his Sunnī teachers. In Cordoba he also learnt the Sunnī rules concern-
ing the adīth classification which he quotes in his work along with those
handed down to him from Ibāī authorities of earlier times. According to
these rules, after the isnād came into existence, the transmitters’ veracity
must be carefully investigated. Honesty, accuracy, and expertise were quali-
ties set against mendacity. Moreover, al-Warjlānī states that all the people
involved in the process of collecting the prophetic traditions—the writer,
the man who dictates and the two men who inspect the dictation—must
be pious individuals who have not committed grave sins, nor are prone to
committing minor sin often, therefore deserving the walāya (association) of
the community.37
In the work by the famous scholar Abū Yaʻqūb Yūsuf Ibn Khalfūn
al-Mazzātī (sixth/twelfth century), Sunnī jurists (namely Mālik, Shāfiʿī,
Abū anīfa) and Prophet’s companions (in particularly Ibn ʿAbbās, ʿIkrima,
ʿĀʾisha) are quoted along with early Baran authorities (Jābir, Abū ʿUbayda,
umām b. al-Sāʾib, al-Rabīʿ, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz). In his epistle addressed to the
Ibāis of Jabal Nafūsa and related to issues concerning marriage, the con-
cubinate, repudiation and adultery, Prophetic traditions are quoted with a
simplified/shorted isnād: ʿanʿIkrima -ʿan Ibn ʿAbbas—ʿan al-nabī or directly
with the formula “qāla al-nabī” or “jāʾa ilā al-nabī.” The author draws
from both the Ibāī tradition (āthār asābinā)—in particularly he quotes
the Aqwāl Qatāda, the Jawabāt Jābir b. Zayd, the Āthār al-Rabīʿ/Riwāyāt
Abī ufra—and Sunnī collections, namely those by al-Bukharī, Muslim and
Mālik.38
The Maghribī Ibāī scholars narrated traditions from those companions
and successors they regarded as good Muslims, thus carefully selecting the
authorities on which they established their jurisprudence. According to Abū
Zakarīyāʾ al-Jannāwunī (half of the sixth/twelfth century), the Law derives
from Qurʾān, Sunna and raʾy (personal reasoning), which became assimi-
lated into ijmāʾ (consensus); qiyās (analogy) was not referred to as a source
of Law until much later. Prophetic traditions are accepted insofar as they

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Ibadi School 109

do not contrast with the Qurʾān, in which case they must be rejected or
submitted to a process of interpretaion (taʾwīl).39

The Musnad al-rabī ʿ b. abīb

In the first half of the sixth/twelfth century, Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf al-Warjlānī
(d. 570/1174) completed his arrangement (tartīb) of a collection of adīth
attributed to al-Rabīʿ b. abīb, in which traditions of the Prophet and the
companions were handed down through the imāms of the school, known as
Musnad al-Rabīʿ b. abīb or al-Jāmiʿ al-aī.40
The Musnad al-Rabīʿ b. abīb is the most important Ibāī collection of
adīth, in the technical sense of the term. The original version of the book,
composed by the third imām of the Ibāī community in Bara, al-Rabīʿ b.
abīb (d. about the end of the second century), is not in common use. The
current version is that rearranged by al-Warjlānī, titled Tartīb al-Musnad
or al-Jāmiʿ al-aī. This Tartīb is divided into four books. The first two
contain 742 traditions on legal and religious matters, arranged in the same
manner as the Sunnī collections of adīth. The material is almost the same
as that reported by Sunnis: most of the traditions transmitted by al-Rabīʿ
are reported in Sunnī collections by other Sunnī authorities with the same
wording, or with slight differences; the isnād of the two first parts is as
follows:
al-Rabīʿ b. abīb—Abū ʿUbayda—Jābir b. Zayd—a companion—
Prophet. The companions are mainly: Ibn ʿAbbās, Abū Hurayra, Abū Saʿīd
al-Khudrī, Anas b. Mālik, ʿʾisha.
Part III (comprising adīth 743–882) and IV (comprising adīth
882–1005) of the Tartīb are additional traditions added by Abū Yaʿqūb
al-Warjlānī. Part III is politically interesting including Ibāī traditions on
the imamate, taqiyya (dissimulation of the belief ), and the attitude toward
sinners. In part IV there are traditions (nr. 883–901) deriving from the
last imām of the Baran community, Abū Sufyān Mabūb b. al-Ruayl
(second half of the second century), traditions (nr. 902–922) from the
Rustamid imām al-Afla b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (r. circa 823–871), from Abū
Ghānim al-Khurāsānī, the author of the Mudawwana, and maqāīʿ of Jābir
b. Zayd.41
The Musnad fulfils two important functions for the Ibāī madhhab: pro-
viding an independent Ibāī collection of adīth without having to refer
to other schools, and affirming the pupil-imām transmission line from the
founder of the madhhab Jābir b. Zayd, via his successor Abū ʿUbayda, via
the successor of the latter, al-Rabīʿ.

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 110 Ersilia Francesca

The later Ibāī scholars, in particular, the end of nineteenth-early twen-

tieth century modernists, Nūr al-Dīn al-Sālimī (d. 1914) and Muammad
A fayyish (d. 1914) highly regarded the Musnad, which they held as the
most trustworthy book of adīth, comparable as far as the accuracy of con-
tent and the line of transmissions are concerned to the books of al-Bukhārī
and Muslim.42
There is no easy way to tell when the traditions preserved in the Musnad
came into being, although the work received the attention of some eminent
scholars, such as L. Massignon, J. van Ess, Mohamed Talbi, J. C. Wilkinson,
and M. Cook.43 The inconsistency in the texts and in the isnāds gives rise to
the doubt that al-Warjlānī collected material from different stages of devel-
opment of Ibāī law.44 I agree with Prof. Wilkinson’s theory postulating that
the Musnad was the fruit of the process of “rationalization,” which Ibāī
law underwent with the aim of safeguarding the school from outside influ-
ences and placing it on the same level as its opponents. The Musnad had the
important function of furnishing the Ibāī school with a collection of inde-
pendent adīth, which resemble in their transmission lines and contents the
classical Sunnī collections, which the lawyers of the sect could return to.
However, this did not reflect the doctrine that the first Ibāī had discussed
in Bara, preserved in sources such as the Aqwāl Qatāda, the thār and the
Futyā al-Rabīʿ.

Conclusion

The narrowing down of the concept of sunna—comprising the exemplary

behavior of the Prophet and his companions becoming restricted to the
behavior of the Prophet—only started toward the end of the first/seventh
century.45 Early Ibāī traditional collections—as well as the Sunnī’s early
works—abound with reports traced back to companions and successors,
and although the concept of “sunnat al-nabī” occasionally emerges in the
earliest sources, in the vast majority of cases, we find sunna referring merely
to both the “living tradition” of the school and the traditions related from
the closest of the Prophet’s followers. Ibāis considered the early period
of the first two al-Rashidūn caliphs as being the ideal age for the Muslim
community and tried to trace back to the example set by the Prophet, his
two successors, and the upright companions. The development of Ibadism
as movement in general and school of law in particular was mainly in the
hands of the fuqahāʾ or ʿulamāʾ. When the community was still settled
in Bara, the first Ibāī authorities were in close contact with the Sunnī
scholars, exchanging advice and opinions with them, thus contributing

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Ibadi School 111

to the general development of the Islamic law. When the community left
Bara and settled in Oman, aramawt, and Maghreb, there was no rivalry
between the main centers of Ibadism even if they developed isnād of their
own where local authorities were mentioned. There were transmitters who,
having learnt the ʿilm in one center moved to another center and dissemi-
nated the learned material there (“bearers of knowledge,” amalat al-ʿilm),
so the bulk of traditions going back to the early Ibāī Basrian authorities
became the “common property” of the whole Ibāī community.
As mentioned above, al-Rabīʿ was the first to give impulse to the sys-
tematic collection of adīth and all other athār; nonetheless, his own role
in transmitting traditions should not be overrated. It is true that we have a
Musnad devoted to all the traditions in whose transmission he has suppos-
edly been instrumental, but an opinion as to whether these traditions—or
at least part of them—can be considered authentic is, as always is the case
in these matters, difficult to form. The Musnad was the fruit of the process
of “rationalization” that the Ibāī law had undergone, with the aim of safe-
guarding the school from outside influences and placing it on the same level
as the other schools of law.
The third/ninth century scholar Abū ʾl-Mundhir Bashīr b. Muammad
b. Mabūb, is considered to be the first theoretician of the sunnat al-nabī,
which he regarded as preeminent to the sunna ascribed to other persons.
He, more than any other scholar before him, was determined to grant the
sunna of the Prophet a position as the guiding principle, second in impor-
tance only to the Qurʾān.
The later Ibāī sources concentrated on isnād criticism. The isnād, if
found sound, was thought to guarantee the authenticity of the text (man)
supported. This scrutiny of isnād resulted in an increasingly sophisticated
criticism that developed into a regular scholarly discipline constituting one
of the branches of the science of tradition (ʿilm al-adīth). The recording of
traditions with an Ibāī isnād reached its zenith with the compilation of the
Musnad al-Rabīʿ. This work gained so much authority in the eyes of Ibāī
scholars that it came to be considered the most accurate collection of tradi-
tions, thus overshadowing the contributions of early collections, such as
the Aqwāl Qatāda, the Āthār, and the Futyā al-Rabīʿ, which preserved the
ancient teachings of the school.
Most arguments presented by the Ibāī authors dealing with the position
of the sunnat al-nabī as second root of Law after the Qurʾan are the same
as those given in Sunnī treatises on this subject. The substance of this argu-
ment is that since, in many verses of the Qurʾān, God has ordered to the
men to obey His Messenger (16:44), this implies that everything preached
by the Messenger should be taken as truth. The sunna is indispensable as the
guiding principle in all human activities, if the Qurʾān does not provide the

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 112 Ersilia Francesca

decisive answers. All traditions judged sound after a rigorous scrutiny must
be put into practice by the whole community; whosoever does not respect
them is considered an infidel.
The works of the last century Ibāī reformists, Nūr al-Dīn al-Sālimī
in Oman and Muammad A fayyish in the Mzab, make it clear that the
Ibāis shared the rules on the science of traditions with the other schools
since they found no reason not to do so. The process of reform in the con-
temporary Ibadism led to a rapprochement between Muslim sects, notably,
between Ibāis and Sunnis. Yet, mastering the Ibāī heritage means not
only knowing its various aspects, but also recognizing its relativity and
historicity. Therefore, these authors refer to the search for an Ibāī iden-
tity in modernity, which can blossom only where there are no bans for
innovation and rethinking.46

Notes

1. Al-Rabīʿ b. abīb al-Barī was the last Ibāī imām who lived in Bara; during
his imamate, the community emigrated to Oman. See Abū ʾl-ʿAbbās Amad
al-Darjīnī, Kitāb abaqāt al-mashāʾikh bi-ʿl-Maghrib, edited by Ibrāhīm
allāy, 2 vols (Costantine, 1394/1974), II, 273–277; Abū ʾl-ʿAbbās Amad
al-Shammākhī, Kitāb al-siyar (lit. Cairo, 1301/1883), 102–105. According
to Brockelmann, al-Rabīʿ died in about 170/786 (G.A.L., Suppl., II, 823),
with him agree Michael Cook, (Early Muslim Dogma [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981], 56) and John C. Wilkinson (“Ibāi adīth: an Essay
on Normalization,” Der Islam, 62 (1985): 233f.). On the contrary, Josef
van Ess fixes the date of al-Rabīʿ’s death between 180/796 and 190/806, see
“Untersuchungen zu einigen ibāitischen Handschriften,” Zeitschriften der
Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 126 (1976): 32–33; Theologie und
Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra. Eine Geschichte des religiösen
Denkens im frühen Islam, 6 vols (Berlin-New York: de Gruyter, 1991–1995),
II, 199.
2. John Wilkinson, Ibāism. Origins and Early Development in Oman (Oxford
andNew York: Oxford University Press, 2010), xiii.
3. Ibid., 436 ff.
4. ʿAmr Khalīfa Ennami (al-Nāmī), Studies in Ibāism (publications of the
University of Libya, Faculty of Arts, 1972), Chap. IV Ibāī Jurisprudence,
79–117; Ersilia Francesca, “The Formation and Early Development in the
Ibāī Madhhab,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 28 (2003): 260–277;
and “Investigating Early Ibāī Jurisprudence: Sources and Case Law,” Jerusalem
Studies in Arabic and Islam, 30 (2005): 231–263.
5. Recently published by Farat b. ʿAlī al-Jaʿbīrī, Rasāʾil al-Imām Jābir b. Zayd
(Oman: Maktaba al-āmirī li-l-nashr wa ʾl-tawzīʿ, 2013).

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Ibadi School 113

6. For a description of the manuscripts, see Ennami, “A Description of New

Ibāī Manuscripts from North Africa,” Journal of Semitic Studies, 15 (1970):
65–69; and Studies in Ibāism, 94–97; van Ess “Untersuchungen zu einigen
ibāitischen Handschriften,” 27–38.
7. Abū Ghānim Bishr b. Ghānim al-Khurāsānī, al-Mudawwana al-ughrā. 2 vols
(Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-ʿl-Thaqāfa, 1984); and Mudawwana
al-kubrā. Arranged by Muammad A fayyish. 2 vols (Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth
al-Qawmī wa-ʿl-Thaqāfa, 1984).
8. Jābir b. Zayd, Jawābāt, Ms. al-Maktaba al-Bārūniyya, Fiqh Ibāī nr. 1, ff. 70A26,
73B17. During the first two centuries of Islam, sunna meant “precedent,” “way
of life,” only later acquired the restricted meaning of precedent set by the
Prophet (sunnat al-nabī).
9. Jawābāt Jābir b. Zayd, f. 70A26; also quoted in Ennami, Studies, 49.
10. Jawābāt, f.68B7–10. The doctrine that prayer without recitation of the Qurʾān is
valid, is expressed in traditions from ʿAlī and from ʿUmar. Against it is directed
the sweeping maxim from the Prophet: “No prayer is valid without recita-
tion.” See Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1950), 154–155.
11. van Ess, Anfänge muslimischer Theologie—Zwei antiqadaritische Traktate aus dem
ersten Jahrhundert der Hiğra (Wiesbaden-Beirut: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977),
122.
12. The meaning of the last sentence is obscure. Jābir probably refers to the acci-
dental loss of the husband’s estate after paying his debts—including the nuptial
gift—or to the circumstance of the debts being equal to or exceeding the assets
of the estate; therefore, the wife, as well as all the legitimate heirs, doesn’t receive
the inheritance.
13. Jawābāt, f. 89B8. See also Jawābāt, f. 70A15.
14. See Jawābāt, f. 89 B13. Also quoted in Ennami, Studies, 49.
15. Patricia Crone and Fritz Zimmermann (eds.), The Epistle of Sālim Ibn Dhakwān
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 144 (Arabic), 145
(English transl.).
16. Ibid., 78, 80, 82, 84 (Arabic); 79, 81, 83, 85 (English transl.). See also, index,
375.
17. The epistle could be considered the earliest extant epistle of religious contro-
versy in Islam. See Roberto Rubinacci, “Il califfo ʿAbd al-Malik b. Marwān e
gli Ibāiti,” Annali dell’Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli, N.S. 5 (1954):
99–121; Wilferd Madelung, “The authenticity of the Letter of ʿAbd Allāh ibn
Ibā to ʿAbd al-Malik,” Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée, 132
(2012): 37–43. The authenticity of the epistle is questioned by Michael Cook,
Early Muslim Dogma, 51–67.
18. Crone and Zimmermann (eds.), The Epistle of Sālim Ibn Dhakwān, 76 (Arabic),
77 (English transl.).
19. Risālat Abī Karīma li-ʿl-imām Abī ʿl-Khaāb al-Maʿāfirī (140–144) (ed. Sālim
b. Muammad al-ārithī, Oman: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-ʿl-Thaqāfa,
1982), 6, 7, 10, 24.
20. Abū ʿUbayda, Masāʾil, quoted in Ennami, Studies, 59.

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 114 Ersilia Francesca

21. Abū ʿUbayda, Risālat Abī Karīma li-al-Imām Abī al-Khaāb al-Maʿāfirī
(140–144), 4 and also 17 and 24. See my “Law and Politics in the Early Ibadi
Communities: Abū ʿUbayda al-Tamīmīʾ Risāla to Abū ʾl-Kha āb al-Maʿāfirī,”
in L’Ibadisme dans les sociétés islamiques médiévales. Modèles politiques, forme
d’organisation et d’interactions sociales, edited by C. Aillet, Casa de Velázquez/
Centro de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales, Madrid (in print).
22. Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām. Eine ibaditisch-maghrebinische Geschichte des Islams
aus dem 3.-9. Jahrhundert (Hg. Werner Schwartz and Shaykh Sālim Ibn Yaʿqūb,
Bibliotheca Islamica 33, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1986), 114;
al-Shammākhī, Siyar, 104, 119–121; van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, II,
208–209; Id. Untersuchungen, 39, 41. The quarrel concerned theological ques-
tions as well, see Pierre Cuperly, Introduction à l’Étude de l’Ibāisme et de sa
Théologie (Alger: Office des Publications Universitaire, 1984), 27 n. 63, 315.
23. al-Wisyānī (second half of the sixth/twelfth century), Kitāb al-Siyar, MS. Z.
Smogorzewski, Krakow 00277, f. 69. In giving his fatwās, al-Rabīʿ followed his
teachers’ opinion: Abū ʿUbayda, Abū Nū and þumām. See Darjīnī, ab., II,
276; al-Shammākhī, Siyar, 104. ʿAbd Allāh and Abū al-Muʾarrij’s legal opinions
were handed down in the Mudawwana of Abū Ghānim al-Khurāsānī, in the
Āthār and in the Futyā ar-Rabīʿ; from ʿAbd Allāh, a Kitāb nikā al-shighār sur-
vives, which deals with legal questions relating to marriage and divorce.
24. Abū ufra ʿAbd al-Malik b. ufra. See al-Darjīnī, ab., I, 416; al-Shammākhī,
Siyar, 119.
25. Abū ʾl-Muʾarrij ʿAmr al-Sadūsī and Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz disputed with Abū ʿUbayda
on theological as well juridical questions. Abū Ghānim transmitted from them
in the Mudawwana. Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz is credited with a work on marriage
called Nikā al-shighār, which is also part of al-Diwān al-maʿrūʿalā ʿulamāʾ
al-ibāiyya; al-Shammākhī, Siyar, 121; al-Sālimī, āshiyat al-Jāmiʿ al-aī,
3vols (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Bārūniyya, 1908), I, 5; van Ess, Theologie und
Gesellschaft, II, 209.
26. Early Ibāī Literature. Abu l-Mundhir Bashīr b. Muammad b. Mabūb Kitāb
al-Raf fi l-Tawīd, Kitāb al-Muāraba and Sīra, introduced and edited by
Abdulrahman al-Salimi and Wilferd Madelung (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz
Verlag, 2011), Bāb al-sunna, 19–22.
27. Ibn Jaʿfar (Abū Jābir Muammad al-Azkawī), al-Jāmiʿ, 3 vols, edited by ʿAbd
al-Munʿim ʿĀmir (Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-ʿl-Thaqāfa, 1981),
I, 48, 49, 56, III, 599.
28. Al-Kudamī, Abū Saʿīd Muammad b. Saʿīd, Kitāb al-Istiqāma 3 vols. (Muscat:
Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-ʿl-Thaqāfa, 1985), III, 6–7.
29. Amad Ibn ammū Kurrūm, Ishāmāt al-madrasa al-Ibāiyya fī khidma al-
sunna al-nabawiyya, Markaz al-manār, El Hamiz (Algeria) 1432/2011, 13–15.
30. The Omani jurists split between the so-called Rustāq and Nizwā parties after
the first imamate collapsed in a civil war because of the controversial deposing of
the imām al- alt b. Mālik al-Kharūī at the end of the third/ninth century. The
different viewpoints over the deposing of al- alt had enormous consequences
not only on the political and social life of the Ibāī movement in Oman, but
it also influenced its legal development over centuries, as the jurists split into

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Ibadi School 115

three parties, the pro-deposing, the anti, and the neutralist. The former disap-
peared early on, the second transformed into the Rustāq party, and the last into
the Nizwā party. See John C. Wilkinson, “Bio-bibliographical Background to
the Crisis Period in the Ibāī Imāmate of Oman,” Arabian Studies, 3 (1976):
137–164.
31. Wilkinson, Ibāism, 413–414, 419–420.
32. Ed. ʿAbd al-MunʿimʿĀmir, 9 vols., Oman 1979–1983.
33. 19 vols., Oman 1402/1982–1406/1986.
34. al-Kindī, Muannaf, I, first part, 18.
35. Ibid., I, first part, 18–21.
36. Ibid., I, first part, 140–143.
37. Ennami, Studies in Ibāism, 88.
38. Ajwibat Ibn Khalfūn (Abū Yaʻqūb Yūsuf Ibn Khalfūn al-Mazzātī), edited by
ʻAmr Khalīfa al-Nāmī (Ennami) (Beirut: Dār al-fat, 1974), 13–20, 38, 54.
39. Cuperly, Introduction, 57–58, 113, 168–169; R. Rubinacci, “La professione
di fede di al-Ğannāwunī”, Annali dell’Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli
(1964): 14, 553–595.
40. al-Rabīʿ b. abīb, al-Jāmiʿ a-aī (Musnad ar-Rabīʿ b. abīb), tartīb Abī
Yaʿqūb b. Ibrāhīm al-Warjlānī, edited by ʿAbd Allāh b. umayd as-Sālimī,
Damascus 1963. See my “La fabbricazione degli isnād nella scuola ibāita:
il Musnad di ar-Rabīʿ b. abīb,” Law, Christianity and Modernism in Islamic
Society—Proceedings of U.E.A.I. 18th Congress, Leuven 1998, 39–59.
41. Maqāīʿ are traditions in which the authority for the transmission between the
Successor (tābiʿī) and the Prophet is not mentioned.
42. Amad b. ammū Kurrūm, Ishāmāt al-madrasa al-Ibāiyya fī khidma al-sunna
al-nabawiyya, 21–26.
43. van Ess, “Untersuchungen,” 36–38 and van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, II,
134; Mohamed Talbi, Études d’Histoire Ifriqiyenne et de Civilisation Musulmane
Médiévale (Tunis: éd. Université de Tunis, 1982), 36f; Wilkinson, “Ibāi
adīth,” 231 f; Cook, Early Muslim Dogma, 56.
44. See Francesca, “La fabbricazione degli isnād nella scuola ibāita,” 55–56.
45. Gautier H. A. Juynboll, Muslim Tradition. Studies in Chronology, Provenance
and Authorship of Early adīth (Cambridge: Cambridege University Press,
1983), 30–33; Adis Duderja, “Evolution in the Concept of Sunnah during
the First Four Generations of Muslims in Relation to the Development of the
Concept of an Authentic adīth as based on Recent Western Scholarship”(Arab
Law Quartely, 26 (2012): 393–437.
46. M. A fayyish Jāmiʿ al-shaml fī adīth Khatam al-Rusul 2 vols, (Beirut, 1987);
Nūr ad-Dīn Al-Sālimī, al-Lumʻa al-murīya min ashiʻʻat al-abaīya (Musqat:
Wizārat ʼal-Turāth ʼal-Qawmī wa-ʼal-Thaqāfah, 1983). See also Mu afā b.
al-Nāir Ouinten, Ārāʾ al-shaykh Muammad b. Yūsuf Afayyish al-ʿaqdiyya
(al-Qarāra (Algeria): Jamʿiyya al-Turāth, 1996), 84–87.

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 Chapter 6

The Concept of Sunna in Early

and Medieval anafism
Ali Altaf Mian*

Introduction

This chapter discusses the meanings of sunna in several core texts of early
and medieval anafism. In early anafī works, the word, sunna, made rare
appearances. In these texts, it denoted normative communal practices, the
binding example of the Prophet Muammad, and the emulation-worthy
model of his companions. In medieval anafism, sunna referred additionally
to a type of religious and moral norm and a source of sacred law. Medieval
anafī legal theorists divided the latter meaning of sunna along epistemo-
logical lines into certainty-yielding sunna and probability-yielding sunna.
This division enabled them to classify prophetic traditions into three types
of reports: concurrent reports, renowned reports, and solitary reports. This
typology of reports presupposed significant legal and theological implica-
tions. In this chapter, I argue that this epistemology-based typology enabled
medieval anafī theorists to substantiate and defend their legal positions
in the context of adīthification. The medieval anafī treatment of sunna
illustrates the legal afterlife of the rationalist theological commitment to
grounding belief and action in certain knowledge.
anafism is the earliest and most widespread of the surviving Sunnī
schools of fiqh. The eponym of this school, Nu‘mān b. Thābit, known
as Abū anīfa (d. 767), was a Kūfa-based silk merchant and scholar of
Muslim sacred law and theology.1 Abū anīfa studied with ammād b. Abī

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 118 Ali Altaf Mian

Sulaymān (d. 737) for nearly two decades before succeeding him as the
leader of his study circle in Kūfa. From ammād, Abū anīfa inherited
the intellectual tradition of Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī (d. 715), ‘Alqamah b. Qais
al-Nakha‘ī (d. 682), and the companion ‘Abd Allāh b. Mas‘ūd (d. ca. 654).
Abū anīfa’s theological teaching was preserved in several works attrib-
uted to him, while his jurisprudence was transmitted to later generations
largely through the literary efforts of his two prominent successors, Abū
Yūsuf Ya‘qūb b. Ibrāhīm al-Anārī (d. 798) and Muammad b. al-asan
al-Shaybānī (d. 804 or 805).2 These three scholars (henceforward, “the
anafī triumvirate”) can be considered the school’s founding fathers. Abū
anīfa’s other notable disciples included Zufar b. al-Hudhayl (d. 774) and
al-asan b. Ziyād al-Lu’lu’ī (d. 819).3 The latter was praised as “loving and
obeying the sunna.”4 Other early anafīs also alluded to the sunna. I dis-
cuss in a following section how Abū Yūsuf used the phrase, “the preserved
and the well-known way” (al-sunnat al-mafūat al-ma‘rūfa), to refer to
the received law as practiced and preached by the above mentioned Kūfan
authorities.5
The early anafīs understood the sunna to be tantamount to the received
law. In the wake of the adīth Folk in the ninth century, the anafīs inte-
grated the adīth-based definition of sunna within their teaching. In fact,
the adīth-based definition of sunna held sway in latter-day anafism.6 This
school’s most cited jurists and theorists took prophetic sunna to be the arch-
source of all religious norms. Later anafī theorists made explicit the divi-
sion of sunna into certainty-yielding sunna and probability-yielding sunna.7
In response to the adīthification of fiqh in the ninth and tenth centu-
ries, the anafīs invoked this epistemological distinction of sunna in order
to generate textual evidence and legal reasoning that substantiated Kūfan
received law. According to Behnam Sadeghi, post-formative anafī jurists
did not find or formulate the divine norms from the canonical sources or
by means of legal principles. These jurists accepted the received law and
later provided its textual justifications with the help of canonical sources
and legal devices.8
For heuristic purposes, we could say that sunna implied three meanings
in early and medieval anafī legalism. First, sunna signified the normative
order of religious life and the established standard of salvation practices.
Second, sunna referred to the deontological legal status of a ritual prac-
tice. In this sense, sunna amounted to a norm that was less binding than
the obligatory act (far), but more important than a supererogatory act
(nafl).9 Third, sunna referred to a source of the revealed norms other than
the Qu’rān. In this sense, sunna designated the non-recited revelatory source
of the divine norms. With this definition of sunna, the anafīs essentially
limited the communalist conception of sunna prevalent in Medina, “for

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 Concept of Sunna in Early and Medieval anafism 119

only the Prophet’s words as related through traditions of certain authen-

ticity” could be considered on par with the Qur’ān.10 In this respect, the
anafīs distinguished between certainty-yielding sunna and probability-
yielding sunna. Both types of sunna could be found in textual sources, such
as adīth, or non-textual sources, such as the established norms of the
Muslim community. The bulk of this chapter elucidates this epistemology-
laden typology of sunna in medieval anafī legal thought, with particular
focus on the relationship between epistemology and authority. Before get-
ting into the details, however, it is helpful to understand this school’s dis-
cursive formation.
Although it is hard to identify when jurists and laypersons began refer-
ring to themselves as followers of the anafī school, significant evidence of
loyalty to Abū anīfa in matters juristic and theological reaches back to the
late eighth century.11 Abū anīfa’s teaching had already spread to Khurāsān
within his lifetime, largely due to the activity of his students such as Abū
Mu ī‘ al-akam b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Balkhī (d. 814), the qāī of Balkh, and
the narrator of Abū anīfa’s Al-Fiqh al-akbar.12 From the 770s to the 790s,
the ‘Abbāsids appointed anafī judges in “Baghdad, Basra, Kufa, Isfahan,
and Egypt.”13 anafism spread prominently in ‘Abbāsid territories thanks
to state patronage, and also due to the prolific literary activity of Abū Yūsuf
and al-Shaybānī. The latter’s copious works form the core of later anafī
texts on positive law.14
During the first half of the ninth century, the anafīs had “reached a
position of supremacy” in Iraq.15 The key anafī authorities of this period
included Shaybānī’s students Ibrāhīm b. Rustum al-Marwazī (d. 826) and
‘Īsā b. Abān (d. 836).16 The following celebratory remark about ‘Īsā b. Abān
shows how anafīs were renowned as jurists and not as specialists of
adīth: “No qāī in Islam is more learned in fiqh than ‘Īsā.”17 The leading
anafī jurist of the second half of the ninth century was Ahmad b. ‘Umar
al-Khaāf (d. 874), a qāī distinguished for his considerable literary activ-
ity and his piety and devotion.18 Many anafīs of this period (as well as
the tenth century) were Mu‘tazilī, and their rationalist theology left a per-
manent stamp on the school’s discursive formation. In this era, the anafīs
“were less involved in the transmission of traditions,” as the jurists and the
traditionists still formed overlapping but distinct groups of specialists.19
This trend changed in the tenth century, largely due to the approach
of the Egyptian scholar Abū Ja‘far al-aāwī (d. 933), the school’s pre-
mier jurist-cum-traditionist.20 Al- aāwī’s scholarship not only connected
anafī positive law to textual evidence (āthār), but also oriented the law
toward the positions of Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī.21 While anafī jurists
of later generations reverted to Abū anīfa’s positions, al-aāwī’s scholar-
ship grounded the exposition of sacred law in adīth. Moreover, subsequent

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 120 Ali Altaf Mian

scholars paid great attention to al-aāwī’s textual corpus. A case in point is
the latter’s commentator, Abū Bakr al-Jaā al-Rāzi (d. 981).22 Al-aāwī
and al-Jaā brought about a significant discursive and methodological
transformation within the anafī school. These tenth century jurists sought
to substantiate the received law of Kūfa using the Qur’ān and prophetic
reports. In this way, they posited proto-anafī positive law as an “epitome
of the interpretative reasoning used by the prophet to derive his sunnah
from the revelation.”23 Although their literary efforts mark the grounding
of anafism in canonical sources, these efforts illustrate also the enduring
authority of the anafī triumvirate.
Within this school, the authority of the anafī triumvirate only increased
over time. This is evident when we consider anafī writings in the sub-
genre of legal literature called “the ranks of jurists” (abaqāt al-mujtahidīn).
The latter-day Indian anafī scholar Muammad ‘Abd al-ayy al-Laknawī
(d. 1887) proposed that the leading jurists and authors of the school were
divided into three major groups: the ancient authorities (mutaqaddimūn),
the late authorities (muta’akhirūn), and the followers (muqallidūn).24 The
ancient authorities included Abū anīfa’s students, such as Abū Yūsuf and
al-Shaybānī, who had the capacity to differ with their teacher in terms of
positive law, but followed him in juristic principles. The late authorities
consisted of the leading anafī jurists of the following generations until
around the end of the twelfth century: al-Khaāf, al-aāwī, Abū’l-asan
al-Karkhī (d. 952), Shams al-A’imma al-ulwānī (d. 1063), Muammad
b. Amad al-Sarakhsī (d. ca. 1090), Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī (d. 1089),
and Qāī Khān (d. 1196), among others. These authorities were endowed
with the capacity of ijtihād in matters left unattended by Abū anīfa or
the mutaqaddimūn. Contrary to these two ranks of jurists, the muqallidūn
did not have the power of ijtihād, but were responsible for “extraction”
(takhrīj), “preference” (tarjī), and “distinction” (tamyīz). Al-Laknawī pro-
vided the example of al-Jaā as someone endowed with the capacity for
takhrīj, for such jurists could “resolve juridical ambiguities and tilt the scale
in favor of one of two or more opinions that govern a case.”25 The special-
ists of tarjī included Abū’l-asan Amad al-Qudūrī (d. 1037) and Burhān
al-Dīn al-Marghīnānī (d. 1196), for these jurists were “able to address cases
with two or more different rulings all established by their predecessors, [and
give] preponderance to one of these rulings over the other(s), on ground
such as its being dictated either by a more strict inference or by public inter-
est.”26 A scholar endowed with tamyīz was any jurist who had the ability to
navigate the aforementioned structure of authority and answer questions
about anafī fiqh with expertise acknowledged by other contemporane-
ous anafīs. Examples of such scholars included adr al-Sharī‘a al-Mabūbī
(d. 1346), among numerous other jurists. With such typologies, anafī

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 Concept of Sunna in Early and Medieval anafism 121

scholars ensured the authority of the anafī triumvirate and thus the sig-
nificance of the school’s Kūfan origins.

The anafī Triumvirate on Sunna

The late eighth and early ninth-century jurists of the ‘Irāqī garrison town
Kūfa devised a conception of sunna different from that of Medina-based
jurists, such as Mālik b. Anas (d. 796). For Mālik, sunna registered local
social and religious norms. While Mālik appreciated and contributed to
the emergent report-based body of knowledge about the Prophet’s life-
world, he interpreted all reports in light of the established customs and
practices of Medina.27 In contrast, the legists of Kūfa, such as Abū anīfa,
paid greater attention to textual and analogical modes of reasoning.28 The
anafī triumvirate’s writings indicate that sunna implied communal norms
and the example of the Prophet and that of the companions. Abū Yūsuf
and al-Shaybānī contested the Medinese preference for local traditions over
transmitted reports from the Prophet and the companions. At the same
time, these Kūfan scholars were committed to their own entrenched herme-
neutic methods. Arguably, through these differences of norm-interpretation
and norm-practice, Kūfan and Medinese jurists preserved the perspectival
and practical differences between the companions who had relocated to
Iraq and those who had stayed behind in Medina after the Prophet’s death.
The modern anafī apologist Muammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī
(d. 1952) argues that the anafī triumvirate embodied “a tradition of con-
sultation” (madhhab shūra) and preferred the Qur’ān and adīth to ana-
logical and custom-based modes of reasoning.29 The anafī triumvirate
constructed a comprehensive legal framework based on multiple textual
and non-textual sources. According to the Egyptian jurist and historian
Muammad Abū Zahra (d. 1974), Abū anīfa had the following seven
sources at his disposal: the Qur’ān, the sunna, the sayings of the compan-
ions, consensus, analogy, juristic preference, and custom (al-kitāb wa’l-
sunnat wa aqwāl al-aābat wa’l-ijmā‘ wa’l-qiyās wa’l-istisān wa’l-‘urf).30 In
short, these modern apologists assert that anafī legal teaching originated
from a hierarchized pool of sources, with the Qur’ān and prophetic sunna
at the top.
While the attribution of madhhab shūra and canonical comprehensive-
ness to the anafī triumvirate is partially valid, this apologetic explanation
aims to exonerate the anafī triumvirate from the negative connotations of
“opinion-based jurisprudence” (ra’y). With this image, apologists temper
Abū anīfa’s portrait as an independent-minded jurist. Nonetheless, they

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 122 Ali Altaf Mian

do cite evidence that salvages both sides of the picture, as is evident in the
following saying attributed to Abū anīfa:

I take [as authoritative what is in] the Qur’ān. If I do not find anything there,
then I hold fast to the Prophet’s sunna, God’s peace and blessing be upon
him. Where I did not find anything in the Qur’ān or in the Prophet’s sunna,
there I have gone with the sayings of the Companions. I take from their
sayings what I consider [to be authoritative] and discard from their sayings
what I consider [to be irrelevant]. I do not prefer other people’s judgment
to the sayings of the Companions. However, when the matter at hand is left
to Ibrāhīm, al-Sha‘bī, Ibn Sīrīn, al-asan, ‘A ā, or Sa‘īd b. al-Musayyab—
among others—then they are people who offer their independent judgments,
and so I exercise my independent judgment as they had exercised theirs.31

Based on such reports, we could say that ra’y was an exhaustive interpre-
tive method grounded in textual sources. Arguably, the early anafī use of
ra’y implied searching investigations whose results were resonant with the
canonical sources of sacred law. As Wael Hallaq explains, “By the middle
of the second century (c. 770 AD), and long before adīth asserted itself
as an unrivalled entity, ra’y had already incorporated systematic and logical
arguments of the first order, arguments that were in turn far from devoid of
Sunnaic support.”32
For the bulk of his legal positions, Abū anīfa cited reports from
ammād b. Abi Sulaymān. The latter served as Abū anīfa’s gateway into
the prophetic past. We can understand this by considering Abū anīfa’s
intellectual genealogy:

The Prophet Muammad (d. 632)

↓
‘Abd Allāh b. Mas‘ūd (d. ca. 654)
↓
‘Alqamah b. Qais al-Nakha‘ī (d. 682)
↓
Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī (d. 715)
↓
ammād b. Abī Sulaymān (d. 737)
↓
Abū anīfa (d. 767)

Apart from the Prophet, all of the above luminaries had spent consider-
able time in Kūfa. In this way, Abū anīfa narrated reports from a strictly
Kūfan genealogy. Some of his reports stop at the companions, especially
‘Abd Allāh b. Mas‘ūd and ‘Alī b. Abī ālib (d. 661), while other reports go

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 Concept of Sunna in Early and Medieval anafism 123

back to the Prophet himself. For example, after narrating a adīth on the
authority of Abū anīfa, al-Shaybānī said, “And we adhere to the adīth of
the Messenger of God. We see no harm in shaking hands with someone in
need of ghusl [bath for ritual purification] because of sexual relations, and
this is the saying of Abū anīfa.”33 The anafī triumvirate cited adīth
in order to justify their legal positions, and used the expression, adīth
Rasūl Allāh, when a particular adīth was under discussion. Moreover,
al-Shaybānī’s consistent clarification of Abū anīfa’s position (“and this is
the saying of Abū anīfa”) shows that the latter wielded immense discursive
authority among his disciples.
Abū anīfa used the word, sunna, to signify norms that were established
by the Prophet’s example or that of his companions. In the tract, Al-Fiqh al-
akbar, we read, “Wiping over sturdy socks is sunna and the night prayers in
the month of Ramaān are sunna.”34 These practices are normative because
their authenticity can be demonstrated by the Prophet’s practice (as in the
case of wiping over sturdy socks) or the companions’ practice (as in the case
of the night prayers [tarāwī]). Another example is al-Shaybānī’s invocation
of the word, sunna, to indicate the preference for using the toothbrush. We
read in Kitāb al-āthār, “In our view, the toothbrush (siwāk) is a part of the
sunna, and it should not be abandoned.”35 In these instances, sunna referred
to normative practice, especially that of the Prophet and his companions.
While sunna also referred to the customs and practices of Kūfa’s earliest
authorities, its predominant meaning was the Prophet’s example.
The anafī triumvirate’s conception of sunna was not entirely identical
with adīth.36 The evidence for this claim is found in Abū Yūsuf ’s Al-Radd
‘alā Siyar al-Awzā‘ī, a text aimed at refuting the legal positions of the Syrian
juristic authority Abū ‘Amr ‘Abd al-Ramān b. ‘Amr al-Awzā‘ī (d. 774).37
Abū Yūsuf contended that some of al-Awzā‘ī’s positions were based either
on an unbinding local norm or an unreliable report (shādhdh). In opposi-
tion to the latter’s preference for native custom and rare reports, Abū Yūsuf
emphasized that the law should be documented by “the preserved and well-
known sunna” (al-sunnat al-mahfuzat al-ma‘rufa).38 Moreover, Abū Yūsuf
distrusted legal positions based on solitary reports: “In our view, the solitary
report (al-wāid) is [sometimes] rare and unreliable, and we do not take it
as binding.”39 Abū Yūsuf therefore distinguished between sunna and adīth.
The former described the foundational and established practices coming
down from the Prophet and company, while the latter referred to fragmen-
tary reports. One could find numerous, and sometimes opposing, reports
regarding a particular situation. In such instances, argued Abū Yūsuf, the
jurist must rely on the established sunna and not on the various adīth
reports: “The adīth regarding this issue are many, but the sunna regarding
this case is well-known.”40 Moreover, the onus of legal reasoning rested on

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 124 Ali Altaf Mian

the jurist, as the “adīth of God’s Messenger, God’s peace and blessings be
upon him, include many meanings and aspects, which can only be grasped
by the person assisted by God.”41 The content of the Prophet’s sunna is
complex, stressed Abū Yūsuf, and necessitates a thorough comprehension of
its underlying modes of reasoning: “Comprehend what you have received
from the Prophet, God’s peace and blessings be upon him, for in [his teach-
ing] are many aspects and meanings.”42
For Abū Yūsuf, Abū anīfa’s legal positions reflected an engaged com-
prehension of the sunna, even if these positions contradicted the solitary
reports used by al-Awzā’ī and others. Abū anīfa’s jurisprudence, argued
Abū Yūsuf, was based on more certain sources, such as the Qur’ān, the
well-known sunna, the consensus of the early jurists (ijmā‘), and reports
and judgments about the Prophet’s practice from luminaries such as
Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī and ammād b. Abī Sulaymān. This body of estab-
lished teachings and practices reflected the embodied understanding (fiqh)
of the Qur’ān, the sunna, and ijmā‘. Abū Yūsuf ’s polemical exposition later
became paradigmatic for anafī legal theorists in their distrust of those
solitary reports that contradicted the Qur’ān or disrupted the entrenched
norms of anafī law.43

Sunna in anafī Legal Theory

In this section, I examine theoretical developments of the concept of sunna

in the epoch following the anafī triumvirate through the twelfth cen-
tury. For scholars of this period, the word, sunna, referred almost exclu-
sively to prophetic precept. Moreover, anafī legal theorists and jurists
used interchangeably the words, sunna and adīth.44 This does not imply
that the authority of the companions disappeared in their writings or in
their legal positions; instead, it suggests that they became more selective
in citing the authority of the companions. At times, they mentioned only
the four caliphs. For example, in al-Karkhī’s Al-Aqwāl al-uūliyya, we read,
“The word, sunna, encompasses the sunna of the Prophet and the sunna of
the rightly-guided Caliphs.”45 The medieval theorists of the school took the
expression, “the preserved and the well-known sunna,” to mean two adīth
categories: the concurrent report (mutawātir) and the renowned reports
(mashhūr). The anafīs of this period debated about solitary reports of
the companions, and whether these reports were to be preferred to rulings
based on analogy. They differentiated between the jurist companions and
the non-jurist companions, preferring the solitary report of a jurist compan-
ion to analogy but preferring analogy to the solitary report of a non-jurist

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 Concept of Sunna in Early and Medieval anafism 125

companion. In this section, I address these issues in detail, after noting

briefly the elements with which anafī legal theorists gave epistemological
and methodological coherence to their legal system.
The legal theoretical works of post-formative anafism located the
Qur’ān and sunna within larger epistemological frameworks (‘ilm, yaqīn,
and ann) and methodological frameworks (adilla, ujaj, and uūl). The
jurists of this period emphasized the rationalist-theological preference for
grounding religious doctrine and action in reliable sources. For this reason,
they deprioritized probability-yielding sources, such as analogy (qiyās) and
the solitary reports (akhbār al-āād). Moreover, if an analogy grew out of
the certain sources of the revealed law, then the anafīs preferred this type
of analogy to a solitary report, except when the solitary report at hand had
been transmitted by a jurist companion (a category they created in order
to hierarchize the solitary reports).46 It is partly in this context that the
adīth Folk continued to criticize the anafīs as “people of opinion” (aāb
al-ra’y).
anafī legal theorists consolidated the certainty-yielding sources into a
seemingly coherent body of knowledge. As they constructed their methodi-
cal schema of the revealed norms, these scholars also identified this legal
system’s underlying analogies and principles. These analogies and principles
in turn regulated how they approached the solitary reports. As Aron Zysow
points out, the anafī treatment of solitary reports served two purposes:
(1) “to admit enough sound material for analogy to function”; and (2) “to
exclude materials that would obliterate the outlines of the legal system.”47
Thus, the anafīs based the general outline of their legal system on the
Qur’ān and “the preserved and the well-established sunna” (concurrent and
renowned reports).
In what follows, I use citations mainly from Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī
(d. 1039), al-Sarakhsī, and Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī to discuss the fol-
lowing salient issues pertaining to sunna in medieval anafī legal thought:
the types of legal proofs, the authority of prophetic sunna, the question
of continuity (ittiāl) between the Prophet’s sunna and later generations,
the epistemological typology of prophetic reports and their theological and
legal implications, and the classification of the companions as jurists and
non-jurists. The analysis of these significant themes illustrates the evolving
authority, conception, and function of sunna in medieval anafism.
In al-Dabūsī’s Taqwīm al-adilla, we read of two types of evidence: ratio-
nal (ujjat‘aqliyya) and divine (ujjat shar‘iyya).48 These two types of proofs
provide varying degrees of certain and probable knowledge about religious
norms. The rational proofs, pointed out al-Dabūsī, are based on abstract
deductive reasoning and therefore cannot provide necessary certainty. The
divine proofs, on the other hand, are based on two sources: God’s revelation

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 126 Ali Altaf Mian

(way) and the Prophet’s sunna. Where way is concerned, there can be no
doubt that it yields only necessary certainty. The Prophet’s sunna is more
complicated. Two forms of prophetic reports, claimed al-Dabūsī, yield cer-
tain knowledge: “the report of the Prophet that is heard directly from him”
(khabar al-rasūl al-masmū‘ minhu) and “the concurrent report narrated from
him” (al-marwī bi’l-tawātur ‘anhu).49 The solitary report (khabar al-wāid),
on the other hand, yields only probability, a form of knowledge tainted
with the possibility of error. To this schema, al-Dabūsī added another type
of divine proof (ujjat shar‘iyya) that yields certain knowledge: consensus
(ijmā ‘).50
Al-Dabūsī’s classification shows us how anafī jurists used epistemol-
ogy-inflected notions of heteronomy and autonomy in order to organize the
legal proofs. Apart from grounding their belief and action in certain sources,
their reliance on an epistemological filter had another important purpose.
As they faced the adīth-centered challenges of later Sunnī schools of law,
it was their methodological preference for epistemological grounding that
allowed them to perpetuate the Kūfan-based body of received law without
much alteration. We should read their prioritization of certainty-yielding
sources as an attempt to salvage and justify Kūfan teaching. According to
them, the received law rarely contradicted the Qur’ān and “the preserved
and well-known sunna.” What gave them trouble, however, was the bur-
geoning scholarship on the authenticity of the solitary reports, some of
which contradicted their received law. They solved this problem by depri-
oritizing the legal influence of the solitary reports, as these reports yield only
probable knowledge.
In his Uūl, al-Sarakhsī organized the evidentiary sources with slight
modifications of style and content. For Sarakhsī, the foundational sources
of the divine norms (al-uūl fī’l-ujaj al-shar‘iyya) are three: the Qur’ān,
the sunna, and ijmā‘.51 He mentioned separately the fourth foundational
source, analogy (qiyās), indicating that it was derived from the first three
sources. These four sources are then divided into two types: those yielding
certain knowledge and those yielding probable knowledge. Sound action,
argued al-Sarakhsī, can be based on both types of knowledge (a point on
which more to come momentarily).
Al-Sarakhsī defined prophetic sunna as “the content of what is heard
from the Prophet and what is transmitted from him with concurrence
(tawātur).”52 The anafīs preferred the equation of sunna with the mutawātir
and mashhūr reports. They treated solitary reports as second-order sources
of sunna. For legal theorists such as al-Sarakhsī, it was important to align
the sunna with the mutawātir, for these authors argued that the authority
of the Qur’ān (a text conveyed by a single khabar mutawātir) is based on
the sunna. This is why al-Sarakhsī stated further that prophetic sunna was

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 Concept of Sunna in Early and Medieval anafism 127

in fact the arch-source of all religious norms, for even the Qur’ān was first
heard on the authority of the Prophet. Thus, the Prophet’s concurrent sunna
and the Qur’ān both wield comparable authority to decree legal norms and
to substantiate moral and legal action. Al-Sarakhsī explained that ijmā‘ also
derives its authority from the Prophet, for it is based on the Prophetic say-
ing, “God will not unite my community [umma] on falsehood.”53 Thus, the
Qur’ān, the concurrent sunna, and ijmā‘ are certainty-yielding sources of
the divine norms, as these sources are based on “what was heard” from the
Prophet, whose infallibility is established with certainty.54 Like al-Sarakhsī,
other anafī scholars also emphasized the central authority of the Prophet’s
sunna.
The discussion of sunna in al-Bazdawī’s Uūl reveals additional aspects
of this concept. In his Uūl, we find a systematic discussion of the anafī
typology of reports—mutawātir, mashhūr, and khabar al-wāid—as well as
their legal and theological implications. I rely on al-Bazdawī’s Uūl to dis-
cuss the epistemological underpinnings of this typology. At the same time, I
supplement al-Bazdawī’s discussion with perspectives from earlier and later
anafī jurists in order to illustrate the far-reaching repercussions of this
typology.
Before he articulated his definition of sunna, al-Bazdawī related the
sunna to the kinds of linguistic terms and performatives jurists use to
interpret the divine norms. For al-Bazdawī, “the sunna of the Prophet
encompasses the command (amr), the prohibition (nahī), the specific term
(khā), and the general term (‘āmm)” (anna sunnat al-nabī ‘alayhi al-salām
jāmi‘atun lil-amr wal-nahī wal-khā wal-‘āmm).55 Al-Bazdawī noted that
we could find examples of all of these linguistic terms and performatives in
prophetic speech. He then offered his definition of sunna: “the sunna has
elaborated the Qur’ān, and it has elucidated and connected these [linguis-
tic] categories with their appropriate commandments” (wa kānat al-sunnat
far‘an lil-kitāb fī bayān tilka al-aqsām bi-akāmihā). Al-Bazdawī’s definition
highlighted the function of prophetic guidance vis-à-vis the Qur’ān: the
sunna puts flesh on the Qur’ānic-derived substantive legal skeleton.
Al-Bazdawī employed the concept of continuity (ittiāl) in order to
theorize the anafī typology of reports. Before venturing into his text, a
few preliminary remarks about his conceptual framework and terminology
are in order. In these legal theoretical discussions, the Prophet’s example
or teaching itself is not on stake, for the entire corpus of prophetic guid-
ance is binding and authoritative. The need for report typology is only
due to discrepancies in the historical transmission and intergenerational
(dis)continuity of this sacred body of knowledge. The possibility of error
enters the report-based body of knowledge vis-à-vis the limitations of oral
transmission. The jurist therefore has to use his independent judgment in

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 128 Ali Altaf Mian

order to assess the epistemological reliability of oral transmissions. In other

words, the jurist evaluates the reliability of the links between the Prophet
and the transmitted report. The links of transmission between the Prophet
and later generations is what al-Bazdawī meant by continuity (ittiāl). He
approached continuity through two angles: content (ma‘nā) and form
(ūra). The report’s content refers to the basic teaching contained therein,
whereas its form refers to the report’s chain of transmission. Keeping these
points in mind, we can see how al-Bazdawī’s detailed discussion of ittiāl
portrayed the intimate links between authority, epistemology, and religious
norms.
Al-Bazdawī divided ittiāl into three types. First, there is “complete con-
tinuity without any doubt” (ittiāl kāmil bilā shubha). This type of continu-
ity characterizes only the concurrent tradition (khabar mutawātir). Second,
there is “continuity in which there is doubt with reference to its formal
aspects” (ittiāl fīhi arb shubha ūratan). This type of continuity character-
izes the renowned report (khabar mashhūr), a category unique to the anafīs.
The meaning of this report coheres with the Qur’ān and concurrent reports,
but its chain of transmission is not secured by necessary certainty but only
acquired certainty. The third form of ittiāl, explained al-Bazdawī, involves
“continuity in which there is doubt with reference to its formal aspects and
with reference to its content” (ittiāl fīhi shubha ūratan wa ma‘nan). This
type of continuity characterizes the solitary report (khabar al-wāid). This
type of report contains the possibility of error with respect to its content
and its chain of transmission. Bazdawī then explained in detail the legal and
theological implications of these three types of reports. We follow him into
these details, for they show how anafī jurists assumed fundamental cor-
relation between the typology of sunna and epistemological typology.
The mutawātir report, asserted al-Bazdawī, “is connected to the Prophet
without a doubt, so that it can be taken as something seen and heard directly
from him.”56 In other words, the mutawātir report yields empirical knowl-
edge about prophetic teaching. As al-Bazdawī said, “the mutawātir report
necessitates certain knowledge at the level of eye-witnessing (‘iyān), which is
necessary knowledge.”57 Because this type of report has been transmitted by
countless people, argued al-Bazdawī, “it is impossible for all of them to con-
spire to fabricate this because of their large number and their trustworthiness
and because of the difference in their localities.”58 This definition stipulates
three conditions for the mutawātir report: (1) large number of reporters;
(2) reporters’ trustworthiness; (3) reporters’ geographical dispersal. Some
anafī jurists specify the “large number” in question. However, according
to the most established view of the school, it is best not to specify this
number. Therefore, the mutawātir’s reporters can be 8 or 80; what matters
is that it has been reported so profusely that the possibility of its fabrication

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 Concept of Sunna in Early and Medieval anafism 129

or falsity becomes logically improbable. Regarding the second stipulation,

al-Bazdawī held that since the first-generation reporters of any mutawātir
report were the companions, it is crucial to uphold their trustworthiness and
accept them as reliable (‘udūl) transmitters. Al-Bazdawī asserted further that
the companions can be trusted given the fact that their transmissions stood
the test of time and the test of spatial dispersion.59 His third stipulation,
therefore, directly stems out of the second. However, the third stipulation
of geographical dispersion did not go unchallenged by other anafī legal
theorists. As al-Bazdawī’s commentator al-Bukharī noted, most anafīs do
not share al-Bazdawī’s last condition (“the difference in their localities”).
Nonetheless, it is important to note that some anafīs added this type of
condition in order to delegitimize the Medinese school, whose sources had
a single origin in Medina. Al-Bazdawī then provided the following examples
of mutawātir reports: the transmission of the Qur’ānic text; the five daily
prayers and the number of genuflections in each; the amounts of various
alms payments.60 He concluded the discussion of the mutawātir report by
mentioning its theological implication: rejecting and opposing the teaching
contained in a mutawātir report is tantamount to unbelief (kufr).61
It is important to note that for the anafīs, concurrence (tawātur)
encompassed not only textual sources, but also consisted of transmitted
embodied practice and shared values. The twentieth-century Indian anafī
jurist Anwar Shāh Kashmīrī (d. 1933) offered an instructive typology of the
mutawātir category.62 Tawātur, explained Kashmīrī, is of four types: narra-
tion-based, group-based, practice-based, and common knowledge or shared
values. Narration-based tawātur consists of prophetic reports narrated by
such large numbers of reporters that it would be inconceivable for all of
them to plot a forgery. Group-based tawātur consists of wide-scale commu-
nal and institutional transmission by means of memorization and teaching.
The prime example of this type of tawātur is the Qur’ānic text. The third
type of tawātur is practice-based and involves the continuous embodiment
of a practice from the Prophet to the present day. Kashmīrī provided the
example of using the toothbrush (siwāk) to illustrate this non-textual type
of tawātur. The final type of tawātur involves shared values and common
knowledge. For example, reports about the Prophet’s miracles belong to this
type of tawātur, for belief in his miracles does not require individual reports
(as it is commonly held that God granted the Prophets certain miracles).
As we can see, tawātur for the anafīs consisted of textual and non-textual
sources of certain knowledge.
Kashmīrī further explained that while the ritual practices documented
by tawātur differ with respect to their legal status (some are obligatory while
others are only preferable), it is necessary to believe in these ritual prac-
tices. He explained, “Indeed the ritual prayer is obligatory, and belief in its

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 130 Ali Altaf Mian

obligation and acquiring its knowledge are all obligatory acts. Rejecting or
remaining illiterate about the ritual prayer amounts to unbelief. Likewise,
the toothbrush [siwāk] is a sunna, but belief in its sunna-ness is obliga-
tory, for it has been established by tawātur. Acquiring knowledge about the
toothbrush is also a sunna. Note that rejecting the toothbrush amounts to
unbelief, while not learning about it amounts to disobedience and aban-
doning it altogether is grounds for punishment.”63 Kashmīrī’s explanation
of the theological implications of the mutawātir report helps us understand
how, for these jurists, certainty-yielding sunna determines the borders of
orthodoxy.
After the mutawātir report, we encounter the renowned report (khabar
mashhūr). According to al-Bazdawī, the mashhūr report started out as a
solitary report during the companions’ lifetime; however, the following two
generations narrated it so profusely that it became renowned. The mashhūr
report yields certainty that is “acquired” or becomes possible “by way of
deduction” (bi-arīq al-istidlāl). Al-Bazdawī reported that for al-Jaā, the
mashhūr report is a subcategory of the mutawātir report. The rejection of
the mashhūr report, taught the early anafī authority ‘Īsā b. Abān, does not
amount to unbelief but misguidance (alāl) and innovation (bid‘a). Like
the mutawātir report, the mashhūr report can also abrogate or specify a
Qur’ānic injunction.
Because concurrent reports and renowned reports provide certain
knowledge, they have the capacity to abrogate or specify the revealed norms
outlined in the Qur’ān. This legal principle is illustrated by the example of
wiping over sturdy socks (al-mas ‘alā al-khuffayn). The Qur’ān commands
believers to wash their feet as a part of the purification ritual known as
wuū’. The Prophet’s example, however, sometimes substituted the washing
of the feet with wiping over sturdy socks with wet hands. The appropria-
tion of the Qur’ānic command by a sunna is thus warranted; however, not
every sunna has the power to modify or abrogate the Qur’ānic command.
In order for a sunna to exert its authority over revealed scripture, it has to
be established with concurrence (tawātur) or renown (istifāa). As al-Jaā
argued, “Indeed wiping over sturdy socks is established from the Prophet
with recurrence [tawātur] and renown [istifāa] so that it necessitates sound
knowledge. Abū Yūsuf has therefore said, ‘The abrogation of the Qur’ān by
means of the sunna is permissible when renowned reports exist such as the
reports about wiping over sturdy socks’.”64 The authority of concurrent and
renowned sunna is therefore comparable to the authority of the Qur’ān.
The solitary report (khabar al-wāid), however, does not wield the
authority to modify or abrogate the Qur’ān or positions based on concur-
rent and renowned sunna. Al-Bazdawī defined khabar al-wāid as any con-
nected report that does not reach the status of mutawātir or mashhūr. The

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 Concept of Sunna in Early and Medieval anafism 131

solitary report “necessitates action but does not necessitate certain knowl-
edge.”65 In other words, matters of belief and dogma cannot be based on
solitary reports; however, practical affairs and ritual acts can be grounded
in these reports. Al-Bazdawī then explained the legitimacy of grounding
action in solitary reports: “Our proof that the solitary report necessitates
action is clear from the Qur’ān, the sunna, consensus, and rational proof.”66
After going through these proofs, he concluded, “action remains sound even
without certain knowledge.”67
Insofar as the inferior authority of the solitary report, the anafīs differed
from the Mālikīs, the Shāfi‘īs, the anbalīs, and the
āhirīs. For the latter, a
solitary report has the capacity to specify the general term (takhī al-‘umūm
bi-khabar al-wāid). The anafīs, however, do not give this authority to
the solitary report. As al-Jaā explained, “It is not permitted to specialize
the general term of the Qur’ān and the firm sunna by means of a solitary
report or by means of analogy (qiyās).”68 Al-Jaā’s wording is important to
understand, as he assumed that the solitary report and analogy were second-
order sources when compared to the Qur’ān and the firm sunna (al-sunnat
al-thābita). This is why anafīs discounted solitary reports that conflicted
with the legal framework grounded in the Qur’ān and sunna. The conflict
between analogy and the solitary report is a bit more complex.
We learn from al-Jaā’s foundational text in anafī juristic princi-
ples (uūl al-fiqh), Al-Fuūl fī al-uūl, that for key anafī jurists such as
al-Shaybānī, analogical reasoning is bypassed even if a single solitary report
sheds clearer light on the legal problem at hand.69 This teaching, how-
ever, included a major qualifier: the reports that could bypass analogy had
to go back to the jurist companions and not the non-jurist companions.
According to the general anafī teaching, the use of analogical reasoning
made more sense when a solitary report specified something contradicting
an established legal principle deduced from the Qur’ān, the sunna, and the
consensus of the earlier generations. The established legal principles used
by anafī jurists represented the essence of their inheritance of the trans-
mitted tradition understood through continued consultation and dialog.
However, the anafīs were not steadfast in this methodological protocol. As
is clear from the above quotation from al-Jaā, the anafīs preferred cho-
sen solitary reports to analogy. These “chosen” solitary reports consisted of
transmissions going back to the jurist companions. While the exact identity
of this group is vague, al-Bazdawī provided the following modest list of the
companions whose solitary reports overruled analogy: the four caliphs, ‘Abd
Allāh b. Mas‘ūd, ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abbās, ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Umar, Zayd b. Thābit,
Mu‘ādh b. Jabal, Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘arī, and ‘Ā’isha. As al-Bazdawī asserted,
“Their adīth is solid proof whether it coheres or disagrees with qiyās.”70 For
all practical purposes, the majority of the solitary reports going back to the

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 132 Ali Altaf Mian

jurist companions were fairly consistent with the accumulated teachings of

the anafī triumvirate. With the help of such juristic principles, medieval
anafīs did not have to refashion—in any radical sense—the vintage teach-
ings of the school’s founding fathers. In the face of what in this volume is
termed adīthification of Sunna, they continued to teach that their legal
positions were ground in sound and certain sources.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown the paramount significance of epistemology in the

early and medieval anafī construction of discursive authority and religious
normativity. The anafī loyalty to certainty—their desire to base their doc-
trines and actions in sound knowledge—demonstrates this discursive tradi-
tion’s indebtedness to rationalist theology. In this legal school, the Qur’ān,
certainty-yielding sunna, and consensus transmit certain knowledge. These
three sources, argued medieval anafī theorists, provide knowledge that can
be traced back to the Prophet with certainty (‘ilm al-yaqīn).71 The solitary
reports, the sayings of the companions, analogy, juristic preference, and cus-
tom transmit probable knowledge. anafī legal theorists therefore divided
legal sources along epistemological lines, for rejection of certainty-yielding
sources amounts to unbelief (kufr), whereas rejection of probability-yielding
sources amounts to misguidance and sinfulness. We could say that “the pre-
served and well-known sunna” became the master-discourse of the law in
anafism, for certain sunna alone authorized any additional certainty-yield-
ing source of the revealed law (viz., the Qur’ān and communal consensus).
The Prophet’s concurrent and renowned sunna, argued the anafīs, was the
arch-source of all divine norms. The anafī distinction between certainty-
yielding sunna and probability-yielding sunna enabled post-formative anafī
jurists to use epistemological grounding in order to authenticate and defend
the legal positions of the school’s founding fathers.

Notes

* I am grateful to Dr. Adis Duderija for inviting me to contribute to this volume. My

thanks also go to my mentor Ebrahim Moosa for his continued guidance, Behnam
Sadeghi for his rigorous and helpful feedback, my Jordan-based fiqh teacher Shaykh
alā Muammad Abū’l-ājj for instructing me in anafī texts, and my colleague
Samuel Kigar for wonderful discussions and helpful comments.

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 Concept of Sunna in Early and Medieval anafism 133

1. For Abū anīfa’s biography, consult Hiroyuki Yanagihashi, “Abū anīfa.”

Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Edited by: Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John
Nawas, Everett Rowson. Brill Online, 2014. Reference. DUKE UNIVERSITY.
July 04, 2014; Hiroyuki Yanagihashi, “Abū anīfa (D. 150/767),” in Islamic
Legal Thought: A Compendium of Muslim Jurists, edited by Oussama Arabi,
David S. Powers, and Susan A. Spectorsky (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013),
11–25; Muammad Abū Zahra, Abū anīfa ayātuhu wa-‘aruhu ārā’uhu wa
fiqhuhu (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, 1947); for an apologetic account in the
context of the modern Ahl-i adīth movement in South Asia, see Muammad
Sarfarāz Khān afdar, Maqām-i Abī anīfa (Gujranwāla: Maktaba-i afdariyya,
2001).
2. On Abū Yūsuf, see Muammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī, usn al-taqāī fī sīrat
al-imām Abī Yūsuf al-Qāī (Cairo: Al-Maktabat al-Azhariyya lil-Turāth, 1998).
On al-Shaybānī, see Muammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī, Bulūgh al-amānī fi sīrat
al-imām Muammad b. al- asan al-Shaybānī (Cairo: Al-Maktabat al-Azhari-
yya lil-Turāth, 1998); Muammad Disūqī, Al-Imām Muammad b. al- asan
al-Shaybānī wa atharuhu fī’l-fiqh al-Islāmī (Doa: Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1987); ‘Izz
al-Dīn usayn, Al-Imām Muammad b. al- asan al-Shaybānī: muaddithan wa
faqīhan (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1993); ‘Alī Amad Nadwī, Al-Imām
Muammad b. al- asan al-Shaybānī: nabighat al-fiqh al-Islāmī (Damascus: Dār
al-Qalam, 1994).
3. On Zufar b. al-Hudhayl, see Muammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī, Lamaāt al-naar
fī sīrat al-imām Zufar (im: Maba‘at al-Andalus, 1969). On al-asan b. Ziyād
al-Lu’lu’ī, see Muammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī, Al-Imtā‘ bi-sīrat al-imāmayn
al- asan b. Ziyād wa āibihi Muammad b. Shujāʻ (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-
Azhariyya lil-Turāth, 2003).
4. See ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Muammad b. Abī’l-Wafā’ al-Qurashī, Al-Jawāhir
al-muīya fī abaqāt al- anafīyya (Gīza: Hajr lil-ibā‘at wa’l-Nashr wa’l-Tawzī‘
wa’l-I‘lān, 1993), 2:56.
5. Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb b. Ibrāhīm al-Anārī, Al-Radd ‘alā Siyar al-Awzā‘ī (Cairo:
Riwān Muammad Riwān [on behalf of Hyderabad: Lajnat Iyā’ al-Ma‘ārif
al-Nu‘māniyya], 1938), 49.
6. The seventeenth century Indian anafī jurist Muibb Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Shakūr
al-Bīhārī (d. 1707) defined sunna as: “[teachings] issued by the Prophet other
than the Qur’ān, including his sayings, actions, and tacit approvals” (mā adara
‘an al-rasūl ghayr al-qur’ān min qawl wa fi‘l wa taqrīr) (‘Abd al-‘Alī Muammad b.
Niām al-Dīn Muammad al-Sahālwī al-Anārī al-Laknawī, Fawāti al-raamūt
bi-shar Musallam al-thubūt, edited by ‘Abd Allāh Mamud Muammad ‘Umar
[Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2002], 1:117). This latter-day definition
yields a limited impression of the term, sunna, in historical anafism. Not all
anafī jurists share Bīhārī’s exclusion of the Prophet’s companions from their
definitions of sunna. In fact, Bīhārī’s Indian contemporary, “Mullā Jīwan”
Amad b. Sa‘īd (d. 1717) mentioned both the Prophet and the companions:
“sunna consists of the saying, action, and silence of the Prophet, and the say-
ings and actions of the Companions” (al-sunnat tuliqu ‘alā qawl al-rasūl wa
fi‘lihi wa sukūtihi wa ‘alā aqwāl al-aāba wa af‘ālihim) (Amad b. Sa‘īd, Nūr

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 134 Ali Altaf Mian

al-anwār fī shar al-Manār [Karāchī: Muammad Sa‘īd and Sons, 1980], 257).
Mullā Jīwan observed further: “adīth, on the other hand, implies specifically
the saying of the Prophet, but in this context it can also mean sunna” (257).
7. Aron Zysow’s 1984 Ph.D. dissertation remains the most thorough account of
the epistemological grounding of anafī legal theory. Recently, it has been made
available in print. See Aron Zysow, The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to
the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory (Atlanta: Lockwood, 2013).
8. See Behnam Sadeghi, The Logic of Law Making in Islam: Women and Prayer in
the Legal Tradition (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,
2013). Sadeghi offers a persuasive account of the development of anafī legal-
ism. For Sadeghi, post-formative anafī jurists did not “discover” the law by
means of interpretation. Instead, they exercised hermeneutic flexibility that
enabled them to substantiate the legal positions of Abū anīfa and his stu-
dents in light of canonical sources and juristic principles. In other words,
they advocated legal positions that could be substantiated by the Qur’ān and
sunna, but these legal positions were based on Kūfan precedent (the law was
thus “canon-blind”). Sadeghi explains, “Mainstream anafī jurisprudence was
nearly maximally hermeneutically flexible. It was nearly maximally biased for
canon-blind law, and thus the decisions on points of positive law were little
affected by the interpretation of the canon. The law advocated was the same
as the canon-blind law. Near maximal hermeneutic flexibility made it possible
to accommodate canon-blind law even where it clashed with the apparent
import of the canon . . . Hermeneutic flexibility refers to the reading of texts,
underscoring the wide range of interpretative options afforded by the herme-
neutic methods. It does not imply the flexibility of laws. In fact, there were
severe constraints on law. The point is that these constraints did not derive
from the canon or from hermeneutic techniques. Legal continuity exerted the
principal constraining influence; so, canon-blind law (and hence the law) usu-
ally consisted of received law. To be sure, legal change occurred: there were
deviations from the received law. However, such divergences were not brought
about by the reading of the canon. Rather, their causes should be located in
pressing changes in the circumstances or values of the community of jurists.
That is, the canon-blind law sometimes differed from the received law in favor
of the precedent-blind, canon-blind law” (Sadeghi, The Logic of Law Making
in Islam, 30)
9. This definition of sunna troubled the anafīs, for certain sunna practices
were virtually obligatory, but lacked the documentation needed for obliga-
tion (fariyya). A far requires proof from either the Qur’ān or the concur-
rent reports. There were some semi-far practices that were based on renowned
reports, which could not necessitate fariyya. The anafīs resolved this problem
by inventing category of the mandatory act (wājib). For an excellent treatment
of the anafī conception of wājib, especially as it relates to matters of theol-
ogy, see A. Kevin Reinhart, “‘Like the Difference between Heaven and Earth:’
anafī and Shāfi‘ī Discussions of Far and Wājib in Theology and Uūl,” in
Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, edited by Bernard G. Weiss (Leiden and Boston:
Brill, 2002), 205–234.

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 Concept of Sunna in Early and Medieval anafism 135

10. I am indebted to Behnam Sadeghi for the idea expressed in this sentence.
Personal Correspondence, 12 July 2014.
11. See Nurit Tsafrir, The History of an Islamic School of Law: The Early Spread of
anafism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, 2004).
12. See al-Qurashī, Al-Jawāhir al-muīya, 4:87–88. See also Wilferd Madelung,
“The Early Murji’a in Khurāsān and Transoxania and the Spread of anafism,”
Der Islam, 59 (1982): 32–39.
13. Tsafrir, The History of an Islamic School of Law, 116.
14. Abū Zahra, Abū anīfa, 234.
15. Tsafrir, The History of an Islamic School of Law, 117.
16. For biographical notes on Ibrāhīm b. Rustum al-Marwazī, see al-Qurashī,
Al-Jawāhir al-muīya, 1:80–82; Muammad ‘Abd al-ayy al-Laknawī,
Al-Fawā’id al-bahīya fī tarājim al- anafīyya (Beirut: Dār al-Arqam, 1998), 28.
For ‘Īsā b. Abān, see al-Qurashī, Al-Jawāhir al-muīya, 3:678–80; al-Laknawī,
Al-Fawā’id al-bahīya, 246–247; Murteza Bedir, “An Early Response to Shāfi‘ī:
‘Īsā b. Abān on the Prophetic Report (khabar),” Islamic Law and Society, 9.3
(2002): 285–311.
17. This remark is attributed to Abū Yūsuf ’s student Hilāl b. Yayā b. Muslim (d.
859). See, al-Laknawī, Al-Fawā’id al-bahīya, 246.
18. See al-Qurashī, Al-Jawāhir al-muīya, 1:230–32. On al-Khaāf, see Peter C.
Hennigan, “Al-Khaāf (D. 261/874),” in Islamic Legal Thought: A Compendium
of Muslim Jurists, edited by Oussama Arabi, David S. Powers, and Susan A.
Spectorsky (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 107–120.
19. Tsafrir, The History of an Islamic School of Law, 19.
20. On al-aāwī, see Nurit Tsafrir, “Abū Ja‘far al-aāwī (D. 321/933),” in Islamic
Legal Thought: A Compendium of Muslim Jurists, edited by Oussama Arabi,
David S. Powers, and Susan A. Spectorsky (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013),
123–145; Muammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī, Al- āwī fī sīrat al-Imām Abī Ja‘far
al-aāwī (Cairo: Al-Maktabat al-Azhariyya lil-Turāth, 1995).
21. Tsafrir, “Abū Ja‘far al-aāwī,” 132–136.
22. Al-Jaā was a major anafī jurist and theorist who wrote a commentary on
al-aāwī’s Mukhtaar and collected the latter’s Ikhtilāf al-‘ulamā’. See Amad
b. ‘Alī al-Jaā, Shar Mukhtaar al-aāwī fī al-fiqh al- anafī (Beirut: Dār
al-Bashā’ir al-Islāmiyyah, 2010); Amad b. ‘Alī al-Jaā, Mukhtaar ikhtilāf
al-‘ulamā’, edited by ‘Abd Allāh Nadhīr Amad (Beirut: Dār al-Bashā’ir
al-Islāmiyyah, 1995). For more on al-Jaā, see Murteza Bedir, “Al-Jaā
(D. 370/981),” in Islamic Legal Thought: A Compendium of Muslim Jurists,
edited by Oussama Arabi, David S. Powers, and Susan A. Spectorsky (Leiden
and Boston: Brill, 2013), 147–166.
23. Brannon M. Wheeler, Applying the Canon in Islam: The Authorization and
Maintenance of Interpretive Reasoning in anafī Scholarship (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1996), 12.
24. See Muammad ‘Abd al-ayy al-Laknawī, Al-Nāfi‘ al-kabīr, on the margins
of Muammad b. al-asan al-Shaybānī, Al-Jāmi‘ al-saghīr (Karachi: Idārat
al-Qur’ān wa’l-‘ulūm al-Islamiyya, 1990), 8–9. Al-Laknawī offered his typol-
ogy as a corrective to the famous seven-tier typology attributed to the Ottoman

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 136 Ali Altaf Mian

anafī scholar Kemālpashazāde (d. 1534). For an excellent discussion of juristic

typologies, see Wael B. Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1–23.
25. Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change, 16.
26. Ibid.
27. For a comprehensive study of Mālik’s intellectual career, see, Umar F. Abd-Allah
Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina: Islamic Legal Reasoning in the Formative
Period (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013).
28. Most Muslim modernists misrepresented the role of prophetic reports in the
anafī school. Consider, for example, the Indian poet-philosopher Muammad
Iqbāl’s following polemical statement: “In view of different social and agricul-
tural conditions prevailing in the countries conquered by Islam, the school of
Abū anīfah seems to have found, on the whole, little or no guidance from
the precedents recorded in the literature of traditions” (Mohammad Iqbal,
The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, edited by M. Saeed Sheikh
[New Delhi: Adam Publishers, 2004], 140). Earlier Western scholars of Islamic
law, too, presented a limited view of sunna in the anafī school. With refer-
ence to Joseph Schacht, M. Mustafa al-Azami notes, “Most of Schacht’s argu-
ments about the position of the sunna of the Prophet in the doctrines of the
ancient schools of law derive from the writings of Shafi‘ī; they are based either
on Schacht’s own deductions from those writings or the accusations of Shafi‘ī
against his opponents” (On Schacht’s Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence
[Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1996], 76).
29. See Muammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī, “Fiqh ahl-‘Irāq wa-adīthuhum,” in
Al-Fiqh wa uūl al-fiqh min a‘māl al-imām Muammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī,
edited by ‘Abd al-Fattā Abū Ghuddah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah,
2004), 71–141. For Kawtharī, Abū anīfa and his students were “people of
consultation” (ahl al-shūra): “A distinguishing feature of Abū anīfa’s school is
that it is the school of consultation and dialogue (madhhab shūra), connecting
one group to another, all the way back to the companions, may God be pleased
with them. Such is not the case with the other schools of fiqh, which are based
on an assemblage of the opinions of their respective leaders” (Kawtharī, Fiqh
ahl-‘Irāq wa-adīthuhum, 109). In other words, continuous discussions, con-
sultations with learned authorities, and dialog refined the essence of the sunna
and outlined the legal principles undergirding divine norms and the normative
teachings of the Prophet and his companions.
30. Abū Zahra, Abū anīfa, 267.
31. Ibid.
32. Wael B. Hallaq, Sharī‘a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 49.
33. Muammad b. al-asan al-Shaybānī, Kitāb al-āthār, edited by Abū’l-Wafā’
al-Afghānī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1993), 1:42. On the authenticity
of Shaybānī’s text, see Behnam Sadeghi, “The Authenticity of Two 2nd/8th
Century anafī Legal Texts: The Kitāb al-āthār and al-Muwaa’ of Muammad
b. al-asan al-Shaybānī.” Islamic Law and Society, 17 (2010): 291–319.

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 Concept of Sunna in Early and Medieval anafism 137

34. ‘Alī b. Sul ān b. Muammad al-Qārī, Mina al-raw al-azhar fī shar al-Fiqh
al-akbar (Beirut: Dār al-Bashā’ir al-Islāmiyya, 1998), 226. According to Josef
van Ess, the author of Al-Fiqh al-akbar is Abū Mu ī‘ al-akam b. ‘Abd Allāh
al-Balkhī (d. 814). See Josef van Ess, “Kritisches zum Fiqh akbar.” Revue des
Etudes Islamiques, 54 (1986).
35. Al-Shaybānī, Kitāb al-āthār, 1:69–71.
36. This paragraph is indebted to Zafar Ishaq Ansari, “Islamic juristic terminology
before Šāfi‘ī: a semantic analysis with special reference to Kūfa.” Arabica, 19.3
(1972), 255–300.
37. Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb b. Ibrāhīm al-Anārī, Al-Radd ‘alā Siyar al-Awzā‘ī (Cairo:
Riwān Muammad Riwān [on behalf of Hyderabad: Lajnat Iyā’ al-Ma‘ārif
al-Nu‘māniyya], 1938).
38. Ibid., 49
39. Ibid., 41, 105.
40. Ibid., 38.
41. Ibid., 63.
42. Ibid., 109.
43. Abū Yūsuf stated this somewhat explicitly. See Abū Yūsuf, Al-Radd ‘alā Siyar
al-Awzā‘ī, 25–33.
44. See, for example, Abū Bakr Amad b. ‘Alī al-Jaā, Mukhtaar ikhtilāf al-‘ulamā’,
edited by ‘Abd Allāh Nadhīr Ahmad (Beirut: Dār al-Bashā’ir al-Islāmiyya,
1995), 197.
45. Abū’l-asan ‘Ubayd Allāh b. al-usayn al-Karkhī, Al-Aqwāl al-uūliyya, edited
by usayn Khalaf al-Jubūrī ([Saudi Arabia], 1989), 77.
46. This was the position of ‘Īsā b. Abān and was cited to be authoritative by
al-Dabūsī and Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī. Al-Karkhī, on the other hand, taught
that the solitary report was to be accepted on all accounts when competing with
analogy. See Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 43.
47. Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 9.
48. Abū Zayd ‘Ubayd Allāh b. ‘Umar al-Dabūsī, Taqwīm al-adillat fī uūl al-fiqh,
edited by Khalīl al-Mays (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2001), 18. For
an excellent exposition of divine and rational proofs in al-Dabūsī’s Taqwīm
al-adilla, see Murteza Bedir, “Reason and Revelation: Abū Zayd al-Dabbūsī on
Rational Proofs,” Islamic Studies, 43.2 (2004): 227–245.
49. Al-Dabūsī, Taqwīm al-adilla, 19.
50. Ibid.
51. Abū Bakr Muammad b. Amad b. Abī Sahl al-Sarakhsī, Uūl al-Sarakhsī,
edited by Abū’l-Wafā’ al-Afghānī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2005), 217.
52. Al-Sarakhsī, Uūl al-Sarakhsī, 217.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Fakhr al-Islām Abū’l-‘Usr ‘Alī b. Muammad al-Bazdawī, Kanz al-uūl, on
the margins of Abd al-‘Azīz b. Amad Bukhārī, Kashf al-asrār ‘an uūl Fakhr
al-Islām al-Bazdawī, edited by ‘Abd Allāh Mamūd Muammad ‘Umar (Beirut:
Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2009), 2:520.

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 138 Ali Altaf Mian

56. Al-Bazdawī, Kanz al-uūl, 2:522. For a general assessment of the mutawātir
report, see Hüseyin Hansu, “Notes on the Term Mutawātir and its Reception
in adīth Criticism,” Islamic Law and Culture, 16 (2009): 383–408.
57. Al-Bazdawī, Kanz al-uūl, 2:524.
58. Ibid., 2:523.
59. Ibid., 2:528.
60. Ibid., 2:523.
61. Ibid., 2:533.
62. Anwar Shāh al-Kashmīrī, Fay al-bārī ‘alā Saī al-Bukhārī, edited by
Muammad Badr ‘Ālam al-Mīrathī (Quetta: Al-Maktaba al-Rashīdiyya, n.d.),
1:144.
63. Al-Kashmīrī, Fay al-bārī, 1:144.
64. Abū Bakr Amad b. ‘Alī al-Jaā, Akām al-Qur’ān, edited by ‘Abd al-Salām
Muammad ‘Alī Shāhīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2007), 2:437.
65. Al-Bazdawī, Kanz al-uūl, 2:538.
66. Ibid., 2:540.
67. Ibid., 2:547.
68. Abū Bakr Amad b. ‘Alī al-Jaā al-Rāzī, Uūl al-Jaā al-musamma Al-Fuūl
fī al-uūl, edited by Muammad Muammad Tāmir (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub
al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2000), 1:74.
69. Ibid., 1:110.
70. Al-Bazdawī, Kanz al-uūl, 2:550.
71. Moreover, anafī legal theorists argued that certainty could be divided further
into two types: necessary (arūrī) and acquired (muktasab). The Qur’ān and the
concurrent reports (akhbār mutawātira) yield necessary certainty; the renowned
reports (akhbār mashhūra) yield acquired certainty. See Zysow, The Economy of
Certainty, 13.

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 Chapter 7

The Concept of Sunna in the

Early Shāfiʿī Madhhab
Gavin N. Picken

Introduction

Muammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (150/767–204/820) occupies a preeminent

position in the field of Islamic Law, and ia considered highly influential
in the articulation of its formative phase of development, especially with
regard to the genesis of the religion’s legal theory (uūl al-fiqh). A cursory
glance at early Islamic history may cause one to assume that al-Shāfiʿī occu-
pies this elevated status due to the fact that he was the eponym of a distinct
legal school within the Sunni context, which has afforded him the position
of an “iconoclast jurist” until the current period. Although this is certainly
true, al-Shāfiʿī’s contribution to the development of Islamic law was much
more far reaching than even this substantial feat.
Indeed, one may observe that since a al-Shāfiʿī is still considered the
eponymous founder of a Sunni legal school that he defined a unique juristic
methodology (uūl al-fiqh) and he articulated this achievement by applying
it to the individual cases that make up positive law (furūʿ al-fiqh). This was
also the case with other juristic luminaries of the formative period but what
distinguishes al-Shāfiʿī is that he authored a seminal text in the realm of legal
theory, namely his Risāla and at the same time, codified its application in
the context of positive law in his voluminous work Kitāb al-Umm. Thus,
al-Shāfiʿī left an unparalleled written legacy that would provide future jurists
with reference works to draw upon. Moreover, al-Shāfiʿī was fortunate to

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 140 Gavin N. Picken

be endowed with that rarest of commodities—a small group of dedicated

students—who would not only propagate his teachings but also develop
his ideas and consequently, form a formal school affiliated with their great
master.
In addition to these considerable achievements, al-Shāfiʿī is credited
with creating a paradigm shift in the understanding of what constitutes the
Prophetic practice (sunna) and associating it with the tradition of narrations
associated with Prophet, known as adīth, which would, in turn—in con-
junction with the Qurʾān—determine Islamic law. It is to this latter accom-
plishment of al-Shāfiʿī that the current chapter is primarily dedicated.

The Life of and Works of Al-Shāfiʿ ī1

Al-Shāfiʿī’s success was far from fortuitous, but rather was the product of a
noble lineage, a life dedicated to learning, constant travel in search of knowl-
edge, a comprehensive grasp of Islamic scholarship, and considerable legal
acumen. The sources are consistent in that al-Shāfiʿī was born in Palestine in
150/767, but differ as to whether he was born in Gazza or ʿAsqalān. It is also
worthy of note that he was born in to a Hāshimī family, his lineage coinciding
with the Prophet’s grandfather, ʿAbd al-Mu alib. This noble origin did not
stop the young al-Shāfiʿī from living in rather difficult circumstances, since
his father died when he was very young, and his mother moved him from
Palestine at the age of two. Later al-Shāfiʿī would move to Mecca where he
would use his prodigious memory to memorize the Qurʾān by the age of seven
and further commit to memory Mālik b. Ana’s (d. d. 179/795) al-Muwaaʾ
by the age of ten.2 As he matured, his teachers in Mecca became the mufti of
the city, Muslim b. Khālid al-Zanji (d. 180/796) and the renowned adīth
scholar Sufyān b. ʿUyayna (d. 198/813). Later, in his early teens, he would
then move to Medina to study with the author of al-Muwaaʾ and learn
Malik’s juristic technique that was understood to be an extension of the tex-
tually orientated method of the traditionists (al-muaddithūn),3 which was
said to be dominant in Hejaz.4
Al-Shāfiʿī never met the other foremost just of the age, namely, Abū anīfa
b. Nuʿmān (d. 150/767), as he was born in the same year that the great
scholar died. Nevertheless, he spent time in the company of his foremost stu-
dents, Muammad b. al-asan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805), who presumably
educated al-Shāfiʿī regarding the competing “rationalist” system in Iraq that
was characterized by the exercising of “personal opinion” (al-raʾy).5
Al-Shāfiʿī eventually found his way to the ʿAbbāsid capital of Baghdad
and it was there that he met some of its greatest scholars and many of

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Early Shāfiʿī Madhhab 141

its brightest minds became his students. Such personalities included Abū
Thawr al-Kalbī (d. 240/854), Ahmad b. anbal (d. 241/855), al-usayn
al-Karābīsī (d. 248/862) and al-asan al-Zaʿfarānī (d. 260/874). It was
also in Iraq that it is said that he began authoring the early versions of his
great works, including a text titled Kitāb al- ujja and a preliminary draft
of the Risāla, which would constitute the basis of his “prior” jurisprudence
(al-qadīm).6
After a sojourn in Baghdad that lasted approximately three to four
years, al-Shāfiʿī then moved to Egypt where Mālik’s teaching was para-
mount. That al-Shāfiʿī refuted Mālik’s opinions and in particular the
evidential source of “Medinan precedent” (ʿamal ahl al-Madina), drew
criticism from some jurists but others, who seemed more open minded,
embraced al-Shāfiʿī’s teaching and a new circle of students grew in his lat-
est domicile. This group of devotees included Yūsuf b. Yayā al-Buway ī
(d. 231/845), Rabīʿ b. Sulaymān al-Murādī (d. 270/880), and Ismāʿīl b.
Yayā al-Muzanī (d. 274/877). More importantly, it was in Egypt that
al-Shāfiʿī crystalized his juristic Weltanschauung, finalizing his work on
the Risāla and completing reviewing his opinions on positive law with
the exception of twenty-two legal cases, which would be the basis of
his multi-volume work Kitāb al-Umm and would be referred to as his
“revised” jurisprudence (al-jadīd).7
In addition to the Risāla and Kitāb al-Umm a number of other texts
are also attributed to al-Shāfiʿī.8 Some of these works may be considered
polemical writings, as they primarily deal with refutations of contem-
poraneous jurists and include critiques of Mālik and al-Shaybānī. The
topic of legal theory was also addressed by al-Shāfiʿī in a text other than
the Risāla, namely Jimāʿ al-ʿIlm and a separate treatise was dedicated
to reconciling disparity in adīth transmission, titled Ikhtilāf al- adīth.
Moreover, given al-Shāfiʿī’s exceptional linguistic ability and talent
for memorizing poetry, he is also credited with an anthology of verse
(dīwān).9
After a period of exceptionally productive authorship during his
five-year stay in Egypt, al-Shāfiʿī died in 204/820 and was buried in the
Qarāfa al-Sughrā cemetery of modern Cairo. In later times his burial site
played an active role in the Ayyūbid revival of Sunnism in the wake of the
Fātimid collapse, as his grave was transformed by the Ayyūbid sultan alā
al-Dīn (r. 569/1174–589/1193) and his later Ayyūbid successor al-Malik
al-Kāmil (r. 614/1218–635/1238). These rulers erected a large mausoleum
in al-Shāfiʿī’s honor and a college (madrasa) in its associated environs. The
mausoleum complex remains a place of visitation and veneration up until
today and many Cairenes consider al-Shāfiʿī to be the “patron saint” of
their city.10

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 142 Gavin N. Picken

Al-Shāfiʿī’s Theory of Bayān

In the classical conception of legal theory, Islamic law is commonly held
to consist of four sources upon which all schools of jurisprudence agree,
namely the Qurʾān, Prophetic practice (sunna), scholarly consensus (ijmāʿ)
and analogical deduction (qiyās). Moreover, these four sources are held to
maintain a hierarchical structure such that primacy is given to the Qurʾān
then the sunna, then ijmāʿ and finally qiyās. This theory is attributed to
al-Shāfiʿī and is said to originate in his seminal treatise on legal theory, the
Risāla.11 Even though al-Shāfiʿī does indeed discuss the four sources in the
Risāla to suggest that this is his only contribution to legal theory would be
incredibly misleading and would seriously underestimate the contribution
of al-Shāfiʿī and undermine the overall value of the Risāla.12
In fact, one of the most novel concepts in the Risāla, and one of al-Shāfiʿī’s
greatest contributions to the genesis of legal theory is the notion of what he
terms “bayān.” Although one may naturally assume this carries the implica-
tion of “clarification,” or “elucidation,” al-Shāfiʿī did not expressly intend its
linguistic or rhetorical value.13 On the contrary, al-Shāfiʿī defined the term
in his own very specific manner and seems to have implied the concept
of “revelatory address.”14 In his conceptualization of bayān al-Shāfiʿī pro-
poses the notion that revelation addresses the legally responsible individual
and that this address is intelligible from a legislative perspective, even if the
there is more than one address, and they seem apparently contradictory.
Thus, al-Shāfiʿī’s primary concern is with how the legal sources interact and
interplay with one another and his main focus is to produce a legal herme-
neutic to mitigate the apparent contradictions that seem inherent in the
sources.15
In this context, al-Shāfiʿī proposes what may be referred to as a “revela-
tory matrix” such that Divine will is communicated to the temporal realm
via revelation. The recipient of this Divine manifestation is none other than
the Prophet but the manner in which he receives this communication can
vary between God’s precise articulation, embodied in the Qurʾān, and other
forms of address communicated to the Prophet and reported in the sunna.
Thus, al-Shāfiʿī reduces the identifiable sources of law to their revelatory
foundations and in fact, does not consider a third possibility except in the
case of extreme necessity. Al-Shāfiʿī suggests that the Qurʾān and sunna
express legal rulings in the following five ways: 1) the Qurʾān alone, such
that the text is completely self-sufficient and requires no further elabora-
tion; 2) the Qurʾān and sunna together, where the sunna merely reiterates
the Qurʾānic injunction; 3) the Qurʾān and sunna together, where the sunna
elaborates the Qurʾānic injunction; 4) the sunna alone, where there is no

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Early Shāfiʿī Madhhab 143

precedent from the Qurʾān; and 5) none of the aforementioned scenarios,

such that the ruling is not apparent and in which case one much resort to
a form of juristic reasoning (ijtihād),16 primarily through the medium of
analogical deduction (qiyās).17
Through this schema, al-Shāfiʿī elaborates every possibility of how the
revelatory matrix may feasibly address a particular legal case and in the
event that the intended legislative purport remains unintelligible, then
analogy will be employed to find a solution. One will note here that even
in this final scenario, when no apparent deduction can be made, the jurist
remains inextricably tied to the revelatory sources, as analogy can only be
made in reference to an existing precedent in the Qurʾān and sunna with an
identifiable common cause of legislation (maʿnā).18 It can be determined,
therefore, that al-Shāfiʿī restricts the sources of law to those of purely Divine
origin and consequently grounds the law in what may be tangibly received
by the Prophet in terms of “revelatory address.” In addition, it can also be
observed that al-Shāfiʿī’s bayān schema displays what may be referred to as
an “architectural symmetry,” since it relies on the Qurʾān alone (Q), the
Qurʾān and sunna in conjunction (Q/S) and then the sunna alone (S).19 As
Lowry observes:

Thus, al-Shāfiʿī’s concept of the bayān complements his claim that the divine
law is all-encompassing, by showing that the divine law exhausts all the pos-
sible permutations of revealed authority, and by showing that it does so in an
orderly and aesthetically satisfying manner.20

It should be noted here that al-Shāfiʿī did not consider the dual revela-
tory sources of Islamic law to be contradictory in any way and hence any
apparent discrepancy between them was entirely superficial.21 The ques-
tion becomes then, how to explain such apparent contradictions when they
occur. Al-Shāfiʿī responds by elaborating a number of hermeneutical rubrics
within the overarching bayān schema to mitigate such apparent contradic-
tions, namely the dichotomous pairings of ʿāmm and khā and jumla/ and
na, and the individual rubric of naskh.22
In considering first the duality proposed by ʿāmm and khā, a text is
deemed “general” (ʿāmm) when it apples to the entirety of a given class
and in fact, upon primary examination all texts appear this way initially.
However, upon closer examination, one may be presented with another text
that applies to a sub category within the general perception of the original
class and hence, this second text applies a restriction to its initial implication
and this is referred to as “specific” (khā). Although this rubric has a wide-
ranging application, it is particularly prevalent in cases where the Qurʾān,
being a finite and primarily universal text, presents a case that is “general”

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 144 Gavin N. Picken

(ʿāmm) and then is restricted by an evidence from the sunna, which is spe-
cific (khā). In this way al-Shāfiʿī is able to harmonize texts that, on the
surface of it, appear to be contradictory and, more importantly, he diffuses
any potential tension between the two revelatory sources by demonstrating
their compatibility.23
The second pairing in al-Shāfiʿī’s hermeneutical rubrics is jumla and na,
which concerns whether an evidence is self-sufficient in terms of it legal
implication, or whether it requires further elucidation. If a text is deemed
self-sufficient, such that its legal purport is conclusive and it requires no
further elaboration, then it is termed “definitive” (na). If, however, on the
other hand a text requires further detail or supplementary explanation, then
it is referred to as “ambiguous” (jumla). Thus, this hermeneutical rubric
concerns the necessity of interpretation of a text, or its independence as
legislative evidence. In the context of al-Shāfiʿī’s conception of bayān, the
jumla and na device is perhaps the most apparent since the Qurʾān will
either provide a text that is unequivocal, which obviates the need for supple-
mentary material from the sunna, or remain ambiguous, in which case the
sunna will define the perceived Qurʾānic ambiguity. Once again, this is a
further method of harmonizing the revelatory sources in a complementary
manner but perhaps, more significantly, it cements the role of the sunna in
the revelatory matrix, as it proffers it an essential role as the primary and
essential interpretative tool to understand the Qurʾān.24
Naskh refers to the theory that certain revelatory injunctions were
repealed by later ones and is said to be indicated by Q. 2:106.25 Like the
aforementioned hermeneutic rubrics, abrogation also relies on the juxtapo-
sition of texts but in this instance, it depends entirely on a revelatory time-
line. Thus, whereas the hermeneutical devices discussed so far are attempts
to demonstrate the complementarity of apparently contradictory texts, as a
means of harmonization, abrogation recognizes the disparity between a pair
of evidences and mitigates the inconsistency by placing them in a histori-
cally chronological sequence.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of al-Shāfiʿī’s articulation of abroga-
tion is that he holds that only intra-source abrogation can occur and he
denies the possibility of inter-source abrogation. In other words, the Qurʾān
can abrogate the Qurʾān and the sunna can abrogate the sunna, but they
cannot abrogate one another.26 Al-Shāfiʿī bases this on Q. 2:106, which,
he claims, implies that only the Qurʾān can abrogate the Qurʾān. In addi-
tion, based on his bayān schema, he understands that the Qurʾān and the
sunna are two ontologically different yet complimentary entities. Practically
speaking, if they were in competition with one another, the Qurʾān would
always outweigh the sunna and hence, they cannot act upon another in
terms of inter-source abrogation.27

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Early Shāfiʿī Madhhab 145

Al-Shāfiʿī’s Conception of Sunna

vis-a-vis adīth
Thus far, it has been tangible that al-Shāfiʿī reveres the sunna as part of
Islam’s revelatory matrix and hence, a fundamental source of law—second
only to the absolute authority of the Qurʾān. Yet, a fundamental question
needs to be raised: what constituted the sunna for al-Shāfiʿī and how did he
determine it? This question is pertinent and essential, as many terminologi-
cal usages displayed considerable mutability during the nascent period of
Islamic legal history.28 Moreover, the concept of sunna was often particu-
larly flexible as it encompassed the practice of the companions and succes-
sors, the customs of specific communities and regional traditions, as well as
the practice of the Prophet.29
Of particular concern to al-Shāfiʿī was the concept of sunna associated
with “Medinan precedent” (ʿamal ahl al-Madina) in the legal theory of his
teacher Mālik. This notion posited the idea that the practice of the people
in Medina at the time of Mālik was separated from the time of the Prophet
by only a minimal time lag and hence, given the large number of compan-
ions that resided in the city after the death of the Prophet, it could be safely
assumed that the practices that were prevalent in the city were of Prophetic
origin. Thus, Mālik believed a form of localized consensus that was con-
firmed by consistency in the practice of the generations that succeeded the
Prophet in his final abode.
Al-Shāfiʿī rejects the idea that “Medinan precedent” engendered a sense
of consensus and, more critically, he was of the opinion that adopting such
an approach would be detrimental to status of adīth as a whole30:

This is the method of those who invalidate adīth in its entirety: they say
we follow consensus except that they only claim that there is consensus. You
claim the consensus of a particular locality where in fact the people there are
in a state of disagreement as you yourself have admitted.31

Al-Shāfiʿī also voices his opposition to Medinan precedent as constituting

the part of the notion of sunna:

You claim that the sunna is established from two perspectives: the first is that
you found the scholarly companions conforming to it and secondly, you did not
find people disputing it. Equally, you reject it if you do not find that the scholars
have an opinion regarding it and you find that people disputed regarding it.32

Indeed, he considers Mālik’s application of this principle to lack consistency

due to the disparate sources he draws upon and, having surveyed Mālik’s

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 146 Gavin N. Picken

opinion on a given case, he demonstrates his frustration by stating, “Where

is Medinan precedent here (ayna al-ʿamal)?”33 Moreover, he did not con-
sider that a localized tradition could be given such a primary position in
determining law. He criticizes this aspect of Mālik’s system commenting:

You seem to claim that knowledge is restricted to you, such that whatever you
permit is permitted, and whatever you reject is rejected. Do you not offer this
privilege to others? There is no Muslim land that is divested of knowledge
and scholars who were emulated by their local communities. Do you not
consider people of Mecca to be justified in their emulation of ʿA āʾ [b. Abū
Rabā (d. 114/732)]? Whatever opinion he held, if it was in agreement with
attested adīth then they agreed with him and if not, they disagreed with him.
Equally, would you not consider the people of Basra to be justified in their
emulation of al-asan [al-Barī (d. 110/728)] and [Muammad] Ibn Sīrīn
(d. 110/728)? Or that the people of Kufa were justified in emulating [ʿĀmir
b. Sharāīl] al-Shaʿbī (d. 103/721) and Ibrāhim [al-Nakhaʿī (d. 96/715)], or
similarly the people of Syria [for emulating their scholars]? Everyone we have
mentioned was a scholar and an imam in his time and some of them were
better than others. In fact the only knowledge that is binding is that of the
Book and the sunna and it is incumbent on every Muslim to follow them.34

It is also noticeable from this quote that al-Shāfiʿī regards the Medinan prec-
edent to be little more than the collective opinions of the scholars of a par-
ticular locale, rather than an organic tradition developed out of Prophetic
practice and a legally binding precedent constituting sunna.
In addition to the concept of Medinan precedent developed and champi-
oned by Mālik, there were other hermeneutical devices that also attempted
to provide an interpretive response to determining the law. Of paramount
importance in this regard was the genesis of “juristic preference” (al-istisān)
by the jurists of Iraq and especially Abū anīfa. Istisān was the setting aside
of the apparent meaning of an evidence, or an analogy based on an apparent
evidence, in favor of exercising a personal judgment to facilitate some form
of perceived public benefit, or a ruling that appeared to be more equitable.35
From al-Shāfiʿī’s perspective, the revelation was entirely self-sufficient, such
that it either provided an evidence in the form of a definitive text (na),
or an evidence from which a ruling could be inferred (dilāla). Therefore,
for a jurist to exercise his personal opinion and “preference” for something
other than revelation indicated was simply unacceptable and indeed, was
completely prohibited:

it is not permissible for anyone who is appointed to be a judge or a mufti

to make a decision based on anything other than a binding evidential
proof, constituted by the Book and sunna, or the undisputed opinion of the

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Early Shāfiʿī Madhhab 147

scholarly elite, or via analogy and it is not permissible for him to judge or
make a decision based on istisān, as istisān is not binding in any way, in the
way that the rest of these are.36

Moreover, al-Shāfiʿī also considers this practice dangerous with regard to

the sanctity of the law, “If it was permissible to invalidate analogy it would
possible, when there is no binding evidential proof, for intelligent people
who are not from the scholarly elite to say whatever they want based on
istisān.”37 As with Medinan precedent, al-Shāfiʿī considered istisān to be
equally arbitrary and in his most damning statement says, “Istisān is little
more than a “matter of taste” (taladhdhudh).”38
In the Risāla, al-Shāfiʿī’s responds to these competing juristic methodolo-
gies by grounding the law within the confines of the revelatory matrix. More
specifically, with regard to the notion of sunna, his response is unequivocal:
the sunna is restricted to the Prophet only. It is noticeable in the Risāla that
relatively little discussion is afforded to the Qurʿān, most probably because
as a source of law, it was undisputed among jurists. Al-Shāfiʿī uses this to his
advantage in attempting to prove the authority of the Prophetic sunna by
quoting verses from the Qurʿān that link God with the Prophet, or instances
where God is mentioned in association with the Prophet and more spe-
cifically, verses that mention that it is part of “true faith” to believe deeply
in God and His Prophet as a coherent theological principle.39 Thereafter,
al-Shāfiʿī quotes verses where either obedience or forms of legal authority
are denoted as being both the realm of God and His Messenger.40 Thus,
al-Shāfiʿī builds his argument from the Qurʾān sequentially and in a way
that, at each stage, augments the status of the Prophet as an authoritative
source in Islam generally, and in the law specifically.41 The ultimate conclu-
sion of this presentation could not be clearer—the Prophet is an extension
of God’s authority in the phenomenal realm.42
In addition, al-Shāfiʿī provides an additional exegetical intervention to
bolster his argument. Having established that God is continually men-
tioned in the Qurʾān in conjunction with His Prophet, al-Shāfiʿī invokes
the revelatory matrix by identifying instances in the Qurʾān where God’s
“Book” (al-kitāb) is mentioned in juxtaposition with the term “wisdom”
(al-ikma).43 It is also noticeable that four of the seven verses quoted
(Q. 2:129, Q. 2:151, Q. 3:164, Q. 62:2) elaborate three functions of
prophethood, namely, “recitation” (tilāwa), “instruction” (taʿlīm), and
“purification” (tazkiya). The second function of instruction is where the
incidences of “Book” (al-kitāb) and “wisdom” (al-ikma) occur, and even
though it would appear that “teaching the Book” might be axiomatic,
“teaching wisdom” is not so obvious. It is here that al-Shāfiʿī intervenes with
an interpretive gloss and suggests that ikma actually refers to the sunna

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 148 Gavin N. Picken

since, by analogy, it is a natural extension of verses in the Qur’an that refer

to God and His Prophet in conjunction, giving the quoted verses the mean-
ing of “teaches the Qurʾān and the sunna.”44 Moreover, given the explicative
role of the sunna in the bayān schema one may posit that these verses actu-
ally imply four functions of prophethood rather than three, that is, “recita-
tion,” “instruction,” “application,” and “purification” (tazkiya).45
The very next verse, Q. 2:231, reiterates verse Q. 3:164 discussed above
and alludes to the revelation of “Book” (al-kitāb) and “wisdom” (al-ikma)
as a Divine blessing to the nascent Muslim community. Similarly, the sub-
sequent verse quoted by al-Shāfiʿī (Q. 4:113) indicates that the revelation of
the “Book” (al-kitāb) and “wisdom” (al-ikma) are a Divine favor bestowed
upon the Prophet specifically. Given that al-Shāfiʿī has already determined
that the “wisdom” to be the sunna, it is certainly significant that both verses
mention the sunna as being “revealed” (anzala), proving for al-Shāfiʿī that
the sunna is of revelatory origin and consequently, is authoritative as a
source of law. The final verse (Q. 33:34) is addressed to the wives of the
Prophet and is also a reminder to them that they witness the “recounting
of ‘God’s signs’ (āyāt Allāh) and ‘wisdom’(al-ikma)” in their homes. Again
for al-Shāfiʿī this would seem to mean that the Prophet’s wives heard the
recital of the Qurʿān and experienced the Prophet’s application of it in his
own household.46
Thus, with regard to the concept of sunna, judging from the presentation
provided in the Risāla, al-Shāfiʿī’s contention is clear: the Qurʿān evinces a
cogent demonstration of the Prophet’s status; that the status of the Prophet
is an immutable theological tenet of faith; that the term sunna is restricted
to the Prophet only; that the legal authority of the sunna of the Prophet is an
undeniable fact, and that it is only through the harmonizing of the Qurʾān
of sunna that Islamic law can be truly understood. As al-Shāfiʿī concludes:

The sunna of the Messenger of God clarifies the meaning that God intended
and is a definitive evidence that is binding upon all. Moreover, God affiliated
the term “wisdom” with His Book and then made it concomitant with His
Prophet. This is something that He did not bestow upon anyone else from
His creation other than His Messenger.47

The question remains, however, having established the significance of the

sunna, how does one determine what constitutes the sunna? As was men-
tioned earlier, this was a critical epistemological question during al-Shāfiʿī’s
lifetime due to the competing conceptualizations of what the sunna meant.
As has also already been established, al-Shāfiʿī determined that the sunna
could only be the sunna of the Prophet, and in parallel to the utilization
of the Qurʾān in Islamic law as evidence, he decided that only a rigorously

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Early Shāfiʿī Madhhab 149

attested text regarding the Prophet could serve as proof. Thus, al-Shāfiʿī
established the sunna via narrated texts regarding the statements, actions
and tacit approval of the Prophet, which were commonly referred to as
adīth.48
Establishing an evidential text from the Qurʾān, however, was a relatively
straightforward process, since it was an undisputed source and because the
text was well established. adīth on the other hand were an entirely differ-
ent matter, as there were regional variations regarding narration of adīth,
and differing attitudes toward the level of probity of such narrations. Thus,
al-Shāfiʿī’s next task was to establish the validity of adīth, in terms of both
their intrinsic authenticity and their force as legislative proof. This was no
easy task since, whereas the Qurʾān was a finite text, adīth were volumi-
nous and unevenly distributed. In addition, even though the collection of
adīth had most certainly begun, the compilation of compendia such as the
canonical works of al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) and Muslim (d. 261/875), were
still many years away.
Faced with a huge corpus of irregular texts al-Shāfiʿī’s solution was quite
ingenious. Rather than focus on adīths that were deemed “consecutive in
their transmission” (mutawātir), which were less problematic as they were
generally considered authentic, he focused his attention on a disputed type
of adīth that had a limited number of narrators at some point in their
chain of transmission, termed khabar al-wāid. This type of adīth was
considered problematic, as it was less well attested to and hence, engendered
a sense of doubt regarding its authenticity and reliability. Thus, al-Shāfiʿī’s
rationale was that if he could prove the validity of khabar al-wāid, he
would have—de facto—proven the validity of any type of adīth that was
better authenticated.
Al-Shāfiʿī dedicates a considerable amount of space in the Risāla to the
discussion of khabar al-wāid and provides a number of discussions to sup-
port his position of accepting this form of adīth.49 Al-Shāfiʿī’s first point
is taken from the Qurʾān, where he posits that God on most occasions sent
an individual prophet to deliver His divine message to a given people. In
addition, the Prophet, on several occasions sent an individual emissary to
represent him to other tribes and peoples in Arabia. Moreover, caliphal suc-
cession, particularly in the case of the second caliph ʿUmar b. al-Kha āb
(r. 13/634–23/644), was based on the selection of an individual. Similarly,
judges have been appointed in the same way and on many occasions,
the companions accepted the testimony of an individual in judicial mat-
ters. Thus, in each example that al-Shāfiʿī provides the gravity of the task
involved is certainly intelligible and at the same time, it was entrusted to
one person. Therefore, in transmitting details relating to the Prophet, which
is also an evidently important task, to receive a narration from an individual

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 150 Gavin N. Picken

is acceptable given that it is a well-established religious norm and with the

proviso that the person in question is reliable.50
A second argument that al-Shāfiʿī develops is to compare the transmis-
sion of adīth to determining the acceptability of witness testimony in court.
Al-Shāfiʿī is careful here to point out both the similarities and differences in
both scenarios so as not to weaken his overall argument. At the same time,
however, al-Shāfiʿī stresses that the fundamental role of both processes is
to produce a reliable report that can be utilized in a legal context. Indeed
al-Shāfiʿī laments the fact that, oftentimes, people are more exacting with
regard to witness testimony than they are with the narration of adīth. In
reality, however, the narration of adīth is a much more significant activity
given that it relates to religious knowledge, may record incidences of revela-
tion, and the consequences of inaccuracy are severe in this world and the
next.51
In addition to proffering arguments to augment the premise of accept-
ing khabar al-wāid, al-Shāfiʿī also provides clear criteria to determine the
authenticity of adīth with regard to their formal structure.52 The first set
of standards relates to the transmitters of adīth, and al-Shāfiʿī provides six
criteria in this regard; any given transmitter must be:

1. Trustworthy in his religion;

2. Known for accuracy in his transmission of adīths;
3. Cognizant of what he transmits;
4. Someone who reports adīths exactly as he heard them rather than
someone who paraphrases so as not to distort their meaning;
5. Someone who transmits from memory (hif) or from written notes
(kitāb); and
6. Someone who is not known to disguise defects in sanads (mudalis).53

Therefore, al-Shāfiʿī provides a means to determine the reliability of nar-

rators in a given chain of transmission (sanad). At the same time, however,
he still needed to determine the consistency of the transmission between
narrators, which was another feature of his discussion in the Risāla.
In this context, al-Shāfiʿī appears to pre-date the later works on adīth
science, as he readily discusses a number of vernacular usages that would
become the staple of this nascent discipline. For example, he readily
describes those chains of transmission that are uninterrupted to the Prophet
as “linked” (muttail), and contrasts this with interrupted chains of trans-
mission termed, referred to as “severed” (munqaiʿ). He also discusses chains
of transmission that are attributed to the Prophet but in reality are only
attested to by one of the companions—termed “circumvented” (mursal)—
and provides further criteria for their acceptance as evidence.54

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Early Shāfiʿī Madhhab 151

Given that now al-Shāfiʿī effectively equates the sunna of the Prophet
with adīth related about him, he still faces one last hurdle in providing an
indisputable theory. What happens when a adīth seemingly disagrees with
another adīth?55 In addition to the possibility that these two narrations
may be subject to the bayān hermeneutics of ʿāmm and khā, jumla and
na, and naskh, al-Shāfiʿī provides several criteria of how to select between
seemingly competing adīths suggesting that desired narrations should be:

1. Those that resemble the Qurʾān most in terms of diction (laf);

2. Those that are better attested to in terms of authenticity;
3. Those that are transmitted by more erudite authorities in the disci-
pline of adīth;
4. Those that are transmitted through more than one chain of
transmission;
5. Those that resemble the Qurʾān most in terms of implicit meaning
(maʿna);
6. Those that most resemble the established sunna;
7. Those that accord with scholarly knowledge;
8. Those that are closer in terms of analogy; and
9. Those that accord with the majority of the companions’ opinions.56

Thus, al-Shāfiʿī was not only familiar with subtleties that concerned
the reliability of narrators and the necessity of there being a sound link-
age between them, but also had systematized an entire set of criteria to
govern these two essential features of adīth transmission. Moreover, the
least attested of such transmissions and hence, the least forceful as a legal
evidence was considered the khabar al-wāid. Therefore, having estab-
lished the probity of this type of transmission from the Prophet, al-Shāfiʿī
could argue that every adīth that was corroborated even more rigorously
could function as a perfectly acceptable legal text and hence, be informative
regarding the sunna of the Messenger of God.

The Reception of Al-Shāfiʿ ī’s Teachings

As significant and novel as al-Shāfiʿī’s proposed theory was, it would have

been relegated to the annals of history if it had not been preserved and pro-
mulgated by those who came after him. In this regard, al-Shāfiʿī’s thought
and teachings were maintained after his death by three of his main students,
namely Rabīʿ b. Sulaymān al-Murādī,57 Yūsuf b. Yayā al-Buway ī, and
Ismāʿīl b. Yayā al-Muzanī. Al-Murādī’s role was one of preservation since,

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 152 Gavin N. Picken

even though he was not al-Shāfiʿī’s most gifted student, he was selected to
receive the eminent jurist’s teachings via dictation, and it is through him
that the manuscripts for al-Risāla and Kitāb al-Umm remained extant.58 In
many ways al-Buway ī was al-Shāfiʿī’s direct heir as he took over his teach-
ing position and remained in that role for over a quarter of a century.59
Al-Muzanī on the other hand was arguably al-Shāfiʿī’s most talented student
but courted considerable controversy due the fact that, in exercising his own
juristic acumen, he opposed the opinion of his teacher.60 What is signifi-
cant, however, is that each of al-Buway ī and al-Muzanī wrote an “abridg-
ment” (mukhtaar) summarizing their teacher’s views to make them more
accessible to a wider audience.61 Despite the mukhtaar of al-Muzanī being
an excellent example to illustrate the immediate reception of al-Shāfiʿī’s
thoughts, the discussion here will focus on the mukhtaar of al-Buway ī, as
it summarized not only al-Shāfiʿī’s views on positive law derived from his
Kitāb al-Umm, but also abridged the legal theory espoused by the Risāla.62
Al-Buway ī contributed considerably to the establishment of a Shāfiʿī
“school,” not only by teaching and promulgating the teachings of al-Shāfiʿī,
but also by producing an abridgment of his most important texts. As was
noted above, al-Shāfiʿī’s works were voluminous and this made them inac-
cessible to many, so al-Buway ī summarized the Risāla and Kitāb al-Umm
into a manageable treatise that could be easily taught.63 Thus, with regard
to the Risāla, which has been under discussion thus far, it was reduced from
1821 paragraphs to just 26.64 Al-Buway ī’s contribution was not, however,
only an exercise in abridgment but also a considerable adjustment to the
way in which al-Shāfiʿī’s teachings were interpreted. The first thing to be
considered in this regard is what criteria did al-Buway ī use to undertake
his abridgment? Firstly, he does not quote al-Shāfiʿī directly even though he
states “al-Shāfiʿī said” (qāla al-Shāfiʿī), but paraphrases his opinions, and this
makes up the majority of the text. Secondly, al-Buway ī’s editorial pattern
displays a distinct inclination to adīth, which is indicative of a traditionist
approach and which, as was noted above, is a salient feature of al-Shāfiʿī’s
juristic Weltanschauung. In this context, he also employs what El Shamsy
refers to as the “adīth principle,” a statement attributed to al-Shāfiʿī with the
purport of, “if a adīth is found to be authentic then it is my view.”65 Thus,
the adīth principle becomes carte blanch for al-Buway ī to add, delete, or
amend any of al-Shāfiʿī’s opinions based on a concept provided by al-Shāfiʿī
himself. On this basis, al-Buway ī would add narrations, provide additional
transmissions, and occasionally disagree with his teacher. It is observable,
therefore, that al-Buway ī uses adīth even more profusely than his own
teacher does, but at the same time, one could equally argue that he also loses
some of the sophistication of al-Shāfiʿī’s distinguished legal discourse.66
In this context, we have a different perspective on how early jurists
understood their relationships with their teachers. One may assume that

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Early Shāfiʿī Madhhab 153

they faithfully follow every aspect of the teachings of their eponymous,

iconoclast scholars but, in reality, they gave considerable consideration to
the application of their methodology, rather than mere emulation of their
every ruling. Thus, al-Buway ī disagreed with al-Shāfiʿī based on the very
principles that his teacher formulated and how could he not when al-Shāfiʿī
had laid so much emphasis on the legal force of adīth?67 To put it another
way, al-Buway ī’s writing of his abridgment was a new step in the develop-
ment of al-Shāfiʿī’s teachings, as it was the canonization of school rather
than the legal articulation of a single scholar. As El Shamsy observes:

unlike the Umm, the Mukhtaar is concerned with representing the posi-
tions not of al-Shāfiʿī the individual, but of Shāfiʿism, an abstracted body of
legal thought that is embodied in but not equivalent to the actual writings
of al-Shāfiʿī.68

Perhaps an unexpected effect of al-Buway ī’s Mukhtaar is that it appealed

directly to traditionists of the period, who up until that point had been
opposed to study of jurisprudence due to its association with “excessive”
rational and personal opinion.69 Thus, al-Buway ī’s Mukhtaar created a
bridge between the reason that law requires to function and the revelation
that is its very foundation—a goal that perhaps al-Shāfiʿī had in mind when
he wrote the Risāla.

Conclusion

There can be little doubt that al-Shāfiʿī’s continuous travel during the formative
period of Islamic history afforded him a unique perspective on the formation of
legal thought. He journeyed to Hejaz in his youth, Yemen as a young man, Iraq
on two occasions, and finally, Egypt, where he ended his life. Consequently, he
became familiarized with the nascent juristic traditions of these regional intel-
lectual centers and particularly, with the “scripturalist” trend of Hejaz epito-
mized by Mālik and the “rationalist” trend of Iraq, represented by Abū anīfa.
While this must have been beneficial in exposing him to differing perceptions
of how Islamic jurisprudence could be articulated, he must have also seen the
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the practice of law among these traditions.
Of specific concern to al-Shāfiʿī was the variance in how the term sunna was
understood and, in particular, how this could be equated with non-scriptural
sources evinced by the regional practice of “Medinan precedent” (ʿamal ahl
al-Madina), established by Mālik. Similarly, al-Shāfiʿī was equally perturbed by
the utilization of “excessive” “personal opinion” (raʾy) and its primacy within
the concept of “juristic preference” (istisān), favored by Abū anīfa.70

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 154 Gavin N. Picken

Thus, al-Shāfiʿī focused on devising his own system that needed to affirm
the meaning of sunna as being that of the Prophet only and at the same
time, provide a systematic way of allowing space for the expression juristic
reasoning, but one that could be controlled through basing it on a revelatory
precedent, namely, qiyās. Another main concern for al-Shāfiʿī was to further
restrict the concept of sunna to a scriptural foundation and therefore, he set
about proving the validity and reliability of adīth so that it could function
as a textual source. Al-Shāfiʿī’s final project was to ensure that sunna—now
restricted to the Prophet and determined by adīth—was compatible with
primary source of revelation and hence, he developed various hermeneuti-
cal rubrics for harmonizing apparent discrepancies between the Qurʾān and
sunna that were articulated in his theory of bayān.
This system was also readily adopted by al-Shāfiʿī’s students such as
al-Buway ī and al-Muzanī. Indeed, they embraced it in the spirit that it was
meant, not in terms of indiscriminate emulation, but rather, in the expres-
sion of discerning ijtihād that characterized much of the period.71 Moreover,
it is also interesting to note that many of the subjects that al-Shāfiʿī raises
in the theory of bayān became standard discussion in the later works of
uūl al-fiqh within the school context.72 Therefore, we find references to
ʿāmm and khā;73 jumla and na;74 naskh;75 khabar al-wāid;76 criteria for
adīth transmission;77 criteria for the approval of adīth narrators;78 qiyās;79
ijmāʿ;80 ijtihād;81 and the fallaciousness of istisān.82
Despite this, much has been made regarding the influence of al-Shāfiʿī
in academic studies, particularly in the discipline of “legal theory” or uūl
al-fiqh; there are those like Schacht who consider his influence to be consid-
erable, and Coulson who lauded upon him the honorific epithet of “Master
Architect.”83 Others, like Hallaq have argued that al-Shāfiʿī’s influence on
later uūl al-fiqh was minimal at best, and Lowry has provided a more bal-
anced approach to this conclusion.84 Hallaq’s premise was that al-Shāfiʿī’s
Risāla bears little resemblance to the works of mature uūl al-fiqh that
appeared approximately a century or more after al-Shāfiʿī’s death. Moreover,
Hallaq places somewhat exacting criteria for the basis of his conclusion:

The most striking fact about the 9th century is that it yields no single work
on uūl al-fiqh. By that we mean a work whose primary task is to lay down
a systematic, comprehensive, and organically structured legal methodology
whose purpose in turn is to derive legal rulings from the material sources-as
was clearly the case in the 10th century and thereafter.85

One may comment here that to compare a preliminary attempt to codify

legal theory with its later mature state is a somewhat unfair exercise, as most
works of the early third/ninth century rarely displayed such organizational

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Early Shāfiʿī Madhhab 155

and theoretical precision.86 Indeed, having discussed al-Shāfiʿī’s theory of

bayān as represented in the Risāla, one might say that it does indeed qualify
as, “a systematic, comprehensive, and organically structured legal method-
ology whose purpose in turn is to derive legal rulings from the material
sources,” albeit in a developmental form.
Moreover, attempting to juxtapose al-Shāfiʿī with the later uūl al-
fiqh tradition may have fundamentally missed the point. As Lowry notes,
approximately eighty per cent of the Risāla is devoted to two main areas,
namely harmonizing source interaction and issues related to the sunna as a
source of law.87 In other words, the Risāla is dedicated to subject of what
constitutes the sunna, how the sunna interacts with the Qurʾān, and the
status of the sunna within law. It is clear, as mentioned earlier, that this was
a response to the juristic milieu of the second/eighth century and the issues
that arose therein. It is also evident that al-Shāfiʿī wanted the law to be
more consistent and to be directly related to revelatory material rather than
human influence, or as Hallaq puts it—somewhat melodramatically—that
al-Shāfiʿī was, “ . . . the victor-jurist who brought the eighth-century unbri-
dled law down to the knees of revelation.”88 Al-Shāfiʿī—as a scripturalist par
excellence—was successful, in that he forced jurists to return the law to its
revelatory origins, reconsider the concept and status of sunna and especially,
the position of adīth as a proof text.89
Although recognition of al-Shāfiʿī’s impact on the articulation of Islamic
law was not so forthcoming in academic studies, traditional Muslim scholars
have long lauded his contribution. For example, Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119)—
despite being affiliated with the anbalī school—referred to al-Shāfiʿī as
both the “father” and the “mother” of uūl al-fiqh.90 Similarly, al-Shāfiʿī’s
position with reference to the development of legal theory has been likened
to that of Aristotle in relation to logic, and Khalīl b. Amad (d. between
160/777 and 175/791) in relation to Arabic prosody.91 Moreover, with
regard to the theological concept of the “renewer” (mujaddid), who will
revive the fortunes of the Muslim world at the beginning of every century,
al-Shāfiʿī was considered to occupy this elevated status in the second century
of the Islamic era.92 Thus, with regard to the concept of sunna and its asso-
ciated adīth, al-Shāfiʿī is regarded as someone who revived religion in his
time, nurtured legal theory and breathed life into Islamic law.

Notes

1. The life of al-Shāfiʿī has been the subject of a number of disparate and multifari-
ous materials, and although one cannot disregard the possibility of hagiographic

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 156 Gavin N. Picken

embellishment, the basic details of his life are recounted fairly consistently.
Sources that relate his life include works of chronography such as al-Kha īb
al-Baghdādī’s (d. 463/1070) Tārīkh Baghdad and works of prosopography
such as al-Dhahabī’s (d. 748/1347) Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ. The biography of
the eponymous imam was also included in the introductory sections of some
later multi-volume juristic texts and representative examples of these include
al-ʿImrānī’s (d. 558/1162) al-Bayān and al-Nawawī’s (d. 686/1287) al-Majmūʿ.
In equal acts of devotion, there are several dedicated biographies such as al-Rāzī’s
(d. 606/1209) Manāqib al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī, which has been replicated in the
modern period by the Azharite scholar Abū Zahra (d. 1394/1974). See Amad
b. ʿAlī al-Kha īb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdad aw Madīnat al-Salām, edited by
Mu afā ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿA āʾ, 24 vols (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004),
2:54–75; Muammad b. Amad al-Dhahabī, Siyar ʿAlām al-Nubalāʾ, edited by
Mu afā ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿA āʾ, 16 vols (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004),
7:335–70; Yayā b. Abū ’l-Khayr al-ʿImrānī, al-Bayān fī Madhhab al-Imām
al-Shāfiʿī, edited by Qāsim al-Nūrī, 14 vols, 2nd ed. (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj,
2008), 1:4–7; Yayā b. Sharaf al-Nawawī, Kitāb al-Majmūʿ Shar al-Muhad-
hdhab, edited by Muammad al-Mu īʿī, 24 vols (Beirut: Dār Iyāʾ al-Turāth
al-ʿArabī, 2001), 1:30–42; Muammad b. ʿUmar ‘Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī,
Manāqib al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī: Irshād al-ālibīn ilā al-Minhaj al-Qawīm, edited
by Amad Majāzī al-Saqā (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li ’l-Turāth, 2008),
23–94; Muammad Abū Zahra, al-Shāfiʿī: ayātuhu wa ʿAruhu, Arāʾuhu wa
Fiqhuhu (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1996), 15–46; and cf. Muammad b. Idrīs
al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, Translated as al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla: Treatise on the Foundations
of Islamic Jurisprudence by Majid Khadduri (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society,
2003), 8–9.
2. See: al-ʿImrānī, al-Bayān, 1:4; al-Nawawī, al-Majmūʿ, 1:31–2; al-Rāzī, Manāqib,
23–37; al-Dhahabī, Siyar, 7: 335–6; Abū Zahra, al-Shāfiʿī, 15–19; al-Shāfiʿī,
al-Risāla, trans. Khadduri, 9–10 and Muammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla,
edited and translated as al-Shāfiʿī: The Epistle on Legal Theory by Joseph E.
Lowry, Library of Arabic Literature (New York: New York University Press,
2013), xviii.
3. On the Hejaz school see Ahmad Hasan, The Early Development of Islamic
Jurisprudence (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1970), 115–151; Knut
S. Vikør, Between God and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law (London:
Hurst, 2005), 22–23 and 25–27 and Wael Hallaq, Shari‘a: Theory, Practice,
Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 46–49.
4. See al-ʿImrānī, al-Bayān, 1:4–5; al-Nawawī, al-Majmūʿ, 1:32–33; al-Rāzī,
Manāqib, 38–43; al-Dhahabī, Siyar, 7:336–7; Abū Zahra, al-Shāfiʿī, 19–21;
al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, trans. Khadduri, 11 and al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by
Lowry, xviii.
5. On the Iraq school see: Hasan, Early Development, 115–151; Noel James
Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, Islamic Surveys—2 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1964), 36–52; Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories:
An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997), 17–20; Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Early Shāfiʿī Madhhab 157

of Law, 9th–10th Centuries C.E., Studies in Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 4
(Leiden: Brill, 1997), 1–31; Vikør, God and the Sultan, 23 and 25–27 and
Hallaq, Shari‘a, 49–50.
6. See al-ʿImrānī, al-Bayān, 1:5; al-Nawawī, al-Majmūʿ, 1:34; al-Dhahabī, Siyar, 7:
337; Abū Zahra, al-Shāfiʿī, 26–7; al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, trans. Khadduri, 13–14
and al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Lowry, xix.
7. See al-ʿImrānī, al-Bayān, 1:5; al-Nawawī, al-Majmūʿ, 1:38; al-Dhahabī, Siyar,
7: 337; Abū Zahra, al-Shāfiʿī, 28–31; al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, trans. Khadduri, 13
and al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Lowry, xix-xx.
8. It is of little surprise that a figure such as al-Shāfiʿi, who has such a large corpus
associated with him in the early phase of the development of Islamic jurispru-
dence, has caught the attention of a number of academic studies. It was per-
haps Schacht in his The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence who provided
the earliest appraisal of al-Shāfiʿi’s role in supporting the sunna as a primary
legal source based on adīth and even though he appears to have misinterpreted
some of al-Shāfiʿi’s teachings, his study remains an important early contribu-
tion. Coulson followed by offering an appraisal of al-Shāfiʿi’s legal theory and
afforded him the laudatory epithet of “Master Architect” in an entire chapter
dedicated to the eminent jurist in his A History of Islamic Law. Makdisi followed
an entirely different trajectory with an article examining the anti-rationalist
trends in al-Shāfiʿi’s Risāla to suggest an anti-Muʿtazilite rhetoric that underpins
the text. Following the familiar Orientalist trope of “back dating,” Calder con-
cluded, somewhat controversially, in his Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence,
that the texts attributed to the scholar were of a much later date and most prob-
ably effort of his students. Many of the aforementioned studies have been revised
and challenged by Hallaq who has not only disputed the notion that al-Shāfiʿi
was the “Master Architect” of nascent Islamic legal theory, but has even sug-
gested that al-Shāfiʿi’s Risāla had little effect on the maturation of later uūl al-
fiqh. Further contributions by Kelsay and Melchert have been useful in shedding
light on al-Shāfiʿi’s position in early Islamic intellectual history generally and
legal thought specifically. Moreover, al-Shāfiʿi’s contribution to the conceptual-
ization of adīth, in the context of both constituting law and revelation, has been
treated in useful studies by Aisha Musa and Aron Zysow. Joseph Lowry’s publi-
cations, however, have arguably been the most significant in recent times, as he
has single-handedly and comprehensively examined the content of al-Shāfiʿī’s
Risāla. Lowry’s valuable contribution has been supplemented by the exceptional
work of El Shamsy who is the only scholar to date to be brave enough to tackle
al-Shāfiʿī’s voluminous al-Umm in any great depth. For details of these studies
see Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 8–16 and cf. the bibliography.
9. Muammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, 8 vols, (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2002),
7:210–395; Muammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, Ikhtilāf al- adīth, edited by
Muammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1986) and
Muammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, Dīwān al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī, edited by Imīl Yaʿqūb,
5th ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 2000).
10. See: al-ʿImrānī, al-Bayān, 1:5; al-Nawawī, al-Majmūʿ, 1:31; al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla,
trans. Khadduri, 16.

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 158 Gavin N. Picken

11. See: Joseph E. Lowry, “Does Shāfiʿī have a Theory of Four Sources of Law? ,” in
Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, edited by Bernard Weiss, Studies in Islamic Law
and Society—15 (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 25–30.
12. Lowry, “Does Shāfiʿī,” 31–45.
13. Joseph E. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory: the Risāla of Muammad Ibn Idrīs
al-Shāfiʿī, Studies in Islamic Law and Society—30 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007),
25:fn. 3.
14. Muammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by ʿAbd al-Fatā Kabbāra, 2nd
ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 2010), 35–40 and cf. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal
Theory, 25–26 and Joseph E. Lowry, “Some Preliminary Observations on
al-Šāfiʿī and Later Uūl al-Fiqh: The Case of the Term bayān,” Arabica, 55
(2008): 507.
15. Lowry, “Does Shāfiʿī,” 49; Lowry, “Preliminary Observations,” 507.
16. Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 40–57; Lowry, “Does Shāfiʿī,” 47;
Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 26–33; Lowry, “Preliminary Observations,”
507–508.
17. It should be noted that al-Shāfiʿī picks up the themes of qiyās and ijtihād later
in the Risāla as distinct hermeneutical rubrics. See al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by
Kabbāra, 242–255 and cf. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 142–163.
18. Al-Shāfiʿī uses the term ‘maʿnā’ whereas as the cognate usage in later uūl al-
fiqh for ratio legis would be ‘ʿilla’. See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles
of Islamic Jurisprudence, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2003),
274–284.
19. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 33–34; Lowry, “Preliminary Observations,”
508–509.
20. Lowry, “Does Shāfiʿī,” 47.
21. Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 102.
22. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 61–69.
23. Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 58–69 and cf. Lowry, Early Islamic
Legal Theory, 69–87.
24. Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 103–131 and cf. Lowry, Early Islamic
Legal Theory, 104–118.
25. The theory of naskh and Shāfiʿī’s understanding of it has been treated exten-
sively by Burton and more recently supplemented by Melchert. See John
Burton, The Collection of the Qur’ān (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1977), 46–113; John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of
Abrogation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990) and Christopher
Melchert, “Qurʾānic Abrogation across the Ninth Century: Shāfiʿī, Abū ʿUbayd,
Muāsibī, and Ibn Qutaybah,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, edited by
Bernard Weiss, Studies in Islamic Law and Society—15 (Leiden: Brill, 2002),
75–98.
26. This is a perspective that even later Shāfiʿī jurists would challenge as is evi-
dent from the discussions of al-Ghazālī (d. 505/111), al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209)
and al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233). See Muammad al-Ghazālī, al-Mustafā fī ʿIlm
al-Uūl, edited by Muammad al-Ashqar, 2 vols (Beirut: Muʾassassat al-Risāla,
1997), 1:236–239; Muammad b. ʿUmar Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Maūl fī

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Early Shāfiʿī Madhhab 159

ʿIlm al-Uūl, edited by āha al-ʿAlwānī, 6 vols, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Muʾassassat
al-Risāla, 1992), 3:347–354 and ʿAlī b. Muammad al-Āmidī, al-Ikām fī Uūl
al-Akām, edited by Sayyid al-Jamīlī, 3rd ed., 4 parts in 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār
al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1998), 3:162–165.
27. Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 82–102 and cf. Lowry, Early Islamic
Legal Theory, 87–104.
28. See for example Zafar Ishaq Ansari, “Islamic Juristic Terminology Before Šāfiʿī:
A Semantic Analysis with Special Reference to Kufa,” Arabica, 19(3) (1972):
255–300.
29. In addition to the chapters in the current volume, a plethora of studies exist
discussing the early concept of sunna in Islamic legal history. See for example:
Hasan, Early Development, 85–114; Fazlur Rahman, “The Living Sunnah and
al-Sunnah wa’l Jamā‘ah,” in adīth and Sunnah: Ideals and Realities, edited by
P. K. Koya (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1996), 129–189; Yaseen Dutton,
The Origins of Islamic Law: The Qurʾan, The Muwaaʾ and Madinan ʿAmal,
Culture and Civilization in the Middle East (Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon,
2002), 32–52 and 168–177; Daniel Brown, Rethinking Tradition in Modern
Islamic Thought, Cambridge Middle East Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 6–20; Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 167–170;
Adis Duderija, “Toward a Methodology of Understanding the Nature and
Scope of the Concept of Sunnah,” Arab Law Quarterly, 21 (2007): 1–12; Adis
Duderija, “Evolution in the Canonical Sunni adith Body of Literature and
the Concept of an Authentic adith During the Formative Period of Islamic
Thought as Based on Recent Western Scholarship,” Arab Law Quarterly, 23
(2009): 1–27; and Adis Duderija, “Evolution in the Concept of Sunnah dur-
ing the First Four Generations of Muslims in Relation to the Development of
the Concept of an Authentic adīth as based on Recent Western Scholarship,”
Arab Law Quarterly, 26 (2012): 393–437.
30. It should be noted here that al-Shāfiʿī is not responding to his teacher Mālik
directly in this exchange, but rather to a Mālikī interlocutor who replies to his
challenges.
31. Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, 7:284–285.
32. Ibid., 7:283.
33. Ibid., 7:282–3.
34. Ibid., 7:289.
35. See Hasan, Early Development, 145–151 and Kamali, Principles, 323–331.
36. Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, 7:319 and cf. al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra,
255–257.
37. Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 257.
38. Ibid.
39. These verses are Q. 4:171 and Q. 24:62. See al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by
Kabbāra, 70–71 and cf. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 171. Regrettably
Lowry misquotes the first of these verses.
40. These verses are Q. 33:36, Q. 4:59, Q. 4:69 and Q. 8:20. See al-Shāfiʿī,
al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 73–74 and cf. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory,
172.

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 160 Gavin N. Picken

41. It is interesting to note that al-Shāfiʿī does not restrict his discussion to the
Qurʾān only, however, but also quotes a adīth from his own teacher Mālik. See
al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 71.
42. Further Qurʾānic references are given in the consequent chapter of the Risāla
to illustrate the same point. These verses include: Q. 48:10, Q. 4:80, Q. 4:65,
Q. 24:63, Q. 24:48–52. See al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 74–75 and
cf. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 173.
43. These verses are Q. 2:129, Q. 2:151, Q. 3:164, Q. 62:2, Q. 2:231, Q. 4:113,
and Q. 33:34. The final verse of this sequence (Q. 33:34) states ‘āyāt Allāh’
rather than ‘al-kitāb’ but like al-Shāfiʿī we may consider it a cognate mean-
ing. See al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, ed. Kabbāra, 72 and cf. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal
Theory, 177–180.
44. Lowry notes that this was not a popular interpretation in the exegetical com-
mentaries on the Qurʾān prior to al-Shāfiʿī, but his interpretation certainly
displays an appealing and compelling lucidity. See Lowry, Early Islamic Legal
Theory, 180–187.
45. Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 72–73.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. See: Muhammad Mustafa Azami, Studies in Hadīth Methodology and Literature
(Plainfield: American Trust Publications, 1993), 1–3.
49. Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 196–239.
50. See al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 210–234 and cf. Lowry, Early Islamic
Legal Theory, 189–190.
51. See al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 197–203 and cf. Lowry, Early Islamic
Legal Theory, 194–197.
52. The similarities between what al-Shāfiʿī denotes as his criteria and later formu-
lations of sanad criticism are striking, and it would appear that he was the first
author to codify this aspect of adīth science. See Lowry, Early Islamic Legal
Theory, 187–188.
53. See: al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 197 and cf. Lowry, Early Islamic
Legal Theory, 193.
54. See: al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 235–239 and cf. al-Rāzī, Manāqib,
60 and Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 197–200.
55. As was mentioned previously, it would not be conceivable for al-Shāfiʿī that
an authenticated adīth would contradict the Qurʾān and in a case where this
would appear to happen, he would invoke the bayān hermeneutics of ʿāmm and
khā, jumla and na, and naskh. See al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra,
131–44 and cf. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 119–126.
56. See: al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, edited by Kabbāra, 163–171 and cf. Lowry, Early
Islamic Legal Theory, 126–128.
57. I refer to him as “al-Murādī” rather than the more common “Rabīʿ” to distin-
guish him from Rabīʿ b. Sulayman al-Jīzī (d. 256/872) who was also a student
of al-Shāfiʿī. See R. Kevin Jaques, “The Other Rabīʿ: Biographical Traditions
and the Development of Early Shāfiʿī Authority,” Islamic Law and Society, 14(2)
(2007): 143–179.

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 The Concept of Sunna in the Early Shāfiʿī Madhhab 161

58. See: Joseph E. Lowry, “Reception of al-Shāfiʿī’s concept of Amr and Nahy in
the thought of his student al-Muzanī,” in Law and Education in Medieval
Islam: Studies in Memory of Professor George Makdisi, edited by Lowry et al.
(Cambridge: E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 2004), 129–130; R. Kevin Jaques,
Authority, Conflict, and the Transmission of Diversity in Medieval Islamic Law,
Studies in Islamic Law and Society—26 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 10; Ahmed
El-Shamsy, “The First Shāfiʿī: The Traditionalist Legal Thought of Abū Yaʿqūb
al-Buway ī (d. 231/846),” Islamic Law and Society, 14(3) (2007): 311 and
Ahmed El-Shamsy, “Al-Shāfiʿī’s Written Corpus: A Source-Critical Study,”
Journal of the American Oriental Society, 132(2) (2012): 199–205 passim.
59. See: Jaques, Authority, 107; El-Shamsy, “The First Shāfiʿī,” 311 and Ahmed
El-Shamsy, “Rethinking Taqlīd in the Early Shāfiʿī School,” Journal of the
American Oriental Society, 128(1) (2008): 9.
60. See: Lowry, “Reception,” 130–132; Jaques, Authority, 107–108; El-Shamsy,
“The First Shāfiʿī,” 303–311 passim; El-Shamsy, “Rethinking”, 9; El-Shamsy,
“Written Corpus,” 204–206 and Ahmed El-Shamsy and Aron Zysow,
“Al-Buway ī’s Abridgment of al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla: Edition and Translation,” Islamic
Law and Society, 19(4) (2012): 329–330.
61. See: El-Shamsy, “The First Shāfiʿī,” 323–336; El-Shamsy, “Rethinking”, 9 and
El-Shamsy and Zysow, “Al-Buway ī’s Abridgment,” 330.
62. El-Shamsy and Zysow, “Al-Buway ī’s Abridgment,” 330–333.
63. El-Shamsy, “The First Shāfiʿī,” 304–311; El-Shamsy, “Rethinking”, 9;
El-Shamsy and Zysow, “Al-Buway ī’s Abridgment,” 329–331.
64. El-Shamsy, “The First Shāfiʿī,” 315–316; El-Shamsy and Zysow, “Al-Buway ī’s
Abridgment,” 334–345.
65. El-Shamsy, “The First Shāfiʿī,” 320.
66. El-Shamsy, “The First Shāfiʿī,” 314–316 and 319; El-Shamsy, “Rethinking”,
9–10.
67. El-Shamsy, “The First Shāfiʿī,” 320–321.
68. Ibid., 314.
69. Ibid., 323–338.
70. The traditional account has ʿAbd al-Ramān b. al-Mahdī (d. 198/813) as the
instigator of the Risāla, as he is said to have requested al-Shāfiʿī to write a work
to bridge the gap between the methodologies employed by jurists in Iraq and
Hejaz, but this account is far from being well attested. Equally, we do not
have a definitive chronology of al-Shāfiʿī’s writings and one wonders, there-
fore, if the Risāla was a rejoinder to his earlier “polemical” treatises? This may
well have been the case, as it is said to have been finalized in Egypt near the
end of al-Shāfiʿī’s life and incorporates an interlocutor who regularly challenges
al-Shāfiʿī, which is reminiscent of the later ʿilm al-kalām style of argumentation.
See al-Rāzī, Manāqib, 58–59; al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, trans. Khadduri, 19–21; and
Schacht, Origins, 330.
71. See: Gavin N. Picken ed., Islamic Law, Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies, 4
vols (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 1:5–7.
72. Although Lowry quite rightly observes the term bayān took on a new connota-
tion in later uūl al-fiqh, the discussion of this subject in al-Ghazālī’s al-Mustafā

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 162 Gavin N. Picken

occasionally bears a striking resemblance to al-Shāfiʿī’s conceptualization.

See Lowry, “Some Preliminary Observations,” 509–510 and cf. al-Ghazālī,
al-Mustafā, 2:39.
73. Al-Ghazālī, al-Mustafā, 2:106–178.
74. Ibid., 2:28–38.
75. Ibid., 1:207–245.
76. Ibid., 1:272–290.
77. Ibid., 1:309–324.
78. Ibid., 1:290–309.
79. Ibid., 2:235–378.
80. Ibid., 1:325–376.
81. Ibid., 2:382–470.
82. Ibid., 1:409–414.
83. See Schacht, Origins, 6–20, 36–81 and 315–29 and Coulson, History, 53–61.
84. See: Hallaq, “Was al-Shafiʿi,” 587–605 and Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory,
359–68.
85. Hallaq, “Was al-Shafiʿi,” 588.
86. I bring to mind here my own reading of al-ārith al-Muāsibī’s (d. 243/857)
writings, who was a contemporary of al-Shāfiʿī’s student, Ahmad b. anbal.
Despite al-Muāsibī enjoying considerable influence in the later Sufi tra-
dition, his writings bear only a passing resemblance, in terms of form and
structure, if compared to the later development of mature Sufi science (ʿilm
al-taawwuf), which would be epitomized by works such as the Risāla of Abū
’l-Qāsim b. Hawāzin al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1074). See Gavin N. Picken, Spiritual
Purification in Islam: The Life and Works of al-Muāsibī, Routledge Sufi Series
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 216–220, and Gavin N. Picken, “Ibn anbal
and al-Muāsibī: A Study of Early Conflicting Scholarly Methodologies,”
Arabica, 55(3) (2008): 338.
87. Lowry denotes approximately one-third of the Risāla is devoted to source inter-
action and around one half of the text is related to the sunna. Lowry, Early
Islamic Legal Theory, 118.
88. Hallaq, “Was al-Shafiʿi,” 588.
89. See Sherman A. Jackson, “Getting the Record Straight: Ibn Al-Labbad’s
Refutation of al-Shāfiʿī,” Journal of Islamic Studies, 11(2) (2000): 121–146
and cf. Christopher Melchert, “Traditionist-Jurisprudents and the Framing of
Islamic Law,” Islamic Law and Society, 8(3) (2001): 383–406.
90. See Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 57.
91. See al-Rāzī, Manāqib, 158; Hasan, Early Development, 179 and cf. Hallaq,
“Was al-Shafiʿi,” 590.
92. See al-Rāzī, Manāqib, 60 and Asma Afsaruddin, “Renewal (tajdid),” in
Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia, edited by Josef Meri, 2 vols,
Routledge Encyclopedias of the Middle Ages–13 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006),
2:678–679.

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 Chapter 8

From Tradition to Institution: Sunna

in the Early anbalī School
Harith bin Ramli

“Take care not to speak on a legal question for which you do not have an
imām.”
—Amad b. anbal (reported by al-Maymūnī).1

While he is considered the founder of the anbalī school of jurisprudence,

it is unclear whether Amad b. anbal (d. 241/855) had any aspirations
to become such a figure. He is not known to have authored any works
on jurisprudence, his primary literary legacy being various types of collec-
tions of traditions. We find reports within the anbalī tradition suggesting
that he was adamant that his legal opinions were not to be recorded and
distributed as sources of law.2 Nevertheless, many, if not all, his leading
disciples transmitted these opinions in collections containing his responses
to various questions, not only about Islamic law, but also on ethics, the-
ology, and, occasionally, legal hermeneutics. Unfortunately, most of this
literature—referred to as Masā’il—has not survived the centuries following
his death. They also often provide conflicting narrations of anbal’s legal
positions, and hardly give us any evidence about his overall method in juris-
prudence. It took almost a full century and a half before anbalīs began to
articulate a comprehensive system of jurisprudence, deriving rather general
principles (uūl) from his different statements. Although it was preceded by
significant efforts to compile and harmonize the different Masā’il, the key

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 164 Harith bin Ramli

developments in this process took place largely in the circle of the anbalī
qāī of Baghdad, Abū Yaʿlā Ibn al-Farrā’ (d. 458/1066), who composed the
school’s first proper uūl al-fiqh work, al-ʿUdda.3
The anbalī school, historically the smallest and least geographically
spread out of the four major madhhabs of Sunni jurisprudence, is the one
most associated with the tendency modern scholarship has often designated
as “traditionalism.” This term is not without its problems, but for the lack of
a better substitute, it continues to be used in order to identify the approach
of scholars just as Ibn anbal to theological questions (i.e. to differentiate
it from kalām), and to the preference for reports over analogy in Islamic
law. To date, however, there has not been an attempt made to explore what
“tradition” meant for the early associated with anbalīs and the traditional-
ist camp as a whole, or to what degree our modern term corresponds with
the Arabic-Islamic concept of “sunna.”4 This study aims to initiate this dis-
cussion by exploring the development of this concept in the early anbalī
sources, both the extant Masā’il literature and the systematizing works of
Abū Yaʿlā and his students.
First, let us begin by looking briefly at studies of Ibn anbal’s jurispru-
dence in the light of broader question of “traditionist-jurisprudence.” The
extant Masā’il are the earliest sources we have for anbalī jurisprudence,
making them the natural starting point for any historical investigation into
this subject.5 Based on the evidence of these sources alone, it appears that
no juristic methodology or hermeneutical system can be properly attributed
to him. According to Susan Spectorsky,

Ibn Hanbal readily answers questions on non-controversial matters, but

whenever he knows of conflicting traditions or conflicting opinion, he refuses
to risk allowing his answer to become authoritative. In fact, he answers all
questions in terms of traditional criticism. If he cannot answer a question
satisfactorily in the framework of traditions, he prefers not to answer at all.6

Christopher Melchert, largely agreeing with Spectorsky,7 characterizes

Ibn Hanbal’s jurisprudence as having “an improvized character.” On the
one hand, they bear the pattern of an older, mainly oral culture that was
not exclusively based on prophetic hadith and still had “traces of reliance
on the speculation and practice of wise men.” But they also reflect a new
emphasis on the exact record of textual sources.8 David Vishanoff, piec-
ing together reports found in later anbalī usūl al-fiqh works, comes to
a similar conclusion. Although Ibn Hanbal is commonly associated with
al-Shāfiʿī, Vishanoff states that he “resisted the latter’s vision of law as a
body of rules correlated with a separate body of revealed evidence.”9 The

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 From Tradition to Institution 165

only pattern that can be deduced from Ibn Hanbal’s application of the
textual canon is that,

he avoided hard and fast rules or clear default meanings . . . for the most part
he did not formulate explicit hermeneutical principles, so that his followers
were left to bolster their own hermeneutical devices by appealing, sometimes
awkwardly to his specific legal interpretations.10

Vishanoff’s remark about Ibn anbal’s resistance to al-Shāfiʿī systematic reform

program agrees with recent studies on the traditionist-jurisprudents (fuqahā’
aāb al-adīth). These have questioned Schacht’s tendency to lump together
scholars of the aāb al-adīth faction, such as Ibn anbal, together with
al-Shāfiʿī, overlooking crucial differences such as the preference among figures
such as Ibn anbal for post-prophetic traditions (i.e. hadith of companions
and successors) over legal reasoning based on analogy (qiyās).11 A static, mono-
lithic view of the traditionist-jurists can lead us to overlook significant changes
in its development. Melchert dates the split between the aāb al-adīth and
the aāb al-ra’y to around the turn of the second/eighth century (the death
of the student of Abū anīfa, Abū Yūsuf in 182/798), occurring mainly
due to the theological controversy over the doctrine of the created Qurʾān.12
According to him, even as the traditionist-jurisprudents achieved significant
victories in the ninth century, significantly shifting Islamic law toward greater
recognition of the importance of hadith, they in turn became drawn toward
the systematic methods of juristic reasoning employed by their opponents.13
Thus, it would be more accurate to speak of a variety of different types of tra-
ditionist-jurisprudent along a spectrum between the aāb al-adīth and the
aāb al-ra’y. The Khurāsānian Isāq b. Rāhawayh (d.238/853), for example,
represents a trend more favorable toward juristic reasoning.14 On the other
hand, studies by Jonathan Brown and Scott Lucas have shed light on the
jurisprudence of stricter types of traditionist-jurisprudents broadly identified
with the “aī movement” such as the Kufan Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849)
and the famous Transoxanian hadith scholar, al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870), who
were less likely to pay attention to reports beyond the first few generations of
Muslims.15 Further complicating the picture, Ahmed El Shamsy has shown
that early Shāfiʿī scholars such as al-Buway ī (d. 231/846), against the evi-
dence of the Risāla, favored an interpretation of al-Shāfiʿī that was closer to
the aāb al-adīth tendency to prefer companion reports over analogical rea-
soning.16 A recent doctoral thesis by Volkan Stodolsky has even argued that
the evidence suggests that it was not al-Shāfiʿī but his student Dāwūd al-
āhirī
(d. 270/883) who was the was the first in Shāfiʿī’s circle to champion the idea
of preferring analogy over companion reports.17

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 166 Harith bin Ramli

Where does Ibn anbal fit into all of this? Susan Spectorsky has noted
that while the Masā’il generally reflect Ibn anbal’s traditionist method
of jurisprudence through hadith criticism, each individual collection is
quite varied, reflecting different preoccupations of the transmitters.18 I
would add here that a closer look at the style and arrangement of each
collection also reveals different aims and audiences. The Masā’il of Kawsaj
(d.251/865), with its juxtaposition of Ibn anbal’s views alongside those of
Ibn Rāhawayh, was probably aimed at demonstrating the concordance of
the two traditionist-jurisprudents in spite of their differing methodologies
(Ibn Rāhawayh was less reluctant to apply his own reasoning on a given
issue).19 The Masā’il collections of Ibn Hānī (d. 275/889), Abū Dāwūd
(d. 270/884), and Ibn anbal’s son āli (d.266/880), on the other hand,
provide mainly short and straight-to-the-point answers to questions with-
out much elaboration of the method by which Ibn anbal arrived at his
positions.20 In this way, they seem to be quick reference points for jurists,
or, in the case of āli, for judges, the underlying assumption being that Ibn
anbal’s statements were by themselves a sufficient source of legal authority.
In other words, it appears that with such collections, we have anbalism
as a madhhab in the making. Contrast this with the Masā’il collections of
ʿAbd Allāh (d. 290/903) and al-Baghawī (d. 317/929), which take a lot
more trouble to provide the details of how Ibn anbal would arrive at an
answer.21 Here Ibn anbal appears more as a classic traditionist-jurispru-
dent, one whose conclusions could still be questioned if better information
about a hadith or narrator were to be brought into the discussion.
Subtle differences can be detected between the different collections
over what constituted traditionist-jurisprudence. Generally, there is the
expected criticism of ra’y and the practice of writing legal works that are
not primarily based on hadith narration.22 According to ʿAbd Allāh, when
asked whether a student of knowledge should train under a single teacher
or travel as an itinerant scholar, gathering and writing down traditions, Ibn
anbal expresses a clear preference for the latter.23 Traditionalist laypersons
in Egypt, confronted between a choice of following a learned scholar from
the aāb al-ra’y or of a scholar of the aāb al-adīth with limited learning
in tradition, were advised to follow the latter to the best of their ability.24
However, while ‘Abd Allāh reports Ibn anbal categorically rejecting the
works of all major jurists, according to Ibn Hānī and Abū Dāwūd, he made
an exception of the works of Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī due to their basis in hadith
scholarship.25 In general, ʿAbd Allāh’s collection seems to be the one most
rooted in the older culture of traditionist-jurisprudence, more reliant on
oral transmission and resistant to the newer textualist approach advocated
by followers of al-Shāfiʿī. For laypersons, or even judges or jurists, no fixed
text could substitute the necessity of consulting experts in the tradition. He

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 From Tradition to Institution 167

reports that according to Ibn anbal, if a person was in possession of a book

containing traditions but had no expertise in hadith, he should consult an
expert traditionist first before using such a source as the basis of religious
practice.26 This fits with the type of collection the Musnad was aiming to be.
Jonathan Brown has argued that a collection like Abū Dāwūd’s Sunan was
written in order to provide the layperson with a simple and accessible canon
of hadith reports to consult—thus, dispensing with the need to consult the
traditionist-jurisprudent.27 If this is accurate, then it could be argued that,
in contrast, a work such as the Musnad, with its multiple isnāds and wide
variety of hadith types, was conceived more as a “database,” to be consulted
and even improved upon by experts.28
Such differences, no doubt, were reflected in the different reports
(riwāyāt)29 of Ibn anbal’s teachings on more specific hermeneutical ques-
tions related to the sunna. In the recent doctoral thesis by Saud Saleh
AlSarhan, we now have a more detailed idea of the early anbalī sources
available to us, as well as how they fit the various stages in the formation of
the madhhab. It argues quite convincingly against the tendency to read the
Masā’il works as direct representations of Ibn anbal’s own views. AlSarhan
argues, therefore, that the frequent contradiction of the various riwāyāt
should be read as reflecting differences among the followers of Ibn anbal.
During the fourth/tenth century, Abū Bakr al-Khallāl (d. 311/923) com-
piled these different reports into his major compendium, thus opening the
way for the formulation of a new hermeneutical framework by Ibn āmid
(d. 403/1013) that could resolve these differences and forge a single school
doctrine.30
The compilation of al-Khallāl and Ibn āmid’s attempt to harmonize
the apparent contradictions between the various reports was a crucial phase
in the development of the madhhab before the systematization of its juris-
tic principles by Ibn āmid’s leading disciple, Abū Yaʿlā, and Abū Yaʿlā’s
own students Abū’l-Kha āb al-Kalwadhānī (d. 510/1116) and Ibn ʿAqīl
(d. 413/1119). With these figures, we can get a decent idea of the major
issues and divides that split the early anbalīs between the time of Ibn
anbal’s death and the formalization of the madhhab from the second half
of the fourth/tenth century. Unfortunately, since al-Khallāl’s collection is
lost to us, we are not able to follow all this development comprehensively in
all its phases. The next best thing is to compare the evidence of the extant
Masā’il collections with the information provided to us by later works in
the anbalī school.
The following discussion will look at the concept of sunnaacross dif-
ferent early anbalī works, focusing on a number of three main topics.
It will begin by looking at how sunna itself was defined, especially the
degree to which it was associated with the sayings and actions of Prophet

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 168 Harith bin Ramli

Muammad. Next, it will turn to the relationship between thesunna and

the Qurʾān. Finally, it explores the idea of Prophetic sunnain more detail
by turning to the typology of hadith as sound in these early sources.
1) The definition of the sunna: Unsurprisingly, beyond slight differences
over the formal definition of the word “sunna,” none of the anbalī uūl
works disagrees over its identification with the Prophet. Nor do they, more
importantly, report any differences from the earlier anbalī tradition.31 Abū
Dāwūd’s report in the Masā’il is the only one to provide us with evidence
that Ibn anbal might have had a more flexible definition of sunnathat
incorporated post-prophetic traditions32:

I heard Amad reply “yes” more than once when asked about whether the
actions of Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān and ʿAlī are considered sunna. One time
he said that this was due to the hadith of the Prophet: “You must hold to the
sunna of my Prophet, and the sunna of the four rightly-guided Caliphs that
will come after me.” Therefore, he named them “sunna.”
And it was said to Amad: “What about ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz?”
He said: “No.”
“Is he not an Imām”?
“Of course.”
If was said to him: “Do you say that that statements like those of Ubayy,
Muʿādh and Ibn Masʿūd (i.e. other companions) are sunna?”
He said: “Nothing pushes me to say this, but I am not keen to go against any
one of them.33

Melchert has read this report as “implicitly excluding most companion

hadith.”34 However, there is no further supporting evidence that Ibn anbal
preferred weak hadiths35 (next in line in the hierarchy of sources) over com-
panion reports, or at least evidence of a controversy among anbalīs over
this report. Instead, there is a recorded debate over whether the reports or
the consensus of the four Caliphs should be preferred to those of the other
companions.36 In any case, besides Abū Dāwūd’s report, all other reports
seem to work on the basis of a standard restricted definition of sunna as pro-
phetic example. This is clearly reflected in a report of ʿAbd Allāh, mentioned
by Abū Yaʿlā, that Ibn anbal considered the principles of Islam (qawāʿid
al-islām) to be four:

Guide (dāll), guidance (dalīl), clarifier (mubayyin), and guided (musta-

dill). The guide is God, the guidance is the Qurʾān, and the clarifier is the
Prophet, as God has said “to clarify to people what has been revealed unto
them (Qurʾān 16:44).” The guided are the people of deep understanding

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 From Tradition to Institution 169

(ulū’l-albāb) and the people of learning (ulū’l-ʿilm) on whose guidance

(hidāya) the Muslims are agreed upon. Do not take inferential reasoning
(istidlāl) except from one with this quality.37

The idea of the Prophet as the “clarifier” of the Qurʾān is clearly Qurʾānic,
but also seems likely to be influenced by al-Shāfiʿī’s development of the
concept of bayān, as seen in his al-Risāla.38 When it came to defining sunna
as prophetic tradition, the early anbalīs had no reason to disagree with
the followers of al-Shāfiʿī. Both traditions formed a united front against
the “Qurʾān-only” advocates (ahl al-qur’ān), who intended to sideline both
prophetic and companion precedent in favor of a minimalist approach to
law that restricted it to the apparent sense of the Qurʾān and consensus
(ijmāʿ).39
A concise summary of Ibn anbal’s stance against these opponents
can be found in the opening lines of the text āʿat al-rasūl, found in the
fifth/eleventh century abaqāt al-anābila of Ibn Abī Yaʿlā (d. 526/1131).
This text is attributed to Ibn anbal and reported on the authority of Ibn
anbal’s son āli. āli’s words introduce this text, explaining that this
treatise was written,

as a refutation of those who call for (following) the literal sense of the Qurʾān
(raddan ʿalā man itajja bi-āhir al-qur’ān), abandoning the Prophet’s inter-
pretation of it, his guidance towards its meaning (tark mā fassarahu rasūl
Allāh wa-dalla ʿalā maʿnāhu), and that from him and his companions which
must be followed (wa-mā yalzamu min atbāʿihi rasūl Allāh wa-aābihi).

It begins by describing the Prophet Muammad as “the one who explains

the Book of God” (al-muʿabbir ʿan kitāb Allāh) and “the guide to the its
intended meanings” (al-dāll maʿānīhi),40 that is, whether it is meant to be
understood in its apparent (āhir) or implicit (bāin) sense, specific (khā)
or general (ʿāmm), abrogating (nāsikh) or abrogated (mansūkh). As for his
companions

They bore witness to all this . . . and transmitted it from him. They were
the most knowledgeable of people concerning the Messenger of God, and,
through their witnessing (mushāhadātihim) of what the Book meant to him,
what he reported concerning God’s intended meaning in it (mā akhbara ʿan
maʿnā mā arāda-llāh min dhālik).41 They are therefore, after the Messenger of
God, they ones who explain it (al-muʿabbirīn ʿan dhālik).42

Two other texts found in abaqāt al-anābila also express the importance
of adherence to the precedent of the Prophet’s companions. ʿAqīda VI or

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 170 Harith bin Ramli

“the Letter to Musaddad b. Musarhad,”43 is said to have been written by

Ibn anbal in response to a request by Ibn Musarhad (d. 228/842–3) to
clarify the sunna in light of the confusion of the Mina. The letter begins
by calling for adherence to the sunna (luzūm al-sunna). One should prefer
the Qurʾān above all things, as it is the uncreated speech of God. Following
that, one must follow,

the sunna of the Prophet and narration from him (al-adīth ʿanhu) and from
the divinely-guided ones, the companions of the Prophet (al-mahdiyyīn aāb
al-nabiyy). Affirmation (al-tadīq, i.e. the affirmation necessary for faith) is
made of that which was brought by the prophets (mā jā’a bihi al-rusul) and
following the sunna of salvation (ittibāʿ sunnat al-najāt), that which is trans-
mitted by the people of learning (ahl al-ʿilm), from each master to the other
(kābiran ʿan kābir).44

The letter goes on to briefly define the views of the Muʿtazila and the Shīʿa,
followed by a list of the correct tenets of faith. Ibn anbal then concludes
by affirming a number of his legal positions, among them the validity of the
funeral prayer behind an Imām who does the takbīr more than four times.
Although Ibn anbal himself holds the view that the correct practice is four
times,

If (the Imām) performs the takbīr five times, one should perform them
together with him, (as) Ibn Masʿūd said: “Perform the takbīr as performed
by your Imām.”
Al-Shāfiʿī disputes me on this matter and says: “If the takbīr is performed
more than four times, the prayer must be repeated.” Against my position he
brings the proof of (the hadith) that the Prophet performed the funeral prayer
for the Negus (al-najjāshī, i.e. the ruler of Ethiopia) with four takbīrs.45

It is noteworthy here that according to this report Ibn anbal bases his
distinct position on the authority of a companion, as opposed to al-Shāfiʿī’s
insistence on following a prophetic report.46 Although later on in the
anbalī tradition, other positions were attributed to Ibn anbal (the offi-
cial position of the madhhab allowing one to follow the Imām up to seven
takbīrs), the position given in the Letter to Musaddad correlates with the one
attributed to Ibn anbal in the Ishrāf of Ibn al-Mundhir.47
In ʿAqīda III or “the Letter to ʿAbdūs b. Mālik,”48 the interdependence
between prophetic authority and the precedent of companions in defining
sunna is articulated in even clearer terms. The letter begins thus:

The principles of the sunna (uūl al-sunna) according to us are holding to

the practice of the companions of the Prophet and following their example

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 From Tradition to Institution 171

(al-tamassuk bi-mā kāna ʿalayhi aāb rasūl Allāh wa-l-iqtidā’ bihim), aban-
doning innovation—every innovation being misguidance—and argumenta-
tion, avoiding the company of the people who follow their lower passions
(aāb al-hawā) and abandoning debating, disputation and arguments over
religion.
The sunna according to us are the traditions of the Prophet (wa-l-sunna
ʿindanā hiya āthār rasūl Allāh). The sunna interprets the Qurʾān, being its
guiding signs (dalā’il). There can be no analogical reasoning within the sunna
(laysa fī al-sunna qiyās), nor can one draw metaphorical similarities based on
it. It is not perceived by the intellects nor by the lower passions, for it is obe-
dient following (al-ittibāʿ) and abandoning the lower passion.49

But what of precedent beyond the first generation of Muslims? The fourth
principle of Islam mentioned earlier in ʿAbd Allāh’s report—the guided
(mustadill)—seems likely to refer to the companions, although the defini-
tion given is vague enough to allow for the possibility of including authori-
ties of later generations. Abū Dāwūd’s Masā’il rejects this possibility. When
asked whether it was preferable to follow al-Awzāʿī or Mālik, Ibn anbal is
reported to have said:

Do not follow any of them. Hold to what the Prophet and his companions
have brought. (Beyond that) a man is free to choose whether to follow the
successors who came after them.50

Contrast this with the report of al-Marrūdhī, who stated that in the absence
of evidence from the companions, one should turn to reports concerning
the position of the successors.51 A number of other reports suggest that
there were situations where Ibn anbal even went so far as to occasionally
prefer the position of a successor to that of a companion. Such as situation
can be seen in a number of examples where Ibn anbal prefers the interpre-
tation of Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab over Ibn ʿAbbās.52

The Relationship between the Sunna

and the Qurʾān
As we have seen, in Ibn anbal’s reported definitions of the prophetic sunna
and its transmission through the companions, there are frequent references
to it as the source of Qurʾānic interpretation. While the two sources were
clearly meant to be seen as interdependent, what exactly was the nature
of this relationship? One key issue, of which there are varied reports of

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 172 Harith bin Ramli

anbal’s position, was over the Qurʾānic command that was, in its appar-
ent sense (āhir), general and open to specification. Did such a statement
have to be acted upon instantly, or did one have to wait for a clarifying
sunna to explain the specifics of the command?53 Based on two examples,
the Masā’il of ʿAbd Allāh reports that Ibn anbal held the position that one
should refrain from acting upon such Qurʾānic commands until the arrival
of clarifying sunna.

I asked my father about the Qurʾānic verses that are general such as His state-
ment: “Thieves, male and female, cut the hands of both of them . . . (5:38).”
I said to him: “A group of people say that if there was no report from the
Prophet on this issue, then we should refrain from acting upon it. Its nature
cannot be decided upon until God clarifies it, shows the correct way for us,
and the Prophet chooses the correct way.
My father said: “God said: “God instructs you concerning (the inheri-
tance of ) your offspring (4:11).” We (Muslims) used to refrain from pass-
ing inheritance to offspring until God sent down revelation that neither a
murderer, a slave nor a polytheist could inherit (from a Muslim). When the
sunna explained the meaning of the Book of God, and the Prophet said: “An
unbeliever cannot inherit from a Muslim, nor a Muslim from an unbeliever,”
and “A murderer cannot inherit,” people did not know this. They disagreed
also over the inheritance of the slave. Then the Prophet said, “Whoever buys
a slave who has wealth, this wealth is the property of the buyer.” Thus, the
wealth of a slave is his master’s, and he does not have any right to it.54

ʿAbd Allāh’s report is contradicted by a riwāya in āʿat al-rasūl, transmitted

by his brother āli, where Ibn anbal does consider a general Qurʾānic
command to be effective without the need for awaiting a clarifying sunna.55
However, ʿAbd Allāh’s position is supported by the “Letter to Abū ʿAbd
al-Raīm al-Jūzajānī,” dated 220/834–5, and found in as early a text as Abū
Bakr al-Khallāl’s Kitāb al- Sunna:

I received your letter in which there was mention of the arguments of the
Murji’īs. Know that—may God be merciful with you—argumentation on
matters of religion is not part of the path of the people of the sunna, nor the
interpretation (ta’wīl) of one who interprets the Qurʾān without a sunna provid-
ing guidance to its meanings or the meaning that God intends from the verse
or a tradition (athar) from the companions of the Prophet. This can either be
known through a report either from the Prophet, or his companions, as they
had witnessed the Prophet and the revelation, what God had narrated to him in
the Qurʾān, and what He meant and wanted by it: specific or general?
As for the one who interprets it according to its apparent sense without a
guiding proof from the Prophet or one of his companions, it is an interpreta-
tion of the people of innovations.56

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 From Tradition to Institution 173

The letter goes on to demonstrate this principle through the example of

the inheritance verse (Qurʾān 4:11) mentioned in ʿAbd Allāh’s report. This,
according to the letter, was the practice of all the Muslim community,
except for “the Khawārij and those like them.”57 It then goes on to refute
the Murji’ī equation of faith (īmān) with Islam by citing numerous pro-
phetic reports.
While affirming the centrality of the sunna in the interpretation of the
Qurʾān, there are no known reports that Ibn anbal accepted sunnaic abro-
gation of the Book of God, and, as already pointed out by Melchert, he
never goes so far as to accept the formula that “the sunna decides over the
Qurʾān (al-sunna qāiya ʿalā al-qur’ān).”58 Both ʿAbd Allāh and Abū Dāwūd
report Ibn anbal’s reservation about this statement in their respective
Masā’il collections. In ʿAbd Allāh’s report, Ibn anbal attributes this view
to a group (qawm), among them, the successor scholars Makūl (d. circa
112–116/730–735) and al-Zuhrī (d. 124/742). He does not reject the view
outright, but states that he prefers instead to see the relationship between
the two sources as one in which the sunna “indicates the meaning of the
Qurʾān (tadullu ʿalā maʿnā al-qur’ān).”59 In Abū Dāwūd’s report, on the
other hand, this statement is presented as a prophetic hadith in which Ibn
anbal replies—on slightly different wording than found in ʿAbd Allāh’s
report—that “the sunna interprets the Qurʾān (al-sunna tufassiru al-qur’ān),”
and that it can only be abrogated by itself.60
These two reports should be read in light of the discussion of Ibn
anbal’s position on general commands in the Qurʾān, as well as reports dis-
cussed in the previous section, where the Prophet is consistently described
as the “clarifier” or “interpreter” of the Qurʾān. As mentioned earlier, such
statements must be read in the context of a united traditionalist front
against the “Qurʾān only” faction.61 Christopher Melchert has argued that
in an attempt to defend hadith-based law, jurists such as Ibn Qutayba and
al-Shāfiʿī felt it was necessary to elevate the Prophet’s authority to a level of
inspiration equal to that of the Qurʾān. In doing so, they also had to quietly
discard companion hadiths as a source of law, as it would be hard to justify
the argument that they were also part of the body of sunna of equal inspira-
tion to the Qurʾān.62 As Joseph Lowry has demonstrated, al-Shāfiʿī’s posi-
tion in his Risāla is more subtle than Ibn Qutayba’s simple identification
of both Qurʾān and Prophetic sunna as complementary sources of inspired
authority. It does not agree with inter-source naskh, and, instead, applies a
dichotomy of general and particular (ʿāmm-khā) in order to harmonize
the Qurʾān andsunna.63 This is in contrast with Ibn anbal who, like other
figures of the traditionalist camp such as Muāsibī and Abū ʿUbayd, took a
different position from Shāfiʿī’s Risāla by allowing for the abrogation of the
sunna by the Qurʾān. Without hard evidence about their positions, it is hard

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 174 Harith bin Ramli

to say what the exact reasons behind this tendency were. On the one hand,
it might reflect a more confident expression of the classical traditionalist
position, unhinged by the Risāla’s challenge to present an airtight argument
for the validity of the sunna. Alternatively, it could reflect a certain defen-
siveness among that the traditionalists that advocacy of the sunna as a source
of law be mistaken for a lack of reverence for the Qurʾān itself.
The Qurʾān- sunna dichotomy also had consequences for legal defini-
tions of acts. The distinction made between far (obligatory actions based
on indisputably certain sources, that is, the Qurʾān and tawātur sunna) and
wājib (obligatory actions based on unit-reports), is most often associated
with the anafī school. However, a number of reports suggest that Ibn
anbal also recognized this distinction.64 The earliest available record of
this is Abū Dāwūd’s Masā’il, related to the question of the legal status of the
action of rinsing one’s mouth (mamaa) and nose (istinshāq) during the
ritual ablution (wuū’).

I heard Amad asked whether rinsing the mouth and nose were obligatory
(farīa). He said: “I do not consider anything far unless it is in the Book
of God.”
I heard Amad asked about the person who forgot to perform rinsing
the mouth and nose until after he started the prayer. He said: “He must stop
the prayer, perform it, and repeat the prayer.” To which it was asked, “Does
he not need to repeat the entire ablution ritual?” He said, “No, it is not
among the obligatory components of the ablution ritual (laysa hādhā min
far al-wuū’).65

Opposed to this position is the riwāya, reported by ʿAbd Allāh and Abū’l-
ārith that “everything in the prayer is far.” While the general command
to perform prayer is Qurʾānic, all of the actions of prayer are based on sunna
and, thus, the implication here is that, when it comes to legal obligations,
Ibn anbal makes no distinction between those established by Qurʾān and
those established by prophetic sunna.66 Ibn Hānī’s Masā’il also queries Ibn
anbal about the legal status of rinsing the mouth and nose, and provides
several varying reports:

He was asked about the person who forgot to perform rinsing the mouth
and nose.
He said: “He comes out of the state of prayer and performs the rinsing so
long as he is still not dry (from the earlier ritual ablution).
He was asked about rinsing of the mouth and nose.
He said: “For both of them, he takes a handful of fresh (i.e. unused) water.
It was said to him: “What if he forgets rinsing of the mouth and nose?
He said: “Then he repeats both the ritual ablution and the prayer.

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 From Tradition to Institution 175

And I heard him say: “He who neglects to perform rinsing of the mouth and
nose repeats the prayer, because God said: “Wash your face . . . (Qurʾān
5:6).” Are the mouth and nose not part of the face??
And I heard him say,”Rinsing of the mouth and nose are part of the sunna
of the Prophet. Therefore, whoever neglects to perform them must repeat
the ritual ablution and the prayer.”67

We see here, within the same text, not only two varying versions of Ibn
anbal’s view on the necessity of re-performing the ablution ritual in its
entirety, but also two different justifications of the legal basis for the obliga-
tory status of the two acts: one Qurʾānic, the other sunnaic.68 A. Kevin
Reinhart has shown that many of the formative figures of the anbalī
movement held the far-wājib distinction in common with the anafīs,
a reflection of common Iraqi roots.69 Early anafīs too identified the legal
category of far with the Qurʾān, and wājib with the sunna, incorporat-
ing mass-transmitted hadiths in the former category as sunna increasingly
became a scriptural source equal to the Qurʾān.70 The different reports of
Ibn anbal’s view on this matter could be read as a shift in his own think-
ing, but seems more likely to reflect a more general split among the aāb
al-adīth, between those who kept to the older tradition of maintaining
the far-wājib dichotomy, and those who felt increasingly drawn to the
tendency among the Shāfiʿīs to see the two labels as identical.71

Hadith

Widespread traditions: There are no reported conflicting riwāyas from Ibn

anbal related to widespread (tawātur) adīths. Abū Yaʿlā takes the position
that they yield necessary knowledge in his al-ʿUdda, describing the latter
as the position of al-Balkhī and other Muʿtazila. He argued that by tak-
ing the position that such knowledge must be acquired, one falls into the
danger of introducing the possibility of doubt in the sources of revelation
(he does not mention the Qurʾān but, presumably, this is what he had in
mind).72 Furthermore, the ʿUdda also takes the position that such knowl-
edge comes directly by God, and not through the reports themselves.73
His student, Abū’l-Kha āb, on the other hand, took the opposing posi-
tion (that tawātur knowledge is acquired). Whereas Abū Yaʿlā had simply
dismissed this position as the one held by Muʿtazila,74 his student Abū’l-
Kha āb informs us that that Abū Yaʿlā’s position was shared by al-Jubbāʿī
and his son Abū Hāshim, alongside the majority of Shāfiʿīs.75 It is possible
that Abū’l-Khattāb here is merely echoing an earlier position of Abū Yaʿlā’s,

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 176 Harith bin Ramli

as Abū’l-Maāsin Ibn Taymiyya reports that he supported al-Balkhī’s posi-

tion in his al-Kifāya.76
Unit-traditions: As Aaron Zysow pointed out in his seminal 1984 doc-
toral thesis, although controversies regarding other more widespread forms
of hadith existed, the central debate in the uūl literature was the one over
the unit-tradition (khabar wāhid).77 Adherence to unit-traditions, once
proven to be sound, was what made aāb al-adīth jurists distinct from the
jurists of other traditions, where their use was more constrained by other
considerations such as juristic discretion or communal tradition.78 As Ibn
anbal states in the report of Abū’l-ārith:

“If a tradition (khabar) from the Prophet is found to be sound (aī) and is
transmitted by trustworthy narrators, then it is a sunna. The one who is sane
and has reached the age of religious responsibility must act upon it, without
looking to anything else, neither legal opinion (ra’y) nor analogical reasoning
(qiyās).”79

The final part of this statement was aimed at jurists such as those of
the Mālikī and anafī traditions, who rejected unit-traditions if they
clashed with established communal practice or analogy based on Qurʾān
or widespread hadith. A paradigmatic case that highlights the distinctive
approach of aāb al-adīth law is the ruling on the effect of camel meat
on ritual ablution (wuū’). Many jurists considered an earlier ruling on
the need to re-perform ritual ablution after eating foods touched by fire
to have been abrogated by a late prophetic hadith and the practice of the
four caliphs. By analogy, this ruling was extended to the eating of camel
meat, which the sunna had also considered ritually polluting due to its
“fiery” nature. However, aāb al-adīth jurists such as Ibn anbal refused
to apply this analogical extension to camel meat, due to the existence of
two sound hadiths where the Prophet made an exception to the general
abrogation.80
It seems that Ibn anbal’s view that it was obligatory to act upon sound
unit-traditions was taken by some of his followers to mean that such hadiths
resulted in necessary knowledge (ʿilm arūrī), putting them on the same
level as tawātur hadiths. A number of his contemporaries such as Dāwūd
al-
āhirī and al-ārith al-Muāsibī are reported to have held the view that
it did result in necessary knowledge.81 However, due to his own tendency to
avoid theological speculation, it seems that the different riwāyas provided
by Abū Yaʿlā seem to be rather forced later readings of more general state-
ments made by Ibn anbal.82 For the “not necessary knowledge” camp, the
most convincing riwāya is the one Abū Yaʿlā reports reading in a manuscript
of al-Athram’s Maʿānī al-adīth:

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 From Tradition to Institution 177

“When a sound tradition from the Prophet reaches me in which there is

an ordinance or obligation, I put the ordinance or obligation into prac-
tice and serve God in this way, but I do not testify that the Prophet said
this.”83

Traditions with defective chains of narration: As aāb al-adīth increas-

ingly wielded isnād criticism and the sound unit-tradition in their assault
against their opponents, they left themselves open on other fronts. A large
number of traditions did not live up to the high epistemological standards
of a text such as al-Shāfiʿī’s al-Risāla. The inner tension brought about by
such expectations is reflected in the divergence of opinion among early
followers of Ibn anbal over the validity of disconnected (mursal) and
weak (aʿīf) traditions as sources.84 In the absence of reliable sources such
as sound hadith, should the jurist turn to such defective traditions, or
should he avoid the inherent uncertainty and resort to analogical reasoning
(qiyās)? According to Abū Yaʿlā, there are two conflicting riwāyas, one that
Ibn anbal accepted mursal adīth as sources of law, the other that he fol-
lowed al-Shāfiʿī by accepting only mursal hadith from companions.85 The
report of al-Maymūnī has Ibn anbal expressing amazement at those who
excluded mursal traditions from their collections, arguing that a hadith
might have a disconnected chain but contain more reliable narrators than
another hadith with a continuous chain.86 The effect of Shāfiʿian epistemo-
logical rigor can be seen in the prioritization of sound companion hadiths
over disconnected prophetic ones. Abū Yaʿlā tells us that the advocates of
the strict rejection of mursal hadiths based their argument on the report of
Ibn Hānī’s Masā’il:

I said to Abū ʿAbd Allāh (Ibn anbal): Do you prefer a disconnected hadith
from the Prophet, or a continuous hadith from a companion?
Abū ʿAbd Allāh said: “I am more impressed (yuʿjibunī) by the companion
hadith.”87

As Abū’l-Barakāt Ibn Taymiyya would later remark, such an example only

proved that Ibn anbal preferred companion hadiths with sound isnāds
over prophetic mursal hadiths, not that he rejected the latter altogether.88
Abū Yaʿlā himself was also in favor of the view that Ibn anbal accepted
mursal hadith. Furthermore, the absence of any controversy over mursal
hadiths in his al-Riwāyatayn wa’l-wajhayn strongly suggests that this was
not an actually a major issue for the majority of the anābila, the alterna-
tive position perhaps being held only by a few swayed by the arguments of
the Risāla.89

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 178 Harith bin Ramli

As for weak hadiths, Abū Yaʿlā again presents two contrasting viewpoints.
The report of al-Muhannā shows Ibn anbal affirms their application in
the absence of stronger evidence, and in preference to qiyās:

Amad said: “People are all equal, other than the weaver, the cupper, and
the sweeper.”
It was said to him: “You follow this hadith, although you consider it weak?”
He replied: “We consider its chain to be weak, but practice is based upon it
(lākin al-ʿamal bihi).”90

But Abū Yaʿlā read other reports as suggesting that Ibn anbal rejected
them as proofs for practice. One such report is also to be found in Ibn
Hānī’s Masā’il:

It was said to him: “Can a person narrate from weak narrators such as ʿAmr
b. Marzūq, ʿAmr b. Hikām, Muammad b. Muʿāwiya, ʿAlī b. al-Jaʿd and Isāq
b. Abī Isrā’īl?”
Abū ʿAbd Allāh said: “Narrating from some of them does not impress me
(lā yuʿjibunī).91

Again, the arguments given by Abū Yaʿlā for the opposing riwāya are uncon-
vincing. Ibn anbal’s refusal to narrate from some weak transmitters can
hardly constitute a basis for rejecting weak hadith altogether. There is also no
reference to a controversy over this issue in his al-Riwāyatayn wa’l-wajhayn.
In any case, the position favored by Abū Yaʿlā was not one that accepted
weak hadith as sources of law, but only as complimentary evidence for the
consideration of jurists. There is some evidence that a third riwāya existed
on this issue. Abū’l-Barakāt Ibn Taymiyya relates a report from al-Nawfalī:

I heard Amad say: “When we narrate from the Prophet on matters of the
permissible, the forbidden, sunnas, and rulings, were are rigorous when it
comes to chains of narration. But when we narrate from the Prophet on
supererogatory acts (faā’il al-aʿmāl) and that which does not conflict with a
ruling, then we are not tough (lā naʿab).92

One can find a similar distinction made by Ibn Abī ātim (d. 327/938) in
the introduction to his Kitāb al-jar wa’l-taʿdīl. He lists three types of narrator.
The first two are manifestly reliable due to their qualities and abilities, while the
third is only reliable based on the vouching of hadith critics. All hadiths nar-
rated by the first two types can be considered sound. As for the third, he is,

trustworthy, pious, and careless, prone to fancy, error and forgetfulness. One
can write down hadith from such a person on matters that inspire (religious)

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 From Tradition to Institution 179

hope or fear (al-targhīb wa’l-tarhīb), renunciation of the world (zuhd), and

manners (ādāb). But his hadith cannot be used as proof on matters of the
permissible and the forbidden (al-alāl wa’l-arām).93

Ibn Abī ātim relates elsewhere a statement by ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Mubārak
allowing the narration of hadith from weak transmitters on matters “such as
manners (adab), admonition (mawʿia), and renunciation (zuhd).”94 One
finds a similar position attributed to Ibn anbal in the Qūt al-qulūb of Abū
ālib al-Makkī (d.386/998).95 At the end of his chapter on knowledge,
Makkī presents a lengthy defense of the use of disconnected or weak hadiths,
arguing that narrator criticism does not establish a truly certain method of
establishing the soundness of a narration. Therefore, such hadiths cannot
be completely dismissed. In addition, due to the limited number of sound
hadiths that can be established, there is no option but to resort to inferior
grades of transmission. For this reason, Ibn anbal is reported to have said
that “the weak hadith is preferable to me than legal analogy or reasoning.”96
Makkī, who was himself a transmitter of the Musnad via Ibn anbal’s son,
ʿAbd Allāh, points out that this text contains many hadiths known to be
weak, since it was not composed for the purpose of collecting hadiths, not
establishing sound ones.97
In summary, the early anbalī sources broadly agree on the importance
of the companions as the transmitters of the sunna and sources of legisla-
tion themselves. Disagreement mainly existed over the degree to which this
authority could be extended to the successor generation. Older features of
Iraqi law seem to have survived in the reports on the Qurʾān that give it inde-
pendence from the sunna as a source of legislation and consider Qurʾān-based
acts as a separate category from sunna -based acts. The decreasing significance
of this distinction reflects the growing influence of al-Shāfiʿī. Furthermore,
the debates over the legitimacy of weak hadiths signify a growing split within
the aāb al-adīth itself, with higher standards being pushed by anbalīs
influenced by the systematic arguments of Shāfiʿī’s Risāla and perhaps even

āhirism. This faction, led by the great compiler of Ibn anbal’s riwāyāt,
Abū Bakr al-Khallāl, held a view of the founder that managed to retain both
aāb al-adīth conservatism and an implicit acknowledgment of the impor-
tance of legal reasoning. al-Khallāl reports that Ibn anbal

wrote down (i.e. studied) books of ra’y and memorised them, then never
referred back to them again. When he spoke about jurisprudence (fiqh), he
would speak with the words of a man who had a deep critical knowledge of
the sciences. He spoke with knowledge (maʿrifa).98

Khallāl’s most important student ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, known as Ghulām al-Khallāl

(d.363/974), might have been the first to formulate a legal hermeneutical

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 180 Harith bin Ramli

system based on his teachers codification of anbalī legal doctrine,99 but

like the majority of his anbalī contemporaries, took a “minimalist” posi-
tion of going no further than verbatim Ibn anbal’s reported statements as
representative of his doctrine.
In this formative phase, the most significant development alongside
al-Khallāl’s major effort of compiling various riwāyāt in his collection,
al-Jāmiʿ, was the composition of the first anbalī legal manual, the mukhtaar
of al-Khiraqī (334/946).100 There seems to have been some opposition to
al-Khiraqī’s work by al-Khallāl and his colleagues, as it contained many posi-
tions based on takhrīj—analogical reasoning of Ibn anbal’s explicit teach-
ings and formulating new laws based on his foundational principles.101 In the
following generation, Ibn āmid (d.403/1013) would turn the tide, cham-
pioning a more flexible “maximalist” interpretation of Ibn anbal’s teachings
that allowed for takhrīj. In his Tahdhīb al-ajwiba, a work that has until now
received little attention from scholarship, he discusses several key questions
concerning the definition and parameters of Ibn anbal’s doctrine, arguing
consistently for the maximalist position. He begins the text with a discussion
of whether or not all legal rulings must be based on explicit texts:

Our colleagues have differed in opinion on this principle as well as others like
it. One group take the path of pausing (waqf) at every juncture, be it in the
branches (furūʿ) or the principles (uūl) of law, and do not consider it accept-
able to formulate a legal position (fatwā) which is not based on a precedent.
The second group make a distinction and say: “If it is related to the prin-
ciples, then nothing can be said without recourse to past statements of the
Imāms on the matter . . . and it if is of the branches in jurisprudence, then an
answer can be given, even if is is an isolated one.
The most accurate position, according to me, is that all principles and
branches are equal (sawā’, i.e. in status), and that an answer must be given
when the need arises. When a new situation appears, one must strive to pro-
vide an answer based on the evidence on that issue, even if the position is an
isolated one.102

Interestingly, Ibn āmid’s justifies taking such a position by appealing to

Ibn anbal’s willingness to go against the grain on theological issues and
formulate new expressions in theology. In contrast to the usual image we
have of Ibn anbal as a staunch traditionalist, Ibn āmid’s portrayal of the
founder depicts him as far more willing to articulate himself theoretically
in new ways.103 This is consistent with Ibn āmid’s aim of promoting Ibn
anbal as an authority in legal hermeneutics and implementing the prin-
ciple of maximizing the body of textual sources as far as possible. While
Ibn āmid’s Tahdhīb al-ajwiba deserves a more detailed study in its own
right,104 for the purposes of this discussion, three broad points can be made

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 From Tradition to Institution 181

with regard to the treatment of the concept of sunna in this work. First, by
treating sound traditions reported by Ibn anbal as the basis of a ruling,
even without a report stating that he explicitly held such a legal position,
Ibn āmid effectively blurred the distinction between the body of texts
Ibn anbal compiled as a hadith scholar with the body of masā’il works
that treated him as a source of legal authority.105 Secondly, the principle of
maximization was extended even to allow for the broad and flexible use of
analogy. Ibn āmid justifies the use of analogy (qiyās) to extend implicit
legal conclusions from Ibn anbal’s explicit statements, justifying this by
drawing parallels with the way jurists use analogy to formulate laws beyond
the explicit texts of the Qurʾān and sunna. Just as in the case of laws derived
by analogy from the Qurʾān are “attributed by us to God” and described as
“God’s command,” when it comes to the sunna:

we include under textually designated law (al-manū ʿalayhi) that which

befits it in meaning (al-maʿnā), and we attribute this to the Prophet. Witness
that when we affirm, based on the explicit text (na) of the Prophet, that
which is additional to his sunna, that which is additional is then attributed
to the Prophet and increased in number due to the existence of an analogous
situation (to the original text).106

The third point is more implicit and relates to the broader effort to define
Ibn anbal into a source of authoritative legal texts in his own right.
Underlying the idea behind the first two points is a theoretical framework
modelled on the approach of traditionist-jurists to the sources of the Qurʾān
and sunna themselves. Elsewhere, Ibn āmid is cited as stating that

The (situation with regards) legal responses of Ibn anbal is no different

from that of the traditions narrated from the Prophet. Earlier ones cannot be
abrogated by later ones other than with an explicit command to abrogate.107

Ibn āmid contrasted the anbalī approach he was advocating with

the well-known distinction made in the Shāfiʿī school between the older
(qadīm)108 and newer (jadīd) teachings of al-Shāfiʿī. In the same way, hadith
transmitters considered all the companions of the Prophet as trustworthy
transmitters, for Ibn āmid,

All those who report from Abū ʿAbd Allāh (i.e. Ibn anbal)—those we have
named, and others—are reliable in what they have reported, and trustworthy
in what they have written down. It is obligatory (wājib) to accept all that
which they have reported, and to give every transmission (riwāya) due atten-
tion, and not to exclude a report, even if it is isolated, or reject it, even if it
is strange.109

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 182 Harith bin Ramli

Alongside promoting a maximalist definition of what constituted the

canon of Ibn anbal’s teachings, Ibn āmid’s approach was clearly aimed
at building the broadest possible consensus among anbalīs. Against him
stood a number of anbalīs who, by Ibn āmid’s own account, favored a
more careful approach, either by avoiding the use of analogy to extend the
rulings of explicit texts, or taking the view that some reports attributed
to Ibn anbal were either mistaken or represented opinions he recanted
later.110 However, the lack of any significant record of opposition to Ibn
āmid’s efforts show that his interpretation of the madhhab had attained
its objective in forming a consensus over how to treat the wide corpus
of transmissions of Ibn anbal’s opinions. It effectively also signified
the “coming of age” of the madhhab, in which a looser adherence to Ibn
anbal “in spirit” gave way to the transformation of anbalism into a
systematic legal school that enshrined the legal views of its eponymous
founder as part of the legal canon, alongside the Qurʾān and sunna.
The end result of all this was that Ibn anbal’s legal opinions would
become so important that it would appear that hadith study would no
longer be a central endeavor in the practice of jurisprudence. Among
the eponymous founders of the classical four Sunnī schools of law, Ibn
anbal is usually considered the most serious traditionist and staunch-
est defender of traditionalism. One would expect it to be the school
that retained the most significant characteristic of the aāb al-hadith:
the study of traditions. However, by the sixth/twelfth century, a leading
anbalī scholar such as Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201) would be bemoaning
the neglect of this discipline among jurists of the madhhab.111 How did
this situation, which, in Melchert’s words, might have horrified the epon-
ymous founder himself, come about?112 The importance of the image of
Ibn anbal as the grand defender and representative of the sunna of his
time cannot be underestimated. Among the noteworthy characteristics of
the anbalī tradition is that it was the first to produce a major biographi-
cal (abaqāt) work listing influential figures related to its development.
This work, the fifth/eleventh century abaqāt al-anābila, written by
the son of the aforementioned Abū Ya’lā, begins with a detailed entry on
the founding figure of the school himself. Following a brief discussion
of Ibn anbal’s Arab lineage, it begins by citing a narration attributed
to al-Shāfiʿī:

Rabīʿ b. Sulaymān said: al-Shāfiʿī said to us: “Amad [i.e. Ibn anbal] is a
leader (imam) in eight things: a leader in hadith, an imam in jurisprudence,
a leader in (the science of ) language, a leader in (the science of ) the Qurʾān, a
leader in pious poverty (faqr), a leader in world renunciation (zuhd), a leader
in abstinence (wara’), and a leader in the sunna.113

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 From Tradition to Institution 183

Further on, the author of the abaqāt al-anābila, Ibn Abī Ya’lā, provides
commentary on the final part of this statement, closely identifying Ibn
anbal’s status as in imam in the sunna with his heroic image as its defender
and champion during the ordeals of the third/ninth century Mina. He
quotes a contemporary of Ibn anbal, Ibn al-al-Madīnī (d.234/849), who
is reported to have stated that “God has assisted this religion with two men,
no third being their equal: Abū Bakr al- iddīq in the age of the Apostasy,
and Ibn anbal in the age of the Mina.”114 Further down, we find even
stronger praises for Ibn anbal that raise his status almost to the level of the
first caliph. al-Shāfiʿī again is quoted here, denouncing anyone with hatred
toward Ibn anbal as an unbeliever. Such a person has “made an enemy of
the sunna,” and by extension made an enemy of the Prophet and his com-
panions.115 Later on ‘Alī b. al-Madīnī is quoted again, this time stating in
even stronger terms that no one had stood up for Islam after the Prophet
more than Ibn anbal, not even Abū Bakr, as the former had to stand alone,
whereas Abū Bakr had the companions of the Prophet with him.116
The anbalī legal tradition developed out of the endeavor of tradition-
ist-jurists to formulate a shared universal tradition based on not only a cor-
pus of prophetic hadiths, but also the example of companions, successors,
and the fatwās of leading figures of later generations. At the same time, it
resisted some implications of al-Shāfiʿī’s project that threatened to limit the
sunna to prophetic hadith, thus opening the door to unwarranted qiyās.
The guiding principle here was that those who had the best knowledge of
the Prophet should be looked to as sources of emulation after the Qurʾān
and prophetic sunna, whether it was the companions who lived to see him
and experience revelation as it came down or the scholars of later genera-
tions who were most familiar with traditions of the Prophet, his compan-
ions, and leading representatives of the sunna of succeeding generations.
The decision not take the path of
āhirism by rejecting qiyās altogether is
a defining moment for this tradition. It is equally significant (although not
as often recognized) that it decided to part ways with the dominant trend
in Shāfiʿism of the fourth/tenth century onward by upholding the qiyās of
the companions and leading figures of later generations (who were most
knowledgeable about earlier tradition and precedents) as a more reliable
source of law than the qiyās of contemporary authorities. The sunna was a
“living tradition” embodied in texts transmitted and interpreted by those
most knowledgeable about it and embodied its ethos in their belief and
practice. A central feature of this ethos was that before any new unprec-
edented decisions were made, extreme caution was exercised to exhaust all
possible earlier precedents that best approximated the prophetic sunna.
Following this logic, each generation provided additional material to sift
through before one reached that point. Over time, however, such a corpus

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 184 Harith bin Ramli

would grow too large to be manageable, a scholarly burden, one could add
to the expanding corpus necessary for the study of traditions, due to the
growing length of isnāds and increasingly higher standards in hadith criti-
cism.117 By being allowed to add to the body of precedents directly on Ibn
anbal’s own juristic rulings and his personal example as a scholar, succeed-
ing generations of jurists were allowed to reset the clock. Instead of the deep
study of early traditions that were becoming more distant in time, they now
had a more manageable canon while being able to remain faithful to the
old tradition-jurist paradigm in spirit. It is noteworthy that the anbalīs,
the last legal tradition to form as a madhhab, were also the first to produce
a biographical-hagiographical collection. More than in any other madh-
hab, the anbalī legal tradition, while it had mostly left its aāb al-adīth
behind, continued to assert that knowing the transmitters, defenders and,
most importantly, living examples of the sunna was equal to knowledge of
the sunna itself.
The anbalī school is frequently depicted as a legal and theological tra-
dition characterized by its rigorous, strict, and zealous adherence to the
Prophetic sunna. The pioneer Islamicist of the early twentieth century,
Ignaz Goldziher, described the anbalīs as “fanatical zealots” and “literalists”
advocating rigid “formal adherence to the principle of sunna.”118 Building
on Goldziher, Joseph Schacht too would later characterize Hanbalism with
“strictness and rigorism,” possessing inferior and unsystematic standards of
legal reasoning.119 A similar sentiment is echoed in Noel J. Coulson’s A
History of Islamic Law, although this work vindicates the later anbalī tradi-
tion for abandoning its earlier “extreme traditionalism” and recognizing the
necessity of legal analogical reasoning (qiyās).120 Largely due to reputation
of modern day Salafism, the anbalī school continues to be characterized
in such terms. More recently, Wael Hallaq contrasted “restrictive and rigid”
traditionalism of early anbalism with later anbalism’s increasing modera-
tion, a development considered necessary “at the peril of extinction.”121
There is some truth to this, and one cannot deny the numerous instances
in which anbalīs have been associated with narrow-minded fanaticism,
from the sectarian riots of Baghdad in the fourth/tenth century to modern
day militant Salafism. However, as the preceding discussion has shown, the
variety of reports about Ibn anbal make it difficult to make any general-
izations about the early anbalī tradition, or traditionist-jurisprudence for
that matter. Among the early anbalīs, there seems to have always been
a significant number who were willing to apply methodical reasoning to
complex legal issues. It is also interesting to note that the more rigorous
tendencies within the school seem to have been connected more with the
little-studied influence of
āhirism. Ibn anbal’s own approach seems to be
characterized by pious conservatism, but one not only inspired by fear of

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 From Tradition to Institution 185

sin or deviation, but also love of tradition and an ecumenical concern for
the unity of the Muslim community as a whole. While Goldziher dismissed
any possibility that the anbalī spirit was rooted in any form of “romantic
impulse” or “deep emotion,” elsewhere, he described hadith literature in
general in dramatically contrasting terms.

Hadith gives expression to a continued development based on the moral

teaching of the Qurʾān. It is also the voice of those more delicate stirrings of
moral consciousness to which the tumultuous beginnings and constant early
struggles of Islam had not been favorable. Hadiths contain the definitions of
higher piety—evidence of which we have already occasion to see—that was
not satisfied with mere formalism.122

Perhaps, in order to arrive at a better appreciation of this often maligned

tradition, we must turn away from judging it purely with the criteria of a
systematic intellectual school and understand not only its nature as a move-
ment of religious piety and devotion, but also the deeper spirit behind the
science of hadith study.123

Notes

1. Abū al-Faraj ʿAbd al-Ramān b. ʿAlī Ibn al-Jawzī, Manāqib al-Imām Amad,
edited by ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Musin al-Turkī (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī,
1979), 245. This statement, reported by one of Ibn anbal’s companions,
ʿAbd al-Malik al-Maymūnī (d. 274/887), is found in an earlier fourth/tenth
century source in a slightly different form representing a more conservative
trend among early anbalīs: “Take care not to speak a word for which you
do not have an imām. See Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-asan Ibn āmid, Tahdhīb al-
ajwiba, edited by al-Sayyid ubī al-Samarrā’ī (Beirut: Maktabat al-Naha
al-‘Arabiyya, 1988), 17.
2. See examples in Christopher Melchert, Amad ibn anbal (Oxford: Oneworld
Publications, 2006), 65–66. Abū Zahra argues that such reports, which por-
tray Ibn anbal’s reluctance to be source of juridicial authority, later gave way
to a more permissive attitude to the recording of his opinions. See Ibn anbal:
ayātuhu wa-ʿaruhu – ārā’uhu wa-fiqhuhu (Cairo, Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī,
1948), 144.
3. Abū Yaʿlā, Muammad b. al-usayn al-Farrā’ al-Baghdādī, al-ʿUdda fī uūl
al-fiqh, edited by Amad b. ʿAlī Sīr al-Mubārakī, 5 vols (Riyadh:1990). This
work bears the heavy imprint of kalām theology and the uūl al-fiqh works
of figures such as the anafī al-Jaā (d. 370/980) and the Muʿtazilī Abū’l-
usayn al-Barī (d. 436/1044), leads one to wonder to what degree it can
be said to properly reflect the early anbalī tradition at all. See the editor’s

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 186 Harith bin Ramli

introduction to al-ʿUdda, 42–44. Earlier anbalī uūl works are mentioned

here, most of them lost, but the surviving Tahdhīb al-ajwiba of Ibn āmid is
any indication, then most of these dealt with hermeneutics in a more piece-
meal fashion. Additionally, later uūl al-fiqh works rarely quote any source
further back than Abū Yaʿlā’s work.
4. Interestingly, modern Arabic tends to use the word ‘turāth’ to refer to what we
identify in English normally as tradition.
5. See the recent discussion of the Masā’il works in Saud Saleh AlSarhan’s doc-
toral thesis “Early Muslim Traditionalism: A Critical Study of the Works
and Political Theology of Amad b. anbal,” (University of Exeter, 2011),
55–96. I have not been able to access the Masā’il collections of arb b. Ismāʿïl
(d. 280/893) and Abū Bakr al-Athram (d. after 260/875) referred to here.
6. Susan Spectorsky, “Amad b. anbal’s Fiqh,” Journal of the American Oriental
Society, 102(3) (1982): 461. See also her “adīth in the Responses of Isāq b.
Rāhawayh,” Islamic Law and Society 8(3) (2001): 407–431, and “Sunnah in
the Responses of Isāq b. Rāhawayh,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, edited
by Bernard G. Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
7. Although, he adds that Ibn anbal does occasionally “risk allowing his answer
to become authoritative and does not always refrain from overruling conflict-
ing opinion,” Melchert, Amad d. anbal, 78.
8. Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th
centuries C.E. (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1997), 14–15 Amad d. anbal,
78–79
9. David Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal
Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law (New Haven, CT: American Oriental
Society, 2011), 232.This is based on one report in Ibn Abī Yaʿlā’s abaqāt
al-anābila that Ibn anbal rebukes his student Abu Bakr al-Marrūdhī for
copying al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla (see fn. 285). However, other reports found else-
where show a more lenient stance. The Masā’il narrated by Ibn Hānī tells
us that Ibn anbal preferred al-Shāfiʿī’s books over those written by other
jurists, because at least he based his legal rulings on hadith. See Amad b.
Muammad Ibn anbal, Masā’il riwāyat Isāq b. Ibrāhīm b. Hānī [Masā’il
Ibn Hānī], edited by Zuhayr al-Shāwīsh (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1394H-
1400H), 164. See also Melchert, Amad d. anbal, 64–65.
10. Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, 232–235.
11. Christopher Melchert, “Traditionist-jurisprudents and the Framing of Islamic
Law”, Islamic Law and Society, 8(3) (2001): 383–406; Scott Lucas, “Where are
the Legal adīth? A Study of the Muannaf of Ibn Abī Shayba,” Islamic Law
and Society, 15 (2008): 283–314; “Principles of Traditionist-Jurisprudence
Revisited,” The Muslim World, 100 (2010): 145–156.
12. Christopher Melchert, Formation of the Sunnī Schools, 6–7. Cf. ʿAbd al-Majīd
Mamūd ʿAbd al-Majīd, al-Ittijāhāt al-fiqhiyya ʿinda Aāb al-adīth fī-l-qarn
al-thālith al-hijrī (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānijī, 1979), 131, which makes a
similar case, dating the split to the controversy of the Mina. Al-Dhahabī nar-
rates an interesting anecdote in which Abū Yūsuf comes down to Basra in the
company of Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd and declares to a gathering of jurists and

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 From Tradition to Institution 187

hadith scholars that he is “of both camps, preferring no one over the other.”
Cf. Shams al-Dīn Amad b. Muammad al-Dhahabī, Siyar aʿlām al-nubalā’,
edited by Shuʿayb al-Arna’ū & Muammad Naʿīm al-Arqasūsī (Beirut:
Mu’assasat al-risāla, 1986), 8:538. I would like to thank Ramon Harvey for
this reference.
13. Christopher Melchert, “Traditionist-jurisprudents,” 395–397. He argues ear-
lier in Formation, 22–31 that the shift away from the older form of tradi-
tionist-jurisprudence also had to do with inherent disadvantages such as the
increasing difficulty in being able to master a sufficient amount of hadiths as
isnāds grew longer. Cf. Scott Lucas, “Where are the Legal adīth?” 313.
14. Melchert, “Traditionist-jurisprudents,” 393; Susan Spectorsky, “Amad b.
anbal’s Fiqh,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 102(3) (1982): 461–
465. On this figure, see Susan Spectorsky, “adīth in the Responses of Isāq
b. Rāhawayh,” Islamic Law and Society, 8(3) (2001): 407–431; “Sunnah in the
Responses of Isāq b. Rāhawayh,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, edited by
Bernard G. Weiss, (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
15. Scott Lucas, “Where are the Legal adīth?” 311–314; “The Legal Principles
of Muammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī and their Relationship to Classical Salafi
Islam,” Islamic Law and Society, 13(3) (2006): 289–324. Jonathan Brown, The
Canonization of al-Bukhārī and Muslim: The Formation and Function of the
Sunnī adīth Canon (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 71–74; “Is the Devil in the details?
Minimalism and Comprehensiveness in the Shariah,” Journal of Religious
Ethics, 39(3) (2011): 465–468. Cf. Christopher Melchert, “Bukhārī and Early
Hadith Criticism,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 121(1) (2001):
7–19.
16. Ahmed El Shamsy, “The First Shāfiʿī: The Traditionalist Legal Thought of
Abū Yaʿqūb al-Buway ī (d.231/846),” Islamic Law and Society, 14(3) (2007):
301–341, especially 317–320. The later Shāfiʿīs were divided over this issue.
Cf. Eric Chaumont,“Le ‘dire d’un Compagnon unique’ (qawl al-wāid min
l-aāba) entre la sunna et l’iğmāʿ dans les uū al-fiqh šāfiʿites classiques,”
Studia Islamica, 93 (2001): 59–76.
17. Volkan Yildiran Stodolsky, “A New Historical Model and Periodization for
the Perception of the Sunnah of the Prophet and his Companions,” Doctoral
thesis (University of Chicago, 2012), 408–434. Interestingly, as Stodolsky
shows, leading modern Shāfiʿī scholars such as Mu afā Abū Khīn and Muftī
ʿAlī Jumʿa, among others, have gone against the classical view established by
Ghazālī’s al-Mustafā and taken the stance that al-Shāfiʿī preferred companion
reports over analogy.
18. Spectorsky, “Amad b. anbal’s Fiqh,” 461, 465.
19. Amad b. Muammad Ibn anbal, Masā’il al-Imām Amad b. anbal
wa-Isāq b. Rāhawayh riwāyat Isāq b. Manūr al-Kawsaj, edited by Abī’l-
usayn Khālid b. Mamūd al-Rabā , Wi’ām al-awshī & Jumʿa Fatī, 2 vols
(Riaydh: Dār al-Hijra, 2004), henceforth: Masā’il Kawsaj.
20. Amad b. Muammad Ibn anbal, Masā’il riwāyat Isāq b. Ibrāhīm b. Hānī,
edited by Zuhayr al-Shāwīsh (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1394H-1400H),
henceforth: Masā’il Ibn Hānī. Amad b. Muammad Ibn anbal, Masā’il

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 188 Harith bin Ramli

al-Imām Amad riwāyat Abī Dāwūd Sulaymān b. al-Ashʿath al-Sijistānī, edited

by Abū Muʿādh āriq b. ʿAwa Allāh b. Muammad (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn
Taymiyya, 1998), henceforth: Masā’il Abī Dāwūd. Amad b. Muammad
Ibn anbal, Masā’il al-Imām Amad b. anbal riwāyat ibnihi Abī’l-Fal āli,
edited by Fal al-Ramān Dīn Muammad, 2 vols (Delhi: al-Dār al-ʿIlmiyya,
1988), henceforth: Masā’il āli.
21. Amad b. Muammad Ibn anbal, Masā’il al-Imām Amad riwāyat ʿAbd
Allāh b. Amad [], edited by Amad b. Sālim al-Mirī (al-Manūra: Dār al-
Mawadda, 2008), henceforth: Masā’il ʿAbd Allāh. Amad b. Muammad Ibn
anbal, Masā’il al-Imām Amad bi-riwāyat Abī’l-Qāsim al-Baghawī, edited by
ʿAmr ʿAbd al-Munʿim Sulaym (Cairo: al-Ma baʿa al-Madanī, 1993), hence-
forth: Masā’il al-Baghawī.
22. Masā’il ‘Abd Allāh, 396–398, Masā’il Abū Dāwūd, 367–369, Masā’il Ibn Hānī,
164–168.
23. Masā’il ‘Abd Allāh, 397 [No.1587].
24. Ibid., 37 [No.1584].
25. Ibid., 396 [No.1580]; Masā’il Ibn Hānī, 164 [Nos.1908–1909]; Masā’il Abū
Dāwūd, 367 (No.1780).
26. Masā’il ‘Abd Allāh, 396 [No.1583].
27. Brown, Canonization of al-Bukhārī and Muslim, 57–58. Although it is worth
bearing in mind that a certain amount of proficiency would have been neces-
sary to read, understand, and apply these texts, even at a personal level.
28. Christopher Melchert, “The Musnad of Amad b. anbal: How It Was
Composed and What Distinguishes It from the Six Books,” Der Islam, 82
(2005): 32–51.
29. In order to avoid confusion, I translate riwāyās attributing a teaching to Ibn
anbal as “reports” and āādīth/akhbār (prophetic or otherwise) as “narra-
tions” or “traditions.”
30. AlSarhan, “Early Muslim Traditionalism,” 96–108.
31. Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 165–166 defines Sunna as “that which is instituted in
order to be imitated”; whereas al-Kalwadhānī, Tamhīd, 1:65 has it as “the way
and the path (al-sharīʿa wa’l-arīqa) laid down in order to be imitated and
followed.”
32. Cf. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 167–168.
33. Masā’il Abū Dāwūd, 369 [Nos.1792, 1793].
34. Melchert, “Traditionist-jurisprudence,” 401.
35. There was some debate about what the term “weak hadith” meant for Ibn
anbal. See footnote 84 below.
36. Abū Yaʿlā, al-Masā’il al-uūliyya min al-Riwāyatayn wa’l-wajhayn, edited by
ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Lāim (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Maʿārif, 1985), 53–54; and
al-ʿUdda, 1198–1201, which frames it in the context of consensus. The debate
also extends to the question about whether the report of a single caliph should
be preferred to the report of another companion. See al-ʿUdda, 1202–1205.
Cf. Kalwadhānī, Tamhīd, 2:220–221.
37. Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 134–135.
38. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 23–60.

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 From Tradition to Institution 189

39. John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation
(Edinburgh: University Press, 1990), 22–25; Melchert, “Traditionist-
jurisprudents,” 403–404.
40. Contrast this with ʿAbd Allāh’s report, which describes God as “the guide”
(dāll), and the Prophet as “the clarifier” (mubayyin).
41. Or, in a different version: . . . that which God had shown him of all this (mā
arāha-llāh min dhālik).
42. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, abaqāt al-anābila, 3:122–123.
43. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, abaqāt al-anābila, 2:426–432. Cf. Henri Laoust, Les pre-
miéres profession de foi Hanbalites (Damascus: Institute francais de Damas,
1957), 13–14; AlSarhan, “Early Muslim Traditionalism,” 45–47 points to dif-
ferent versions of this creed that reveal different theological positions of their
transmitters.
44. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, abaqāt al-anābila, 2:427–428.
45. Ibid., 2:432.
46. See the same report in Masā’il ʿAbd Allāh, 124 [No.516]. In Masā’il Abū
Dāwūd, 217 [No.1020], Ibn Masʿūd’s report is preceded by a statement
by the Prophet. Masā’il ʿAbd Allāh, 124 [No.515],Masā’il Abū Dāwūd,
217 [No.1019] set the maximum limit to seven, which was to become the
standard position in the madhhab. See Abū Yaʿlā, al-Masā’il al-fiqhiyya min
kitāb al-Riwāyatayn wa’l-wajhayn, edited by ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Muammad
al-Lāim (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Maʿārif, 1985), 1: 207–209; al-Hāshimī, Ru’ūs
al-masā’il fī’l-khilāf ʿalā madhhab Abī ʿAbd Allāh Amad b. anbal, edited by
ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿAbd Allāh Duhaysh (Beirut: Dār Khir, 2001), 256–257.
Al-Shāfiʿī’s position can be found articulated in al-Umm, edited by Rifʿat
Fawzī ʿAbd al-Mu alib (Manūra: Dār al-Wafā’, 2001), 2:605–609.
47. Ibn al-Mundhir, al-Ishrāf, 2:362. In Abū Bakr al-Marwazī, 64–65, Ibn anbal
takes a noncommittal position over how many takbīrs there are in a funeral
prayer, stating that one should follow the Imām and that “there is no set num-
ber of times for this.” Here, the disagreement is not with al-Shāfiʿī, but with
Sufyān al-Thawrī, and the proof Ibn anbal cites for his position is not the
report of Ibn Masʿūd, but a propethic hadith reported by Zayd b. Arqam. This
argument will appear later in al-Riwāyatayn wa’l-wajhayn (fiqh), 207–208.
48. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, abaqāt al-anābila, 2:166–174. Cf. Laoust, Les premiéres pro-
fession de foi Hanbalites, 13; AlSarhan, “Early Muslim Traditionalism,” 40–43,
who suggests that parts of this creed might even go back as far back as Ibn
al-Madīnī (d.174/794).
49. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, abaqāt al-anābila, 2:166–167.
50. Masā’il Abū Dāwūd, 369 [No. 1793].
51. Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 724.
52. Abū Yaʿlā, Masā’il al-uūliyya, 55–56.
53. Ibid., 35.
54. Masā’il ʿAbd Allāh, 385–386 [No.1544].
55. Abū Yaʿlā, Masā’il al-uūliyya, 35–36.
56. Abū Bakr al-Khallāl, al-Sunna, edited by ʿA iyya ʿAtīq al-Zahrānī (Riyadh:
Dār al-Rāya, 1994) 4:23. This letter is also reproduced by Ibn Taymiyya

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 190 Harith bin Ramli

Majmūʿat al-fatāwā, edited by ʿĀmir al-Jazzār & Anwār al-Bāz (al-Manūra:

Dār al-Wafā’, 1997), 7:243–403.
57. Abū Bakr al-Khallāl, al-Sunna, 4:24.
58. “Amad Ibn anbal and the Qur’ān,” Journal of Qur’anic Studies, 6(2) (2004):
27. G. H. A. Juynboll has shown that the earliest known occurence of this
statement is in the Sunan of al-Dārimī. See “An Excursus on the ahl al-sunna
in connection with van Ess, Theologie und Gesselschaft, Vol. IV, Der Islam, 75
(1998):323. Like ʿAbd Allah’s report, and unlike Abū Dāwūd’s, al-Darimi’s
attribution of this statement to a successor: Yahya b. Abi Kathir, as narrated by
al-Awza’i. In the Sunan, Awza’i also narrates a statement from Hasān b. ʿAtiyya
that “Gabriel came with the sunna just as he came with the Quran” [607].
59. Masā’il ʿAbd Allāh, 397 [No. 1585]. This information is supported by the
evidence of another report found in Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda1: 134–135.
60. Masā’il Abū Dāwūd, 368 [No. 1788].
61. John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation
(Edinburgh: University Press, 1990), 22–23.
62. Christopher Melchert, “Traditionist-jurisprudents and the Framing of Islamic
Law,” Islamic Law and Society, 8(3) (2001): 403–404. See also his “Qurʾānic
Abrogation across the Ninth Century: Shāfiʿī, Muāsibī, Abū ʿUbayd, and
Ibn Qutayba,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, edited by Bernard Weiss,
(Leiden: Brill, 2002): 88, 94–95.
63. Joseph Lowry, “The Legal Hermeneutics of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba: A
Reconsideration,” Islamic Law and Society, 11(1) (2004). See also his Early
Islamic Legal Theory: The Risāla of Muammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (Leiden:
Brill, 2007), 123–125. Later Shāfiʿī tradition took on a position closer to
Ibn Qutayba’s, allowing inter-source abrogation. See Imām al-aramayn
al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān fī uūl al-fiqh, edited by ʿAbd al-Aīm Abū Dīb (Qatar:
Shaykh Khalīfa bin amad Āl Thānī, 1399H), 1307–1309; al-Ghazālī,
al-Mustafā min ʿilm al-u1ūl, edited by Hamza b. Zuhayr āfi (Jeddah: Dār
al-nashr Sharikat al-Madīna al-munawwara li’l- ibāʿa), 2:99–104.
64. Abū Yaʿlā, RwW (U), 42–44; al-ʿUdda, 376–378.
65. Masā’il Abū Dāwūd, 12–13. Abū Yaʿlā also attributes the statement “I do not
consider anything far unless it is in the Book of God” to an “Ibn Ibrāhīm.”
See RwW (U), 42 and al-ʿUdda, 376–377. The Muswadda of Āl Taymiyya
(p. 50) also reports that Abū Yaʿlā attributes this statement to a report of al-
Athram in the introduction to the latter’s al-Mujarrad.
66. This was the interpretation of Ibn Shāqullā, against the apparent sense of
the statement, which would suggest that every minor detail of the prayer was
obligatory. See Abū Yaʿlā, al-Masā’il al-uūliyya, 43; al-ʿUdda, 378–379.
67. Masā’il Ibn Hānī, 1.16.
68. The two versions of Ibn anbal’s methodology can be applied to the two
legal positions. Those who went with the Quranic basis for the mamaa and
ishtinqāq would have to subscribe to the position that the ablution would have
to be re-performed in its entirety, as washing the face and washing in the right
order (tartīb) are integral actions in the ablution ritual. On the other hand,
attributing the obligatory nature of the two actions to Prophetic Sunna means

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 From Tradition to Institution 191

that while these particular acts have to be re-performed, the rest of the actions
in the original ritual remain valid. In Masā’il Kawsaj, 1:71, the Quranic argu-
ment is attributed to Isāq b. Rāhawayh, whereas Ibn anbal only affirms
istinshāq as obligatory based on Prophetic Sunna. This text seems to be the
basis for the discussion of Ibn anbal’s view in al-Marwazī’s Ikhtilāf al-ʿulamā’
and Ibn al-Mundhir’s al-Ishrāf.
69. A. Kevin Reinhart, “Like the difference between Heaven and Earth: anafī
and Shāfiʿī discussions of far and wājib in Theology and Uūl,” in Studies
in Islamic Legal Theory, edited by Bernard Weiss, (Leiden: Brill, 2002),
228–230.
70. Reinhart, “Like the difference between Heaven and Earth,” 224–225.
71. As Reinhart points out, although the later sources usually trace the idea of
far-wājib synonymity to al-Shāfiʿī, the evidence of the Risāla indicates that
he too made a distinction between obligations based on indisputable sources
such as the Quran, and those based on disputable sources. See “Like the dif-
ference between Heaven and Earth,” 226–227. Unfortunately, Reinhart does
not provide any further information as to when and why this view became
dominant in the Shāfiʿī school. There is stronger evidence that Ibn anbal did
make the dichotomy, since the earliest reports of his position on the obliga-
tory nature of mamaa and istinshāq show that he, together with other aāb
al-adīth jurists such as Abū Thawr and Abū ʿUbayd, only considered istinshāq
obligatory. See Muammad b. Nar al-Marwazī, Ikhtilāf al-ʿulamā’, edited by
al-Sayyid ubī al-Samarrā’ī (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1985), 24–25; Ibn al-
Mundhir, al-Ishrāf, 1:200–201. In both sources, the given basis for this posi-
tion is hadith, not the Quran. Ibn al-Mundhir argues that al-Shāfiʿī himself
would have adhered to the hadith had he been more aware of the significance
of the matter.
72. Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 847–849.
73. Ibid., 850–852.
74. Ibid., 847.
75. Abū’l-Kha āb, Tamhīd, 3: 23–24.
76. Āl Taymiyya, al-Muswadda, 234.
77. Aaron Zysow, “The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology
of Islamic Legal Theory,” Doctoral thesis (University of Harvard, 1984), 32.
78. Zysow, “Economy of Certainty,” 30–48 explores the debates over the unit-
tradition in the anafī,
āhirī and anbalī. A lengthy discussion of the issue
in al-Shāfiʿī thought can be found in Abdul Salam Muhammad Shukri, “The
Relationship between ʿIlm and Khabar in the Work of al-Shāfiʿī,” Doctoral
thesis (University of St. Andrews, 1999); Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory,
187–206.
79. Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 859.
80. Muammad b. Ibrāhīm Ibn al-Mundhir, al-Ishrāf ʿalā madhāhib al-ʿulamā’,
Abū ammād aghīr Amad al-Anārī (Ra’s al-khayma: Maktabat Makka
al-Thaqāfiyya, 2004), 1:71–73110–111. Ibn al-Mundhir points out that the
issue of camel meat is the last remaining debate over the validity of one’s
state of purity after consuming food touched by fire. See also Masā’il ʿAbd

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 192 Harith bin Ramli

Allāh, 17; Masā’il Abū Dāwūd, 24; Masā’il Ibn Hānī, 1:7–7; Masā’il āli, 430;
al-ʿUkbarī, Ru’ūs al-masā’il, 61; al-Hāshimī, Ru’ūs al-masā’il, 65; Ibn Qudāma,
al-Mughnī, 1:250–255. Although al-Shāfiʿī considered other hadith evidence
as proof that the ruling on camel meat was abrogated, the compelling evi-
dence of the two sound hadiths would continue to convince later Shāfiʿīs.
See al-Nawawī, Kitāb al-majmūʿ shar al-Muhadhdhab li’l-Shīrāzī, edited by
Muammad Najīb al-Mu īʿī (Jeddah: Maktabat al-Irshād, 1980), 2: 65–69,
who reports that the eleventh century Shāfiʿī traditionist al-Bayhaqī, and
argues that this is the ‘older’ (qadīm) doctrine of al-Shāfiʿī.
81. See Zysow, “Economy of Certainty,” 42–45.
82. Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 898–900.
83. Translation taken from Zysow, “Economy of Certainty,” 48. See more on
this issue in Jonathan Brown, “Did the Prophet Say It or Not? The Literal,
Historical, and Effective Truth of adīths in Early Sunnism,” Journal of the
American Oriental Society, 129(2) (2009): 259–285.
84. In the case of the latter category, there was even disagreement about what
this meant exactly for Ibn anbal. While Abū Yaʿlā identified it with what
was considered “weak” among hadith experts, Ibn Taymiyya explains that
the definition of this category changed around the time of al-Tirmidhi
(d. 279/892), and therefore could include what would later be considered
as “sound” (asan) or without fatal defects (al-wāhī). See a good summary of
Ibn Taymiyya’s disagreement with earlier jurists such as Abū Yaʿlā in Abdul
Hakim I. Al-Matroudi, The anbalī School of Law and Ibn Taymiyya: Conflict
or conciliation (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2006), 59–66.
85. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 202–203.
86. Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 906–907.
87. Masā’il Ibn Hānī, 2:165. See also Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 909.
88. Āl Taymiyya, al-Muswadda, 250.
89. Perhaps for this reason, Ibn ʿAqīl gives no attention to any of the examples
given by Abū Yaʿlā in his discussion. See al-Wajīz, 4:421–422.
90. Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 938. See two other similar reports on pp. 939–940,
including another one from al-Muhannā.
91. Masā’il Ibn Hānī, 2:238. See also Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 941–942.
92. Āl Taymiyya, al-Muswadda, 273. For a discussion of such traditions in the
Musnad, see Melchert, “The Musnad of Amad b. anbal,” 45–47.
93. Ibn Abī ātim, Kitāb al-jar wa’l-taʿdīl (Hyderabad: Ma baʿat Majlis Dā’irat
al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1941–1953), 1:10.
94. Ibn Abī ātim al-Rāzī, al-Jar wa’l-taʿdīl, 2: 30–31.
95. Abū ālib al-Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:488
96. QQ, 1:486
97. Ibid., 1:487. Melchert, Formation of the Sunnī Schools, 146–147, points
to the growing friendliness toward Shāfiʿism displayed by anbalīs such as
al-Khallāl.
98. Ibn al-Jawzī, Manāqib al-Imām Amad, edited by ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Musin
al-Turkī (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1979), 79.
99. Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, 232–233.

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 From Tradition to Institution 193

100. Melchert, Formation of the Sunnī Schools, 143. Ibn Taymiyya (Majmūʿat
al-fatāwā, 34: 111–112) states that it consisted of forty volumes. Melchert
quotes the historian al-Dhahābī’s statement that before al-Khallāl’s compila-
tion project, there was no independent school (madhhab mustaqill) that could
be attributed to Ibn anbal. Amad, Ziāuddin. “Abū Bakr al-Khallāl—The
Compiler of the Teachings of Imam Amad b. anbal,” Islamic Studies, 9(3)
(1970): 245–254. al-Khiraqī’s al-Mukhtaar was the subject of an unpub-
lished doctoral thesis. See Anas Khalid, “The Mukhtaar of al-Khiraqī: A
Tenth Century Work of Islamic Jurisprudence” (Doctoral Thesis, New York
University, 1992). See also Nimrod Hurvitz, “The Mukhtasar of al-Khiraqī,”
in Law, Custom and Statute in the Muslim World, edited by Ron Shaham
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), 1–16.
101. For takhrīj in the Shāfiʿī school, see Christopher Melchert, “The Meaning
of Qāla’l-Shāfiʿī in Ninth Century Sources,” in ʿAbbasid Studies II: occasional
papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies, Cambridge, 6–10 July 2002, edited
by James Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2004); Ahmed El Shamsy, The
Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (Cambridge:
Cambridge University, 2013), 173–182.
102. Ibn āmid, Tahdhīb al-ajwiba, 18. This passage is reproduced word for
word in the entry for Ibn āmid in Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, abaqāt al-anābila, 3:
318–319.
103. Ibid.
104. AlSarhan, “Early Muslim Traditionalism,” 96–108 provides a brief sketch of
this work in the context of debates with the Shāfiʿīs.
105. Ibn āmid, Tahdhīb al-ajwiba, 33–35. This was the view of al-Marrūdhī, al-
Athram, and Ibn anbal’s two sons, āli and ʿAbd Allāh. Opposed to it were
a group of unnamed anbalīs and Shāfiʿīs who argued that this would place
hadith scholars on the same footing as scholars of law, and blur the distinction
between the two boundaries (p. 28). Refuting the views of such minimalist
anbalīs might have been the motivation for āli and Amad’s circulation
of texts such as ‘āʿat al-rasūl’. Considering the amount of space Ibn āmid
dedicated to refuting the latter, it seems that this was still a controversial topic
during his lifetime.
106. Ibn āmid, Tahdhīb al-ajwiba, 39. On this issue, he went against his teacher
al-Khallāl and a majority of anbalīs, instead siding with a more maximalist
minority position taken by al-Khiraqī and his teacher al-Athram.
107. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, abaqāt al-anābila, 3: 318.
108. “ʿatīq” in the quoted passage. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, abaqāt al-anābila, 3: 318.
109. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, abaqāt al-anābila, 3: 315–316.
110. For a number examples of masā’il works that were rejected by some of Ibn
āmid’s contemporaries, see Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, abaqāt al-anābila, 3: 316–318.
111. See the introduction to his al-Taqīq fī masā’il al-khilāf, edited by ʿAbd
al-Mu īʿAmīn Qalʿajī (Aleppo: Dār al-Waʿy al-ʿArabī), 1:2–4. This work is
essentially an attempt to revive hadith source-methodology in anbalī law.
112. Melchert, Amad d. anbal, 59.
113. Ibn Abī Ya’lā, abaqāt al-anābila, 1:10.

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 194 Harith bin Ramli

114. Ibid. 1:28.

115. Ibid. 1:29.
116. Ibid. 1:36.
117. Melchert, Formation of the Sunnī Schools, 22–31.
118. Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, trans. Andras and
Ruth Hamori (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 237.
119. Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1964), 35. His earlier study, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), hardly dedicates any space to anbalism.
Schacht himself expresses his regret for this in the preface (p. iv), explaining
that he did not have access to Ibn anbal’s legal responsa (Masā’il). However,
even the later An Introduction to Islamic Law hardly provides any details beyond
a general description of the Hanbali legal tradition as “mainly concerned with
subordinating legal subject-matter to religious and moral principles, expressed
in traditions from the prophet.” Hanbali legal reasoning is also described as
“of a cautelary nature, concerned with moral issues and differing wildly from
the systematic legal thought which had been brought to technical perfection
by al-Shafi’i and which the Traditionists disliked.” See pp. 35–36.
120. Noel J. Coulson, The History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press: 1964), 72.
121. Wael Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 127. For more on the bias
against anbalism in early Western scholarship, see George Makdisi, “L’Islam
Hanbalisant,” translated as “Hanbalite Islam” in Studies on Islam, edtied by
Merlin L. Swartz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 216–274.
122. Goldziher, Islamic Theology and Law, 41.
123. The author would like to thank Christopher Melchert and Ramon Harvey for
kindly reviewing earlier drafts of this chapter.

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 Chapter 9

Sunna in the
āhirī Madhhab
Amr Osman

Overview of the History and Main

Doctrines of the
āhirī madhhab

The founding of the

āhirī madhhab1 is attributed to Abū Sulaymān Dāwūd
ibn ‘Alī ibn Khalaf al-Ibahānī al-
āhirī (d. 270/884), whose biographers
portray him as a scholar who possessed vast knowledge and argumenta-
tion skills and had many followers. The Shāfi‘ī scholar Abū Isāq al-Shīrāzī
(d. 476/1083) goes so far as to state that the “mastership of knowledge in
Baghdad culminated in Dāwūd,”2 a problematic statement given the lack of
some basic biographical information on Dāwūd and his life. Furthermore,
none of Dāwūd’s works has survived. In his Fihrist, Ibn al-Nadīm
(d. 438/1047) attributes to him a large number of works, including ones
that obviously dealt with legal theoretical subjects of uūl al-fiqh—such as
al-Uūl, a copy of which Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 771/1370) seems to have
had a copy some five hundred years after Dāwūd’s death; Kitāb al-Dhabb
‘an al-Sunan wa-l-Akām wa-l-Akhbār (“In Defense of Sunnas, Rulings, and
Reports,” a work said to have comprised 1000 folios); Kitāb al-Ijmā‘ (on
consensus); Kitāb Ibāl al-Taqlīd (on the invalidity of the [uncritical] fol-
lowing of others’ views); Kitāb Ibāl al-Qiyās (on the invalidity of analogy);
Kitāb Khabar al-Wāid (on traditions narrated by one transmitter); Kitāb
al-Khabar al-Mūjib li-l-‘Ilm (on reports that establish apodictic knowledge);
Kitāb al-Khuū wa-l-‘Umūm (on the restrictedness and unrestrictedness of
terms); Kitāb al-Mufassar wa-l-Mujmal (on clear and ambiguous terms);

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 196 Amr Osman

in addition to an untitled work where Dāwūd apparently presented some

of Muammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī’s (d. 204/820) views (Kitāb al-Kāfī fī
Maqālat al-Mualibī).3 Dāwūd, in fact, began his scholarly career as a fol-
lower of al-Shāfi‘ī and later Shāfi‘ī biographers regularly refer to him as
such.4
Significantly, Dāwūd did not distinguish himself as a adīth transmitter
and critic, at a time when adīth was becoming more and more the “knowl-
edge” (al-‘ilm) that any distinguished jurist must have.5 Indeed, he figures
in only a handful of transmittal chains (isnāds), and is reported to have
ridiculed the ahl al-adīth on account of their obsessive interest in searching
for traditions.6 Other evidence suggests that he was less interested in acquir-
ing knowledge (mudhākarah) and more interested in engaging in debates
(munāarah).7 This, in fact, points to a possible influence on him by one of
his teachers, Abū Thawr al-Kalbī (d. 240/854), whom Dāwūd is described as
having been one of his “disciples.”8 Abū Thawr was a jurist from Baghdad who
studied with many important scholars, including al-Shāfi‘ī, and transmitted
from great traditionists like Muslim (261/875), Ibn Mājah (d. 273/886),
Abū Dāwūd (275/808), and Abū ātim al-Rāzī (d. 277/890).9 He is also
reported to have written a number of works that contained both adīth and
“jurisprudence” (fiqh).10 Remarkably, it is reported that he used to follow
the way of the ahl al-ra’y (the way of the anafī scholar Muammad ibn
al-asan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805) in particular), until al-Shāfi‘ī arrived in
Baghdad. At al-Shāfi’ī’s hand, he, and an important friend of his, al-usayn
ibn ‘Alī al-Karābīsī (d. between 245/859 and 248/863), abandoned ra’y and
adhered to adīth.11 However, despite his interest in adīth, there is strong
evidence that he was not regarded as part of the ahl al- adīth of his time.
In fact, Ahmad ibn anbal (d. 241/855), a leading adīth scholar of his
time, is reported to have expressed his dislike of his views, and Abū ātim
al-Rāzī described him as a scholar who relied on ra’y, thus arriving at right
as well as wrong conclusions, but who had no status in adīth knowledge.12
Similarly, al-Karābīsī, from whom Dāwūd transmitted a report,13 does not
seem to have entirely abandoned ra’y when he met al-Shāfi‘ī and “converted”
to adīth. A jurist with “good comprehension and vast knowledge,”14 he
is described as a leading scholar (imām) who combined the knowledge of
both jurisprudence and adīth ;15 however, similar to Abū Thawr, he did not
seem to have much interest in adīth transmission.16 More importantly, he
was openly hostile to the ahl al- hadīth, including Amad ibn anbal who
described him as an “innovator”— indeed, the successor of the Murji’ī her-
etic Bishr al-Marīsī (d. 218/833)—and one of those who abandoned adīth
for their “books.”17 The reason for this harsh view is that al-Karābīsī was of
the opinion that, whereas God’s speech is not created (i.e. the Qur’ān is not
created), our enunciation of it is. This, remarkably, was also Dāwūd’s view

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 Sunna in the
āhirī Madhhab 197

on this controversy on the “createdness of the Qur’an” (khalq al-Qur’ān).

Furthermore, he accepted al-Karābīsī’s view that a report transmitted by a
single transmitter (khabar al-wāid) establishes apodictic knowledge, just
like reports transmitted by large number of people (mutawātira),18 a view
that was rejected by anafī, Shāfi‘ī, most Mālikī, Mu‘tazilī, and Khārijī
scholars.19 For all these as well as other reasons, the predominant view that
Dāwūd was affiliated with the ahl al- adīth is most likely wrong; the avail-
able biographical and doctrinal evidence about him strongly suggests that
he was closer, both in personal profile and legal doctrines, to the Ahl al-Ra’y,
who were basically associated with Abū anīfah al-Nu‘mān (d. 150/767)
and his followers.20
Unsurprisingly, and consistent with Dāwūd’s apparent lack of interest
in adīth, only a couple of his students distinguished themselves as adīth
transmitters. This equally applies to his son and most important student,
Muammad (d. 297/909). Best known as a litterateur,21 Muammad ibn
Dāwūd reportedly succeeded his father in his circle while he was still of
young age. Some of Ibn Dāwūd’s views are reported in some sources, such
as al-Qāī al-Nu‘mān’s (d. 363/974) Ikhtilāf Uūl al-Madhāhib. According
to this, he was a staunch critic of qiyās, istisān (usually translated as equity)
and (possibly) exercising reasoning (ijtihād) in issues on which the law
is silent. The reasons given for his rejection of these notions bespeak an
obvious desire for systematization and consistency that lead to agreement
in legal matters (legal disagreement is here regarded as absolutely evil).
Furthermore, Ibn Dāwūd seems to have accepted the principle of al-ibāah
al-aliyyah, meaning that only things that are explicitly forbidden are for-
bidden, whereas other things fall within the scope of what is permitted “by
default.” This, remarkably, was also the view of Abū Thawr al-Kalbī and
al-usayn al-Karābīsī,22 which they shared with the ahl al-ra’y and Mu‘tazilī
theologians.23
Other views attributed to early generations of āhirīs—who actually dis-
agreed on many issues—include that only the consensus of the companions
(ijmā‘ al-aābah) is valid, a view attributed to Dāwūd himself.24
āhirīs are
reported to have held that reports with disconnected chains of transmission
(munqai‘) did not establish knowledge and consequently did not qualify
to be a basis of action.25 Some
āhirīs rejected a view attributed to Dāwūd,
according to which when a companion says that the Prophet has com-
manded or forbidden something, this does not constitute evidence unless he
mentions the exact words of the Prophet.26 Some
āhirīs, including Dāwūd
himself and his son Muammad, held that the Qur’ān did not contain meta-
phorical or figurative expressions (majāz),27 which are considered a degraded
form of language that does not befit God and also leads to ambiguity that
does not befit the Qur’ān.28 Some
āhirīs are reported to have held that

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 198 Amr Osman

the Qur’ān could be abrogated by all kinds of adīth, including traditions

transmitted by one or a large number of individuals,29 or that this latter
category of adīth be abrogated by the former category (the āād traditions
narrated by individual transmitters) that are epistemologically equal to the
Qur’an and mutawatir traditions.30 Some
āhirīs are also reported to have
held that transmitted texts cover all possible occurrences (al-awādith).31
Some of them regarded the presumption of continuity (istiāb al-āl) as
legal evidence,32 a principle that Dāwūd believed was based on consensus.33
The purpose of this brief exposition of the reported views of first gener-
ations of
āhirī scholar is twofold. First, it demonstrates that whereas these
scholars did not contribute much to the transmission of adīth, they had
an obvious interest in theoretical aspects of its transmission, including the
epistemological weight of various kinds of traditions. Second, these gen-
erations have disagreed much about many theoretical legal issues. This dis-
agreement continued until the advent of Abū Muammad ‘Alī ibn Amad
ibn Sa‘īd Ibn azm al-Andalusī (d. 456/1064), the most prolific
āhirī
scholar and the only one whose works have survived. Summarizing what
would become the established views of the madhhab, Ibn azm points out
that all
āhirīs agreed on the supremacy of legal texts as the only sound
basis of legal rulings.34 They all agreed that every term is to be interpreted
in its widest possible extent unless it is particularized by a valid indica-
tor (dalīl).35 In other words, a term is always presumed to be unrestricted
(‘āmm) unless a valid piece of evidence indicates otherwise. They took
commands and interdictions (al-awāmir wa-l-nawāhī) to indicate abso-
lute obligation (wujūb) to do or to avoid doing something unless a valid
indicator suggests otherwise.36 Remarkably, they agreed that the practice of
the Prophet (al-sunna al-‘amaliyya) does not in itself establish obligation;37
only a Prophetic statement could establish obligation or qualify a Qur’ānic
injunction.38 In other words, only verbal adīth is a valid source of the law.
The Prophet’s practice, irrespective of how habitual it was, is only recom-
mended to Muslims to follow but is not legally/religiously binding.39

Sunna in the
āhirī madhhab

Speaking about the various kinds of sunan, Ibn azm follows what had
become a regular distinction between a saying (qawl) of the Prophet, his
practice (fi‘l), and his consent (iqrār).

Sunnas are divided into three parts: A saying of the Prophet, peace be upon
him; an act of his; or something that he has seen and learned about and then

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 Sunna in the
āhirī Madhhab 199

came to endorse and did not forbid. The ruling regarding his [verbal] com-
mands is [that they establish] obligation—as we will explain in the chapter
on commands in this book—as long as there is no evidence that the sense of a
command has changed from obligation to recommendation, or to any of the
other senses of commands. And the ruling regarding his acts is to regard them
as exemplary, but not obligatory, unless it be a carrying out of a ruling, or
an explanation of a matter related to his speech as discussed in this book. As
for the Prophet’s endorsement of a matter that he learned about and did not
forbid, this means that he only meant that that matter was permissible, but
not that it is obligatory or recommended. For God has made it incumbent
upon the Prophet to proclaim [His message], told him that he protected him
from people, and imposed on him the duty to explain to people that which
has been revealed to them. Accordingly, if any person claims that the Prophet
knew about a forbidden matter and did not forbid it [explicitly], this person
is an unbeliever, for he denies that the Prophet delivered the Message as he
had been ordered, and described him [the Prophet] in a way other than that
which God had described him. Furthermore, his claim would entail that the
Prophet lied when he said during the Farewell Pilgrimage: “God, has I deliv-
ered the message,” to which people replied: “Yes.” The Prophet then said:
“God, be my witness.”40

As for the first kind, it establishes absolute obligation (fa-hukm

awāmirihi . . . al-far wa-l-wujūb) absent any indicator that it establishes
recommendation or the mere permission to do something. The practice of
the Prophet, however, constitutes a good exemplary behavior that a Muslim
may want to follow although he does not have to (wa-ukm fi‘lihi . . . al-ittisā’
bi-hi fī-hi wa-laysa wājiban). The Prophet’s consent only confirms that
a certain practice is not forbidden, but it does not mean that a Muslim
must or should follow it (wa-ammā iqrāruhu . . . ‘alā mā ‘alima wa-taraka
inkārahu iyyā-hu, fa-inna-mā huwa mubī li-dhālika al-shay’ faqa wa ghayr
mūjib la-hu wa-la nādib ilay-hi).41
Ibn azm goes on to refute the view that the Prophet’s practice must be
imitated by Muslims. He argues that nothing in the Qur’ān and the sunan
instructs Muslims that they have to follow the practices of the Prophet. In
Ibn azm’s words, “He who claims that [the ruling regarding] the Prophet’s
acts is obligation, his claim is unfounded, for God has not made it incum-
bent upon us in any part of the Qur’an or sunna to imitate the Prophet’s
acts.”42 Ibn azm, who obviously uses sunna here to refer to adīth, quotes
Q. 33:21 for further support: “Verily, there is an excellent example for you
in the Messenger of God.” The meaning here is that the Prophet’s prac-
tice is good for believers, yet it is not incumbent upon them (otherwise,
the Qur’ān would have said ‘alay-kum rather than la-kum, as Ibn azm
explains).43 Accordingly, not following the Prophet’s practice is not blame-
worthy, although following it is meritorious. In addition to the lack of any

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 200 Amr Osman

textual evidence for the contention that Muslims must follow the Prophet’s
practice, Ibn azm argues, this is not feasibly possible to begin with. If
Muslims are required to emulate the Prophet, they would have to reside
where he resided, pray in the exact way that he prayed, fast all the days the
he fasted, move according to every move that he did, etc.44 Ibn azm is
obviously overstating his view here, but his argument—which is consistent
with his overall character and jurisprudence—is that if Muslims believe that
they must follow the practices of the Prophet as they are required to follow
his statements, they must follow all his actions consistently, for there is no
good reason to follow some and abandon the others. Whereas it is unrealis-
tic that people may be able to do everything that the Prophet did, some of
the things that Ibn azm mentions are indeed doable—such as fasting all
the days that he fasted.
Ibn azm’s typical next step when refuting an argument is to refer to
those who hold it and show their inconsistency in applying their stated
principles. In the case of practical sunna, for example, he mentions that the
main adversaries of the
āhirīs were the Mālikīs. Mālikīs are the farthest
from following the practice of the Prophet, and examples of their differ-
ing from his practice abound, Ibn azm states. For example, whereas the
Prophet punished wine drinkers by flogging them 40 lashes, Mālikīs main-
tained the view that the punishment was 80 lashes. Other examples include
the Prophet’s kissing his wives when he was fasting, which kissing, Mālikīs
held, voided fasting. Furthermore, whereas the Prophet led the prayers
while he was sitting down (when he was ill), Mālikīs insisted that the leader
of the prayers must be standing up.45 This point relates to what Ibn azm
regards as “confusion” on the part of those who gave practice priority over
statements, which confusion will be discussed in more details shortly. It also
relates to his earlier point that the consistent and comprehensive follow-
ing of the practice of the Prophet is not possible, either in theory or in the
actual practice, even by those who purportedly upheld it.
Next, Ibn azm severely criticizes the Mālikī view that any tradition
(adīth) must be supported by practice (‘amal). In his view, this contention
is baseless and contradictory, for it is traditions that authorize practice, not
vice versa. Neither following unauthorized practices nor abstaining from
following authorized practices constitutes any evidence for what the right
thing to do is, Ibn azm asserts.46 He then asks the holders of this view,
“What do you say about an authentic tradition with a solid chain of trans-
mitters before its content is actually put into practice, is it authoritative or
not?”47 If they say that it is authoritative, then whether people act according
to it or not does not really matter as far as its authoritativeness is concerned.
If, on the other hand, they claim that it is not authoritative (because it is not
sanctioned by practice), then people’s practices cannot in themselves make

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 Sunna in the
āhirī Madhhab 201

it as such. Before the advent of Muammad, Ibn azm explains, all people
followed corrupt religions and ideas, but their practice did not make their
views sound and authoritative. He then goes on to ask believers in practice,
“When has God established the obligation to act upon a true tradition,
was that before or after it has been put into practice?” If they answer that
a tradition becomes authoritative before it is acted upon, they have already
given up their view and agreed with Ibn azm’s. However, if they say that it
becomes authoritative only after practice, this means that those who initi-
ated the practice assumed the function of the Lawgiver (who is none other
than God, as all Muslim scholars agree), a view that is tantamount to dis-
belief (kufr).48
Ibn azm goes on to ask Mālikīs about whose practice they actually
followed. Is it the practice of the entire Muslim community (umma), he
wonders, the practice of a certain generation of Muslims, the practice of
the Prophet Muammad, the practice of Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthmān,
the practice of a specific companion from Medina, or the practice of all
jurists of Medina. These, he points out, are all the possible options as far as
‘amal is concerned.49 Knowing the scale of disagreements among Muslims,
he argues, they cannot claim that they are talking about the practice of the
entire community. The same applies to the scholars of each generation, for
there has been no generation whose scholars did not disagree with each
other.50 If they say that the ‘amal that they follow is the practice of the
Prophet, Ibn azm confronts them with many examples of issues in which
they do not follow his practice.51 If, however, they claim that the practice
they mean is the practice of Abū Bakr, he responds to this by mentioning
that Mālik’s Muwaa’ includes ten of Abū Bakr’s views, eight of which are
not followed by Mālikīs.52 The same applies to ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān, and the
rest of the companions in Medina, as well as prominent Medinan successors
such as al-Zuhrī and Rabī‘at al-Ra’y.53 Moreover, they cannot claim that
they follow the practice of the companions, for the companions, like oth-
ers, regularly disagreed with each other, which was also the case with later
scholars of Medina. So if even the scholars of Medina itself disagreed among
each other, Ibn azm wonders, why follow the views of some of them and
not others? And if Mālik’s is the closest legal school to the practice of great
companions like Abū Bakr and ‘Umar, why, then, attribute the school to
him and not to them? Finally, Medina, Ibn azm insists, did not have any
privilege over other Muslim cities and regions. ‘Umar established garrison
cities in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt and settled Muslims there. It is inconceiv-
able that these were abandoned without correct Islamic teachings. Medina,
furthermore, was only governed by evildoers after the generation of the
companions. In other words, it ceased to be a place where authentic Islam
was rightly practiced.54

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 202 Amr Osman

In brief, Ibn azm insists that Mālikīs did not actually know what they
meant when they talked about practice, yet they presumptuously used it at
the same time to judge the authoritativeness of traditions.55 He mentions in
this context Q. 3:59: “ . . . And if you have a dispute on any matter, refer it to
Allah and the Messenger if you truly believe in Allah and the Last Day . . . ”56
For instance, speaking of a legal dispute regarding the obligatory religious
charity (zakāt), Ibn azm mentions that the common practice concern-
ing this issue only began some 80 years after the Prophet’s death. Regional
governors (appointed by ‘Uthmān, ‘Alī, and ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr) had
had different practices on this issue during those years. Since there is no
good reason to privilege the practice of any of them, Ibn azm argues, this
dispute must be referred to the Qur’ān and adīth the authenticity of which
has been established by sound chains of transmitters.57 In other words, since
all Muslim generations disagreed, the right thing to do is not to rely on their,
more often than not, differing views and practices, but rather to refer every-
thing to God (meaning the Qur’ān) and His Messenger (meaning adīth
). These fixed and authoritative texts, in other words, secure conformity if
practice follows them rather than vice versa.
Ibn azm moves on to reject reports that some companions actually
acted in contradiction to some traditions that were brought to their atten-
tion. In his view, there is no good reason to accept these reports about
the companions contradicting traditions while the companion themselves,
according to these same reports, were themselves willing to question the
authenticity of Prophetic traditions. In other words, just as the holders of
this contention believe that the companions had doubts about traditions,
they should have similar doubts about these reports about the companions,
for it is possible that these—rather than the Prophetic traditions, allegedly
rejected by some companions—are in fact the fabricated reports. Ibn azm,
therefore, rejects all those reports that he believes do not befit the early
leaders of the community, who would not abandoned any part of Islam.58
Having rejected practice as a legitimate source of the Prophet’s sunna, Ibn
azm here defends the status of adīth as the only secure source of sunna,
such that adīth and sunna become one and the same thing.
At this point, Ibn azm had to attend to the question of why the Prophet’s
companions—disagreed. He gives many reasons for this disagreement, the
first of which is that there should not be any assumption that any compan-
ion knew all Prophetic traditions to begin with. The companions worked to
provide for their families and were not idly sitting with the Prophet all the
time to listen to and learn his sayings. (In this juncture, Ibn azm refers to a
saying by the famous companion and prolific transmitter of adīth from the
Prophet, Abū Hurayrah (d. 57/676). According to this, whereas other com-
panions of the Prophet were busy with their business, Abū Hurayrah used

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 Sunna in the
āhirī Madhhab 203

to spend all his time with the Prophet to learn from him.) Furthermore,
as other human beings, the companions were liable to forget some of the
Prophet’s statements. When they travelled, they were required to exercise
ijtihād in issues on which they did not know any traditions. In addition
to this, a companion may think that a transmitter of a certain tradition
has mixed up. He may also think that a certain tradition was abrogated by
another, or that a certain tradition or Qur’ānic verse was stronger evidence
in a certain case relevant to which many traditions existed. A companion
may also accept the authenticity of a certain tradition that other compan-
ions regarded with suspicion.59 For all these reasons, disagreement among
the companions and even among their Successors—who were all following
the same sources in principle—was natural given the circumstances of their
times. Nevertheless, to demonstrate their keenness to follow the Prophet’s
adīth, he mentions that some of them would travel long distances to con-
firm a certain tradition that they heard,60 which means that al-rilah fi alab
al-‘ilm was actually begun by none other than the companions themselves
in the few decades that followed the Prophet’s death. Finally, Ibn azm
rejects the authenticity of or re-interprets all reports about companions—
including ‘Umar, but also other prominent companions—prohibiting the
transmission of traditions.61 If adīth is our only valid source of sunna, then
it is inconceivable that the companions would oppose its dissemination.
A last issue that Ibn azm discusses on the subject of sunna is the valid
ways of transmitting traditions. What is important here is that the trans-
mission be based on direct audition and through the use of terms explicit
in their reference to this audition, such as “I have been told by so and so,”
or “I have heard from so and so.” Ijāzah (a permission by a traditionist to
another—usually a teacher to a student—to transmit traditions contained
in a book that he has not actually read aloud to him), therefore, is not valid,
for the transmitter has not heard each tradition that he transmits from his
source, and he would be telling a lie if he gives others the impression that he
actually heard the traditions from his informant even if he is authorized by
the informant himself to transmit them in his name.62

āhirīsm: A Textualist Theory

The
āhirī madhhab represents the culmination of the view that the
Prophetic i sunna s one and the same as adīth, which refers to statements
made by the Prophet Muammad. Ibn azm uses the terms sunan, akhbār,
and riwāyāt interchangeably to refer to adīth. His rejection of the Mālikī
notion of ‘amal ahl al-Madīnah—which he goes to great pains to refute in

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 204 Amr Osman

a lengthy rebuttal in his Ikām—is part of his broader rejection of practice

as a source of the religious law. This position also led him to even reject
cases where a companion refers to a certain view or act as the “sunna.” In
Ibn azm’s view, this kind of vague statements does not constitute evidence
that what is described was the stated view of the Prophet himself and could
very well be the view of the companion instead.63 It could also be a wrong
understanding, on the part of the companion, of the instructions given
in a certain tradition. The companions, he points out, used to interpret
traditions in ways that differed from their correct meanings and were them-
selves aware that they were ignorant of some traditions.64 Accordingly, their
reference to sunna may in fact be a reference to their own practices. If the
Prophet’s practices were not a source of obligatory rules, it follows, a fortiori,
that the practices of the companions were not either.
This
āhirī attitude toward practical sunna is not surprising. The
termāhir, which
āhirīs were named after, is primarily a hermeneutical
term the relevance of which is realized only in the context of dealing with
texts. It was used by al-Shāfi‘ī’ (in his Risālah) and al-abarī (in his Tafsīr)
in the context of the scope of application of terms (the subject of al-‘umūm
wa-l-khuū). āhir refers to al-ma‘nā al-‘āmm, meaning a term’s fullest pos-
sible extension that is inclusive of everything that can potentially fall under
its gamut. When the Qur’ān speaks of al-nās, for example, the āhir mean-
ing of this term is one that refers to all people everywhere rather than to
a specific group of them. Limiting the reference of this word to include a
specific group of people only is a particularization or restriction (takhī)
that excludes some of its referents. Particularization requires a valid indi-
cator, such as a Qur’ānic verse or an authentic Prophetic tradition. āhir
also appears in the context of the imperative mood (al-amr) and its various
senses.
āhirīs maintained that in the absence of any indicator to other-
wise, any imperative establishes absolute obligation—(wājib or far, rather
than recommendation (nadb) or permissibility (ibāah), to do something
immediately—‘alā al-fawr, rather than at a later time (‘alā al-tarākhī)—and
as many times as is required (‘alā al-tikrār). These hermeneutical assump-
tions led
āhirīs to reject other notions, such as qiyās, which essentially lim-
its or restricts the scope of applicability of legal rules (if a certain beverage is
prohibited, the ratio legis (‘illah) of this prohibition is used to prohibit other
beverages, for instance). That
āhirīs were named after a hermeneutical tool
is indicative enough of their focus on textual sources of the law rather than
non-textual sources, including practice.
There is another aspect of the
āhirī juridical thought that is relevant
to their rejection of practice as a valid source of the law.
āhirism has been
long (mis)characterized as being a literalist hermeneutical and legal theory,
a characterization that does not take into account the fact that literalism is a

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 Sunna in the
āhirī Madhhab 205

controversial subject in the field of linguistics, and that

āhirism is not lit-
eralist according to current understandings of literalism. Unlike literalism,
which assumes that any text can be interpreted independently of any context
(in “zero context,” as some linguists would put it),65
āhirism relies on the
historical and textual contexts when interpreting texts.66 As such,
āhirīsm
is essentially a textualist theory, one that insists on the absolute supremacy
of legal texts and dismisses all non-textual evidence. It is also a formalist
theory, one that proceeds on the basis of specific assumptions and according
to specific rules.67 Accordingly, a good
āhirī is one who accepts only texts
(the Qur’ān and adīth) as valid sources of the law and reject all non-textual
sources, such as qiyās (and its opposite, the argumentum e contrario), istisān,
and malaa, ‘amal, etc. The process of dealing with these textual sources is
strictly formalist, meaning that it abides by specific rules throughout and is
indifferent to how the outcome may look like. If this methodology is fol-
lowed correctly,
āhirīs maintained, believers should be able to determine
God’s ruling in each case with complete confidence. This belief that rulings
that are deduced from legal texts are based on solid ground of certitude is
central in
āhirī’s jurisprudence, for it is related to their understanding of
divine justice, which justice requires that the addressees of the law are able
to know (meaning to possess solid knowledge of ) what they are required to
do. Begin uncertain about what they are required to do is inconsistent with
God’s justice, let alone that it leads to disagreement, which is,
āhirīs held,
necessarily bad and harmful.68

āhirīs, in other words, belonged to those madhhabs (which include the
anafī and Ja‘farī madhhabs to varying degrees) that insisted on complete
certainty in their jurisprudence, unlike other madhhabs that have had to
make do with a certain degree of doubt (ghalabat al-ann, meaning “in all
probability”) in their legal conclusions. Arguably, the certainty that
āhirīs
sought after can be best served, not only if they rely on fixed texts, but also if
they proceed in their juridical thought on the basis of specific assumptions
and follow specific hermeneutical rules. For example,
āhirīs maintained
that there is a “default” sense of imperatives, as we have noted. When God
or the Prophet says “do,” they take this to mean that we must carry out
the act in question, and that we have to do this immediately and as many
times as is required in each case. This textual form gives them a solid basis,
in their view, to establish their conclusions on certainty. However, there is,
arguably, a great deal of uncertainty in practice. For one, the mere prac-
tice by the Prophet does not tell us, in and of itself, whether he expected
Muslims to follow it as a religious duty, or that it is only recommended to
them to follow or even a mere declaration that a certain act is permissible.
Furthermore, there is always a chance that the Prophet changes his practice,
and it is inconceivable that this may happen without anyone noticing it.

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 206 Amr Osman

In other words, if the practice of the Prophet is followed, there is no way

Muslims can be certain that they are following his last practice. In adīth,
on the other hand, the Prophet either would explicitly or implicitly point
out that a certain tradition has been abrogated by a new one, as many actual
cases demonstrate. In other words, Muslims can be certain that they are fol-
lowing the Prophet’s last statement on a given subject.69
Practice, in other words, cannot be a solid source in a legal system that
does not accept anything short of certainty. When we deal with practice, we
deal with something that may be constantly changing and one the indication
of which as far as the degree of obligation that it establishes, if any, is almost
unknown. This would even apply to practices that the Prophet always fol-
lowed, for he used to do a lot of supererogatory acts that other Muslims
were not required to emulate. Statements, in contrast, has the advantage
of being clear in their indication as well as of being fixed and stable, which
removes any ambiguity or doubt as to that which Muslims are required to
do or to avoid doing. In brief, that the
āhirī madhhab rejected the practi-
cal sunna and accepted only adīth as a valid source of the religious law is
consistent with the overall
āhirī theory.

Notes

1. I say madhhab rather than “school of law” because

āhirism never actually
developed into a law school proper, as I argue in my forthcoming The
āhirī
Madhhab: A Textualist Theory of Islamic Law.
2. Wa-intahat ilay-hi ri’āsat al-‘ilm fī Baghdād. Al-Shīrāzī, abaqāt al-Fuqahā’
(Beirut: Dār al-Rā’id al-‘Arabī, 1970), p. 92.
3. Ibid., 217. Dāwūd’s books are probably all lost (for this, see ‘Ārif Khalīl
Muammad Abū ‘Īd. Al-Imām Dāwūd al-āhirī wa-Atharuhu fī al-Fiqh
al-Islāmī [Kuwait: Dār al-Arqam, 1984], p. 125).
4. Al-Subkī begins his biography of Dāwūd by stating that the latter was one
of the leaders and guides of the Muslims (kāna aad a’immat al-muslimīn
wa-hudātihim) (Tāj al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Subkī. abaqāt al-Shāfi‘iyyah
al-Kubrā, Vol. 2 [Cairo: Ma ba‘at ‘Īsā al-Bābī al-alabī, 1964–1976], p. 248).
Al-Subkī is not the only Shāfi‘ī scholar whose discussion of Dāwūd’s views
betrays this desire to boost his image. We get the same impression from Shams
al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348), who rejects the view of the famous Shāfi‘ī
scholar Abū al-Ma‘ālī al-Juwaynī (478/1085) that Dāwūd’s views were worth-
less (Siyar A‘lām al-Nubalā’, Vol., 13 [Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1981],
pp. 107–108), and from al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277), who argues against the view
that Dāwūd’s views did not count as a valid legal disagreement (Muyī al-Dīn
al-Nawawī. Tahdhīb al-Asmā’ wa-l-Lughāt, Vol. 1 [Damascus: Dār al-Fayā’,
2006], p. 445).

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 Sunna in the
āhirī Madhhab 207

5. According to al-Kha īb al-Baghdādī, transmission of adīth from Dāwūd was

rare, although the person who reported this about him also mentioned that
his works “contained much adīth” (al-Kha īb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdād,
Vol. 8 (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 1966), p. 370).
6. Ibn Abī ātim al-Rāzī, al-Jar wa-l-Ta‘dīl, Vol. 1 (Haydarabad: Ma ba‘at
Jām‘iyyat Dā’irat al-Ma‘ārif al-‘Uthmāniyyah, 1942), p. 410. The Ahl al- adīth,
of course, were offended by these remarks, but they do not seem to have tried to
tarnish Dāwūd’s reputation, which is generally positive despite some criticism
of his lack of interest in adīth and “unorthodox” view on the question of khalq
al-Qur’ān.
7. For how these two activities were characteristic of scholars in Dāwūd’s time,
see Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law: 9th-10th
Centuries C.E. (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1997), pp. 183–184.
8. Min ghilmān Abī Thawr (al-Dhahabī, Siyar, Vol. 13, p. 103). The word ghulām
(singular of ghilmān) could indicate that the person who so described Dāwūd
meant that he was a blind follower of Abū Thawr.
9. Ibn ajar al- ‘Asqalānī, Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb, Vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
‘Ilmiyyah, 1994), p. 81.
10. Al-Kha īb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, Vol. 6, p. 65.
11. Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 68.
12. Al-Subkī, abaqāt, Vol. 2, p. 77.
13. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 118.
14. Al-Kha īb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, Vol. 8, p. 64.
15. Al-Subkī, abaqāt, Vol. 2, p. 117.
16. Al-Kha īb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, Vol. 8, p. 64.
17. Ibid., Vol. 8, pp. 64–67. On Bishr al-Marīsī, see EI2, Vol. 1, p. 1241.
18. Al-Subkī, abaqāt, Vol. 2, p. 126.
19. Ibn azm, al-Ikām fī Uūl al-Akām, Vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīdah,
n.d.), pp. 97 and 107.
20. For this, see my forthcoming The āhirī Madhhab.
21. Al-Kha īb al-Baghdādī (Tārīkh, Vol. 5, p. 256) introduces him as the author of
Kitāb al-Zahrah, a work on love.
22. Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 19.
23. Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, al-Bar al-Muī, Vol. 1 (Kuwait: Wazārat al-Awqāf
wa-l-Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, 1992), p. 154.
24. Abū al-usayn al-Barī, Mu‘tamad fī Uūl al-Fiqh, Vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub
al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1983), p. 27, and al-Shīrāzī, Tabirah (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr,
1980), p. 359.
25. Abū al-usayn al-Barī, Mu‘tamad, Vol. 2, p. 143.
26. Al-Zarkashī, al-Bar al-Muī, Vol. 3, p. 374.
27. For this view of some
āhirīs, see al-Shīrāzī, Tabirah, p. 177 and al-Zarkashī,
al-Bar al-Muī, vol. 2, p. 182. Al-Zarkashī mentions that al-Rāzī had noted
that Ibn Dāwūd rejected the presence of majāz even in adīth, a view that no
other scholar held (ibid., Vol. 2, p. 185). This view is indeed consistent with
other
āhirī views. If majāz is inconsistent with a language used for prescriptions
and proscriptions (as the Qur’ān does), this should equally apply to adīth.

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 208 Amr Osman

28. Abū al-usayn al-Barī, Mu‘tamad, Vol. 1, pp. 24–25. Dāwūd is reported to
have held that the Qur’ān does not contain ambiguous terms (al-Zarkashī,
al-Bar al-Muī, Vol. 3, p. 455).
29. Al-Shīrāzī, Tabirah, p. 265.
30. Abū al-usayn al-Barī, Mu‘tamad, Vol. 1, pp. 398–400.
31. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 228.
32. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 325.
33. Al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabirah, p. 526. Istiāb al-āl requires the presence of two con-
ditions, an earlier one (which is to be assumed or argued for) and a more recent
one (e.g. the innocence for a person accused of committing a crime must be
assumed). The consensus attributed to Dāwūd here is taken as evidence of the
earlier condition.
34. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 931.
35. Ibn azm, al-Ikām, Vol. 1, pp. 338–339.
36. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 259.
37. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 422.
38. I use “practical” sunnah to refer to the deeds of the Prophet Muammad (in
contrast to his sayings, or adīth) here because Ibn azm, as will be mentioned,
uses sunan to refer to adīth, which is the only valid source of Sunnah in his
view.
39. Ibn azm, al-Ikām, Vol. 1, pp. 138–139.
40. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 6–7.
41. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 6.
42. Wa-ammā man qāla anna af‘ālahu (pbuh) ‘alā al-wujūb, fa-qawluhu sāqi li-
anna Allāha ta‘āla lam yūjibu ‘alay-nā qatt fī shay’in min al-qur’ān wa-l-sunan an
naf‘ala mithla fi‘lihi ‘alay-hi al-salām (ibid., Vol. 2, p. 7).
43. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 7.
44. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 7–9.
45. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 9.
46. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 97ff.
47. Ara’aytum al-khabar al-musnad al-aī qabla an yu‘mala bi-hi, aaqqun huwa
an bāil? (ibid., Vol. 2, p. 98). Obviously, aqq and bāil here refers to the
authoritativeness or otherwise of the report.
48. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 97–99.
49. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 100.
50. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 100.
51. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 100–106.
52. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 106–110.
53. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 110–112.
54. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 115–116.
55. For a discussion of the Mālikī principle of ‘amal ahl al-Madīnah, see, for
instance, Muhammad Yousuf Gouraya, Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence (with
Special Reference to Muwatta’ Imam Malik) (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf,
1985). Gouraya makes a strong case that Mālik never bound himself either by
the consensus of the scholars of Medina or even the practice of the Medinans
(‘amal ahl al-Madīnah), and that his fatwās reflected only his own personal

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 Sunna in the
āhirī Madhhab 209

views. See also Khalīfah Bābakr al-asan, al-Ijtihād bi-l-Ra’y fī Madrasat al- ijāz
al-Fiqhiyyah (Cairo: Maktabat al-Zahrā’, 1997), pp. 463ff, and passim.
56. Al-Ikām, Vol. 2, p. 114.
57. Wa-hādha tanāzu‘ yūjibu al-radd ilā al-Qur’ān wa-mā aa ‘an al-nabī bi-l-
asānīd al-aīah (ibid., vol. 2, p. 113).
58. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 121–122.
59. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 125–129.
60. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 130.
61. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 134–145.
62. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 145–148.
63. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 72.
64. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 12ff.
65. One may be tempted to take Ibn azm’s interpretation of Q. 22:31 as an
example of his “literalism” as this term is popularly understood to mean a rigid
fixation on the wording of a certain text accompanied by a total disregard to its
“spirit” or objectives. However, this would be correct only if Ibn azm admits
that any other interpretation of this verse is linguistically valid. This, however, is
not the case. In his view, that the verse says that the Prophet’s practice only sets
an exemplary model that Muslims would be commended to follow although
they do not have to is the only correct reading of the verse. ‘alay-kum, he would
say, cannot mean anything else as it is used in the Arabic language. Accordingly,
it is Ibn azm’s textualism rather than his presumed literalism that should
explain his interpretation of this verse.
66. Accordingly,
āhirīs may and did refer to the practice of the Prophet as a source
of meaning (to understand an ambiguous tradition, for instance), but not as a
source of the law itself.
67. For more on these views on
ahirism, see my forthcoming The āhirī
Madhhab.
68. For more on these points, see my forthcoming The āhirī Madhhab.
69. Commenting on al-Shāfi‘i’s rejection of Medinan ‘amal, Ahmed al-Shamsy
(“Rethinking ‘Taqlīd’ in the Early Shāfi‘ī School,” Journal of the American
Oriental Society, 128(1) (2008)), describing this ‘amal as a “black box,” argues
that al-Shāfi‘ī “saw Medinan practice as an aggregate position devoid of any
intelligible logic, artificially created by jurists who picked and chose among
existing positions and practices and selectively declared some of them nor-
mative” (p. 6). This statement can very well describe Ibn azm’s—and in all
probability Dāwūd’s, an early follower of al-Shāfi‘ī, and subsequent
āhirīs’—
argument against ‘amal.

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9781137376459_11_ch09.indd 210 8/6/2015 5:36:00 PM
 Chapter 10

The Relative Status of adīth and

Sunna as Sources of Legal Authority
vis-à-vis the Qurʾān in Muslim
Modernist Thought
Adis Duderija

The discussions and the debates on the nature of the concept of sunna and
its conceptual, epistemological, and hermeneutical relationship with the
concept of a sound hadith and the Qur’an continue to take place in modern
Islamic studies. Indeed, what is striking, as will hopefully become evident
in the course of reading of this chapter, is the level of continuity that these
discussions in the modern context have with those of the classical period
of Islam discussed in the previous chapters. In this chapter, I examine the
views of several prominent modernist Muslim scholars who have developed
some innovative conceptual, methodological, and hermeneutical arguments
and ideas regarding the question of the relative status of the Sunna and
adīth as sources of legal authority vis-à-vis the Qurʾān and their norma-
tive role in Qurʾānic interpretation. They include Javed Ghāmidī, Fazrul
Rahman, Muammad Shahrūr, and Ghulām Parwez. I also include a brief
discussion of my own understanding of the concept of Sunna as based on
previously published work. Given that this is the only chapter that focuses
on the modern period, the discussion is aimed more at breadth rather than
depth.

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 212 Adis Duderija

Javed Ghāmidī
Javed Ghāmidī (b.1951), a strong critic of traditional Pakistani religious
thought, was born in 1951 in a village of Sahiwal, a district of the Punjab
province in Pakistan. In terms of his early education, it included both mod-
ern (Matriculation from Islamia High School, Pakpattan in 1967), as well
as traditional forms (Arabic and Persian languages, and the Qurʾān with
Mawlawi Nur Ahmad of Nang Pal).1 He came to Lahore in 1967 and resided
there until recently, when he had to leave Pakistan due to death threats
issued against him by the Taliban. He currently resides in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia. He did his BA honors in English Literature and Philosophy from
the Government College, Lahore, in 1972, and studied Islamic disciplines
in the traditional manner from various teachers and scholars throughout his
early years. In 1973, he came under the tutelage of Amīn Islāhī (d. 1997),2
an accomplished Pakistani/Indian scholar, who had a deep impact on
Ghāmidī’s thought. Ghāmidī, like Islāhī, was associated with the famous
scholar and revivalist Mawdūdī (d. 1979) for nine years, but the differences
in opinion between the two about nature and role of religion in society lead
to Ghāmidī’s expulsion from Jamaat Islamī (JI) in 1977.3 Ghāmidī, unlike
Mawdūdī, considered that the establishment of religion in society is not
a matter of state enforcement, but that its essential function is to purify
the soul and to motivate people to serve God.4 As part of this view of the
nature and function of religion, Ghāmidī redefined many of the classical
concepts in Islamic law such as sunna, adīth, tawātur, ijmāʿ, jihād, to name
but a few.5 He taught Islamic studies at the Civil Services Academy for
more than a decade, from 1979 to 1991. Ghāmidī is the founder-president
of Al-Mawrid Institute of Islamic Sciences6 and is the chief editor of the
Urdu Monthly “Ishraq”7 and the English Monthly “Renaissance.”8 He is
also the founder of the Musab School System,9 which aims “to produce
good Pakistani Muslims, with sound moral values and excellent education,
knowledge of religions and scholarship’.”10 Ghāmidī appears regularly on
various TV channels to discuss Islam and contemporary issues as a part of
his campaign to educate people about Islam. This exposure made him a
prominent media personality.11 Since 2006, he has been a member of the
Council of Islamic Ideology, government of Pakistan.
Although Ghāmidī’s thought has been significantly influenced by his
predecessors Farahī and Islahī,12 many of his contributions to Islamic
thought are original. This is evident, for example, in his major work,
Mizan, in which he explains the foundational principles of understand-
ing Islam. These principles are based on the understanding that the spe-
cific nature of the Qurʾān and adīth is such that it requires systematic

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 AQ: Please The Relative Status of adīth 213
confirm if this
running head
is fine with you
as there is not interpretational models in order for their teachings to be understood
enough space to
accommodate
correctly.
full title. In Mizan, it is evident that Ghāmidī follows and further elaborates on
Islahī’s views, especially on his conceptual, epistemological, and method-
ological delineation between Sunna and adīth bodies of knowledge. Like
Islahī, Ghāmidī equates the concept of Sunna with that of millet Ibrahim, by
which he refers to the religious traditions of the faith of Prophet Abraham
(who in the Qurʿān13 is described as a anīf, a person who follows true
monotheism) that Prophet Muammad revived, reformed, and added to.
He argues that these religious practices have reached us through in actu
(bodily perpetuations of numerous individuals) based sources of knowledge
and not written or oral based, such as the adīth.14 Therefore, the Sunna’s
epistemological value is same as that of the Qurʾān, and much higher than
that of adīth, few of which, if any, Ghāmidī considers as having such epis-
temological value.15 This concept of sunna is understood as being based on
perpetuation of religious practices only through ijmāʿ of Prophet’s compan-
ions and successors, by means of what he refers to as “ ʾamali tawātur.”
Importantly, Ghāmidī has identified the precise content and nature of
sunan, the individual components of sunna, which form the complete con-
tent of religion. He categorizes them into the following:

1. Worship Rituals (i.e. the alāt; zakāt and adaqat of ‘Id al-Fir; sawm
and I‘tiqāf; ajj and ʾUmra; Animal Sacrifice at end of ajj);
2. Social Sphere (Marriage and Divorce and their relevant details; absten-
tion from coitus during the menstrual and the puerperal period);
3. Dietary Sphere (Prohibition of pork, blood, meat of dead animals,
and animals slaughtered in the name of someone other than Allah;
slaughtering in the prescribed manner of tadkhiya by pronouncing
Allah’s name);
4. Customs and Etiquette (Remembering Allah’s name before eating
or drinking and using the right hand for the same; Greeting one
another with as-Salāmu ʾalaikum (peace be to you) and respond-
ing with Wa ʾalaikum as-salām (and peace be to you); Saying
al-amdulillah (praise be to Allah) after sneezing and responding to
it by saying yaramukallah (may Allah have mercy on you); keep-
ing the moustaches trimmed; shaving pubic hair; removing the
hairs under the armpits; paring fingernails; circumcising the male
offspring; cleaning the nose, the mouth and the teeth; cleaning the
body after excretion and urination; bathing after the menstrual and
the puerperal periods; bathing the dead before burial; enshrouding
a dead body and preparing it for burial; burying the dead; ‘Id al-Fir
and ‘Id al-Adha.16

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 214 Adis Duderija

Corollary to his efforts in specifying the content of sunna, Ghāmidī has

developed several methodological criteria for determining scope and nature
of sunna too. These include the following:

1. sunna pertains only to things that are religious in nature and to prac-
tical affairs of life;
2. Belief, ideology, history, and occasions of revelation do not fall under
the aegis of the concept of sunna;
3. practices initiated by the Qurʾān and implemented by the Prophet
(e.g. amputating the hands of thieves; flogging criminals and adulter-
ers) are not sunna;
4. a new sunnacannot be “made” on the basis of observing an optional
sunna (e.g. optional night prayer in the month of fasting (tarāwī);
non obligatory fasts;
5. only aspects of human nature that the prophets of God have made an
essential part of religion constitute sunna ;
6. things that Prophet(s.) never wanted to constitute as part of sunna
(e.g. wording of supplications);
7. sunna, like the Qurʾān, is not validated through an isolated report
(khabar-i wāid), and, in addition to the Qurʾān, is one of the only
two independent source of religion in Islam.17

As evident from the examples given above, this definition of sunna leads
him to argue for a somewhat novel definition of sunna compared to those
from the pre-modern period. For example, the directives emanating from
the Qurʾān are not sunna, but only his explanation or clarification of them
are (e.g. Qurʾānic punishment of lashing for fornication is not sunna); prac-
tices adopted or modified by the Prophet from the Abrahamic religious
tradition and later sanctioned by the Qurʾān (e.g. prayer rituals) also con-
stitute sunna ; Prophet Muammad’s moral excellence (uswa asana) is not
sunna but a model behavior (e.g. Prophet’s manner of performing ablution);
general guidance, even of religious nature, if it is not intended to form part
of rituals or practice is also not sunna (e.g. wording of different prayers in
different situations); like the Qurʾān, sunna is not established on the basis
of isolated (aad) adīth-based evidence, but only through tawātur;18 and,
finally, that the epistemological basis of sunna rests on the ijmāʿ and tawātur
of the Prophet’s companions.
In addition to putting into place principles of delineating the contents,
the nature, and the scope of sunna, Ghāmidī has elaborated on the princi-
ples in understanding adīth. He defines adīth as “narratives which record
the words, deeds, and tacit approvals of the Prophet Muammad.” Ghāmidī
argues that they are mostly akhbar-i aad (isolated reports) and do not add

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 The Relative Status of adīth 215

to the contents of religion, which is in its entirety found in the Qurʾān and
sunna. Ghāmidī, however, readily acknowledges that adīth literature is “the
largest and most important source which records the biography, history
and the exemplary life of the Prophet Muammad as well as his invaluable
explanations of various issues of religion.”
The first criteria in understanding adīth that pertains to the examina-
tion of the chain (isnād) of adīth involves examination of any hidden
flaws in the chain of narration of a adīth (ʾilāl), the probity of the nar-
rators (ʾadl), their grasp and memory (ab), and their contemporaneous-
ness (ittisāl). In relation to the establishing the authenticity of the text of
the adīth, Ghāmidī argues that nothing in the text should be against the
Qurʾān and sunna and the established facts derived from “knowledge and
reason.” Another criterion pertains to the language of the adīth, which,
for Ghāmidī, like that of the Qurʾān, is high literary Arabic. In this con-
text, Ghāmidī argues that only after an extensive period of learning and
training can those “conversant with the delicacies of the Arabic language
and its various styles and constructions” be capable of detecting problems
with the language in a adīth, based on which that particular adīth can
be rejected. An additional principle that needs to be employed in under-
standing adīth pertains to the Qurʾān’s self-description of being mizān
(the “Scale of Truth”) and furqān (the “Distinguisher” between truth and
falsehood). Because of this nature of the Qurʾān, it is like “a guardian of
every religious concept and it has been revealed as a barometer to judge
between what is right and what is wrong.” Therefore, the Qurʾān is not
dependent on the adīth for its explanation including for the purposes
of its specification. On the contrary, the adīth need to be interpreted in
the light of the Qurʾān and cannot change or modify the Qurʾān in any
way. Therefore, in Ghāmidī’s thought, the role and the scope of adīth is
solely confined to explaining and elucidating religion or in delineating the
exemplar of the Prophet. Ghāmidī also tells us that a correct understand-
ing of adīth entails discerning the question who its original addressees
were. Hence, they must be understood with reference to the instance and
occasion of the topic it records.19 Another criterion Ghāmidī considers
necessary for having a correct understanding of adīth is the idea that all
the variant texts of a adīth must be studied before making any judgment
regarding its soundness.20 Finally, since revelation and reason can never
exist in a contradictory relationship, any adīth, if found to be contrary
to reason, is to be rejected.21 Following Islahī, and based on the above
outlined considerations, Ghāmidī considers that adīth can be accepted
as sources of legal authority only if the basis for such a adīth exists in
the Qurʾān, sunna, or the established principles of human nature and
intellect.22

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 216 Adis Duderija

To sum up, Ghāmidī has developed a very specific and systematic theory
pertaining to the definition of sunna that is both epistemologically and
methodologically independent of adīth. He considers sunna as an inde-
pendent source of legal authority in relation to religious practices only. The
adīth are not an independent source of legal authority in Islam and, its
content can be accepted only if it is in accordance with several criteria dis-
cussed above.

Farul Rahman

Farul Rahman (d.1988), was born in the Hazara area of what is today
Pakistan. His father was a well-known scholar of the time who had stud-
ied at the famous Islamic madrassa in Deoband, India. Rahman studied
Arabic at Punjab University, where he received his Master’s in Arts. He com-
pleted his Doctoral degree at Oxford University on Ibn Sina’s (d. 428/1037)
work Kitāb al Najāt. He spent eight years (from 1950–1958) at Durham
University, where he taught Persian and Islamic philosophy. He moved to
Canada from England and joined the faculty at McGill University, where
he taught Islamic studies until 1961. He then returned to Pakistan to
become part of the General Ayyub Khan’s reform efforts to align Pakistan’s
political and legal systems with Islamic teachings. As part of these efforts,
a Central Institute of Islamic Research was set up, which Rahman directed
from 1961–1968. Rahman also served on the Advisory Council of Islamic
Ideology, which was the highest policy-making body in Pakistan. During
this time, he came under increasing attack from those who wanted to derail
the government’s reform efforts. His views on Sunna and adīth, among
others, earned him the wreaths of the traditionalists and, with deteriorat-
ing health and inability to pursue reforms effectively, Rahman went to the
United States in 1968. There he spent most of his illustrious teaching and
research career at the University of Chicago until his death in 1988.23
Rahman has written considerably on the issue of sunna and adīth
and their role in Qurʾānic interpretation as sources of legal authority. His
most systematic discussion on this issue can be found in his book titled
Islamic Methodology in History.24 Like Ghāmidī, Rahman has made a clear
conceptual distinction between sunna and adīth bodies of knowledge.
He conceptualizes sunna in form of a general normative moral law and an
ethico-religious behavioral system, giving rise to a normative practice that
cannot be textually fixed. Rahman also conceptualizes sunna as a concept
that allows for interpretation and adaptation. This is so, argues Rahman,
because sunna, as a concept, was inclusive of the Prophet’s own raʿy and

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 The Relative Status of adīth 217

qiyās as well as those of the companions, which gave rise to ijmāʿ.25 As

such, Rahman argues that sunna, as a normative ethico-religious behav-
ioral system, was not large in quantity and was not meant to be some-
thing specific because “no two cases in practices are identical in their
moral, psychological or material settings.”26 Another argument Rahman
mentions in favor of the idea that the “original” concept of sunna is not
what is contained in the classical “adīth-fiqhi “ literature is that Prophet
Muammad was first and foremost a moral reformer, and that he only
on very rare occasions resorted to “general legislation as a means of fur-
thering the Islamic cause.” Therefore, Rahman continues, the Prophet’s
legislative activity was far from being that of a pan-legist but very much
situation-based and ad hoc, as mirrored and confirmed by the content
of Qurʾān itself.27 Hence, he argues, Prophet’s legal actions could not be
“strictly” and “literally” taken as normative. Furthermore, Rahman argues
that sunna historically underwent changes from being a dynamic concept
first associated with general ethico-behavior norms of the Prophet and,
over time, becoming co-extensive and existing in a dialectic relationship
with the concept of ijmāʿ of the Muslim community that was inclusive of
ijtihād. Rahman continues that with the massive increase in circulation
and writing down of adīth and the onset of the process of what we in this
volume is described as adīthification of sunna, however, the organic link
between Sunna-ijtihād and ijmāʿ became undone and sunna was largely
conflated with the concept of a saih adīth as per early classical ulūm
ul-adīth.28 Rahman, unlike Ghāmidī, does not attempt to clearly delin-
eate the contents of the concept of sunna.
Rahman clearly recognizes the importance of adīth for Muslims and
the study of history by provocatively and rhetorically asking, “If all of
adīth is given up what remains but a yawning chasm between us and the
Prophet?”29 He also describes the methods of those who “in the name of
progressivism wish to brush aside the adīth and the Prophetic sunna ”
as worse than Nero’s methods of rebuilding Rome.30 Equipped with his
sunna -ijmāʿ –ijtihād theory, Rahman considers that the adīth are sug-
gestive of “the sum total of aphorisms put out by the Muslims themselves,
ostensibly about the Prophet, although not without an ultimate historical
touch with the Prophet.”31 He asserts further that adīth represent the
“interpreted spirit of the prophetic teaching” 32 and a total fixation of for-
merly dynamic living sunna that crystallized as a result of the ijtihād-ijmāʿ
process.33 Having formulated these views on the nature and the scope
of the concepts of sunna and adīth, Rahman argued that in all cases in
which the Qurʾān conflicts with the adīth, the Qurʾān had to be privi-
leged over the adīth categorically, since the Qurʾān, unlike the adīth, is
the direct and preeminent source of God’s guidance.34

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 218 Adis Duderija

In summary, Rahman has developed a systematic theory of the inter-

relationship between adīth and sunna bodies of knowledge as well as a pre-
cise definition of sunna whose normativeness as a source of legal authority
he readily recognized. However, he strongly departs from the adīth-based
concept of sunna and considers adīth, in principle, not as the container for
content of the concept of sunna. Thereby, he denies their normative value
as an independent source of legal authority restricting greatly their role in
Qurʾānic interpretation to that of the important sources of early Muslim
opinions about the Qurʾān and the Prophet, and the history of early Muslim
thought.

Muammad Shahrūr

Muammad Shahrūr (b.1938), is one of the “most interesting and innova-

tive thinkers in the contemporary Arab-Muslim world.”35 The success of his
first book on Islam, Al-kitāb wa’l Qurʾān: qiraʾa muʾasira (The Book and the
Qurʾān: A contemporary reading (1990)), which has sold a vast number of
copies, has been described as an extraordinary book that “challenges a mil-
lennium of Islamic tradition.”36 It propelled Shahrūr into being one of the
most controversial and talked about figures among intellectuals, students,
and scholars of the entire Middle East during the 1990s. The controversy
around The Book and the Qurʾān started immediately after its first release
in Syria in 1990 and has lasted over a decade, with many books and arti-
cles written on it. There were even views that Shahrūr’s book was part of a
Zionist organization plot to produce a new commentary of the Qurʾān by
using an Arab writer’s name.37 Elsewhere, his ideas and theories have been
compared with that of Martin Luther, the “Father of Protestantism.”38
Muammad Shahrūr was born in 1938 in Damascus, the capital of
Syria. Shahrūr’s childhood was spent in a liberal atmosphere. His father was
a practicing Muslim but ethical teachings of Islam were emphasized in his
upbringing over those of ritualized tradition. Shahrūr’s most formative years
“coincided with the politically most unstable periods of the Syrian Arab
Republic after it gained its independence in 1947.”39 In 1959, Shahrūr was
sent to Russia, Syria’s political ally in the mid-1950s, to study civil engineer-
ing. It is in Russia where “he experienced another phase of political and
ideological confusion.”40 His religious beliefs were challenged by Marxist
philosophy and Soviet-style atheism. During this time, he primarily sought
to defend his theistic beliefs. He graduated in 1964 with a diploma from
the Moscow Institute of Engineering, was fluent in Russian, and married
a Russian wife who bore him a son. The same year he returned to Syria. In

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 The Relative Status of adīth 219

1968, he left Syria and studied at the University College in Dublin where he
earned his master’s degree in 1969 and his doctoral degree in soil mechan-
ics and foundation engineering in 1972. He returned in the same year to
Syria and lectured at Damascus University until 1998. There he became a
well-recognized scholar in his area of expertise. Throughout this period,
the failure of the ideology of pan-Arabism and the events surrounding the
Six Day War in 1967 had an important impact on shaping of his thought,
including his views on religion. Sharur’s interest in religion never waned,
and although he shared with other Syrian thinkers the belief that Islam pos-
sesses a universal epistemology that encourages rationalism, human liberty,
and the appropriation of knowledge, Shahrūr did not find his inspiration in
the classical philosophical heritage nor in the exegetical tradition of medi-
eval Islam, but rather in his work as a natural scientist and engineer.”41
Without considering himself shackled by the classical Islamic disciplines
and their methodologies Shahrūr’s sole concern was to develop absolute
consistency between what he considered to be the Qurʾānic Weltanschauung
and his own modern and rational experiences of reality, which were sig-
nificantly shaped by thinkers such as Alfred North Whitehead, Bertrand
Russell, Emmanuel Kant, Johann G. Fichte, and Georg W. F. Hegel.42
Unlike the case of many reformist minded Muslim intellectual from the
Muslim majority world43 the furor around Shahrūr case has was a relatively
“restrained and civilized affair” and the credits for this should not in a small
part be given to the Syrian government at that time. For example, Shahrūr
has never been accused of apostasy or blasphemy. He was never subjected
to a public hearing not was there ever any attempt to arrest him. His writ-
ings were never officially banned in Syria. His The Book and the Qurʾān
was officially banned in Egypt and temporarily forbidden in Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait. Today Shahrūr is considered a major proponent of a reformist
interpretation of Islam.44
Shahrūr has contributed several important methodological consider-
ations and ideas to the discussion of the question of the status of sunna and
adīth as sources of legal authority vis-à-vis the Qurʾān. At the most general
level, he considers that the (adīth-based) sunna45 in classical Islamic schol-
arship inappropriately became practically the first source of legislation, in
effect, displacing the Qurʾān.46 In this context, he writes:

Islamic jurists’ excessive fixation on the life of Muammad (s) has led to the
unfortunate result that the sunna of the Prophet (s) not only became theoreti-
cally the second most authoritative source of Islamic law but practically also
very often the primary source of legislation. When issuing their fatwas—in
particular on legal issues with far reaching social and political implications—
Islamic jurists very often ignored the rules of the Book or had them replaced

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 220 Adis Duderija

by the, sunna which over time became their ultimate—and often only—
point of reference. By focusing on the sunna of the Prophet (s) as a major
source of Islamic legislation, our honourable scholars clearly over stepped
the mark when they began to treat it as the principal and most authoritative
source of truth, equal if not superior to the word of God in the Book. Their
theologically most detestable step was to regard the Book as incomplete and
in need of the elaborations and specifications of the sunna, implying that a
divine text needs to be completed and confirmed by a human source—which
is a truly blasphemous thought!47

Shahrūr laments that this adīth-based sunna has resulted in “no room for
innovative thinking, reform, or renewal in Islamic law.”48 To counter the
adīth-based approach to sunna, Shahrūr develops an innovative (but not
unprecedented) discussion of the concept of Sunna. Shahrūr, makes a dis-
tinction between the prophetic (nubuwwa) and messenger (risāla) aspects
of Muammad’s divine mission. In this context, he argues that the former
deals with the universalist dimension of the Divine message as embodied
in the Al-Kitāb49 which he restricts to eschatological and purely theologi-
cal issues and which are ambiguous and transcend this earthly reality. The
latter is concerned solely with definite, unambiguous, and objective reality
that is subject to human faculties and senses. He goes on to assert that only
the Qurʾān (in contradistinction to adīth and sunna ) is the sole source of
both nubuwwa and risāla because only the Qurʾān possess the ontologi-
cal quality of “being in and for itself.” The sunna, as shall later be further
elaborated upon, on the other hand, is defined by Shahrūr as the Prophet’s
own human-bound, non-absolute ijtihād/interpretation/understanding of
the Al-Kitāb.50
Shahrūr rebuts the traditional understanding of—and arguments
employed in the defense of—adīth-based sunna and its necessity to
Qurʾānic interpretation,51 on the erroneous basis that it sanctifies all aspects
of the Prophet’s existence equally. While not rejecting the concept of sunna
per se,52 Shahrūr argues for a specific and circumstantial nature of the con-
cept of sunnaof the Prophet based on the following five principals:

1. the idea that Prophet’s decisions were conditioned by his historical

context;
2. his ijtihād in restricting the allowed did not need divine revelation;
3. his restrictions of the “unrestricted permissions” (alal mulaq) were
subject to constant corrections as a result in change in circumstances
in his own life;
4. his ijtihād, unlike revelations, were not infallible and
5. his ijtihād, regardless if it was of Prophetic or non-Prophetic nature,
does not constitute Islamic legislation.53

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 The Relative Status of adīth 221

To get a more detailed understanding of Shahrūr’s concept of Sunna, espe-

cially in relation to its legal authority of Sunna, we also need to examine
his views on what constitutes the concept of “obedience” to Muammad.
Shahrūr distinguishes between two different types of obedience to
Muammad, “combined obedience” (al-āʿa al-mutaila) by which he
means the obedience to Allah and His Messenger and “separate obedience”
(al-āʿa al-munfaila ) which implies eternal obedience to Allah and time-
restricted obedience to Muammad.54
The first type of obedience that links the obedience of Allah to that of
his messenger is derived from 3: 13255 and 4:69,56 and is obligatory for
everyone who lived at the time of Muammad or after his death. Shahrūr
subdivides this type of obedience into two categories, namely, absolute and
relative obedience. The examples of the former, whose instructions believers
simply follow in both form and spirit of the Qurʾān and Messenger’s prac-
tice, are restricted to the alāt, ajj and awm. In the latter category, “which
requires ijtihād within the limits set by Allah” is included the percentage of
zakāt, the minimum of which is 2.5 %, but which can change with chang-
ing economic and financial circumstances of the society/individual.57
The second type of obedience to Muammad, al- āʿa al-munfaila, is
derived from verses 4:5958 and 5:9259 and is separate from God’s obedience
to those believers who came after his death. The nature of this obedience
is such that

It designates the obedience of his followers to what he had decided, based

on the principle of “tying and loosening.” While creating the founda-
tions of a new state amidst the political and cultural turmoil of his time,
Muammad (s) continuously exercised ijtihād, sometimes loosening up to
a maximum of permissibility, sometimes tying it up to an absolute mini-
mum. He was by no means infallible in his ijtihād, while his decisions
reflected the conditions of his time.60

In this category, Shahrūr includes Muammad’s prohibition of music,

dance, singing, the visual arts, visiting the graves that “enjoy neither abso-
lute validity nor eternal authority.” This is so because these prohibitions
and their rationale were organically linked to the context of the prevailing
idolatry of Arabian society of the time.
Apart from his novel insights into the concept of sunna, Shahrūr also
innovatively classifies adīth into two categories, namely, as words of wis-
dom and prophetic statements. The former “contain moral sayings that
are universally understood and shared by all people.” They are “formu-
lated from the pool of human experiences and hence come from within
human beings.” Shahrūr argues further that these words of wisdom “may

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 222 Adis Duderija

be perceived by revelation” but are of different “quality” from it, since wis-
dom can exist independently of revelation. Hence, no religious or civil
law should be based on them because they are general and ethico-moral in
nature rather than being literally sources of positive law.61
Shahrūr divides Prophetic statements into five categories. The first cat-
egory of statements includes the statements about rituals, known in clas-
sical scholarship as aadīth al tashāʾir, which constitute “Muammad’s (s)
instructions, comprising his messengerhood, on how to perform the ritual
obligations of the Book.” These are to be obeyed by the believers uncondi-
tionally, as they come under the category of “combined obedience” (al-āʿa
al-mutaila) as explained above. The second category of statements relate to
the unseen world (aadīth al-akhbar bi l-ghayb). These statements are out-
side the sphere of belief (al- ʾ imān) and because the Prophet had no special
knowledge about the unseen world, it would be improper for believers to
take these statements as the truth.
The statements about legal injunctions (adīth al-akām) that “com-
prise every legal injunction and every piece of legislation that Prophet
Muammad issued are another group of statements identified by Shahrūr.
They are in strict compliance with the verses of the Book and are between the
limits that Allah has set. Basing himself on the conceptualization of sunna
as outlined above, Shahrūr argues that these statements were contingent on
the social and political problems that the Prophet faced in ancient Arabia.
As such, these statements are not binding upon the subsequent generations
of Muslims “because they merely reflect his activities as a mujtāhid who
responded to the needs of his time and who applied rulings that the objec-
tive conditions of his society made necessary.” Therefore, even if today’s
believers deviate from the letter of the prophetic ijtihād, this does not under-
mine the potential validity of their ijtihād and does not diminish their “love
for the Prophet Muammad.” The fourth category Shahrūr terms “Sacred
Statements,” which, in the classical Islamic tradition, pertains to the aadīth
al-qusiyya about the unseen world, which were believed to be inspired by
divine revelation. Shahrūr dismisses the claim that they are sacred or divine
on the basis of the same reasoning he used in relation to the second category,
the above mentioned aadīth al-akhbar bi l-ghayb. The final category iden-
tified by Shahrūr refers to “Personal Statements,” which he names aadīth
al-hayāt al-insanī. These pertain to the sayings about Muammad’s personal
life, his eating and sleeping habits, his favorite pastimes, his way of dress-
ing, speaking, travelling, walking, running, hunting, and so on. They also
include his kindness, good-naturedness, tolerance, courage, and his feelings
about justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, hardship and welfare, and
so forth.” Shahrūr forms the view that these cannot in any way be consid-
ered normative, as they belong among solely personal matters.62

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 The Relative Status of adīth 223

Therefore, from the discussion above, we can conclude that for Shahrūr
the concepts of adīth and sunna, as he defines them, are clearly not inde-
pendent or supplementary sources of legal authority in Islam per se. Their
role in Qurʾānic interpretation, including that of Propeth’s ijtihād, especially
in the realm of law, is non- binding because of its contextually contingent
nature.

Ghulām Parwez

Ghulām Parwez (d. 1985) was a Pakistani scholar based in Lahore. He is

founder of the Tolu-e-Islam movement. The words “Tolu-e-Islam” meaning
“dawn” or “resurgence” of Islam, were taken from the title of a poem by the
sub-continent’s great Muslim philosopher and poet Allama Iqbal (d. 1938).
According to its website the aims and objectives of Tolu-e-Islam are:

to remove all non-Qurʾānic ideologies, beliefs, and practices prevalent in

present-day Islam, and replace them with Qurʾānic concepts based upon
reason and rationale. Tolu-e-Islam’s literature is essentially directed towards
individuals who are in search of truth so that they can overcome the forces
of secularism and be able to establish a pure Qurʾānic society, wherever they
may be.63

Parwez was born in a Sunnī (anafī) family of Batala, district Gurdaspur,

India, in 1903. At that time, Batala, a town now in the Punjab Province of
India, was a very famous place of Islamic learning, philosophy, and culture.
Parwez’s grandfather, Hakim Bakhsh was recognized as an accomplished
scholar and renowned sufī of the Chishtia Nizamia discipline of mysticism.
From a young age, under his grandfather’s tutelage, Parwez immersed him-
self in the study of the Qurʾān and the classics of Islamic scholarship. He
completed his secondary education from “A Lady of England” High School
Batala in 1921 and graduated from the Punjab University in 1934.
When he was in his twenties and during his stay in Lahore, he came
into close association with Allama Iqbal who had a significant impact on
Parwez’s understanding of the Qurʾān and whose ideas spurred Parwez into
being a pioneer worker for the Pakistan Movement. With the help of Iqbal,
Parwez came into association with one of the greatest Muslim Scholars of
the subcontinent Aslam Jairajpurī (d.1955),64 by whom he was educated in
advanced studies in Arabic literature. Parwez remained in close company
with Jairajpurī for over 15 years, until the partition in 1947.
In 1938, under the instructions of Ali Jinnah (d. 1948), the founder
of modern day Pakistan, Parwez started publishing monthly Tolu-e-Islam

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 224 Adis Duderija

whose primary purpose was to propagate the idea that, according to the
Qurʾān, ideology and not geographical boundary, was the basis for the
formation of nation, and that a politically independent state was a pre-
requisite for living an “Islamic” way of life. This view was antagonistic to
the interests of the British, the Hindu majority, as well as Indian Muslim
ultranationalists.
During the Pakistan Movement, Parwez was Jinnah’s adviser in the mat-
ters pertaining to the Qurʾānic values and principles and a member of the
Law Commission formed under the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan. Parwez
also founded the Qurʾānic Education Society and was the Director of the
Qurʾānic Research Center established under his guidance Lahore. He orga-
nized a countrywide network of spreading the pristine Qurʾānic teachings
called Bazm-e-Tolu-e-Islam. Similar “Qurʾān only” or ahl -Qurʾān, organiza-
tions exist in other Muslim countries most notably in Egypt.65
Parwez was a prolific writer and has authored many books on Qurʾānic
teachings, the most celebrated of them being Maʾarif-ul- Qurʾān in eight
volumes, Lughat-ul-Qurʾān in four volumes and Mafūm ul- Qurʾān in
three volumes. His most sustained exposition on the issue that concerns this
chapter can be found in his work titled Muqām-e-adīth (The Actual Status
of adīth) that has been translated into English by his followers.66
In the work, Muqām-e-adīth Parwez levels a very strong critique of the
classical theory of the status of sunna and adīth as sources of legal authority
vis-à-vis the Qurʾān and their employment in Qurʾānic interpretation. Not
unlike Shahrūr, he espoused a doctrine of what could be termed Qurʾānic
self-sufficiency in matters of doctrinal, ritual, and legal import, which has
earned him a name of being a Qurʾānist (Qurʾāniy). The first argument
Parwez makes in relation to the Qurʾān’ s ritual, legal and doctrinal self –suf-
ficiency is based on his concept of al-dīn. Arguing against the classical view
that al-dīn comprises of the Qurʾān and adīth, he argues that al-dīn is a
system of Islam67 that is purely Qurʾānic, based on truth (quoting Qurʾān
35:31) and that only the Qurʾān has been conveyed and preserved to the
humankind in a complete and authentic form.68 Parwez adds that the same
does not hold true for adīth as neither Allah nor the Prophet put mecha-
nisms into place to ensure the same for the adīth. He rebuts the views of
traditionalist scholars who espouse the view that adīth/ sunna constitute
un-recited revelation (way ghayr al-malū) discussed in the introduction
section of this volume. Parwez also vehemently rejects the classical view
that the Qurʾān is more in need of sunna /adīth than vice versa includ-
ing the idea that that sunna /adīth can abrogate or negate the Qurʾān.69
Parwez also highlights that even if one subscribes to the classical argument
of the Prophet serving as the Qurʾān’s best explicator, the adīth literature
on the subject is not even remotely comprehensive enough to perform this

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 The Relative Status of adīth 225

function. An additional argument for the Qurʾān’s self-sufficiency is made

on the basis of referring to conflicting definitions of the concept of sunna
that exist among traditional minded Muslim scholars which, in his view, can
only give rise to division and sectarianism among Muslims. He maintains
that the correct understanding of the concept of “following the Prophet” is
by following the Qurʾān’s system (al-dīn) only. In this context he states:

To follow God means to follow His law revealed in the Book the preservation
of which He took upon His Ownself. By virtue of this, the Messenger became
capable of delivering it in concrete book form to the whole of Muslim umma.
In the same vein, “to follow the Messenger” will not mean that a person or
group makes his own clichés of Messenger’s teachings and starts to follow
them. It is absolutely necessary, that in order to follow, we must have an
objective standard. By this we can conclude, God did not put any seal of His
authority nor did the Messenger deliver it to his disciples in any concrete
form with his approval; that it was neither in God’s program nor the aim of
the Messenger, to preserve the adīth.70

Parwez uses the classical argument that adīth are not the verbatim repro-
ductions of the prophetic sayings but merely interpretations as another
argument against them being included as part of al-dīn. He adds that the
classical efforts which have attempted to “rationalize” and “authenticate”
adīth were insufficient as they suffer from inherent epistemological and
methodological weaknesses and that there is no “divine proof ” for them
to be accepted as normative. The only normative adīth is the Qurʾān. He
rejects the classical theory according to which there is the “utmost need
for aadīth” because without them, we cannot grasp the correct interpreta-
tion of the Qurʾān. Instead, not unlike Shahrūr, he argues for Qurʾān by
Qurʾān (known classically as taʾwil al Qurʾān bi -l Qurʾān) interpretation
only and demonstrates how certain interpretations of Qurʾānic passages are
contradicted by adīth.71 Parwez forms the view that “the correct stature of
adīth happens to be as history of al-dīn. It can prove beneficial to history,
but to present it forward to rationalize al-dīn will carry little meanings.”
Parwez also argues that the most damaging aspect of placing adīth next to
al-dīn, was that it caused Qurʾān, “that is full of life, to go into eclipse.”72
Importantly, Parwez does not make a systematic distinction between sun-
naand adīth as do other scholars discussed in this article.
In summary, Parwez upholds the view that adīth and sunna, as he defines
them, do not constitute sources of legal authority in Islam (or what he calls
al-dīn). Instead, he forms the view that the Qurʾān is fully self-sufficient
in terms of its own interpretation and that adīth and sunna have in many
instances eclipsed and distorted the actual Qurʾānic teachings, including
those that have legal import.

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 226 Adis Duderija

Finally, in my previous published work I have argued that that the nature
and the scope of the concept of sunna, like that of the Qurʾān, comprises
of its ʿamaliyya/ ʾibadiyya ( i.e. worship and creed), fiqhiyya ( legal), and
akhlāqiyya (ethical) elements, and that the sunna compliance or otherwise
of a particular principle, value, or behaviour is ultimately traced back to
the principles governing Qurʾānic methodology of interpretation or, more
generally, the overall usūlu-l-fiqh theory.73 According to this approach, all of
the components of sunna, (apart from its ʿibadiyya dimension, which is in
essence in actu, and more or less corresponds to Ghāmidī’s concept of sunna
explained above,74 requiring no interpretation and not dependent on writ-
ten transmission of knowledge) are hermeneutically directly linked to that
of the Qurʾān. This, in turn, implies that the sunna compliance or otherwise
of certain principles, values, or behaviours is entirely dependent on the way
the Qurʾān is interpreted. Therefore, the most crucial and decisive factor
in establishing sunna is linked to methodologies pertaining Qurʾānic inter-
pretation, that is, the questions pertaining to Qurʾānic hermeneutics and
not an automatic default deferral to the adīth body of literature as either
authenticated or hermeneutically employed by the classical muadīthūn or
ʾusūliyyūn methodologies. As such, this method restores sunna’s conceptual
and hermeneutical link with the Qurʾān that was evident in the pre-classical
Islamic scholarship.75 Importantly, this approach to sunna/adīth dynamic
and their role in the overall usūl ul-fiqh theory is also not constrained with
the hierarchical classical usūlu-l-fiqh theory as it dislocates and displaces
the central role of adīth body of literature, which, alongside the principle
of ijmāʿ, largely determined the hermeneutic playing field within which
Qurʾān and sunna were interpreted in pre-modern Islamic legal thought as
explained in the chapters of this volume. This approach to the nature and
the concept of sunna allows for new interpretational possibilities of both
the Qurʾān and sunna by means of novel interpretational models that, for
example, give more scope to non-textual sources such as reason in interpre-
tation or consider the very concept of sunna to be constitutive of reason,
which are based on objective-based nature of ethical value, which permit
a more contextual-based approach to Qurʾāno–sunnaic interpretation, or
which are based on the notion of giving hermeneutic primacy to ethico-
moral or objective-based (maqasid ) approaches to usūlu-l-fiqh theory.76

Conclusion
Contemporary Muslim scholars whom we have examined in this article
have contributed several important methodological and hermeneutical

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 The Relative Status of adīth 227

insights into the question that, as we saw in all of the previous chapters, has
a long genealogy in Muslim thought, namely the status of sunna and adīth
bodies of knowledge as source of legal authority and tools in Qurʾānic inter-
pretation. Despite coming from, at times, very different educational and
socio-cultural backgrounds, all of them share the idea that the mainstream
classical-based scholarships’ position on the role and the status of sunna
and adīth as sources of legal authority, vis-à-vis the Qurʾān needing to
be challenged and re-conceptualized. In several ways, what these scholars
have proposed with reference to the concepts of sunna and its relative status
of source of legal authority is a significant departure from the discussions
that have taken place in the formative and classical periods, as is evident
from the discussions presented in the chapters of this volume. This is par-
ticularly evident in, for example, Shahrour’s understanding of the nature
of Prophet’s ijtihād being fallible and contextually contingent; Rahman’s
dynamic understanding of the concept of Sunna based on his sunna-ijtihād
and ijmāʿ theory; Ghāmidī’s argument that sunna’s scope is limited only to
things that are religious in nature and to practical affairs of life; Parwez’s
concept of the Qurʾān’s exegetical and hermeneutical self-sufficacy or my
idea of hermeneutically linking, non- ʿibadiyya elements of the concept of
sunna to that of the Qurʾān in such a manner that is not constrained by the
classical usūlu-l-fiqh theory.
As noted at the very beginning of the introduction to this volume,
how we go about conceptualizing sunna has important implications
at the level of Islamic law, ethics, and politics. While exploring these
dimensions of the concept of sunna was not a focus of this volume, it
is important to note that the modernist conceptualizations of the con-
cept of sunna described above have wide-ranging socio-cultural, political,
legal, and ethical ramifications and often have been employed for the
purposes of reform, and as noted above, authorities associated with them
have often been labeled as reformists. As a result, these reformers were
often strongly criticized by the proponents of classical understandings of
the nature and the scope of the concept of sunna discussed in this book,
who interpreted these attempts at reform as attacks on “Islam” itself. In
cases of Rahman and Ghāmidī this resulted in them having to go into
exile due to death threats. It remains to be seen whether or not these
novel understandings of the concept of sunna will be able to challenge
or even, perhaps, dislodge those stemming from the classical period,
but given the growing chorus of voices, both Muslim and non-Muslim,
demanding an Islamic reformation, dealing with the question of sunna as
a source of legal authority in Islam is bound to gain further attention in
the foreseeable future.

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 228 Adis Duderija

Notes
1. M. Masud. “Rethinking sharīa: Javēd Amad Ghāmidī on udūd,” Die Welt des
Islams, 47 (3–4) (2007): 356–375, at 357.
2. A brief biographical sketch can be found here. http://renaissance.com.pk/jafe-
titl98.html. A discussion on his work on Qurʿānic interpretation can be found
in Mir 1986. Islāhī was a student of Al-Farahī, (1863–1930) a celebrated and
erudite Indian scholar of Islam. With Al-Farahī he learnt traditional Islamic
sciences. From 1930, Islahī studied adīth sciences for several years under Abd
al-Rahman Mubarakpurī ( d.1935), one of the most accomplished scholars of
adīth in the Subcontinent. See A. Khurshid “Mawlana Amin Ahsan Islahī: An
Obituary,” Islamic Studies, 37 (1) ( 1998): 144–146.
3. A. Iftikhar (2005). Jihad and the establishment of the Islamic Global Order:
A comparative study of the worldviews and interpretative approaches of al-
A’la Mawdūdī and Javed Ahmad Ghamidi. Ph.D. diss, McGill University,
Department of Islamic Studies, Montreal, 5.
4. Ibid., 5–6. In this respect, his criticism of Mawdūdī was in great affinity with
that of another contemporary Indian scholar Waid al-Din Khan (b.1925).
5. Ibid., 6. For his views on what constitutes religion see, J. Ghāmidī, Islam: A
Comprehensive Introduction. Translated by Shehzad Saleem, Al-Mawrid A
Foundation for Islamic Research and Education: Lahore. Available here: http://
www.al-mawrid.org/pages/download_books.php.
6. www.al-mawrid.org.
7. www.ghamidi.org.
8. www.monthly-renaissance.com.
9. www.musab.edu.pk.
10. Masud, “Rethinking sharīa: Javēd Amad Ghāmidī on udūd,” 358.
11. http://www.al-mawrid.org/pages/research_detail.php?research_id=5.
12. See footnote 44.
13. E.g. II, 135/129; III, 67/60, 95/89; IV, 125/124;
14. Supra note 42, 17–18.
15. H. Hansu. “Notes on the Term Mutawātir and Its Reception in Hadīth
Criticism,” Islamic Law and Society, 16 (3–4) (2009): 383–408.
16. Ibid., 18–19.
17. Ibid., 61–64.
18. In this context, he adds that it was the Prophet’s religious duty to ensure that
these religious practices are widely known and can be perpetuated by tawātur
principle.
19. Ghamidi gives an example of the famous adīth according to which Prophet
reportedly said that only the members of the prophet’s own tribe could be the
leaders of the Muslim community. He argues that, unlike the classical scholars
who understood this to be an absolute religious command, this must be evalu-
ated in the context of the “political situation which was to arise right after him”(
i.e. the Prophet). Ibid., 67–68.

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 The Relative Status of adīth 229

20. Here he provides an example of adīth prohibiting use of pictures and portraits.
In this context he argues: “If only some of the narratives are studied, one can
easily conclude that this prohibition is absolute and every picture and portrait
is prohibited in Islam. However, if all the variants are collected and analyzed,
it becomes evident that the prohibition is regarding only those pictures which
have been made for worshipping.” Ibid., 68.
21. Ibid.
22. Supra note 40, at 50–70.
23. F. Rahman. Revival and Reform in Islam. Edited with an introduction by
Ebrahim Moosa. (Oxford: Oneworld 2000), 1–3.
24. Supra note 34.
25. Ibid., 12.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.,10.
28. Ibid., 17–23.
29. Ibid.,70–71.
30. Ibid.,69.
31. Ibid.,76.
32. Ibid.,74.
33. Ibid., 75.
34. A. Saeed. “Fazlur Rahman: A Framework for Interpreting Ethico-legal Content
of the Qurʾān,” in Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qurʾān, edited by S. Taji-
Farouki (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 37–67.
35. M.Shahrour. The Qur’an, Morality, and Critical Reason: The Essential Muammad
Shahrūr. Translated, edited and with an introduction by Anderas Christmann
(Leiden and Boston: Brill.2009), xvii.
36. P. Clarke. “The Shahrūr Phenomenon: A Liberal Islamic Voice from Syria,”
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 7 (3) (1996) :337–341, at 337.
37. Ibid.
38. R.Nabielek, “Muammad Shahrūr, ein ‘Martin Luther’ des Islam,” Inamo,
23/24 (6) (2000): 73–77, 74.
39. Supra note 72, xix.
40. Ibid., xx.
41. Ibid., xxi.
42. Ibid.
43. The most famous case being that of the Egyptian scholar H. N. Abu Zayd
(d.2010).
44. Supra note 72, Introduction.
45. He refers to the traditional Sunna as “the collective body of all adīth that
capture the words and deeds of the Prophet,” Ibid., 80. To avoid confusion and
maintain consistency, I shall refer to this understanding of classical Sunna to
which he refers as adīth-based Sunna. When he employs the term Sunna in a
non-traditional way I shall simply refer to it as Sunna.
46. Ibid., 71.
47. Ibid.

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 230 Adis Duderija

48. Ibid.
49. By which he means the Qurʾān.
50. Ibid.,75–76.
51. This includes the concept of bayān as employed by Shafi’i derived from Q
16:44 to mean that bayān is equal to adīth based Sunna ; that Muammad’s (s)
acts and deeds are sacrosanct, that is, unblemished by mistake and hence infal-
lible giving rise to the theory of Prophet’s impeccability (al- ‘isma) thus putting
adīth based Sunna ontologically and epistemologically on equal level as the
Qurʿān; that Prophet’s words were inspired by God as per 53: 3–4 to mean
that adīth based Sunna equals way; the Qurʿ ānic verse 59:7 which instructs
believers to take what the Prophet gives them and to refrain from doing so
when he forbids it is also equated with adīth based Sunna; and the concept of
obedience (taʿa) to Prophet as per 3:132 as meaning obedience to adīth based
Sunna.
52. He accepts the uswa hasana Qur ʿānic verse as meaning that the prophet should
be a role model for Muslims but problematizes what the concept of “uswa
hasana” actually entails arguing that it is restricted to tawīd defined as basic
moral commandments of and belief in God. Ibid., 95–96.
53. Ibid., 71–115.
54. Ibid., 91–95
55. And obey God and the Apostle; that you may obtain mercy. Y. Ali’s translation
is used in this paper.
56. All who obey God and the Apostle are in the company of those on
whom is the grace of God—of the prophets (who teach), the sincere
(lovers of truth), the witnesses (who testify), and the righteous
(who do good): Ah! What a beautiful fellowship!
57. Here he adds in a footnote that the knowledge of this obedience is neither
epistemologically nor methodologically dependent upon the traditional adīth
sciences.
58. O you who believe! Obey God, and obey the apostle, and those
charged with authority among you. If you differ in anything among
yourselves, refer it to God and His apostle, if you do believe in God
and the Last Day: That is best, and most suitable for final determination.
59. Obey God, and obey the apostle, and beware (of evil): if you do turn back,
know you that it is our apostle’s duty to proclaim (the message) in the clearest
manner.
60. Ibid., 94.
61. Ibid., 102–103.
62. Ibid., 103–108.
63. http://www.tolueislam.org/index.htm.
64. Distinguished Professor of Arabic and Persian at Aligarh Muslim University,
India.
65. http://www.ahl-alquran.com/English/main.php.
66. http://www.tolueislam.org/Parwez/mh/mh.htm.
67. Perwez’s definition of al-dīn, whose details needn’t concerns us for the pur-
poses of this paper, can be gleaned from the following passage: “The reality

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 The Relative Status of adīth 231

is that Islam is not (as is commonly believed) a religion, in which each one
of us can worship the God of our own wishful concepts. Islam is a collective
system for life, in which we are collectively subservient to the Law of Qurʾān.
Islamic republic or system . . . is responsible for legislating and imposing God’s
Laws and having them implemented in the nation. The first Islamic nation was
established by the Messenger, the purpose and aim of which was to abide by
God’s Law. In Qurʾāns terminology, ‘to follow Allah and Messenger’ does not
mean to follow ones wishful thinking of our own make-belief world. It meant
to follow the system that the Messenger had established. God’s commands were
present in the Qurʾān the Messenger with powers bestowed upon him by Allah,
according to the needs and ethos of that culture, made the public abide by those
laws.” Parvez sees these laws as clearly evolving and subject to change as long as
the underlying principals or objectives of these laws are maintained.
68. Apart from mentioning Qurʾānic verses such as 75:17, 15:9, and 5:67.
Interestingly, he also backs up this observation on the basis of a contents of
a adīth of the Prophet’s Last Sermon according to which the prophet asked
the people present there to bear witness that he had conveyed to them the
Revelation in a complete form. The Sermon has been recorded in the adīth
collection of Bukharī, Tirmidhī and Ibn anbal.
69. See introduction to this volume.
70. http://www.tolueislam.org/Parwez/mh/mh.htm.
71. http://www.tolueislam.org/Parwez/mh/mh_04.htm.
72. http://www.tolueislam.org/Parwez/mh/mh_02.htm.
73. Adis Duderija, “Toward a Methodology of Understanding the Nature and
Scope of the Concept of Sunnah,” Arab Law Quarterly 21 (2007): 1–12.; Adis
Duderija, A Paradigm Shift in Assessing/Evaluating the Value and Significance
of Hadith in Islamic Thought – From ulum-ul-hadith to usul-ul-fiqh,” Arab
Law Quarterly, 23, ( 2009), 195–206.
74. For example, I would argue that the social sphere and customs –based ele-
ments of sunna as defined by Ghāmidī would need to be rethought in light of a
more contextualist- oriented Qurʾānic hermeneutics. See for example, in refer-
ence to divorce, Adis Duderija, “The Hermeneutical Importance of Qur’anic
Assumptions in the Development of a Values Based and Purposive Oriented
Qur’an-Sunna Hermeneutic: Case Study of Patriarchy and Slavery,” HAWWA-
AQ: Please
Journal of Women in the Middle East and the Muslim World, 11, 2013, 58–88.
provide text 75.
for this 76. See for example, Adis Duderija, Constructing Religiously Ideal ‘Believer’ and
note.
‘Muslim Woman’ Concepts: Neo-Traditional Salafi and Progressive Muslim
Methods of Interpretation (Manahij), Palgrave Series in Islamic Theology, Law
and History ed. by Khaled Abou El Fadl, (New York: Palgrave, 2011)

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 AQ: Adis Contributor Biographies
Duderija’s
biography is
missing. Please
include.

Usman Ghani is currently Assistant Professor in Arabic and Translation

Studies Department of Arabic and Translation Studies College of Arts and
Sciences American University of Sharjah, in the United Arab Emirates.
He completed his PhD in Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of
Exeter, UK, and prior to that, he obtained his MA in Islamic Studies from
the Markfield Institute, Leicester UK. Prior to that, he studied Arabic at
the Islamic Institute in Bury Lancashire, and thereafter pursued further
in the faculty of Quranic Sciences at the International Islamic University
in Medina, Saudi Arabia. In addition to working at Trinity St. David, he
has taught at the University of Leeds and Leeds Metropolitan University.
Dr. Ghani’s research focuses and specializes on the subject area of Hadith
from the formative period until the present day. He also specializes in
Qur’anic studies, Islamic Law, and Arabic Linguistics.
Ahmet Temel’s research focus centers in Islamic law and legal theory. He
is interested in the development of Islamic intellectual history in general,
and Islamic legal history in particular. He has authored various articles,
book chapters, encyclopedia entries, and review essays in both English and
Turkish in the following specific topics of his interest: early classical period
of usul al-fiqh, different classical and modern approaches to the authentica-
tion of hadith reports, the genre of legal tafsir (ahkam al-quran), modern
state of shari‘a in Muslim-majority countries and in the West, Islamic law
and human rights, modern nation-state vs. religion, and Islamophobia in
Muslim-majority countries. Ahmet Temel holds an M.A. in Islamic law
from the department of Islamic law at Marmara University and a PhD in
Islamic studies from the department of religious studies at the University
of California at Santa Barbara. He currently teaches in the department of
Islamic law at Istanbul University.
Amr Osman is currently Assistant Professor of Islamic History at Qatar
University. He earned his PhD from the Department of Near Eastern Studies
at Princeton University in 2010. His research interests include the intellec-
tual history of Islam as well as modern and contemporary Arab politics and

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 252 Contributor Biographies

thought. His first book, The āhirī Madhhab (third/ninth–tenth/sixteenth

Century): A Textualist Theory of Islamic Law, examines the history and doc-
trine of a medieval school of Islamic law, engaging with modern scholarship
on “literalism” and “textualism.” He has published peer-reviewed articles
in both Arabic and English on the redaction of the Qur’anic text, Muslim
theology, the media and the Egyptian revolution, global history, and the
relevance of early Islamic history to modern politics in Muslim countries.
He has also translated Wael Hallaq’s The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and
Modernity’s Moral Predicament into Arabic.
Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort teaches Islam and (Classical) Arabic at
Radboud University Nijmegen. She successfully completed her PhD
research “Between History and Legend: The Biography of the Prophet
Muammad by Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī,” in which she studies the sīra mate-
rial about the life of the Prophet Muammad by the famous Medinan
scholar al-Zuhrī (d. 742 C.E.) Her current research deals with the analy-
ses of aādīth about the Prophet Muammad, the earliest generations of
Muslims, and the initial period of the Islamic empire in Islamic sources
from the earliest centuries of Islam. She has published articles on “The
Umayyad Court and Sīra” and “Ahl al-kitāb,” in Muhammad in History,
Thought, and Culture; An Encyclopedia of the Prophet of God, Fitzpatrick,
Coeli & Walker, Adam (Eds.), Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2014, co-edited
the volume Transmission and dynamics of the textual sources of Islam: Essays in
Honour of Harald Motzki, eds. N. Boekhoff-van der Voort, C. Versteegh &
J. Wagemakers Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2011, in which she also wrote the
article “The Kitāb al-maghāzī of `Abd al-Razzāq b. Hammām al-San`ānī:
Searching for earlier source-material,” 27–47.
Ersilia Francesca is Associate Professor for Islamic History at University of
Naples “L’Orientale.” The main focus of her scholarly activity is on the ori-
gins and the development of the Ibadi school of law and its relationship to
the Sunni schools in the early centuries of Islam. Moving from her interest
in Islamic law particularly in the contemporary fatwas, Francesca started to
research also in gender studies and in contemporary history of economics
in the Arab world. She wrote some articles on the application of the zakāt
(almsgiving) in the contemporary Islamic states and a book on the subject
of Islamic economic thinking. Her recent publications include Economia,
religione e morale nel mondo islamico, Carocci, Roma 2013. “Comparing
the Ibāī and Sunnī Law in Bara: The case of the zakāt on cattle,” in
Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée, 132, 2012, pp. 45–61.
“Constructing an Identity: the Development of the Ibādī Law,” in Angeliki
Ziaka (ed.), On Ibadism, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim—Zürich—New
York, 2014, pp. 109–133. Francesca is also the editor of the volume Ibadi

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Theology. Rereading Sources and Scholarly Works, Georg Olms Verlag,

Hildesheim—Zürich—New York (in print) and co-editor of the volume
La rivoluzione ai tempi di Internet. Il futuro della democrazia nel Maghreb e
nel mondo arabo, Il Torcoliere, Università di Napoli “L’Orientale,” Napoli
2012.
Aisha Y. Musa holds a PhD in Arabic and Islamic studies from the
Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at Harvard
University. She is assistant professor of Religion and Middle Eastern Studies
at Colgate University, Hamilton, NY. Her research and teaching interests
include Hadith and Sunna, translation of classical Arabic texts, Qur’anic
interpretation, women’s issues, Islamic Law, and modern-day reformist and
neo-traditionalist movements. Dr. Musa is the author of various books and
articles, including Hadith as Scripture: Discussions on the Authority of Prophetic
Traditions in Islam (Palgrave, 2008), “Hadith Studies” in The Bloomsbury
Companion to Islamic Studies (Continuum, 2013), “Jizya: Toward a more
Qur’anically based Understanding of an Historically Problematic Term,”
in Transcendent Thought (November, 2011), Al-Mostafa Center for Islamic
Research, Manila, Philippines, and “The Qur’anists,” Religion Compass 4/1
(2010).
Gavin N. Picken is an Associate Professor in the Department of Arabic and
Translation Studies, American University of Sharjah, UAE. In addition to
working at the American University of Sharjah, Dr. Picken has taught at the
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Cambridge
University, and Edinburgh University. His teaching and research inter-
ests concern the Islamic tradition in the formative period, including the
development and codification of Qur’an and hadith studies, jurisprudence,
theology, and mysticism, as part of the evolution of Islamic intellectual his-
tory. Dr. Picken is the author of Spiritual Purification in Islam: The Life and
Works of al-Muhasibi (Routledge, 2011) and the editor of a four-volume
compendium of selected articles titled Islamic Law (Routledge 2010).
Ali Altaf Mian is Assistant Professor of Theology and Religious Studies at
Seattle University. Mian received his PhD in Islamic Studies from Duke
University in 2015. His dissertation, “Surviving Modernity: Ashraf ‘Ali
Thanvi (1863–1943) and the Making of Muslim Orthodoxy in Colonial
India,” is a thematic study of Muslim theology, legalism, and mysticism
in British India. Mian’s research interests include South Asian Islam, the
history of Hanafi legal thought, and gender and sexuality in contemporary
Islam.
Harith Bin Ramli is a fellow at the Cambridge Muslim College. He
studied Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Durham and the

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 254 Contributor Biographies

University of Oxford, and received his doctorate from the University of

Oxford in 2012 for his thesis on the Qūt al-qulūb of Abū ālib al-Makkī.
He has taught courses on Islamic Studies at SOAS and the University of
Nottingham. His current research explores the relationship between Sufism
and Islamic theology, particularly the interaction between Sufism and the
early Hanbali school.

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