Claimants' Closing Submissions in The Horizon Issues Trial

THE POST OFFICE GROUP LITIGATION
Claim No. HQ16X01238, HQ17X02637 & HQ17X04248
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION

Before The Hon. Mr Justice Fraser
B E T W E E N:-
ALAN BATES & OTHERS

Claimants
– and –
POST OFFICE LIMITED

Defendant
CLAIMANTS’ WRITTEN CLOSING

FOR TRIAL OF HORIZON ISSUES
The structure of this Written Closing is as set out overleaf.
The Claimants adopt the same abbreviations and form of references
as used in the Claimants’ Written Opening.

Contents
OVERVIEW ..........................................................................................................................................3
The SPM Experience ..................................................................................................................................... 6
Post Office’s Disclosure ................................................................................................................................ 9
Scope of Trial – Processes Relating to TCs ............................................................................................. 20
Defendants’ Witnesses................................................................................................................................ 23
Claimants’ Witnesses .................................................................................................................................. 44
Expert Evidence ............................................................................................................................................ 54
FACT EVIDENCE ........................................................................................................65

Introduction of Horizon (1999-2000)......................................................................................................... 65
Migration to Horizon Online (2009-2010)................................................................................................ 67
Changes Made (or Not Made) to Improve Horizon............................................................................... 70
PING and TAs .............................................................................................................................................. 80
TCs .................................................................................................................................................................. 82
Helpline ......................................................................................................................................................... 89
SPMs Disputing Shortfalls ........................................................................................................................ 91
Screen Layout and Reports available to SPMs ....................................................................................... 96
Post Office Investigation of Disputes ...................................................................................................... 99
Fujitsu Remote Access (Insert, Inject, Edit, Delete) ............................................................................ 110
Reference Data ........................................................................................................................................... 117
Named Bugs ................................................................................................................................................ 118
Recurring Problems ................................................................................................................................... 133
Problem Management ............................................................................................................................... 136
Individual SPMs ........................................................................................................................................ 140
HORIZON ISSUES ....................................................................................................167

Issues 1, 4 & 6: Bugs & Errors .................................................................................................................. 168
Issues 5 & 15: Reconciliation ................................................................................................................... 192
Issues 2, 8, 9 & 14: Information Available to SPMs and PO .............................................................. 195
Issues 7, 10, 11, 12 and 13: Remote Access ............................................................................................. 202
Issue 3: Robustness .................................................................................................................................... 210
CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................221
APPENDIX 1: HORIZON ISSUES TABLES....................................................................................223
APPENDIX 2: ROYAL MAIL AUDIT CHRONOLOGY ................................................................253
APPENDIX 3: DR WORDEN’S CREDIT AND RELIABILITY ......................................................257

OVERVIEW
The SPM Experience
OVERVIEW
The Horizon Issues Trial has been revealing. As Dr Worden put it “specific knowledge
changes the whole ball game” {Day18/167:4-5}.
The position on remote access is now unrecognisable from the picture painted by the
Post Office in preparation for an appearance before the Select Committee, in response
to Second Sight, in its public announcements in response the BBC’s Panorama
programme and in its defence to these proceedings (see GDef §57 {C3/3/25}). Mr Roll
was fundamentally right. What emerged in evidence was a picture of an open back
door to the system, while the Post Office boasted of its window locks.
Mr Roll was right about the remote alteration of transaction data without SPM’s
knowledge. It is no surprise that he felt uncomfortable at the time; and it is no surprise
that he was steadfast in his evidence about remote access. We now know that not only
was it possible but that it happened, as is clear from Mr Parker having checked with
colleagues who had “performed such actions” (Parker 2, §27 {E2/12/9}).
As with many other aspects of this case, there can only really be two explanations for
how at least some of the truth has come to light – or perhaps a combination of those
explanations. It is at least conceivable that the management and understanding of the
Horizon system is so poor, patchy, disorganised, inadequately documented and ad hoc
that proper answers to reasonable enquires or assertions could not have been given
when the GDef was pleaded, or from April 2018 when Mr Coyne was asking questions,
or up to and including the trial itself.
However, the obvious alternative is a lack of candour, verging on Nelsonian blindness
and/or dissembling, by which the Post Office sought to avoid proper scrutiny of the
Horizon system and its flaws, to avoid scrutiny of the scope of what was effectively
unfettered remote access and to avoid scrutiny of the striking discord between the
reality and the Post Office’s public narrative to date.
–3–
OVERVIEW
The SPM Experience
The Post Office has certainly not been very forthcoming in these proceedings, neither
about known bugs or defects in Horizon nor about the extent of remote access
privileges.
In relation to known bugs, Post Office’s failure to admit and acknowledge the
Dalmellington bug before it was identified by Mr Coyne is a striking example of the
Post Office’s lack of candour in these proceedings about the shortcomings of the
Horizon system and its own knowledge of those shortcomings.
Between receipt of the Letter of Claim and sending the Letter of Response, Paula
Vennells and Rob Houghton were in email correspondence about the Dalmellington
bug and Angela Van Den Bogerd was copied into that correspondence {F/1495.2}. The
Post Office’s decision not to mention or acknowledge this widespread and internally
well known bug in its Letter of Response, when it was known to have affected 88
branches between 2010 and 2015, is extremely unsatisfactory. The Post Office was less
than forthcoming about this.
The Post Office’s careful wording in their Letter of Response1 was likely, if not
calculated, to convey a misleading impression, namely that the Post Office knew of
three bugs but it accepted that there may be others. That was not a fair, accurate or
complete statement of the situation or what the Post Office knew of it. And it took Mr
Coyne to discover the existence of the Dalmellington bug, as well as a number of
others. The Post Office was less than forthcoming about this.
The statement in the letter from the Post Office’s solicitors, dated 11 January 2017, that
“the Falkirk/Callendar Square issue was only known to have affected that one branch” is yet
another striking example. That was not a fair, accurate or complete statement of the
1 {H/2/95} §1.8 “Nevertheless, you make repeated references to the existence of historic defects in Horizon in
order to give a false impression that Horizon deeply suffers from major defects, that Post Office does nothing
about them and that these errors have caused postmasters losses which have gone unremedied. In order to
dispel any myths around the defects reported on by Second Sight and cited by other sources, we have set out
below in detail what happened in these instances. To be clear - Post Office does not claim that these have been
the only defects in Horizon”
–4–
OVERVIEW
The SPM Experience
situation or what the Post Office knew of it.2 The Post Office was also less than
forthcoming about this.
Moreover, no explanation has ever been provided as to how that statement came to be
made to the Claimants − notably at a stage in proceedings when the Post Office was
contending that the GLO issues should exclude the risk that Horizon did not provide
an accurate record of transactions (as well as excluding consideration of remote
access).3
It is also salient to recall how the Post Office pressed for the Claimants to particularise
their complaints about the Horizon system, at a time when the Post Office well knew
that there obviously material matters of which the Claimants were likely not to be
aware.
Throughout this litigation the Claimants and Mr Coyne’s requests for documents and
information have been refused by the Post Office, or disclosure delayed to a very late
stage. The Post Office has throughout repeatedly refused disclosure on grounds of
alleged disproportionality and/or scope of trial, yet these considerations did not seem
to apply where the Post Office was protecting its own interests, resulting in last minute
disclosure of documents designed to shore up its own case or repair damage caused
by the evidence of its own witnesses. The extraordinary reticence of Dr Worden to
support almost any of Mr Coyne’s requests for information also calls for a better and
more convincing explanation than that which Dr Worden offered the Court.
Despite these difficulties, Mr Coyne did uncover a significant number of bugs, errors
and defects often with webs of related KELs and PEAKs. The Claimants take issue
with large parts of Dr Worden’s approach, but even on his estimates of “the maximum
2 See e.g. the 2006 email chain at {F/333.1}, which includes the Anne Chambers email on p3, and on p1
specific comment that this is a wider issue and Post Office are actively managing the problem as a
cross domain problem with Fujitsu. This bug had been the subject of evidence in the Seema Misra
trial see e.g. Mr Jenkins’ witness statement dated 8 October 2010 {F/727/14-15}.
3 Parsons 2 §141 and §145 {C11/3/43} re: Claimants’ proposed issue 5, at {C11/3/376} “Was there a
material risk that Horizon did not provide an accurate account of transactions processed by Claimants, taking
into account: (a) defects, flaws or bugs which had the potential to affect branch accounts and thereby generate
alleged shortfalls; and (b) the ability of Post Office (itself or through an IT provider as its agent) to alter or
influence transactions and thereby generate alleged shortfalls?”
–5–
OVERVIEW
The SPM Experience
possible number of bugs with financial impact” he identified 672 (conservative) and 145
(central). 4
The evidence of both experts is that they each felt that they had not been able to “plumb
the depths” of the Horizon system − as Dr Worden put it, in the year which he had had
to do so {Day18/146:2-8}, and describing “a kind of swamp of difficult questions” which he
did not feel he was going to make progress with {Day18/85:21-23}. These comments
too are telling.
Dr Worden had been provided with an initial pack of pre-selected documents when
preparing his report, but apparently none of the internal Post Office documents which
evidenced serious internal concerns about the system. Seeing most of them for the first
time in cross-examination, he accepted that a number of them were not reconcilable
with the view which he had formed of Horizon and how it operated. This fatally
betrayed the flaw in adopting his “top down” approach and in conflating how Horizon
should operate with how it actually did in practice.
In addressing the Horizon Issues, the Court will see that the Claimants take Issue 3
“robustness” last – for good reason. Whilst the reference to “robustness” is to some
extent a question of semantics, Issue 3 as a whole is in any event dependent on the
Court’s findings on other issues, even including e.g. remote access (Dr Worden
expressly acknowledged this link: {Day20/79:4-22}). The Post Office’s attempts to
inflate the importance of this issue should not distract from an analysis of the
underlying facts about what really happened – the approach which Mr Coyne sought
to take.
The SPM Experience
Although not a matter primarily in issue in this Trial, the evidence has given the Court
further insight into the experience of SPMs in relation to discrepancies and problems
which they encountered with the system and in seeking help for those problems.
4 Worden 2, §120 {D3/6/31} and Worden 2, §126 {D3/6/32}
–6–
OVERVIEW
The SPM Experience
The evidence showed that SPMs often experienced pushback from the NBSC when
asserting that a problem was Horizon related, and that the means available to them to
challenge and investigate the underlying cause of problems left them helpless,
frustrated, worried and sometimes desperate.
Individual PEAKs often contain evidence of different facets of these problems. The
following are examples illustrating doubling figures and some other issues of which
SPMs have complained:-
(a) Doubling of sums credited: Doubling of sums credited to branch accounts
when cash pouches were remmed in (through system remming errors): e.g.
PEAK PC0195380 {F/588/3}, in which Anne Chambers is investigating one
problem where £80 had doubled and then notes: “Just seen another example of this
in live... this time they scanned the barcodes, then pressed Previous instead of Enter after
the last barcode, and then went forward again. They now have a loss of £25,000.”. (This
PEAK and the fact that Dr Worden was totally unaware of the £25,000 loss when
basing his views on the £80 mentioned in KEL acha4221Q was put to Dr Worden
at {Day20/17:1-18})
(b) Doubling of discrepancies: Doubling of discrepancies when fixes were applied.
In PEAK PC0198077{F/630} (p2) “NBSC has just advised that another office had a
similar problem, although the discrepancy has now been sorted out. Details of the site
and problem are below for information...”; (p2-3) “We have now cleared this by clearing
gain from local suspense, which should clear the gain in the office”, and (p3) “The
solution we thought we had for Hucclecote SPSO, FAD 186523, has not resolved the
problem, but has actually doubled the discrepancy. The original figures in suspense were
clear loss from local suspense in OOH su of £998.81 which was the original loss in the
for the branch and this shows twice. We have entered a clear gain from local suspense but
has doubled the discrepancy that was showing on AA su from £1997.62 to £3995.24”.
See also Roll 2 §9 {E1/12/3} “I recall on more than one occasion where subpostmasters
had problems with a deficit showing in their accounts, and then as a result of working
through a process to try to resolve it, the deficit doubled’.
–7–
OVERVIEW
The SPM Experience
(c) UEB: The Post Office/ NBSC’s user error bias (‘UEB’) illustrated by the headwind
faced by SPMs when reporting problems and NBSC telling SPMs that it was not
a system fault when it was. E.g. in PEAK PC0198077 {F/630} (p2)“The spmr was
bounced back to NBSC as a balancing error rather than a system problem”; an SPM’s
forum post about the “hell line” {F/1257.1/6}; in the Helen Rose Report "The
postmaster denied reversing this transaction and involved a forensic accountant as he
believed his reputation was in doubt" {F/1082/2} {Day5/80:8-15}; and in the case of
Alan Brown, at Callendar Square, “The Spmr made several telephone calls to the
NBSC, telling them about his problems and he was advised to carry on with balancing
and produce his Cash Account” {F/300.1/2}, and “Telephoned the office and Allan said
that he was having problems again with transfers. He has contacted the Horizon helpdesk
who have subsequently come back to him to say that there is no system problem and that
he should contact NBSC. He did this and from what I can understand the NBSC have
told him that he is trying to balance on two different terminals. Allan disputes this and
is adamant that there is a system error” {F/324.1}.
(d) PO approach to SPM liability: The Post Office refusing to relieve SPMs of
liability known to be false: Again, staying in the case of Alan Brown, at Callendar
Square, “However, as part of the shortage relates to transfers, and no error notice will
be issued, then the Suspense Account Team are not prepared to authorise the entry. I
telephoned The Suspense Account Team (Ann Wilde), who told me that checks could be
made with Girobank after next Wednesday, and if that shows that duplications have been
made, then they will authorise the amount to be moved to the suspense account, until the
office receives an error notice. However, Ann stands by what she said about the transfer
problems, and that they would not move this amount to The Suspense Account”
{F/300.1/3}. Mr Godeseth fairly described Mr Brown’s situation as “a horrible
position to be in” {Day8/58:3-5}.
(e) NBSC advice re: branch accounts: NBSC advising SPMs to rollover without
having actually put cash into the till, while declaring they had, again in the case
of Alan Brown “Spmr concerned that he has now made a fraudulent entry in that he
has rolled over to the next trading period and put the loss into local suspense. He has
then gone on to state that the cash has been made good, which it hasn’t. This was done
–8–
OVERVIEW
Post Office’s Disclosure
on the advice of the Helpdesk” {F/312.1/2}. Given that other SPMs have been
convicted, and some sent to prison, precisely on that basis, Mr Brown’s concerns
were understandable.
As will already be apparent to the Court, there have been a number of unusual features
in the Post Office’s conduct of the Horizon Issues Trial. The Post Office’s approach to
disclosure is one of them.
As foreshadowed in the overview above, Post Office has throughout these proceedings
displayed a reluctance to disclose documents which are or might be unhelpful to it.
Nor has it provided information to that effect. The Post Office has been less than
forthcoming in this respect. The Claimants have as a result been required to expend
huge time, energy and resources pursuing document requests, and overcoming initial
resistance from Post Office. Notable examples of the difficulties faced by the Claimants
are:
(a) KELs, PEAKs and Release Notes, as explained in the Claimants’ Written Opening
§26 - §42 {A/1/12} - {A/1/17} and Appendix 1 {A/1/106} – {A/1/115}, and therefore
not repeated here;
(b) pre-2011 Royal Mail Audits, addressed at §24 - 25 below, and further within
Appendix 1 to these submissions at §638 et seq.;
(c) documents relied on by Mrs Van Den Bogerd in relation to individual SPMs,
addressed at §26 to 33 below;
(d) late disclosure of OCP and OCRs disclosed mid way through trial, addressed at
§36 to §43 below;
(e) very late disclosure of other documents, §44 et seq. below − even after all the
evidence was complete; and
(f) a reluctance to volunteer any (or any helpful) explanation of the documents
disclosed late and how they came to be disclosed so late.
–9–
OVERVIEW
In almost all cases, the documents finally disclosed came months after the Claimants
or Mr Coyne first made requests for them, or the Post Office identified them as
relevant, and often appeared to be intended to support or repair aspects of the Post
Office’s case (although this was seldom their ultimate effect).
Royal Mail Audits
The position in relation to pre-2011 Royal Mail is referred to in the Recusal Judgment
at §120 - §122 {C7/49/38}. WBD provided factually inaccurate information to both the
Claimants and the Court. It was only because the Claimants continued to press for
disclosure of these documents over a period of months and because the Court then
gave directions for an application to be made, that the true position became known
and the documents ultimately obtained during the trial itself (see chronology in
Appendix 1, §639 et seq.)
Mr Parsons thirteenth witness statement, which does not waive privilege in key
documents, leaves important issues unexplained (Appendix 1, §654- 655).
Documents Relating to Individual SPMs
Mrs Van Den Bogerd did not exhibit documents that she referred to in her witness
statement; rather, she gave disclosure “POL number” references, which were routinely
incorrect and/or mis-described. Further, many of the documents she had relied upon
were not referred to at all. Instead, the Post Office belatedly added hyperlinks to her
witness statement (very shortly before she gave her oral evidence) and, when checked,
those links led to documents not otherwise actually identified in her witness statement.
The Claimants had requested documents which had been responsive to searches and
collated by the Post Office, in respect of the operation of the individual SPMs’ branches
on 18 December 2018 {H/149}. It was not until 11 February 2019 that WBD said that “a
disclosure list named "Claimants' Horizon Witnesses" which contains the relevant, non-
privileged documents reviewed by Post Office's witnesses during the production of Post
Office's responsive witness statements” {H/196/6-7} would be provided. It was then
provided on 20 February 2019 {H/213} and the documents themselves were not made
available until 25 February 2019. This set of further disclosed documents included
– 10 –
OVERVIEW
many of the documents later hyperlinked to Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s statement. Thus
these documents, which could and should have been identified in and disclosed with
Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement on 16 November 2018, were not made
available to the Claimants until more than 3 months later.
Whether or not it was the purpose of the presentation of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness
statement in this way to make life as difficult as possible for the Claimants, this was
certainly the effect.
The Claimants were put to huge effort to identify which of the documents referred to
in Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement were the intended documents, to identify
where relevant disclosure had not been provided, and to identify the documents, and
entries within those documents, on which Mrs Van Den Bogerd was apparently basing
her evidence. That task had to be undertaken before her evidence could be properly
understood or any challenge to her evidence as a whole considered and formulated.
Care could and should have been taken over the preparation of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s
witness statement and the documents referred to within it. It is difficult to understand
how Mrs Van Den Bogerd could confidently have signed a statement of truth without
a careful and accurate record of the documents relied upon being available, certainly
as would be expected if an exhibit to her witness statement had been prepared.
Specific rows or entries could and should have been identified within spreadsheets
spanning thousands of pages (e.g. one of the transaction data spreadsheets for Mr Latif
spanned 28,890 rows {Day6/22:3-19} {F/1365.1}). The difference between transaction,
event and session data could have been explained rather than left to the Claimants to
decipher, a task made excessively difficult by the multiple erroneous references to one
type of data which was in fact another type. Where a spreadsheet required a list of
product codes in order to decode it, that document should have been specifically
identified and explained, and relevant product codes identified.
Similarly, it would have been helpful, to say the least, to have been told of the 1 hour
time difference (for 6 months of the year) between ARQ and other data.
– 11 –
OVERVIEW
The problems faced by the Claimants are well illustrated by the following examples
relating to Mr Latif and Mr Anup Patny and Mr Aakash Patny:
(a) In relation to Mr Latif and the issue relating to transfers between stock units, at
§90 of Bogerd 2 {E2/5/23} Mrs Van Den Bogerd referred to transaction data for
June, July and August 2015 and gave three document references: {POL-0444061},
{POL-0444062} and {POL- 0444063}. The Claimants were left to discover that
these documents were in fact spreadsheets of event data for those months. This
event data did not “show” what Mrs Van Den Bogerd described at paragraph 91
– 92 of her statement – it did not show any transactions at all. The transaction
data was not disclosed until 21 February 2019, and Mr Latif had fact gone to
Kashmir on 19 February 2019. Shortly before trial, hyperlinks were added to Mrs
Van Den Bogerd’s statement for both the event data and transaction data, and a
corrections sheet to the Defendant’s witness statements dated 14 March 2019
then provided amendments to §90 to also refer to the disclosure numbers for that
recently disclosed transaction data {E2/16/3}. There were also errors in Mrs Van
Den Bogerd’s account of what the transaction data showed, in her §91.2 and
§91.3, which were later corrected by the 14 March 2019 document. As with all
other SPMs, no rows were identified for any of the transactions referred to in Mrs
Van Den Bogerd’s statement. Nor did Mrs Van Den Bogerd identify or explain
the product ID codes referred to in the transaction data, which are needed to
understand it - transaction data only contains the product IDs of the transaction.
Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement failed to explain e.g. the product codes
for transfer in and transfer out are 6276 and 6277. When asked in evidence if she
could explain a particular product code her immediate answer was she would
need the product ID list {Day6/24:4-14} {F/1292.2}. This document was not
referred to anywhere in her evidence, despite its obvious.
(b) As to the duplicate TA issue for Mr Latif, at §98 Mrs Van Den Bogerd gave a
document reference to what she said was transaction data {POL-0444076} which
she said showed two TAs having been received on 18 January 2018. In fact, the
document reference was to a spreadsheet of event data for March 2018. Again,
it did not show what Mrs Van Den Bogerd said it did. (The hyperlink added
– 12 –
OVERVIEW
shortly before trial was to the transaction data for January 2018, and the
corrections sheet finally identified the correct document {E2/16/3}.)
(c) In relation to Mr Anup Patny and Mr Aakash Patny and the system outage in
May 2016, the document reference provided at §63 was as follows: “Fujitsu have
extracted the transaction and event data for the Patnys' branch around this time
{POL-0444059}” [emphasis added]. This reference was in fact to event data (only)
and for Mrs Burke’s branch. Shortly before trial, the correct hyperlink was added
and a correction made in the 14 March 2019 corrections sheet {E2/16/2}). An
important part of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s response to Mr Anup Patny and Mr
Aakash Patny’s evidence was what she said about cash declarations at §67 to 70
{E2/5/19}. However for this part of her statement, no document references were
given and the Claimants could not identify the apparent source of the
information (as transaction and event data do not state cash holdings). The
document which was apparently the source of this part of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s
witness statement was only disclosed on 7 March 2019, and the hyperlink was
then added to her statement {F/1834.2}.
(d) The other issue raised by Mr Aakash Patny concerned the processing of a
MoneyGram transaction. At §71 Mrs Van Den Bogerd referred to what she said
the “transaction data {POL-00444060}” showed. Again this was wrong. Mrs Van
Den Bogerd had referred to event data, which did not show what Mrs Van Den
Bogerd said it did. As in other cases, no product ID references were explained,
but the position was even worse in this case, as the only product ID list disclosed
{F/1292.2} did not match any of the relevant MoneyGram codes required to
decode the Patny’s transaction data. The Claimants were ultimately able to work
this out by cross-referencing some of the session data which had been disclosed
{F/1437.1} but, yet again, this was another time consuming and unhelpful barrier
to understanding her evidence and identifying and considering the source
documents upon which she relied. The relevant rows, and entries could and
should have been explained in Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement. The
correct documents should have been identified.
– 13 –
OVERVIEW
Mrs Van Den Bogerd was not able to give any explanation for this proliferation of quite
so many errors, save that said she did not do the referencing herself {Day6/65:20-25}.
The Claimants further note that properties of one of the documents ultimately
hyperlinked to Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement in respect of cash declarations
at the Patnys’ branch {F/1514.1}, showed that it was created on 1 March 2019
{Day6/66:6}-{Day6/67:13}. It was not possible to understand the basis of Mrs Van Den
Bogerd’s evidence before this document was provided, however, Mrs Van Den Bogerd
said she had not looked at that document when preparing her witness statement. This
situation creates doubt about the extent to which Mrs Van Den Bogerd herself
considered documents prior to signing her witness statement and/or whether Mrs Van
Den Bogerd’s team (or their lawyers) had had regard to documents beyond those
disclosed to the Claimants.
OCPs and OCRs
Mr Coyne had identified that OCPs and OCRs would be a useful and relevant source
of information, in open correspondence, certainly by early July 2018 , when he made a
prescient, constructive and sensible request for MSCs, OCPs and OCRs “where the data
to be changed has had a financial impact on Post Office or where they relate to fixing a peak”
{C5/16}. This request was not supported by Dr Worden, leaving the Post Office free to
object to it.
The Post Office duly did object, on multiple bases (8 August 2018 {C5/22/2}), including
that “OCRs would not be used for any such change (OCRs were used minor support changes
that did not required the full approval process that was needed for OCPs)” and “Post Office
does not understand what is meant by ‘financial impact’."
Financial impact did not need explanation, as it was a term which Mr Coyne had taken
from the Operational Change Process, which included on p23 [emphasis added], “In
most cases, an OCR does not involve the financial integrity of the system. Under these
circumstances one of the SSC Manager, the Support Services Manager or the Customer Service
Duty Manager can approve an OCR. If the data to be changed has a financial impact on Post
Office, then approval must also be given by a senior Post Office Manager.”
– 14 –
OVERVIEW
Mr Coyne pursued his request, and in open correspondence on 14 December 2018
{C5/29/10} he provided a definition of “financial impact” as meaning “those incidents
where a bug/defect/error resulted in a financial discrepancy in the financial accounts.”
WBD’s letter dated 21 December 2018 strangely suggested that Post Office did not
know whether any OCP records existed, stating “We are currently liaising with Fujitsu
to determine if and to what extent OCP records exist” {H/155/4}. However, by 17 January
2019, WBD’s position was that OCPs were being extracted by Fujitsu, but there was
criticism of Mr Coyne both for not having pursued these and other requests timeously,
and for pursuing them at all: “It is not clear to us why Mr Coyne wants all the information
and documents requested or how they will be used at the trial, to the extent that they will be
used at all.”
On 24 January 2019 the Post Office disclosed over 21,000 OCPs and OCRs. WBD’s
covering letter {H/179} presented these documents as if they were a complete set of
records and there was no hint to the contrary. However, 3 months later, on 18 April
2019, a further set of over 2,500 OCRS was disclosed {H/263}, these apparently having
been found by Fujitsu on a back-up which had been forgotten (WBD letter 3 May 2019
{H/273}).
The Claimants raised detailed concerns about this late disclosure in correspondence
(letter dated 17 May 2015 {H/283/2}), to which WBD partially responded on 3 June
{H/323}, although this letter repeatedly sought to pin the delay in disclosure of OCRs
generally on the Claimants and Mr Coyne, including the repeated refrain that Mr
Coyne had not explained what “financial impact” meant (as to which, see above).
Mr Parsons of WBD has since provided an 18th witness statement dated 19 June 2019
{C11/23}. The Claimants do not accept his explanation that the provision of disclosure
on 24 January 2019 was “due to desire to act in a co-operative manner with the Claimants”:
§6 {C11/23/2}. To the Claimants, the opposite appeared to be the case, and the Post
Office’s professed puzzlement over the meaning of “financial impact” verging on the
disingenuous, in all the circumstances.
– 15 –
OVERVIEW
Very Late Disclosure
Disclosure After Written Openings
Post Office disclosed a number of documents after the exchange of opening
submissions (midday on 4 March 2019) and before the start of oral evidence (11 March
2019). These documents appeared to be designed to shore up the Post Office’s case,
and indicated that further specific searches for documents helpful to Post Office had
been carried out.
Two of the documents related to the Dalmellington bug were disclosed only hours
after filing of Written Openings: an email from Mrs Van Den Bogerd {F/1421.1} and a
report {F/1427.1} which showed investigations into the branches whose status had been
unconfirmed in the Fujitsu presentation {F/1415} − a point raised by Mr Coyne in his
supplemental report dated 1 February 2019 §4.49-4.52 {D2/4.1/109-110} and relied upon
by the Claimants in their Written Opening.
Freeths had previously specifically asked for documents relating to these unconfirmed
branches (22 January 2019 {H/173/6} §17), and WBD had in response dated 11 February
2019 both (a) complained about the requests generally ({H/196/16} §9.1), and (b)
informed Freeths that disclosure had been provided ({H/196/26} §17). It is hard to
reconcile the account given by WBD in its 11 February 2019 letter with the subsequent
disclosure of documents on the afternoon of 4 March 2019. And the timing was
surprising.
On 7 March 2019, the Post Office also disclosed {F/1095.1}, an email thread which
contained copies of receipts relating to the Helen Rose Report {F/1082}. Mrs Van Den
Bogerd was taken to this document in re-examination {Day6/96:3}-{Day6/102:10}, and
Mr Coyne was also cross-examined by reference to it {Day15/46:17}-{Day15/47:25}, and
it is apparent that Post Office consider it a helpful document. Freeths had requested
all attachments and documents referred to in the Helen Rose report (15 June 2018
{H/67/9} and 22 June 2018 {H/68}, which WBD did not provide on the basis that it had
no duty to seek out known adverse documents ({H/94/7}). So the disclosure itself and
the timing were surprising.
– 16 –
OVERVIEW
As noted at §35 above, the cash account log in relation to Mr Anup Patny’s branch,
with a document date of 1 March 2019 {F/1514.1} was also disclosed for the first time
on 7 March 2019 and then hyperlinked beside §67 of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness
statement {E2/5/19}.
Disclosure after the Recusal Application
The Horizon trial was unexpectedly interrupted, and adjourned part-heard, due to the
Post Office’s Recusal Application made on 21 March 2019. Had the Recusal
Application not been made, the Horizon trial would have concluded on 8 May 2019
{A/4/2}. However, after the Recusal Application was determined: Mr Parker’s
evidence was heard on the morning of 11 April 2019; the expert evidence was heard
over two weeks from 4 June 2019; and oral closing submissions are listed for 1 and 2
July 2019.
Post Office took the opportunity afforded by the delay caused by its Recusal
Application to disclose some further documents, most of which should have been
disclosed well before, and a number of which again appear to have been disclosed
specifically to improve upon or repair the oral evidence of the Post Office’s own
witnesses.
On 28 May 2019 WBD sent a letter {H/301} which began “We refer to the cross-
examination of Mr Andy Dunks on 20 March 2019 and, specifically, two questions that Mr
Dunks was unable to answer…”, and disclosed ARQ records prior to 2014/15. This letter
also sought to provide corrections to Mr Godeseth’s witness statement and oral
evidence.
Although the letter stated that “The pre 2014/2015 records run back to 2004 —this is as far
back as Fujitsu have been able to provide”, which suggested that those years had all been
provided, it turned out that one year’s records were missing, namely those 2013-14
were missing, as Freeths pointed out: {H/331}. This struck the Claimants as odd,
particularly at such a late stage and given the terms in which WBD’s letter was
expressed, which gave no hint of a missing year. WBD’s response was to take “urgent
instructions from Fujitsu” {H/339}. Eventually, when the missing records were finally
– 17 –
OVERVIEW
disclosed at 13.01 on 13 June 2019 (during cross-examination of Dr Worden), they
showed that, contrary to the Post Office’s case and Mrs Mather’s evidence (at §19-20
{E2/8/4}) the ARQ limit had been exceeded in this very year: ({F/1848.20} shows 765
records). That revelation was not something which WBD explained or even
acknowledged in any covering letter.
On 29 May 2019, WBD sent a further letter {H/302}, seeking to change the evidence
which Mr Godeseth had given in relation to the Balancing Transaction Tool about
which he had been cross-examined on the basis of the disclosed documents,
specifically the Host BRDB Transaction Correction Tool Low Level Design {F/425}5.
The points made by WBD in this letter on which Post Office apparently wishes to rely,
had not been elicited by Post Office’s Leading Counsel in re-examination of Mr
Godeseth despite the fact that the very document which is referred to within it (the
Host BRDB Update Outstanding Recovery Transaction Tool Low Level Design document
{F/558.1}) had been disclosed6 by Post Office overnight while Mr Godeseth was giving
his evidence and uploaded to the trial bundle, presumably for that purpose.
This is an unusual approach by the Post Office. The Post Office appears to be seeking
to improve upon the evidence of its own witnesses by later correspondence.
After these letters and documents, a further 40 documents were received by the
Claimants on 30 and 31 May 2019, i.e. the Thursday and Friday before the expert
evidence began on Tuesday 4 June. This disclosure was disruptive to the Claimants
and their expert’s preparation for trial. Given the timing, Freeths’ requested “an urgent
explanation for each of these documents disclosed including what each document is and why it
has been disclosed at this extremely late stage” {H/321}. However, WBD declined to explain
the documents, responding that the content “is apparent from the documents themselves”
5 Mr Godeseth agreed that this document did not show the necessary database object fields table for
correcting the locks (i.e. “type 1”) and thus agreed that the use of the tool had gone beyond this low
level design document {Day7/178:22}-{Day7/179:10}.
6 There is a dispute as to whether technically this document had previously been disclosed by being
included by Post Office on a list of 10,000 documents with the title “Commercial in Confidence” (as
with 3,975 other documents) and in respect of which Post Office claimed privilege – see Freeths
letter dated 20 May 2019 {H/288}. If this was disclosure, it was not in any meaningful, practical,
sense.
– 18 –
OVERVIEW
{H/325}. This was a particularly unhelpful approach. The relevance of many of these
documents was far from self-evident and a more helpful explanation was fairly to be
expected in the circumstances.
It was apparent however that some of documents were, on any view, obviously
relevant, adverse to Post Office, and accordingly ought to have been disclosed earlier.
Significantly {F/1848.8.1}, concerning the 4 March 2019 incident relating to rem ins and
the effects of keying in a double zero, identifies Post Office’s “Head of Legal - Dispute
Resolution & Brand” Rodric Williams on the first page.
PEAK PC0273234 {F/1848.8.2} was also disclosed at this point. This is a document
adverse to Post Office and would have been directly relevant to the evidence which
Mrs Van Den Bogerd had given in her witness statement relating to Drop & Go. The
PEAK also contained evidence of keystrokes which were plainly available to the Post
Office from Fujitsu − a point on which Post Office’s witnesses had given very odd
evidence (addressed further below). It would therefore have been an obviously
relevant document for the Claimants to have referred to at that stage, had it been
disclosed to them. As it bore directly on Issue 8, it is even more surprising that it was
not disclosed earlier, especially given the consideration that appears likely to have
been given to the availability of keystrokes when Mrs Mather’s witness statement was
being drafted.
The explanation for the timing of the disclosure of this PEAK given in the 18th witness
statement of Mr Parsons does little to improve the position or assuage any concerns; it
reveals that Post Office waited 2 months from discovering this PEAK on 29 March 2019
(§20 {C11/23}) before disclosing it to the Claimants, just before the resumed hearing.
Further, despite the excuse given for this 2 month delay being that “For the next couple
of months my firm continued to investigate these bugs and a number of further documents
relating to these bugs came to light”, in fact, on 24 June 2019 at 17.42 WBD provided yet
further disclosure in relation to this bug {H/341} and email chain {F/1825.01}. In
response to a request for an explanation as to why this document had not been
disclosed before, WBD said that the document had been provided to it on 10 May 2019,
was intended to be disclosed on 31 May 2019 but due to an oversight was not disclosed
– 19 –
OVERVIEW
Scope of Trial – Processes Relating to TCs
on that date. This was neither a helpful nor reasonable approach. Nor was this a
satisfactory explanation. The Post Office appears to have been less than forthcoming.
The Post Office’s position in relation to TCs is reminiscent of its position at the
Common Issues trial, namely wanting the evidence all one way. In this trial, the Post
Office has both asserted the process of issuing and disputing TCs are out of scope, and
therefore refused to provide disclosure on these topics, but also adduced evidence on
these topics which is favourable to the Post Office.
So, Mr Smith’s witness statement simultaneously asserted that (1) the process by which
FSC determines whether a TC is required (§13 {E2/9/3}) and the dispute process for TCs
(§14{E2/9/3}) are both not within scope, and (2) makes statements designed to suggest
these are thorough and reliable processes e.g. “Disputes are decided on their merits, having
regard to the available evidence” (§14{E2/9/3}), and “There have been no successful disputes
around TCs for cheques due to the investigation work performed by team members using
associated systems such as POLSAP, Credence or BancTec to investigate issues before issuing
TCs” (§28 {E2/9/6).
Mr Smith’s witness statement is relied upon by Dr Worden on the very topics which
the Post Office claim to be out of scope. Worden 1, §931-932 (emphasis added):
How many of these TCs might have been in error? Paul Smith's Witness Statement
describes some approximate numbers of disputed TCs (Witness Statement of Mr Paul
Smith, 16 November 2018). If this evidence is accepted, it enables me to calculate the
approximate financial impact of errors in processing TCs. Since one may assume that
any erroneous TC is likely to be disputed (along with many TCs that are correct), the
level of disputed TCs is in my opinion an approximate upper limit on the level of
erroneous TCs.
932. Where there is evidence on the proportion of disputed TCs upheld, that may give
further information on the level of TCs which were erroneous in the first place. When
a disputed TC is upheld, I may infer that the TC was in error (i.e. the Subpostmaster
said it was in error, and after investigation Post Office agreed); whereas, is it is not
upheld, that may indicate that after further investigation, Post Office concluded that
it was not issued in error. Although that does not indicate with certainty that the TC
– 20 –
OVERVIEW
was correct, because there was further investigation, I infer that in many cases when
a dispute was not upheld, the TC was correct.
Freeths wrote to WMB on 22 January 2019 {H/173} specifically raising these issues and
seeking disclosure as follows:
“Mr Smith’s witness statement deals with volume of disputed TCs and success rate
based on “information provided to me by the Team Leaders identified in the headings”.
No documents are exhibited in relation to these issues.
It is apparent from para 16 that a case management system to record each individual
challenge to a TC was only introduced in September 2018, but we do not understand
this to mean that prior to this there are no records at all in relation to the number of
TCs issued by individual teams, the number of disputes raised, or the number of
successfully disputed TCs. The way this information is currently presented to the
court is very unsatisfactory, being essentially hearsay evidence of what team leaders
have apparently told Mr Smith, with no information about how reliable that
information is, or reference to any documentary record.
Please disclose documents which relate to the numbers of TCs issued, challenged and
successful in individual teams, ie the subject matter of this statement which is
currently dealt with on a largely hearsay basis, as above.
Please also disclose documents which relate to the introduction of the TC case
management system, and records from that system from September 2018.
Further, it is unrealistic for your client on the one hand to adopt the position that the
process by which TCs are issued and disputes resolved is outside the scope of the
Horizon Issues Trial (Smith paras 13 and 15) and yet on the other hand, Smith to later
positively rely on investigation work done prior to issue of TCs (para 28) and for your
client’s expert to proceed on the basis that the outcome of the dispute process is a
largely accurate reflection of whether the initial TC was issued correctly (Worden para
932). Please disclose documents which evidence the way in which the teams within
PO decide whether to issue a TC and resolve disputes about TCs.
Please ensure this disclosure includes any documents which deal with the facts of the
matters on which Dr Worden has made assumptions and inferences in relation to TCs,
in particular at para 931 (“one may assume that any erroneous TC is likely to be
disputed”) and 932 (“I infer that in many cases where a dispute was not upheld the
TC was correct”).
These requests were all refused on the basis they were out of scope: {H/196/16} §9.2 –
9.6.
– 21 –
OVERVIEW
The extent to which Dr Worden relies on TCs is addressed in Section B below. As to
what he had been told as to scope and his views about it {Day18/114:15} –
{Day18/115:6}:
Q. Can I ask you, did you form a view yourself about whether that was out of scope
or were you told not to look at it?
A. I was told that it was out of scope, and I found some difficulty with that because in
a sense things like robustness of Horizon actually depends on all sorts of things and
one has to try and assess the consequences of certain things, where the causes, how
business processes work and so on, are out of scope. And it is a bit of a blurry
boundary.
Q. We will come back to it later, but you refer to transaction corrections and
transaction acknowledgements and things as very important countermeasures in your
report?
A. That is right, yes.
Q. So they were central to your analysis?
A. They are essential to my analysis.
– 22 –
OVERVIEW
Defendants’ Witnesses
Overarching Themes
A number of themes became evident in the witness statements of the Post Office’s
witnesses, and the way in which they gave evidence;
Positive Spin
Post Office’s witnesses almost uniformly placed a positive spin on events in their
witness statements, and either overlooked or underplayed matters which were
negative to Post Office. These points are identified further in relation to individual
witnesses and topics below, but notable examples are:
(a) Mrs Van Den Bogerd made no mention of any of the problems relating to the
introduction of Legacy Horizon or Horizon Online, although been very serious
problems had in fact been encountered: §194 to 197 and §201 to 202(e) below.
She apparently had not carried out any investigation into what had been
happening at these times {Day5/168:1-11}, despite addressing these topics in her
witness statement.
(b) The fact that the recommendation in the Helen Rose report was not implemented
was neither addressed in Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement nor Mrs
Mather’s witness statement, and the correspondence directly on this issue was
very unsatisfactory: §322 to 323 below.
(c) Mr Smith’s witness statement gave the impression that Post Office had
introduced a new case management system for TCs in September 2018, but it
transpired during cross-examination that system is still in roll out, and only fully
implemented in 2 out of 8 teams: §239 below. The Court will note that the
Claimants had previously specifically requested documents relating to the
introduction of this system and records from it (22 January 2019 letter {H/173}
and §63 above).
– 23 –
OVERVIEW
(d) Similarly, Ms Phillips’ witness statement gave the impression that the Branch
Dispute Form had brought about a major new change of approach, but it
transpired that it is relatively infrequently used: §264 to 268 below.
These aspects of Post Office’s evidence mirror the evidence presented by Post Office at
the Common Issues trial. There were two further striking points on this theme.
Firstly, Post Office appear to have prepared for a meeting with MPs in May 2010 on
the basis that they would say that their aim was to be “open and transparent” {F/930/3},
but in fact to present the migration to Horizon Online as both “an upgrade”(p12) (it
was not an upgrade in terms of functionality, §200 below), and as having been “tested
and has the full support of the NFSP” (in fact the pilot was suspended and the NFSP had
raised concerns, §202(d) below).
Secondly, in November 2015, Mrs Van Den Bogerd had herself identified Post Office’s
historic failures to be open and honest and a need to change {F/1402} Extract from
Lessons Learnt Log Redacted Scheme Investigation Process; BAU Improvement Opportunities,
on page 5, point 9.2:
Issue: “Failing to be open and honest when issues arise, eg roll out of Horizon, HNGx
migration issues / issues affecting few branches not seemingly publicised.”
Rationale for Change: “Need to understand and action learnings from Horizon,
HNGx roll out redacted.
Need to continually publicise progress of change. Be proud to announce the positives

while detailing the challenges.
Adopting a mind-set of that no hidden agenda / no ‘skeletons in the cupboard’ will

demonstrate that lessons have been learned from Horizon, HNGx, redacted and
business shows its willingness to change.”
Mrs Van Den Bogerd said she thought that to be an important change and a helpful
one {Day5/186:10-12}. However, the Court is invited to find that at least in this
litigation to date, the Post Office has chosen not to act on that proposed change.
– 24 –
OVERVIEW
Reliance on Others
Many of the Post Office’s witnesses relied on what they had been told by others, or
work done by others, such that on many topics the Court did not hear direct evidence
from an informed person with actual knowledge of the matters in issue. A good
example is Mrs Mather, who in relation to ARQ requests, had “no idea” why she was
telling the Court about what Mr Knight believes rather than Mr Knight himself
{Day6/171:19-25} (§308 - 309 below).
In a number of cases this process has been revealed to have led to significant error:
(a) Mrs Van Den Bogerd in her witness statement at §179 {E2/5/41-42}, referred to a
table prepared by Kjetil Fugelstad, Senior Programme Analyst with the volume
of customer sessions by Claimant branch and made a specific point in relation to
Mrs Stubbs about what that data showed “Taking the Barkham branch as an
example, being the branch that Mrs Stubbs was Subpostmistress for and raises a number
of matters that I have responded to at paragraphs 103 – 110 above, you are able to see
that that the workload for this particular branch in 2001 involved an average of 1,047
weekly customer sessions and in 2007 this had increased to 1,836”. However, Mrs
Van Den Bogerd was apparently entirely unaware that WBD had sent a letter to
Freeths stating that the exhibit contained errors and had been revised and
replaced (letter from WBD dated 18 January 2019 {H/172}, and transcript
{Day5/153:9} – {Day5/154:1}). This was significant, not least because the figures
in the revised spreadsheet for Mrs Stubbs’ branch were much smaller and
showed a decrease rather than an increase, i.e. they did not support the evidence
given by Mrs Van Den Bogerd in her witness statement. It became apparent that
Mrs Van Den Bogerd simply did not understand the data “I have no idea how this
data would have been changed, or been incorrect in the first place”{Day5/155:18} –
{Day5/156:1}.
(b) Mr Smith in his first witness statement had relied on figures provided to him by
various team leaders. The presentation of those figures was relied on by both
experts in their respective reports. However, the Court now knows that Mr
Smith’s witness statement was wrong in relation to Santander TCs (§241 to §245
– 25 –
OVERVIEW
below), and can have no confidence in the figures presented for other products,
which rely on multiple hearsay, with no documentary support, and which Mr
Smith largely could not explain: §233 et seq below.
(c) Mr Godeseth in his first statement presented an absolute position in relation to
remote access in Legacy Horizon as follows: §58.10 {E2/1/17} In Legacy Horizon,
any transactions injected by SSC would have used the computer server address as the
counter position which would be a number greater than 32, so it would be clear that a
transaction had been injected in this way.” That was wrong, and Mr Godeseth had
to correct that position in his third witness statement, at §25 {E2/14/7}: “In
paragraph 58.10 of my first statement I stated that any transactions injected by SSC in
Legacy Horizon would have used the computer server address as the counter position
which would be a number greater than 32. I have read Parker 2 and I am now aware that
it was also possible for SSC to insert transactions with a counter position with a number
less than 32. I did not discuss this in my first statement because I was not aware of it.”
There are a number of surprising aspects of Mr Godeseth’s evidence on this issue:
(i) Firstly, why Mr Godeseth was giving evidence about it at all. It became clear
that he did not know any of the detail of what remote access Fujitsu had
during Legacy Horizon and was in reality reliant on Mr Jenkins and Mr
Parker.
(ii) Secondly, if the source of the information in Mr Godeseth’s first witness
statement was Mr Jenkins (as in his oral evidence he confirmed it was) why
Mr Jenkins didn’t tell him, alternatively Mr Godeseth did not understand, the
possibility of remote access being made directly at the counter (therefore not
having a counter position of greater than 32). The Court can reasonably infer
from what is known about Mr Jenkins’ experience with Legacy Horizon that
he would have known about this. Further, Mrs Van Den Bogerd in her
second witness statement (served the same date as Mr Godeseth’s first),
referred exactly this possibility (§18.4 {E2/5/6}). She said source of her
information was Fujitsu, and she thought this was probably originally from
Gareth Jenkins ({Day5/51:15} – {Day5/52:5}, and further at §326 below).
– 26 –
OVERVIEW
(iii) Thirdly, why if Mr Godeseth had initially got the wrong information from
Mr Jenkins, why he would not have sought out Mr Jenkins to speak to him
about this. Mr Godeseth was insistent he had not gone back and spoken to
Mr Jenkins about the error in his first statement {Day7/97:9-24}. This is very
odd indeed, because we know that Mr Jenkins was otherwise commenting
on Mr Godeseth’s later witness statements (re: number of branches affected
by the Receipts and Payments Mismatch bug §385 below). Mr Godeseth was
also at times equivocal about the source of his evidence.
In a number of cases, the people who had actually done the work were not identified
in the witness statement:
(a) Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s reason for not listing the small team of 9 or 10 people who
had assisted her in relation to the SPM evidence was that “I didn’t think it was
necessary” {Day6/108:20} – {Day6/109:1}.
(b) The list of the (many) colleagues Mr Godeseth had relied on, §111 below, was
not set out in his witness statement.
(c) The members of the team at SCC who Mr Parker had relied upon to produce the
tables to his statement were not identified because he “didn’t see it as being
relevant” {Day12/89:2-6}. Mr Parker said he had only read through the comments
and trusted his team to “get the technical detail right” {Day12/89:12-15}.
There were some occasions where witnesses indicated that the evidence contained in
their witness statements was not in fact their evidence at all.
(a) Mr Johnson, did not know the source of a screen shot in his witness statement,
and could not say who had cut and pasted it into his statement {Day7/8:5-7}:
Q. So do you know where these ones have come from?
A. No.
Q. Did you actually cut and paste these into the statement yourself?
A. No, I did not.
– 27 –
OVERVIEW
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Who did?
A. The statement was provided to me by our solicitors based on conversations and

–
MR JUSTICE FRASER: You don't need to tell me about that. I just wondered
who had cut and paste these into the statement.
A. I don't know who did that.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: You don't know. Right.
(b) Similarly, Mr Godeseth:
(i) indicated that a correction had been made to his statement in relation to the
number of bugs affected by Callendar Square because “somebody” spotted
that his statement was “out of line” with the spreadsheet at
{F/322.1}{Day8/73:17-23};
(ii) was unable to explain the change made from 60 to 62 affected branches in
respect of the Receipts and Payments Mismatch bug: {Day8/84:3} –
{Day8/86:3}, at §384 below; and
(iii) whereas in his witness statement in relation to ARQ requests, Mr Godeseth
had said “I have been informed by my colleague Jason Muir (Operational Security
Manager in Security Operations Team) that …” §31 Godeseth 1 {E2/1/10}, in
cross-examination it became apparent this was untrue, and in fact Mr
Godeseth had been “effectively asked to put it in” his witness statement
{Day7/149:7}-{Day7/150:1}:
Q. Just to explain what the figures are. And you have a footnote to that which
says: "These figures do not include the ARQs that Fujitsu has issued in relation
to these proceedings." So is it actually -- where did you get that information
from?
A. From Jason.
Q. So what did you ask him?
– 28 –
OVERVIEW
A. Personally I didn't ask him anything. This was information that was being
requested to go into the witness statement, so I'm confident that it is correct. I
have no particular motive in providing that information.
Q. I'm just trying to -- I'm not talking about motive, I'm just trying to identify
how it has ended up in your witness statement.
A. I was effectively asked to put it in.
Q. So did Jason Muir actually inform you of this in response to any requests
from you?
A. No.
(c) was unable to provide almost any meaningful comment at all in relation to
problem management, as this section of his witness statement had been based
entirely on information from Steve Bansall, Fujitsu’s Senior Service Delivery
Manager and Mr Godeseth was unfamiliar with any of the documents he had
exhibited (§415, and 413(e) - 413(g) below: “basically I got this from Steve”).
The whole picture is extremely unsatisfactory. The Post Office could and should have
called witnesses who have direct knowledge of the matters addressed in their witness
statements. The decision to call witnesses who do not have such direct knowledge
obviously increases the prospect of errors occurring in their evidence. However it
also has the effect of preventing the Claimants and the Court from asking a person who
is informed and knowledgeable about the matters in hand.
Gareth Jenkins
The most notable absentee witness was Mr Gareth Jenkins. Mr Jenkins was the author
of many of the most important contemporaneous documents, and was described by
Mr Godeseth as “an expert on Riposte”, “having far more knowledge about it at a practical
level” than Mr Godeseth, and he agreed that Mr Jenkins was “the most obvious person to
talk about it in a sense” (in context, Legacy Horizon).
The significance of Mr Jenkins had become apparent to the Claimants prior to trial, and
there was correspondence on this as follows:
(a) On 30 January 2019, Freeths sent a letter to WBD asking as follows {H/184}:
– 29 –
OVERVIEW
Please let us know the reason why Gareth Jenkins is not being called as a witness
by Post Office, and if there is a reason why he is unable to give evidence at trial.
We note that Mr Jenkins is the author of many important contemporaneous

documents, and that both of Mr Godeseth’s witness statements give hearsay
evidence on the basis of conversations he has apparently had with Mr Jenkins.
Is Mr Jenkins available during the trial period?
(b) WBD responded on 12 February {H/201}, providing no explanation, and
asserting privilege on all matters:
The information that you have sought regarding Mr Jenkins is clearly privileged.
It was of course open to your clients to approach Mr Jenkins to give evidence or to

apply to call him pursuant to CPR 33.4. Are your clients minded to make such an
application, out of time? If so, amongst the things they should bear in mind is that
he acted as our clients expert witness in relation to a number of criminal
prosecutions that are currently being looked at by the Criminal Cases Review
Commission.
Freeths responded on 13 February 2019 {H/203}:
We note your response to our letter regarding the reason for not calling Mr Jenkins
and why he is not available to give evidence during the trial: you have declined to
give any or even to tell us whether he is available during the trial.
You have cited that the explanation for him not himself giving evidence is
privileged. We do not accept that whether Mr Jenkins is in fact available or not
during the trial is privileged information, and in any event we infer from your
response that he is available and could be called by Post Office.
As to your reliance on privilege generally, if correct, then this could of course be

waived by Post Office at any time. Despite the obvious relevance of a candid
explanation, we note that Post Office is declining to provide any explanation at all.
If Post Office is actually going to provide some explanation (at some point in the
future) please let us know what that is now, so we can consider it fairly, and are
not ambushed or surprised by a new explanation being advanced late or during the
trial itself.
It is relevant information which will affect our approach to the trial and, as you
will appreciate, may affect the weight to be given to evidence which is said to have
– 30 –
OVERVIEW
come originally from him, but which appears in the witness statements of a number
of other Post Office witnesses.
Section 4 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 provides as follows (emphasis added):
4 Considerations relevant to weighing of hearsay evidence.
(1) In estimating the weight (if any) to be given to hearsay evidence in civil
proceedings the court shall have regard to any circumstances from which any inference
can reasonably be drawn as to the reliability or otherwise of the evidence.
(2) Regard may be had, in particular, to the following—
(a) whether it would have been reasonable and practicable for the party by whom the
evidence was adduced to have produced the maker of the original statement as a
witness;
(b) whether the original statement was made contemporaneously with the occurrence
or existence of the matters stated;
(c) whether the evidence involves multiple hearsay;
(d) whether any person involved had any motive to conceal or misrepresent matters;
(e) whether the original statement was an edited account, or was made in collaboration
with another or for a particular purpose;
(f) whether the circumstances in which the evidence is adduced as hearsay are such as
to suggest an attempt to prevent proper evaluation of its weight.
The absence of any explanation for the decision not to call Mr Jenkins is striking. He
is clearly an informed person with actual knowledge of the capacity for remote access
within Legacy Horizon, the interpretation of ARQ data, and e.g. the Receipts and
Payments Mismatch Bug and the Local Suspense issues, in respect of which he
authored almost all of the material documents. Mr Jenkins also continued to provide
commentary to Mr Godeseth in relation to his evidence in the run up to the trial:
{Day8/84:3} – {Day8/86:3}, at §384 below and even had a phone call with Dr Worden
{Day18/90:2-12}.
The Court is invited to infer that Mr Jenkins was available and could have been called,
that there was a conscious decision not to do so, and that this was motivated, at least
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in part, to prevent the Claimants and the Court from properly being able to test the
evidence of Mr Jenkins.
Corrections and Amendments prior to Witness giving Evidence
Many of Post Office’s witnesses made corrections or amendments to their statements
shortly before giving evidence.
In some cases, these corrections must have been known about for a long time – notably
Mrs Van Den Bogerd made a correction in respect of Mrs Stubbs’ case, which she must
have known about at the latest after Mrs Stubbs gave evidence at the Common Issues
Trial {Day5/13:17-21}.
Mrs Van Den Bogerd also made a correction in respect of Mrs Burke and Mr Patny’s
circumstances, which she had apparently notified her solicitors about before the
Claimants gave evidence {Day5/16:18-21} and {Day5/21:16-23}. There should not have
been a delay in making those corrections until after the Claimants’ evidence had
concluded. Mrs Burke in particular was extensively cross-examined on the unamended
version of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s account, which had (wrongly) indicated that Mrs
Burke was at fault.
The way in which corrections and amendments were produced when they were, was
also very unhelpful, as the amendments were not shown to the actual witness
statement, rather they were contained in one or more separate standalone documents.
For Mr Godeseth and Mr Parker, in addition to corrections as above, significant
amendments had also been made via the service of subsequent witness statements,
which left the extent to which their previous statements had been amended unclear.
When this first occurred, on the service of Parker 2 (which made significant
amendments to Parker 1, including confirming Mr Roll’s evidence on an important
aspect of remote access within Legacy Horizon), Freeths specifically asked WBD to
provide an amended version of Parker 1, showing the specific amendments as they
apply to individual paragraphs, “so there is no doubt about the parts of Mr Parker’s first
witness statement are affected and precisely in what way” (letter dated 30 January 2019
– 32 –
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{H/185}). However WBD did not respond to this letter, and did not adopt this
approach, either for Mr Parker or any other witness.
The approach to service of amendments and corrections to witness statements in this
way created real problems. For example:
(a) In Mr Godeseth’s case, his third witness statement described an error only at
§58.10 of his first witness statement (§73(c) above), but in fact other paragraphs
of his first witness statement were also affected by this change of evidence.
Amendments had not been made to those paragraphs.
(b) In Mr Parker’s case, the Court was required to piece together his evidence over
five different documents: Parker 1 {E2/11/1}; Parker 2 {E2/12/1} (correcting
statements made in Parker 1); Parker 3 {E2/13/1} (correcting statements made in
Parker 1 and 2); corrections served on 14 March 2019 {E2/16/4} (correcting Parker
1 and Parker 2); and corrections served on 10 April 2019 {E2/17/1} (correcting
Parker 3). The result was confusing, and it was unclear the extent to which
Parker 2 was intended to revise Parker 1, including whether the allegation that
Mr Roll’s witness statement have an “inaccurate and misleading” account of
Fujitsu’s powers (Parker 1, §11 {E2/11/3}), given that in Parker 2, Mr Parker
effectively conceded Mr Roll was correct.
Further, in relation to searches carried out by Mr Parker’s colleague Mr Simpkins:
(a) In Parker 2 §29 {E2/12/10}, Mr Parker referred to a search of PEAKs undertaken
by his colleague, John Simpkins, using defined search terms
("RiposteMessageFile", "RiposteMessage", "LPO Delete", "Marooned", "RiposteObject
put"), and stated “From the results I can determine that this was only carried out in
the following circumstances while Mr Roll was employed by Fujitsu…”.
(b) Parker 3 referred back to §29 of Parker 2, and stated at §19 {E2/13/4}: “In
paragraph 29 of my second witness statement I listed the circumstances in which
data was injected into a counter in Legacy Horizon while Richard Roll was
employed by Post Office. Of the six circumstances listed, only one involved
transaction data being injected.”
– 33 –
OVERVIEW
(c) Corrections served on 14 March 2019 {E2/16/4}, revised §29 of Parker 2 by
deleting the words “while Richard Roll was employed” and inserting the words “in
Legacy Horizon”, effectively extending the scope of §29.
(d) Corrections served on 10 April 2019 {E2/17}, revised §19 of Parker 3, deleting the
words “while Richard Roll was employed” and inserting the words “found as a result
of the searches described in that paragraph”, effectively confining the scope of §29.
(e) What these various corrections and amendments did not do, was explain why
the changes were being made. The last change, to add “found as a result of the
searches described in that paragraph”, must have been made to cater for the fact that
in fact more searches had been carried out – as referred to by WBD in a letter to
Freeths dated 20 March 2019 {H/253}. It was left to the Claimants to piece this
together and understand what had in fact occurred. It appears from the answers
given by Mr Parker in cross-examination that a specific decision was taken not
to explain the full position in his evidence {Day12/20:6-11}.
Individual Defendant Witnesses
Mrs Van Den Bogerd
Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement omitted anything unhelpful to Post Office,
and emphasised throughout the fault of SPMs. For example, as above, there were very
significant omissions in respect of the problems on the introduction of Horizon and
migration to Horizon online (§67(a) above), she did not address the fact the Helen Rose
recommendation had not been implemented (§67(b) above), she did not identify in her
witness statement that phantom transactions could cause losses to SPMs (as they
obviously could (§408 below); she suggested that pre-PING SPMs made a conscious
decision not to rem in packs of lottery scratch cards on Horizon, rather than possibly
having made a mistake or not understood the process (an obvious alternative, which
she accepted in cross-examination {Day5/59:8-17}.
She did appear more willing than during the CIT to accept reasonable propositions
when put to her, for example in respect of user error bias {Day6/77:16-18}:
Q. Do you accept that Post Office suffers from user error
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bias in the way that it meets concerns raised by SPMs?
A. In some instances, yes, I do.
However on a number of topics she remained steadfast in the face of common sense,
for example in relation to Mr Abdulla’s having received three TCs in identical amounts
over consecutive months, maintaining only one was an error {Day5/15:4} – {Day5/16:6}.
In her witness statement Mrs Van Den Bogerd consistently suggested that individual
SPMs were to blame for problems they had experienced - a clear manifestation of UEB
on the part of Post Office. Some allegations that SPMs were at fault were changed
only after the SPMs had given their evidence, by way of corrections dated 14 March
2019. Others were conceded only in cross-examination. Of particular note:
(a) In relation to Mrs Burke, §104 of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s statement suggested
causative fault on her part, which was only removed by the list of corrections on
14 March 2019 {E2/16/3}, which added the all important words “However this had
no bearing on the failed recovery of the £150 cash withdrawal”. (As at §85 above, Mrs
Burke had been cross-examined on the basis she was at fault, prior to this
correction being made).
(b) In relation to Mr Tank. §78 of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement
specifically stated that if the correct recovery process had been followed by Mr
Tank, the branch would not have sustained a shortfall {E2/5/21}. However, in her
oral evidence she conceded that no user error was causative of the error which
was generated in his case, the recovery failed, and Mr Tank did what he was told
to do on the receipt which was to pay out – it was an authorised payment
{Day6/50:1}-{Day6/52:22}.
The way in which documentary references to SPM evidence was dealt with in Mrs Van
Den Bogerd’s witness statement is addressed at §26 to §35 above.
Ms Phillips
Ms Phillips generally gave evidence in a straightforward manner, although there were
occasions where she departed somewhat from this style, notably in relation to the table
of Santander TCs (see §244(a) below).
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The main difficulties with Ms Phillips’ evidence were caused by the drafting of her
witness statement, which did not give a complete or accurate picture of the process
adopted by her team when recovering amounts settled centrally and in particular (1)
did not explain the link between the debt recovery process and disputes raised by
SPMs on the Helpline (see §260 below), and (2) gave the impression that the newly
introduced Branch Dispute Form was used in all cases (§67(d) above and §264 to 268
below).
Mrs Mather
Mrs Mather was a straightforward witness who was evidently trying to assist the
Court.
The difficulties with her evidence arose from the limits of her knowledge and
understanding in relation to Credence, which was the primary focus of her witness
statement, addressed at §284 below.
There simply must be other people within Post Office who have more knowledge and
better experience of Credence and would be better placed to provide accurate and
informed evidence on this important topic. Similarly ARQ requests - as at §72 above,
the obvious person to give evidence about what Mr Knight believes would have been
Mr Knight.
Mr Smith
Mr Smith’s witness statement was almost entirely hearsay evidence, on topics where
there clearly are many documents, but exhibiting none.
His witness statement contained a major error in relation to Santander TCs, which it
seems was only picked up because Mr Coyne had relied upon it in his report. Given
the way Mr Smith’s statement was prepared, there is the very real and likely prospect
of further errors.
Mr Smith’s witness statement also created a misleading impression about the
introduction of a new TC case management system (§67(c) above, and §239 below).
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On a number of occasions Mr Smith sought to finesse his answers in cross-examination,
including on the issue of Santander TCs (§244(b) below). However the main
impression given by his oral evidence was that he simply did not know any of the
detail and what he might “assume” is not a reliable way to identify actual facts.
Mr Johnson
The primary concern in relation to Mr Johnson’s witness statement was how it was put
together, given the screenshots of unknown origin (§75 above).
In his oral evidence, Mr Johnson was generally trying to be a helpful witness to the
Court, although again, he did not give the impression of having a particularly in depth
knowledge of his subject.
Mr Dunks
Mr Dunks (a Fujitsu employee), was called by Post Office to give evidence on the
process of audit data extraction and to explain how the integrity of data is maintained
during that process, but his ability to do so was limited.
Mr Dunks said he couldn’t recall the content of the Extraction Client User Manual
{F/1716} {Day7/47:1-13}, {Day 7/48:8-10} (a document the Court might expect him to
have exhibited), and he was unable to explain when a control involving a check of JSNs
was made available {Day 7/61:19} to {Day 7/62:13}.
Mr Dunks did not know about important issues arising in this litigation, including
whether gaps and duplicates in audit data might be caused by the retrieval process
itself {Day 7/50:17} - {Day 7/51:20} and what practically happens when gaps and
duplicates are found and how the ARQ is then provided {Day 7/52:11} - {Day 7/53:16}.
He could not explain how duplicates were removed in the period following the
introduction of Horizon Online (as referred to in a witness statement by Gareth
Jenkins prepared for the Seema Misra trial) {Day 7/56:15} - {Day 7/58:8}.
It became apparent that at least part of Mr Dunks’ statement had been prepared using
a standard Fujitsu witness statement template. He couldn’t really explain §8 of his
witness statement (“There is no reason to believe that the information in this statement is
– 37 –
OVERVIEW
inaccurate because of the improper use of the system. To the best of my knowledge and belief at
all material times the system was operating properly, or if not, any respect in which it was not
operating properly, or was out of operation was not such as to effect the information held within
it.” {E2/10/3}), and initially said he couldn’t remember if that paragraph was his choice
of words {Day7/43:7-17}. However, it plainly wasn’t, as it mirrored the wording in
previous statements from Gareth Jenkins {F/676/3}, and Penelope Thomas {F/573/6},
and when those references were put to him, ultimately Mr Dunks accepted that this
particular paragraph “may” be part of the standard Fujitsu witness statement template
{Day 7/59:7-23} and agreed the wording wasn’t something he had particularly thought
about prior to signing {Day 7/59:22} - {Day 7/60:8}, and re-examination {Day7/72:16-17}.
Mr Godeseth
Mr Godeseth appears to have been put in an impossible position, called by Post Office
to give evidence on a wide range of topics about which he had little or no knowledge
at all. However Mr Godeseth had not identified in his witness statements all of the
people on whom he had relied or the full extent of his reliance. The issues these matters
gave rise to include those addressed at §73(c) and §75(b) above.
In his oral evidence, Mr Godeseth on a number of occasions initially downplayed the
extent of his reliance on others when giving his evidence:
(a) In relation to his first witness statement generally {Day7/85:14-17}:
Q. So you were sufficiently uncertain about certain things to have to go and speak
to a number of your colleagues?
A. I wouldn't say "uncertain". It is due diligence, double checking.
(b) In relation to Riposte {Day7/88:3-5}:
It's difficult to judge how much I knew beforehand, but certainly talking to Gareth
has freshened up my understanding of it
(c) And in relation to the Receipts and Payments Mismatch Bug, describing
“knowledge derived from what Gareth told me, plus further looking at some detail” –
despite, as addressed below at §383, the documents available demonstrating that
the account given in Mr Godeseth’s statement was incorrect.
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Further, on the contentious topic of remote access, Mr Godeseth tended to argue wider
points, rather than provide a straightforward answer to questions he was asked
({Day7/92:9} – {Day7/96:6}, and again {Day7/101:2} – {Day7/102:23}).
Mr Godeseth’s oral evidence did however subsequently become generally accepting
of the limitations of his own knowledge, errors in his witness statements, the extent to
which he had relied on others, and reasonable inferences from documents identified
by the Claimants. This included in respect of the many material errors in his second
witness statement in relation to known bugs, addressed in detail below at §365, §366,
§383, and §384 - 385.
Mr Parker
Mr Parker’s witness evidence was particularly unsatisfactory in its presentation of
evidence in relation to remote access, as addressed above at §87 and §89(b) et seq. In
his oral evidence, Mr Parker also gave conflicting evidence as to whether he had
known at the date of his first witness statement the possibility of remote access being
made via individual branch counters. He responded clearly to the Judge’s questions
that he did know at the date of his first witness statement, that Fujitsu had this power
{Day12/23:5} – {Day12/24:24}. However he later changed his position, stating that he
did not {Day12/86:19} – {Day12:87:21}. If Mr Parker knew about this possibility when
preparing his first witness statement, yet did not address it – this would be a very
significant omission indeed. If he did not, then, he should not have been giving
evidence on the topic.
On this and other topics, Mr Parker was heavily reliant on work done by other Fujitsu
employees:
(a) Mr John Simpkins and Mr Mark Wright carried out the searches to produce data
for the spreadsheet of calls per month received by the SSC during the time of Mr
Roll’s employment {F/1839} (Parker 1 at §28 {E2/11/8}), {Day 12/31:20}.
(b) Mr Simpkins also carried out searches in relation to remote access, §90 above;
(c) The tables to Parker 1 apparently “produced by a team from SSC”, were said to be
prepared by Mr Simpkins, Mr Wright, Dave Seddon and he believed one other,
– 39 –
OVERVIEW
although could not remember that person’s name {Day 12/88:20} to {Day 12/89:1}.
Mr Parker had only read through the comments provided by his team, rather
than carried out his own analysis.
An important part of Mr Parker’s evidence which was relied upon by Post Office to
seek to discredit Mr Roll, was the SSC calls spreadsheet {F/1839}. Mr Parker said that
it was him personally who had decided which of the codes in the spreadsheet
represented ‘potential software issues’ {Day 12/36:22-23}. He said he had specifically
gone back to the Fujitsu End to End Application Support Strategy document {F/823/23}
and “read through it once more” to refresh his memory on the codes {Day12/56:10-21}. If
this had happened, then it is notable that the document was not referred to in Mr
Parker’s witness statement. Further, it is hard to understand how Mr Parker could
consider code 68 (Administrative Response) as a catch-all closure category when no
other closure category was appropriate ({Day 12/39:15} - {Day 12/40:19}), or to describe
code 70 (Avoidance Action Supplied) as not necessarily meaning that there is a fault in
the product {Day 12/68:1-22} - the Fujitsu manual states “To be used when there IS a fault
in the product…” {F/823/24}.
The explanation given by Mr Parker for these discrepancies was as follows
{Day12/73:23} – {Day12/75:16}:
Q Well, there are two layers of chaos. One is the way that categories are assigned.
Do you agree with that?
A I agree that they are not checked after use. Q And that they are highly subjective?
A And that they are very subjective, yes.
Q And the second point is that when you were compiling your witness statement you
went a bit off piste and departed from the definition that you say you read. Is that
fair?
A It's fair to say that I used the definition my experience dictated rather than that in
the document.
Q You didn't think that was important it make clear to the court?
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A I forgot that that was exactly what I had done in that circumstance when I prepared
that a few months ago.
Q Mr Parker, I will give you an opportunity to consider this. Is the truth of the
matter that when you looked -- well, is the truth of the matter that you had not
specifically looked at the words of the Avoidance Action Supplied definition and you
went with recollection without considering the tension between the definition and
your recollection?
A I read the details in that document to refresh my memory and allocated the codes
based on my experience and the document. Q Well, in that case, it appears you have
taken a deliberate decision to exclude a category which you knew included a fault with
the product from Potential Software Error column. Is that what you did?
A What I did was I used my experience to put that in what I believed to be the right
category heading for it.
Q So it was a deliberate decision to depart from the definition in the documentation

we have looked at and record it as not having even the potential for a software error?
Is that your evidence?
A My evidence is that my experience is that it is used more times when it is outside

a software fault than inside.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I wonder if you could put the question a third time.
MR GREEN: Was it a deliberate decision to depart from the express words that you
had looked at carefully -- or looked at?
A Yes. It was.
As addressed further below, Mr Roll was cross-examined at length by reference to that
spreadsheet as if it were an accurate record of work done by Mr Roll. The fallacy of
that position became clear in light of:
(a) The closure of PEAKS using categories which were clearly inappropriate and
masked the fact that those PEAKs concerned potential software issues,
(i) PEAK 0027887 {F/16} and Peak 0241771 {F/1326}, closed using code 68
(Administrative Response), {Day12/40:20} - {Day12/53:2};
(ii) PEAK 0065021 {F/97} and PEAK 0068327 {F/100.1}, closed using code 62 (No
Fault in Product), {Day12/56:1} - {Day12/67:25};
– 41 –
OVERVIEW
(iii) PEAK 0204765 {F/718} (which in fact references KEL wrightm33145J, relating
to the Payments Mismatch Bug) and PEAK 0063914 {F/93} closed using code
70 (Avoidance Action Supplied), {Day12/68:1} - {Day12/80:20}.
(iv) (In fairness to Mr Parker, in his first witness statement he had identified that
the allocation of response codes is subjective and there is no re-examination
to ensure consistency: Parker 1 §39 {E2/11/10});
(b) Mr Parker’s approach to the assigned categories, as addressed above, §117 - 118;
and
(c) the fact that the codes analysed were only those that Mr Roll closed himself, and
did not include other PEAKs worked on by him {Day 12/35:12-16}.
Where there is a conflict of evidence between Mr Parker and Mr Roll, the Court is
invited to prefer Mr Roll’s evidence.
Hearsay Evidence - Mr Membery
The Post Office did not call Mr Membery to give evidence, and on 9 April 2019 served
a notice of intention to rely on his statement as hearsay evidence {H/257}.
On 10 April 2019, the Claimants confirmed the necessary extension of time for that
notice to be served {H/258}, stating that Mr Membery’s evidence should be dealt with
in closing submissions.
As to the general presentation of his statement:
(a) Mr Membery’s statement does not identify or explain any of the limitations of
the ISAE 3402 audits carried out (§620 below), nor any of the deviations or non-
conformances found by the auditors. A fairly balanced witness statement would
have included these matters. Overall, Mr Membery’s witness statement portrays
the audit process in a positive light, including for example, the introduction of
ISAE 3402 audits omitting Fujitsu and Post Office’s initial reluctance, which is
apparent from disclosed documents identified by Mr Coyne and the Claimants
(§Error! Reference source not found. below).
– 42 –
OVERVIEW
(b) Mr Membery’s witness statement was apparently designed to give a high level
overview of audits that Horizon has been subject to since it was introduced in
2000 (§7.1), but his role in relation to audits only began in 2011 (§21), and his
evidence in relation to the period prior to that is limited to his apparently having
“no reason to believe” that similar steps weren’t previously carried out. Mr
Membery in reality appears to have little or no real knowledge of pre-2011
audits. Certainly no pre 2011 audits were exhibited or to his statement.
(c) Mr Membery relies on a document apparently prepared by a Mr Lenton (not
called by Post Office), but the properties to that spreadsheet show that it was
created by David Parker in 2010, and was last saved by”BH1”, casting serious
doubt on Mr Lenton as the author of that document. None of this could be tested,
given that neither Mr Membery nor Mr Lenton were called by Post Office.
The Claimants are entirely sympathetic to the position of Mr Membery, but the simple
fact is that they have been unable to test his evidence. The Claimants invite the Court
to give very limited, if any, weight to Mr Membery’s statement, given the matters
above.
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OVERVIEW
Claimants’ Witnesses
The Claimants called evidence from three former SPMs (Mr Latif, Mr Tank and Mr
Anup Patny), two former assistants (Mr Aakash Patny and Mrs Burke), Mr Roll, a
former Fujitsu employee, and Mr Henderson, a director of Second Sight.
The SPM and assistants giving evidence were not Lead Claimants and therefore Post
Office had not given disclosure in their cases prior to their witness statements being
prepared. The Post Office subsequently provided a witness statement from Mrs Van
Den Bogerd referring to ARQ data and other evidence, in the unsatisfactory way as
addressed previously above.
Each of these individuals did their best to assist the Court with their recollection of
problems with the Horizon system that were experienced on the ground in the
branches in which they worked. In many respects their recollections were
substantiated by the documents which were subsequently disclosed by Post Office.
Mr Latif
Mr Latif was SPM of the Caddington branch, from 1 October 2001 until 26 September
2018. He provided a statement ({E1/1/1} as amended) and gave evidence about a failed
stock unit transfer in or around July 2015, and mistakes in a TA and a TC intended to
correct the error, in January 2018.
Mr Latif provided his evidence via video link from Islamabad, Pakistan. He had left
the UK on 19 February to be in Kashmir to deal with his deceased Father’s estate. The
consequence of the Post Office’s late disclosure of documents in his case (ARQ data
received 21st February 2019) was that he had not been able to see or review this
information prior to giving evidence and being cross-examined on the late disclosed
documents.
Mr Latif was motivated to assist the Court as best he could. He had travelled for more
than 3 and a half hours from Kashmir to Islamabad in order to give his evidence from
an appropriate location (a firm of solicitors) with access to a desktop computer and a
– 44 –
OVERVIEW
strong Wi-Fi connection and did not complete his evidence until after 630pm local
time.
Mr Latif was an experienced and well-informed Subpostmaster. He had been an SPM
for 17 years {Day2/18:1-8} and had been a trainer for other SPMs in procedures such as
accounting, balancing and reconciling {Day2/31:14-20}. Mr Latif explained that he had
a number of assistants working for him at the branch, including two at managerial
level: one formerly worked for the police and the other was a very close friend
{Day2/7:11-17}.
The cross-examination of Mr Latif was:
(a) on the basis of documents which were complex and difficult to understand,
indeed Mrs Van Den Bogerd struggled to explain them despite the work having
been done for her by her “small team” (e.g. {Day6/23:15}-{Day6/24:10}); which he
had not seen prior to giving his evidence, because of their late disclosure
({Day2/56:14}-{Day2/57:22}, and above); and in respect of which filtering had
been applied (so that it appeared differently from the form in which it had been
disclosed) {Day2/58:23} – {Day2/59:13};
(b) by reference to an incorrect account given in Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness
statement at §90 and §91 {Day2/56:6-23} - she later amended those paragraphs
prior to her giving her own evidence {E2/16/3}, and agreed had been wrong in
her statement as originally drafted {Day6/25:6} – {Day6/27:19};
(c) on a factually incorrect basis, describing entries in the July 2015 transaction data
to Mr Latif as performing a “back office reconciliation function that wouldn't be visible
to a Subpostmaster”{Day2/62:19}-{Day2/63:14}, when in fact these entries
represented the cash (1” is the product code ID for cash). Mrs Van Den Bogerd
confirmed these entries are relevant and an important part of the transaction
{Day6/29:2} - {Day6/30:4}.
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OVERVIEW
Mr Tank
Mr Tank was Subpostmaster of the Fleckney branch from 4 May 2006 to 15 March 2017.
He provided a first statement {E1/6/1} and a supplemental statement {E1/11/1}
(revising dates in his first statement and responding to Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness
statement). By those two statements Mr Tank addressed: (1) a power failure in
September 2014 causing a shortfall of £600; (2) a shortfall of £195.04 in 2011 which
resulted from a Horizon Online failure and (3) recurring issues relating to mail labels.
There was contemporaneous support for much of Mr Tank’s evidence, in the form of
forum posts (disclosed by Mr Tank), and other documents disclosed by Post Office on
20 February 2019 ({H/213}) which had been relied on by Mrs Van Den Bogerd in her
witness statement but not exhibited by her (they were subsequently hyperlinked).
Mr Tank was generally a clear witness, with a good recollection of events, albeit it is
fair to say, not the dates on which they had occurred.
Mr Tank did appear to be intimidated by the Court process, and subsequently
explained that he had been “extremely nervous” and had been confused when
answering some questions about which documents he had reviewed when preparing
his witness statements.7
The extent to which Mr Tank was criticised for not having discovered and disclosed
his old forum posts prior to providing his first witness statement, and the importance
of being precise in his evidence {Day2/104:23-25} – {Day2/105:1-15}, was perhaps
surprising given the extent of Post Office’s own disclosure failings and the way in
which Post Office gave evidence on these issues (including the chaotic ARQ
referencing in Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement, the failure to exhibit relevant
documents, and the serious errors in the account she gave e.g. in attributing the £195.04
shortfall to user error on the part of Mr Tank).
7 Freeths’ letter dated 27 March 2019 {H/255/2} responding to WBD’s letter of 15 March 2019 {H/242.6}.
– 46 –
OVERVIEW
Mr Anup and Mr Aakash Patny
Mr Anup Patny and Mr Aakash Patny are father and son, Mr Anup Patny was the SPM
of the Spencefield branch from 13 October 2014, until he was suspended on 17 August
2016. Mr Aakash Patny worked as an assistant in the branch.
Mr Anup Patny and Mr Aakash Patny gave evidence about problems balancing cash
and stamps which followed a national Horizon system outage on 9 May 2016 (Mr
Anup Patny {E1/3/2-3} §7-13 and Mr Aakash Patny {E1/2/2-3} §6-17), and Mr Aakash
Patny also addressed a MoneyGram problem occurring in February 2016 (Mr Aakash
Patny §18-24 {E1/2/3-4}).
Mr Anup Patny’s evidence was relatively limited, essentially to the fact there had been
a national outage on 9 May 2016 (which was not disputed by Post Office), Mr Aakash
Patny having remmed in a cash delivery on 11 May 2016 and, and receiving a call from
Debra Lambley, which he directed to his son. He was however cross-examined at
some length by reference to cash declarations which he had not undertaken. The
allegation put to him that cash declarations minutes apart which were different in
amount showed that the things were “pretty chaotic” and “all over the place” were
rejected by him, Mr Anup Patny explaining that the way in which the user entry works
within Horizon is such that it is easy to make a manual error because unless previous
digits are deleted, the system can add on the new entry to a previous figure
{Day2/179:23} – {Day2/180:24}. There was no challenge to this account, and Mr Aakash
Patny later gave a consistent account {Day3/25:14} – {Day3/27:20}, describing what
might happen if an SPM “didn’t tab correctly” causing an apparently massive gain or
loss – an account which was again not challenged by Post Office’s counsel.
Mr Aakash Patny was a patently honest witness and there was no proper basis for the
awkward allegation of dishonesty which was (after a morning break) unexpectedly
put to him by Post Office’s counsel in respect of the May 2016 balancing problem, as
follows: {Day3/46:5}-{Day3/47:9}:
Q. Do you agree with this, that if a declaration of stamps goes up, the cash position is
automatically decreased, isn't it?
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OVERVIEW
A. I'm not sure. I don't know that. As in do you mean for overall, or holding --
Q. It automatically happens, doesn't it, that as the declaration of stamps goes up, the
cash position will go down?
A. I don't see why that would. The cash is going to remain the same, isn't it, if
stamps go up?
Q. Let me put it in a different way. If you were trying to disguise a shortfall of cash,
one thing you could do is to declare too much by way of stamps, isn't it?
A. No.
Q. You disagree with that?
A. Yes, because why would stock make a difference to cash?
Q. Because the more stock you've got, the less cash will show, as a matter of balance?
A. Potentially, but I'm not too sure of that.
Q. Are you confirming that all of the declarations that you made in relation to both
cash and stamps at all times were accurate to the best of your knowledge?
A. I tried to, yes.
Q. And a declaration of stamps -- you remember the £18,000 declaration of stamps,

was that an attempt by you to disguise a shortfall of cash?
A. No.
Q. I suggest it may have been. I suggest it was, Mr Patny. You deny that?
A. I do, yes.
Mrs Van Den Bogerd confirmed that she had not intended such an allegation in her
witness statement {Day6/68:5-25}:
Q. Okay. What we see in the call logs -- and I'm talking about the logs we have I
think already seen but they are at {F/1509.1} if we could just look at those. You were
in court I think when you heard a positive allegation of dishonesty being put to Mr
Aakash Patny, weren't you?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. That he was inflating the stamps to conceal cash deficit?
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OVERVIEW
A. Yes, I was here, yes.
Q. But that's not an allegation that you suggested in your witness statement?
A. No, I haven't.
Q. And the reason for that is you don't believe that's necessarily what he was doing?
A. I didn't offer an opinion at all. What I was in this looking to do was to try and
look at what he said had happened and look at what we could see from the data. Now,
what we can see is that the stamps are overdeclared and that has a corresponding cash
entry and there was a loss beforehand, but I haven't gone further with any other
suggestion on this.
As put to Mrs Van Den Bogerd, the allegation was also wholly inconsistent with Mr
Aakash Patny’s efforts to obtain a Credence report, as recorded in the Helpline call
logs {F/1509.1} (26 May 2016 entry, row 140, column “P” Resolution Details “Emailed
ESG Thu 26/05/2016 14:22 requesting credence report please see attached documents advised
office of credence info office adamant stamps are declaring themselves and overriding is figure
referred to IT if believes system issue”), and see further the entries on 21 June 2016 and 1
July 2016, recording Mr Aakash Patny chasing the Credence report (rows 147 and 149
column “K” Description”), and 3 August 2016 (row 155) closing the call.
Mr Aakash Patny confirmed in re-examination that he had never received this
Credence report {Day3/63:5-7}. Mrs Van Den Bogerd also confirmed in cross-
examination that since he had requested it and Post Office had said they would
produce it, they should have done {Day6/71:9-14}. (The Claimants specifically
requested disclosure of “requests for and relating to the Credence report referred to within
the NBSC call log”, but no further disclosure was provided.8)
As put to Mrs Van Den Bogerd {Day6/70:13-25}:
Q. And the Credence report would have shown the keystrokes?
A. Yes.
8 Freeths letter 4 February 2019 {H/186/2}, WBD letters 11 February 2019 {H/196/18} and 27 February 2019
{H/227/2}
– 49 –
OVERVIEW
Q. And if Mr Patny had been dishonest, it would provide powerful evidence of his
dishonesty, wouldn't it, the precise keystrokes entered?
A. Potentially, yes.
Q. And it is Mr Patny we see chasing up and repeatedly requesting the Credence

report in these logs?
A. Yes. Q. It doesn't make any sense if he thinks he has been dishonest, does it?
A. Well, he wants to see the information. I mean that's what he is after, isn't he?
Whether or not a Credence report would have contained keystroke activity is wholly
unclear, given the changes in evidence by both Mrs Van Den Bogerd and Mrs Mather
on this issue and the recent disclosure showing keystrokes were available from Fujitsu.
However, a person who was deliberately inflating stamps to conceal a cash deficit is
obviously unlikely to be chasing further information and reports showing the precise
events in branch.
Post Office’s allegation that the declaration of stamps was made to “disguise a shortfall
of cash” (above, {Day3/46:24}-{Day3/47:9}), was also completely at odds with the case
previously put that what had happened was cash had been misplaced on 11 May and
found on 12 May, and an accurate declaration made on 13 May {Day2/176:11-17}). The
declarations of stamps in the event data which Post Office’s counsel relied upon, were
dated 18 – 25 May 2016 ({F/1507.1} – with Post Office’s filter applied).
The fact that such a serious allegation was put to Mr Aakash Patny without good
foundation is a vivid illustration of Post Office’s willingness to allege fraud and
dishonesty against SPMs, where an SPM is alleging a problem with the Horizon
system.
Mrs Burke
Mrs Burke was an assistant at the Newport branch, where her husband was
Subpostmaster. She had worked for the Post Office since she was 16 years old both as
an assistant and as an SPM {Day3/68:12-19}. She had helpfully retained a full set of
documentation relating to the issue she had encountered following the 9 May 2016
national system outage.
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OVERVIEW
In her witness statement {E1/4/1} she explained the failed recovery process which she
experienced, and her efforts to rectify a resultant shortfall in her accounts of £150,
which included her tracking down the customer herself. She had received unhelpful
advice from the Helpline in that she was told that “If the transaction isn't on your
transaction log then the transaction hasn't gone through” {F/1466/3-4}, which was incorrect,
because it had, and this is what had caused the shortfall.
Despite Mrs Burke definitively not having caused the shortfall, Mrs Van Den Bogerd
served a witness statement suggesting that the cause was Mrs Burke’s alleged user
error in not clearing the stack: §104 {E2/5/25}. Mrs Burke was then extensively cross-
examined by reference to §104 of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement, in a
manner designed to suggest her not having cleared the stack was a significant failing
and increased her chance of suffering a loss (this took up 7 pages of the transcript:
{Day3/73:19} to {Day3/80:21}).
It was not until after Mrs Burke’s evidence that §104 of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness
statement was corrected to state “However, this had no bearing on the failed recovery of the
£150 cash withdrawal.”
Mrs Van Den Bogerd said that she had made this correction to her solicitors before
hearing Mrs Burke’s evidence {Day5/16:11-21}:
Q. And then the other sort of correction we've got is corrections of evidence that you
have only recently heard -- you were in court, weren't you, for the evidence of Angela
Burke?
A. I was, but actually for Angela Burke I had already made that correction to my
solicitors before I heard that evidence.
Q. So hold on a second, you had already decided to make the correction you have made
in relation to Angela Burke before she gave evidence?
A. Yes.
If this is correct, then plainly the Claimants should have been notified of this prior to
Mrs Burke being cross-examined, and it was unfair and unreasonable for Mrs Burke to
be cross-examined in the way she was without knowing of this intended change.
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OVERVIEW
Mr Roll
Mr Roll was right. He was honest. And he could not fairly be said to have any axe to
grind.
Mr Roll worked for Fujitsu between 2001 and 2004 as an IT Product Specialist, with a
particular role in 3rd line support. He appeared on the BBC Panorama programme on
Horizon as a whistle-blower, giving details on Fujitsu’s ability to remotely access and
alter branch accounts without the knowledge or permission of the Subpostmaster. Mr
Roll’s evidence was important and it was right: §2 and 3 above. Without his evidence,
the Court would never have heard the evidence that it did as to Fujitsu’s ability to
remotely access branch accounts and would have been likely to proceed on a totally
false premise in relation to remote access.
Mr Parker directly challenged Mr Roll’s evidence in Roll 1 as “inaccurate and misleading”
Parker 1, §11 {E2/11/3}. However, this was misplaced and unfair, to say the least. It
was of course Mr Parker who later served a second witness statement effectively to
correct his first witness statement, which had been wrong.
Mr Roll was a rational and careful witness. His recollection as to the extent of software
issues9 that he and the SSC dealt with was challenged on the basis of a spreadsheet
referred to in Parker 1 {F/1839/1}, which purported to convey the percentage of
potential software issues encountered by the SSC as indicated by PEAK closure codes.
Mr Roll, who had no insight into how the spreadsheet was created, reasonably
accepted that he was unable to challenge the numbers presented to him on their face
{Day 3/119:4-23}. Mr Roll was however clear that there was a stark disconnect between
his recollection and the figures presented to him: the way he remembered it did not
agree with the figures he was shown. For example, at {Day 3/157:20}:
Q. For "coding problems" I take it you're talking about software bugs. On the basis
of the analysis of the evidence that we have just been through at slightly painful length,
would you accept that it is possible that you may have rather exaggerated the position,
no doubt unintentionally, in the last sentence of paragraph 11?
9 Mr Roll clarified in oral evidence that when he uses the term ‘software issues’ this encompasses both
code issues (or software bugs) and data corruption issues {Day 3/161:4-20}
– 52 –
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A. Certainly the way I remember it doesn't agree with the figures, so yes, it is possible
that --
Q. Much of your work was not fire-fighting coding problems at all, was it, coding
problems represented a tiny amount of your work?
A. On the evidence you have just supplied, that's correct.
A further example appears at {Day 3/160:15-22}:10
Q. Do you think there's a danger that by describing yourself as "routinely

encountering" software errors, you may have unintentionally exaggerated the
position?
A. I'm referencing here the whole department, not myself and it was my recollection
that as a department we were routinely encountering software errors, which, as we
have previously said, the figures don't support that but that was my recollection.
However, the premise of this cross-examination was later shown to be fundamentally
flawed: what later became clear when Mr Parker gave evidence, was that the figures
put to Mr Roll based on that spreadsheet, and Mr Parker’s classification of those which
represent ‘potential software issues’, were not merely subjective but hopelessly
unreliable and, in some cases, positively misleading (§89(b) above). The Claimants
invite the Court to prefer Mr Roll’s recollection, not least because his recollection on so
many important issues has already proven to be a correct and reliable. Mr Roll
maintained that, but for the spreadsheet figures that were presented to him, he
remembered that the SSC were regularly encountering software issues which could,
and did, cause financial discrepancies at branch level and, where the cause of the
discrepancies could not be found, it was reported up the chain and assumed to be the
fault of the Subpostmaster;11 and that much of the work being carried out by the SSC
was “firefighting coding problems in the Horizon system”.12
Mr Roll was also cross-examined on many issues by Post Office’s Leading Counsel
reading long paragraphs from Mr Parker’s witness statements, often at speed, and then
10 See also, e.g.: {Day 3/157:20} to {Day 3/158:7}, {Day 3/159:4-6} and {Day 3/175:24} to {Day 3/176:8}
11 Per Roll 1, §10 {E1/7/2}, about which Mr Roll he was cross-examined at {Day 3/160:11-22}
12 Per Roll 1, §11 {E1/7/2}, about which Mr Roll was cross-examined at {Day 3/157:9} to {Day 3/158:18}
– 53 –
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Expert Evidence
being asked if he agreed e.g. {Day 3/114:3-24} and {Day 4/116:12-20}. Answers elicited
in this way were of limited evidential value for obvious reasons.
In short, the evidence tended to show that Mr Roll was right about remote access, right
about time pressure, right about the nature of his work, right about the frequency of
software issues and their handling and right about his own feelings of unease, at the
time.
Mr Henderson
Mr Henderson is a director of Second Sight who undertook a limited review of Horizon
and the Post Office and went on to assist with the mediation scheme before being
terminated in 2014.
Mr Henderson was a clear and confident witnesses doing his best to assist the Court.
He felt that he had been constrained in the evidence he could give due to the
confidentiality agreement as modified by the protocol which he informed the Court he
had signed with Post Office {Day4/183:20}-{Day4/184:12}.
Expert Evidence
The experts took distinct and contrasting approaches as to the issues themselves, their
investigation of them and their opinions on them.
Mr Coyne
Mr Coyne adopted a fact-based or “bottom up” approach. He started by trying to find
out what had actually happened. He tried to identify sensible lines of enquiry at an
early stage ({C5/0.1} and {C5/0.2}) by identifying relevant sources of evidence, trying
to obtain them, analysing them and trying to follow them through to a reasoned
conclusion. This was not easy, not least because of the headwind which he
encountered in trying to obtain the documents which he regarded as being plainly
relevant, many of which he alone requested as long ago as 2 July 2018.
Through these endeavours Mr Coyne discovered the Dalmellington bug, which he
mentioned in his first report. He also discovered the APPSUP role (including fact that
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Expert Evidence
it had been used over 2,000 times between 2009 and 2018). He explained these in his
reports. This prompted the Post Office to adduce further factual evidence 13 on those
issues, which had not previously been forthcoming.
Both of these points were plainly both important and adverse to the Post Office’s case.
The Post Office well knew of both of these issues:
(a) Dalmellington: The Post Office knew all about this bug/defect, how many
branches it had affected, how many instances of it had occurred and over what
period of time. The Fujitsu presentation dated 10 December 2015 {F/1415}, the
email chain from Anne Chambers to Katheryn Alexander, probably in January
2016 {F/1425.1}, and the emails of 1 July 2016 {F/1495.2} (after the Letter of Claim,
but shortly before the Post Office’s Letter of Response on 28 July 2016 {H/2})
together and/or individually put Post Office’s knowledge of the Dalmellington
bug beyond any doubt.
(b) APPSUP: The Post Office knew about the APPSUP role too. In 2017, the Post
Office entered into a formal agreement with Fujitsu with regard to access to
Horizon and the Post Office’s data, including by use of the APPSUP role. The
document containing this was called “Post Office Account User Access Procedure”
{F/1705} (and was put to Dr Worden {Day20/105:7}).
So, despite knowing about these two important issues, the Post Office left the experts
to root around in the “swamp” which was Horizon to try to find these issues. In the
event, Mr Coyne uncovered both; Dr Worden, neither.
Dr Worden did not support any of Mr Coyne’s requests, but Mr Coyne nonetheless
sought to do the best he could in difficult circumstances.
Mr Coyne was balanced and fair. By way of example, Dr Worden agreed that Mr
Coyne had been “scrupulously fair” {Day20/42:11}-{Day20/43;18} in his treatment of bug
13 For example, in relation to the APPSUP role, Parker 3 and Godeseth 3 both addressed this and were
served (without permission) on Thursday, 28 February 2019, when Written Openings were due at
midday on Monday, 4 March 2019.
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Expert Evidence
#8 in the bugs table in Joint 2, at {D1/2/7-8}. Mr Coyne’s response to cross-examination
about the relevance of documents relating to TCs was also telling in fairly balancing
the possibility that this further information might make the position better or worse
for Post Office {Day14/53:9-10}.
A number of attacks were made to Mr Coyne’s credibility and fairness which were
unfounded. Notable examples include:
(a) The criticism of Mr Coyne for not having sought to identify the number of
branches affected by particular bugs “anywhere” in his reports and Post Office’s
Leading Counsel “struggling to understand” Mr Coyne’s answer that he had done
so {Day15/129:13} – {Day15/130:23}. Mr Coyne had set this information out in
the bugs table in Joint 2.
(b) “Cautioning” Mr Coyne for saying that in one of his early requests for information
he had been given a response that he shouldn’t be requesting any information
that makes any attempt to identify particular claimant characteristics
{Day16/22:18} – {Day16/22:8}, in circumstances where this is exactly what
happened (§1.3 {C2/21/5-6}, §1.5{C2/21/7-8}), see re-examination {{Day17/176:2} -
Day17/177:25}).
The fact that these challenges were made at all shows that they were being made
opportunistically rather than on a carefully considered basis.
The fact that Post Office felt it necessary to make opportunistic challenges of this sort
speaks to a lack of confidence in their own expert evidence, concerns as to their expert’s
impartiality, or both.
Much of Post Office’s cross-examination of Mr Coyne was a prisoner to definitions
and assumptions, which were sought to be imposed upon Mr Coyne. As to the
assumptions, see for example {Day17/97-99}, including the refrain “reliably assume”. As
to the definitions, see for example {Day17/104}:
Q. And the difference between transient discrepancies and lasting discrepancies is

transient discrepancies get handled by countermeasures. So there is no ultimate effect,
there is no lasting effect. There may be some short period of time where there is a
– 56 –
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Expert Evidence
potential shortfall, but in the long run the countermeasures existing in the Horizon
system will ensure that the discrepancy is resolved. Yes?
A. They should ensure if they are all working in position correctly, yes.
The Court sought to clarify this fairly complicated cross-examination14 by asking Mr
Coyne how many bugs should be listed in paragraph 1.15, at {Day17/106:6-16} and after
lunch Mr Coyne explained this further. For example, at {Day17/109:7-19}:
Q. I'm not seeking to achieve an advantage by just saying bugs, I'm simply using
the term as a form of shorthand, Mr Coyne. I understand what you mean when you
seek to make yourself clear. That's entirely reasonable. That table identifies 29 bugs.
You now say 21 bugs are lasting. And just to be clear, what you are actually saying
is that 8 of the 29 bugs were not lasting, they are bugs that in your judgment would
not have got past the countermeasures that exist in Horizon, yes?
A. Not quite. They are bugs which have the potential, so they could well be caught at
a later point in time. They go to one of the later Horizon Issues.
The Court again sought to clarify the effect of the questions and answers at
{Day17/110:14-21}:
MR JUSTICE FRASER: A different way of putting the same point is the passage that
I asked you about, which is at 1.15 on JS2 on page 29, which said: "The number of
distinct bugs, for which the experts have seen strong evidence of the bug causing a
lasting discrepancy in branch accounts, is between 12 and 29." 29 is now 21?
A. Yes, my Lord {D1/2/29}.
On one view, Mr Coyne was almost too accommodating of the difficulties imposed on
him by the assumptions and definitions he was required to accept in Post Office’s cross
examination of him. He was subjected to repeated challenges on paragraph 1.15 in
Joint 2 {D1/2/29}, which was in essence a compromise, and followed the immediate
(and important) context of the different approaches of the experts identified at §1.9 and
§1.10 in respect of “branch impact” {D1/2/28-29}. The premise of much of his cross-
examination was a requirement to accept Dr Worden’s approach to lasting impact ,
14 On the footing being pressed upon him, Mr Coyne in places appeared to be confining bugs with
“potential” impact to Issue 4, rather than Issue 1, which on a correct reading, the Claimants submit
does include potential impact and is not confined to “lasting financial impact”.
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Expert Evidence
which was even put to him as being the purpose of the bugs table itself {Day17/106:1-
5}, which was wrong. Mr Coyne did not agree with this approach to Issue 1, he
occasionally made this clear,15 but it plainly caused him difficulties in responding to
the way the questions were being put.
Stepping back, Mr Coyne’s evidence, both in his Reports and orally, represented a
genuine attempt fairly to identify and characterise the bugs, errors and defects which
he had been able to identify, in the context of the system as a whole, in so far as he had
been able to analyse it. He correctly identified the Issues in his reports and
conscientiously sought to address them on the basis of facts which he had found in
such evidence as he was provided with. As explained below, this was in marked
contrast to the approach of Dr Worden.
Dr Worden
Dr Worden adopted an unusual approach in his reports in a number of important
respects:-
(a) Dr Worden re-defined some of the Horizon Issues, which had been agreed
between the parties and ordered by the Court.16
(b) He then formed his opinions on those issues, on the basis of a “top down”
approach.
(c) In cross-examination, it became clear that these opinions often comprised little
more than fairly high-level impressions.
(d) These high-level impressions were, in turn, apparently based on extrapolations
from his own experience and from significant assumptions (in the Post Office’s
favour) that:
(i) the design aspirations for the Horizon system had been almost perfectly met;
15 For example, {Day17/100:20-22}: “They do have an impact on branch accounts until it is dealt with by Post
Office. There is very little doubt about that.”
16 See Dr Worden’s Issues (‘DWI’) below.
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Expert Evidence
(ii) the Post Office’s factual evidence was correct; and
(iii) the Post Office’s business and reconciliation processes worked close to
perfectly in in identifying and/or correcting system derived errors in branch
accounts, so that however many such errors there were, there would be
effectively never be a “lasting” effect on branch accounts.17
Dr Worden’s opinions appeared to be directed at disproving the Claimants’ claims in
this litigation generally. That was not his role. Nor was that approach called for by
the Horizon Issues as ordered by the Court.
Dr Worden showed scant interest in the underlying facts – at least not where they were
unfavourable to the Post Office.
(a) He repeatedly reached conclusions without reference to obviously relevant (and
available) contemporaneous documents, such as:
(i) documents showing the Post Office’s internal recognition of its concerns
about Horizon;
(ii) PEAKs relating to bugs, errors or defects identified in the table in Joint 2
{D1/2/3} (e.g. the key PEAKs at 2, 5, 6(i), 7, and at least some of those in 8)18;
(b) In Worden 1, he failed to deal with the Dalmellington bug properly, despite it
being described in detail by Mr Godeseth, in Godeseth 2. Even in Joint 2, he did
17 An example in his analysis of KELs, where he makes an “easy” inference in relation to something
that most KELs do not say, on the basis of something Mr Parker himself does not say, as follows at
§402.3 {D3/1/103}: “When some countermeasure would avoid financial impact, sometimes this is stated
explicitly in the KEL, but often it is not. I assume this is because KELs were written by people deeply familiar
with Horizon, who expected their readers to understand that there would be no impact (as noted in the Witness
Statement of Mr Parker at paragraph 66).”
18 Although, in stark contrast to this, Dr Worden not only read but quoted from the Anne Chambers
PEAK in Dalmellington, in which she said she could only look back 2 months and had only found 4
instances. Failing to mention the other known instances of the Dalmellington bug created an
obviously misleading impression of the situation.
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Expert Evidence
not agree with Mr Coyne on the 112 instances and the 88 branches affected. This
was bizarre. His explanation in cross-examination was unsatisfactory.19
(c) He generally declined to support Mr Coyne’s lines of enquiry and requests for
documents from as early as April 201820 – in many cases, the very documents
upon which he would later seek to rely.
(d) He did not seek any further information to clear up any genuine ambiguity that
stood in the way of reaching an informed view on important issues – possibly
most strikingly, the alleged ambiguity which he asserted remained after Parker2
as to remote access {Day18/82:8-25} and prevented him from acknowledging the
obvious and altering his opinion accordingly.
Dr Worden’s expert opinions were neither properly founded, nor fair-minded, as
evident from:-
(a) The fact that Dr Worden re-defined the Horizon Issues and the way in which he
did so, which was strikingly supportive of the Post Office’s general case in the
litigation.
(b) The fact that Dr Worden claimed to have “established” contested and
contentious facts in the Post Office’s favour (§1119 at {D3/1/245} and
{Day18/52:15-24}). He therefore rejected Mr Roll’s evidence.21 That was not his
19 Despite Godeseth 2 explaining it in some detail (including the number of incidents and branches
affected) and Dr Worden himself relying on Godeseth 2, in Worden 1, in relation to each of the
other three bugs (other than Dalmellington) explained there, Dr Worden stated in cross-
examination that he did not refer to it because it “was not an important bug because it doesn’t leave a
subpostmaster with a lasting shortfall” {Day19/194:7} to {Day19/195:6}. However, he also the Post
Office stated that he did read the Fujitsu presentation and “must have noticed” the unresolved
£25,000 and £2,500 issues {Day19/196:4-24}.
20 Mr Coyne’s early attempts to identify and progress sensible lines of enquiry are first to be found in
open correspondence in the document entitled Experts’ Joint Working Notes (Enquiries Document)
dated 20 April 2018 {C5/0.1} to which WBD responded at {C5/0.2}. As the Court is aware, Mr Coyne
continued to seek further information, as is apparent from {C5}. Two examples are at {C5/7/1} and
{C/5/16}. Dr Worden’s stance can be seen from his stated position at {C5/13/2}.
21 He also regarded the Claimants’ evidence generally as irrelevant.
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role. Nor was it consistent with the guidance to which he referred in his expert’s
declaration, at the end of Worden 1 (§1194 at {D3/1/260}).
(c) The fact that Dr Worden refused to change his view about remote access (or take
any steps to resolve any genuine ambiguity) when the Post Office’s witness Mr
Parker eventually agreed with Mr Roll about it.
(d) The fact that Dr Worden sought to set parameters to direct the Court’s approach
by constructing a statistical model in which:
(i) he adopted an obviously flawed, premise of uniform distribution of impact
of bugs on branch accounts (Cf. Penny Black), which he boldly defended in
his evidence;
(ii) he adopted a scaling factor22 based upon the following flawed assumptions:
(A) an assumption of a univariable correlation between the number of
transactions in a branch and impact of bugs on branch accounts;
(B) an assumption that that correlation was linear and directly
proportionate;
(C) an assumption that the bugs which he was using as his control (for this
purpose) occurred in branches of average size; and
(D) mistaking session numbers for transactions numbers (despite the
distinction being important and clearly in evidence).
(e) He made a series of basic errors in his calculations,23 all of which favoured the
Post Office), including the following:
(i) omitting available figures for the ‘gaps’ in the 2007 Session Data (clearly
identified in a separate column, even in the original spreadsheet);
22 Variously found in Worden 1 at, for example, §769 {D3/1/176}; and Worden 1 at §686 {D3/1/161}.
23 He also incorrectly calculated the average number of branches between 2000 and 2019, but including
the figures for 1999 in his averaging calculation.
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Expert Evidence
(ii) dividing the (reduced) session total by 561 instead of the 496 branches which
appeared on the spreadsheet; and
(iii) stated that he had taken the figure of 48 million transactions per week from
Bogerd 2 (and said it to be agreed by Mr Coyne), when the number was 47
million, was found in Bogerd 1 and Mr Coyne had correctly taken 47 million
– all this in service of a calculation of Dr Worden’ scaling factor to two
decimal places.
It was also not clear from Dr Worden’s Reports from where he had derived his
approach or the facts upon which he relied. For example:
(a) Dr Worden did not make clear that he had adopted what he called a simple
statistical analysis because the Post Office’s solicitors had encouraged him to
“keep it simple” {Day19/90:11}−{Day19/91:13};
(b) He relied upon Parker 1, in various respects. As to his examination of KELs, at
§879 {D3/1/195}, he expressly refers to the fact that “Fujitsu have analysed the same
KELs, reaching conclusions similar to my own”. Whilst disavowing any reliance on
Fujitsu’s apparently independent analysis, he notes that “they have a better
understanding of the meaning of KELs than I do.” None of this explains how
Fujitsu’s analysis repeated passages, almost verbatim, from Dr Worden’s later
Report. In oral evidence he stated “it is obvious from the terminology that they use
that they sometimes picked up my wording” {Day20/47:25}.
(c) He did not disclose in his Reports that he had spoken to Gareth Jenkins, as a
source of information in relation to the Receipts & Payments Mismatch bug
(Worden 1, §650 {D3/1/153}), and indeed appeared specifically to suggest the
contrary by referring to his reliance upon “written evidence, particularly a written
analysis by Gareth Jenkins”.
It was only in Dr Worden’s oral evidence that his disregard for detail and precision
became apparent. This was unheralded by his reports, which tended strongly to
suggest the opposite. Dr Worden was not a details man.
– 62 –
OVERVIEW
Expert Evidence
Dr Worden’s evidence also strayed outside his expertise - he was certainly not a
behavioural economist, although he sought to give evidence in his report about when
an SPM would likely call the Helpline. He accepted in cross-examination that he had
neither the facts nor the relevant expertise to make these estimates: {Day18/20:4-8}
Dr Worden’s evidence was in large part about statistics, although he has no formal
qualifications as a statistician. Memorably as to his statistical calculations, whereas Dr
Worden’s starting position was “I believe that the statistics I have applied as a scientist
particularly but also as an engineer goes to the point of advanced statistical analysis”
{Day18/10:16-19}, following cross-examination in relation to those calculations, he
sought to convey a very different impression: “I was very careful in my reports not to use
advanced statistics. I was trying to keep it at undergraduate level, if you like.” {Day19/86:20-
22}.
Further detailed submissions as to Dr Worden’s reliability as an expert witness are
addressed in Appendix 3.
– 63 –
OVERVIEW
Expert Evidence
– 64 –
Section A. FACT EVIDENCE
Introduction of Horizon (1999-2000)
FACT EVIDENCE
Over the relevant period, there were evidently problems with Horizon – problems of
which the Post Office was aware. Yet, none of Post Office’s witnesses acknowledged
them or identified these in any of their witness statements.
Even where the Common Issues Trial had identified the existence of internal
documents to that effect (and the Court had asked for a list) there was still no
recognition of those concerns in the Post Office’s witness statements. Although the
Post Office did serve a number of further witness statements in 2019, none sought to
address those matters.
As in the Common Issues Trial, the Claimants have been left to try to piece together
the picture. The Post Office was not even candid about the Dalmellington bug, which
it had stopped investigating after the Letter of Claim and which Mr Coyne only
discovered by chance.
The Post Office has been less than forthcoming, amongst other things, about the
shortcomings of Horizon.
There were problems when Horizon was first introduced; that much is clear, although
as noted above, none of Post Office’s witnesses acknowledged or identified these in
their witness statements.
This is perhaps most striking in Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s case because, as at §70 above,
she had herself in November 2015 referred to the roll out of Horizon as a time when
Post Office had failed to be open and honest when issues arose.
By definition, she must therefore have had knowledge both that (1) there were
problems at this time, and (2) there had been a failure to be open and honest about
them.
Key documents from this period (as put to Mrs Van Den Bogerd) included:-
– 65 –
(a) PEAK PC0027887 {F/16}, call date 21 July 1999, a receipts and payments
mismatch problem escalating to over £1.05m, relating to a known software
problem.
(b) PEAK PC0033128 {F/22}, call date 10 November 1999, an SPM experiencing a
discrepancy of £43k, initially undiagnosed ( “no fault can be found”, 29 November
1999), with the underlying problem not identified and fixed until months later:
“The evidence in the message store was that messages continued to be written to the
message store but that all the 'Payment' transactions which should have been recorded
in the rollover trailer messages failed to appear (although others did, such as the Rem
OUT and Transfer OUT totals). This indicates that the problem was not one of running
out of Disk space but of failing either to retrieve, or write out, transaction totals for one
particular node in the node hierarchy” (18 February 2000), and “Root cause of stock
unit integration problem. Data trees have been failing to build fully, and the system has
not been detecting this. Consequently, discrepancies in the balancing have been
occurring. In the case of Dungannon a whole Payments node was missing. There have
been a number of calls relating to this kind of issue. A fix has been put in at CI4 which
will prevent this happening” (4 July 2000).
(c) ICL Pathway Customer Service Management Support Unit Monthly Incident
Review, November 2000, {F/89/6} recording on p6:
“The most frequently occurring incidents in November were both types of

Receipts and Payments Incidents (Migration and Post Migration), with
31 incidents per category. The Migration incidents have remained at the
same level, whereby the Post Migration occurrences have increased.”
(d) ICL Pathway Customer Service Management Support Unit Monthly Incident
Review, December 2000, {F/84/6} recording on p6:
“The most frequently occurring incidents in December were Post

Migration Receipts and Payments Incidents with 65 incidents followed by
18 Migration Receipts and Payments incidents.”
Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s evidence was that as a Retail Network Manager she was
listening to problems raised by SPMs, but was not being provided with any
– 66 –
Migration to Horizon Online (2009-2010)
background information from Post Office about what the problems being encountered
were {Day5/165:14-21} and see also {Day5/167:7-21}.
The background to the introduction of Horizon was the Benefits Payment Card Project,
or Pathway Project, which was widely regarded as IT disaster (see e.g. Computer
weekly article, dated 1 November 2000, Pathway and the Post Office: the lessons learned
{F/70}). ICL was the Post Office’s IT provider at this time, and remained so at the date
of the introduction of Horizon. It is a matter of public record that Fujitsu was the
majority shareholder in ICL from 1990 (80% shareholding), and became a 100%
shareholder in 1998. The procurement process left the Post Office holding the contract
as part of the deal for the DSS to abandon it. Dr Worden’s views about its “greenfield”
origins and subsequent development were formed without reference to its history (of
which he was blissfully unaware) and relevant contemporaneous documents.
None of Post Office’s witnesses made clear to the Court in their witness statements the
limitations of Horizon Online, and in particular the fact it was not designed to deliver
improved functionality. This much is apparent from the “Welcome to the Horizon Online
Induction Training” slides dated 7 December 2009 {F/555}, p8:
Horizon Online TM:
-is about reducing the Post Office's® operating costs, (around 1 m per week) and is a
fundamental element of forward: three2eleven
-is based on the principle of "Business Equivalence”
-will look and feel very different to existing Horizon
-but will not radically change transaction processes
As with the introduction of Horizon, there were also problems around the time of the
migration to Horizon Online, again, not identified in any of Post Office’s witnesses
statements. Again, this is most problematic in the case of Mrs Van Den Bogerd,
because, as at §70 above, she had herself in November 2015 referred to “HNGx
– 67 –
migration issues” as something which Post Office had failed to be open and honest
about at the time.
As had to be established through the cross-examination on the documents:
(a) The Horizon Online High Volume pilot had had to be halted after 614 branches
had migrated, because of the problems which had been reported (see {F/610}
Operations Functional Report, April 2010).
(b) Some SPMs experienced very serious problems. {F/588/1} PEAK PC0195380,
dated 2 March 2010, recording one SPM reporting as follows (p3, emphasis
added):
On the 1st of March at the close of business we found that on node 5 the cash was short
of £1000. All of the figures for that day match the figures presented at the time of each
transactions. An instant saver withdrawal for £1000 was transacted that day, but I
was unable to find this transaction using the online report facility. I feel very anxious
as I believe a system error has occurred at the time of this transaction.
On the 2nd of March a transaction for a cash withdrawal was completed where the
system commanded a member of staff to issue the money to the customer on screen but
the receipt printed for that transaction printed out a decline slip. The customer was
honest enough to bring back the decline receipt a day later with the money.
On the 2nd of March on node 5 a £220 cash deposit was authorised on screen but
twenty minutes later the customer brought back a receipt that stated the transaction
had declined. We contacted the NBSC as and when the customer produced the receipt.
The NBSC stated that the transaction approved on the system and had no idea why
the money was not deposited and why the decline slip was printed.
A rem was scanned in our system and all figures had doubled up. The helpline team
was notified at the time to which they seemed more confused as to why it happened
than me!
Another error occurred on the system when 10 items of postage seemed to disappear
for no reason half way through a customer’s transaction. The system commanded no
money to be taken from the customer on screen or by receipt.
A transaction on node 2 where a car tax was entered disappeared; the system was not
even being used when the tax information disappeared from the system as the clerk
– 68 –
who was processing the transaction was writing the details of the vehicle on the tax
disc!
The help desk team simply regarded the matter as a glitch. We were told to complete
the transaction again.
The Helpline team seem not to be sure of any query we bring to them, they are guarded
to take ownership to any problem and never reply to any calls. It is a shame as the only
person we get results with is Garry Elenor which makes no sense as he is part of the
horizon training team.
Since the four days of closure we have lost over £5000 to date. This includes staff
wages, retail closure, combined salary and losses incurred on the counters.
It has been noted when speaking to a helpline representative in Bangalore our servers
are not online all the time and communicating as there is a software problem. Our cash
declarations have not once been received since the new system has taken over.
We have no idea when the system will crash and for how long it crashes. Our
customers are very upset with the way our business now trades, as our office had a
very low rate of closure which now seems to have spiralled out of control!
I really wish that the new system was not undertaken in our office as it is adding stress
on the customers ourselves and our staff.
I have a deep regret in initially volunteering to take part in this new pilot scheme, as I
did not expect to have these complications with such poor services from the helpline.
Unfortunately our migration officer is away (Garry Elanor ) leaving us with no one
with the means to correct our issue today.
Why should it be my liability to recoup all the losses in this already declining business,
when these systems should have adequate contingencies for any such problems that
could or would arrive. It seems that the helpline have left me for seven hours now
without any intention of calling us back as no one again wants to take ownership over
this problem.
(c) Fujitsu initiated a “Red Alert” with independent reviews {F/614/4} Horizon
Online Programme Update, 8 April 2010.
(d) The NFSP whilst remaining supportive had “raised concerns”: ibid.
– 69 –
Changes Made (or Not Made) to Improve Horizon
(e) There had been multiple branch closures (due to Horizon problems) over the
Easter 2010 period, with SPMs seeking compensation as a result: {F/639/3}
(author Paula Vennells).
(f) After the pilot recommenced, some SPMs raised concerns in regard to “system
integrity and the creation of losses” {F/658/2};
(g) The ongoing delay to the programme was impacting on the resource available to
deliver migration support, with the support team continually reducing as people
left on voluntary redundancy terms {F/657/3}.
(h) The pilot was extended: {F/708/8} Period 12 09/10 Sales Report “Horizon migration
- A number of issues have occurred with the Data Centre which have impacted on have
affected live service to all Horizon Online branches. Following on from this a decision
has now been made to extend the duration of the pilot period to allow for further testing
to be undertaken on the system. As a consequence the planned date for the full roll-out
schedule to commence has now been postponed until satisfactory progress has been made
in achieving stability of branches within the pilot.”
Miskeying
Mrs Van Den Bogerd had in her witness statement chosen to respond to Coyne 1
§5.125, where Mr Coyne had referred to a “Business transformation – Finance Wave 1 L3
pack Discussion document” {F/1258}, dated 1 October 2014 and which includes the quote
at p18 (emphasis added):
“A significant proportion of demand at FSC is driven by errors/mistakes made in

branch with entering in data into Horizon. Part of these errors can be avoided with
relatively small changes to horizon (e.g., related to two-part transaction for bureau
pre-order, mismatches with AEI third party kit, top-up and redemption of budget
cards, the “quantity” field for cheques and miskeys in general)”
In her witness statement, Mrs Van Den Bogerd simply said “my understanding is that
these examples were considered by Post Office along with other potential improvements at the
– 70 –
time” (§157 {E2/5/35}) before moving on to address other instances where Post Office
had made changes to Horizon, thus not engaging with the issue raised by Mr Coyne.
The fact evidence which it was necessary to elicit in cross-examination shows that
miskeys have has been a longstanding issue, they can have a significant impact on
SPMs, and Post Office has failed to address these problems in any meaningful way.
(a) Recommendations to deal with miskeys had been made as far back as 2008 –
“Summary of IS Review - Peter Laycock, 2008” {F/476}, which recommends “Double
entry and cross validation free form transactional values at the counter for all financial
prods [POCA, bill payments/personal banking)”; identifies the operational impact
“May add some time to process at the counter (minimal)”; the system impact “Changes
to Horizon required to prompt for double entry and cross validation – should not be
overly complicated or expensive (PL}”;the opportunity − c80% reduction in disputes
and claims …”; and the action “Assess cost of system changes to Horizon and time
window (IT)”. And under “Other Business Benefits” inter alia “Major improvement
of point of transaction data integrity”; “Double entry, customer sight and validation of
transaction will minimise balancing issues …”; “Operational efficiency – less balancing
errors, productivity savings, less calls to NBSC and partner banks.”
(b) Similar recommendations had been made in 2012 - Mis-Keyed Project Feasibility
Study {F/994} - which includes at p4 §3.1 Background “As part of the P&BA centre
of excellence drive, one of the areas of concern is the number of instances of mis-keyed
transactions that occur and much to the detriment of P&BA. A mis-keyed transaction
occurs when an incorrect value is input by the counter clerk, which causes a poor
customer experience. The mistake can have a significant impact on the branch and
resource is required in P&BA to manage the client and address the error. A very large
value mis-keyed transaction will put the viability of a branch in doubt. The objective of
the feasibility study is to establish the options for preventing mis-keyed transactions and
more detailed benefits and success criteria will be considered. …” (emphasis added).
Also the recommended resolve on p10 “Make it happen to improve the situation
where mis-keying occurs.”
– 71 –
(c) Helpline call logs show many occasions where SPMs had experienced miskeying
with very significant financial effects. For example:
{F/1201}
Row 444- 07/04/2015-MISSKEY- PM PUT THROUGH #10789.37 RATHER

THAN #1089.37 WHEN DOING AN ONLINE BANKING TRANSAC
Row 1030- 07/04/2014- Online Banking- HAS PUT THROUGH ONLINE

DEPOSIT FOR #13000 INSTEAD FOR #1300
Row 5974-10/04/2014- MISSKEY- CMR HAS TRIED WITHDRAWING

#2096.44 BUT OFFICE ENTERED AS A DEPOSITPM KNOWS CUSTOMER
AND THEY ARE GOING TO RESOLVE THEMSELVESCMR HAS SIGNED
RECEIPT FOR DEPOSIT SAYING IT IS A MISTAKE
{F/1368}
Row 1171- 10/08/2015- miskeying - miskey santander pm entered 19400 should

have been 1940
Row 1578 - 10/08/2015- miskeying- has miskeyed cash deposit for santander as
entered £14,000 instead of £1,400
Row 4497- 12/08/2015- miskeying- MISKEY, SHOULD HAVE BEEN 40

POUNDS BUT DEPOSITED 4000, DID CORRECT TRANSACTION THE
SECOND TIME
{F/1429}
Row 586 - 08/02/2016- miskeying- Online banking miskey Santander Deposit

done incorrectly overstated should have been approx £3400 keyed in £34k
Row 2509-09/02/206- Miskey- Sat santander business deposit for £4428.58

entered as £44,298.58 - Cannot reverse due to mag card?
(d) Indeed, Mrs Van Den Bogerd had indeed identified miskeys as a cause of
shortfalls in her first witness statement dated 24 August 2018: §177 {E4/1/33}:
“Mis-key. If a Subpostmaster enters the wrong value of a transaction into Horizon

this could cause a discrepancy. By way of example, if a banking customer deposits
£1,000 into his account and the person serving the customer mistakenly enters
£10,000. This would create a shortfall of £9,000 for the branch. The same thing
would sometimes happen with paper records.”
– 72 –
It appears that Post Office’s response to the known issues relating to mis-keys was not
to introduce any design change to Horizon to e.g. prompt for amounts over £500, or
e.g. double entry for banking deposits. Rather the process appears to be as at {F/1449}
“Over Keyed On Line Banking Cash Deposit Customer Present - End Of Procedure” - the
SPM must make good or settle centrally any resulting shortfall in the usual way, but
the Helpline operator will complete a miskey form (“To find the Mis Key form follow the
filepath P:\Core K Base\Miskey Forms\Mis Key A&L or Mis Key Non A&L”) {Day5/109:20}
– {Day5/111:23}. This document is however confusing in a number of respects, and
Mrs Van Den Bogerd thought it likely incomplete {Day6/109:3} – {Day6/111:9}; but, on
any view, it did nothing to prevent mis-keys.
Van Den Bogerd’s Selected Changes
Mrs Van Den Bogerd selected three examples of changes made for the benefit of SPMs:
Drop & Go, Cheque Rem out and Bureau de change automated second receipt §158
{E2/5/35}. The implication of her evidence was that these were at the very least
representative, if not the best, examples she could find of improvements made by Post
Office. The reality was illuminating, as became apparent in cross-examination.
Drop & Go
The presentation of the changes made to Drop & Go in Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness
statement (§158.1 – 158.2 {E2/5/35} suggested that it all went smoothly. However the
documents (which the Claimants had to search for and find, as none of them had been
referred to or exhibited) revealed a different story.
The November 2014 change had in fact caused major problems, including re-instating
an existing known issue of locking customer accounts. {F/1346}, ATOS presentation
“Online Mails – PIR” dated 2 June 2015:
(a) Page 2 (emphasis added):
…As the project progressed, Click &Drop was de-scoped during Sept14 and the
Drop&Go changes were deployed on the 5th Nov 14.
– 73 –
The enhanced Drop&Go service introduced a new D&G database hosted on CDP and
aligned the Horizon Drop&go basket behaviour with the standard Horizon basket
functionality. The Quick mails process was originally enhanced to prevent users
exiting and settling to cash in error (a failing of the existing service which results in
customer accounts being locked). However the Commercial Team wanted the ability
for customers to procure any mails product with a Drop&Go account and thus a late
change was made to allow users to exit Quick Mails to access other Horizon functions.
This re-instated the existing known issue of locking customer accounts if the correct
counter processes are not followed.
Since go live a number of issues have been encountered that have resulted in a large
number of blocked customer accounts, a resultant high volume of calls into NBSC, and
dissatisfaction within branches and for impacted customers.
(b) Page 3:
Lessons learned that have been captured to ensure that other similar projects don’t
suffer from the same pitfalls.
(c) And further at p12 (emphasis added):
Key Lessons Learned
Commercial decisions over customer experience
Summary: The decision was taken to allow a known design flaw to continue to enable
customers to use their D&G accounts to purchase other mails products.
Limited and Non-effective Communications
Summary: Limited training and communications were issued to branches as this was
assumed to be an incremental change to an existing product.
Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s evidence was that she “wasn’t aware of the exact details” but she
“knew there were problems” {Day5/116:15-16}, and she accepted it was fair to say her
witness statement had given a “slightly rosy picture” {Day5/117:7-14}.
There was no hint of any of these matters in her witness statement.
– 74 –
As for the June 2017 change, it is difficult to understand the full significance of the 7
October 2016 “Drop & Go – Settle to Cash Resolution” document {F/1549}, because of a
number of redactions throughout.
(a) E.g. on page 4:
(b) And on page 5:
(c) And page 14:
Mrs Van Den Bogerd was unable to assist further, e.g. in relation to page 4 above
{Day5/119:13-16}:
Have you ever heard of a discussion of a debit transaction correction being used in
quotes in that way? Is there anything ...?
A. No. That doesn't make any sense to me.
– 75 –
However, she agreed that on the basis of the content which is visible within the
document, that there were clearly problems with the development of the Drop & Go
prototype {Day5/122:7-11}.
Finally, the 27-28 April 2017 email chain “RE: Drop & Go - Checkpoint Approval to
release for Pilot” {F/1640} indicates that the live code deployed in model offices had
“broken the existing live code for telecoms” and the pilot was stopped just in time (“I’ve
already checked in with Rob H and Mick M on this one – we cannot consciously put code live
if we know it will break the bigger network, especially on the run up to a bank holiday”).
Cheque Rem Out
The second example chosen by Mrs Van Den Bogerd related to an improvement to the
cheque rem out process (paragraph 158.3 {E2/5/36}). This was “quite a straightforward”
change and “it didn’t cost an awful lot of money to get it sorted either” {Day5/129:25} -
{Day5/130:8}, yet it was not introduced until August 2015.
The cheque rem out process:
(a) had been an issue for a long time {Day5/125:8-12};
(b) was clearly problematic (5 September 2013, Horizon Service Improvements
Workshop {F/1129/3-4});
(c) yet even when the change needed had been identified as part of the Branch
Support Programme, and reported to the Executive Committee as scheduled for
release in October 2014 (Branch Support Programme paper dated 25 June 2014
{F/1225/3});
(d) the release test plan was not produced until February 2015 {F/1323/4}; and
(e) ultimately the change did not happen until August 2015.
Bureau de Change automated 2nd receipt
The third example chosen by Mrs Van Den Bogerd was a change to automatically print
a second receipt for bureau de change transactions. This change was not introduced
until September 2014.
– 76 –
The design of Horizon was such that no second receipt automatically printed, and
indeed, could not be printed if the SPM or assistant proceeded to serve another
customer. This left SPMs unnecessarily exposed to liability for customer fraud,
because, as the Post Office knew, the bank would not refund a fraudulent transaction
without a duplicate receipt retained by the SPM showing the security checks
performed (see 5 September 2013, Horizon Service Improvements Workshop
{F/1129/5-6}.
Again this was a simple change to make and there was no reason it could not have
been done before. Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s view was that “if a receipt is required as part
of the transaction … it should always have been automatically produced” {Day5/133:20-25},
which was a candid acceptance by her that not only was the change long overdue but
the problem should not have existed in the first place in the design of the system. This
is a good example of a defect rather than a bug.
The fact that these three changes were chosen to be presented in Post Office’s favour
as apparently representative examples of changes made to the benefit of SPMs is
telling.
Changes to MoneyGram
Mrs Van Den Bogerd in her witness statement also chose to respond to a reference in
Coyne 1 to poorly handled changes introduced by Post Office having caused errors in
accounts (Coyne 1, §5.183), and specifically the reference to MoneyGram which Mr
Coyne had identified.
The account in Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement §161-163 {E2/5/36-37} was
again very different from the picture which emerged on cross-examination. Notably,
whereas her witness statement suggested the communications had been the same (“to
remind” SPMs), in fact the advice to SPMs had changed significantly over time:
(a) The 1 October 2015 communication {F/1382} did not say speak to NBSC, contrary
to the impression in her witness statement (§161-162), nor (importantly) did it
give any guidance about transactions before or after polling time.
– 77 –
(b) The 3 March 2016 Branch Focus article {F/1440} was the first communication to
say contact NBSC – although we do not know how prominently or otherwise this
article appeared in Branch Focus. (The timing of this article was in fact 10 days
after the problems experienced by Mr Patny, on 23 February 2016)
(c) Almost two years later, a flowchart headed “MoneyGram Decision Tree Refund
Customer Diagram V0.2 19” {F/1767} was apparently published in Branch Focus.
(d) The flowchart showed the complexity of the process, and now for the first time
mentioned cut off time (i.e. polling time) as an issue affecting how the SPM
should proceed.
The form of the flowchart disclosed and exhibited to Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness
statement was without any article or explanation. However Mrs Van Den Bogerd
described having found the diagram together with a Branch Focus article dated 19
February 2018, as follows {Day5/138:16} – {Day5/139:7}:
Q. Yes. Then the next thing you refer to at 163.2 {E2/5/37} is the flowchart at
{F/1767}. Can we have a look at that please. So we are now in 19 February 2018.
Again, we don't know exactly where or how this was in the Branch Focus article?
A. My understanding is it was attached to that version of it. That's my

understanding, it went out with that version of ...
Q. Well, this one seems to be 19 February 2018 this one. Is that right? You said it is
19 February 2018 in your witness statement?
A. Yes, because the actual diagram itself isn't dated, the flowchart itself isn't dated
on here.
Q. Yes.
A. So when I located it it was with that Branch Focus is how it was presented to me
as that's when it went out, on that date.
That Branch Focus article was not exhibited by Mrs Van Den Bogerd, and not disclosed
by Post Office. However, after Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s evidence was completed, by
letter timed at 15.33 on 21 March 2019 {H/24.01} (after Post Office issued their recusal
application), Post Office disclosed the document {F/1767.1} The Claimants note it
– 78 –
begins with the line “Your feedback suggests refunding MoneyGram transactions can be
confusing.”
There were evidently wider problems around this time with MoneyGram, which had
not been referred to in Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement at all. All emphasis
added:
(a) MoneyGram Quarterly Business Review dated 18 July 2016 {F/1502}, p24,
Problem Statement: “Multiple instances of system latency have been reported since
24th January 2016. The latency was exposed by changes to the IT environment in the
January Release … This latency is causing some transactions on the POL system to time
out, resulting in high traffic to the operational contact centres and obvious customer
impact” and p29: “Duplicate transactions are created in MG systems as a result of the
Post Office time outs. A joint MG/POL team is working to ascertain impact on
settlement and implementation of an appropriate plan of action”. The bar chart on p25
shows the highest number of problems occurring in w/commencing 22 February
2016. (This was in fact the week during which Mr Patny had difficulties – on 23
February 2016).
(b) “Small Project Proposal: DM0055860 - Hot House - Moneygram issue” dated 19
October 2016 {F/1555}: “For the last several months Post Office has experienced a live
operational issue with MoneyGram transactions across the Branch Network. In the event
of a transaction timing out at the counter, an system error message is displayed to the
user (Error Code 84) and the transaction is aborted. This leaves no record of the
transaction at the counter and the transactions and funds may or may not have been
committed in the MoneyGram domain. This causes significant issues for Post Office and
MoneyGram, and for customers. … A quick fix has been identified by the Atos team, to
amend the existing AP-ADC reference data to treat the system error as a timeout
response and trigger the correct counter behaviour. This is being targeted for deployment
this week and will resolve the counter issues.”
The above document indicates that ATOS had found the problem within the first hour
of testing. As to why Post Office had not commissioned ATOS earlier, Mrs Van Den
– 79 –
PING and TAs
Bogerd’s response was that she “could not understand why it took so long” {Day5/152:14-
18}.
PING and TAs
Introduction of PING
PING was “at last” introduced in 2012. Overall it was an improvement for SPMs and
simplified the process (as agreed by Mrs Van Den Bogerd {Day5/61:25} – {Day5/62:3})
which had previously required scratchcards to be remmed in on Horizon and activated
on the Camelot terminal. The PING change applied to both scratchcards and lottery
online sales {Day5/62:4-6}. PING was also introduced by Post Office for Post and Go
and Paystation transactions (see §230(e) below).
Post Office has never explained why PING took so long to introduce. Notably:
(a) Lottery had been in branches since before the introduction of Horizon (e.g. Mr
Bates was required to have a lottery terminal in a prominent position in his
branch).
(b) {F/506} PING Project (Interfacing Client Data into POL Systems) Requirements
Catalogue, p3 can see that first version of document dated 10 October 2008.
(c) Implementation was not until 2012 (Mrs Van Den Bogerd w/s §25 {E2/5/8}).
(d) There was internal recognition (at least at Fujitsu) that PING had taken a long
time to implement - Reconciliation Controls {F/1539} author Gareth Jenkins, p5
“It would appear that PING has gone live for Camelot (at last)”.
Problems with TAs
There is ample evidence that TAs were issued incorrectly or there were other problems
with TAs:
(a) Mrs Van Den Bogerd in her witness statement had explained the multiple TAs
issued to Mr Latif as follows §98 {E2/5/24}: “To be clear, this was a data entry error
by Post Office and not an issue with Horizon. Horizon processed the TAs accurately.”
– 80 –
PING and TAs
The purpose of this statement had been to tell the Court that there was no
problem with Horizon, but Mrs Van Den Bogerd was compelled to accept that
her account could not be correct, and that on the face of it, it at least suggested
some doubt as to the robustness and integrity of the Camelot data stream coming
through the automated system {Day5/66:24} - {Day5/69:18}.
(b) Mrs Van Den Bogerd was aware that some people had problems with TAs quite
a few times and some had duplicate TAs {Day5/70:18-23}.
(c) Helpline call logs also recorded problems with TAs, for example {F/1223}:
Row 431, 09/06/2014, “PM SAYS HAS STILL GOT A DISCREPANCY DUE TO
THE TA PROBLEM”.
Row 2375, 10/06/2014, “TC NOT RECEIVED FOR THE TA THAT WAS
DUPLICATED FROM LAST SATURDAY FOR NATIONAL LOTTERY.
PRINTED OFF TC REPORT AND ON THERE AS PROCESSED.”
Row 3176, 11/06/2014, “PM STILL NOT RECEIVED TC FOR THE TA

PROBLEM”.
(d) Mrs Van Den Bogerd fairly accepted that these were the sort of problems that
SPMs had from time to time {Day5/72:19-21}, and there were problems with
duplicated TAs from time to time {Day5/73:4-10}.
(e) In a “FRAUD & CONFORMANCE TEAM HANDOVER DOCUMENT” {F/965}
prepared March 2012, updated July 2012, there is recognition of problems
experienced by Crown branches as follows {F/965/22}: “Post & GO TA missing or
duplicated” “Crowns have incurred discrepancies as a result of missing TA’s or duplicate
TA’S...”. (There is no reason to believe that SPMs were any less vulnerable to
this problem than Crown branches were; and, moreover, SPMs were potentially
liable for the resulting discrepancies.)
Disputing a TA
As recorded in the PING Project (Interfacing Client Data into POL Systems) {F/506}, it
was part of the design that SPMs had no option other than to accept TAs presented to
them on Horizon:
– 81 –
TCs
(a) P11: “The Branch will be presented with the value to “accept” only. Unlike TC’s there
will be no opportunity to write off or ask for evidence due to the inherent robustness of
the Camelot data provided. Also post HNG the only available ‘evidence’ will be within
the office systems so all accountability to bring the TA to account is already within the
branch domain”
(b) See also p15 “If there are any, then the User is presented with a list of all Outstanding
TA’s to process. There will not be an option to bypass this, and it will normally be the
case that Users will just Accept all TAs without further consideration.”
Consistent with the Horizon design, it was Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s evidence (in cross-
examination – contrary to the impression given in her witness statement in relation to
Mr Latif), that TAs had to be automatically accepted on the Horizon system, there was
no option within Horizon for them to be challenged, the only option was for the SPM
to call the Helpline, and she volunteered that (consistent with the Horizon design)
most branches would just accept anyway, without even really looking at it, {Day5/65:2-
8} {Day5/69:19} – {Day5/71:18}.
TCs
Figures from Individual Teams
It was impossible to have confidence in the information presented by Mr Smith in his
witness statement, which relied on multiple hearsay, in some cases without being able
to identify the names of the original sources, with no supporting documents, and
which Mr Smith was largely unable to explain. He was not well able to assess whether
what people were telling him was correct {Day6/194:3-6}.
His evidence in relation to products and figures in his witness statement included the
following exchange {Day6/184:6} – {Day6/185:19}:
Q. So just to get a feel for how this was done, if we look at paragraph 17 which is
{E2/9/4}, "Cash bureau and personal banking team", the people that you spoke to or
contacted were Sarah Parkes and Gillian Hoyland, is that right?
A. It was.
– 82 –
TCs
Q. What did you do, did you email them, did you talk to them, did you call them, did
you meet them; what happened?
A. There was an email that was quite explicit as to the information I required and I
did do follow up emails and on occasion I would speak to people.
Q. On occasion you would speak to people?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you speak to Sarah Parkes?
A. I didn't speak to Sarah Parkes, no.
Q. Did you speak to Gillian Hoyland?
A. From memory, I did, yes.
Q. And which aspect did you speak to her about?
A. Just to request that the information was provided, to explain what the information
was needed for and that it was time critical because I was still awaiting the data at the
time.
Q. And you've got these average numbers. Was there a reason why the period was
different between the cash and the bureau figures?
A. That's not something I'm aware of.
Q. You don't know?
A. I don't know.
Q. And it suggests there that there are 680 disputes, paragraph 18, 40 upheld. And
you understand that the disputes tend to relate to alleged shortages in pouches received
by branches and they are dealt with at the cash centre as opposed to FSC?
A. That's right.
Q. Who did you gain that understanding from? Was that something that Gillian
Hoyland told you?
A. That would have come from an email and I cannot remember who sent me the email
at this stage.
– 83 –
TCs
In relation to BOI and Lottery retracts, the estimated figures for disputed and
compensating TCs were presented in his witness statement as 1500 and 500
respectively for both products. He was unable to explain that or to give the Court any
confidence in the accuracy of those figures {Day6/186:7} – {Day6/188:1} (emphasis
added):
Q. Okay. Camelot, debit card and ATM team, Andrea Green. {E2/9/5}: "The
Camelot, debit card and ATM team had the following number of TCs disputed and
issued the following number of compensating TCs in the 2017 financial year." We
have a table there. Again, there is no underlying document provided?
A. No.
Q. How did Andrea Green give you this information?
A. Andrea Green will have sent this as an email which I will have forwarded on to
our solicitors.
Q. And it just says -- under "BOI retracts" and "Lottery" the number of TCs issued
for those two is very different, isn't it: 4,174 and lottery is 24,139?
A. It is.
Q. But the number of disputed TCs apparently is estimated to be the same?
A. It appears so, yes.
Q. And the number of compensating TCs is also estimated to be identical?
A. It appears so, yes.
Q. Do you have any feel at all from your own knowledge as to whether those figures
are even remotely reliable?
A. The number of issued TCs I would suggest are very accurate. The number of TCs
disputed is not something that I can comment on at this stage. I do know that prior to
having our case management system in there was no consistent method of recording
the method of disputes.
Q. You say in paragraph 21 what your colleague Andrea Green has told you. So just
working out the information flow –
A. Yes.
– 84 –
TCs
Q. -- it's you got it from Andrea and she got it from various experienced team leaders?
A. Team members.
Q. Team members. Did she tell you who they were at all?
A. She didn't.
Q. Okay. So it's hop over to Andrea Green and then another hop over to some other
team members who are not identified?
A. Yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: That's really a point for me, Mr Green.
MR GREEN: I'm grateful, my Lord.
Mr Smith’s lack of knowledge, precision and understanding was also apparent in
relation to MoneyGram, in the following exchange with the Judge {Day6/196:9} –
{Day6/197:17} (emphasis added):
MR JUSTICE FRASER: … “When you say "MoneyGram receive one or two disputes
a month", is that MoneyGram the company receiving disputes from the Post Office,
is that MoneyGram the team receiving disputes back from branches about TCs, or is
it something else? What does it mean?
A. My Lord, I believe this is MoneyGram as the team within the FSC.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: The MoneyGram team.
A. Yes, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Receiving one or two disputes a month from ..?
A. Branches.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: From the branches. And is your understanding that they
are disputes in respect of transaction corrections issued by the team, or in respect of
something else?
A. My assumption based on what I put in paragraph 16, which is that this is the
information that I have gained from team leaders, it would be disputes regarding
transaction corrections that have been received by branch.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: But your paragraph 16 is talking about the sense of

proportion of TCs that have been challenged and what challenges were successful.
– 85 –
TCs
A. I'm specifically --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: So the one or two disputes a month are back in respect of
TCs that have been issued, is that right?
A. That is my assumption, yes, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: And that would be as a proportion of what higher number,

or any idea, or you can't remember, or you were never told?
A. I'm unaware of the number, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Unaware. All right, that's very helpful, thank you.
It is obvious that the presentation of information to the Court in this way creates the
very real prospect for error. The Claimants and the Court can have no confidence in
the figures provided by Mr Smith given: the absence of any documentary support for
them; Mr Smith’s evident lack of knowledge and understanding of them; and further
specific concerns in relation to Santander TCs, addressed separately below.
It is further notable that Mr Smith’s witness statement makes no attempt to address the
historical position. A good example is §24 of his witness statement which is the
entirety of the information provided for DVLA as follows: “Jacqueline has explained to
me that TCs are very rare in this team. During the past year the team have only issued four and
none of them have been disputed”. Mr Smith was shown the spreadsheet {F/889}, tab
Summary by period, showing 2,717 DVLA TCs for 2010/2011, which prompted an
explanation by Mr Smith that the type of transactions with the DVLA had changed,
and are now limited to fleet companies with a corporate relationship {Day6/193:1} –
{Day6/193:22}. Without this context, §24 would have created a misleading impression.
TC Case Management System
Mr Smith stated at §16 of his witness statement that “Post Office introduced a case
management system that records each individual challenge to a TC in September 2018”.
However, that was not an accurate or complete picture, as it emerged in cross-
examination: the system is still in roll-out and Mr Smith could not give a date for when
roll-out is due to be complete across all teams {Day6/179:12-24}. He thought that of the
– 86 –
TCs
roughly eight teams, only two were fully integrated with the new system {Day6/179:25}
– {Day6/180:15}.
Mr Smith’s evidence was that reports have been developed that are showing some
trends for specific products that are being used now {Day6/180:17} – {Day6/181:9}. He
initially did not provide a straightforward answer to why those reports weren’t
addressed in his witness statements, but later said there was no reason why not
{Day6/181:10} – {Day6/184:1}. As above, these were in fact documents which the
Claimants had specifically requested: see 22 January 2019 letter {H/173} and §63 and
§67(c) above. In all the late disclosure Post Office has chosen to provide in the gap
caused by the Recusal Application, these reports remain noticeably absent.
Santander TCs
The impression conveyed by Mr Smith’s evidence in his first witness statement in
relation to Santander TCs was misleading and wrong. Both experts had understood it
to mean that 19,491 TCs had been issued by the Post Office, 2,890 of them had been
disputed by SPMs, and 2,222 of those had been upheld by Post Office (see Smith 1 §23
{E2/9/5}, and read in context of §16 {E2/9/3-4}).
However, Mr Smith served a second witness statement on 8 March 2019 (the Friday
before the trial commenced) revealing that, in fact, all of those figures related to the
position between Post Office and Santander, rather than SPMs and Post Office. So, the
19,491 figure represented error notices sent by Santander to Post Office, and the 2,890
figure was the number of disputes between Post Office and Santander. In this witness
statement he said the number of TCs issued by Post Office was 3,968.
These problems had arisen because Mr Smith was giving second hand evidence. He
had spoken to Ms Phillips and she had provided the figures in his first witness
statement. There is no reason why Ms Phillips could not have provided information
about Santander TCs in her witness statement.
Both Ms Phillips and Mr Smith were resistant to accepting that the table in Mr Smith’s
first statement was wrong, when it was obviously a mistake:
– 87 –
TCs
(a) Ms Phillips: “your perception is wrong I’m afraid”, and “I think its an explanation of
what the headers actually mean” {Day6/141:2} – {Day6/142:7}.
(b) Similarly Mr Smith: “there was information in there that wasn’t fully explained
regarding notices” … “The facts and the figures I would dispute were wrong”, although
later accepting (following questions from the Judge) that the content of the
statement was in fact simply wrong {Day6/182:2} – {Day6/183:5}.
Ms Phillips was unable to give the number of TCs issued by Post Office which were
disputed, and was clear in her response that she simply could not answer that, it was
something she had already been asked by Mr Smith, and this was not something which
was recorded {Day6/143:8-20} {Day6/146:15} – {Day6/147:11}. Given the purpose of Mr
Smith’s second witness statement to correct his first witness statement, the Court might
reasonably have expected him to have made those points clear – not least because of
the experts’ reliance on his figures − but he did not do so.
TCs Generally
Mrs Van Den Bogerd agreed that, as appeared to be the case at the Common Issues
trial, pre-PING there was a problem with very large lottery TCs arriving weeks later,
some of which were in error, some credits some debits, and that SPMs effectively
become used to quite a lot of lottery TCs coming in (“from the numbers that we were
processing, yes, I would say that would be fair”) {Day5/59:18} – {Day5/60:13}, sometimes
accepting them in the expectation of compensating TCs. The PING solution was not
introduced until 2012.
It has been part of the original design of Horizon, that the lottery terminal and Post &
Go were separate terminals, and not integrated within the Horizon system itself. This
point was well made by an individual SPM at a Branch User forum in 2014: {F/1228}
line 74, John Follenfant Lansdowne branch, 21 May 2014:
“Lottery and Paystation: Why can’t I sell lottery on Horizon as other retailers do and
similarly why is not the Paystation functionality contained on Horizon – saves
messing around with separate tills or pots of cash with TA’s the following day or even
later. Appreciate that there are major differences between offices in size, sales mix and
– 88 –
Helpline
counter styles etc but savings could be made in equipment, consumables and by giving
local managers better basic information to make realistic informed decisions on
ordering stock, cash and currency and securing it. Please remember that Post Office
Ltd costs of operation and Subpostmaster costs may not align in that POL do not pay
the direct costs of operation assuming that the admin costs are covered in transaction
payments.”
Incorrect TCs were also in issue in the case of Mr Latif (incorrect TC for scratch card
stock in January 2018) and Mr Patny (TC for MoneyGram only covered half the loss),
and Mr Tank and Mrs Burke who both received TCs after a failed recovery, neither of
which identified that failed recovery had been the cause of the loss being corrected by
the TC.
Helpline
A number of individual SPMs gave evidence about the inadequacies of the Helpline.
Mr Latif, in cross-examination {Day2/32:15-23}:
A. … the helpline is not very good either . It is full of inexperienced people there in a
call centre somewhere where we don’t know where they are and I have made a number
of calls to the helpline and the word ”helpline” is not correct for it , it’s not a helpline
. They go through very basic stuff , okay, and it’s not very good. That’s my personal
opinion; nobody else’s , that’s my personal opinion.”
And further, Mr Latif, again in cross-examination {Day2/43:9} - {Day2/44:2}:
Q. And those mistakes are usually rectified by your informing Post Office and Post
Office helping you by issuing a transaction correction, for example?
A. Not always, sir. That's not my experience with them. Sometimes they do,
sometimes they don't. It all depends on what operator you get on what day and that's
my personal experience and that's the experience and the mood I have in the office,
that it's hit and miss. It depends on which operator you get, how well they are trained,
it is whether the response you get back is good or not so good.
Q. It also depends, doesn't it, Mr Latif, on how clearly you identify the problem? You
would accept that, wouldn't you?
– 89 –
Helpline
A. Yes, indeed. In terms of if they are remote they can't see what we've got in front
of ourselves. You know, their knowledge can sometimes be very basic. Sometimes
very good -- sometimes very good, sir, I accept that. But sometimes it's not.
Mr Tank’s forum posts include his own difficulties encountered in respect of the
£195.04 shortfall he experienced in December 2011 {F/1257.1/1}, including “Phoned help-
line and was told by very irate member of staff that loss is mine unless I can sort out with
customer directly” – this was in fact a Horizon generated shortfall, caused by failed
recovery, and not user error on Mr Tank’s behalf. They also show the experience of a
fellow SPM who had an unexplained loss of £176.74 but had chosen to pay it in rather
than “go through the stress of the hell line” {F/1257.1/6}.
Mrs Van Den Bogerd in cross-examination agreed she had heard of the Helpline being
referred to as the hell-line {Day6/59:13-17}.24
Mrs Burke was given incorrect advice by the Helpline following the national system
outage on 9 May 2016, in that she was told that “If the transaction isn't on your transaction
log then the transaction hasn't gone through” {F/1466/3-4}, which was incorrect, because it
had, and this is what had caused the shortfall.
This incorrect advice was only recorded in a transcript, which Mrs Burke had had to
pay a fee to obtain from the Post Office, following a subject access request: {F/1481.1}.
The transcript contrasts starkly with the NBSC call log entry for the same day {F/1253.1}
row 19, 9 May 2016, which does not record at all the advice she was given, and states
as the resolution that “she was not able to understand situation” which was not a fair,
accurate or complete account of what was said. The Claimants rely on these
documents as a striking illustration of the inaccuracy and unreliability of the NBSC call
logs – particularly in correctly capturing the concerns expressed by SPMs and the
advice actually given in response.
24 The Claimants note in contrast the evidence of Mr Beal at the Common Issues trial {C8.11/26/32},
transcript page 121 lines 14-23.
– 90 –
SPMs Disputing Shortfalls
PO Debt Letters
Ms Phillips is the team leader for Agent Accounting. This team was previously called
the Current Agent Debt team, a semantic change only {Day6/115:14-22}.
Ms Phillips exhibited two letters to her witness statement {F/1832} and {F/1833}, which
are the versions which have been in place since September 2014, and remain the current
versions of these letters. Both letters are written in the language of debts owed by the
SPM to Post Office {Day6/117:6-8} {Day6/119:14-16}. They are, in reality, debt recovery
letters. (This resonates very strongly with evidence heard at the Common Issues Trial.)
The letters do not mention any dispute process, nor give any indication that it is
possible to dispute the amounts which are presented as debts {Day6/117:14-16}
{Day6/118:11-13} − the fact both letters say if the SPM have any queries they can contact
the team, is obviously different from identifying that there is a dispute process (as Ms
Phillips accepted) {Day6/120:4-11}.
These letters are usually successful in getting money in from SPMs {Day6/120:12-18}.
FSC Checks for Disputes raised on Helpline
It became clear from Ms Phillips evidence that disputes raised prior to settling centrally
would generally not be checked by the Agent Accounting team before the process of
sending out the debt letters commenced. The process, as it supposed to work, is
apparently as follows:
(a) Every Friday the Agent Accounting team runs a report to identify SPMs who
have settled centrally. The Agent Accounting team then sends the first of the
two letters {F/1832} the following Monday {Day6/121:8-13}. That letter states that
there is a debt owed by the SPM and how it can be repaid to the Post Office.
(b) If an SPM raises a dispute with the Helpline after they have already settled
centrally, then apparently, “they would let us [the Agent Accounting team] know”
{Day6/122:21-23}.
– 91 –
(c) However, if the SPM raised the dispute with the Helpline prior to settling
centrally (“until he has actually settled centrally then I wouldn’t know about it”
{Day6/123:1-2}) this would not occur. In these cases, the Agent Accounting team
would only know that the amount had been disputed on the Helpline if the team
checked the Helpline logs.
(d) The team has access to Helpline logs and according to Ms Phillips “do try and
check the majority of the larger ones” {Day6/121:25} – {Day6/122:16} (noting the two
caveats in this statement, as underlined). In the cases they do check, they “look
for any call in the previous month that could relate to the loss that they have settled”
{Day6/123:16-21}. They check the call logs but don’t listen to the recordings of
the calls {Day6/125:17-19}.
(e) When pressed as to the limit above which the team would check, Ms Phillips
said “We try and do everything above £5,000” {Day6/124:1} (again noting the
caveat). An amount for e.g. £2,000 would usually not be checked. As confirmed
by Ms Phillips {Day6/124:13-25}:
MS DONNELLY: So if mid-way through trading period a subpostmaster contacts

the helpline and says "I have a £2,000 discrepancy in my accounts that I know if
it is not resolved is going to have to be settled centrally and I want to dispute that
now", as I understand your evidence, after they in fact settle centrally, on the
Monday morning your team will send them letter 1 because you wouldn't check
the helpline logs for an amount less than £5,000?
A. I'm not saying it's always £5,000.
Q. But that's generally what would happen?
A. Yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: So if it is not always £5,000 what other figure limit

would it be?
A. It depends. We can sometimes check them all. It depends how many fresh items
have been settled centrally in that week.
– 92 –
(f) The auditing of the process and controls which are apparently measured each
month do not include the value which it has been decided to use that week to
check the Helpline logs, and this isn’t recorded {Day6/125:8} – {Day6/127:3}
Thus, a very different picture emerged from Ms Phillips’ evidence than the one Post
Office has consistently presented to date, namely that a dispute could be raised on the
Helpline at any time – the Post Office implicitly suggesting that this could be done
effectively. See for example the Branch Trading Statement flowchart agreed between
the parties at the conclusion of the Common Issues trial {C7/44/334}, which states
(emphasis added):
“If the SPM wishes to dispute a discrepancy (whether it has been settled centrally or
made good), the SPM may contact NBSC to lodge a dispute (before, at the time of or
after submitting the BTS).”
The reality became clear that, in fact, many SPMs who raise disputes on the Helpline
will simply be sent debt collection letters by the Agent Accounting team as if no
dispute had been raised at all.
It is very unsatisfactory that the true picture in relation to disputing shortfalls was not
explained by Post Office in a witness statement. This is all the more acute, given that
the process followed by the Agent Accounting team appears to be undocumented (or
at least, no documents have been disclosed). Unchallenged, this evidence would have
created a misleading impression.
Branch Dispute Form
Ms Phillips in her witness statement very much gave the impression that there had
recently been a significant change of approach, to the benefit of SPMs, by the
introduction of a Branch Dispute Form {F/1831} at the beginning of 2018. However,
the position which emerged on cross-examination was quite different.
In fact the Branch Dispute Form is relatively rarely used. Ms Phillips said it would be
sent “only if its difficult” {Day6/128:25}, and that since it was introduced, she claimed
that “at least five a month” {Day6/129:9} were sent out.
– 93 –
Further, it appears that the Branch Dispute Form in effect operates as an additional
hurdle to SPMs seeking to dispute shortfalls in their accounts, because if they are sent
a copy but don’t return it within 7 days, the dispute will be unblocked (Phillips witness
statement §11).
The Branch Dispute Form requires SPMs to provide the date of discrepancy, product
reference and NBSC reference number. The form itself state that “All information
requested below must be provided to enable an investigation” and Ms Phillips confirmed that
if an SPM cannot identify a specific date and product then the debt will be unblocked.
Ms Phillips could not say how many of the Branch Dispute Forms which were returned
in 2018 resulted in the SPM repaying, this is not something which is tracked. Her
words were “Once the debt is cleared off the system and its not part of the measures any more”
{Day6/134/24-25} - notably her language again being that of “debt”.
No Formal Dispute or Appeal Process
The Claimants note that:-
(a) As above, SPMs are not told about any dispute process in the letters they are
sent.
(b) Ms Phillips did not refer to any documented dispute process either in her witness
statement or her oral evidence.
(c) In the context of trying to understand what had changed following the
introduction of the Branch Dispute Form, on 22 January 2019 Freeth wrote to
WBD seeking disclosure of documents relating to Post Office’s procedures in its
use of the form, including recording internal actions taken on receipt {H/173/5}.
The response from WBD ({H/227/3 } on 27 February 2019) was as follows:
Post Office has confirmed that there is not a specific document which relates
to Post Office s procedures for using the Branch Dispute Form, but its use is
incorporated into the dispute process.
A flowchart of the dispute process is at POL- 0173159.
(d) The flowchart identified as POL- 0173159 is the document at {F/1276}.
– 94 –
(e) However, when Ms Phillips was asked about this flowchart, her evidence was
that that it was not current (“That is a very old one” {Day6/137:3}) and she thought
that Post Office had stopped having a Relationship Manager at all in 2015
{Day6/137:5-10}.
(f) When asked if there was an appeal process, notably Ms Phillips’ immediate
response was “In what respect?” {Day6/138:16-17}. She later said that SPMs “can
come back to us and we will go to support services for assistance” {Day6/138:22-25}, but
this was not conveyed as being a formal appeal process, nor is there any evidence
of this possibility being conveyed to SPMs.
There obviously was not current dispute or appeals policy, since had there been one,
it would have been disclosed, it would have been identified by WBD in their 27
February 2019 letter, and/or it would have been identified and explained by Ms
Phillips in her witness statement. It is a reasonable if not inevitable inference that
there is in fact no documented, current dispute or appeal process.
The absence of such a policy is obviously likely to deter rather than encourage disputes
and is a telling indication of the Post Office’s approach to this issue.
As to the former dispute process as referred to in the flowchart at {F/1276}, and the
related document {F/1275}, the Court is invited to note that:
(a) These documents are dated November 2014. The Dispute Process appears as
v1.0 and identifies the creator of the document as Andrew Winn {F/1275/3}, who
is the named Relationship Manager in both documents. The process required
SPMs to submit disputes or appeals in writing to the Relationship Manager (p5,
§2.4, and see also the related 14 November 2014 flowchart, “Dispute resolution
process” {F/1276/2}.
(b) Post Office did not call Andrew Winn, but the Court has heard evidence that he
was part of the Branch Support Programme – see Branch Support Programme
Terms of Reference, 7 August 2013 {F/114/2}, where he is one of three members
of the working group responsible for “branch accounting and client settlement”, and
“resolving specific branch accounting issues”. Mr Winn was also involved in the
– 95 –
Screen Layout and Reports available to SPMs
mediation scheme, conducting some of the spot reviews: Mrs Van Den Bogerd
{Day5/55:25} – {Day5/56:7}.
(c) The Court has seen evidence of Mr Winn’s response to the possibility of
problems with Horizon at paragraph 406(c) below, emails dated 9-11 December
2014. Mr Winn’s response indicates a person with no interest whatsoever in
knowing the truth about Horizon. The fact he held the position of Relationship
Manager is notable. Mr Winn was not an errant employee responding in an off-
hand manner to an SPM concern about phantom transactions, he was the three
people specifically tasked by the Branch Support Programme led by Mrs Van
Den Bogerd to resolve branch accounting issues and individual disputes, and
was the sole person formally appointed by Post Office as Relationship Manager
to resolve disputes and appeals.
The Claimants invite the Court to infer that any Claimant using the Post Office Dispute
Process for the short period it was in operation would have faced an uphill struggle.
Mr Johnson confirmed that the overall layout of the Horizon screen as viewed in
branches has been largely the same since the introduction of Horizon in 1999/2000 -
albeit there has been a change to the view in that that the button icons no longer have
pictures on them {Day7/15:23} – {Day7/16:13}.
It is apparent that screen layout is likely to be a contributing factor to a number of
miskeys (above, at §205)
As evident from the screenshots in Mr Johnson’s witness statement, many buttons are
together with no white space in between, and yet there is plenty of white space
available {Day7/10:22} – {Day7/11:16}. The zero and double zero keys are next to each
other {Day7/14:3-9} - errors potentially made as a result of this layout are obviously
consistent with many of the helpline entries at §205(c) above. Re-examination of Mr
Johnson re-affirmed the obvious point that buttons close together can mean that the
wrong buttons are sometimes accidentally pressed {Day7/25:1-11}.
– 96 –
One of the recommendations in the 2012 - Mis-Keyed Project Feasibility Study {F/994}
was specifically to “Look at the Buy and Sell Icons on the travel home screen are too close
together and it becomes difficult to isolate the correct icon. It would be useful to clearly show
which icon to press showing the Buy and Sell icons more clearly” {F/994/7}, with the impact
of the layout described as follows “Having these two icons next to each other many of the
Counter Colleagues hit the wrong icon, which means there is no way of reversing the
transaction when a mistake has been issued” {F/994/14}. Mr Johnson’s evidence that these
transactions could always have been reversed was unpersuasive {Day7/13:15} –
{Day7/14:2}.
SPMs are not able to export any system data to a csv or Excel file, and there is no
evidence that Post Office has ever even given thought to this (mirroring Mrs Van Den
Bogerd’s evidence at the Common Issues Trial). Mr Johnson, who gave evidence about
the reports available to SPMs, said as follows {Day7/17:7-18}:
Q. Now, part of your witness statement has dealt with the reports available to SPMs.
A. Yes.
Q. One of the things they can't do is export data to a CSV file, can they?
A. I don't know what a CSV file is.
Q. Or an Excel spreadsheet?
A. No, they can't export that from Horizon, as far as I know, no.
Q. And has any thought been given, as far as you know, to allowing that to happen?
A. I don't know.
Mr Johnson struggled to give an account of how an SPM who suspected a duplicate
entry would try to investigate it. He ultimately volunteered that “It’s not the most user
friendly way of investigating” {Day7/22:1}.
The following exchange was also notable as to the limited facilities available to an SPM
who does not know what has caused a discrepancy or when it has occurred {Day7/22:3-
16}:
– 97 –
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Can I just ask you a question. When you say the filtering
that it can be done, that can be done in branch, can it?
A. Yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Am I right that would only be of any -- that would only be
of any assistance if you knew what you were looking for already, wouldn't it?
A. Not necessarily. A postmaster may have come to the conclusion that a discrepancy
occurred on a particular day by virtue of looking at his cash declaration for the previous
day and the current day, and the previous day had no discrepancy, the current day
does, so he may want to filter then to that particular day when the discrepancy
occurred on his cash declaration.
The production of these reports is part of the ‘back office’ processing in branch and
these can be printed on a narrow till roll. The limited functionality and lack of a user
friendly approach is consistent with the general commentary contained within Network
Development Programme Operation Simplification, 21 October 2016 {F/1556} at p4:
1.1. Business Problem
Post Office branch 'back office' balancing and accounting processes are still rooted in
legacy practices and methods. These operations processes and associated work flows
are inefficient and susceptible to losses and fraudulent activity. Many business rules
are ill-defined and the language is confusing to those who operate the processes.
1.2 Drivers for Change
There is a requirement for balancing and reconciliation processes to be intuitive and

easy to operate and for those processes to use simple language and applied business
rules that negate the requirement for excessive training in branches and back office
Support Services.
Mr Johnson frankly agreed with the commentary at p6 {Day7/22:18} – {Day7/23:12},
which identifies the prospect of errors, rework and fraud, as follows:
There are a number of branch operations processes, especially around branch

accounting and reconciliation, which operate using legacy processes. They are
unnecessarily complex and detract Post Office branch resources from serving
– 98 –
Post Office Investigation of Disputes
customers. Stock Unit Management and accountability is very poorly controlled and
is operated on very complex business rules. The lack of accountability and visibility of
cash and stock transfers between Stock Units can lead to errors, rework and provides
opportunities for fraud.
Credence
Credence was one of the systems that Post Office had, that SPMs did not have, to be
able to investigate accounting issues, apparent shortfalls and their cause.
Mrs Mather’s Role
The Post Office called Mrs Mather to give evidence about the use of Credence to
investigate disputes.
Mrs Mather is a team leader within the Finance Service Centre - not the Financial
Service Centre Team Leader as §1 of her witness statement appeared to suggest. Mrs
Mather’s teams are currently MoneyGram and cheques {Day6/150:4-15}, although her
team doesn’t use Credence for MoneyGram {Day6/153:4-13}.
Her evidence was very specific to her experience, rather than wider FSC operations.
E.g. when asked to comment on {F/1120} PEAK PC0228049 30 August 2013, relating to
a bank deposit “I cant answer for that particular enquiry. On cheques we have the
information that we require to investigate” {Day6/159:16-23}.
Although she has worked in FSC since 1987 and been a team leader since 1999 {E2/8/1}
apparently she only started using Credence in 2016 {Day6/165:11-13}. She uses it
“perhaps once a week” but described herself as knowing her way around it {Day6/172:7-
10}. Whilst that is no doubt true in a sense, the Claimants anticipate there must be
other people within Post Office who have more knowledge and better experience of
Credence and would have been able to better assist the Court on this issue.
The criticisms made below of Mrs Mather’s evidence, are not intended as criticisms of
Mrs Mather personally, who it is clear was doing her best to assist the Court in all the
circumstances.
– 99 –
Key Stroke Activity
Paragraph 12 of Mrs Mather’s witness statement clearly stated that Credence “records
all key stroke activity performed in that branch by the user ID, date and time” (§12 {E2/8/3}),
so it was something of a surprise that she then disavowed this in her evidence-in-chief.
This came about as follows.
In the light of Ms Mather’s evidence, the Claimants’ Leading Counsel had put to Mrs
Van Den Bogerd that Credence data records the actual key strokes that have been used
{Day5/80:16-20}, the Credence report would show the specific keystrokes by the
operator in branch and show all keystrokes pressed25 {Day6/69:10-23}).
Post Office’s Leading Counsel then re-examined Mrs Van Den Bogerd by reference to
paragraph 9 of Mrs Mather’s witness statement: “You will see what Mrs Mather actually
says…”. In response, Mrs Van Den Bogerd then changed her evidence about whether
Credence records key stroke activity: “That’s not my understanding, not every single
stroke” {Day6/104:2-10}.
Post Office’s Leading Counsel (having realised the error), revisited this in examination
in chief of Mrs Mather by reference to paragraph 12, by way of bringing this to the
Court’s attention: “I have to ask a question which is born out of sheepishness on my part”. It
was at this point that Mrs Mather very much changed the effect of her evidence
{Day6/149:7-21} as noted above:
Q. … Could I ask you to explain what you mean by the phrase "It records all keystroke
activity"?
A. What I actually meant was the transactional data as in sales and non-sales.
Thus, a volte face was achieved in the Post Office evidence about the recording and
availability of key strokes, namely that Credence does not record all key stroke activity
at all. Indeed Mrs Mather confirmed this in an exchange with the Judge, in which she
25 This was particularly relevant in Mr Aakash Patny’s case, as he had been waiting for and chasing a
Credence report that had been promised and was accused of dishonesty by the Post Office in cross-
examination.
– 100 –
confirmed that the term “key stroke activity” should be crossed out {Day6/172:24} –
{Day6/174:3}.
However, in the late disclosure from Post Office of the Drop & Go PEAK {F/1848.8.2/3}
it now appears clear that keystrokes are plainly available to Post Office from Fujitsu.
Whether or not they are in practice accessed via Credence is difficult now to clarify
with any witnesses. What matters is that, contrary to the clear impression created by
the unexpected gyrations in the Post Office’s evidence, the Post Office does have access
to keystroke information from Fujitsu.
When Dr Worden was asked about the Drop & Go PEAK, his answers added
unheralded additional information as the availability of keystroke information. He
referred to a department of Fujitsu, called “TED,” about which the Court had
previously heard no evidence from Post Office or indeed anyone, but which Dr
Worden thought had logs that did go down to the keystroke level {Day20/120:8-16}.
Dr Worden stated that the keystrokes would have been available to look at “on the
day” i.e. in close to real time {Day20/120:18-22} and was used “a great deal”
{Day20/120:2}. These would obviously have been a great help to Mr Patny had they
been supplied to him.
Fujitsu’s ability to record and access keystroke activity is further confirmed by the
Drop & Go email disclosed whilst drafting these Submissions, on 24 June 2019,
{F/1825.01} which includes within it the line “attached is the keystroke from Fujitsu”. At
the time of preparing these submissions, although the attachments mentioned in that
email have been requested by the Claimants, they have not been disclosed {H/343}.
The Post Office’s explanation for this will require careful scrutiny, in the circumstances.
Availability of Credence Data
The documents evidence that June 2013, a recommendation was made that Post Office
extend the life of its business transaction data to 24 months, for reasons which included
product claims and disputes, fraud and conformance investigations, and non-
conformance and suspension hearings: Benefits of extending life of business transaction
data, {F/1092}.
– 101 –
Mrs Mather confirmed that it remains the case that Credence currently holds
information for 3 months {Day6/153:14-16}, but she said that there are some reports
where she could see information for 24 months {Day6/155:17-20}, although she couldn’t
say when that change happened {Day6/155:21-23}. Asked which those reports were
she could only think of automated bill payments {Day6/157:13-25}.
Thus it appears, that other than potentially in respect of automated bill payments (as
to which the position is very unclear), it still remains the case that Credence retains
data for only 3 months – albeit that this is considerably longer than information is
available to SPMs for.
Credence Reports
The E&Y Management Letter, for year ended 28 March 2011, {F/869/12-14}, shows that:
(a) issues with the backend and front end change process had been identified in the
previous year’s audit, including, at point 13 (emphasis added) “During our
walkthrough of user administration of the front end of Credence we noted several users
with administrator rights, including some generic users (this is noted below as a separate
point). These users have the access rights to create and amend reports, including those
which may be relied upon for audit evidence. These users can change report design, and
processing without documented request, test or approval. When users have the rights to
change reports that are used by the business for reconciliation, exception reporting or
other processing, there is the risk that the reports are manipulated either intentionally or
accidentally”.
(b) E&Y was unable to comment on whether management addressed those
concerns, because, perhaps surprisingly, Credence was taken out of scope for the
2011 audit.
Mrs Mather was not able to comment on this document and was not aware of the issues
addressed. (For understandable reasons, Mr Membery did not give evidence.)
– 102 –
The matters identified by E&Y in 2011 are however consistent with:
(a) §9 of Mrs Mather’s witness statement, which states “Credence gets its information
from Horizon and when I am looking for information from Credence, I will download the
information I am looking for into the format of an excel spread sheet” {E2/8/2}.
(b) “Driving business benefits through the consolidation of data review”, Post Office Fraud
Solution, 18th May 2012, p8 {F/935/8}:
The limited understanding of how Credence interrogation can operate and no

centralised data repository means that the majority of teams do most day to
day operations on bespoke Access and Excel databases. Microsoft database
products were not designed to hold multi-million volume records, nor conduct
the complexity of queries that Post Office users are currently utilising them
for. The Network Transformation team in particular referenced using 12
bespoke databases on a daily basis, one of which uses approximately 30 billion
transaction level records as required, all of which are stored in excel format on
DVDs.
These databases provide limited functionality, despite many parts of the

business developing very sophisticated macros. They are not future proofed,
many only being able to be operated by current employees. In addition these
databases are prone to failure, as they are operating beyond capacity. Due to
multiple copies of the same data no single version of the truth exists within
the Post Office.
Accordingly, on this basis, and absent any evidence that Post Office addressed the
concerns identified by E&Y in relation to Credence, the Claimants invite the Court to
infer that it did not. Indeed, that appears to be the only evidence before the Court.
Presentation of Credence Reports
As above, Credence reports are reviewed by FSC in excel spreadsheet form and can be
interrogated accordingly. Unlike for SPMs, it is not presented to FSC on a till roll
{Day6/168:13-16}.
As below at §322, the Helen Rose report recommendation in relation to the
presentation of reversals in Credence Reports was also not acted upon, despite a
recognition of the implications on Court cases and prosecutions.
– 103 –
ARQ Data
The Court is invited to find that Post Office rarely obtains ARQ data to investigate
disputes, and (contrary to Post Office’s evidence), it is likely that the cost of obtaining
this data is a deterrent to these requests being made. (Indeed Post Office’s Leading
Counsel specifically put to Mr Coyne that a reason the Post Office did not obtain ARQ
data was because it was labour intensive and quite expensive, e.g. {Day15/71:21})
The evidence called by Post Office on this topic was extremely unsatisfactory.
Mrs Mather addressed ARQ requests in three paragraphs of her witness statement, as
follows: {E2/8/4}
18. I understand that Mr Coyne has alleged that Post Office staff were deterred from
making ARQ requests because of fees or penalties.
19. I understand that a witness statement of Fujitsu's Torstein Olav Godeseth

contains details of the number of ARQs issued since the 2014/15 financial year. I have
spoken to my colleague Christopher Knight, the Intel & Admin Team Leader, who has
confirmed that Post Office get an allowance of 720 data queries a year (roughly 60 a
month). He is not aware of any fees or penalties having been paid by Post Office, nor
anyone being deterred from making ARQ requests because of fees that might have to
be paid by Post Office.
20. I understand that Fujitsu have confirmed to Post Office's solicitors that Post Office
have only exceeded their contractual limit when extra data was required as part of this
litigation and that a new commercial term was issued in this instance detailing what
was agreed and how much it would cost. Any requests above the agreed amount are
chargeable but I understand that the terms depend on the details of the requirement.
Mrs Mather had “no idea” why she was telling the Court about what Mr Knight believes
rather than Mr Knight himself doing so {Day6/171:19-25}.
The process for obtaining ARQ data was clearly not something Mrs Mather knew
about at all, other than in the vaguest possible terms. It was difficult to understand
why she was giving evidence about this. She said she didn’t have access to ARQs
{Day6/152:22-24}, appears not to have worked in a team where someone has actually
sought the ARQ data (“I would imagine its when it’s the fraud team or the security team”)
{Day6/157:7-10} and no-one in her team makes ARQ requests {Day6/168:6-7}. She did
– 104 –
not know about the cost of an ARQ, but apparently did know that after a certain
number they would be charged {Day6/170:4-16}.
Whereas in his witness statement in relation to ARQ requests, Mr Godeseth had said
“I have been informed by my colleague Jason Muir (Operational Security Manager in Security
Operations Team) that …” §31 Godeseth 1 {E2/1/10}, in cross-examination it became
apparent this was untrue, and in fact Mr Godeseth had been “effectively asked to put it
in” his witness statement {Day7/149:7}-{Day7/150:1}:
Q. Just to explain what the figures are. And you have a footnote to that which says:
"These figures do not include the ARQs that Fujitsu has issued in relation to these
proceedings." So is it actually -- where did you get that information from?
A. From Jason.
Q. So what did you ask him?
A. Personally I didn't ask him anything. This was information that was being
requested to go into the witness statement, so I'm confident that it is correct. I have
no particular motive in providing that information.
Q. I'm just trying to -- I'm not talking about motive, I'm just trying to identify how
it has ended up in your witness statement.
A. I was effectively asked to put it in.
Q. So did Jason Muir actually inform you of this in response to any requests from
you?
A. No.
Thus it transpired that Mr Godeseth also had no knowledge at all about these matters.
Mr Dunks was not able to provide any assistance in relation to the problem identified
in Peak PC0211833 {F/829}, that audit retrieval for ARQ returns were missing an
indication as to whether a transaction was a reversal {Day 7/67:1} to {Day 7/68:1}.26 He
26 This is in spite of the fact that the problem was a serious one, with prosecution teams relying on
these spreadsheets in criminal proceedings {F/829/2}, and that the issue was apparently being
managed by Penelope Thomas, who, at least as at the date of her witness statement in the Seema
Misra trial, worked in the exact same role as Mr Dunks {F/573/1}.
– 105 –
also could not comment on the Helen Rose Report, and its conclusion that, until at least
the summer of 2013, it was not identified to be a problem that the reversal indicator
which was introduced in ARQs did not show whether the reversal was system or user-
generated {Day 7/70:14-23}.
Mr Dunks was unable to provide any meaningful assistance in relation to gaps and
duplicates or steps taken when they are found: {F/1716/43}.
The email chain at {F/728} provides insight into when Post Office would be willing to
obtain ARQ data. In particular:
If we can encourage Mark Dinsdale to authorise the audit trail, I feel it would be
beneficial given the current interest in Horizon from media & MP's.” (p11)
Nigel, no probs with requesting data from Fujitsu, but it will take around 3 weeks.
Has Jason agreed to take this case on, because we don't hand over Horizon logs to a
spmr. It needs an expert to understand what it says, and usually this requires one of
the investigators.
I'll give Jason a call in the morning, then I will raise an ARQ from Fujitsu
Is this for our benefit, as there is a cost attached to ARQ requests, we do get a supply
free of charge as part of the contract but we usually don't have enough, therefore we
usually charge the defence lawyers. (p9)
“This branch has a very large loss which the spmr is attributing to Horizon. We have
already had one Flag case on this and this will remain high profile so the data does
need to be retrieved. (p8)
This email chain shows that there is a marked reluctance to obtain ARQ data – unless
it is for Post Office’s benefit, or where defence lawyers can be charged for it. The data
appears to have been obtained in Pam Stubb’s case only because it was high profile.
(This chimes with the email chain at §406(c) above, relating to phantom cheques, where
media interest was raised as a possible reason to follow up, although Mr Winn chose
not to do so).
– 106 –
As noted above and further set out below at §322, the Helen Rose report
recommendation in relation to the presentation of reversals in ARQ reports was not
acted upon.
Helen Rose Report (Credence and ARQ)
Mr Coyne identified the Helen Rose report from disclosure {F/1082} and referred to it
in his first report, which prompted responses from the Post Office by the witness
statements of Mrs Van Den Bogerd and Mrs Mather.
The Helen Rose report is dated 12 June 2013. As the executive summary makes clear,
the SPM concerned had engaged a forensic accountant, in circumstances in which he
believed his reputation to be in doubt. It is apparent in context that the SPM had
initially been accused by the Post Office of having personally reversed the customer’s
bill payment to cash. {F/1082/2}:
Executive Summary
A transaction took place at Lepton SPSO 191320 on the 04/10/2012 at 10:42 for a
British Telecom bill payment for £76.09; this was paid for by a Lloyds TSB cash
withdrawal for £80.00 and change give for £3.91. At 10:37 on the same day the British
Telecom bill payment was reversed out to cash settlement.
The branch was issued with a Transaction Correction for £76.09, which they duly
settled; however the postmaster denied reversing this transaction and involved a
Forensic Accountant as he believed his reputation was in doubt.
A number of important points arise from the report itself:
(a) Firstly, the Credence data clearly indicated that the Subpostmaster had manually
completed the reversal: “On looking at the credence data, it clearly indicates that the
reversal was completed by JAR001 (postmaster) at 10:37 04/10/2012 and was reversal
indicator 1 (existing reversal) and settled to cash. An existing reversal is where the
session number/Automated Payment number has to be entered to reverse the item.”
(b) Secondly, Mr Jenkins had discovered from the ARQ data that the reversal had in
fact been initiated by recovery: “The reversal was due to recovery (Counter Mode Id
= 118) so this was not an explicit reversal by the clerk.”
– 107 –
(c) Thirdly, the reversal initiated by recovery could well have caused loss to the
SPM: “it is certainly quite easy for the clerk to have made a mistake and either he or the
customer could be in pocket / out of pocket (depending on exactly what happened!)”;
(d) Fourthly, Fujitsu considered this was not a problem with Horizon: “The system is
behaving as it should.” − as further confirmed by Mrs Van Den Bogerd in an
exchange with the Judge {Day5/92:25} – {Day5/94:17}.
(e) Fifthly, what had actually happened was not obvious, even using ARQ data:
“Note that the standard ARQ spreadsheet may not make it easy to confirm that the
Reversal was part of Recovery, but the underlying logs used to extract them can show
it.”
(f) Sixthly, Ms Rose was concerned about the effect on the interpretation of data
including in prosecutions, and recommended that a change be made: “…my
concerns are that we cannot clearly see what has happened on the data available to us and
this in itself may be misinterpreted when giving evidence and using the same data for
prosecutions. My recommendation is that a change request is submitted so that all system
created reversals are clearly identifiable on both fujitsu and credence.”
Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement gave a wholly misleading impression of the
content and significance of the Helen Rose report: §154 {E2/5/34}, especially “The
extracts taken from the report by Helen Rose referred to by Mr Coyne are taken out of context
and mistakenly claim that the relevant reversal was issued in error by Horizon, not the
Subpostmaster” and §154.3 “the issue was therefore surrounding how the transaction reversals
were displayed / accessible in branch and that there was no issue with Horizon itself”.
In cross-examination, Mrs Van Den Bogerd revealed that – despite the significance of
the issues identified - Ms Rose’s recommendation had not been acted upon
{Day5/92:16-23}.
…."My recommendation is that a change request is submitted so that all system

created reversals are clearly identifiable on both Fujitsu and Credence." Do you know
if that change request was acted on after that?
A. I don't believe it has been acted on.
– 108 –
Q. You don't believe it has been?
A. I don't believe so.
This was something of a revelation, not least since the information had twice been
requested by the Claimants prior to trial:
(a) Mr Coyne had specifically asked “Was the existing ARQ report enhanced to make it
clear whether a Reversal Basket was generated by Recovery or not [Page 4]? Further, if
so, when did this take effect?”, Post Office responded that the request was out of
scope {C5/21/36}.
(b) Freeths again specifically asked for any documents evidencing if the Helen Rose
recommendation had been acted on, and if so when (letter dated 22 January 2019,
{H/173/7}). WBD’s response on this occasion was that “An explanation on this
matter can be found at paragraph 13 of Ms Mather's statement” (11 February 2019
{H/196/27}). Neither paragraph 13 {E2/8/3}, nor any other paragraph of Ms
Mather’s statement, states that the Helen Rose recommendation was not acted
upon. This was something which obviously could have been addressed in Post
Office’s witness evidence; it very much appears that a conscious decision was
taken not to inform the Claimants of the true picture, leaving it yet again for the
Claimants to investigate and elicit this evidence in cross-examination.
It is very unclear why Mrs Mather addressed the Helen Rose report in her witness
statement at all. This is not something she knew about herself {Day6/166:9-12}, and she
entirely misunderstood the report when preparing her first witness statement (§15
{E2/8/3} “Looking at the Helen Rose report referred to in paragraph 5.49 of Mr Coyne's report,
Post Office was able to use Credence to identify that the Subpostmaster had reversed a
transaction but had also taken £76.09 payment from the customer. In reversing the transaction,
the Subpostmaster had effectively removed the payment to British Telecomm, making the bill
unpaid”), a paragraph which was corrected by significant amendments shortly before
Mrs Mather gave evidence {E2/16/2}.
So, both Mrs Van Den Bogerd and Mrs Mather wrongly asserted that the Report
showed an SPM reversal, when in fact it showed the opposite and more.
– 109 –
Fujitsu Remote Access (Insert, Inject, Edit, Delete)
The Post Office’s pleaded position in relation to remote access has been proven to be
materially inaccurate and demonstrably untrue. The position as it stood prior to the
evidence being called was addressed in the Claimants’ Written Opening, §61 - §79
{A/1/21-26}.
The Court heard evidence in relation to remote access from Mr Roll (called by the
Claimants), Mr Godeseth and Mr Parker. For reasons explained in the Introduction
above, where there remains a conflict of evidence the Claimants invite the Court to
prefer Mr Roll’s evidence because it is now clear that he was an honest and reliable
witness.
Legacy Horizon
Inserting Transactions at the Counter
At first, the only type of insertion that the Post Office would accept, via Mr Godeseth
was via the correspondence server, which was said to always be visible to an SPM
because of the counter position greater than 32 (§58.10 Godeseth 1 {E2/1/17}. If this
method was used then the node ID would be greater than 32.
However, as Mr Parker and Mr Godeseth ultimately conceded, Mr Roll was correct,
and transactions could also be inserted at the counter, using the correspondence server
to piggyback through the gateway to the individual counters in the branch (Roll 2, §20
{E1/10/6}, Parker 2 (§27 {E2/12/9}, Godeseth 3 (§25 {E2/14/7}, correcting their earlier
statements).
Transactions inserted in this way would appear in branch accounts and reports as if
they had been carried out by the counter used in the branch (Parker 2, §31 {E2/12/10}).
All members of the SSC were able to insert data in this way (Parker 2, §32 {E2/12/11},
correcting Parker 1 §20.2 {E2/11/4}).
The lack of Fujitsu’s control over this process is well illustrated by the fact that (1) Mr
Godeseth and Mr Parker both apparently believed it was not possible, so clearly
– 110 –
neither of them was managing or controlling the process or aware of anyone who was,
and (2) Mr Parker apparently believed that his colleague Mr Simpkins had identified
all occasions when transactions had been injected in this way during Legacy Horizon
by running a set of search terms (Parker 2, §29 {E2/12/10} and {E2/16/4}), only for Mr
Simpkins to later identify some further search terms which identified further occasions
{H/253}, causing Mr Parker to amend his statement to no longer purport to be
comprehensive (see §90 above).
Manual Changes to Branch Messagestore
Mr Parker initially said that in “Legacy Horizon it was not possible to delete or edit messages
that had been committed to the message store” {§19 {E2/11/4}). However by the time Mr
Parker provided his third witness statement (28 February 2019) he had again had to
correct his evidence to include: “it would be necessary for the SSC to delete the message store
file (and hence all the transaction data it held) to allow Riposte to replicate a full and complete
copy of that transaction data from another source” {E2/13/5}.
Fujitsu could and did make manual changes to objects in the branch messagestore,
resulting in OCP’s being raised (relating to front-end fixes). Example PEAKs include
PC0130275 {F/323}, PC0152014 {F/432} and PC1075821 {F/485}. These changes would
also result in an OCR being raised, relating to the back-end fix and POLFS system
records. These Peaks arose when there was an absence of equal but opposite
settlement lines.
Manual changes to the messagestore were open to error; as agreed by Mr Godeseth
{Day 8/4:16} to {Day 8/5:1}.
The Court has seen an example of such a change being made in the branch
messagestore which appears both not to have been communicated to the SPM; and
which appears to have caused a loss to the SPM.
PEAK PC0152014 {F/432} involved an issue with a bureau de change transaction due
to a single SC line being written for $1,000 (£484) with no settlement in the middle of
– 111 –
two RISP transactions.27 Corrective action was taken by inserting a message into the
messagestore, as seen in OCP 17510 {F/432.2}. However, the back-end fix, as seen in
OCR 17532 {F/434.1}, was for just over $2,000, instead of $1,000. The Peak itself notes
that: “Once the problem was corrected, there should have been no impact on the branch.
However it has been noted that the stock unit BDC had a loss of $1000, which was generated
after the correction was made. We have already notified Gary Blackburn at POL (email
attached). This appears to be a genuine loss at the branch, not a consequence of the problem or
correction.”28
Indeed, in cross-examination, Mr Godeseth agreed:-
(a) What appears to in fact be the case is that the additional loss was as a result of
the difference in the two corrections made by the OCP and OCR {Day 8/12:21} to
{Day 8/14:5}.29
(b) It is a “fair inference” to make from the content of the Peak that the Subpostmaster
was not told about the changes which were made by Fujitsu. However, Mr
Godeseth claimed that Post Office would have been “well aware” and he “would
argue that it’s a Post Office decision whether or not to tell a Subpostmaster” {Day 8/8:24}
to {Day 8/9:8}.
Neither Fujitsu nor Post Office keep a proper and accurate record of the number of
instances in which data is injected, amended or deleted in Subpostmaster accounts.
There is no such record before the Court.
Data Rebuilds
Contrary to the original position adopted in Parker 1,30 there are instances in which the
rebuilding of branch transaction data did involve a manual component.31 This accords
27 {F/432/2}
28 {F/432/3}
29 Mr Godeseth was not re-examined on this issue. Post Office’s Leading Counsel later sought to put a
different factual case to Mr Coyne “on instructions”, which conflicted with Mr Godeseth’s evidence.
30 Parker 1, §18 {E2/11/4} and §55.4 {E2/11/10}
31 See, e.g., Mr Roll’s evidence at {Day 4/117:3} to {Day 4/118:22}
– 112 –
with the potential “scenarios” described in Parker 2 at §38.2 to 38.3 {E2/12/12-13}.
Leading Counsel for the Post Office took Mr Roll to §38.2 (involving removal of the
envelope data) and suggested that this was “the most that anyone at the SSC would ever
do in terms of changing transaction data”, a proposition which Mr Roll stated did not
accord with his recollection.32 Mr Roll was not taken over the page in Parker 2 and
shown §38.3 (involving replication of transactions “as far as we are able to” when Fujitsu
was unable to access a portion of the transaction data) during the course of his cross-
examination. Mr Roll’s evidence was that Subpostmasters would be unable to tell that
such data rebuilds had been undertaken.33
As conceded by Mr Parker, the rebuilding of branch transaction data was something
that fell within Mr Roll’s remit (Parker 1 §55.4 {E2/11/10}) and, in the circumstances, it
is submitted that his evidence is to be preferred in relation to the carrying out of this
task, including the ability to do so without the knowledge of the Subpostmaster (Roll
2, §23 to 24 {E1/10/7}). In short, Mr Roll was right about this too.
The Court is invited to find that the manual rebuilding of transaction data did take
place on occasion by Fujitsu personnel, it was capable of having an impact upon branch
accounts, and it was capable of being done without the knowledge or permission of
the Subpostmaster.
Horizon Online
Balancing Transaction Tool
Mr Godeseth in his first witness statement introduced the Balancing Transaction Tool
as follows {E2/1/16}:
58.1 A small group of Fujitsu users from the Software Support Centre (SSC) (30
users) have the ability to inject additional transactions into a branch's accounts in
Horizon Online, using a designed piece of functionality called a Balancing
Transaction.
32 {Day 4/123:13-23}
33 {Day 4/124:10-14}
– 113 –
58.2 BTs are conducted using the branch transactional correction tool. The tool is
described in section 5.2.2 of the document {POL-0219310} and the Host BRDB
Transaction Correction Tool Low Level Design document {POL-0032866}.
58.3 BTs do not require acceptance through the Horizon terminal by branch users
unlike TCs and TAs.
58.4 BTs are clearly visible in the transaction reports that are available to
Subpostmasters via Horizon as they are stated to have been carried out on counter
number 99. 12
58.5 As far as I am aware there has only been one usage of the tool (i.e. one BT has
been inserted into a branch's accounts).
The Post Office has attempted to limit the focus of this issue to the ‘Balancing
Transaction tool’, in respect of which there is only said to have been one use. However,
balancing transactions are not limited to use of this tool.
In Peak PC0197592 {F/611}, an update is being made to a stock unit entry as well as a
deletion to an opening figure of cash. Mr Godeseth agreed that this was what was
happening,34 albeit he stated that the data being deleted was not transaction data.35 At
{F/611/3} one can see that Mr Jenkins is proposing the use of a different SQL script,
even though at this time (April 2010), the Balancing Transaction tool had been both
developed and put into use. In short, there are a number of ways in which a balancing
transaction could be effected.
Privileged Users
Privileged user access is not subject to strict controls. Prior to July 2015, only log-off
and log-on activities by Privileged Users were audited (see Godeseth 1, §59.6
{E2/1/18}).
Post Office has not identified any guidance applicable to privileged users which limits
their use of these powerful access rights.
34 {Day 8/36:1}
35 {Day 8/35:17}
– 114 –
The APPSUP role was first identified by Mr Coyne, in Coyne 2 §3.278 – 3.281 {D2/4/82},
who identified PEAK PC0208119 {F/768}, “SSC Database users do not have correct
permissions” and 2175 entries in the privileged user access logs between 2009 and 2018
relating to use of this role.
Neither Mr Parker nor Mr Godeseth had referred to the existence of the APPSUP role
in their initial witness statements and the Post Office did not disclose its existence.
However, in each of their third witness statements, they did do so, in response to Mr
Coyne’s discovery of it (above). In each case, the content of their statements revealed
that neither of them knew how often or when this role has been or is used and neither
had considered the privileged access user logs which were available and had been
referred to by Mr Coyne (Parker 3, §15 {E2/13/4}. Godeseth 3 §18 - §21).
If those logs are not consulted by Post Office or Fujitsu in the context of this litigation
and all the scrutiny it entails, it seems a certainty that they are not otherwise consulted
or scrutinised in Post Office or Fujitsu’s day to day operations.
Although not addressed by any Post Office witness, PEAK PC0208119 {F/768} records
a chronology in relation to APPSUP privileges, with which the Court will now be
familiar, as follows:
(a) February 2011, the issue is first raised re: SSC users having the APPSUP role
which they should not have (and not having the SSC role they should
have). There are exchanges through to September 2011 emphasising that
APPSUPP is extremely powerful and SSC should not have it – it is a security
breach. The comment from Anne Chambers makes clear it is used by SSC (“when
we go off piste”) and she would like SSC to retain the APPSUP role, as well as
having the SSC role necessary to use the new tools.
(b) October 2011 – March 2012, there is discussion about the need to release a fix to
correct the above situation for new users, and it appears a fix went out in March
2012 in relation to new users.
(c) July 2014, there is a discussion that the fix only corrected the position for new
users, and existing users would still have APPSUP access.
– 115 –
(d) May – June 2015, further entries record that SSC users have more access than
required which is contrary to security policy, and there is a query in June 2015 if
a script can be developed to develop correct user access. There is no response
and the PEAK is closed as Administrative Response.
A letter from WBD to Freeths on 11 February 2019 {H/196} sets out at pages 9 to 13 the
number of people with a different role, namely the ‘POA UNIX’ role. This is described
at paragraph 8.7.7 {H/196/15} as including “[l]ots of privileges”, such as “the ability to
update/delete/insert into any of the Branch database tables”.
Mr Godeseth confirmed that their powers were extensive and could “do an awful lot of
damage” {Day 8/44:12 - 20}:
Q. You would agree that those people have the role which allows them privileges to
update, delete, or insert into branch database tables whether they are using the
correction tool or not?
A. Those people could log on to the database and do an awful lot of damage.
Q. And the only audit of that that we have prior to 2015 was log on and log off; that's
correct, isn't it?
A. Correct.
UNIX users were said to include “the guys in Ireland”. In re-examination, Mr Godeseth
further re-affirmed the powers afforded to these users {Day8/112:14} – {Day8/113:12}
Q. And "UNIX user", who would the UNIX user be?
A. Oh, sorry, UNIX user would be one of the guys in Ireland.
Q. One of the guys in Ireland. So when you say "one of the guys in Ireland", do you
mean members of the SSC, or do you mean someone else?
A. Someone else.
Q. Well, if we go over the page to page 2 of the same document {F/616.1/2} about a
third of the way down there's a reference to Ed Ashford at Core Services Unix Support.
Who is Ed Ashford?
– 116 –
Reference Data
A. Ed Ashford is one of the guys in Ireland. Q. Who are the "guys in Ireland" exactly?
Could you just clarify -- I appreciate that this may not be your daily fare but~... A.
They are the people who support the hardware, so UNIX is an operating system so
they work at a pretty low level on the systems.
Q. When you say "low level", I mean what do you mean by that? Do you mean they
have powerful user rights, or they have weak user rights or ..?
A. They have pretty powerful user rights, but they are very -- very much driven by
process as to how they use them.
It is clear that privileged user rights existed for the APPSUP role, the POA UNIX role
and other DBA users. They were poorly controlled and there was no or (depending
on the timeframe) no, or at least no effective, logging of user activity kept, less still one
that was audited.
Reference Data
During both Legacy Horizon and Horizon Online, Fujitsu was able to edit reference
data in Horizon.
The errors in reference data could create errors in branch accounts.
In cross-examination of Mr Roll, Post Office attempted to draw a sharp distinction
between operational data and transactional data. However, this distinction was a false
one, because it left out of account the effect that reference data would have on
transaction data in branch accounts.
This became clear in cross-examination of Mr Godeseth both generally, in the context
of how the system works for the purchase of a first class stamp: {Day7/140:15} –
{Day7/142:14}; and in the specific example relating to E-pay (1 November 2018),
causing branch discrepancies in 76 branches, because “There was a human mistake made
when undertaking the change to the reference data for these products”. {F/1848.3/2}.
From this and other evidence it became clear that the Post Office’s case theory that
there was a bright line distinction between transaction data and operational data was
wrong in asserting a false dichotomy, in that respect.
– 117 –
Named Bugs
Named Bugs
There are four named bugs. These are key for understanding the types of problems
that occurred in the Horizon system. They are useful because, as bugs actually
admitted by the Post Office there is a greater documentary record of them, although
the Dalmellington bug was only admitted after it was discovered by Mr Coyne, the
Claimants’ expert. These named bugs are dealt with in Mr Godeseth’s second witness
statement {E2/7/}.
Callendar Square (2003-2006)
Post Office’s Evidence
Post Office called Mr Godeseth to give evidence about the Callendar Square bug. As
to his evidence overall in relation to this bug:
He had no first hand knowledge of this bug, but presented material in his witness
statement which he said he had derived from discussions with Gareth Jenkins
reviewing documents (Godeseth 2, §13 {E2/7/3}).
He presented his evidence in relation to this bug in the context of the Seema Misra trial.
The Claimants do not invite the Court to make findings in relation to the Seema Misra
trial, but invite the Court to note that (1) part of Mr Godeseth’s witness statement
purported to set out what Post Office’s former solicitors, Cartright King, had told to
Post Office’s current solicitors, WBD (Godeseth 2, §8.3 {Day8/10-23} – these were
matters obviously outside of his knowledge and should not have formed any part of
his evidence, and (2) Mr Jenkins gave evidence at the Seema Misra trial in relation to
Callendar Square.
Mr Godeseth’s account of this bug was wrong. Most significantly, he described it has
having occurred in 2005 (§13 {E2/7/3}, when in fact it had persisted for many years
previously (addressed below), with only the manifestation of the bug at the Callendar
Square branch occurring in 2005. (This statement had also been made in
correspondence sent on behalf of Post Office: 28 July 2016 letter {H/2/96} “This defect,
which was discovered in 2005 and fixed in March 2006, involved Horizon failing to recognise
– 118 –
Named Bugs
transfers between different stock units”) and was substantially repeated in WBD’s letter of
11 January 2017.
His evidence about the number of branches affected was also misleading and wrong:
(a) Mr Godeseth in his statement referred to an understanding said to be derived
from Matthew Lenton (§15 {E2/7/5}), giving the impression that an analysis had
been prepared specifically for his statement using event logs. This was not
correct, as Mr Godeseth ultimately accepted {Day8/70:24} – {Day8/71:1}}. Mr
Godeseth had also not spoken to Mr Lenton directly about this {Day8/69:12-22}.
(b) Mr Godeseth had in fact relied on a spreadsheet, which was not exhibited by him
and was only disclosed by WBD on 27 February 2019. It is apparent from that
spreadsheet {F/322.1} and its properties, that it had been compiled by Anne
Chambers on 22 December 2015 (i.e. not contemporaneously as Mr Godeseth
apparently believed {Day8/70:11-14}), it had been compiled from a list of PEAKS
(i.e. not error logs), and it was evidently not a complete list – noting specifically
“NB many other branches had multiple events, preventing replication, but these are the
majority of those which came to Peak, having either reported a problem or it caused a
reconciliation report entry”. The Claimants have would little confidence in the
completeness of this spreadsheet, or the efforts made to ensure its completeness,
even if it were expressed to be complete. But it is not even claimed to be complete.
There is no explanation before the Court as to why the spreadsheet was
compiled, some 10 years after the event.
Material Facts
The Callendar Square bug occurred in Legacy Horizon, it was a problem with Riposte
and it could and did affect balancing in branches {Day8/49:15} – {Day8/50:1}.
The documents evidence it was a longstanding problem (Mr Godeseth ultimately
acknowledged this, and suggested it had probably been a bug since Horizon went in
{Day8/67:5-7}.
– 119 –
Named Bugs
KEL JBallantyne 1359R {F/243} was raised on 24 November 2000. “Timeout Waiting for
Lock Agents and correspondence (Data Centre) and indicates that a decision was initially
taken to ignore the problem:
Solution - ATOS
Needs investigating<br><br>If we get an occasional one of these events, when Riposte

is busy (such as Riposte starting up which was the occurrence on the 04/04/2003) then
this can be ignored. The original error type that this call was raised for was when the
Riposte service hung following archiving and continuously output these messages.
KEL JSimpkins338Q {F/565/2} identifies the type and frequency of problems with
balancing which SPMs experienced as a result of this problem (although does not show
the actual amount of any of the discrepancies {Day8/51:25} – {Day8/52:9}):
Feb 2003:
We are seeing a few of these each week, on Wednesdays during balancing. This can
lead to problems if the PM is balancing on the counter generating the events, as it may
not have a full view of transactions done on other counters. PC0086212 sent to
development.
June 2004:
This event can also give rise to Transfer problems, where the eventing Node was not
replicating and so allowed Clerk to Transfer In [TI] of a txn which had already been
TI on another Node for the second time or an Existing Reversal [ER] of the TI. See
details on call E-0406030482 / PC0103864.
Sept 2005:
This problem is still occurring every week, in one case at the same site on 2 consecutive
weeks. PC0126376 sent to development.
The effects of the duplicated transfers were significant for SPMs. For example, the June
2004 entry referred to within KEL JSimpkins338Q above, gave rise to a £22,290
discrepancy: KELCObeng2025 {F/354}.
The September 2005 problem identified within KEL JSimpkins338Q was in fact the
Callendar Square branch (from which the bug later derived its name). The reality of
the problems experienced by that SPM are only available to the Court from reviewing
– 120 –
Named Bugs
wider disclosure in that case – which show that (as the experts agree) Fujitsu’s record
of PEAKS and KELS alone does not present the full picture.
The chronology of events for the Callendar Square branch shows the very real
difficulties that SPM faced as a result of the bug:
(a) PEAK PC0126042 {F/297}, records the first call from the SPM on 15 September
2005. The problem is identified on p2 as follows:
Date:15-Sep-2005 16:12:27 User:Cheryl Card

[Start of Response]
Due to the Riposte errors on 14/09/05 from 15:30 onwards (see call E-0509140700),
messages were not replicated on counter 3. As a result, 3 transfers in to stock unit AA
were done twice, initially on other counters then again on counter 3. The transfers in
were
for: 3000.00 (cash)
400.00 (cash)
89.69 (cheques)
This has resulted in a loss of 3489.69 in CAP 25 to the outlet, which POL may need to
correct via an error notice.
Phoned the PM to explain what the problem was. He is concerned about other
transactions which he has input twice (3 Giro deposits
and another cheque) because of the replication problem. Have advised him to contact the
NBSC as this is a business issue.
(b) PEAK PC0126376 {F/298} records that the SPM called back on 21 September 2005,
explaining that the problem had recurred. On p2 - 3
21/09/05 17:09 UK955763

Information: pm experienced similar problems last week and wants us to
investitgate why this is happening.
Pm stated he has not had any disconnected node messages or

any on line issues.
21/09/05 17:14 UK955763
Information: Another transfer of £45.40 approx
Transfer out - node 2

user GMP001 S/U E
– 121 –
Named Bugs
Transfer in node 3 & 4

user AJ0001 & LLN001 S/U F
This transfer appeared on both nodes 3 & 4.

When clerk accepted transfer in it accepted it. After she
accepted it she went back into transfers and node 4
transaction for £608.13 appeared.
Date:22-Sep-2005 16:13:08 User:Cheryl Card

[Start of Response]
This is another occurrence of last week's problem (PC0126042), where messages were
not replicated due to Riposte errors. Last
week the PM did some duplicate Transfer In transactions which caused reconciliation
errors - fortunately this week he has not done
so. The PM wants to know why these problems have occurred twice within 2 weeks. I
will pass the call to development for comment.
(c) An Area Intervention Manager Visit Log {F/300.1} records that the SPM received
visits from his Area Intervention Manager on 20, 21 and 28 September 2005. The
SPM was experiencing “severe problems balancing”. He was told by the Helpline
to carry on balancing despite the problems, had received apparently conflicting
advice about the use of the suspense account, and enquires were left unresolved
(“No follow up was received from Service Support regarding this call”).
(d) A further Area Intervention Manager Visit Log dated 7 October 2005 {F/301.2}
records the SPMs continuing concern that “he has still not heard anything regarding
the loss he is rolling.” …
(e) The problem then occurred again. {F/302} PC0127246, p1:
“12/10/05 17:26 Pm is transfering a stock unit from node 7 to node 2, it has been
accepted on node 2 but has notbeen tranfered.
12/10/05 17:39 UK956078
Information: Pm was trying to transfer £2490 from node 7 onto node 2.
She states that she has accepted the transfer on node 2
– 122 –
Named Bugs
but the system is not showing this.
On node 7 it is showing pending transfer but it is not
showing on node 2.
It appears on her transfer sheet as cmpleated.”
(f) A further Area Intervention Manager Visit Log dated 4 November 2005 {F/310.1}
records the SPM’s continuing loss and concerns about being held liable for it:
Spoke to Alan about the ongoing issue of his Horizon problems. He now has received
the error notice for the Girobank duplicate transactions. This still leaves a loss of
around £3500. I told Alan that this was still being investigated and as soon as I had
some news I would get back to him.
Alan worried about this, because he had read an article in the Subpostmaster which
makes him think that he will be held liable, and he has no intention of making this
good. He again said that the transfers had been sorted, but he needed paperwork to
back this up in order to correct the loss.
(g) Within Fujitsu at this time, an entry on 10 November 2005 within PEAK
PC0126376 {F/298/5} records “workarounds” being in place:
1/ This problem is the route cause of the reconciliation error closed in PC0126042
2/ Presumably the route cause is deemed to be software not hardware
3/ The Postmaster has a workaround in place which is not to duplicate transactions

(e.g. Transfer In) just because the original attempts were successful but not showing
on all nodes
4/ POA CS MSU have a workaround in place which is that if 3/ above is not followed
& PC0126042 reoccurs, a BIMS will be issued advising POL to issue a Transaction
Correction
5/ There is no SLT for software fixes as they are delivered based upon the priority or
severity of the issue and could remain open until both businesses decide a fix is
necessary or the work around is adequate
(h) The reality of the position for the SPM, and the advice he received from the
Helpline is revealed by the Area Intervention Manager Visit Log dated 16
November 2005 {F/312.1}:
– 123 –
Named Bugs
16.11.05 Discussed on going issue of loss due to Horizon mis balance.
Spmr concerned that he has now made a fraudulent entry in that he has rolled over
to the next trading period and put the loss into local suspense.
He has then gone on to state that the cash has been made good, which it hasn’t. This
was done on the advice of the Helpdesk.
18.11.05 I have contacted Jennifer Robson, who has confirmed that the loss has to be
put into Emergency Suspense. I have now asked when this will be done as the spmr is
worried about doing something that it totally contrary to his contract.
(i) As at 5 and 6 January 2006 the matter was still unresolved. The Area Intervention
Manager Visit Log, 5 and 6 January 2006 {F/324.1} records the Horizon helpdesk
as having told him “there is no system problem”:
Telephoned the office and Allan said that he was having problems again with
transfers. He has contacted the Horizon helpdesk who have subsequently come back
to him to say that there is no system problem and that he should contact NBSC. He
did this and from what I can understand the NBSC have told him that he is trying
to balance on two different terminals. Allan disputes this and is adamant that there
is a system error.
(j) Finally, an email from Anne Chambers of Fujitsu dated 23 February 2006
{F/333.1/3} indicates that the problem had been known about for years
(consistent with the KELs above), affected many branches, most weeks for years,
and Fujitsu had never “got to the bottom” of why the Callendar Square branch was
particularly affected: (Mr Godeseth accepted this did not indicate that she gave
the problem at the branch special priority to sort out {Day8/65:4-9}).
Taken to the documents above, Mr Godeseth agreed the SPM was not in an easy
position, indeed he described it as a “a horrible position to be in” {Day8/58:3-4}.
The bug was apparently fixed in March 2006 (Godeseth 2, §14.2 {E2/7/5}.
The actual number of branches affected is unknown, save that it must be many more
than the 29 identified in the December 2015 spreadsheet, said to represent the “majority
of those that came to PEAK”, and as referred to further at §366(b) above. The indication
in Anne Chambers’ contemporaneous email dated 23 February 2006 that it affected a
– 124 –
Named Bugs
number of branches each week, would suggest the number of affected branches to be
in excess of 500 (even at least 2 branches per week x 52 weeks x 5 years).
The Court is further invited to note that WBD provided the Claimants with seriously
misleading information about the extent of this bug in pre-trial correspondence:
(a) As above, in their 28 July 2016 Letter of Response {H/2/96}, WBD described the
problem as having been discovered in 2005, which was incorrect. (This section
of the letter is introduced as being purportedly comprehensive, and “to dispel any
myths” about what happened, §1.8 on p95).
(b) On 11 January 2017 WBD stated that a “full explanation” had been given of this
and other bugs, and purported to “confirm” that “The Falkirk / Callendar Square
issue was only known to have affected that one branch.” {H/6/3}. That was not true.
Receipts and Payments Mismatch (2010 – 2013)
Post Office again called and relied upon Mr Godeseth to give evidence about the
Receipts and Payments mismatch bug, although again he had no first hand knowledge
of it – he was entirely reliant on what he had been told by Gareth Jenkins (who, it
emerged, had briefed Dr Worden), and the only document exhibited to his witness
statement was a note authored by Mr Jenkins {F/1000} (referred to at §39, §40 and §41).
Mr Jenkins was in fact also the author of two other notes in relation to this bug: {F/1001}
(a document also referred to at the Common Issues Trial, misdated on Opus, likely
date c. 29 September 2010), and {F/777}, a 25 February 2011 document prepared by Mr
Jenkins following the Panorama programme.
Mr Godeseth said those documents ({F/1001} and {F/777}) had not been drawn to his
attention by Mr Jenkins {Day8/76:4}-{Day8/77:7}, but later also said that he had had
seen {F/1001} before giving evidence {Day8/78:25} - {Day8/79:2}. The significance of
{F/1001} is apparent on its face in relation to the prospect of remote access:
Proposal for affected Branches
– 125 –
Named Bugs
There are three potential solutions to apply to the impacted branches, the groups
recommendation is that solution two should be progressed.
SOLUTION ONE - Alter the Horizon Branch figure at the counter to show the
discrepancy. Fujitsu would have to manually write an entry value to the local branch
account.
IMPACT - When the branch comes to complete next Trading Period they would have
a discrepancy, which they would have to bring to account.
RISK- This has significant data integrity concerns and could lead to questions of
"tampering" with the branch system and could generate questions around how the
discrepancy was caused. This solution could have moral implications of Post Office
changing branch data without informing the branch.
SOLUTION TWO - P&BA will journal values from the discrepancy account into the
Customer Account and recover/refund via normal processes. This will need to be
supported by an approved POL communication. Unlike the branch "POLSAP"
remains in balance albeit with an account (discrepancies) that should be cleared.
IMPACT - Post Office will be required to explain the reason for a debt recovery/ refund
even though there is no discrepancy at the branch.
RISK - Could potentially highlight to branches that Horizon can lose data.
SOLUTION THREE - It is decided not to correct the data in the branches (ie Post
Office would prefer to write off the "lost"
IMPACT - Post office must absorb circa £20K loss
RISK - Huge moral implications to the integrity of the business, as there are agents
that were potentially due a cash gain on their system
Further, as noted by the Claimants during the Common Issues Trial, Post Office’s
pleaded position in their RFI {C4/2/15-16} is that the single “Balancing Transaction”
referred to in the Generic Defence §57(3) “was used to correct an error arising from the
“Payments Mismatch” problem (as to which, see page 25 of the Letter of Response)” i.e. used
in respect of this Receipts and Payments Mismatch Bug (which gives rise to the
inference that Solution One was adopted, at least in respect of one branch). Mr
Godeseth however did not know and had not checked {Day8/88:10-18}.
– 126 –
Named Bugs
It is notable that document {F/1001} was not even mentioned in Mr Godeseth’s witness
statement. Questioned about which solution was adopted he offered only that “My
understanding is that TCs were issued” {Day8/81:6-11}, Mr Godeseth’s understanding
was not a reliable source, given his very limited knowledge (e.g. {Day8/83:15-18} “I
will take your word for it”), and misplaced confidence in other matters – as addressed
below.
Mr Godeseth’s evidence was shown to be materially inaccurate in respect of this bug.
He asserted that the bug had arisen and been identified in September 2010: §36
{E2/7/10} and {Day8/75:6-22}, and expressed confidence in that as “knowledge derived
from what Gareth told me, plus further looking at some detail”. If Mr Godeseth had in fact
looked at the detail of {F/1001}, he would however have known that the issue had first
arisen in May 2010, SPMs had been kept in the dark about it, and it was not planned
to be fixed until late October, {F/1001/2-3}:
Note the Branch will not get a prompt from the system to say there is Receipts and
Payment mismatch, therefore the branch will believe they have balanced correctly.”
Impact
• The branch has appeared to have balanced, whereas in fact they could have a loss or
a gain.
• Our accounting systems will be out of sync with! what is recorded at the branch
• If widely known could cause a loss of confident in the Horizon System by branches
• Potential impact upon ongoing legal cases where branches are disputing the integrity
of Horizon
• It could provide branches ammunition to blame Horizon for future discrepancies
Identifying the issue and forward resolution
The Receipts and Payment mismatch will result in an error code being generated
which will allow Fujitsu to isolate branches affected this by this problem, although this
is not seen by the branches. We have asked Fujitsu why it has taken so long to react to
and escalate an issue which began in May. They will provide feedback in due course.
– 127 –
Named Bugs
Fujitsu are writing a code fix which stop the discrepancy disappearing from Horizon
in the future. They are aiming to deliver this into test week commencing 4th October.
With live proving at the model office week commencing 11 t h October. With full roll
out to the network completed by the 21st of October. We have explored moving this
forward and this is the earliest it can be released into live.
As to the number of branches affected, again Mr Godeseth’s evidence was concerning.
His witness statement initially stated that he was sure that 60 branches were affected
(§42 {E2/7/11}), but this number was revised to 62 branches in the Defendants’ list of
corrections {E2/16/4}. The Claimants were able to work out that the source of those
numbers (and the initial error) was likely to be a spreadsheet {F/754}, which had not
been exhibited by Mr Godeseth. The properties of that spreadsheet show Mr Jenkins
as the author.
Cross-examination of Mr Godeseth in relation to this issue was illuminating as to Mr
Godeseth’s unfamiliarity with the source of the information appearing in his
statement, and also the continuing role of Mr Jenkins, in apparently reviewing and
commenting on the evidence in preparation for trial {Day8/84:3} – {Day8/86:3}:
Q.… If we look at the "Affected branches" tab first, there's a list of affected branches
there, and if we go back to the "Check for duplicate branches", there's a total at the
bottom of 64 but we can see the number 2 in row 34 and the number 2 in row 41,
can't we?
A. Yes.
Q. So if you subtract both those from 64 you get the 60 number in your original
witness statement, don't we? Is that a calculation that you made or someone else
made?
A. No, no, I didn't do a calculation to come up with the 60. I was quoting from other
people.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Someone just gave you the 60, did they?
A. I thought I was quoting from other people. I -- Gareth even said to me that in my
statement I had said "approximately 60", so I was not -- clearly I didn't because the
statement here doesn't contain that word. I had rather hoped it had when this was
first brought to my attention, but no, I certainly did not do any specific calculation to
come up with the 60 that I put into my original statement.
MR GREEN: Did Gareth explain the change to you from 60 to 62?
A. No.
– 128 –
Named Bugs
Q. But how did he come to tell you what was in your original statement? What was
that conversation?
A. I picked up the number -- to be -- my objective in this was to explain to the court

the symptoms of the bug and how -- the technical aspect of it. I did not pay particular
attention to getting the detail on how many branches were affected, correct.
Q. Okay. So you have spoken to Gareth since your statement?
A. I don't think I have spoken to him about this in particular. I was -- as I say, when
Gareth had said I had originally said "approximately 60" I was thinking that was
quite neat, but that's not the case.
Q. Well, you said "Gareth even said to me that in my statement I had said
'approximately 60'", so he must have said that to you after your statement had been
filed?
A. It was a comment in a document that we were exchanging.
Q. But you hadn't spoken to him about remote access since your first statement?
A. No.
Q. Why have you stayed off that topic with him?
A. Oh, sorry, this was just a comment. We have been exchanging documents, we
have been commenting on documents, so it was not a particular conversation. It is
merely a case of Gareth had commented on this when it was pushed back to us that I
had originally said 60 and actually the answer was different.
Mr Godeseth in truth did not know about this bug other than superficially, and was
unable to assist the Court in his evidence about it in any meaningful way.
Material Facts
On the basis above, the Claimants invite the Court to make the following findings of
fact in relation to the Receipts and Payments Mismatch bug.
“Receipts and Payments Mismatch” is a shorthand for a specific bug in Horizon Online
which arose during stock unit balancing although a “receipts & payment mismatch” is
symptom of many bugs. The problem occurred if an SPM pressed cancel during a
particular point in the balancing process.
Branches were affected from at least May 2010. Fujitsu were either unaware of it or
did not act on it until late September 2010 (when the first of the Gareth Jenkins notes
was written {F/1001}). A fix was not produced until October 2010. At least 62 branches
– 129 –
Named Bugs
were affected, as identified in the spreadsheet at {F/754}. The effect of the bug was that
it appeared the branch had balanced when it had not. The spreadsheet shows that e.g.
one SPM had a negative discrepancy of £777.96 on 16 July 2010 as a result of the bug.
Injecting transactions without the SPM’s knowledge was discussed by Fujitsu and Post
Office in relation to this bug {F/1001}, and Post Office’s pleaded case is that a Balancing
Transaction was used in respect of one of the branches affected by this bug {C4/2/15-
16}.
Local Suspense Account (2010 – 2013)
Again Post Office relied on Mr Godeseth in respect of this bug. Again Mr Godeseth
did not have any direct knowledge of it.
Mr Godeseth’s witness statement and knowledge was essentially derived from
{F/1075}, a 15 May 2013 document authored by Gareth Jenkins.
The paragraph of that document set out at §396 below as to Post Office knowledge of
the bug and failure to communicate with Fujitsu was selectively not referred to, rather
Mr Godeseth said in his witness statement that the “bug was discovered in January
2013” §47 {E2/7/12}, and said that he couldn’t comment on whether Post Office had
known about it since 2012 {Day8/98:2-18}.
Material Facts
The Local Suspense Account bug occurred between 2010 and 2013.
It occurred because a change was made to the archiving strategy in July 2011. It is a
good example of a change to non-transactional data in the branch database which
affected branch accounts – see {Day8/97:7}- {Day8/98:1}.
According to Mr Jenkins’ note, the bug effected 14 branches. The Post Office was aware
of the bug in 2012, but Fujitsu was not informed that there was a problem until 2013,
see Mr Jenkins’ note {F/1075/2}:
– 130 –
Named Bugs
This problem was not reported to Fujitsu in 2011 / 12 and only affected a small number
of Branches and only for a single Trading Period. However the two branches with the
largest discrepancies did report the issue to Post Office Ltd who could see the impact
of the problem in their back end system and wrote off the loss or gain for the branch
but did not ask Fujitsu to investigate further.
However, Mr Godeseth’s witness statement fails to address this where he states
imprecisely that the “bug was discovered in January 2013” §47 {E2/7/12}. In oral evidence
Mr Godeseth was more careful to explain {Day8/98:10-18}:
Q. …The point there is that although it had persisted
for years not months, it was SPMs who drew it to
Post Office's attention and when they did, then Fujitsu
saw it and was able to try and correct it?
A. We became aware of it in 2013, from my understanding.
Q. Yes, because it was raised by SPMs?
A. Correct.
Q. And Post Office had known about it since 2012?
A. I can't comment on that.
Dalmellington (2010-2016)
Mr Godeseth again gave evidence, although he had no first hand knowledge of the
bug {Day8/98:25} – {Day8/99:1}. He did not know who had prepared the presentation
in relation to this bug which he had referred to in his witness statement (redacted
{F/1416}, and unredacted {F/1415}), and whether this was also Mr Jenkins. He again
gave the impression of being unfamiliar with the facts (e.g. {Day8/101:3-7}.
Material Facts
The Dalmellington bug was discovered as a named bug by the Claimants’ expert, Mr
Coyne. It was not a bug which had been mentioned in the Post Office’s letter of
response on 28 July 2016 {H/2}, nor admitted in GDef nor in correspondence..
– 131 –
Named Bugs
Like the Callendar Square bug, the Dalmellington Branch is named after an
eponymous branch but it was not the only branch to suffer with the problem. The bug
relates to issues that arose when the SPM attempted to transfer cash from their main
branch to an outreach branch (hence the Dalmellington branch is also known as the
outreach issue).
The Dalmellington Branch reported the issue in 2015. The problem occurred on 8
October 2015 and resulted in Peak PC0246949 {F/1389} and again on 21 October 2015
resulting in Peak PC0247207 {F/1393}. The Dalmellington branch was showing a loss of
£32,000 as a result of the bug.
Both Fujitsu and the Post Office were first aware of this bug by 2010 and indeed there
were 2 fixes in 2010 and 2011 {F/1415/7}. However in later years, the bug persisted but
no calls were raised with Fujitsu {F/1415/8}, and Mr Godeseth accepted that it looked
like the point being made by the slide was that the issue had not been raised by the
Post Office with Fujitsu so that the problem could not have been corrected earlier
{Day8/100:5-11}. Mr Godeseth agreed that SPMs were suffering duplicate pouches over
a number of years due to a known problem with the system but Fujitsu was not
informed of this problem until 2015 {Day8/100:19}-{Day8/101:7}.
The Dalmellington bug was known about by December 2015. It is therefore deeply
unsatisfactory that the Post Office did not mention this bug until it was discovered by
Mr Coyne. Indeed it is only with Mr Godeseth’s second witness statement that there
was any positive recognition by the Post Office that the Dalmellington bug exists.
What is more it appears there was in fact some public pressure in regards to the
Dalmellington bug in November 2015. Computer Weekly published two blog posts
{F/1399} and {F/1405}. It is likely this pressure explains why the Fujitsu presentation at
{F/1415} took place on 10 December 2015. This pressure was no doubt felt by the Post
Office, who were concerned about the blog posts and the Dalmellington bug. This can
be seen from internal Post Office emails, particularly those sent by Paula Vennells
(former CEO of the Post Office) who commented on the blog posts {F/1495.1/5}. Mrs
Vennells recognises that Post Office seem to have been “very lax at handling £24k”
{F/1415.1/5}.
– 132 –
Recurring Problems
Despite a “mini task force” being asked for conduct an “urgent review” on the
Dalmellington error on 1 July 2016 {F/1495.2}, it, it appears that on the same day there
was a change of approach and the same taskforce was asked to “stand down.” The letter
of response was served on 28 July 2016 {H//2}. Just four weeks before the Post Office
was asking for an urgent review into the Dalmellington bug. It was surely at the
forefront of Post Office’s mind.
Recurring Problems
Phantom Transactions
Mrs Van Den Bogerd was apparently previously unaware of a problem with phantom
sales and was only informed of this fact by Post Office’s solicitors {Day5/24:16-21}. This
was despite her having been involved in the mediation scheme, and phantom
transactions having been a specific issue raised during the mediation scheme
{Day5/25:8} – {Day5/26:15}. Prior to being informed by Post Office’s solicitors that there
had been reports of phantom sales in 2000, Mrs Van Den Bogerd said she would have
assumed user error {Day5/27:2-4}.
The three documents put to Mrs Van Den Bogerd clearly evidence that there have been
problems with phantom transactions over time, albeit not acknowledged by Post
Office until now.
(a) {F/97} Master PEAK for phantom sales, PC0065021 (17 April 2001). On p5 it
records that ROMEC had been to site and actually seen the phantom transactions
“so its not just the PMs word now”. On p7 it concludes “Phantom transactions have
not been proven in circumstances which preclude user error. In all cases where these
have occurred a user error related cause can be attributed to the phenomenon.”
(b) {F/773} PEAK PC0208335 (11 February 2011), records phantom stock
declarations:
The office reports the balance done on 09/02/2011 was fine. Then at the end of the
day on 10/02/2011 the office did the daily cash declaration and declared their
stamps and went into discrepancies. The system brought up 6 pages of losses and
– 133 –
Recurring Problems
gains that contained items that are no longer valid stock, such as old first day
envelopes and 58 PO saving stamps. The office then called the helpline and was
passed between both NBSC and HSD trying to determine the cause. On the
morning of 11/02/2011 the spmr went into declarestock to check and there was an
existing declaration there dated 17/02/2010. The office went into the declaration
and confirmed it showed the PO saving stamps and other stock items, some
showing as minus stock amounts, that were not correct to the branch.
It somehow seems that the system has somehow picked up this declaration and this
is the cause of the discrepancies appearing on the system. The spmr was told to
declare the correct stock figures but is reluctant to do this as this will cause
discrepancies when she next balances that are not relevant to herself at the moment.
(c) {F/1286.2/2}, email chain from NBSC Admin Team to Branch Support Team (9 –
11 December 2014).
(i) Email from Alan Brown, NBSC Admin Section, to Branch Support Team:
"BRANCH REPORTING THAT HE HAS FOUND SENSITIVE ISSUE

WITH HORIZON WHEN THE SYSTEM PUT A PHANTOM CHEQUE
ON THE CHEQUE LINE IN JULY 2013. CLAIMS TO HAVE EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM. ALTHOUGH HE HIMSELF DID NOT
SUFFER A LOSS. THINKS THAT HORIZON IS FLAWED. DID NOT
ASK TO BE CONTACTED ABOUT THIS. JUST WANTED TO SAY
THAT HE HAD THIS INFORMATION AND THREATENED TO GO TO
MP AS A RESULT.
Caller Parry (Mr. Paramjee Dha?) 01202 556805"
(ii) That email is forwarded to Nigel Allen, who then forwards it to Andrew
Winn, as follows:
Please see below.
Given the current media and in particular the BBC's attention on Horizon, do
you think it worthwhile looking into this 'alleged flaw' with Horizon that this
spmr has highlighted to pre-empt any enquiries from his MP?
(iii) Andrew Winn then responded:
Hi Nigel
– 134 –
Recurring Problems
There is nothing I can investigate given the level of detail provided unless he
only accepted one cheque in July 13. Even then I don't have the level of detail
needed and would need Fujitsu support. Without a date/value we can't really
raise a request.
I don't really understand what the purpose of the call is. Does he want it
investigated or not? My instinct is that we have enough on with people asking
us to look at things.
I can't figure out how if a phantom cheque appeared on Horizon he could avoid
a loss unless another phantom transaction took it away again!!!!
Andy
Mrs Van Den Bogerd accepted the inadequacy of that response {Day5/46:7} –
Day5/47:6}:
Q. … The first point is that information which might be relevant if you had an interest
in knowing the truth about the reliability of Horizon has been offered –
A. Yes.
Q. -- by a subpostmaster who has rung up, and the subpostmaster has said they've
got evidence, as we saw, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And if one had any interest whatsoever in knowing the truth about the reliability
of Horizon, you would say "Well, can you please get him to send the evidence",
wouldn't you?
A. Yes, you would.
Q. And that's not what happened?
A. No.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Do you consider that that reaction from Mr Winn is an

adequate reaction –
A. No.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: -- or an inadequate reaction?
– 135 –
Problem Management
A. That's a totally inadequate reaction. The fact that we had the details from the
branch on there -- you know, the name of the branch, the FAD code, it would have
been very easy for Mr Winn to have contacted to get further information and I would
have expected him to have done so.
Mrs Van Den Bogerd in her witness statement did not engage with the prospect of
phantom transactions causing losses in branch accounts for which they were not
responsible. Her emphasis was to the contrary: §13 {E2/5/4}“I understand the key point
to be that such matters, provided they relate to stock sales, should not cause a discrepancy in a
branch's accounts”. However, she had to accept in cross-examination that there was a
risk of loss {Day5/48/15-22}, as there obviously is.
Failed Recoveries
Following a power cut or Horizon online failure there may be a failed recovery which
generates a shortfall in the accounts of an SPM who is otherwise in no way at fault.
This process is apparently by design, KEL Acha95T {F/1700}:
If a T1 recovery request times out at the counter, recovery is abandoned and no second
attempt is made to get the recovery information. This is as designed; it was decided to keep
recovery simple and not have too many error paths. The priority is to get the User working
again, so in this sort of error path we just mark the recovery as failed and leave it for SSC to
sort out.
Yet the guidance given by Post Office to SPMs {F/1365} does even identify the
possibility of a failed recovery.
These issues are addressed in detail in relation to Mr Tank and Mrs Burke’s cases,
further below.
Problem Management
The evidence about problem management procedures which apparently were in place
was as follows:
(a) At §64 of Mr Godeseth’s second witness statement he stated that:
When Legacy Horizon was in place Problem Management was reported in a

specific section within the Service Review Book (SRB). The Service Review Book
– 136 –
Problem Management
was "the primary input into the Service Management Forum reporting on
performance against SLT's" {POL-0106087}.
(b) However, when asked about this part of his witness statement, Mr Godeseth said
“basically I got this from Steve” (i.e. Steve Bansall, Fujitsu’s Senior Service Delivery
Manager), said he didn’t know the reporting methodology in any detail at all,
and he was left imagining how it might have taken place – he had never been to
a service review meeting and it wasn’t clear he had ever seen a service review
book {Day7/159:23} - {Day7/161:6}.
(c) Mr Godeseth described the service review book outputs as a “very high level”
review of problem management and main problems {Day7/161:4-6}.
(d) At §65 he said:
From September 2010 these SRBs reported metrics only against contractual
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and as there are no contractual SLAs for Problem
Management, it is not covered in the SRB reports between September 2010 and
2014.
(e) However, this was also “from Steve”, and Mr Godeseth could not assist with why
this had occurred {Day7/:161:7} – {Day7/162:3}.
(f) Asked about §66 which referred to annual problem review reports for the years
2014 – 2017, Mr Godeseth simply didn’t know if that system was still in place in
2018 or not {Day7/162:5-12}.
(g) Mr Godeseth did not know if the 2014 POA Problem Management – Problem
Review document {F/1420} had been implemented (this was in fact one of the
documents exhibited at his §66), but agreed it appeared on the face of the
document it had and that it addressed some problems, but said he didn’t know
anything about it {Day7/163:15} – {Day7/164:15}.
(h) The 2015 POA Problem Management – Problem Review document {F/1497}
included an entry in relation to Dalmellington {F/1497/7} which Mr Godeseth
agreed it was fair to say that wasn’t a particularly rigorous or robust treatment
– 137 –
Problem Management
of recording the problem, its extent, duration and effect {Day7/166:24} –
{Day7/167:2}.
The Fujitsu Post Office Account Customer Service Problem Management Procedure
{F/1692} was apparently never brought into effect, despite having first been drafted in
November 2007 and subject to various review and amendments through to September
2017 (document history p4-5).
Despite exhibiting this document in his witness statement, Mr Godeseth wasn’t sure
if he had ever seen it before, and said it certainly wasn’t a document he was
“particularly familiar with” {Day7/151:9-18}. He was unable to explain the reason it was
not implemented despite multiple versions having been issued for approval
{Day7/157:4} – {Day7/159:18}
The scope and aims of the document are described in it {F/1692/8} as follows:
The scope of Reactive Problem Management is from identification of a Problem

through to closure and includes root cause analysis, identification of Known Errors,
initiation of any necessary Change Requests and the provision of management
information to POA & Atos. Problem Management is responsible for ensuring that
resources are prioritised to resolve Problems in the appropriate order based on business
need. The scope of Proactive Problem Management includes trend analysis and
investigation to identify potential Problems, which are then progressed through the
Problem Management process to be removed from the estate.
The aim of Problem Management is to investigate, eliminate or prevent causes of

Incidents and Known Errors regarding POA & POL Infrastructure/Information
System and to prevent the recurrence of Incidents related to these errors. To achieve
this aim, Problem Management seeks to establish the Root Cause of Incidents and then
start actions to improve or correct the situation. The objective of Problem
Management is:
 To minimise disruption to the business by proactive identification and

analysis of the cause of service Incidents and by managing Problems to
closure
 To ensure escalation as part of a defined escalation process
– 138 –
Problem Management
 To efficiently and effectively identify the Root Cause of Incidents/Problems
 To define Known Errors and their permanent fixes and/or temporary

Workarounds, associated with all incidents
 To track and maintain relationships between Known Errors and existing

incidents
 To identify Problem trends, to assess the performance of the Problem

Management process and the quality of services delivered to POL.
Mr Godeseth fairly agreed that to have a robust system it is important to make
informed assessments of where problems lie based on the relevant information
available, and to capture and track that in a way that can be analysed, and that that
seemed to be consistent with if not the aim of this procedure {Day7/152:17} -
{Day7/153:2}. He also agreed that the proposed metrics within the policy are
competent professional metrics that you would expect to see in a policy of this sort
{Day7/155:17-20}.
Mr Coyne and Dr Worden both believed the procedure had been implemented when
preparing their early reports: Coyne 1 §5.156-157 {D2/1/96-97}, Worden 2 {D3/7/81} row
21.
Mr Coyne had also made a request for information “Please provide how many times (and
over what period) the “Problem Management Process” has recorded the potential for a system
or software error?”, to which Post Office’s response was “Post Office objects to this request.
Fujitsu believes that it does not record problems in such a way that would allow this to be
determined without retrospectively carrying out detailed analyses. This would require a
disproportionate effort and cost” {D2/5/26}.
In short, an obviously important system which would have contributed to improving
the robustness of horizon was not implemented despite the recognised need for it
spanning 10 years.
– 139 –
Individual SPMs
Individual SPMs
Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement expressly stated that she had aimed to give
the court “a balanced view” of the range of possible errors, but in fact the content, if not
the aim, of her witness statement was directed at identifying user errors made by SPMs
or their assistants as the likely cause of shortfalls. It was not a balanced view.
Nonetheless, this appeared to be the basis upon which several of the individual SPMs
were challenged in cross-examination.
Mr Andrees Latif
The way in which Mr Latif gave evidence and the particular aspects of the way in
which he was cross-examined, by reference to documents he had not previously seen,
is addressed at paragraph 132 above.
The Claimants invite the Court to make the following findings in relation to the
substantive matters raised by Mr Latif’s evidence, as below.
Stock unit transfer
Mr Latif recalled having problems with a stock unit transfer in or around July 2015
which caused a £2,000 shortfall in his accounts. He was certain that this had occurred
and had a good clear recollection of the steps he had taken at this time, including, for
example, checking CCTV.
The Claimants acknowledge that ARQ data which was eventually produced by the
Post Office for June, July and August 2015 (transaction and event data for each of those
months) did not obviously show that such a shortfall had occurred.
However, the ARQ data disclosed for Mr Latif was for a relatively small window of
time (3 months), and Mr Latif was unsure about the exact date of occurrence, as
apparent from the wording of his witness statement. Further, the Claimants
specifically wrote to WBD on 4 February 2019, making this point, as follows {H/186/2}:
Also at paragraph 90, Mrs Van Den Bogerd exhibits transactional data for June to
August 2015. We anticipate that data outside of this range was identified by Post
Office and considered by Mrs Van Den Bogerd and/or her small team, and our 18
– 140 –
Individual SPMs
December 2018 request seeks disclosure of that data. As Post Office must recognise,
Mr Latif may have misremembered the date of this incident.”
WBD responded on 11 February 2019, effectively refusing to provide any further
disclosure outside that narrow window {H/196/19}:36
Disclosure of the transaction and event data which were referred to by Mrs Van Den
Bogerd has been disclosed as: POL- 0444063, POL-0444062, POL-0444061, POL-
044407. The remaining data and filtered data will be disclosed in the list "Claimants'
Horizon Witnesses". These documents cover the date ranges of June to August 2015
and January to March 2018.
Further there were two striking aspects in respect of Mr Latif’s evidence about stock
unit transfers which had not been acknowledged or investigated by the Post Office:
(a) There are known bugs which affected stock unit transfers, namely Callendar
Square and Dalmellington. Mrs Van Den Bogerd did not have these in mind
when preparing her witness statement – she said she had not even heard about
Callendar Square {Day6/20:22} – {Day5:21:25}. The fact that this type of bug
could have caused the loss described by Mr Latif is clearly relevant.37
(b) The event data for Mr Latif’s branch for July 2015 {F/1354} showed evidence of
additional receipts having been printed, which was a feature of the
Dalmellington bug (Appendix 1 to Parker 1 {E2/11/23} and see KEL acha621P
{F/1426}, raised 15 October 2015 updated 14 January 2016), but that had not been
investigated or apparently noticed by the Post Office prior to cross-examination
(Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s evidence was that this was something that she “would
want to go back and have a look at”) {Day6/32:5} – {35:12}.
36 For completeness, the Post Office did in fact subsequently on 28 February 2019 disclose session data
(only) for September 2015 for Mr Latif. The Post Office had not provided session data for June to
August 2015 and this type of data was not relied upon by Mrs Van Den Bogerd in respect of stock
unit transfers by Mr Latif.
37 Mrs Van Den Bogerd was asked about these bugs in re-examination {Day6/85:19} – {Day6/89:25}. For
the avoidance of any doubt, it is obviously not the Claimants case that Mr Latif was in fact affected
by the Callendar Square or Dalmellington bugs, rather that bugs of this type, affecting stock unit
transfers, can and did occur.
– 141 –
Individual SPMs
It was put to Mr Latif that Post Office’s call logs did not record a call having been made
by Mr Latif about this stock unit transfer over the period June to August 2015, however:
(a) Mr Latif was clear that he had complained to the area manager, Mr Navjot Jando
a number of times {Day2/54:3-7} and {Day2/55:13-19}.
(b) Mr Latif may well have called the area sales manager, rather than the helpline,
in which case there would be no helpline log of this call {Day2/40:9-14}.
(c) The Claimants contend that, generally, Helpline call logs are not a complete,
accurate or reliable source of information, as Mr Latif himself explained
{Day2/44:10-16}:38
Q. So those are all the call logs for June to August 2015 and they don't show
the call that you say you made. How do you explain that?
A. I'm not sure. Sometimes we ring up and they don't know that we made
the call. We've had in the past when we rang up, we say we spoke to somebody
and they haven't logged the call properly. Mistakes do happen, sir.
As above, Mr Latif had a good clear recollection of the events surrounding the stock
unit transfer which caused his branch a £2,000 loss. Mr Latif was an experienced SPM
and knew how to correctly and efficiently perform this type of transfer. He recalled
checking his 16 channel CCTV system to make sure there had not been any human
error or that anything untoward had happened {Day2/22:19} – {Day2/25:7-22}, and ran
all the reports that were available to him in branch, but these did not assist him in
ascertaining what had caused the problem, and he (rightly) identified that Post Office
had access to much more data than him about what happened at the back end
{Day2/28:22-25}-{Day2/29:1-10}. He complained to his area manager (above), but
ultimately made good the loss, on the basis of his understanding that he was liable for
the amount even if caused by a “computer glitch” {Day2/52:11-25}- {Day2/53:1-18}.
38 The call logs disclosed for Mr Latif are also not in chronological order {F/1829.1}{Day2/44:21} –
{Day2/45:19}, which further casts doubt on the accuracy of the log and/or the production of it for this
trial. The Post Office has not provided any explanation for this.
– 142 –
Individual SPMs
The Court is invited to find that Mr Latif did genuinely experience an occasion where
£2,000 went missing as part of a stock unit transfer, albeit the date on which this
occurred is not clear. Mr Latif’s case is, at the very least, consistent with a bug affecting
his branch and this particular stock unit transfer, albeit the Claimants acknowledge
and accept that it may be difficult for the Court to make precise findings on the
available evidenced in this trial. What his evidence and his case clearly illustrates is
the difficulty faced by an SPM in identifying the true cause of an alleged shortfall.
TA / TC issue
The second issue Mr Latif gave evidence about concerned duplicate TAs received by
him in January 2018; and the TC he was then sent, intended to correct this error, but
which it was his evidence, left him with a loss.
As to the duplicate TAs, Post Office admitted that there had been an error by Post
Office in respect of the TAs that Mr Latif was sent on 18 January 2018. Mrs Van Den
Bogerd claimed that there had been a manual data entry by the Post Office. Her
evidence was as follows, §98 {E2/5/24}:
98. The transaction data {POL-0444076}, including data relating to TCs, shows that
the branch received two TAs on 18 January 2018. However, due to an error by Post
Office, instead of increasing the scratch-card stock, the TAs decreased the stock. To be
clear, this was a data entry error by Post Office and not an issue with Horizon.
Horizon processed the TAs accurately. I note that the TAs were accepted by the branch,
which could have been challenged at that point if the user had noticed that the TAs
were not for a positive number, as they should have been.
There are two features about that paragraph which are concerning, and indicate a
desire to protect Post Office’s interests to the detriment of the Claimants, including bias
towards absolving the Horizon system of any blame and often attributing fault to
SPMs (‘UEB’), namely:
(a) The characterisation of the error as a “data entry error” (even by the Post Office)
was entirely wrong. Mrs Van Den Bogerd confirmed in cross-examination that
this was indeed wrong, and that in fact the TA was automated not manual, and
that it would be fair to correct her witness statement to say “this is an issue with
– 143 –
Individual SPMs
Horizon and not a data entry error by Post Office”, the data had originated with
Camelot and been conveyed by Horizon {Day5/66:24} - {Day5/69:2}. She agreed
that on the face of it, it at least suggested some doubt as to the robustness and
integrity of the Camelot data coming through in that automated system
{Day5/69:14-18}.
(b) Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s emphasis in her witness statement on Mr Latif having
“accepted” the TA, rather than challenging it at that point was positively
misleading, when, in fact, Mrs Van Den Bogerd well knew that TAs had to be
automatically accepted on the Horizon system, there was no option within
Horizon for them to be challenged, the only option was for the SPM to call the
Helpline, and she volunteered that (consistent with the Horizon design) most
branches would just accept anyway, without even really looking at it, {Day5/65:2-
8} {Day5/69:19} – {Day5/71:18}.
(c) The Court may note that Mr Latif having accepted the TA was also raised in
cross-examination of Mr Latif: “Q. … The point I wanted to make -- and it is no big
criticism, Mr Latif, but the point is you were at your branch required to check the TAs
and Post Office made a mistake and you missed the mistake; is that fair?” {Day2/82:19-
22}.
The significant issue which was in dispute between the parties, was whether the TC
which was subsequently issued on 24 January 2018 {F/1833.1}, fully corrected the
problem with the duplicate TAs. As to this:
(a) Mr Latif’s evidence was that it did not, and he was left with a £1,000 loss, and
that there was an issue with the TC: witness statement §11-14 {E1/1/2-3}, and in
oral evidence {Day2/76:24} – {Day2/78:1}.
(b) Mrs Van Den Bogerd in her witness statement, and maintained in cross-
examination that the TC had been correctly issued; however, the basis for that
contention was unclear and she had difficulty dealing with the entries in the
transaction data which were put to her in cross-examination {F/1761.1},
– 144 –
Individual SPMs
explaining that she had only looked at it “at a high level” {Day6/36:17}, that her
“team are closer to this” {Day6/40:15}.
The Claimants will invite the Court to accept that the transaction data {F/1761.1} and
Helpline log {F/1834.1} is consistent with Mr Latif being left with a loss (albeit in the
sum of £500 rather than £1000) on the following basis:
(a) The pattern for TA entries each morning is negative then positive in the same
amounts: 4 January: 2237 6:55, -20, 2309 8.54 +20; 9 January: 6046 6.11 -25, 6213
9.15 +24; 15 January: 10202 6.12 -25, 10331 9.12 +25
(b) However on 18 January, both TA entries arrived as positives: 12983 9.10 +25,
12984 9.10 +25
(c) The effect of a +25 which should have been a -25, was to leave Mr Latif 50 short.
He was therefore due a TA for 50 cards,
(d) (The reversed transaction for 50 cards was neutral on his accounts – (i.e. cards
down and cash up), so reversal did not change the fact Mr Latif was short and
therefore carrying a loss).
(e) Mr Latif should therefore have been sent a TC to increase his stock by 50 cards,
however, the TC which was sent {F/1833.1} (24 January 2018 “PLEASE ACCEPT
THIS 100 STOCK CREDIT TC…”) increased his stock by 100 cards and required
a cash adjustment. This left Mr Latif £500 short.
Mr Latif called the Helpline on 25 January 2018 {F/1834.1} and the Helpline call log
states “TC received for launch of £10 x 100 scratch card games…only received 50…if we accept
the TC will cause a discrepancy?”
Note that, the resolution details box within the Helpline log is cut off and incomplete,
however Mr Latif confirmed this call in re-examination, and that the issue was not
resolved “That is the problem: nothing came back from Camelot. And again we kept chasing
them, we kept chasing the Post Office and nothing came back until September the audit
happened.” {Day2/96:6}-{Day2/97:17}.
– 145 –
Individual SPMs
Mr Jayesh Tank
Power Failure (£600, September 2014)
In Mr Tank’s first witness statement he described having suffered a £600 loss following
a power failure, which he recalled had occurred around 2010 – 2011 (Tank 1 §6 – 14
{E1/6/2-3}). However, he subsequently discovered a forum post {F/1257.1/5-6},
referring to him having suffered this loss in September 2014, which he addressed in his
supplemental statement on 27 February 2019 (Tank 2 §11-14 {E1/11/13}).
Mr Tank’s contemporaneous forum post dated 29 September 2014 {F/1257.1/5-6}
records:
I too have had a recent unexplained loss of c.f600 on 16th Sep. Settled centrally on
17th Sep.
Not had any correspondence from Chesterfield so rang this morning, they said letter
is being sent today. I informed them that I was going to dispute. Interestingly their is
another postmaster on the facebook group who has also suffered an unexplained loss.
Mr Tank also exhibited a letter sent to him on 29 September 2014 {F/1257.2} referring
to a statement of discrepancy for £660, and a further letter dated 13 October 2014
{F/1262.1} confirming the “debt” would be deducted from Mr Tank’s remuneration in
October 2014.
These letters were Post Office documents, of which the Claimants anticipate Post Office
were well aware prior to Mr Tank’s second witness statement. Further all of the ARQ
data for September 2014 (transaction, session and event data, {F/1257.3}, {F/1257.4} and
{F/1257.5}) (disclosed to the Claimants on 7 March 2019) have properties dated 2
January 2019.39
Despite the date of Mr Tank’s supplemental witness statement, and what very much
appears to be Post Office’s prior knowledge, Post Office chose not to provide any
evidence in relation to the events of September 2014.
39 The event and transaction data also both have this date as the “generated date” on the face of those
documents.
– 146 –
Individual SPMs
Rather, Post Office’s counsel put to Mr Tank a case about what Post Office “say” the
ARQ data “would” show, or what PO would “expect” (Day2/114:1-10}, but:
(a) There was no proper evidential basis for these questions, and Mr Tank was in no
position to comment on what Post Office’s ARQ data would or would not show,
nor whether it would consistently show the same indicators irrespective of e.g.
whether or not there were recoverable transactions, or whether the precipitating
event was a HOL failure or a power outage, or whether the ARQ records or how
they were extracted had changed in any material way over the years.
(b) Post Office’s counsel’s questions were confusing in that they repeatedly conflated
(1) the electrical failure / power cut to the branch which Mr Tank described as
having happened in September 2014, with (2) the Horizon Online failure which
occurred in December 2011, which Mr Tank had not attributed to a power cut,
and which his forum post described as a “HOL failure” {F/1257.1}. See e.g.
{Day2/118:4-23}, stating that “Post Office agrees that that was a power cut” in relation
to the £195 loss which followed a HOL failure, then defining use of the word
“outage” as “Horizon going offline for a moment as opposed to a power cut to the whole
shop” {Day2/119:14-16}, which caused confusion for Mr Tank, see e.g.
{Day2/131:12-20} “I’m not sure if it was a power outage, but I think it may have been a
problem with the system … The system went down in some way”.
(c) The Recovery – Horizon Online Quick Reference Guide {F/1365} to which Mr Tank
was taken (but did not in fact have in his branch at the time {Day2/139:9}) is a far
from clear document but does indicate that different types of precipitating event
have different consequences. There is accordingly a real possibility that they may
manifest differently in the ARQ data.
At its lowest, Mr Tank’s evidence in relation to the £600 discrepancy which he
sustained in September 2014 and repaid in October 2014 is indicative of the difficulties
which even an experienced and motivated SPM had in establishing the cause of a
discrepancy in branch:
– 147 –
Individual SPMs
(a) Mr Tank reviewed CCTV footage and printed a 15-18 foot transaction log which
did not assist him in identifying the cause of the discrepancy.
(b) He called Chesterfield who did no more than tell him that they could not see any
problems (Tank 2 §13 {E1/11/3}).
(c) Post Office certainly did not ever suggest to Mr Tank, the explanation which was
put to him in cross-examination for the first time, namely user error in accidentally
handing cash to the customer and also registering it as having been deposited
{Day2/122:20-23}.
(d) Mr Tank was in any event certain that he had not occurred from his review of the
CCTV {Day2/122:24} – {Day2/123:20} “I can say that there is no cash that went over the
till”.
Horizon Online Failure (£195.04, December 2011)
As above, Mr Tank originally identified his £600 loss as having occurred in 2010 – 2011.
This led Mrs Van Den Bogerd to review entries in call logs for those years, and on that
basis to address in her witness statement,40 a shortfall of £195.04 which was referred to
in NBSC call logs,41 and a PEAK, PC0214226 {F/870}.42
In consequence, Mr Tank addressed this particular shortfall in his supplemental
witness statement, at §10 {E1/11/2}. He had also discovered a contemporaneous forum
post dated 13 December {F/1257.1/1} relating to this loss, which formed the basis of his
evidence on this issue (emphasis added):
Hi all
40 §77 {E2/5/20}
41entry dated 13 December 2011 {F/1286.1}. These call logs were not disclosed with Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s
witness statement, and despite being specifically requested on 18 December 2018 {H/149/2} , were not
disclosed until 21 February 2019 {H/216}.
42This PEAK references KEL acha959T {F/1700}, which includes the text “If a T1 recovery request times
out at the counter, recovery is abandoned and no second attempt is made to get the recovery information.
This is as designed; it was decided to keep recovery simple and not have too many error paths. The
priority is to get the User working again, so in this sort of error path we just mark the recovery as failed
and leave it for SSC to sort out. If it does become a frequent occurrence development could look at this
area again, but there is no obvious improvement.
– 148 –
Individual SPMs
Some advice/help required.
Yesterday during HOL FAILURE was in process of POCA card withdrawal.
Transaction seemed to go thru ok apart from horizon printing 3 identical receipts
receipts showed a DISCONNECTED SESSION with recovery code
receipts also showed
CA WD LIMIT
1- @ 195.04 195.04-
TOTAL DUE TO CUSTOMER 195.04
Cash TO CUSTOMER 195.04
BALANCE 0.00
Because receipts showed cash due to customer. we paid out.
Come evening balancing till showed approx £200.00 loss. Thought at time must be
mis-count and will try to sort in morn.
This morning produced transaction log for the period of HOL FAILURE. No record
of 195.04 transaction at all!!!!
Phoned help-line and was told by very irate member of staff that loss is mine unless I
can sort out with customer directly, apparently there is a message on screen during
HOL failure to not pay any money to customer (HAS ANYONE SEEN THIS). Asked
irate staff to pass call up as I was not a happy bunney, was told she was not going to
do this, only after i asked to speak to contracts manager or somebody from POL press
office with regards to speaking to press about my loss was I given a No. for chesterfeid.
So spoke to POCA lady at chesterfeild, who after pressing a few buttons was able to
find transaction, She coudnt promise anything but will see if she can get a credit TC
after she has spoken to fujitsu?????? She took my No. and promised to call back sfter
speaking to fujitsu, being very non-committal about possible loss.
What should be my next course of action???
Speak to press (is there anything in contract preventing me doing this?
Speak to CWU (not member of POLFED anymore)?
Speak to Shoesmiths?
– 149 –
Individual SPMs
Try taking POL to small claims court?
Any usefull suggestions aprecciated
Shortly before trial, Post Office then disclosed what it described as a “TC Log” {F/871.1}
appearing to evidence that a TC had been issued to Mr Tank, which Mr Tank accepted
in evidence it had {Day2/142:7-11}.
As is evident from the documentary record:
(a) Mr Tank did not know about the possibility of, or process relating to a failed
recovery. This was unsurprising, since Post Office’s Recovery – Horizon Online
Quick Reference Guide {F/1365} makes no mention of this possibility, which Mrs
Van Den Bogerd herself conceded {Day6/62:6-15}.
(b) Mr Tank did not know that his branch had been identified in a PEAK or any
Fujitsu or Post Office report.
(c) Mr Tank was told by the Helpline that the loss was his unless he could sort it out
with the customer directly, and it was only on pressing the matter forcefully that
he spoke to a person at Chesterfield who even then was non-committal about
possible loss.
(d) Whereas ultimately a TC was issued, and it may have been Post Office’s intended
practice and procedure to issue TCs in such cases,43 Mr Tank’s branch account in
Horizon was wrong unless and until a TC was issued.
(e) The design of the recovery procedure within Horizon was such that Mr Tank was
in a position of uncertainty and risk, and subject to Post Office’s discretionary and
manual actions. If Post Office had not issued a TC, Mr Tank would have been left
to bear the loss. As Mr Tank described it {Day2/143:14-18}
43Although this was certainly not clearly put to Mr Tank: {Day2/144:1-6}: “A. If I didn’t call in to report,
would I still have got the refund? Q. I think you would have actually, yes.  A. I wasn’t to know. I didn’t know
there was a PEAK – Q. But I’m not sure, I don’t have the--okay—A. I don’t know either.”
– 150 –
Individual SPMs
Q. How is that a fault with Horizon?
A. Because the error shouldn't have happened in the first place. If -- it seems like --
with the relationship between postmasters and the Post Office, it's very much one-
sided and we as subpostmasters bear all the risk.
There was no question of user error having caused this shortfall, Mr Tank did exactly
what the receipts printed by the Horizon system told him to do. However:
(a) in Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s second witness statement §78 {E2/5/20-21}, she critiqued
Mr Tank for handing all receipts to the customer and asserted that “if the correct
recovery process had been properly followed in accordance with the Horizon Online Quick
Reference Guide the branch would not have sustained any shortfall” (and there was no
amendment to this paragraph of her statement, at any time prior to Mrs Van Den
Bogerd giving evidence);
(b) Mr Tank was cross-examined about having handed over all receipts {Day2/140:6-
13};
(c) even after Mrs Van Den Bogerd accepted in cross-examination that Mr Tank
having handed receipts to the customer was not causative of the error {Day6/51:2-
4}}, moments later she was still suggesting some causative fault: {Day6/52:13-22}
A. Right, well, I didn't intend to suggest it was completely his fault. I mean him
giving the receipts back to the customer was user error and had he held onto those
he would have seen exactly ... but other than that I mean he couldn't have done
anything because it was a failed recovery anyway and he did do what the receipts
will have told him which is to pay out, which is what he did.
Q. He did what the receipts told him to do, didn't he?
A. To pay out. It was an authorised payment, yes.”
The Claimants will rely on the fact that Post Office, even after detailed review of the
evidence in the course of this litigation, nonetheless alleged user error as the cause of
the shortfall, as a clear example of UEB on the part of Post Office.
– 151 –
Individual SPMs
Label issue
Mr Tank described in his first witness statement a recurring issue whereby transactions
were processed without labels being printed, which led to small losses being incurred
each time (around £2.50 each): §15-19 {E1/6/3}. In his first witness statement Mr Tank
had said he did not recall the exact date but thought the issue had occurred in or
around 2007. In his supplemental witness statement he revised this to in or around
2011 §15 {E1/11/3}.44
Mrs Van Den Bogerd in her witness statement relied on a process said to be “detailed
within the Horizon Online help user guide”, which she said permitted a replacement label
to be printed so that the SPM could process a separate transaction for spoiled postage
labels, §82, {E2/5/21} (emphasis added):
Also, it is possible to process a completely separate transaction for spoiled postage

labels and printing a replacement, so even if Horizon did not prompt this, or the
Subpostmaster presses the wrong button on the prompt, they can always correct the
error. This option would also have been open to Mr Tank had, as he alleges, the printer
not produced a label at all. This process is detailed within the Horizon Online help
user guide.
However, the document hyperlinked to §82 of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s statement was a
two page document apparently created as an extract for trial (heading
“EVD_Ref019_Fleckney”, disclosed on 20 February 2019 {H/213}). The document
begins “A label can only be spoiled, if the label is on hand”, and does not identify any way
in which a replacement label could be produced as she suggests.
In cross-examination, Mr Tank was clear that Horizon had not performed as it should
{Day2/146:25}-{Day2/147:1-5}:
Q. Well, Horizon allows you to record a label as rejected, doesn’t it? 
A. It does, yes. Usually, usually, but in this particular scenario it didn’t give you that
option. 
Q. But normally it would prompt you to specify whether or not the label has been
44 this followed disclosure of Mr Tank’s performance interview transcript dated 5 November 2015, which
refers within it to Mr Tank having first experienced this issue in 2011 {F/1399.1/15}
– 152 –
Individual SPMs
printed correctly, wouldn’t it?
A. Yes, this is my point: during this particular issue, Horizon doesn’t perform as it
should.
Mr Tank did not accept §82 of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement was correct
and identified that the procedure she relied upon and he was taken to, specifically
required the label to be on hand. The cross-examination of Mr Tank was unclear as to
what “procedures” exactly were being put to him that he ought to have followed:
{Day2/147:8} – {Day2/148:10:
“Q. And it is also possible, isn’t it, to process a completely separate transaction for
spoiled postage labels and printing a replacement? Have a look at {F/1848.6} This
just summarises the procedure that’s in place. 
A. ”A label can only be spoiled , if the label is on hand.”
Q. Ms van den Bogerd’s evidence at paragraph 82 of her witness statement at

{E2/5/21} says this process is available even if the printer had not produced a label at
all. Do you accept that? 
A. No, because the previous page showed that you had to have a label on hand. 
Q. So she is wrong about that?”
A. Yes. Well, it is contradictory, isn’t it?
Q. Well, I accept that that's what that document says, but the evidence from Post
Office is that in fact you could do that even if the printer had not produced a label at
all?
A. I could do that, but then it would be contrary to the other instructions.
Q. If you could do it -- my point is a simple one, Mr Tank. There were procedures

built into Horizon to cater for the situation that you explained -- I have to say in the
vaguest of terms, but as I understand what you are saying, there were procedures in
place which ensured you could deal with the situation, weren't there?
A. No.
Q. We will have to differ.
Mrs Van Den Bogerd then said in oral evidence that that it was not a replacement label
which could be printed, but a replacement receipt, {Day6/62:23}-{Day2/63:8}:
– 153 –
Individual SPMs
Q. Let's move now if we may please, just going at some speed, just in relation to the
label transaction issues that Mr Tank experienced. His evidence was that he couldn't
use a spoiled label process because the guide told him that he couldn't do so unless the
label was on hand.
A. Okay.
Q. And if it has not been printed out it's not going to be on hand, is it?
A. No, but you can print a receipt, that's part of the process, and claim on the receipt.
The possibility of printing a further receipt and claiming in that way was also not
recorded in the manual to which Mrs Van Den Bogerd had referred and was not put
to Mr Tank (or at least not clearly).
There is documentary support for Mr Tank having sustained these difficulties and
having struggled to resolve them in:
(a) NBSC call logs {F/1286.1}, 28 July 2014 (row 310 on the remedy tab): “PM IS
PUTTING IN 4.34 X 10 TO GET PO TO TAKE NOTICE OF HORIZON PROBLEM.
NOT HAPPY-HAPPENED VARIOUS TIMES, HAS EVIDENCE. ESCALATION
REQUIRED.
(b) Performance interview transcript dated 5 November 2015 relating to Mr Tank
having claimed official postage as a form of protest {F/1399.1}45, especially p15-18,
which record Mr Tank having been told the matter had been investigated and
there was no issue with the production of labels (16 -17), expressing concern how
many times the error had happened in other branches (p16), having reported the
matter to Mr Andrew Perkins (Post Office business analyst) and reported it to the
Horizon Service Desk (p17).
The Court is invited to accept the evidence of Mr Tank in relation to the difficulties he
incurred in respect of label transactions, and that these difficulties were attributable to
an unknown fault with Horizon, which Post Office did not investigate meaningfully
45 Mr Tank was challenged in cross-examination that he had not told Post Office what he was doing at
the time, which Mr Tank convincingly rejected {Day2/154:17-23} and {Day2/156:13} – {Day2/157:2}.
– 154 –
Individual SPMs
or at all. Nor did the Post Office actually help Mr Tank with the problem – hence his
frustration, borne out in his interview.
Mr Anup Patny and Mr Aakash Patny
May 2011 National Outage and Cash / Stamp Balancing
The evidence of Mr Anup Patny and Mr Aakash Patny was that the national outage
occurred on 9 May 2016, and two days later on 11 May 2016 Mr Anup Patny remmed
in a cash delivery in the morning and Mr Aakash Patny experienced a shortfall of over
£17,000 when balancing that evening.
Mr Anup Patny very reasonably accepted that the national outage may not have been
cause of the balancing issues subsequently experienced {Day2/170:18-24}, but given the
proximity in time, it is unsurprising that he and his son connected these events and
indeed there must be a real possibility, if not a likelihood, that there is a material
connection, albeit that the precise way in which this took effect is difficult to trace with
precision on the existing evidence. This does plainly show, however, how difficult it
was for SPMs facing alleged shortfalls of this type.
As above at §141 - 148, Post Office pursued a case both that (1) the cash discrepancy
had been caused by misplacing cash (“at some point on 11 May someone hadn't counted a
big pile of £10 notes” and then finding it the next day and “an accurate cash declaration on
12 May” {Day2/176:11-17}) and that (2) Mr Aakash Patny had deliberately inflated stamp
declarations to disguise the loss {Day3/46:25}-{Day3/47:9} – despite those declarations
having occurred on 18-25 May 2016, i.e. after he had supposedly already found the
cash. For reasons set out in detail above, dishonesty should not have been alleged.
As to Post Office’s miscounting cash theory:
(a) Mr Anup Patny and Mr Aakash Patny rejected that they had misplaced “a big pile
of £10 notes” or other user error in counting cash. Mr Patny was very clear that
the discrepancy was not resolved by him discovering physical cash of £17,000 (e.g.
{Day3/23:21} – {Day3/24:18} and that the problems with balancing arose, were
addressed and ultimately resolved, by adjustments within the Horizon system.
– 155 –
Individual SPMs
(b) Post Office’s theory obviously does not explain the problems which continued in
the branch accounts after 12 May 2016 (see session data, below).
(c) Post Office’s counsel’s explanation of what the event data {F/1507.1} showed on 13
May 2016 ({Day3/17:21} – {Day3/20:11} putting that the positive discrepancy
“cancelled out” the negative discrepancy and putting that the variance check was
compared to the previously declared position was not accepted by Mr Aakash
Patny.46
(d) Post Office also relied on the 11 May 2016 entry in the Helpline log,47 which records
a call from the branch at 19.07 as follows “Doing BP and got a shortage in cash
£17,000. Had a rem in of £46,5000 cash £16,000 coin”, but Mr Aakash Patny was clear
he had not told the Helpline that 16,000 in coin had been received ({Day3/13:15-
22}.48 The Claimants note that Post Office’s counsel was content to put that the
entry for £46,5000 was a typo {Day3/13:18}, but did not address the obvious
possibility that there had been a misreading or confusion by the Helpline operator
in respect of the cash rem in amount. According to a Post Office document
{F1834.2} produced for the purposes of this litigation dated 2 October 2018 49, the
amount of coin actually received totalled £1,600, which strongly suggests a typo
by the Helpline operator in relation to the £16,000 figure.
(e) The account given by Mrs Van Den Bogerd in her witness statement, to the effect
that there was a problem with manual counting of cash and cash declarations,
entirely ignored both what Mr Anup Patny and Mr Aakash Patny had said about
the cash problems relating to stamps discrepancies over the same period and in
46 The Claimants note that the Operations Manual – Branch Trading is consistent with Mr Aakash Patny’s
account {F/368/23-24}, esp. emphasis added “When you wish to check whether there is a difference between
the cash figure for shared stocks automatically generated by the Horizon system and the total cash figure of
individual tills in your shared stock units..”
47 in the bundle at both {F/1509.1} and {F/1522.1}, all references below are to {F/1509.1}
48 The Claimants note that Post Office’s counsel was content to put that the entry for £46,5000 was a typo
but did not address the obvious possibility that there had been a misreading or confusion by the
Helpline operator in respect of the cash rem in amount. The amount of coin actually received
totalled £,1600 – see {F1834.2} disclosed 20 February 2019.
49 but not disclosed until 20 February 2019, and not hyperlinked to §66 {E2/5/18} Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s
witness statement until 4 March 2019
– 156 –
Individual SPMs
respect of similar amounts, did not address any of the entries in the ARQ data
relating to stamp discrepancies (see below), nor the Helpline calls which also
linked the two (esp., 26 May 2016, row 140 {F/1509.1}).
The May 2016 session data {F/1438.1}, (to which neither Mr Anup Patny or Mr Aakash
Patny was taken) is the most useful record of events, when combined with Mr Aakash
Patny’s witness statement and the Helpline call logs. The session data shows (when
Post Office’s filter is removed) the following entries:
(a) 11 May 2016 timed 19.08 (rows 28186-7) cash declaration discrepancy - £17,339
(loss).
(b) 18 May 2016 timed 18.55 (rows 31271-2), stamp declaration discrepancy £16,689
(surplus).
(c) 19 May 2016 timed 13.10 (rows 31466-7), stock adjustments to cash and stock:
stamps £16,689 cash -£16,689. This is the date of the call from Debra Lambley
referred to in Mr Aakash Patny’s witness statement §13 {E1/2/3}
(d) 19 May 2016 timed 19.03 (rows 31753-6) cash declaration discrepancy -£16,715
(loss), and stamp declaration discrepancy £16,692 (surplus). This accords with §14
of Mr Aakash Patny’s witness statement describing how that evening the system
again showed a cash shortage and he immediately called the helpline. The NBSC
call logs {F/1509.1} show a call from Mr Patny at 18.47 (row 137) , entry “CALL
TODAY FROM CHERSTERFIELD AND £16,000 ADJUSTMENT NOW DOWN IN
THE OFFICE THE £16,000.”
(e) 23 May 2016 timed 15.07 (rows 33311-2) stock adjustment to cash and stock:
stamps £16,692, cash -£16,692. This accords with Mr Aakash Patny’s oral evidence
that the same issue came back the following week {Day3/29:17-18} and
{Day3/31:24} – {Day3:32:9}.
– 157 –
Individual SPMs
(f) 25 May 2016 timed 19.16 (row 34768-69) cash declaration discrepancy and loss
system £16,763 (loss).50 This accords with Mr Aakash Patny’s evidence that the
branch was left with this large cash loss {Day3/63:8-10}.
The Claimants invite the Court to reject all of Post Office’s speculative and confused
theories which are not well founded in the evidence, and to find that there clearly was
one or more issues with Horizon which caused the branch to experience large
fluctuations in balancing their cash and stock, likely compounded by incorrect or
inadequate balancing advice being given on the Helpline and/or from Chesterfield.
MoneyGram issue
In his first witness statement, Mr Aakash Patny recalled having a problem with
MoneyGram which led to discrepancies in his account. He recalled (§18 - §24 {E1/2/3-
4} on 23 February 2016 attempting to put a MoneyGram transaction through for £3,100
but the customer’s card declining, and attempting again, but the customer’s card
declining again and this resulting in a shortfall of £6,200 in the branch accounts. He
called the Helpline to report the problem, and subsequently received a £3,100 TC, but
was left with a £3,100 loss. Mr Aakash Patny did not believe that he had made a
mistake which had led to the shortfall.
Mrs Van Den Bogerd in her witness statement stated that the transaction data “shows
a very different pattern of events … and clearly demonstrates user error played a material role
in events” and speculated “I do not know whether the customer actually paid in cash – I
suspect not as few people carry that much cash on them. If no cash was paid, this would generate
a £3,100 cash shortfall. This was due to user error in recording a cash payment on a transaction
when in fact no cash was taken” (§71-72) {E2/5/19}.
What was unusual about this part of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement was
that, unlike for other SPMs, she did not refer to the NBSC log {F/1509.1}, which as will
be seen below, does not sit well with her evidence.
50 The discrepancy does not continue to show in the session data, the Claimants infer because the stock
unit was rolled over and the discrepancy settled centrally, thus removing it from the branch
accounts, but Post Office treating the amount as a debt.
– 158 –
Individual SPMs
The NBSC logs show calls from Mr Aakash Patny and records of “resolution” by Post
Office as follows:
(a) Row 114, on 23 February 2016 at 12.49 and at column K, Description, “DEBIT
CARD DECLINED FOR MONEYGRAM HOW TO CLEAR”, and P, Resolution
Details “SETTLE TO CASH AND THEN CANCEL AND REVERSE”.
(b) Row 115, on 23 February 2016 at 19.15, “cash dec £6000 short due to MoneyGram
refund did not do the existing reversal” and “email sent to Robert needham”
(c) Row 116, on 24 February 2016 at 12.29 “asking if the discrepancy has been resolved yet
- waiting for a TC to be issued - had failed to reverse a MG for £6000 that was cancelled
on the same day as having been sent” and “NO - no specified timeframe for the resolution
of this issue - await receipt of TC”;
(d) Row 117, on 27 February 2016 at 07.33 “ref 1660973 rcvd TC this morning from Robert
Needham what todo?” and “will need to accept it, make good cash will get rid of your
discrep. make good cash will send it back to cfield and will still show loss til they contact
you”.
(e) Row 133, on 10 May 2016 at 13.39 “1659711- 1660973- 1668653- has received a letter
from chesterfield asking for £3100 to be paid back as settled centrally in Feb, the PM thinks
this is regarding a MG” and “esg sarah has checked Horace and only 1 MG transaction
done if no money handed to cst then should not have been double loss, Sarah adv to refer
PM to write to the relationship manager.”
These logs provide obvious support for Mr Patny’s account and are contrary to the
“user error” asserted by Mrs Van Den Bogerd in her witness statement, as they show
that Mr Patny was advised on the Helpline to settle to cash.
Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement was not amended prior to Mr Patny giving
evidence, although Mrs Van Den Bogerd said she had informed her solicitors of the
changes she subsequently made before the trial started ({Day5/21:13-24}, denying that
these changes were in consequence of hearing Mr Patny’s evidence).
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Individual SPMs
The amended version of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s §72 {E2/16/2} entirely deleted the
allegation of user error in settling to cash, and recorded that within the Horizon
system, in fact Mr Patny had no choice: “At this point the transaction was committed and
could not be removed from the stack, therefore Mr Patny had to settle to cash.” (However,
she still did not acknowledge the Helpline having expressly advised him to do this.)
Mr Patny was cross-examined by reference to transaction data {F/1436.1}, which it was
put to him showed “two appearances of £3,100, but that’s a single transaction”, which Mr
Patny agreed {Day3/37:6-14}.
This transaction data was disclosed by Post Office without the product ID codes or any
explanation as to how to read the data. If it assists the Court, the Claimants believe
that there are 5 relevant rows in the transaction data, rows 1066 – 1070, and that the
product codes (which are not in the product ID list {F/1292.2}), can be derived from
cross-referencing back to the session data {F/1437.1}, which shows the following
sessions (rows 4449 - 4453):
23-Feb-2016 12:37:05 40170 MoneyGram Repeat Send 1 0
23-Feb-2016 12:37:49 40231 MGram Send Classic 1 3100
23-Feb-2016 12:42:58 34179 Visa Debit Payment 0 0
23-Feb-2016 12:48:36 1 Cash -1 -3100
23-Feb-2016 12:49:21 40173 MoneyGram Cancel -1 0
The Claimants do not dispute that the transaction data shows only one MoneyGram
transaction, and that this was cancelled, but not reversed. In oral evidence, Mr Aakash
Patny believed he had carried out a reversal on his second call to NBSC {Day3/42:4-
25}. The Court is invited to find that whereas this was Mr Patny’s genuine recollection,
for whatever reason, the reversal was not successful. It is possible that this was in some
way related to the fact this was after polling time, which was identified by Post Office
as an issue later in 2016, see e.g. the update to the Board dated 22 July 2017 {F/1664/81}
and F/1664/86}.
– 160 –
Individual SPMs
It was put to Mr Patny that a 19 October 2015 Operational Update (Update {F/1391.1}
{F/1391.2} {F/1391.3} {F/1391.4}) was part of the Horizon Guidance at the time, and that
“in an ideal world” he would have followed it, which Mr Patny accepted {Day3/39:16} -
{Day3/40:5}. However, it was not put to Mr Patny how he would have become aware
of the new guidance, and it was apparently accepted that he did not know about it (no
challenge to his evidence at {Day3/49:1-5} that he did not). (The Court is further invited
to note that the information about the change to the cancellation process is, in any
event, not prominently displayed within the guidance and is in fact only mentioned
on page 4.)
Post Office also relied on the transaction data to suggest that Mr Patny had not
experienced a loss on 23 February 2016 which was twice the amount of the
MoneyGram transaction. It was Post Office’s position, that there was a net downward
movement in declared cash holdings from 22 to 23 February 2016 totalling £8,601.59,
and that this this could be partly explained by the £3,100 MoneyGram transaction, for
which a TC was later issued, and the net value of transactions decreasing cash holdings
by £1,806 but that this left £3,694.88 unaccounted for.
By way of background, this explanation was given at §74 of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s
statement {E2/5/20}, with no exhibited documents, albeit she had previously referred
to transaction data. The hyperlinks added just before trial were to event and session
data, and to a snip of filtered transaction data {F/1436.1.1} with a column added to
show the calculations which formed the basis of Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s evidence.
As to whether Mr Patny experienced a doubling of the MoneyGram loss, such that
when he subsequently received a TC for £3,100, he remained out of pocket for the same
amount:
(a) Mr Patny’s evidence was that he had, and the Helpline logs (above) provide
contemporaneous evidence supporting this.
(b) Post Office’s calculations are entirely consistent with the branch having
experienced a double loss – Post Office’s calculations show there was a
discrepancy on the same day slightly in excess of double the MoneyGram
– 161 –
Individual SPMs
transaction amount. (Post Office might have had a point to make if the remaining
unexplained discrepancy was below £3,100, but it was not).
(c) Mr Patny’s area manager, Mark Irwin, had agreed with Mr Patny that it seemed
that the MoneyGram had doubled up {Day3/56:21-24}.
(d) There were problems with MoneyGram transactions around this time, including
duplicate transactions being created: MoneyGram Quarterly Business Review 18
July 2016{F/1502/29} “Duplicate transactions are created in MG systems as a result of
the Post Office time outs. A joint MG/POL team is working to ascertain impact on
settlement and implementation of an appropriate plan of action.”
For these reasons, the Court is invited to accept Mr Patny’s account, because it is
overwhelmingly likely that, for all the difficulties plumbing the depths of Horizon, Mr
Patny is right about this. Again, the difficulties faced by an SPM are clear.
Mrs Burke
Mrs Burke provided a witness statement {E1/4} and a comprehensive exhibit, in which
she explained:
(a) On 9 May 2016 she noticed the Horizon system was slow and during transactions
a sand timer appeared on the screen: §10. This caused a queue to form in the
branch: §12.
(b) Mrs Burke served a customer who wanted a withdrawal of £180 from his card
account and £73 from his wife’s card account: §13. The next customer wanted a
£150 withdrawal. Because of the problems that day, she didn’t press enter to clear
her stack. She processed the transaction in the usual way and a receipt printed
stating that it had been authorised, so she paid the customer: §13-14.
(c) However, when she then pressed enter to clear her screen the sand timer appeared
and disconnected session receipts printed, listing the three previous transactions:
§15. These receipts {F/1461} indicated that the customers should have been paid,
as they stated “TOTAL DUE TO CUSTOMER £403”. The customers had in fact
– 162 –
Individual SPMs
already left the branch by this point, and Mrs Burke had already paid out the cash
to them in accordance with these receipts.
(d) After serving two more customers, a further receipt printed which said “Recovery
Failed” {F/1464}. This showed only the first two of the three payments that Mrs
Burke had made, and “TOTAL DUE TO CUSTOMER £253”. Mrs Burke initially
though this meant the first two transactions had failed (as these appeared on the
failed recovery receipt), but after studying her transaction log, Mrs Burke could
see that the final £150 withdrawal was missing”: §17. The effect of the error was
to cause a £150 shortfall in her accounts: §19
(e) Mrs Burke called the NBSC Helpline and was told that if the transaction was not
on her transaction log it had not gone through: §20, and transcript of call (obtained
by Mrs Burke making a subject access request and paying a fee) {F/1466/3-4}. (As
above, this transcript contrasts with the NBSC call log entry for the same day
{F/1253.1} row 19, 9 May 2016, which does not record at all the (incorrect) advice
she was given, and states as the resolution that “she was not able to understand
situation”).
(f) Mrs Burke was able to identify and track down the customer who had withdrawn
the £150 and explain that Horizon was £150 down following his cash withdrawal.
The customer was happy to help and provided her with his receipt {F/1467} and
allowed her to accompany him to his bank and obtain a bank statement {F/1470/2}
showing the withdrawal: §23-§24.
(g) On 13 May 2016 Mrs Burke’s husband informed Post Office of the steps they had
taken and complained about the initial advice provided on the Helpline: §25, and
see call log {F/1253.1} and see letter in response dated 23 May 2016 {F/1480},
apologising for the “unnecessary additional actions that you personally took due to lack
of support advice from the desk in relation to the transaction that did not recover once the
system was restored”.
(h) On 17 May 2016 the branch received a TC which they accepted, but the TC was for
Lloyds rather than TSB, which again Mrs Burke’s husband raised with NBSC, but
never heard further about: §26 and {F/1687.1}, row 5. (The TC also included a
– 163 –
Individual SPMs
warning "Please be careful when entering transactions", suggesting that user error
had caused the need for the TC and failing to acknowledge or notify her of the
system fault that had caused the problem.)
(i) Mrs Burke did not believe that Post Office would have resolve the issue without
clear proof that the £150 had been authorised and that the money had left the
customer’s bank account and was very troubled that there was no record on
Horizon of the transaction she had carried out: §27.
Mrs Van Den Bogerd’s witness statement in response (§103 – 110) {E2/5/25}:
(a) Suggested that Mrs Burke was at fault in not clearing the stack and this was
causative. This was simply wrong, and was amended by Mrs Van Den Bogerd,
but only after Mrs Burke had been cross-examined at length on this issue.
(b) Asserted that “Horizon .. accurately recorded and recovered the unrecovered transactions
and communicated this information to Mrs Burke” (§109), with no acknowledgement
that Mrs Burke’s branch accounts were incorrect as a result, and that the
information communicated to Mrs Burke by the receipts was contradictory and
unclear, and that the Horizon helpline gave her incorrect advice.
(c) Asserted that if MRs Burke hadn’t taken the steps she had, there “would have” been
an investigation and Mrs Van Den Bogerd was “sure” this “would have” led to the
same outcome: §110.
Post Office subsequently provided very late disclosure of documents intended to
evidence that Post Office “would have” corrected the shortfall caused by the national
outage without Mrs Burke having taken the steps she did, namely:
(a) a BIMS incident report {F/1470.1}, disclosed on Monday 4 March 2019;
(b) an email from Mr Dunks to various individuals at Post Office {F/1470.1.1}
attaching a link to the BIMS report stating “I have attached a spreadsheet containing
the list of all transactions that require POL to manually reconcile as appropriate.”
(emphasis added), disclosed Thursday 7 March 2019; and
– 164 –
Individual SPMs
(c) a spreadsheet {F/1848.4} which includes for Mrs Burke’s branch “Manual
Reconciliation Required”.
This was in reality the only substantive challenge to Mrs Burke’s account, and Mrs
Burke was cross-examined on the basis that Post Office would have issued a TC
without her having taken the steps she did, which Mrs Burke fairly accepted was
possible {Day3/96:3}-{Day3/97:9}, with creditable good grace given her experience and
all the circumstances.
The Claimants highlight however, that the TC process depended on both Fujitsu and
Post Office’s manual processes and therefore the risk of human error. As above, the
TC which was issued was in fact for the wrong bank and included an inappropriate
warning.
As a result of a bug, error or defect in Horizon Mrs Burke’s branch accounts were
wrong, she was incorrectly advised by the Helpline, and she was dependent on Fujitsu
and Post Office taking steps to manually rectify the problem caused in her branch
accounts.
– 165 –
Individual SPMs
– 166 –
Section B. HORIZON ISSUES
Individual SPMs
HORIZON ISSUES
This section is structured as below:
(a) Issues 1, 4 & 6: Bugs & Errors
(b) Issues 5 & 15: Reconciliation
(c) Issues 2, 8, 9 & 14: Information Available to SPMs and PO
(d) Issues 7, 10, 11, 12 and 13: Remote Access
(e) Issue 3: Robustness
This structure differs from the structure in the Claimants’ Opening Submissions by:
(a) Moving Robustness (Issue 3) to the end of the list, since in the light of the
evidence, it is clear that no sensible conclusion can be reached on that issue until
the other issues are considered. Further, as the Court will be aware, the
Claimants do not share the Defendant’s view of the prominence and importance
of the term “robustness”, which at least on the Post Office’s approach is in large
part, a hostage to the definition of that term and any assessment of the likelihood
of Horizon being the cause of shortfalls that arise in branches requires an
understanding of other Horizon issues. (The Claimants do not adopt Issue 3 as
providing the answer to Issues 1, 4 and 6, as Dr Worden contends.)
(b) Grouping together the two previously groupings, 8 and 9, and 2 and 14, which
are largely non-contentious and can sensibly be considered together.
The Claimants rely on the matters set out in Section A above, in support of the
submissions in this section. The Horizon Issues are not hermetically sealed and there
is plainly at least some overlap between them. The Claimants have sought to highlight
below particular aspects of the expert evidence which is particularly relevant to
particular Issues, but that should not be taken as suggesting that that evidence is
irrelevant to other issues. On both parties’ cases, there is some overlap and
interrelationship between Issues, as well as the evidence which bears upon them.
– 167 –
Issues 1, 4 & 6: Bugs & Errors
Claimants’ Answers to these Issues
Horizon Issue 1:
To what extent was it possible or likely for bugs, errors or defects of the nature alleged
at §§23 and 24 of the GPOC and referred to in §§ 49 to 56 of the Generic Defence to
have the potential to (a) cause apparent or alleged discrepancies or shortfalls relating
to Subpostmasters’ branch accounts or transactions, or (b) undermine the reliability
of Horizon accurately to process and to record transactions as alleged at §24.1 GPOC?
Claimants’ Answer: Possible? Yes. Likely? Significant & material risk.
(a) Not only possible, but has happened: It is clear, and agreed, that bugs, errors and
defects have both: (i) caused apparent or alleged discrepancies or shortfalls
relating to SPMs’ accounts or transactions; and (ii) undermined the reliability of
Horizon accurately to process and record transactions.
(b) Correct approach: Even on the evidence of the Post Office’s expert, there is
“strong evidence” of at least twelve bugs “causing a lasting discrepancy in branch
accounts”. However, Dr Worden’s perspective (a) requires actual causing of
discrepancies, rather than potential; (b) requires the discrepancy to be “lasting”
(clarified as, effectively, permanent); and (c) includes assumptions as to the near
perfect effectiveness of business processes outside of Horizon, as part of the
Horizon system. It is only on that basis that he then addresses the high threshold
of “strong evidence”. On the Issue as agreed and ordered by the Court, there are
clearly many more examples of bugs, errors and defects having obvious potential
to cause (and in fact causing) discrepancies, which require manual correction by
the Post Office if they are not to be lasting/permanent. Furthermore, until such
corrections are properly carried out, the figures shown on Horizon are wrong,
unreliable and an inaccurate reflection of the transactions processed and
recorded at the branch.
(c) Impossibility of precision: As to likelihood of such bugs, errors or defects causing
discrepancies, this is difficult to answer with precision because of: (i) the lack of
– 168 –
a proper problem management system; (ii) the difficulty the experts have faced
both in both piecing together documents relating to them and in “plumbing the
depths” of the Horizon system; and (iii) the Post Office and Fujitsu’s own lack of
information and / or lack of candour on this issue.
(d) Likelihood: What is clear, however, is that there are thousands of TCs alone
issued each year for errors that the Post Office (even on its approach) does not
attribute to the branch. Further, the number of potential bugs in the Horizon
system over the course of the relevant period is entirely consistent with the
Claimants’ case. This much was accepted by the Post Office’s expert himself,
who gives a range of 145 to 672 bugs, and made a calculation in respect of the
latter which resulted in approximately one bug per Claimant. The Court can
safely conclude that there is a material risk of such bugs, errors and defects
arising, which is significant.
Horizon Issue 4:
To what extent has there been potential for errors in data recorded within Horizon to
arise in (a) data entry, (b) transfer or (c) processing of data in Horizon?
Claimants’ Answer: Potential? Yes. Extent? Significant & material risk.
(a) Not only possible, but has happened: It is agreed that there is evidence that bugs,
errors and defects arising from data entry, data transfer and processing of data
in Horizon have occurred, and have caused financial discrepancies.
(b) Examples: Varying types of errors in data recorded within Horizon include:
(i) Mis-keying errors (entry of incorrect figure);
(ii) Keying errors (e.g. decimal point entry);
(iii) Remming errors (due to scanner not working, due to hardware fault, or
working incorrectly due to software issue);
(iv) Phantom transactions; and
(v) Errors in reference data.
– 169 –
(c) Extent: The experts have been unable precisely to quantify the extent of these
bugs, errors and defects. As with Issue 1, the Court can safely conclude that there
is a significant and material risk of such bugs, errors and defects arising. The
Claimants would say that such a risk is particularly relevant in the case of
disputed discrepancies or those which an SPM could not understand.
Horizon Issue 6:
To what extent did measures and/or controls that existed in Horizon prevent, detect,
identify, report or reduce to an extremely low level the risk of the following:
a. data entry errors;
b. data packet or system level errors (including data processing, effecting, and
recording the same);
c. a failure to detect, correct and remedy software coding errors or bugs;
d. errors in the transmission, replication and storage of transaction record data; and
e. the data stored in the central data centre not being an accurate record of transactions
entered on branch terminals?
Claimants’ Answer: Significant & material risk of failing. Significant & material
risk of errors.
(a) Existence of measures and controls: There are many measures and controls
within Horizon that existed to prevent, detect, identify, report or reduce the risk
of varying errors.
(b) Failings of measures and controls: The Court has, however, seen numerous
examples of these measures and controls failing significantly in practice. This
includes, for example:
(i) DEA: failure of the Double Entry Accounting countermeasure (Callendar
Square and Receipts & Payments Mismatch bugs);
(ii) DUE: failure of the Early Detection of User Errors countermeasure (keying
and mis-keying errors);
– 170 –
(iii) SEK: failure of the Secure Kernel Hardware and Software countermeasure
(gaps and duplicates in audit store data);
(iv) Fixes: fixes which have doubled discrepancies.
(c) Failure to act on key recommendations: The Court has seen evidence of the Post
Office failing to implement recommendations which would have had the effect
of reducing the level of risk of errors. These include the failure to establish a
problem management system and to implement changes aimed at mitigating the
possibility of mis-keying errors.
(d) Deferring fixes on cost / benefit basis: The Court has seen evidence of the Post
Office deferring fixes on a cost / benefit basis.
(e) Delay in identifying and remedying problems: As a result of the failings in the
measures and controls that existed in the Horizon, some defects have lain
undetected in Horizon for extended periods without being fixed.
(f) Measure of extent: As with Issue 1, precision is impossible; the Court can safely
conclude that there is a significant and material risk of the measures and controls
that exist in Horizon failing, such that (depending on definitions) they did not
therefore reduce to an extremely low level the types of errors described in Issue
6.
Important Aspects of the Expert Evidence
Evidence of Mr Coyne
In relation to these issues 1, 4 and 6, the Claimants rely on the evidence of Mr Coyne,
in particular, his written evidence on the following matters:
(a) Bugs, errors and defects: Coyne 1, §5.1 to 5.81 {D2/1/55}. See, in particular, §5.16
{D2/1/58}, in which he identifies the Dalmellington Bug. Coyne 2, §3.20 to 3.146
{D2/4.1/16}. See, in particular, Table 1 at §5.1 to 5.81 {D2/4.1/18}.
(b) Errors in entry of data: Coyne 1, §5.122 to 5.133 {D2/1/86}. See, in particular
§5.122 to 5.125 in which he analyses the issue of mis-keying. See, more generally,
– 171 –
Coyne 2, §3.147 to 3.219 {D2/4.1/56}; including §3.148 to 3.153 {D2/4.1/18} on
‘phantom transactions’.
(c) Errors in transfers of data: Coyne 1, §5.134 to 5.137 {D2/1/90}. See, more generally,
Coyne 2, §3.147 to 3.219 {D2/4.1/56}.
(d) Errors in processing of data: Coyne 1, §5.138 to 5.145 {D2/1/91}. See, more
generally, Coyne 2, §3.147 to 3.219 {D2/4.1/56}.
(e) Measures and controls: Coyne 1, §5.155 to 5. {D2/1/95}. See, in particular, §5.162
{D2/1/98} on the concerns raised in the E&Y 2011 management letter and §5.167
to 5.195 {D2/1/99} on the failures of those controls and measures. Coyne 2, §5.238
to 5.267 {D2/4.1/189}, in which Mr Coyne addresses Dr Worden’s position on
Issue 6.
Contrasting Expert Approaches
The experts took starkly different approaches to Issue 1 in their reports, as is evident
from the entries in Joint 2 at §1.9 and §1.10 {D1/2/28}:
§1.9. “The experts have differing views on “branch impact”. Mr Coyne refers to any
discrepancy that caused a loss (or gain) within branch accounts that needed corrective
action as an “impact to branch accounts”. Dr Worden only considers an effect or impact
on branch accounts where a discrepancy loss (or gain) was not rectified by a correction
such as a Transaction Correction.”
§1.10 “Dr Worden believes that transient inaccuracies in branch accounts, which needed
some form of correction, have arisen so frequently and from so many causes that to list
them is not useful; and that evidence of each correction being carried out is unlikely to
persist to this day.”
Thus Dr Worden focused on whether a discrepancy caused by a bug, defect or error
was at some future point corrected, and placed a great deal of emphasis on TCs as
countermeasures, and Mr Coyne was cross-examined at length as to which bugs had
lasting, actual impacts on branch accounts, which involved incorrectly redefining
Horizon issue 1 as the premise of this cross-examination (§173 - 176 above). This
– 172 –
imported obvious difficulties into Mr Coyne’s cross-examination and the evidential
significance of his answers.
The approach taken by both Dr Worden and the Post Office is flawed, both by
departing from the formulation of Issue 1 as the Court ordered, and by seeking one
way findings in Post Office’s favour in relation to Post Office’s business practices and
TCs which do not form part of the Horizon System as defined {C1/1/1}.
In cross-examination, Dr Worden agreed he had added in “lasting” {Day18/148:1-2}
and explained that he had treated “lasting” as meaning “permanent” {Day18/154:2-12}:
Q. How did you understand lasting?
A. There were delays in the TC process which might be due to client organisations or
might be due to all sorts of things, and they could be at the outside, I believe, several
months. My definition of lasting did not depend on TCs coming in within a certain
timeframe. If TC never came in, that would be lasting, but if TC took several months
to come in that is not what I would call a lasting effect. A lasting effect is permanent;
it is at the end of the day, you know, he has lost money forever.” {Day18/154:2-12}
He further volunteered (as was obviously correct) that the branch accounts would look
wrong for that period {Day18/155:3-7}:
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I beg your pardon, a TC, a transaction correction, would

that be a transient inaccuracy?
A. That would be a transient inaccuracy, yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: That's very useful.
A. The branch accounts would look wrong for that period.
Dr Worden had not considered the Working Agreement which contained standard
timescales for issuing TCs {F/1324/8-13} (inc. 4 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years). He
had also not supported Mr Coyne’ specific request for “the average duration of resolution
for Transaction Corrections” {C5/11/14}, which Post Office refused to answer on the basis
it was allegedly out of scope.
Dr Worden’s approach to Issue 1 also focused on an assessment of the claims made by
the Claimants rather than assessing the potential for bugs and errors to affect SPMs
– 173 –
generally. Again this was not required by Issue 1, and Dr Worden’s answer to Issue 1
does not address the issue as formulated.
In oral evidence Dr Worden recognised that he had taken his own course in this respect
{Day18/148:3-17}, and “Yes, I’ve stuck the word “claimants” there” – {Day18/156:2-6}.
Dr Worden’s conclusions were designed to suggest that the Claimants’ claims are so
implausible to be wholly unrealistic (e.g. §635 {D3/1/151}) and §644 {D3/1/152}). His
focus on disproving the Claimants claims is clear from §65 Worden 1 {D3/1/17} in
which he states in his summary opinion on Issue 1: “In my opinion, bugs in Horizon
cannot account for even a small part of the Claimants’ shortfalls – either for all Claimants taken
together, or for any individual Claimant”. This conclusion was not called for by any of the
issues, was reached by wholly flawed methodology and was wrong.
Dr Worden addressed Issue 1(b) separately from Issue 1(a), choosing to focus only on
the audit store (see Worden 1 §574 {D3/1/138}, §848-850 {D3/1/191}, Section 4.4
{D3/1/45-48}, and Section 6.26 {D3/1/73-74}. His treatment of this issue was skewed in
favour of Post Office, and did not properly engage with the evidence, addressed
separately below. In contrast, Mr Coyne, rightly approached Issue 1(b) as overlapping
with and requiring consideration of the matters at Issue 1(a), considering these parts
of Issue 1 together in his reports..
Dr Worden’s Statistical Methodology
Dr Worden’s statistical approach was premised on a number of assumptions:
(a) First he assumed an even distribution of bugs having an even impact across all
Claimants and SPMs in approximately equal measure: §769 {D3/1/176}.
(b) Second, he proceeded on the basis there was nothing special about Claimants
themselves; §621-622 {D3/1/148}, even having thought very hard about it
(Appendix F, {D3/2/207} §430) all he could come up with was the possibility the
Claimants might be less competent, so might be responsible for making more
errors. (Itself an example of UEB).
– 174 –
(c) Third, he proceeded on the basis that Claimants branches are smaller and have
fewer transactions (§623 onwards {D3/1/149}) and are therefore, less likely to be
hit by a Horizon bug in a given month.
All of these assumptions proved to be flawed. Most importantly, there very much is
something special about the Claimants, namely that they are Claimants to the GLO.
The GLO was advertised, inviting individuals to join who had suffered financial loss
as a result of Post Office attributing alleged shortfalls in branch accounts to them for
which they was not responsible and/or where the cause was not determined: {C7/3/39}.
Dr Worden apparently did not know about this advert, and was unfamiliar with how
a GLO works.
This specific knowledge had not been taken into account by him, see {Day18/167:2-8}
and {Day18/168:1-8}:
A. Yes. I should say generally that probability theory is what one uses in the absence
of specific knowledge like you have just put to me, and that specific knowledge changes
the whole ball game.
Q. The specific knowledge changes the whole ball game, doesn’t it, Dr Worden?
A. It does, absolutely.
A. Absolutely, and this shows that specific knowledge overrides probability theory,
when you have that specific knowledge.
Q. It is essential. Do you know how GLOs work, Dr Worden?
A. GLO?
Q. Yes, that is a group litigation order?
A. Sorry, no, I’m – I haven’t looked into that, really.
Q. They are advertised for people to join[…]”
Dr Worden later acknowledged that whether an SPM felt they had suffered shortfalls
was (obviously) a material factor in an SPMs decision to join the group (albeit he
– 175 –
otherwise resisted the wider relevance of this to his calculations): {Day19/88:13} –
{Day19:89:10}:
Q. I will clarify it to you. The Post Office's case is that large numbers of
subpostmasters are perfectly happy with the Horizon system and do not feel they have
suffered from unjustified shortfalls.
A. Yes.
Q. But others do feel they have.
A. Yes.
Q. How many of the former group do you think you would expect to join a group
action complaining about something they haven't suffered?
A. I don't know the answer to that question but I would not expect many.
Q. No. Zero or close to zero?
A. Yes.
Q. If you were aggrieved because you believed that you had in fact suffered in that
way and you were afforded the opportunity of redress, do you think the fact that you
believe you have suffered in that way is a material factor in your decision whether to
join the group action or not?
A. It is a material factor, and it is not a material factor in whether Horizon during

your tenure caused bugs to you.
Dr Worden’s scaling factor was subject to numerous basic errors, all of which favoured
Post Office (§184184(e), above), and compared apples with pears, using number of
customer sessions for the Claimants, as against number of transactions for SPMs
generally. It is hard to understand how this important difference could have been
overlooked by an expert in Dr Worden’s position - see the heading of the spreadsheet
itself {F/1837}, Mrs Van Den Bogerd §14.2 “a session is one or more transactions”
{§[E2/5/4}, and e.g. Mrs Burke’s disconnected session receipt showing three
transactions {F/1461}.
– 176 –
In applying his scaling factor, Dr Worden had also not identified the size of the
branches which had been affected by known bugs, so did not have a control against
which to compare the size of the Claimant branches.51
Dr Worden’s statistical methodology, combined with other assumptions and
calculations within his report, led him to produce the summary calculations table at
Table 8.4 of Worden 1 {D3/1/173}, proposing the “Maximum possible number of bugs,
corrected for KEL sampling, creation, and retention” as being 145 “central estimate” and 672
“conservative estimate”.
Proceeding on the reasonable evidential basis that that e.g. 40 or 48 branches may be
affected by a particular bug (using figures from Joint 2 {D1/2/3}), Dr Worden’s
conservative estimate was calculated by him as being consistent with each of the
Claimant branches having experienced one occurrence of a bug {Day20/64:1-21}:
A. I would have to write it down. So what we are saying is you start with 32,000
occurrences of a bug, and I say claimants held branches for 50,000 months –
Q. This is branches hit, not occurrences, so this is –
A. Yes, absolutely. But each branch was hit in a month –
Q. At least once.
A. Yes. And we have to take 50,000, we divide it by 3 million, and what I get from
that is I can cancel all the thousands out and I get 32 x 50/3, so that is about 500. So
it is consistent with one occurrence of a bug to each claimant branch during their
tenure.
Q. Thank you, Dr Worden. Consistent with a branch with one occurrence of a bug -
- one or more occurrence of a bug, but at least one bug affecting a claimant branch and
that bug being a bug of a type that impacts branch accounts?
A. What we have calculated is the mean, so some branches are affected by more, some
less etc, and that's what that calculation would suggest, the conservative one. I think
51 Dr Worden’s explanation was that this would be “the next level of detail down” {Day18/191:18-20}; “an
extra level of sophistication in my calculation” which he had not done as he did not think required
{Day18/192:16-24}
– 177 –
that's one of the conservative numbers, isn't it? The central estimate would give a
smaller number.
Q. Yes.
Dr Worden and TCs
Dr Worden in his report criticized Mr Coyne for raising the issue of errors in TCs,
which he said were out of scope ({D3/1/198} §891) but then used this as a justification
for dedicating a whole section of his report to calculating an “upper limit” on the
magnitude of discrepancies in Claimants accounts arising from erroneous TCs.
Although this appears in section 9 of his report, Dr Worden and Post Office seek to
rely on it in respect of Issue 1 and bugs: e.g. Joint 2 {D1/2/7} in respect of bug 8 and
§1.11 {D1/2/29}. None of the Horizon issues required Dr Worden to carry out this
exercise and Dr Worden’s reliance on it is inconstant with Post Office’s position in
relation to TCs and scope of trial and related disclosure.
In fact, Dr Worden essentially agreed with the paragraphs in Mr Coyne’s report (§3.13
and §3.18 {D2/1/27} and {D2/1/28}) which are relied upon as the justification for this
exercise (Worden 1 §892.3 {D3/1/199}).
As to this exercise:
(a) Dr Worden relied on a table of annual TC data {D3/1/205} produced by Post
Office, without making any enquiries as to obvious peculiarities in that data (esp.
£53m credit in 2015).52
(b) Dr Worden’s figures were entirely premised on the evidence of Mr Smith being
accepted (§931 {D3/1/206} and §934 {D3/1/207}, in particular the figures for
lottery. However, as detailed above (§101 - 104, and §233- 238), the Court can
have no confidence in that evidence, which was unreliable hearsay evidence
without a single exhibit, and the number of disputed lottery TCs was an estimate
52 The Claimants attempts to find out the reason for this had been unsuccessful: Freeths letter 22 June
2018 (H/69/2}, which was unanswered, and question to Mrs Van Den Bogerd at the Common Issues
Trial {C8.11/28/18} at transcript page 66, lines 6-15.
– 178 –
which Mr Smith was unable to say was even remotely reliable. In oral evidence,
Dr Worden was resigned to accepting in cross-examination that Mr Smith did
not seem to have been hugely well placed to giving reliable figures {Day19/76:2-
5}.
(c) Dr Worden reproduced in his report {§938 {D3/1/207-8} a TC summary from a
TC Reporting Pack {F/987}, but chose to include only the figures for TCs caused
by branch, not those in the table immediately below, which showed TCs not
caused by branch.
(d) Dr Worden’s relies on similar assumptions to those in relation to bugs (branches
affected equally but subject to scaling factor for size) which were flawed, as
above. They are shown to be obviously flawed in the case of e.g. Mr Abdulla,
who received TCs for three consecutive months all in the same amount of £1092.
(e) This exercise embarked on by Dr Worden simply does not assist the Court at all.
The Secure Audit Store
As above, Dr Worden answered Issue 1(b) purely by reference to the audit store, which
he praised as “accurate and immutable”, and a “gold standard”.
Dr Worden’s report acknowledged that the audit store was a “backstop”, and “rarely
used” but asserted that this was because other comparisons were usually “sufficient”:
Worden 1 §270 {D3/1/74}. In his report, Dr Worden simply did not engage with the
fact evidence which indicates that cost was a reason for not obtaining ARQ data (§306
et seq. above), but he reluctantly accepted in cross-examination that the emails he was
taken to indicate cost was a material disincentive: {Day19/34:15-22}.
Dr Worden in his report again did not engage with the evidence that there are issues
with the reliability of the ARQ data after it is extracted (§313 above). On this issue, he
would not accept the reasonable inference from {F/1716/43} that gaps and duplicates
do arise: {Day19/44:6-24}. Dr Worden did however think that gaps and duplicates
– 179 –
could arise “somewhere on the way in” {Day19/44:25} - {Day19/45:6} and {Day19/49:6} -
{Day19/50:5}.53
In relation to the reversal indicator recommended by Helen Rose, Dr Worden agreed
that he thought it would have been relatively simple to make the change requested and
that he didn’t know of any sensible reason not to do so: {Day19/54:18} - {Day19/55:4}.
The Claimants say that an audit record that may contain gaps or duplicates is not
accurate. An audit record that can be edited before it is presented to Post Office or an
SPM (in a prosecution or otherwise) is not tamper proof. And an audit record which
does not show whether a transaction is a reversal and does not make clear whether a
reversal is system generated (§320 above) is not an accurate record of activity affecting
branch accounts.
And perhaps most obviously, an audit record which is rarely used, and when it is used
is extremely difficult to decipher, is of very limited use.
On these issues, Mr Coyne gave important evidence when cross-examined about how
labour intensive and expensive it would be for the audit store to be used more
frequently: {Day15/82:5-14}, {Day15/84:6-14} and {Day15/87:1-14}:
I have got experience of working or designing audit stores for a number of different
systems and they don't have to work in the way that they have been defined here.
Audit systems are often very easily accessible to be able to be read by certain users.
There's nothing inherently difficult about that. I accept that the write aspect of it, you
know, you wouldn't want people writing to an audit database. But having the ability
to read to it is something that's quite simple -- read from it is quite simple.
A. Well, the purpose of having an audit of what happens at branch counters is so that
if there is a dispute over what has happened that somebody, presumably this will be
53 There is also evidence in PC0121925 {F/275.1/1} of Fujitsu obtaining an audit log in an attempt to
investigate a discrepancy and it not containing information which it should have done. In the entry
on 15 June 2005, Martin McConnell writes: “1. There is no messageport notify event recorded in the
audit.log when there should have been. (This comes from Riposte). Without this update, Dataserver will not
have the figures ‘in its books’ to be able to see past the figures that have been accumulated for cash since the
data tree was first built”. It is unclear whether, or if so how, this gap in information in an audit log
retrieved by Fujitsu made its way into the audit store.
– 180 –
Post Office, can have a very quick look at what happened and find out the truth. That's
the purpose of having an audit store. There is no other reason for it other than looking
back at what actually happened. It is my perception that that look back was available
to people at the Post Office.
Q. Mr Coyne, I would like to suggest to you that it is completely unrealistic to think

that a separate sealed core audit store of the sort we're talking about should be cracked
open hundreds of times a day in preference to using management information systems
which are designed for that precise purpose?
A. I think the word "sealed" is misleading and the concept of cracking something open
to get access to it I think is misleading as well. Things in an audit store are only -- can
be written to and only written to once, and the term that's often used is write once
read many, WORM. So the process is written to once, but people can read from that
store on many occasions.
Dr Worden’s evidence that the design of Horizon was a consequence of Post Office’s
business requirements and what had been agreed between Post Office and Fujitsu
({Day19/35:7} - {Day19/36:24}) was in keeping with Mr Coyne’s evidence .
Miskeying
The factual evidence relating to miskeys as raised by Mr Coyne and elicited by the
Claimants is set out at §203 et seq above.
Dr Worden’s oral evidence was effectively that whether the miskeying
recommendations were implemented or not was irrelevant to him, he hadn’t looked at
it, nor tried to analyse how user friendly or prone to miskeying the user interfaces
were: {Day19/98:18} - {Day19/99:7}, and {Day19/99:8-15}.
He did accept that in relation to the 4 March 2019 draft report, which includes the
instruction not to enter double zeros {F/1848.8.1/3} , that what is showing on the face
of the Horizon system is wrong as a result of what has happened {Day19/103:19-22};
that the design did not seem good to him {Day19/109:16-20} and that what had
happened was initially there had been a defect in the system in that the scanner
remming in didn’t work, then the SPM had had to manually enter the figures, the user
– 181 –
interface in relation to decimal points “probably is wrong” {Day19/111:25} to
{Day19/112:15}.
Bugs Causing Discrepancies in Accounts
(The factual evidence relating to the four named bugs (i.e. the three admitted by Post
Office and Dalmellington as identified by Mr Coyne), is set out at §361 et seq.)
Even under Dr Worden’s approach, there are at least 12 bugs “for which the experts have
seen strong evidence of the bug causing a lasting discrepancy” [Emphasis added] (Joint 2,
§1.15 {D1/2/29}). This is noteworthy, although it goes beyond the criteria of Issue 1 in
the following respects:-
(a) Lasting discrepancy: As above, a ‘lasting’ discrepancy is not required by the
wording of Issue 1. Further, there is no evidence on the business processes
adopted by the Post Office in issuing TCs, and so there is no factual basis for the
assumptions made by Dr Worden that with most bugs, errors or defects,
transient errors are ultimately made good at some point in time by TCs.
(b) Bug causing a discrepancy: Issue 1 asks about the potential for bugs causing
discrepancies, it does not require the bugs to have actually caused a discrepancy.
While observing the latter is sufficient to demonstrate potential, it is not a
prerequisite.
(c) Strong evidence: This raises the threshold even higher. It is unrealistic to expect
or require strong evidence to exist in respect of every bug, error or defect in order
to demonstrate potential under Issue 1, not least because the experts agree that
the available evidence, largely in the form of PEAKs and KELs, provided a
“limited window on what happened” (Joint 2, §0.3 {D1/2/26}). Indeed, even in
relation to the three named bugs acknowledge by the Post Office, which were
fully investigated and the subject of witness evidence from the Post Office, Dr
Worden draws attention to the incomplete picture and gaps in the evidence
about how these bugs were handled (Joint 2, §9.8 {D1/2/40}).
It is clear that Dr Worden approached the bugs, errors and defects table in Joint 2 on
the basis that each bug needed to have caused a discrepancy or shortfall which was
– 182 –
lasting – lasting confirmed by Dr Worden to mean a “permanent” effect, in that the
Subpostmaster “has lost the money forever” {Day18/154:2-12}. It was also on the basis of
this approach that Mr Coyne was cross-examined and that he revised the number of
bugs that he felt comfortable saying fell within Joint 2, §1.15 {D1/2/29} to 21 (see §173
to 178 above).
The correct way to approach each item in the bugs, errors and defects table is to ask
the following:-
(a) Is there evidence that the bug, error or defect had the potential to cause a
discrepancy relating to a branch account, such that it required correction (often
by the process of issuing TCs)?
(b) Until such correction was received, was what was presented on Horizon reliable
as an accurate processing and recording of transactions, or was it potentially
wrong.
When Dr Worden was taken through the first 10 items in the bugs, errors and defects
table in cross-examination, by reference to the correct criteria, it became evident that
there was no sensible way of disputing that all of them fell squarely within the ambit
of Issue 1:-
(a) Bugs 1 to 3 {D1/2/3-4}: These are the named bugs acknowledged by the Post
Office. They also fall within Dr Worden’s 12 bugs for which he has seen strong
evidence of a lasting discrepancy being caused (Joint 2, §1.2 {D1/2/27} in
conjunction with §1.15 {D1/2/29}).
(b) Bug 4 – Dalmellington {D1/2/4}: Dr Worden accepted in cross-examination that
the bug did: (i) in fact cause errors in branch accounts that were then required to
be corrected; and (ii) what Horizon was showing before it was corrected was
wrong {Day19/180:10-18}. He further stated of the bug that: “The system is
misleading them” (i.e. the SPMs) – {Day19/185:17} to {Day19/186:1}. Finally, his
reason for not finding that this bug that had the potential to impact branch
accounts was telling: “In my mind they didn’t have the potential – didn’t have – had a
small potential of having a lasting effect on branch accounts. Certainly had a transient
effect, there is no question of that.” {Day20/8:19-22}
– 183 –
(c) Bug 5 – Remming In {D1/2/5}: Dr Worden’s analysis of this bug in the table is:
“As for the Dalmellington bug, above – PO had a robust process for detecting and
correcting remming errors, whatever their origin. So, there were no lasting effects on
branch accounts.” Dr Worden suspected that he had not seen the PEAK
(PC0195380) referred to in the relevant KEL given his view on remming errors in
general {Day20/15:1-6}. In the PEAK, Anne Chambers confirms that the
transaction in issue could not be reversed {F/588/2}. In another PEAK which
references the same KEL (PC0203085) {F/695.1}, it was apparent again that the
transaction in issue could not be reversed. Further, it was a slightly different
problem to the duplicate rem issue seen in the past as it involved a pouch being
remmed in on two counters, which Gareth Jenkins had thought should not be
possible {F/695.1/4}. Dr Worden accepted that if Gareth Jenkins was right, then
this indicated a bug in the system – {Day20/19:14} - {Day20/20:11}. He further
accepted that this bug resulted in a “transient error” {Day20/20:12-14}.
(d) Bug 6(i) – Remming Out {13/2/5}: Dr Worden again relies upon the same analysis
as that adopted in relation to the Dalmellington bug. Dr Worden was shown the
KEL in relation to this bug (acha508S) {F/403}. He could not recall certain details
of this KEL but stated that “again I do start with a strong prior expectation that
remming errors get fixed”; he also confirmed that this was the basis upon which he
approached his report {Day20/22:7-20}. Again, Dr Worden suspected that he had
not looked at PEAK PC0143435, which refers to the relevant KEL {Day20/22:22-
25}. Dr Worden was taken to this PEAK which not only confirmed that the
discrepancy caused by the issue required a TC, but stated that “50 or so similar
branches” were in the same position {F/384/3}.
(e) Bug 6(ii) – Remming Out {D1/2/6}: Dr Worden was taken to KEL
GMaxwell3853P {F/276} which references: (i) an office requiring an Error Notice
(the predecessor to TCs) to remedy a discrepancy; and (ii) Development having
identified a possible bug in the code. It was decided, however, not to make
changes given the risks involved. That led to the following exchange at
{Day20/26:4} - {Day20/27:2}:
– 184 –
Q. I'm just asking you: it is a lasting bug?
A. It is a lasting bug, yes.
Q. Let's go to number 7 now, if we may, please.
A. Sorry, it might have been fixed in the next release, for instance, one doesn't
have the history, but there we go.
Q. That is speculation in favour of the Post Office.
A. Absolutely. I'm sorry, I shouldn't have done that.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, I just wonder whether there is a potential

confusion in the question my learned friend has asked. It may be my confusion.
Where my learned friend said "lasting bug", bearing in mind the emphasis I placed
during my submissions and indeed in cross-examination on bugs with lasting
effect, it might be helpful if my learned friend could distinguish between a bug that
lasts and a bug which has lasting effect. I believe he is putting the first point, not
the second.
MR GREEN: I think you knew what I meant, Dr Worden, didn't you?
A. I did. And I'll clarify what I mean: it's a bug that was not fixed, we cannot see
was fixed, but it was a bug without lasting effects in my opinion.
Q. For all the reasons we have heard?
A. Yes.
(f) Bug 7 – Local Suspense Issue {D1/2/6}: Dr Worden was taken to the KEL
acha5259Q {F/637} and a PEAK PC0198077 {F/630} relating to this issue. In
particular:
(i) By reference to the description in the KEL alone, the following exchange took
place at {Day20/28:16} - {Day20/29:1}:
Q. -- the summary was that the PM was forced to clear local suspense several
times resulting in the cash figure on the balance report changing and possibly
a discrepancy in the new trading period.
A. Yes.
Q. So that certainly had the potential to cause an impact on branch accounts

at that time, subject to later correction?
– 185 –
A. Yes.
Q. And probably did, yes?
A. I think it did, yes.
(ii) The PEAK referenced: (i) the SPM being bounced back as it was suggested a
balancing error had taken place rather than a system problem {F/630/2}; (ii) a
fix being applied to the Hucclecote branch which ultimately doubled the
discrepancy {F/630/2-3}; and (iii) a “wider issue” which “is outstanding, and can
also contribute to screen freezes and double settlements and hence further
discrepancies” {F/630/8}. When asked why Dr Worden did not read the PEAK
or get a feel for these issues, he responded at {Day20/38:16-20}: “My feeling
was I’d read the KEL and I think I’d formed the opinion it was a transient effect, and
Fujitsu had done that, so I didn’t drill down.”
(g) Bug 8 – Recovery Issues {D1/2/7}: In the table, Mr Coyne sets out quotes from
various PEAKs and explains that one of the KELs relevant to this issue, acha959T
{F/1700} is referred to by 2,473 other PEAKs from 2010 to 2018, “each of these may
(but may not) indicate a similar issue with the Horizon process and potentially creating
a discrepancy within branch accounts” [emphasis added]. Dr Worden accepted the
proposition that Mr Coyne’s description was scrupulously fair {Day20/42:11} to
{Day20/43:18}.
(h) Bug 9 – Reversals {D1/2/8}: In the table, Mr Coyne quotes from KEL PSteed2847N
{F/152} which records: “the PM should be contacted to say that the problem is due to a
software error and that they should ask the NBSC for balancing procedures”. Dr
Worden’s analysis in the table states that reversals lead to many calls, KELs and
PEAKs, “not necessarily related to any fault in Horizon” and “Whether or not this was
caused by a fault in Horizon, all remming errors are detected by Horizon and corrected
by TCs (or previously, error notices). Therefore, there was no lasting effect on branch
accounts.” This clearly leaves wide open the potential for there to be faults in
Horizon in relation to reversals causing discrepancies that require correction. Dr
Worden confirmed that in relation to this bug he relied upon the same points as
with Dalmellington above {Day20/44:11} to {Day20/45:8}.
– 186 –
(i) Bug 10 – Data Tree Build Failure Discrepancies {D1/2/9}: This bug falls within Dr
Worden’s 12 bugs for which he has seen strong evidence of a lasting discrepancy
being caused (Joint 2, §1.2 {D1/2/27} in conjunction with §1.15 {D1/2/29}).
As is evident from the above exercise, all of the bugs, errors or defects set out at items
1 to 10 of the table had, at the very least, the potential to cause, (although often in fact
did cause or more than likely caused) discrepancies relating to branch accounts which
required some form of intervention and correction. Until that correction took place,
the figures presented on Horizon were not reliable. Further, in most cases, in any
event, there is no direct evidence that corrections were in fact made.
It is submitted that taking the first 10 bugs in order in the table is both highly indicative
of Dr Worden’s approach to his task, and is highly instructive for the Court in how it
should view the bugs in the table as a whole and whether or not they bear directly on
Issue 1. It is evident that this is a matter of overall approach, rather than a case of
cherry-picking a random small sample of bugs in the table that do not demonstrate a
clear pattern.
Further, it is evident from Dr Worden’s approach to the bugs table, which involved
largely ignoring PEAKs in favour of only reading KELs, that his analysis missed certain
points on the magnitude of these bugs, both with regards the number of branches
potentially impacted and the size of the discrepancies created. This includes references
to: (i) “50 or so similar branches” needing correction {F/384/3}; (ii) a “wider issue” which
“is outstanding, and can also contribute to screen freezes and double settlements and hence
further discrepancies” {F/630/8}; (iii) another manifestation of the same problem leading
to a £25,000 discrepancy {F/588/3} when the KEL only refers to an incident involving
an £80 discrepancy {F/794}.
Extent of Likelihood
Issue 1 asks the extent to which it was “possible or likely” for bugs, errors and defects to
have the potential to cause discrepancies or undermine the reliability of Horizon. It is
difficult for the Court to answer this question with any degree of precision due to the
following:-
– 187 –
(a) Problem management: The lack of a proper problem management system, such
as that recommended in {F/1500}. Such a system would have charted incidents
and known errors, as well as their causes, and provided an invaluable reference
point in assessing scale and extent of issues.
(b) Difficulties faced by the experts in carrying out their task: In Dr Worden’s own
words, “there are levels of depth and complexity in the way Horizon actually works
which the experts have not been able to plumb” {Day18/85:10-23} and “It is a very big
system to understand in a year” {Day18/146:2-8}.
(c) The Post Office and Fujitsu’s own lack of knowledge and / or candour in
providing information: This is most readily demonstrated by failing to disclose
any information on the Dalmellington Bug until it was identified by chance by
Mr Coyne, in spite of the fact that the Post Office and Fujitsu had undertaken an
investigation of the bug recently and uncovered its 112 occurrences across 88
branches.
One useful indicator on extent is the number of TCs issued each year. In particular:-
(a) Internal Post Office recognition: With regards TCs issued by the Post Office to
correct, for example, remming errors, there is an internal recognition by the Post
Office that, even on its own analysis, a significant proportion are recorded as not
being caused by the branches. One can see this at {F/987} – under the ‘Summary
by Period’ tab, 21,660 Cash Rem TCs are said to be caused by branch errors
versus 4,093 Cash Rems TCs said to be caused by other errors (i.e. 16% of the
total number).
(b) Software bugs resembling user errors: The experts have agreed that: “Many
software bugs can have the same effects as a user error (as illustrated, for instance, by the
Dalmellington bug, which produced a remming error).” Joint 3, §3.22 {D1/4/5}
(c) UEB: In concert with Mrs van den Bogerd’s concession that the Post Office
sometimes suffers from UEB {Day6/77:16-18}, and the evidence set out above in
relation to the headwind faced by SPMs when calling the Helpline (see §249 to
255 above), this further reinforces the caution that one should exercise in
– 188 –
accepting the Post Office’s characterisation of TCs being issued due to errors
‘caused by branch’.
In light of the above, the Court can be confident that there is a material risk, which is
significant, of such bugs, errors and defects arising and causing discrepancies in
Subpostmasters’ branch accounts. Further, the level of errors, even if only a small
proportion of the overall volume of transactions effected through Horizon, is entirely
consistent with the Claimants’ pleaded case: see Generic Reply at §36 to 37 {C3/4/21}
and Claimants’ Provisional / Outline Document in relation to the Horizon Issues at §1.2
{C1/2/2}.
Approach to Issue 4
There is important agreement between the experts in respect of Issue 4, including as to
the degree of overlap with Issue 1 and the fact that the specific types of errors listed at
4(a) to 4(c) have arisen and have caused discrepancies :
(a) Joint 3, §4.1 {D1/4/7}: “Bugs, errors and defects identified in relation to Horizon Issue
1 are often relevant to Issue 4 in that they are ultimately errors arising from the
processing of data in Horizon.”
(b) Joint 3, §4.2 {D1/4/7}: “There is evidence within the PEAKs and KELs of bugs / errors /
defects within Horizon arising from parts (a), (b) and (c) of this issue that occurred
without causing financial discrepancies as well as some that occurred during financial
discrepancies.”
(c) Joint 3, §4.3 {D1/4/7}: “Reference data is critical to the operation of Horizon and errors
in reference data have led to discrepancies in branch accounts.”
The Claimants further rely on the bugs, errors and defects table in Joint 2 and the matters
above, in support of Issue 4.
To the extent it assists the Court, the Claimants identify specific examples of each of
sub-issues 4(a) to (c) below (albeit these too, overlap):
(a) Data entry errors
– 189 –
(i) Mis-keying errors: See §203 et seq. above.
(ii) Phantom transactions: See §405 et seq. above.
(b) Data transfer errors:
(i) Communications failures: As Dr Worden agrees at 5.141 {D3/2/135}, there is
clear evidence of error arising in data transfer. 54 The KEL {F/355} referred to
by Dr Worden states:
“The cause is usually a network problem where there are delays between the auth
agents and the correspondence servers.” {F/355/1}
“We have also seen a scenario where due to the comms problems the counter has
timed out and cancelled one of the transactions however the other still needs to
be cancelled manually as the counter only sends a single reversal. Being unaware
that a duplicate has been accidentally created.” {F/355/2}
This is obviously not a single event, as the text of the KEL plainly shows.
However, Dr Worden does not recognise the wider impact of
communications failures. Where Mr Coyne references another KEL
(obengc5933K) at §5.93, Dr Worden seeks to characterise this as “a rare form
of communication failure” {D3/2/216}. Mr Coyne does not agree with that
characterisation or the implication that it appears to be intended to carry with
it, as he explains at Coyne 2, §5.245 {D2/4.1/191} and, for example, gives
another example of a Riposte data transfer failure at §5.248 {D2/4.1/191},
which was a failure affection 401 transactions, although in that case Mr Coyne
points out that the bug was fixed before any impact on branch accounts.
(ii) Power failures / outages: It is also clear that power failures or outages would
affect data transfer, as in the cases of Mr Tank and Mrs Burke, addressed
above (from §439 and §482 respectively).
54 His comments on the absence of an effect on branch accounts are plainly wrong, on the face of what
is said on p.2 of the KEL “Reconciliation: as epay have topped up the phone twice, having received two
separate requests, they will expect payment from POL.” {F/355/2}
– 190 –
(c) Data processing errors
(i) Duplicate transactions: GMaxwell3651K {F/342} and surs357P {F/500} both
demonstrate that any failures or interruptions in service with the harvesting
process can cause duplicated payment transactions to be processed. In the
latter case Streamline, the external third party, received a payment file with
835 duplicate payment transactions totalling £76,564.53. In this instance
Streamline identified the duplicates and prevented payment processing.
However, identification occurred after the transaction data had been
transmitted from Horizon and despite any processes designed to prevent
this.
(ii) Problems with decimal places: Peak PC0075240 {F/113}, dated 8 April 2002
demonstrates an issue between the branch counter total and the Host
account. This Peak was raised by a branch who noticed that their Cash
Account lines were not matching the amounts recorded in reports {F/113/1}.
There was a problem with the processing of the Horizon data as there was a
discrepancy between the branch account and the host account: “The TIP
calculations are incorrectly storing £0.01 as £0.0099” {F/113/3}. As identified by
Mr Coyne the problem was with the code in that (§3.160 {D2/4.158}): “program
code values of 0.01 and 0.0099 were checked for zero values. The 0.0099 values were
returned as zero as the code ignored values after two decimal places.” Ultimately a
fix was applied PC0075415 {F/115}.
– 191 –
Issues 5 & 15: Reconciliation
Horizon Issue 5:
How, if at all, does the Horizon system itself compare transaction data recorded by
Horizon against transaction data from sources outside of Horizon?
Claimants’ Answer: Largely automated.
(a) For most of the Post Office’s clients, there is a regular automated process of
comparing (or reconciling) transactions as recorded in branches with the
transactions recorded in the data received back from third party clients (e.g.
Camelot and Santander). Some of those comparisons are carried out within
Horizon ‘itself’, while others may not be. Regardless, due to the large volume of
transactions, these comparisons are largely automated.
Horizon Issue 15:
How did Horizon process and/or record Transaction Corrections?
Claimants’ Answer: Manually created. Automatically processed & recorded.
(a) Creation a manual process: When the Post Office’s central accounting function
decides that it is necessary to make some adjustment to a branch account, as the
branch transaction data does not align with client or supplier data held by the
Post Office, such adjustment is made by a manual process of deciding to issue,
and then issuing, a TC. The allocation of responsibility leading to a TC requires
no input or involvement from the Subpostmaster. As a human process, this is
inevitably subject to errors.
(b) Effect: The result of a Subpostmaster processing (and accepting) a TC will
normally be the creation of the specified transaction, which will then be returned
to POLFS as part of the normal flow of summarised transaction data at the end
of the trading day.
– 192 –
(c) Processing: Where the TC is processed successfully on Horizon, a message will
be displayed confirming the same. Horizon Online includes a check to see
whether TCs fail due to discrepancies between the validation of the transaction
at the counter and the values held within the TC message. Where this happens,
a failed warning message appears and Subpostmasters are advised to contact the
Helpline.
(d) Dispute: If a dispute was raised in respect of a TC, this was normally done
outside of Horizon (by way of calling the Helpline). The dispute was not
recorded in any way on Horizon itself. If a dispute is successful, then a
compensating TC is issued.
(e) Numbers: Between the years of 2006 to 2017 TCs were applied more than 100,000
times each year.
There is no dispute between Mr Coyne and Dr Worden on the substance of Issues 5 and
15.
In Joint 3, §5.1 {D1/4/8} the experts agreed:
Reconciliation between transactions recorded on Horizon and transactions recorded

by Post Office's clients is largely automated.”
Detected discrepancies were subject to manual corrective fixes and/or the issue of
Transaction Corrections/Error Notices to the Subpostmasters.
There extent of agreement in relation to Issues 5 and 15, is most clearly apparent from:
(a) Coyne 2 §5.365 to 5.368 {D2/4.1/225}, agreeing with Dr Worden’s account of the
process of reconciliation; and
(b) Worden 1 §905 {D3/1/201}, agreeing with Mr Coyne’s account of how TCs are
recoded and processed within Horizon.
– 193 –
(The exercise embarked upon by Dr Worden in calculating an alleged upper financial
limit on the magnitude of erroneous TCs, is obviously not called for by these Issues and
is in fact relied upon by him in relation to Issue 1, as addressed above, from §516)
– 194 –
Issues 2, 8, 9 & 14: Information Available to SPMs and PO
Horizon Issue 2:
Did the Horizon IT system itself alert Subpostmasters of such bugs, errors or defects
as described in (1) above and if so how.
Claimants’ Answer: No.
(a) Horizon did not, in general, alert Subpostmasters to any significant bugs or other
defects in the Horizon system.
Horizon Issue 8:
What transaction data and reporting functions were available through Horizon to
Post Office for identifying the occurrence of alleged shortfalls and the causes of alleged
shortfalls in branches, including whether they were caused by bugs, errors and/or
defects in the Horizon system?
Claimants’ Answer: The Post Office had more information.
(a) Access to additional information: Post Office had access to data and systems
which were not available to Subpostmasters.
(b) Facilities available: The descriptions of facilities for PO in the two expert reports
are consistent and can be taken together as a description of those facilities. These
included ‘official sources of information’, such as TPS Reports, APS Reports, DRS
Reports and Business Incident Management Process Reports. These also
included ‘additional sources of information’, such as that received from Fujitsu
and Subpostmasters.
(c) Keystrokes: Despite the Post Office asserting and then denying the availability
of keystrokes, it belatedly emerged that the Post Office, via Fujitsu, does have
access to the individual keystrokes entered in a branch by Subpostmasters.
Horizon Issue 9:
– 195 –
At all material times, what transaction data and reporting functions (if any) were
available through Horizon to Subpostmasters for:
a. identifying apparent or alleged discrepancies and shortfalls and/or the causes of the
same; and
b. accessing and identifying transactions recorded on Horizon?
Claimants’ Answer: Primarily limited to day-to-day transactions. Limited ability to
identify cause of discrepancies.
(a) Data and reports available: SPMs did have access to many reports relating to
different aspects of running a branch (such as currency exchange, stock etc.), as
well as transaction logs (for individual transactions, available for 42 then 60 days)
and event logs. These reports and data were limited to day-to-day transactions.
It was possible to print these on till rolls. The system available to SPMs was not
user friendly.
(b) Ability to identify causes of discrepancies: The causes of some types of apparent
or alleged discrepancies and shortfalls may be identified from reports or
transaction data available to Subpostmasters. Other causes of apparent or
alleged discrepancies and shortfalls may be more difficult or impossible to
identify from reports or transaction data available to Subpostmasters, because of
their limited knowledge of the complex back-end systems. Identification
requires information from the Post Office and/or Fujitsu and co-operation of Post
Office staff and Subpostmasters.
Horizon Issue 14:
How (if at all) does the Horizon system and its functionality:
a. enable Subpostmasters to compare the stock and cash in a branch against the stock
and cash indicated on Horizon?
b. enable or require Subpostmasters to decide how to deal with, dispute, accept or

make good an alleged discrepancy by (i) providing his or her own personal funds or
(ii) settling centrally?
– 196 –
c. record and reflect the consequence of raising a dispute on an alleged discrepancy,

on Horizon Branch account data and, in particular:
i. does raising a dispute with the Helpline cause a block to be placed on the value of
an alleged shortfall; and
ii. is that recorded on the Horizon system as a debt due to Post Office?
d. enable Subpostmasters to produce (i) Cash Account before 2005 and (ii) Branch
Trading Statement after 2005?
e. enable or require Subpostmasters to continue to trade if they did not complete a

Branch Trading Statement; and, if so, on what basis and with what consequences on
the Horizon system?
Claimants’ Answer: The system can compare cash & stock figures. But has no
facility to raise or record a dispute.
(a) Comparison of cash and stock: Subpostmaster comparison of Cash and Stock in
branch and figures recorded within Horizon can be determined by the
Subpostmaster/Auditor physically counting the cash and stock in branch and
inputting those values derived into Horizon for a comparison to be made against
the electronically derived figures held by Horizon.
(b) Functionality: It is agreed that functionality enabling the Subpostmasters to deal
with, dispute, accept or make good alleged discrepancies is as follows:
(i) At the end of the Trading Period, Horizon reports to the user the amount of
any discrepancy. The system invites the user to transfer this amount into the
local suspense account and continue to roll over – or to discontinue this
operation. If, at the end of a Trading Period, there is a discrepancy (i.e. either
a surplus or a shortfall) of less than £150, the Subpostmaster must 'make
good' the discrepancy – either by removing money from the till (in the event
of a surplus) or by adding money to the till (in the event of a shortfall).
(ii) The ability to make good through Horizon was also available before 2005
under Cash Accounting. ‘Making good’ causes the derived cash position to
remain the same and the actual cash position to change accordingly. The next
– 197 –
Trading Period can then begin with a balanced account (both physical cash
and electronically recorded).
(iii) If, at the end of a Trading Period, a branch has a discrepancy of more than
£150, they have the option to either make good or settle the discrepancy
centrally. The ability to ‘settle centrally’ was not available under Cash
Accounting. If the Subpostmaster chooses to settle centrally, they do not have
to physically place cash in the till (in the case of a shortfall) at the time.
Instead, a message is sent to Post Office's Finance Services Centre and the
discrepancy is moved to a central account. A Subpostmaster may wish to
dispute a discrepancy. This only appears to have been available post 2005.
(c) Dispute: The Subpostmaster cannot dispute a discrepancy or any figure on
Horizon, or record that they have raised a dispute. Horizon records figures even
when they are known to be incorrect by the SPM, the Post Office or both. A
dispute is normally raised through contacting the helpline.
Issue 2 (alerting of bugs to Subpostmasters)
The experts are agreed on this issue that the answer is, in general no. In Joint 2, §2.1
{D1/2/38} the experts agreed:
Horizon did not, in general, alert Subpostmasters to any significant bugs or other defects
in the system itself.
That said, the extent to which any IT system can automatically alert its users to bugs
within the system itself is necessarily limited. Whilst Horizon has automated checks,
there are types of bugs that would circumvent such checks.
Dr Worden’s interpretation of the issue in Worden 1 is as follows: “Issue 2 appears to be
asking - could Post Office have given its Subpostmasters automated support in Horizon, in the
place of human support?" to which he answers no, Worden 1, §986 {D3/1/216}. This
– 198 –
formulation of the issue is very odd, and is not on any view what this issue requires
the experts to consider.55
Issues 8 and 9 (availability of information and report writing)
There is no disagreement between the experts in respect of Issue 8, as recorded by Joint
3 at {D1/4/10}:
(a) §8.1: “Post Office had access to data which would not have been available to
Subpostmasters.”
(b) §8.2: “The descriptions of facilities for PO in the two expert reports are consistent and
can be taken together as a description of those facilities.” Those descriptions can be
found in Coyne 1, §8.1 to 8.9 {D2/1/140} and Worden 1, §1081 to 1088 {D3/1/238}.
(c) §8.3: “Post Office were reliant upon Fujitsu for diagnosis of whether the occurrence of
shortfalls was caused by bugs/errors or defects within the Horizon system.”
In respect of Issue 9: there is apparently no dispute as to the nature and type of
information available to Subpostmasters. For example, in Worden 1, §991 {D3/1/220},
Dr Worden draws attention to the following example reports: (i) reports by stock unit
(SU) on a daily or weekly basis, or by user; (ii) balance reports; and (iii) journals such
as Transaction and Event Logs. Transaction Logs are described by Dr Worden as the
“main tool used” to find the cause of discrepancies.56
As to the utility of the information available to Subpostmasters, this is agreed in Joint
2 at §9.3 {D1/2/39}:
The causes of some types of apparent or alleged discrepancies and shortfalls may be
identified from reports or transaction data available to Subpostmasters. Other causes
of apparent or alleged discrepancies and shortfalls may be more difficult or impossible
to identify from reports or transaction data available to Subpostmasters, because of
55 It appears that the Post Office may be seeking, wrongly and inappropriately, to rely on this
conclusion by Dr Worden as a challenge to the Claimants’ pleaded case. See the Post Office’s Written
Opening Submissions at §290 {A1/2/102}. However, this misstates or misunderstands the Claimants’
pleaded case: Generic Reply, §§13 to 16 {C3/4/6} and 21.11 {C3/4/17}
56 Worden 1, §1000 {D3/1/222}
– 199 –
their limited knowledge of the complex back-end systems. Identification requires

cooperation of Post Office staff and Subpostmasters.
There is some disagreement between the experts is whether the information available
to Subpostmasters, when utilised in conjunction with the Post Office’s guidance and
procedures, enabled Subpostmasters to identify the cause of most discrepancies,
however this is beyond the true scope of Issue 9.
Dr Worden’s view is that SPMs can identify the cause of most discrepancies, a
conclusion which is based on his assumption that “most discrepancies are caused by
human error” and the information available to Subpostmasters lends itself to
identifying such errors (see, e.g., Worden 1 at §958 {D1/1/214}).
Mr Coyne disagrees with this approach, considers Dr Worden’s assumption
unfounded (being dependent on Dr Worden’s flawed approach to Issue 1), and
accordingly does not agree with Dr Worden’s conclusion: Coyne 2, (§5.397
{D2/4.1/235}).
Issue 14 (functionality of Horizon for SPMs)
There is no substantive dispute between the experts in relation to Issue 14, and the
significant points of agreement in Joint 2 are as follows:
(a) §14.1 {D1/2/40}: “The descriptions by the experts of facilities available to the
Subpostmasters are consistent with one another and can be taken together as an agreed
description.” Those descriptions can be found in Coyne 1, §7.19 to 7.38 {D2/1/135}
and Worden 1, §987 to 1009 {D3/1/220}.
(b) §14.2 {D1/2/40}: “Subpostmaster comparison of Cash and Stock in branch and figures
recorded within Horizon can be determined by the Subpostmaster/Auditor physically
counting the cash and stock in branch and inputting those values derived into Horizon
for a comparison to be made against the electronically derived figures held by Horizon.”
(c) §14.3 {D1/2/40}: (After the experts agreeing and setting out the functionality
enabling Subpostmasters to deal with, dispute, accept or make good alleged
– 200 –
discrepancies): “The Subpostmaster cannot dispute a discrepancy on Horizon or record
that they have raised a dispute. This is done through contacting the helpline.”
(d) §14.4 {D1/2/42}: “The experts agree that no technical controls have been identified
within the disclosure that would indicate Subpostmasters were prevented from trading if
they did not complete a Branch Trading Statement.” Mr Coyne’s position is that the
restriction is imposed by a business process (Coyne 2, §5.404.e {D2/4.1/237}).
Keystrokes
The unsatisfactory position in relation to the evidence about keystrokes is set out in
Section A above. Dr Worden was not able to resolve the confusion in Post Office’s
evidence in relation to Credence and keystrokes, as this was not something he had
“drilled down” into{Day18/38:4-25}.
He however thought that Fujitsu had access to keystrokes via another department
called TED {Day20/51:12-25}:
Q. So, if you had understood from Post Office's evidence at some point that keystrokes
would have been available to Post Office, this is the sort of thing that that would look
like, isn't it?
A. Yes, it is. But I do not think that is what it is.
Q. What do you think this is?
A. I think in frontline support Fujitsu had an operation called TED, which I can't
remember what the initials stand for, but they look at event logs, and I think keystrokes
are in event logs and used by Fujitsu when they are investigating a bug or a mystery
of some kind.
Q. So you think that somewhere in the system through event logs you can find these
keystrokes?
A. I think so. I'm pretty sure of it.
– 201 –
Issues 7, 10, 11, 12 and 13: Remote Access
Horizon Issue 7:
Were Post Office and/or Fujitsu able to access transaction data recorded by Horizon
remotely (i.e. not from within a branch)?
Claimants’ Answer: Yes.
(a) Fujitsu could access all transaction data recorded by Horizon. Both the Post
Office and Fujitsu can read data remotely.
Horizon Issue 10:
Whether the Defendant and/or Fujitsu have had the ability/facility to: (i) insert, inject,
edit or delete transaction data or data in branch accounts; (ii) implement fixes in
Horizon that had the potential to affect transaction data or data in branch accounts;
or (iii) rebuild branch transaction data:
a. at all;
b. without the knowledge of the Subpostmaster in question; and
c. without the consent of the Subpostmaster in question.
Claimants’ Answer: Fujitsu – Yes. The Post Office – Inject as Global User whilst in
branch.
(a) Fujitsu – Yes on all counts: It is clear following this trial that Fujitsu did indeed
have the abilities / facilities listed in (i), (ii) and (iii), and that these could be used
without the knowledge or consent of the Subpostmaster in question. They could
do so by way of any one or more of the following: SSC role utilising various tools,
the APPSUP role, Privileged User rights, Database Administrator rights, or by
way of the ‘guys in Ireland’ (to the extent they differ from the preceding roles).
(b) Post Office – Global Users: The Post Office only had the ability to inject
transactions by way of its Global User role. While such transactions might be
injected without the knowledge or consent of the Subpostmaster, the role was
– 202 –
such that it did require the Global User to be physically in the branch at the time
of the transaction, so that the SPM might thereby know or suspect what had
happened.
Horizon Issue 11:
If they did, did the Horizon system have any permission controls upon the use of the
above facility, and did the system maintain a log of such actions and such permission
controls?
Claimants’ Answer: Role too wide. Not controlled. No / no proper logs.
(a) Audits / Logs: While the Balancing Transaction Tool specifically wrote to an
audit journal table, and templates were developed for it to avoid errors in use, it
was only used once. Other abilities / facilities which were able to achieve the
same result and, indeed, were more powerful, were available and effectively
unaudited. While some Privileged User Logs do exist, those logs: (i) did not exist
prior to 2009; (ii) prior to July 2015, only recorded when a user logged on and
logged off; and (iii) even after July 2015, the experts agree that such logs are not
a useful source of evidence about remote access.
(b) OCPs: OCPs occasionally document remote alteration of transactional data or
other branch data. There is evidence, however, that 7% of these OCPs were
issued retrospectively and, further, that there are several instances in which the
person that raises the OCP is also the same person to monitor it.
(c) Access not properly controlled: The view of the Post Office’s own expert is that
the number of Privileged Users and SSC users who can create a Balancing
Transaction seems high. Roles were not properly controlled even after concerns
were raised by E&Y in the 2011 Audit, particularly in respect of the APPSUP role.
Horizon Issue 12:
If the Defendant and/or Fujitsu did have such ability, how often was that used, if at
all?
Claimants’ Answer: In use, but precise extent unclear.
– 203 –
(a) Extent unclear: Other than use of the Balancing Transaction Tool (which, after
some uncertainty, it has been established was used once), the experts have been
unable to state with confidence how often the above abilities / facilities were
used.
(b) Indications are that use was frequent: The Claimants’ expert has found, for
example, that the APPSUP role was used 2,175 times between 2009 and 2018. The
Post Office’s expert confirmed that this is consistent with his survey of the
Privileged User Logs, and suggests that this equates to about one person per
working day utilising the role. Fujitsu’s witnesses confirmed the capabilities of
the role and did not dispute the number of uses cited by the Claimants’ expert.
While the Fujitsu witnesses maintained that most uses of the role would be in a
support function, they expressly did not review the Privileged User Logs cited
by the Claimants’ expert. In any event, the experts did not find those logs useful
to identify how these facilities were used.
Horizon Issue 13:
To what extent did use of any such facility have the potential to affect the reliability of
Branches’ accounting positions?
Claimants’ Answer: To a material extent & did in fact do so.
(a) Potential and actual effect: They not only had the potential, but they did in fact
affect the reliability of branch accounting positions. This was precisely the
design of the abilities / facilities referred to above.
In Short
As Dr Worden put it, “more or less Fujitsu or Post Office could do anything”: {Day18/67:5-
6}.
In relation to Issues 7 and 10 to 13, the Claimants’ rely on the evidence of Mr Coyne, in
particular, his written evidence as follows:
– 204 –
(a) Injection in Legacy Horizon: Coyne 2, §5.439 to 5.448 {D2/4.1/248}.
(b) Balancing Transaction Correction Tool: Coyne 1, §9.26 to 9.32 {D2/1/153}, and
Coyne 2, §3.249 to 3.265 {D2/4.1/79} and §5.428 to 5.438 {D2/4.1/245}.
(c) TIP Transaction Repair Tool: Coyne 1, §9.33 to 9.39 {D2/1/155}.
(d) Privileged Users: Coyne 2, §5.449 to 5.452 {D2/4.1/251}.
(e) Privileged User Logs: Coyne 2, §5.453 to 5.454 {D2/4.1/253}.
(f) APPSUP: Coyne 2, §3.277 to 3.282 {D2/4.1/85}.
(g) Data rebuilds: Coyne 1, §9.20 to 9.25 {D2/1/152}, and Coyne 2, §3.249 to 3.265
{D2/4.1/79} and §5.459 to 5.466 {D2/4.1/255}.
(h) Global branches and users: Coyne 1, §9.15 to 9.19 {D2/1/151}, and Coyne 2, §4.9
to 4.22 {D2/4.1/100} and 5.425 to 5.427 {D2/4.1/244}.
(i) Permission controls and data auditing: Coyne 1, §9.52 to 9.61 {D2/1/159}, and
Coyne 2, §5.467 to 5.486 {D2/4.1/256} and 5.425 to 5.427 {D2/4.1/244}.
Privileged Users, including APPSUP
Dr Worden agreed that privileged users can edit and delete in Horizon Online, and
that the same rationale applied to Legacy. This is consistent with p46 of the High
Level Design for Horizon Online {F/1784/46}, which states that previous privileged
user roles have been taken into account when defining the roles in Horizon, which
include APPSUP: p15 and p20-21.
The position taken in Dr Worden’s first report was that changes made by privileged
users could not be carried out without the knowledge of the SPM (summary table at
{D3/1/248}) because they would become visible to SPMs in branch, and although not
flagged as a change, this was only a theoretical problem because SPMs could “always
find out about changes made by SSC, via a request to the helpdesk”, for the audit data to
compare with the data in branch ({D3/1/246} §1123. (This in fact reflected the same
point made in Godeseth 1, §59.3, {E2/1/18}).
– 205 –
This was an impossible stretch in a great many respects, but also overlooked the fact
that Post Office has until recently in this litigation denied that remote access to branch
accounts was possible. In Post Office’s response to the Panorama programme aired on
17 August 2015 which had featured Mr Roll, Post Office asserted (in a page still on Post
Office’s website)57:
“There is also no evidence of transactions recorded by branches being altered through

‘remote access’ to the system. Transactions as they are recorded by branches cannot be
edited and the Panorama programme did not show anything that contradicts this.”
Dr Worden did not seek to maintain the position at {D3/1/246} §1123} in his oral
evidence: {Day20/129:9-24}
The Privileged User Logs did not exist prior to 2009, and only recorded log on and log
off until July 2015. From July 2015 they included further information, but even Dr
Worden’s view was that “The Privileged User Access logs are not a useful source of evidence
about remote access, including Balancing Transactions”: Joint 4 §10.1 {D1/5/4}.
Mr Coyne had identified the PEAK relating to APPSUP permissions (PEAK PC0208119
{F/768}) and addressed it in his second report ({D2/4.1/85 §3.279), and also identified
that from the Privileged User Logs that this role had been used 2,175 times between
2009 to 2018. Mr Godeseth and Mr Parker served statements responding to Mr Coyne’s
discovery of the APPSUP role, but despite this being a specific issue in these
proceedings, neither of them actually looked at the logs to try to identify what actions
had been carried out (Godeseth 3, §19 {E2/14/6}, Parker 3 {E2/13/3} §13).
It is a fair inference that if, even in these circumstances under the scrutiny of this Group
Litigation, Post Office and Fujitsu don’t review the Privileged User Logs, they are in
reality never reviewed, and there is no scrutiny of the APPSUP role.
57 http://corporate.postoffice.co.uk/bbc-panorama-our-response. This page is in fact the

only result returned for a search for “remote access on Post Office’s site:
http://corporate.postoffice.co.uk/search/node/remote%20access.
– 206 –
Dr Worden’s evidence was that he had spent a number of hours trying to understand
the Privileged User Logs and get to the bottom of them {Day20/187:16-25}, but he got
“very little out of them” {Day20/137:20}
The only scrutiny of the APPSUP role which has been seen in the documents is in the
EY 2011 audit, which, as below identified serious issues, and which the evidence in
PEAK PC0208119 {F/768} suggests were not addressed timeously, and may not ever
have been fully addressed.
It is a striking omission that Dr Worden did not report on the APPSUP role at all
{Day20/93:6-8}, even though it was specifically documented in the 2011 EY report, and
had been addressed by Mr Coyne in his report, as above.
Transaction Correction / Balancing Transaction Tool
The documents relating to this tool indicate that there was a need for SSC to carry out
balancing transactions: Transaction Correction Low Level Design {F/425/8} “The utility
will allow SSC to correct transactions by inserting balancing records…”, and PEAK
PC0195962 {F/594} proposing amendments to the Balancing Tool to avoid mistakes.
The Transaction Correction tool was recognised within the design document as a
powerful tool, with the need for specific protections:
Warning: The use of this powerful tool has inherent risks. If the SQL statement is
incorrect or badly written, it is possible to cause unintended consequences, some of
which may cause serious problems to the Branch Database. It is expected that only a
small number of skilled staff will run this tool and that they will have detailed guidance
as to when and how to use the tool.
It is implicit that this was the reason the tool was designed to automatically write to a
journal which could then be audited
What is surprising is that the tool was apparently only used once after it was created.
The explanation is that SSC preferred to go off piste with APPSUP. This was a more
powerful tool, which was unbounded as to which tables it could access {Day20/155:3-
5}. The protections provided for in the Transaction Correction Low Level Design did
not apply to APPSUP.
– 207 –
OCPs and MSCs
Mr Coyne reviewed the OCPs and identified that 7% were described as having been
created retrospectively: {Day17/184:3-5}. This percentage was agreed by Dr Worden
{Day20/147:4-19}.
As to Post Office’s reliance on “four eyes”, it is notable that many disclosed OCPs have
in fact been raised and monitored by the same person, as put to Dr Worden
e.g.:{F/292.4/1} OCP 1 September 2005 P1 raised by monitored Martin Harvey ;
{F/485.2/2} OCP 2 March 2009/ P2 is raised and monitored by Anne Chambers.;
{F/540.01/2} OCP 16 October 2009 raised and monitored by Anne Chambers; and
{F/616.1/3} OCP 14 April 2010 raised and monitored by Vishnu Ramachandran.
Database Administrators
Dr Worden agreed with Mr Godeseth evidence that DBAs can do “an awful lot of
damage” {Day20/145:4-14}. He was unclear whether the DBAs were the guys in Ireland
or not {Day20/146:7} - {Day20/147:3}.
TIP Repair Tool
Mr Coyne identified the TIP Repair Tool, referred to in the TPS - EPOSS Reconciliation
- TIP Transaction Repair HLD Specification {F/1597}, in Coyne 1, §9.33 to 9.41
{D2/1/155} and subsequently identified PEAKs and OCRs relating to the use of this
tool, most helpfully set out in Joint 4 §10.10 {D1/5/7}.
Mr Coyne’s request to know how many transactions had been repaired in this way,
was refused by Post Office on the basis that “This information is not needed because this
topic does not affect branch accounts” and “Furthermore, Fujitsu does not presently hold
information on the number of repaired transactions. It would therefore require a manual review
and collation of this data to provide the requested information. This would be disproportionate.”
{C5/21/20}: There is accordingly no evidence as to how often this tool is used and
apparently no log of the use of this tool.
Post Office’s position that this tool “cannot directly affect the branch accounts in the Branch
Database” Godeseth 1, §60 {E2/1/18} is not in dispute. However, Mr Coyne’s opinion is
– 208 –
that this tool has the potential to affect branch account data if its use leads to
discrepancies between recipient systems and branch leading to the issuing of a flawed
TC: §9.40 - §9.41 {D2/1/156} and {Day16/49:19-24}.
Mr Coyne was cross-examined on the basis that the prospect of such human error was
“very small”, “very unlikely”, or “very low’, as to which he said {Day16/59:16-24}:
A. I do accept that it is low but it isn't that many error that's required. It is only
really required that an error is made by Fujitsu either on the value or potentially the
transaction type, because if the transaction type is altered the transaction could go
somewhere differently or be dealt with differently. And then the only other decision
that needs to be taken is that Post Office accept that data rather than the branch's
version of the data.
Mr Coyne is plainly right that this could introduce errors in branch accounts, and
further than uses of the tool to perform “multiple repairs at speed” ({F/1597/11} increases
the prospect of human error.
Global Users
The Global User process management document dated 24 May 2019 {F/1848.8.3} details
an absence of appropriate security controls in relation to Global users, in that 32 people
who had left still had this access attributed to them.
– 209 –
Issue 3: Robustness
Issue 3: Robustness
Claimants’ Answers to this Issue
Horizon Issue 3:
To what extent and in what respects is the Horizon System “robust” and extremely
unlikely to be the cause of shortfalls in branches?
Claimants’ Answer to Issue 3: Robust? Depends on definition & system. Extremely
unlikely? No (significant & material risk).
(a) Assessment of robustness: The robustness of Horizon can only be assessed after
one has looked at Issues 1, 4 and 6 (extent of bugs, errors and defects, measures
and controls) and Issues 7 and 10 to 13 (remote access).
(b) Relevance of TCs and the Helpline: TC creation and the Helpline are not a part
of the Horizon system as defined by the parties and the Court. It is clear that,
without taking into account TCs and the Helpline, the Horizon system cannot
sensibly be described as robust and / or extremely unlikely to be the cause of
shortfalls in branches, in the context of this litigation. To the extent that TCs and
the Helpline are considered relevant (or “essential”, per Dr Worden), the
robustness of Horizon is contingent upon the adequacy of the business processes
underpinning TCs and the Helpline, which are not within the purview of the
Horizon Issues Trial.
(c) Countermeasure failures: The Court has seen numerous examples of Dr
Worden’s ‘Horizon countermeasures’ failing significantly in operation. These
include DEA, DUA, MID, SEK, SEC and UEC.
(d) Remote Access open door: Any system that can be easily subverted would not
be robust. It is evident that the Post Office and / or Fujitsu had a number of
different extremely powerful tools and roles at its disposal which had the
potential to insert, edit and delete transactional data or data in branch accounts.
Roles were not properly controlled, even after E&Y raised issues about this in the
2011 Audit (perhaps corrected in 2017). Logs of use of powerful roles and tools
– 210 –
Issue 3: Robustness
either did not exist or were not useful. Use of these roles and tools were therefore
effectively unaudited. (The experts agree that such logs that do exist do not
provide a useful source of evidence about remote access.)
(e) Plumbing the swamp: The experts faced real difficulties in appraising the
Horizon system. As noted in Issue 1 above, those difficulties similarly preclude
the Court from reaching a confident and precise evaluation of “robustness”.
Indeed, the Post Office’s own expert was shown several documents during his
oral evidence which: (i) he had not seen before; and (ii) he confirmed were not
reconcilable with the view which he had formed of the system and, therefore, its
robustness.
(f) Material risk of Horizon being the cause, once a shortfall is present: The Issue
does not ask whether the Horizon System is unlikely to cause shortfalls. Rather,
it asks whether, when there is a shortfall, it is then extremely unlikely that Horizon
caused it. That simply does not fit the evidence that the Court has heard. As is
clear from Issue 1, there is a material risk that a shortfall in a branch account is
caused by the Horizon System. To the extent that the Post Office relies upon
SPM user error as a comparator for frequency, there is no basis for this. The
prevalence and true cause (e.g. training) of such errors is outside the purview of
the Horizon Issues Trial.
The Claimants rely on the evidence of Mr Coyne, in his written evidence in particular
at:
(a) Coyne 1, §3.9 to 3.10 {D2/1/26}, §5.82 to 5.113 {D2/1/76}; and
(b) Coyne 2, §5.209 to 5.233 {D1/4.1/182}.
And further, the Claimants’ rely upon the experts’ agreements in Joint 3 as follows:
– 211 –
Issue 3: Robustness
(a) §3.3 {D1/4/3}: “It was possible for some of the Horizon support staff working at Fujitsu
to modify the Horizon back-end branch database. In 2012, Post Office's auditors observed
that there were inappropriate system privileges assigned to the APPSUP role (which
allowed amendments to the BRDB).”
(b) §3.7 {D1/4/3}: “Peaks show that some defects have lain undetected in Horizon for
extended periods without being diagnosed and fixed.”
(c) §3.15 {D1/4/4}: “It is difficult to measure the extent of the robustness of Horizon, apart
from how it might limit the extent of impact on branch accounts, as in Issue 1.”
(d) §3.16 {D1/4/4}: “There are indications that in its first year of operation, and in the first
year after the introduction of Horizon Online, the system suffered from more problems
than in other years. One might expect a higher level of problems in these early periods.
The extent to which these problems were serious, or evaded countermeasures, or caused
discrepancies in branch accounts, is not agreed.”
(e) §3.20 {D1/4/5}: “As Horizon has changed throughout its lifetime, the existence and
effectiveness of any countermeasures has too. To have considered the time dependence of
all robustness countermeasures over 20 years, would have made the expert reports
impossibly lengthy. There was not the time to do so."
Overlap and Interrelationship with other Issues
As identified above at §17 and 489(a), “robustness” is to an extent a question of
semantics, and this Issue 3 as a whole in dependent on the Court’s findings on the other
issues, above.
This link is recognised by Post Office’s Dr Worden. For example, Dr Worden, in
relation to his reliance on TCs as a countermeasure and the impact on robustness said
{Day18/151:20-22} and {Day18/152:18-24}:
It goes to my analysis of robustness. It is an example of user error correction, which I

think is quite an important one.
– 212 –
Issue 3: Robustness
Q. And it is right, isn’t it, that the answer to the robustness question on your analysis
would be very different depending on whether you included the corrective impact of
TCs or not?
A. Absolutely. Yes.
Q. Fundamentally different, in fact?
A. Yes, very different.
Further in relation to remote access and the relationship with robustness (in the context
of the APPSUP Peak), Dr Worden {Day20/79:4-22}:
Q. Your robustness measure has two facets to it. It is to have an appropriately typed
security policy and to follow it?
A. That's part of it. And as I say, if there is great lax in security policy that poses a
threat to robustness.
Q. Indeed.
A. But I would emphasise if security policy is really flaky then you start worrying
about robustness.
Q. If you have an inadequate security policy, that poses a threat to your robustness
countermeasure?
A. And it is proportional in the sense of the more inadequate it is, the bigger the threat.
Q. Yes. And if you have a perfectly acceptable security policy but it is not followed,
you have got the same problem?
A. Yes, I mean security policies change over time and sometimes –
Q. It is a simple question.
A. Yes.
Evidence of Post Office’s Own View in Internal Documents
There are a large number of internal Post Office documents which indicate internal
recognition within Post Office of shortcomings, problems or inadequacies of Horizon
and/or related backend systems.
– 213 –
Issue 3: Robustness
(a) A Technology Strategy Update Decision Paper dated 30 January 2017
{F/1611/87}, author Rob Houghton, presented to the Post Office Board, records
IT as “not fit for purpose” (p87), Fujitsu with a 6 year contract signed with Post
Office which “continues to invest in legacy and obsolescence” (p98); and that “The
Horizon (HNG-X) platform is at the end of its life and needs replacing” (p100).
(b) Minutes of a Group Executive Meeting dated 17 January 2017, attended by Paula
Vennells, Jane Macleod and Angela Van Den Bogerd and others {F/1603}, which
record (p5):
Credence - Support and maintenance has moved to Accenture but on old hardware.
Single platform if goes, goes completely. Driving pressure into Accenture to get
more capability. Accenture picked up difficult pass and the additional costs at the
moment. Starting to see light at the end of the tunnel. RH having difficult
conversations, flag up any issues, assumptions and risks to GE. KPMG engaged to
undertake a GAP analysis to produce an IT control framework.
Fujitsu - negotiations will be tough as POL do not hold the power. FJ see the
contract as a cash cow, so need to persuade them that working with POL to migrate
to cloud technology is to their benefit against a 'too good' contract. They may say
make us whole but we cannot give additional work because of the procurement risk.
Only choice if they will not work with us is to start building an alternative. Come
back to GE with an update on the FJ negotiations plan
(c) “Thin Client” – a compelling case, Discussion document, dated 28 November
2016 {F/1586/2-3}, recording that “The Horizon (HNGX) platform is at the end of
its life and needs replacing. Previous attempts to move away from HNGX
platform, specifically with IBM, have been unsuccessful” (p2), and “Horizon was
created before the internet had any real effect on Retail or Banking. It was built as a
'closed' system & designed based on paper processes, is clumsy & operator unfriendly.
Since 1996 it hasn't seen any major upgrades” and “However, whilst modernising the
'front end' is relatively straightforward, as the project developed we realised that shifting
the 'back-end' is extremely difficult. As a result we reverted back to Fujitsu, this pushed
back the replacement of HNGX by 12-18 months” (p3).
– 214 –
Issue 3: Robustness
(d) Back Office Transformation Decision Paper, 22.10.16 {F/1557/1}:
3. Our back office also struggles with the complications of dealing differently with
each of our many clients, heavily manual processes, reconciling disparate sources
of data, retrospective financial controls and a lack of flexibility. This backlog of
challenges, poor support contracts and a lack of skills have led to a prohibitive cost
of change preventing the improvements that should occur as a part of business as
usual.
(e) Back Office Strategy Executive Summary, 29.8.16, {F/1522/1}:
The Back Office process and applications remain complex, unreliable, expensive to
maintain and not suitable for today’s business
(f) Welcome to the Horizon Online Induction Training, 7.12.09, {F/555/10}58
Horizon is also a system that is wrapped up in 'barbed wire' - making changes
difficult and costly - test everything!
As time has passed and more product have been developed Horizon has evolved
- from a technical perspective essentially we have bolted things on the side - we
undo the barbed wire stick a bit in then wrap everything back up.
(g) Audit of Craig Y Don, 11 June 2001, {F/99.1/4}: “a correct assessment of cash holdings
could not be made because the Horizon system intermittently adds the previous days cash
holding to the daily declaration.”
(h) Pam Stubbs, email 1.11.2000 {F/68/2} … “it is Horizon related”.
Dr Worden when taken to these documents in cross-examination, said that that the
description of the back office as being unreliable did not surprise him {Day18/113:4-
24}, but that the descriptions of Horizon contained within the documents at {F/555/10}
and {F/68} were “different from” and “inconsistent” with the impression he had formed
of Horizon prior to seeing these documents.
58 Referred to by Mr Coyne 1 §5.65 {D2/1/71}
– 215 –
Issue 3: Robustness
Recent Bugs, Errors and Defects
The experts (and Mr Godeseth) agree that Horizon has improved over time, however,
there are many documents which evidence that Horizon continues to experience bugs,
errors and defects affecting branch accounts.
Over a 3 month period between November 2018 and February 2019, there were three
incidents which affected branch accounts, each caused by changes made to Horizon,
as evidenced by the (seemingly new) “Incident Reports”:
(a) 1 November 2018 {F/1848.3}, headed “E-Pay Issue Management – Incident Report &
Status Update”, describing a back end change causing mismatch on stock rollover
and branch discrepancy;
(b) 27 November 2018 {F/1842}, headed Horizon Issue Management – Incident Report
& Status Update, describing a problem which had caused transactions to be
recorded in old trading periods and therefore not to appear in branch accounts,
and
(c) 1 February 2019 {F/1848.2}, headed Official Postage Issue - – Incident Report & Status
Update, describing a change made which caused official postage claims to
increase cash on hand in branch.
Further documents showing recent problems, as identified above in Section A, include:
(a) Drop & Go PEAK PC0273234 21 August 2018 {F/1848.8.2}, which followed a fix
to the same script in April 2018 {F/1787.1}
(b) {F/1848.8.1}, relating to the 4 March 2019 incident relating to rem ins and the
effects of keying in a double zero;
EY Audits
Dr Worden relies on ISAE 3402 audits, or Service Audits, as part of his assessment of
robustness, and his view that Horizon is a “tightly run ship” Joint 3 §3.23 {D1/4/5}.
As to the ISAE 3402 audits and Dr Worden’s reliance on them as giving Horizon a
“clean bill of health” §165 {D3/6/44}:
– 216 –
Issue 3: Robustness
(a) This type of audit did not exist for Horizon prior to 2012. (In fact the disclosed
versions are 2012 to 2017 – no ISAE 3402 audit for 2018 has been disclosed.
(b) Neither the 2012 ISAE 3402 audit {F/1041}, nor any later audit, identified the
problems with APPSUP privileges which in fact existed {F/768}. None of these
audits refer to “APPSUP” at all.
(c) The purpose of these audits is to provide assurances to Post Office and its
auditors about the risk of material misstatements in Post Office’s financial
statements: {F/1041/9}. The audits themselves expressly state that they “should
not be used by anyone other than these specified parties”.
(d) The control objectives and controls are selected by Fujitsu rather than the auditor
{F/1041/67}.
(e) The audit expressly excludes the auditor giving any opinion on application
processing and application controls {F/1041/67}.
(f) Much of the content of these audits has been simply cut and pasted from one
year to the next. (E.g. for control objective 10, which Dr Worden relied upon, the
tables within the audits for 2013 {F/1176/83-84} and 2014 {F/1196/82-83} are
identical, and likewise for 2015 {F/1562/85-86} and 2016 {F/1626/86-87}.)
(g) Dr Worden said he had noticed that quite a lot of the wording was very similar
or identical from one year to the next: {Day20/107:18-20}.
The only one of the EY audits which significantly advances the parties’ understanding
of the issues in this litigation is in fact the 2011 EY audit {F/869} identified by Mr Coyne
in his first report, which identifies both:
(a) recommended changes to the change management process, at p29 (generally)
and p30 (HNGX), and noted the absence of evidence of approvals for changes
having been retained ;and
(b) at p31-32, the need for a review of privileged access to IT functions across all
applications, and that where access is deemed inappropriate it should be “revoked
– 217 –
Issue 3: Robustness
immediately” and p33 (HNGX) inappropriate system privileges assigned to the
APPSUP role.
The PEAK which appears to relate to these recommendations in respect of privileged
users and the APPSUP role {F/768}, indicates that contrary to those recommendations,
privileges for new users not removed until 5 October 2012, and existing SSC users
APPSUP privileges had still not been removed as at May 2015 – June 2015.
As to change management, Mr Coyne had identified in his report, that Post Office
decided not to accept the risk rather than act on the recommendation to strengthen its
change management process: {F/1140/3}.
In short, on a proper analysis, the audits tend to show the exact opposite to what the
Post Office contends. A picture emerges of unsatisfactory access control in clear breach
of security policy, in an inadequate documented system with no functional records of
the use of privileged access, coupled with documented failures in processes and
permissions and a failure to put those things right, despite attention being drawn to
them.
Documentation
As an element of alleged “robustness” the Post Office asserted that Horizon is “a
comprehensively documented IT system” (Post Office Opening Submissions, §181
{A/2/65}). However, the evidence is now clear, that this is simply not the case.
For Legacy Horizon, there is almost a wholesale absence of documents, including on
extremely important issues such as the injection of transactions at the counter or via
the correspondence server.
For Horizon Online, the documents that do exist and have been produced are
frequently in draft form, some with track changes outstanding, leaving their status
unclear, for example, HNG-X Technical Network Architecture {F/840}; Post Office
Account User Access Procedure {F/1705}; HNG-X Authorisation High Level Design
{F/1784}; Operational Change Process {F/202}; Report: End to End Reconciliation
Reporting {F/896}). In contrast, the Problem Management Procedure {F/1692} was not
– 218 –
Issue 3: Robustness
implemented (according to Mr Godeseth), and yet the document history shows it
having been issued for approval three times {F/1692/4}.
In Horizon Online, documents are also missing on important issues such as the
exercise of the APPSUP role and privileged user rights more widely and also any
information about how audit support respond to gaps and duplicates in audit data
{F/1716/43}.
It is striking that despite having the OCP approval process in operation at this time,
Post Office was apparently unable to produce evidence of approval of changes made
to its auditors (§621(a), above). If it is right that such approval had been given then it
is inexplicable that these documents could not be found.
The Claimants also note the effect of the blanket MSCs identified by Mr Coyne, which
despite Mr Coyne’s expectation that Post Office would be aware, apparently were a
“complete revelation” to Post Office {Day16/7:23} – {Day16/11:17}
– 219 –
Issue 3: Robustness
– 220 –
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
The utility of the Horizon Issues Trial is abundantly clear and the importance of the
findings in this trial has been sharpened by the Post Office’s apparent intention to rely
upon them in an attempt to reverse the burden of proof (as found in the Common
Issues Trial) back onto the Claimants in all future trials – the Post Office’s Opening
Submissions §24.2 {A/2/11}.
The picture which has emerged is unrecognisable from that asserted by the Post Office:
in response to Second Sight; in response to BBC Panorama; in response to the
Claimants’ Letter of Claim; in response to the proposal that Horizon and remote access
should be included in the list of GLO Issues; in the Post Office’s Skeleton Argument
for the Third CMC at §25(a) {C8.4/2/9}; in the Post Office’s original witness evidence
for the Horizon Issues Trial; and even in the oral evidence of the Post Office’s witnesses
during the trial.
It is in the light of that picture and the Post Office’s unusual approach to numerous
aspects of this trial (not limited to its approach to disclosure) that the Horizon Issues
fall to be determined as the Claimants respectfully submit they should be, as
summarised in Appendix 1.
That approach by the Post Office has not only impeded the efficient and fair resolution
of the Horizon Issues but justified, if not invited, judicial scrutiny of the reasons for it.
Even on the approach adopted by the Post Office’s expert, Dr Worden, his central
estimate for the number of possible bugs that had financial impact over the relevant
period was 145 which indicates (on the basis of the number of branches affected by
other bugs) something of the order of 6,000 branches being impacted at least once
(potentially multiple times). This is fatal to the gateway argument upon which the
Post Office intends to rely. In any event, the evidence plainly shows a significant and
material risk of discrepancies caused by bugs, errors or defects, and the contrary is not
seriously arguable.
– 221 –
CONCLUSION
The contest of evidence in relation to remote access should never have happened.
Fujitsu could effectively do anything without any appropriate access control and
without any (or latterly any intelligible) records of such activities. In effect, an open
back door to the Horizon system.
On any view, the Post Office has been less than forthcoming in this trial.
PATRICK GREEN QC
KATHLEEN DONNELLY
OGNJEN MILETIC
REANNE MACKENZIE
27 June 2019
– 222 –
APPENDIX 1: HORIZON ISSUES TABLES
The first Table (A) is arranged with the Horizon Issues in numerical order
The second Table (B) has identical content, but is arranged with the Horizon Issues grouped
by subject matter following the structure of Section B of these submissions
In both Tables, rows in blue indicate that the Issue is agreed or substantially agreed
Arranged numerically
HORIZON ISSUE (ARRANGED NUMERICALLY) CLAIMANTS’ ANSWER
1 To what extent was it possible or likely for bugs, errors or POSSIBLE? YES
defects of the nature alleged at §§23 and 24 of the GPOC and LIKELY? SIGNIFICANT & MATERIAL RISK
referred to in §§ 49 to 56 of the Generic Defence to have the
potential to (a) cause apparent or alleged discrepancies or Not only possible, but has happened: It is clear, and agreed, that bugs, errors and
shortfalls relating to Subpostmasters’ branch accounts or defects have both: (i) caused apparent or alleged discrepancies or shortfalls relating
transactions, or (b) undermine the reliability of Horizon to SPMs’ accounts or transactions; and (ii) undermined the reliability of Horizon
accurately to process and to record transactions as alleged at accurately to process and record transactions.
§24.1 GPOC?
Correct approach: Even on the evidence of the Post Office’s expert, there is “strong
evidence” that at least twelve bugs “causing a lasting discrepancy in branch accounts”.
However, Dr Worden’s perspective (a) requires actual causing of discrepancies,
rather than potential; (b) requires the discrepancy to be “lasting” (clarified as,
effectively, permanent); and (c) includes assumptions as to the near perfect
effectiveness of business processes outside of Horizon, as part of the Horizon
system. It is only on that basis that he then addresses the high threshold of “strong
evidence”. On the Issue as agreed and ordered by the Court, there are clearly many
more examples of bugs, errors and defects having obvious potential to cause (and
in fact causing) discrepancies, which require manual correction by the Post Office if
they are not to be lasting/permanent. Furthermore, until such corrections are
properly carried out, the figures shown on Horizon are wrong, unreliable and an
inaccurate reflection of the transactions processed and recorded at the branch.
Impossibility of precision: As to likelihood of such bugs, errors or defects causing

discrepancies, this is difficult to answer with precision because of: (i) the lack of a
proper problem management system; (ii) the difficulty the experts have faced both
in both piecing together documents relating to them and in “plumbing the depths”
(A) APPENDIX 1: HORIZON ISSUES TABLES
of the Horizon system; and (iii) the Post Office and Fujitsu’s own lack of
Likelihood: What is clear, however, is that there are thousands of TCs alone issued
each year for errors that the Post Office (even on its approach) does not attribute to
the branch. Further, the number of potential bugs in the Horizon system over the
course of the relevant period is entirely consistent with the Claimants’ case. This
much was accepted by the Post Office’s expert himself, who gives a range of 145 to
672 bugs, and made a calculation in respect of the latter which resulted in
approximately one bug per Claimant. The Court can safely conclude that there is a
material risk of such bugs, errors and defects arising, which is significant.
2 Did the Horizon IT system itself alert Subpostmasters of such NO

bugs, errors or defects as described in (1) above and if so how. Horizon did not, in general, alert Subpostmasters to any significant bugs or other
3 To what extent and in what respects is the Horizon System ROBUST? DEPENDS ON DEFINITION & SYSTEM
“robust” and extremely unlikely to be the cause of shortfalls in EXTREMELY UNLIKELY? NO (SIGNIFICANT & MATERIAL RISK)
branches?
Assessment of robustness: The robustness of Horizon can only be assessed after
one has looked at Issues 1, 4 and 6 (extent of bugs, errors and defects, measures and
controls) and Issues 7 and 10 to 13 (remote access).
Relevance of TCs and the Helpline: TCs and the Helpline are not a part of the
Horizon system as defined by the parties and the Court. It is clear that, without
taking into account TCs and the Helpline, the Horizon system cannot sensibly be
– 225 –
described as robust and / or extremely unlikely to be the cause of shortfalls in

branches, in the context of this litigation. To the extent that TCs and the Helpline
are considered relevant (or “essential”, per Dr Worden), the robustness of Horizon is
contingent upon the adequacy of the business processes underpinning TCs and the
Helpline, which are not within the purview of the Horizon Issues Trial.
Countermeasure failures: The Court has seen numerous examples of Dr Worden’s

‘Horizon countermeasures’ failing significantly in operation. These include DEA,
DUA, MID, SEK, SEC and UEC.
Remote Access open door: Any system that can be easily subverted would not be
robust. It is evident that the Post Office and / or Fujitsu had a number of different
extremely powerful tools and roles at its disposal which had the potential to insert,
edit and delete transactional data or data in branch accounts. Roles were not
properly controlled, even after E&Y raised issues about this in the 2011 Audit
(perhaps corrected in 2017). Logs of use of powerful roles and tools either did not
exist or were not useful. Use of these roles and tools were therefore effectively
unaudited. (The experts agree that such logs that do exist do not provide a useful
source of evidence about remote access.)
Plumbing the swamp: The experts faced real difficulties in appraising the Horizon
system. As noted in Issue 1 above, those difficulties similarly preclude the Court
from reaching a confident and precise evaluation of “robustness”. Indeed, the Post
Office’s own expert was shown several documents during his oral evidence which:
– 226 –
(i) he had not seen before; and (ii) he confirmed were not reconcilable with the view
which he had formed of the system and, therefore, its robustness.
Material risk of Horizon being the cause, once a shortfall is present: The Issue
does not ask whether the Horizon System is unlikely to cause shortfalls. Rather, it
asks whether, when there is a shortfall, it is then extremely unlikely that Horizon
caused by the Horizon System. To the extent that the Post Office relies upon SPM
user error as a comparator for frequency, there is no basis for this. The prevalence
and true cause (e.g. training) of such errors is outside the purview of the Horizon
Issues Trial.
4 To what extent has there been potential for errors in data POTENTIAL? YES
recorded within Horizon to arise in (a) data entry, (b) transfer EXTENT? SIGNIFICANT & MATERIAL RISK
or (c) processing of data in Horizon?
Not only possible, but has happened: It is agreed that there is evidence that bugs,
errors and defects arising from data entry, data transfer and processing of data in
Horizon have occurred, and have caused financial discrepancies.
Examples: Varying types of errors in data recorded within Horizon include:

– 227 –

Extent: The experts have been unable precisely to quantify the extent of these bugs,
errors and defects. As with Issue 1, the Court can safely conclude that there is a
significant and material risk of such bugs, errors and defects arising. The
Claimants would say that such a risk particularly relevant in the case of disputed
discrepancies or those which an SPM could not understand.
5 How, if at all, does the Horizon system itself compare LARGELY AUTOMATED
transaction data recorded by Horizon against transaction data For most of the Post Office’s clients, there is a regular automated process of
from sources outside of Horizon? comparing (or reconciling) transactions as recorded in branches with the
6 To what extent did measures and/or controls that existed in SIGNIFICANT & MATERIAL RISK OF FAILING
Horizon prevent, detect, identify, report or reduce to an SIGNIFICANT & MATERIAL RISK OF ERRORS
extremely low level the risk of the following:
a. data entry errors; Existence of measures and controls: There are many measures and controls within
b. data packet or system level errors (including data Horizon that existed to prevent, detect, identify, report or reduce the risk of
processing, effecting, and recording the same); varying errors.
c. a failure to detect, correct and remedy software coding
errors or bugs;
– 228 –
d. errors in the transmission, replication and storage of Failings of measures and controls: There Court has, however, seen numerous
transaction record data; and examples of these measures and controls failing significantly in practice. This
e. the data stored in the central data centre not being an includes, for example:
accurate record of transactions entered on branch
terminals? (i) DEA: failure of the Double Entry Accounting countermeasure
(Callendar Square and Receipts & Payments Mismatch bugs);
(ii) DUE: failure of the Early Detection of User Errors countermeasure
(keying and mis-keying errors);
(iii) SEK: failure of the Secure Kernel Hardware and Software
countermeasure (gaps and duplicates in audit store data);
Failure to act on key recommendations: The Court has seen evidence of the Post
Office failing to implement recommendations which would have had the effect of
reducing the level of risk of errors. These include the failure to establish a problem
management system and to implement changes aimed at mitigating the possibility
of mis-keying errors.
Deferring fixes on cost / benefit basis: The Court has seen evidence of the Post
Delay in identifying and remedying problems: As a result of the failings in the

– 229 –
Measure of extent: As with Issue 1, precision is impossible; the Court can safely
therefore reduce to an extremely low level the types of errors described in Issue 6.
7 Were Post Office and/or Fujitsu able to access transaction data YES
recorded by Horizon remotely (i.e. not from within a branch)?
Fujitsu could access all transaction data recorded by Horizon. Both the Post Office
and Fujitsu can read data remotely.
8 What transaction data and reporting functions were available THE POST OFFICE HAD MORE INFORMATION
through Horizon to Post Office for identifying the occurrence
of alleged shortfalls and the causes of alleged shortfalls in Access to additional information: Post Office had access to data and systems
branches, including whether they were caused by bugs, errors which were not available to Subpostmasters.
and/or defects in the Horizon system?
Facilities available: The descriptions of facilities for PO in the two expert reports
Reports and Business Incident Management Process Reports. These also included
‘additional sources of information’, such as that received from Fujitsu and
Subpostmasters.
Keystrokes: Despite the Post Office asserting and then denying the availability of
keystrokes, it belatedly emerged that the Post Office, via Fujitsu, does have access
to the individual keystrokes entered in a branch by Subpostmasters.
– 230 –
9 At all material times, what transaction data and reporting PRIMARILY LIMITED TO DAY-TO-DAY TRANSACTIONS
functions (if any) were available through Horizon to LIMITED ABILITY TO IDENTIFY CAUSE OF DISCREPANCIES
Subpostmasters for:
a. identifying apparent or alleged discrepancies and shortfalls Data and reports available: SPMs did have access to many reports relating to
and/or the causes of the same; and different aspects of running a branch (such as currency exchange, stock etc.), as
b. accessing and identifying transactions recorded on well as transaction logs (for individual transactions, available for 42 then 60 days)
Horizon? and event logs. These reports and data were limited to day-to-day transactions. It
was possible to print these on till rolls. The system available to SPMs was not user
friendly.
Ability to identify causes of discrepancies: The causes of some types of apparent

transaction data available to Subpostmasters. Other causes of apparent or alleged
discrepancies and shortfalls may be more difficult or impossible to identify from
reports or transaction data available to Subpostmasters, because of their limited
knowledge of the complex back-end systems. Identification requires information
from the Post Office and/or Fujitsu and co-operation of Post Office staff and
Subpostmasters.
10 Whether the Defendant and/or Fujitsu have had the FUJITSU – YES
ability/facility to: (i) insert, inject, edit or delete transaction THE POST OFFICE – INJECT AS GLOBAL USER WHILST IN BRANCH
data or data in branch accounts; (ii) implement fixes in
Horizon that had the potential to affect transaction data or data Fujitsu – Yes on all counts: It is clear following this trial that Fujitsu did indeed
in branch accounts; or (iii) rebuild branch transaction data: have the abilities / facilities listed in (i), (ii) and (iii), and that these could be used
a. at all; without the knowledge or consent of the Subpostmaster in question. They could
do so by way of any one or more of the following: SSC role utilising various tools,
– 231 –
b. without the knowledge of the Subpostmaster in question; the APPSUP role, Privileged User rights, Database Administrator rights, or by way
and of the ‘guys in Ireland’ (to the extent they differ from the preceding roles).
c. without the consent of the Subpostmaster in question.
Post Office – Global Users: The Post Office only had the ability to inject
injected without the knowledge or consent of the Subpostmaster, the role was such
that it did require the Global User to be physically in the branch at the time of the
transaction, so that the SPM might thereby know or suspect what had happened.
11 If they did, did the Horizon system have any permission ROLES TOO WIDE
controls upon the use of the above facility, and did the system NOT CONTROLLED
maintain a log of such actions and such permission controls? NO / NO PROPER LOGS
Audits / Logs: While the Balancing Transaction Tool specifically wrote to an audit
journal table, and templates were developed for it to avoid errors in use, it was
only used once. Other abilities / facilities which were able to achieve the same
result and, indeed, were more powerful, were available and effectively unaudited.
While some Privileged User Logs do exist, those logs: (i) did not exist prior to 2009;
(ii) prior to July 2015, only recorded when a user logged on and logged off; and (iii)
even after July 2015, the experts agree that such logs are not a useful source of
evidence about remote access.
OCPs: OCPs occasionally document remote alteration of transactional data or other

branch data. There is evidence, however, that 7% of these OCPs were issued
retrospectively and, further, that there are several instances in which the person
that raises the OCP is also the same person to monitor it.
– 232 –
Access not properly controlled: The view of the Post Office’s own expert is that
12 If the Defendant and/or Fujitsu did have such ability, how IN USE, BUT PRECISE EXTENT UNCLEAR
often was that used, if at all?
Extent unclear: Other than use of the Balancing Transaction Tool (which, after
unable to state with confidence how often the above abilities / facilities were used.
Indications are use was frequent: The Claimants’ expert has found, for example,
that the APPSUP role was used 2,175 times between 2009 and 2018. The Post
Office’s expert confirmed that this is consistent with his survey of the Privileged
User Logs, and suggests that this equates to about one person per working day
utilising the role. Fujitsu’s witnesses confirmed the capabilities of the role and did
not dispute the number of uses cited by the Claimants’ expert. While the Fujitsu
witnesses maintained that most uses of the role would be in a support function,
they expressly did not review the Privileged User Logs cited by the Claimants’
expert. In any event, the experts did not find those logs useful to identify how
these facilities were used.
– 233 –
13 To what extent did use of any such facility have the potential TO A MATERIAL EXTENT & DID IN FACT DO SO
to affect the reliability of Branches’ accounting positions?
Potential and actual effect: They not only had the potential, but they did in fact
affect the reliability of branch accounting positions. This was precisely the design
of the abilities / facilities referred to above.
14 How (if at all) does the Horizon system and its functionality: THE SYSTEM CAN COMPARE CASH & STOCK FIGURES
a. enable Subpostmasters to compare the stock and cash in a BUT HAS NO FACILITY TO RAISE OR RECORD A DISPUTE
branch against the stock and cash indicated on Horizon?
b. enable or require Subpostmasters to decide how to deal Comparison of cash and stock: Subpostmaster comparison of Cash and Stock in
with, dispute, accept or make good an alleged discrepancy branch and figures recorded within Horizon can be determined by the
by (i) providing his or her own personal funds or (ii) Subpostmaster/Auditor physically counting the cash and stock in branch and
settling centrally? inputting those values derived into Horizon for a comparison to be made against
c. record and reflect the consequence of raising a dispute on the electronically derived figures held by Horizon.
an alleged discrepancy, on Horizon Branch account data
and, in particular: Functionality: It is agreed that functionality enabling the Subpostmasters to deal
i. does raising a dispute with the Helpline cause a block with, dispute, accept or make good alleged discrepancies is as follows:
to be placed on the value of an alleged shortfall; and
ii. is that recorded on the Horizon system as a debt due to (i) At the end of the Trading Period, Horizon reports to the user the
Post Office? amount of any discrepancy. The system invites the user to transfer this
d. enable Subpostmasters to produce (i) Cash Account before amount into the local suspense account and continue to roll over – or to
2005 and (ii) Branch Trading Statement after 2005? discontinue this operation. If, at the end of a Trading Period, there is a
e. enable or require Subpostmasters to continue to trade if discrepancy (i.e. either a surplus or a shortfall) of less than £150, the
they did not complete a Branch Trading Statement; and, if Subpostmaster must 'make good' the discrepancy – either by removing
so, on what basis and with what consequences on the money from the till (in the event of a surplus) or by adding money to the
Horizon system? till (in the event of a shortfall).
– 234 –
(ii) The ability to make good through Horizon was also available before
2005 under Cash Accounting. ‘Making good’ causes the derived cash
position to remain the same and the actual cash position to change
accordingly. The next Trading Period can then begin with a balanced
account (both physical cash and electronically recorded).
(iii) If, at the end of a Trading Period, a branch has a discrepancy of more
than £150, they have the option to either make good or settle the
discrepancy centrally. The ability to ‘settle centrally’ was not available
under Cash Accounting. If the Subpostmaster chooses to settle centrally,
they do not have to physically place cash in the till (in the case of a
shortfall) at the time. Instead, a message is sent to Post Office's Finance
Services Centre and the discrepancy is moved to a central account. A
Subpostmaster may wish to dispute a discrepancy. This only appears to
have been available post 2005.
Dispute: The Subpostmaster cannot dispute a discrepancy or any figure on

– 235 –
15 How did Horizon process and/or record Transaction MANUALLY CREATED

Corrections? AUTOMATICALLY PROCESSED & RECORDED
Creation a manual process: When the Post Office’s central accounting function
branch transaction data does not align with client or supplier data held by the Post
Office, such adjustment is made by and manual process of deciding to issue, and
then issuing, a TC. The allocation of responsibility leading to a TC requires no
input or involvement from the Subpostmaster. As a human process, this is
Effect: The result of a Subpostmaster processing (and accepting) a TC will normally

be the creation of the specified transaction, which will then be returned to POLFS
as part of the normal flow of summarised transaction data at the end of the trading
day.
Processing: Where the TC is processed successfully on Horizon, a message will be

displayed confirming the same. Horizon Online includes a check to see whether
TCs fail due to discrepancies between the validation of the transaction at the
counter and the values held within the TC message. Where this happens, a failed
warning message appears and Subpostmasters are advised to contact the Helpline.
Dispute: If a dispute was raised in respect of a TC, this was normally done outside
of Horizon (by way of calling the Helpline). The dispute was not recorded in any
way on Horizon itself. If a dispute is successful, then a compensating TC is issued.
– 236 –
Numbers: Between the years of 2006 to 2017 TCs were applied more than 100,000
times each year.
– 237 –
Arranged thematically
HORIZON ISSUE (ARRANGED THEMATICALLY) CLAIMANTS’ ANSWER
1 To what extent was it possible or likely for bugs, errors or POSSIBLE? YES
defects of the nature alleged at §§23 and 24 of the GPOC and LIKELY? SIGNIFICANT & MATERIAL RISK
referred to in §§ 49 to 56 of the Generic Defence to have the
potential to (a) cause apparent or alleged discrepancies or Not only possible, but has happened: It is clear, and agreed, that bugs, errors and
shortfalls relating to Subpostmasters’ branch accounts or defects have both: (i) caused apparent or alleged discrepancies or shortfalls relating
transactions, or (b) undermine the reliability of Horizon to SPMs’ accounts or transactions; and (ii) undermined the reliability of Horizon
accurately to process and to record transactions as alleged at accurately to process and record transactions.
§24.1 GPOC?
Correct approach: Even on the evidence of the Post Office’s expert, there is “strong
evidence” that at least twelve bugs “causing a lasting discrepancy in branch accounts”.
However, Dr Worden’s perspective (a) requires actual causing of discrepancies,
rather than potential; (b) requires the discrepancy to be “lasting” (clarified as,
effectively, permanent); and (c) includes assumptions as to the near perfect
effectiveness of business processes outside of Horizon, as part of the Horizon
system. It is only on that basis that he then addresses the high threshold of “strong
evidence”. On the Issue as agreed and ordered by the Court, there are clearly many
more examples of bugs, errors and defects having obvious potential to cause (and
in fact causing) discrepancies, which require manual correction by the Post Office if
they are not to be lasting/permanent. Furthermore, until such corrections are
properly carried out, the figures shown on Horizon are wrong, unreliable and an
inaccurate reflection of the transactions processed and recorded at the branch.
Impossibility of precision: As to likelihood of such bugs, errors or defects causing

discrepancies, this is difficult to answer with precision because of: (i) the lack of a
proper problem management system; (ii) the difficulty the experts have faced both
in both piecing together documents relating to them and in “plumbing the depths”
of the Horizon system; and (iii) the Post Office and Fujitsu’s own lack of
Likelihood: What is clear, however, is that there are thousands of TCs alone issued
each year for errors that the Post Office (even on its approach) does not attribute to
the branch. Further, the number of potential bugs in the Horizon system over the
course of the relevant period is entirely consistent with the Claimants’ case. This
much was accepted by the Post Office’s expert himself, who gives a range of 145 to
672 bugs, and made a calculation in respect of the latter which resulted in
approximately one bug per Claimant. The Court can safely conclude that there is a
material risk of such bugs, errors and defects arising, which is significant.
4 To what extent has there been potential for errors in data POTENTIAL? YES
recorded within Horizon to arise in (a) data entry, (b) transfer EXTENT? SIGNIFICANT & MATERIAL RISK
or (c) processing of data in Horizon?
Not only possible, but has happened: It is agreed that there is evidence that bugs,
errors and defects arising from data entry, data transfer and processing of data in
Horizon have occurred, and have caused financial discrepancies.
Examples: Varying types of errors in data recorded within Horizon include:

– 239 –

Extent: The experts have been unable precisely to quantify the extent of these bugs,
errors and defects. As with Issue 1, the Court can safely conclude that there is a
significant and material risk of such bugs, errors and defects arising. The
Claimants would say that such a risk particularly relevant in the case of disputed
discrepancies or those which an SPM could not understand.
6 To what extent did measures and/or controls that existed in SIGNIFICANT & MATERIAL RISK OF FAILING
Horizon prevent, detect, identify, report or reduce to an SIGNIFICANT & MATERIAL RISK OF ERRORS
extremely low level the risk of the following:
a. data entry errors; Existence of measures and controls: There are many measures and controls within
b. data packet or system level errors (including data Horizon that existed to prevent, detect, identify, report or reduce the risk of
processing, effecting, and recording the same); varying errors.
c. a failure to detect, correct and remedy software coding
errors or bugs; Failings of measures and controls: There Court has, however, seen numerous
d. errors in the transmission, replication and storage of examples of these measures and controls failing significantly in practice. This
transaction record data; and includes, for example:
e. the data stored in the central data centre not being an
accurate record of transactions entered on branch (i) DEA: failure of the Double Entry Accounting countermeasure
terminals? (Callendar Square and Receipts & Payments Mismatch bugs);
(ii) DUE: failure of the Early Detection of User Errors countermeasure
(keying and mis-keying errors);
– 240 –
(iii) SEK: failure of the Secure Kernel Hardware and Software

countermeasure (gaps and duplicates in audit store data);
Failure to act on key recommendations: The Court has seen evidence of the Post
Office failing to implement recommendations which would have had the effect of
reducing the level of risk of errors. These include the failure to establish a problem
management system and to implement changes aimed at mitigating the possibility
of mis-keying errors.
Deferring fixes on cost / benefit basis: The Court has seen evidence of the Post
Delay in identifying and remedying problems: As a result of the failings in the

Measure of extent: As with Issue 1, precision is impossible; the Court can safely
therefore reduce to an extremely low level the types of errors described in Issue 6.
5 How, if at all, does the Horizon system itself compare LARGELY AUTOMATED
transaction data recorded by Horizon against transaction data For most of the Post Office’s clients, there is a regular automated process of
from sources outside of Horizon? comparing (or reconciling) transactions as recorded in branches with the
– 241 –
15 How did Horizon process and/or record Transaction MANUALLY CREATED

Corrections? AUTOMATICALLY PROCESSED & RECORDED
Creation a manual process: When the Post Office’s central accounting function
branch transaction data does not align with client or supplier data held by the Post
Office, such adjustment is made by and manual process of deciding to issue, and
then issuing, a TC. The allocation of responsibility leading to a TC requires no
input or involvement from the Subpostmaster. As a human process, this is
Effect: The result of a Subpostmaster processing (and accepting) a TC will normally

be the creation of the specified transaction, which will then be returned to POLFS
as part of the normal flow of summarised transaction data at the end of the trading
day.
Processing: Where the TC is processed successfully on Horizon, a message will be

displayed confirming the same. Horizon Online includes a check to see whether
TCs fail due to discrepancies between the validation of the transaction at the
– 242 –
counter and the values held within the TC message. Where this happens, a failed
warning message appears and Subpostmasters are advised to contact the Helpline.
Dispute: If a dispute was raised in respect of a TC, this was normally done outside
of Horizon (by way of calling the Helpline). The dispute was not recorded in any
way on Horizon itself. If a dispute is successful, then a compensating TC is issued.
Numbers: Between the years of 2006 to 2017 TCs were applied more than 100,000
times each year.
2 Did the Horizon IT system itself alert Subpostmasters of such NO

bugs, errors or defects as described in (1) above and if so how. Horizon did not, in general, alert Subpostmasters to any significant bugs or other
8 What transaction data and reporting functions were available THE POST OFFICE HAD MORE INFORMATION
through Horizon to Post Office for identifying the occurrence
of alleged shortfalls and the causes of alleged shortfalls in Access to additional information: Post Office had access to data and systems
branches, including whether they were caused by bugs, errors which were not available to Subpostmasters.
and/or defects in the Horizon system?
Facilities available: The descriptions of facilities for PO in the two expert reports
Reports and Business Incident Management Process Reports. These also included
‘additional sources of information’, such as that received from Fujitsu and
Subpostmasters.
– 243 –
Keystrokes: Despite the Post Office asserting and then denying the availability of
keystrokes, it belatedly emerged that the Post Office, via Fujitsu, does have access
to the individual keystrokes entered in a branch by Subpostmasters.
9 At all material times, what transaction data and reporting PRIMARILY LIMITED TO DAY-TO-DAY TRANSACTIONS
functions (if any) were available through Horizon to LIMITED ABILITY TO IDENTIFY CAUSE OF DISCREPANCIES
Subpostmasters for:
a. identifying apparent or alleged discrepancies and shortfalls Data and reports available: SPMs did have access to many reports relating to
and/or the causes of the same; and different aspects of running a branch (such as currency exchange, stock etc.), as
b. accessing and identifying transactions recorded on well as transaction logs (for individual transactions, available for 42 then 60 days)
Horizon? and event logs. These reports and data were limited to day-to-day transactions. It
was possible to print these on till rolls. The system available to SPMs was not user
friendly.
Ability to identify causes of discrepancies: The causes of some types of apparent

transaction data available to Subpostmasters. Other causes of apparent or alleged
discrepancies and shortfalls may be more difficult or impossible to identify from
reports or transaction data available to Subpostmasters, because of their limited
knowledge of the complex back-end systems. Identification requires information
from the Post Office and/or Fujitsu and co-operation of Post Office staff and
Subpostmasters.
14 How (if at all) does the Horizon system and its functionality: THE SYSTEM CAN COMPARE CASH & STOCK FIGURES
a. enable Subpostmasters to compare the stock and cash in a BUT HAS NO FACILITY TO RAISE OR RECORD A DISPUTE
branch against the stock and cash indicated on Horizon?
– 244 –
b. enable or require Subpostmasters to decide how to deal Comparison of cash and stock: Subpostmaster comparison of Cash and Stock in
with, dispute, accept or make good an alleged discrepancy branch and figures recorded within Horizon can be determined by the
by (i) providing his or her own personal funds or (ii) Subpostmaster/Auditor physically counting the cash and stock in branch and
settling centrally? inputting those values derived into Horizon for a comparison to be made against
c. record and reflect the consequence of raising a dispute on the electronically derived figures held by Horizon.
an alleged discrepancy, on Horizon Branch account data
and, in particular: Functionality: It is agreed that functionality enabling the Subpostmasters to deal
i. does raising a dispute with the Helpline cause a block with, dispute, accept or make good alleged discrepancies is as follows:
to be placed on the value of an alleged shortfall; and
ii. is that recorded on the Horizon system as a debt due to (i) At the end of the Trading Period, Horizon reports to the user the
Post Office? amount of any discrepancy. The system invites the user to transfer this
d. enable Subpostmasters to produce (i) Cash Account before amount into the local suspense account and continue to roll over – or to
2005 and (ii) Branch Trading Statement after 2005? discontinue this operation. If, at the end of a Trading Period, there is a
e. enable or require Subpostmasters to continue to trade if discrepancy (i.e. either a surplus or a shortfall) of less than £150, the
they did not complete a Branch Trading Statement; and, if Subpostmaster must 'make good' the discrepancy – either by removing
so, on what basis and with what consequences on the money from the till (in the event of a surplus) or by adding money to the
Horizon system? till (in the event of a shortfall).
(ii) The ability to make good through Horizon was also available before
2005 under Cash Accounting. ‘Making good’ causes the derived cash
position to remain the same and the actual cash position to change
accordingly. The next Trading Period can then begin with a balanced
account (both physical cash and electronically recorded).
– 245 –
(iii) If, at the end of a Trading Period, a branch has a discrepancy of more
than £150, they have the option to either make good or settle the
discrepancy centrally. The ability to ‘settle centrally’ was not available
under Cash Accounting. If the Subpostmaster chooses to settle centrally,
they do not have to physically place cash in the till (in the case of a
shortfall) at the time. Instead, a message is sent to Post Office's Finance
Services Centre and the discrepancy is moved to a central account. A
Subpostmaster may wish to dispute a discrepancy. This only appears to
have been available post 2005.
Dispute: The Subpostmaster cannot dispute a discrepancy or any figure on

7 Were Post Office and/or Fujitsu able to access transaction data YES
recorded by Horizon remotely (i.e. not from within a branch)?
Fujitsu could access all transaction data recorded by Horizon. Both the Post Office
and Fujitsu can read data remotely.
10 Whether the Defendant and/or Fujitsu have had the FUJITSU – YES
ability/facility to: (i) insert, inject, edit or delete transaction THE POST OFFICE – INJECT AS GLOBAL USER WHILST IN BRANCH
data or data in branch accounts; (ii) implement fixes in
Horizon that had the potential to affect transaction data or data Fujitsu – Yes on all counts: It is clear following this trial that Fujitsu did indeed
in branch accounts; or (iii) rebuild branch transaction data: have the abilities / facilities listed in (i), (ii) and (iii), and that these could be used
a. at all; without the knowledge or consent of the Subpostmaster in question. They could
– 246 –
b. without the knowledge of the Subpostmaster in question; do so by way of any one or more of the following: SSC role utilising various tools,
and the APPSUP role, Privileged User rights, Database Administrator rights, or by way
c. without the consent of the Subpostmaster in question. of the ‘guys in Ireland’ (to the extent they differ from the preceding roles).
Post Office – Global Users: The Post Office only had the ability to inject
injected without the knowledge or consent of the Subpostmaster, the role was such
that it did require the Global User to be physically in the branch at the time of the
transaction, so that the SPM might thereby know or suspect what had happened.
11 If they did, did the Horizon system have any permission ROLES TOO WIDE
controls upon the use of the above facility, and did the system NOT CONTROLLED
maintain a log of such actions and such permission controls? NO / NO PROPER LOGS
Audits / Logs: While the Balancing Transaction Tool specifically wrote to an audit
journal table, and templates were developed for it to avoid errors in use, it was
only used once. Other abilities / facilities which were able to achieve the same
result and, indeed, were more powerful, were available and effectively unaudited.
While some Privileged User Logs do exist, those logs: (i) did not exist prior to 2009;
(ii) prior to July 2015, only recorded when a user logged on and logged off; and (iii)
even after July 2015, the experts agree that such logs are not a useful source of
evidence about remote access.
OCPs: OCPs occasionally document remote alteration of transactional data or other

branch data. There is evidence, however, that 7% of these OCPs were issued
– 247 –
retrospectively and, further, that there are several instances in which the person
that raises the OCP is also the same person to monitor it.
Access not properly controlled: The view of the Post Office’s own expert is that
12 If the Defendant and/or Fujitsu did have such ability, how IN USE, BUT PRECISE EXTENT UNCLEAR
often was that used, if at all?
Extent unclear: Other than use of the Balancing Transaction Tool (which, after
unable to state with confidence how often the above abilities / facilities were used.
Indications are use was frequent: The Claimants’ expert has found, for example,
that the APPSUP role was used 2,175 times between 2009 and 2018. The Post
Office’s expert confirmed that this is consistent with his survey of the Privileged
User Logs, and suggests that this equates to about one person per working day
utilising the role. Fujitsu’s witnesses confirmed the capabilities of the role and did
not dispute the number of uses cited by the Claimants’ expert. While the Fujitsu
witnesses maintained that most uses of the role would be in a support function,
they expressly did not review the Privileged User Logs cited by the Claimants’
expert. In any event, the experts did not find those logs useful to identify how
these facilities were used.
– 248 –
13 To what extent did use of any such facility have the potential TO A MATERIAL EXTENT & DID IN FACT DO SO
to affect the reliability of Branches’ accounting positions?
Potential and actual effect: They not only had the potential, but they did in fact
affect the reliability of branch accounting positions. This was precisely the design
of the abilities / facilities referred to above.
3 To what extent and in what respects is the Horizon System ROBUST? DEPENDS ON DEFINITION & SYSTEM
“robust” and extremely unlikely to be the cause of shortfalls in EXTREMELY UNLIKELY? NO (SIGNIFICANT & MATERIAL RISK)
branches?
Assessment of robustness: The robustness of Horizon can only be assessed after
one has looked at Issues 1, 4 and 6 (extent of bugs, errors and defects, measures and
controls) and Issues 7 and 10 to 13 (remote access).
Relevance of TCs and the Helpline: TCs and the Helpline are not a part of the
Horizon system as defined by the parties and the Court. It is clear that, without
taking into account TCs and the Helpline, the Horizon system cannot sensibly be
described as robust and / or extremely unlikely to be the cause of shortfalls in
branches, in the context of this litigation. To the extent that TCs and the Helpline
are considered relevant (or “essential”, per Dr Worden), the robustness of Horizon is
contingent upon the adequacy of the business processes underpinning TCs and the
Helpline, which are not within the purview of the Horizon Issues Trial.
Countermeasure failures: The Court has seen numerous examples of Dr Worden’s

‘Horizon countermeasures’ failing significantly in operation. These include DEA,
DUA, MID, SEK, SEC and UEC.
– 249 –
Remote Access open door: Any system that can be easily subverted would not be
robust. It is evident that the Post Office and / or Fujitsu had a number of different
extremely powerful tools and roles at its disposal which had the potential to insert,
edit and delete transactional data or data in branch accounts. Roles were not
properly controlled, even after E&Y raised issues about this in the 2011 Audit
(perhaps corrected in 2017). Logs of use of powerful roles and tools either did not
exist or were not useful. Use of these roles and tools were therefore effectively
unaudited. (The experts agree that such logs that do exist do not provide a useful
source of evidence about remote access.)
Plumbing the swamp: The experts faced real difficulties in appraising the Horizon
system. As noted in Issue 1 above, those difficulties similarly preclude the Court
from reaching a confident and precise evaluation of “robustness”. Indeed, the Post
Office’s own expert was shown several documents during his oral evidence which:
(i) he had not seen before; and (ii) he confirmed were not reconcilable with the view
which he had formed of the system and, therefore, its robustness.
Material risk of Horizon being the cause, once a shortfall is present: The Issue
does not ask whether the Horizon System is unlikely to cause shortfalls. Rather, it
asks whether, when there is a shortfall, it is then extremely unlikely that Horizon
caused by the Horizon System. To the extent that the Post Office relies upon SPM
user error as a comparator for frequency, there is no basis for this. The prevalence
– 250 –
and true cause (e.g. training) of such errors is outside the purview of the Horizon
Issues Trial.
– 251 –
– 252 –
APPENDIX 2: ROYAL MAIL AUDIT CHRONOLOGY
The position in relation to pre-2011 Royal Mail is referred to in the Recusal Judgment
at §120 - §122 {C7/49/38}. WBD provided factually inaccurate information to both the
Claimants and the Court. It was only because the Claimants continued to press for
disclosure of these documents over a period of months that the true position became
known and the documents ultimately obtained.
The relevant chronology is as set out below.
Freeths first asked for disclosure of audit reports within a letter dated 19 September
2018 {H/115/2}:
We note that your client has disclosed a number of audit reports produced by Ernst &
Young, from 2011 (POL219214 / POL219218), 2012 (POL-0219403) and 2016
(POL218775), presumably pursuant to paragraph 53(6) of the Generic Defence.
We note that the 2011 report in fact states “the main area [Ernst & Young] would
encourage management focus on in the current year is improving the IT governance
and control environment” and sets out the “risk [in relation to Horizon specifically]
that users may inappropriately or accidentally use the access leading to loss of
application or data integrity”. The 2016 report prioritises “reconciliation of Horizon
and IPSL” to help to deal with fraud, relating to which it is stated there is a “strong
possibility” of reoccurrence.
We would be grateful if you could now disclose the annual reports, produced by Ernst
& Young or otherwise, for each year since the introduction of Horizon, so that the
experts and the Court will be able to consider how the system developed over time.
The response from WBD on 3 October 2018 {H/124/3} stated:
Since the requests in your letter for disclosure of third party reports refer to particular
documents within an identified date range, Post Office will take steps to locate these
documents and provide disclosure of them. It should be noted that the scope of this
disclosure will be to the reports which you have specifically referred to in your requests
and not a broader search for all third party reports which have been produced. We
anticipate that locating and reviewing these documents will take a couple of weeks and
we will provide an update shortly.
WBD did not in fact provide any update to Freeths in relation to the audit reports
requested.
Mr Parsons’ thirteenth witness statement states that Mr Parsons had formed the view
by early November 2018 that Royal Mail had been asked to provide audit documents
but had said they were unwilling to do so without a Court order (§15.3-15.5 {C/10/5/6}).
If this was Mr Parsons’ belief, then this was certainly not communicated to the
Claimants at this time.
Freeths again made a specific request for audit reports on 21 December 2018 {H/154/2}.
This request directly related to the content of Mr Membery’s witness statement {E2/2}
which referred to audits of the Horizon system during both Horizon Online and
Legacy Horizon (e.g. §8, §13 and §22 {E/2/2/2-4}. The request was for: “Audit reports of
Horizon carried out annually by Ernst and Young or otherwise”
WBD’s response on 17 January {F/169/2}, referred to audit reports from 2011 onwards,
but made no mention of the alleged position of Royal Mail.
It was not until 27 February 2019 {H/227/1}, after further exchanges of correspondence,,
that WBD for the first time said that audits had been requested from Royal Mail but
that Royal Mail was concerned to provide them without a court order:
“Post Office understands that E&Y were the auditors of Horizon prior to 2011. Copies
of the audit reports are held by Royal Mail Group. Post Office has made a request for
these documents however Royal Mail Group are concerned about providing these
documents without a formal order from the Court for third party disclosure. Please
could you confirm if you wish to continue to pursue disclosure of these documents, in
which case assistance from the Court on this disclosure request may be required.
The Claimants responded the next day, on 28 February 2019 {H/230.1), including as
follows:
We confirm that we do require disclosure of the E&Y Audit Reports produced prior to
2011. We do not understand Royal Mail Group’s concerns about disclosing the reports
without an order from the Court for third party disclosure.
– 254 –
We feel certain that when Post Office separated from Royal Mail on 1 April 2012
under the Postal Services Act 2011, there must have been provisions made to allow
Post Office to have access to documents relating to its own business. It follows from
this that any ‘concerns’ that Royal Mail may have are no answer to our request and
that for the purpose of the test on disclosure, these documents plainly fall within Post
Office’s power and control.
Even in the unlikely event that this was not the case, it is wholly disproportionate to
require the Claimants to make an application to the judge to provide a very few
documents whose relevance is obvious.
The fact that Horizon is audited annually is referred to and relied upon in your client’s
witness evidence and the E&Y reports that post-date 2011 have been disclosed in these
proceedings.
Despite the urgency and the imminent commencement of the trial, WBD did not
respond to Freeths’ letter.
The Claimants Leading Counsel raised the matter in Court on 14 March 2019. In
response, and on instructions from WBD, Post Office’s Leading Counsel summarised
the position as follows {Day4/189:7-17}:
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I have no brief for Royal Mail. My Lord, last year my
instructing solicitors -- I think actually Post Office contacted Royal Mail and said
"Could we have these documents, they are being requested in these proceedings" and
Royal Mail said "We're not going to give them voluntarily, if you want them you will
need a court order".
MR JUSTICE FRASER: And this was last year, was it?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: This was towards the end of last year, yes, in the late
part of last year. I'm looking around to --
The Judge therefore made an Order requiring the Claimants to issue an application for
third party disclosure {C7/43}.
On 15 March 2019, WBD sent a letter to the Freeths stating that in fact WBD had not
previously requested audit reports from Royal Mail at all {H/243}.
– 255 –
Ultimately, after the Claimants issued their application {C10/1} – {C10/3}, Royal Mail
disclosed documents voluntarily, and the application between the Claimants and the
Royal Mail was resolved by consent {C/10/7}.)
Post Office was ordered to produce a witness statement explaining steps taken to
obtain the reports {C2/46}, and subsequently Mr Parsons filed his thirteenth witness
statement {C10/5}.
As to the content of that statement, the Claimants note the extent to which privilege
has not been waived in the significant communications referred to, in particular the 2
November 2018 email relied upon at §15.2 {C10/5/5-6} (apparently the source of Mr
Parsons’ belief that audits had been requested from Royal Mail), or the 12 November
2018 email forwarded to Mr Parsons §15.6 {C1-/5/6-7}, or the emails dated 11 and 13
February 2019 referred to at §22 and §24 {C10/5/9}).
The Claimants are not in a position to comment further on the content of Mr Parsons
statement save to note, as above, that if Mr Parsons had in fact formed the view he says
he had in early November 2018, why this was not communicated to the Claimants until
27 February 2019 and why WBD ignored Freeths’ 28 February letter; such that the
Claimant were required to raise the matter in Court and to issue an application against
Royal Mail during the trial.
– 256 –
APPENDIX 3: DR WORDEN’S CREDIT AND RELIABILITY
Gareth Jenkins an unstated source of information
Conversation: It transpired during evidence that Dr Worden had spoken with Gareth
Jenkins over the phone in May 2018, with the Post Office’s lawyers present
{Day18/90:2-12}. “The position was I wanted a clarification in my understanding of the
receipts payment mismatch, and a phone call was set up with WB present.”
{Day18/102:2-5}
Conversation not cited as source of evidence in expert report: Dr Worden did not
reference his conversation with Gareth Jenkins in Worden 1, §650 {D3/1/153} when
discussing the sources of information available to him in relation to the Receipts &
Payments Mismatch bug. This is despite his saying in cross-examination: “That helped
to clarify my understanding of the documents. I could read the document I think with a little
more confidence once Mr Jenkins had explained some things. I was particularly interested in
double entry accounting and how that applied and the conversation with Mr Jenkins did clarify
that.” {Day19/125:8-13}.
Approach to key dispute of factual evidence re Richard Roll
Worden 1, §1119 {D3/1/245} dismissal of Roll evidence: Dr Worden accepted that the
evidence of Mr Roll which he rejected (the ability to inject transactions without the
knowledge of Subpostmasters) was a disputed issue of fact {Day18/51:18-24}.
PO evidence was basis for rejecting Roll evidence: Dr Worden accepted that the basis
was Mr Godeseth’s evidence about ‘counter 32’ injections; this was how he “established”
that Mr Roll’s evidence should be rejected {Day18/52:15-24}.
Eventual acceptance this was wrong: Dr Worden accepted he had made a mistake in
his §1119 – {Day18/53:3-19}; he eventually accepted that both his approach and
conclusion were wrong – {Day18/56:5-7}
– 257 –
Worden 2, §84 {D3/6/21} maintains conclusion at §1119 of Worden 1: In Worden 2, Dr
Worden states that his opinion is not altered and that Mr Roll “could not alter branch
accounts without the Subpostmaster knowing”. Despite accepting (as above) that §1119
was wrong in approach and conclusion, Dr Worden said that he stands by his
conclusion at §84 of Worden 2 – {Day18/81:1-20}
No longer a dispute on the facts but Dr Worden does not acknowledge position:
Despite Mr Roll’s evidence now being accepted in Parker 2, Dr Worden states that he
does not understand the phrase ‘piggyback’ {Day18/58:19-21}; still does not
understand whether this would mean that it is possible to inject a transaction without
the knowledge of an SPM – {Day18/59:16-20}.
No steps taken to clarify perceived ambiguity: In answer to the Judge’s question
about whether Dr Worden’s opinion differs to Mr Roll’s evidence, he states:
“I’m not sure it contradicts what Mr Roll actually said because Mr Roll said there was
this counter 32 mechanism which made it clear. My opinion is yes, that would have
made it clear, but there may be other mechanisms like actually seeing the guy do it.”
– {Day18/73:17-23}.
Regardless, Dr Worden confirmed that he did not seek any further information from
Fujitsu or anyone else to clarify the position. As to why this was, he replied at
{Day18/85:10-23}:
“Priorities and, you know, whether I felt that further investigation would get me
further. It was kind of my feeling that it was a difficult area and that – put it this way,
sorry, it is very hard to explain this, but there are levels of depth and complexity in the
way Horizon actually works which the experts have not been able to plumb, if you like,
and there is a whole lot of detail about how a transaction might have been identified.
For instance, there is a PEAK that talks about counter 11 and 12. That’s not counter
32 but that will maybe give an indication. To my mind there was a kind of swamp of
difficult questions there and I was not going to – I felt, rightly or wrongly, going to
make progress in that area.”
– 258 –
Example of fair and balanced approach: Dr Worden agreed that his approach to
assessing the evidence in Roll 2 and Parker 2 in Worden 2 may be treated as an example
of his being balanced and fair – {Day18/88:2-17}.
Treatment of Dalmellington
Lack of treatment in Worden 1: Despite the Dalmellington Bug being addressed in
Godeseth 2, not only set out the 112 instances impacting 88 branches but exhibited the
Fujitsu presentation setting out the history and timeline in more detail, Worden 1 did
not address the Dalmellington Bug. Given that Dr Worden was tracing through the
bugs mentioned set out in §61 of Godeseth 2 {E2/7/15} (Dr Worden relying on Godeseth
2 in relation to his explanation of the three other bugs ‘acknowledged’ by the Post
Office), Dr Worden’s failure to address the Dalmellington bug is not capable of
reasonable excuse: no fair-minded and impartial expert could reasonably take that
course.
Nonetheless, in cross-examination, Dr Worden was afforded the opportunity to
explain how he could possibly had done this. He explained that:-
(a) He did not reference it as it “was not an important bug because it doesn’t leave a
subpostmaster with a lasting shortfall” {Day19/194:7} to {Day19/195:6}.
(b) He did read the Fujitsu presentation and “must have noticed” the unresolved
£25,000 and £2,500 issues, “but, as I say, my feeling of the importance of it in the context
of the overall analysis of remming bugs was not important because things at the edge of a
sample – a sample of 108, four things at the edge, it is difficult to know what the detail to
those four cases are, so I was concerned with the majority” {Day19/196:4-24}.
Partial treatment in Worden 2: While he did address the bug in Worden 2, Dr Worden
did not reference the Fujitsu presentation or the 112 occurrences of the bug and four
unresolved outcomes (one for £25,000 and one for £2,500). Instead, he only referred to
a PEAK with commentary from Anne Chambers that she had looked back at the
records over the past two months and found four instances. That led to the following
exchange at {Day20/7:13} to {Day20/8:15}:
– 259 –
Q. Now, there are two possible explanations for you not making reference to the fact that in
this case the bug concerned affected 88 branches rather than 1 or 4 or 5. There are two possible
explanations for not mentioning the 112 instances or the 88 branches. One is that you didn't
know, and the other is that you did know and you chose not to mention it. Which of those two
is the explanation?
A. That is a good question. I think I knew, but my prevailing view is that remming errors
are detected very directly by an imbalance between a rem in and a rem out and that therefore
remming TCs do not involve a large element of human judgment as to whose fault it was that
did this, or whether it was the bank etc. So remming TCs in my opinion are rather fast and
direct things and I was not concerned -- for instance, by the time we have the 118 it was many
years and I don't know exactly -- for instance, I cannot recall the exact timing between Anne
Chambers PEAK and the whole sequence of several years, but my understanding is that over
the whole sequence of several years these rems, these TCs consequent on remming errors, were
made rather rapidly. And that is my whole background understanding of Dalmellington and
other incidents. Now, if I fail to mention Dalmellington and other incidents on this case,
perhaps I should have done, but I think it is clear from my reports that all remming errors I
believe get corrected by TCs –"
Misrepresenting document on mis-keying issue
Characterisation in Worden 1: In relation to an internal Post Office feasibility study
on mis-keying {F/932/4}, Dr Worden stated in Worden 1 (Appendix C.1, §131
{D3/2/40}):
The Post Office internal feasibility study makes it clear that Post Office were concerned
at the costs incurred as a result of mis-keying. However, the 'Background' section of
the report makes it clear that the costs of concern were Post Office's central costs, and
were not costs or discrepancies in accounts in the branches..."
Evasiveness in cross-examination: When it was pointed out to him that his
characterisation of this document was wrong, Dr Worden responded as follows at
{Day19/96:2} to {Day19/97:4}:
– 260 –
Q. Why did you not mention that impact in your summary of the background?
A. The last sentence I agree I did not -- it didn't register with me, but it seemed to me
that poor customer experience and impact on the branch, and it seemed to me that
basically mis-keying can lead to errors and it leads to costs having to correct those
errors, and certainly large impacts in my opinion are very likely to be corrected.
Q. Taking your evidence on its face first, the passage that you have referred to
absolutely does identify that costs and discrepancies in branch accounts were of
concern.
A. It says "impact" on the branch. And it does -- I agree with you the last sentence
does say that it has impact on the branch, but the general tenor of the document seems
to me that it is saying, look, this stuff occurs, we can correct it, but it is costing us
money to correct it --
Q. Are you being scrupulously fair in your answers, Dr Worden, on that point?
A. I agree with you that that last sentence of that paragraph I had not paid attention
to in my summary.
Q. I'm going to suggest to you that that is not a scrupulously fair answer. Do you
agree?
A. I think I have answered your question fairly.
Q. Is it scrupulously fair?
A. Scrupulously fair? I'm trying to be as fair as I can, certainly.”
Equating sessions with transactions
Understanding that a session is on average 1.7 transactions: When analysing the
average number of Claimant branch transactions, Dr Worden only relied on session
data and wrongly equated one session to one transaction. This is despite his
acknowledgment, on Day 18, that he knew that the average number of transactions in
a session was 1.7 – {Day18/182:13} to {Day18/185:12}.
– 261 –
Subsequent statement that a session and transaction are equivalent: On Day 19,
however, Dr Worden re-thought the position and maintained that a session is the same
as a transaction – see exchanges at {Day19/4:2} to {Day19/5:4} and {Day19/6:16} to
{Day19/13:1}. This was in the face of being shown a disconnected session receipt and
Bogerd 2, at §14.2 {E2/5/4}, which contradicted his evidence.59 It was put to Dr Worden
that he was embarrassed at what happened on Day 18 and so came up with an answer
of convenience to cover up his embarrassment; Dr Worden denied that.
Failure to address APPSUP role and associated PEAK
Failure to identify or address APPSUP role: Dr Worden failed to identify or address
the APPSUP role in either of his expert reports, or indeed even acknowledge the role
in Joint 4 – the only such references to the role were made by Mr Coyne.
The APPSUP PEAK: Dr Worden failed to address the PEAK {F/768} in which it is
evident that inappropriate access to the APPSUP role was present prior to and
subsequent to the Ernst & Young audit upon which Dr Worden relies. Dr Worden
thought that he had read the PEAK at the time of his second report, but when asked if
he should have drawn the Court’s attention to it, he replied: “I think Mr Coyne had.”
When asked “Well, why didn’t you then? Why didn’t you deal with it?” He responded:
“Perhaps I did not have anything else to say about it. I mean I was -- I had to be very selective
in my supplemental report.” {Day20/113:2-13}
Ballpark estimates / lack of precision
At several points during his cross-examination, Dr Worden conveyed that his
approach to his evidence and statistics more generally was one that did not involve a
great deal of precision. Examples include:-
59 As did §104 of Bogerd 2 {/}, in which she discussed transactions being added to the “basket” – the
very paragraph that Dr Worden was actually referring to at §35 of Worden 2 {D3/6/10}, where he
incorrectly states that the suggestion that Angela Burke made a mistake is in §103 of Bogerd 2.
– 262 –
(a) Ballpark estimates: “Well, there is a process in engineering of ballpark estimates, which
are imprecise – or ballpark assumptions – I’m sorry if I get confused about the wording
here – which are very approximate assumptions you make in order to drive a calculation
through. And then you look back at the calculation and you say: is the precision I have
achieved in that calculation sufficient or do I need to refine / revisit some assumptions?”
{Day18/17:18} to {Day18/18:1}
(b) Mistakes in PO spreadsheet for number of sessions at SPM branches: “I had
thought about it, but as I say, the precision I needed in this number is a rather low precision,
and to that precision I felt it didn’t make a significant difference.” {Day18/176:25}. “I
can’t remember the precise details of my calculation because, as I say, I was looking for a
precision which was rather low. And therefore in terms of priorities and what I put my
effort to, I knew that other parts of my calculation had greater imprecision than that, and
so I didn’t spend a lot of effort on trying to refine this figure.” {Day18/178:2-8}
(c) Scaling factor: “Now I was aware when I made this calculation that the precision I could
achieve, firstly the precision I needed was rather small. It might have been to a factor of 3,
or something like that. Secondly, the precision I could achieve was rather small for reasons
for completely unconnected with this; other parts of the calculation were less precise.”
{Day18/180:4-10}
(d) Gaps in spreadsheet on session data and whether noticed difference: “You can
do it by eyeballing” {Day18/180:19-22}. “But as I say, the whole basis of this calculation
is how much precision do I need for different parts of it. And I don’t spend time struggling
to produce high precision in parts of the calculation which will not produce high precision
in the result.” {Day18/181:11-15}
(e) Did not look at size of branches actually hit by acknowledged bugs: “No, this is
what I would call the next level of detail down that one could have gone to look at the
branches affected by the bugs or the acknowledged bugs” {Day18/191:18-20}; “As I say, it
is an extra level of sophistication in my calculation which I didn’t do. I acknowledge that.”
– 263 –
{Day18/192:5-6}; “Q. Right. And you say what about why it is acceptable for you to leave
out that step of the analysis? A. Because one makes a calculation at certain levels of
approximation based on the precision you require in the result, and the precision I required
in the result was probably to within a factor of 3 or a factor of 10 and I made the judgment
that to achieve that precision I didn’t need to go to that next level of detail that you have
described to me.” {Day18/192:16-24}
Audits and Richard Roll
Reliance on audits to counter Roll evidence: Dr Worden’s relied on service audits to
dispute the veracity of Mr Roll’s fact evidence, without appreciating that there were in
fact no such audits during Mr Roll’s tenure – {Day20/117:3} to {Day20/118:17}.
Recommendation on mis-keying
When asked about the Post Office’s decision not to act on the recommendation set out
in the mis-keying feasibility report, Dr Worden responded at {Day19/98:18} to
{Day19/99:7}: I cannot recollect exactly what I knew or did not know, but I have not paid
attention to whether the Post Office actually acted on the recommendations because, as I say,
user interface issues are very complicated and I hesitate to be an armchair critic, if you like, of
somebody’s user interface design and what steps they took to improve it. That is a complicated
issue when you look at – say somebody said “We can improve the design. What do we do about
it? Let’s run some trials”. And what’s the virtue of changing the design versus the virtue of
keeping it stable? For all those postmasters who are using it perfectly correctly, you want to
keep user interface stable over the years. So there are those trade-offs, all of which I haven’t
looked at.”
Focus on Disproving the Claimants’ case
Issue 1
Focus on Claimants rather than SPMs: Dr Worden confirmed that despite Horizon
Issue (1) referring to Subpostmasters’ accounts, he took his own course and looked at
– 264 –
the Claimants’ accounts – {Day18/148:3-17}. Later on, when looking at his report: he
stated “Yes, I’ve stuck the word “claimants” there” – {Day18/156:2-6}
Focus on ‘lasting’ discrepancies: Despite Horizon Issue (1) only referring to apparent
or alleged discrepancies or shortfalls (sub-issue (a)) and the accurate processing and
recording of transactions (sub-issue (b)), Dr Worden confirmed that it was his decision
to make it a requirement that a discrepancy be “lasting” – {Day18/148:1-2}; lasting said
later to mean forever – {Day18/154:2-12}.
Issue 2
Re-framing of Issue: Dr Worden states at Worden 1, §968 {D3/1/216}: “Issue 2 appears
to be asking - could Post Office have given its Subpostmasters automated support in
Horizon, in the place of human support?" The Issue asks no such thing, although Dr
Worden conclude in any event that the answer to this revised question is no – Worden
1, §986 {D3/1/216}. The Post Office has subsequently attempted to use this conclusion
to disprove elements of the Claimants’ pleaded case.60
TCs
Conclusion on prospects of Claimants’ cases: Dr Worden eventually accepted that he
used his calculation on the rates of erroneous TCs in order to reach a stated conclusion
that they could not account for even a small part of the claimed shortfalls in this case –
{Day19/80:2} to {Day19/81:7}.
Not referencing TC table with non-user errors: In his report, Dr Worden only
reproduced a table of TCs {F/987} said by the Post Office to specifically relate to errors
in branch; he did not, however, reproduce or even mention the table immediately
below which contained numbers for TCs that the Post Office acknowledges were
attributable to ‘other errors’. That led to the following exchange on why that table was
not included at {Day19/119:10-21}:
60 See the Post Office’s Written Opening Submissions at §290 {A1/2/102}. However, the sections of the
Generic Reply cited therein are not apt to the issue in question or Dr Worden’s conclusion.
– 265 –
“A. Well, why would I have wanted to? (Pause) For completeness it would have been
useful but I felt – as far as the distribution of TCs and the distribution of erroneous TCs,
but I agree I could well have quoted that last table and it would have been useful to do so
Q. I’m going to ask you to give his Lordship a candid answer: was that a mistake or was
it deliberate?
A. It certainly wasn’t deliberate. It wasn’t, if you like, an oversight or a wrong editorial
decision, if you like. But the question I’m asking myself is how that adds to the
information?”
– 266 –
Contents
OVERVIEW ..........................................................................................................................................3
The SPM Experience ..................................................................................................................................... 6
Post Office’s Disclosure ................................................................................................................................ 9
Royal Mail Audits ................................................................................................................... 10
Documents Relating to Individual SPMs ............................................................................. 10
OCPs and OCRs ....................................................................................................................... 14
Very Late Disclosure ............................................................................................................... 16

Scope of Trial – Processes Relating to TCs ............................................................................................. 20
Defendants’ Witnesses................................................................................................................................ 23
Overarching Themes ............................................................................................................... 23
Individual Defendant Witnesses ........................................................................................... 34
Claimants’ Witnesses .................................................................................................................................. 44
Mr Latif ..................................................................................................................................... 44
Mr Tank..................................................................................................................................... 46
Mr Anup and Mr Aakash Patny ........................................................................................... 47
Mrs Burke ................................................................................................................................. 50
Mr Roll ...................................................................................................................................... 52
Mr Henderson .......................................................................................................................... 54
Expert Evidence ............................................................................................................................................ 54
Mr Coyne .................................................................................................................................. 54
Dr Worden ................................................................................................................................ 58
FACT EVIDENCE ........................................................................................................65

Introduction of Horizon (1999-2000)......................................................................................................... 65
Migration to Horizon Online (2009-2010)................................................................................................ 67
Changes Made (or Not Made) to Improve Horizon............................................................................... 70
Miskeying ................................................................................................................................. 70
Van Den Bogerd’s Selected Changes .................................................................................... 73
Changes to MoneyGram......................................................................................................... 77
PING and TAs .............................................................................................................................................. 80
– 267 –
Introduction of PING .............................................................................................................. 80
Problems with TAs .................................................................................................................. 80
Disputing a TA......................................................................................................................... 81
TCs .................................................................................................................................................................. 82
Figures from Individual Teams ............................................................................................. 82
TC Case Management System ............................................................................................... 86
Santander TCs .......................................................................................................................... 87
TCs Generally........................................................................................................................... 88
Helpline ......................................................................................................................................................... 89
SPMs Disputing Shortfalls ........................................................................................................................ 91
PO Debt Letters ........................................................................................................................ 91
FSC Checks for Disputes raised on Helpline ....................................................................... 91
Branch Dispute Form .............................................................................................................. 93

No Formal Dispute or Appeal Process ................................................................................. 94
Screen Layout and Reports available to SPMs ....................................................................................... 96
Post Office Investigation of Disputes ...................................................................................................... 99
Credence ................................................................................................................................... 99
ARQ Data................................................................................................................................ 104
Helen Rose Report (Credence and ARQ) ........................................................................... 107
Fujitsu Remote Access (Insert, Inject, Edit, Delete) ............................................................................ 110
Legacy Horizon...................................................................................................................... 110
Horizon Online ...................................................................................................................... 113
Reference Data ........................................................................................................................................... 117
Named Bugs ................................................................................................................................................ 118
Callendar Square (2003-2006) .............................................................................................. 118
Receipts and Payments Mismatch (2010 – 2013) ............................................................... 125

Local Suspense Account (2010 – 2013) ............................................................................... 130
Dalmellington (2010-2016) ................................................................................................... 131

Recurring Problems ................................................................................................................................... 133
Phantom Transactions .......................................................................................................... 133
Failed Recoveries ................................................................................................................... 136
Problem Management ............................................................................................................................... 136
– 268 –
Individual SPMs ........................................................................................................................................ 140

Mr Andrees Latif ................................................................................................................... 140
Mr Jayesh Tank ...................................................................................................................... 146
Mr Anup Patny and Mr Aakash Patny .............................................................................. 155
Mrs Burke ............................................................................................................................... 162
HORIZON ISSUES ....................................................................................................167

Issues 1, 4 & 6: Bugs & Errors .................................................................................................................. 168
Claimants’ Answers to these Issues .................................................................................... 168
Important Aspects of the Expert Evidence ........................................................................ 171
Issues 5 & 15: Reconciliation ................................................................................................................... 192

Issues 2, 8, 9 & 14: Information Available to SPMs and PO .............................................................. 195

Issues 7, 10, 11, 12 and 13: Remote Access ............................................................................................. 202
Issue 3: Robustness .................................................................................................................................... 210
Claimants’ Answers to this Issue ........................................................................................ 210
CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................221
APPENDIX 1: HORIZON ISSUES TABLES....................................................................................223
APPENDIX 2: ROYAL MAIL AUDIT CHRONOLOGY ................................................................253
APPENDIX 3: DR WORDEN’S CREDIT AND RELIABILITY ......................................................257
– 269 –
– 270 –

Claimants' Closing Submissions in The Horizon Issues Trial

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Claimants' Closing Submissions in The Horizon Issues Trial

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THE POST OFFICE GROUP LITIGATION

Claim No. HQ16X01238, HQ17X02637 & HQ17X04248

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION

ALAN BATES & OTHERS

POST OFFICE LIMITED

CLAIMANTS’ WRITTEN CLOSING

The structure of this Written Closing is as set out overleaf.

The Claimants adopt the same abbreviations and form of references

as used in the Claimants’ Written Opening.

FACT EVIDENCE ........................................................................................................65

HORIZON ISSUES ....................................................................................................167

APPENDIX 1: HORIZON ISSUES TABLES....................................................................................223

APPENDIX 2: ROYAL MAIL AUDIT CHRONOLOGY ................................................................253

APPENDIX 3: DR WORDEN’S CREDIT AND RELIABILITY ......................................................257

changes the whole ball game” {Day18/167:4-5}.

to Second Sight, in its public announcements in response the BBC’s Panorama

knowledge. It is no surprise that he felt uncomfortable at the time; and it is no surprise

colleagues who had “performed such actions” (Parker 2, §27 {E2/12/9}).

explanations. It is at least conceivable that the management and understanding of the

Horizon system is so poor, patchy, disorganised, inadequately documented and ad hoc

or up to and including the trial itself.

However, the obvious alternative is a lack of candour, verging on Nelsonian blindness

reality and the Post Office’s public narrative to date.

Dalmellington bug before it was identified by Mr Coyne is a striking example of the

Horizon system and its own knowledge of those shortcomings.

than forthcoming about this.

Coyne to discover the existence of the Dalmellington bug, as well as a number of

forthcoming about this.

an accurate record of transactions (as well as excluding consideration of remote

by the evidence of its own witnesses. The extraordinary reticence of Dr Worden to

to do so {Day18/146:2-8}, and describing “a kind of swamp of difficult questions” which he

too are telling.

time in cross-examination, he accepted that a number of them were not reconcilable

should operate with how it actually did in practice.

extent a question of semantics, Issue 3 as a whole is in any event dependent on the

expressly acknowledged this link: {Day20/79:4-22}). The Post Office’s attempts to

The SPM Experience

4 Worden 2, §120 {D3/6/31} and Worden 2, §126 {D3/6/32}

frustrated, worried and sometimes desperate.

SPMs have complained:-

(a) Doubling of sums credited: Doubling of sums credited to branch accounts

PEAK PC0195380 {F/588/3}, in which Anne Chambers is investigating one

(b) Doubling of discrepancies: Doubling of discrepancies when fixes were applied.

through a process to try to resolve it, the deficit doubled’.

postmaster denied reversing this transaction and involved a forensic accountant as he

is adamant that there is a system error” {F/324.1}.

{F/300.1/3}. Mr Godeseth fairly described Mr Brown’s situation as “a horrible

position to be in” {Day8/58:3-5}.

Post Office’s Disclosure

disclosure is one of them.

displayed a reluctance to disclose documents which are or might be unhelpful to it.

not repeated here;

Appendix 1 to these submissions at §638 et seq.;

addressed at §26 to 33 below;

§36 to §43 below;

evidence was complete; and

disclosed late and how they came to be disclosed so late.

Office’s case (although this was seldom their ultimate effect).

Royal Mail Audits

Appendix 1, §639 et seq.)

documents, leaves important issues unexplained (Appendix 1, §654- 655).

Documents Relating to Individual SPMs