158
4, NOVEMBER 1971
conic Communica ions
WILLIAM H. HUGGINS, FELLOW, IEEE
Abstract-The computer has been viewed primarily as a symbol-
manipulating machine. Yet, it is capable of generating and displaying
N isual images showing abstract form, shape, and dynamic process.
Recent psychological research on perception suggests that pictures
and symbols play important but very different roles in creative
thought. By providing enactive and iconic modes of communication
between man and machine, the computer can serve as a prosthetic
device to assist man in giving public expression to his private mental
images. By so doing, it may be possible to equalize in some measure
the imbalance between man's great endowment for perceiving and
very limited capability for producing visual images. By so doing, we
may enhance the human use of the computer as an intellectual com-
panion rather than as an economic competitor.
ICONIC COMMUNICATIONS
The Human Use of Computers
T HE computer has been called, with ample justi-
fication, a symbol-manipulating machine. As such,
its potential for enormous impact upon man is
sharply revealed for hitherto, the production, manipu-
lation, and transformation of symbols has taken place
exclusively in the human mind, communicated through
natural language and mathematical expression. Sym-
bols written on paper, or other media, are static and
dead. Not until perceived by the human mind have
they acquired meaning and interracted with each other
to yield new results. Now, the modern computer pro-
vides a slate upon which we write our symbols so as to
have the consequences of what we write unfold dy-
namically before us. This is a truly revolutionary de-
velopment. The invention of the printing press gave
man unlimited ability to record information in static
-form; the computer has for the first time given a dy-
namic character to this process.
By bestowing upon the computer some portion of his
unique ability to manipulate symbols, man has created
a surrogate capable of performing many of his tradi-
tional functions. The familiar maxim-that a human
being should not be called upon to perform tasks better
done by machine-seems acceptable when those tasks
involve brute muscle power. The maxim is given au-
thority by the ancient belief that pure thought is the
noblest production of man, and that manual labor
should be avoided. Let the dumb animal or the engine
provide muscle power so that man may be free to use
his intellect to control the process. But now, with the
Manuscript received March 17, 1971; revised May 4, 1971.
The work leading to this paper has been supported in large part by
the Office of Computing Activities, National Science Foundation
under Grant GJ-336.
The author is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, The
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 21218.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EDUCATION, VOL. E-14, NO.
development of the computer, even that human func-
tion of decision making and control seems likely to be
performed increasingly by the new artificial intelligent-
sia, mass produced with little pleasure or pain for the
greater economic advantage of manufacturer and em-
ployer.
The use of the computer to replace some human
functions is fraught with consequences of dubious mor-
ality. It is astonishing that many people find attractive
the goal of building a machine capable of performing
what has hitherto been a unique human function-and
incredible that the more unique the function to humans,
the more attractive the goal! Contrast this, if you will,
with the concern that has led man to set up wildlife
preserves where animals may live in their natural habi-
tat, protected from the encroachments of civilization.
Instead, we deny such amenities to man and inflict
change at a rate with which few can cope. Perhaps the
time has come for us to recognize that certain functions
must be reserved for man alone, even though these
might be done more cheaply or better by machine. Per-
haps to protect man's birthright, legislation is needed
to forbid encroachment upon this human preserve by
the machine.
If such legislation were passed, the problems facing
engineering educators would be vastly simplified-we
could all go back to teaching circuit theory and those
other nice subjects that we have enjoyed for so many
years. Of course, these subjects have been pleasant to
teach and fun to learn because they seemed useful1 and
because the subject matter is clearly described by neat
algorithms and procedures. But precisely these latter
qualities make these procedures well suited for imple-
mentation on a digital computer. If we accept the
maxim that this part of the design process should no
longer be done by man, we are left with a residue that
is a nasty assortment of important but ill-defined issues,
likely of little academic interest, deficient in esthetic
beauty, often irrational and frustrating, and requiring
1 A. W. Holt has observed that the possibility of finding satisfac-
tion in doing laundry by hand is largely destroyed by the very exis-
tence of the washing machine! (Several reviewers, have objected to this
footnote and claimed that a housewife obviously gets more pleasure
from using a washing machine. This, however, does not negate the
fact that the possibility of finding pleasure in doing laundry by hand
has been destroyed by the availability of the washing machine-
rather, it explains why this is so. Why not then use the machine? I
say that technology is like drugs; people are titillated by it; it is habit
forming and may produce a desire to move on to harder stuff. Further-
more, pushers are strongly motivated for economic reasons to hook
more and more users. Of course, drugs in themselves are not evil and,
when administered wisely to enhance human resources, they may be
beneficial. But when administered primarily for the profit of the
pusher and supplier, they are harmful.)
HUGGINS: ICONIC COMMUNICATIONS
for meaningful resolution an understanding and breadth
of experience possessed by few students.
Evidently, I hold a pessimistic view of the ultimate
consequences of using machines to perform man's func-
tions. I do not find assurance in the fact that no com-
puter today can write Shakesperian verse; instead, I
believe we must consider what has already been done in
less than one decade of modest effort and face squarely
the technological imperative: that if something is techno-
logically feasible, it will be done on earth as it is in
heaven [1].
Why then am I contributing to this Special Issue on
the Application of Computers to Electrical Engineering
Education? Let me explain. Because the computer is a
linguistic machine, it is capable of being instructed to
perform any human task which can be described com-
pletely and accurately by its teacher. If the instructions
are sufficiently detailed and all inclusive, the human
teacher may then be retired to a home for senior citi-
zens while the automaton carries on. I try hard not to
think about these prospects.
But because the computer is a linguistic machine, it
is also potentially capable of entering into the internal
world of man's intellect, where it can extend his analyt-
ical, associative, perceptive, and conceptual powers.
This, and only this, I regard as the truly human use of
the computer-an intellectual companion rather than
an economic competitor. This is the use that should be
uppermost in the education of human beings. Unfor-
tunately, this use offers little economic incentive in our
present society. Furthermore, this use raises funda-
mental problems, largely unrecognized and thus far
ignored. The task of providing the kinds of communica-
tion between man and the computer required for the
computer to be part of man's intellectual processes is
an altogether different undertaking than that required
for a computer to control a guided missle or a chemical
plant, or to optimize the design and layout of an inte-
grated circuit.
Communication between computer and machine can
be provided by well-established techniques of communi-
cation theory to encode information in many different
ways, any of which permit exact recovery by appropri-
ate transducers. But for man, simple display of symbols,
linquistic statements, or graphs may not be sufficient.
For how does man think? Is the presentation of nu-
merical data or equations or graphs even beginning to
scratch the surface of what might be required to really
use the computer as part of ones intellectual processes?
Is it possible that the special inclinations and abilities
that attract some people to computer science lead them
to ignore and minimize the requirements that most
people of other intellectual endowments find important?
Why is it that only recently are graphical displays ap-
pearing on computers, despite the fact that such dis-
plays were used on the early Whirlwind computer 20
years ago? In this paper I attempt to discuss some of
these questions.
159
The Picture and the Symbol
Television began its invasion of our society about two
decades ago and shortly thereafter, by a remarkable
coincidence, so also did the computer.
Because it utilized extant radio technology and could
exploit an existing market, television achieved imme-
diate acceptance. Today, few homes are without at
least one TV set. Now, the computer invasion of the
home is also about to begin, for the development of
large-scale integrated circuitry will soon make it eco-
nomically feasible to put a computer into every home.
And, just as with television, the commercial market for
the home computer will be exploited without prelimi-
nary investigation and research into the psychological
and sociological effects of these devices upon the people
who use them. Yet, it is conceivable that both may
create potent alterations in man's most precious and
unique gift-his mind. Will human thought be radically
changed as a consequence? If so, what will be the nature
of these changes?
Many people agree that television has had a pro-
found effect upon children who have grown up watching
it. By the time they finish school, many will have spent
10 000 to 15 000 hours watching TV. The impact of TV
on our culture is hard to evaluate, but there is little
doubt it is enormous. For instance, D. R. Entwisle has
found [2 ] that disadvantaged first graders of the Balti-
more inner-city schools have better developed abilities
to associate and use common words than the more
privileged children of corresponding age in surburban
schools. Furthermore, by the time children finish ele-
mentary school, their verbal associative structures ap-
pear to be much further developed than students of the
same age who lived 50 years ago or than students who
today are members of cultural groups in which TV is
little used [3].
Except for a few isolated efforts to use the TV me-
dium in imaginative new ways for educational purposes
(Sesame Street being the most noteworthy example), it
is a moot question whether the gross effect of TV has
been "good" or "bad." It has, for sure, reduced the
element of wonder and surprise which is so helpful in
motivating learning in the class room. Perhaps the
decline of student interest in science and engineering is
in part a result of blase young people finding little
novelty or excitement in the contemplation of RLC
circuits when for years they have watched people walk
on the moon and fanciful dragons fly without fear of
falling.
Prior to television, fantasy could be encountered in
science fiction novels. But the novel conveys its story
by symbolic language which acquires meaning only
when decoded in the mind of the reader. This tags it as
a mental construction and robs it of the immediate im-
pression of reality that is conveyed by the moving
image seen on the TV screen. The intellectual barrier
between the rational and irrational is in danger of being
160
breached by commercial television.2 This may account
for the rapidly growing interest in shamanic thought
and distrust in the intellectual's motto: veritas vos liber-
abit [4].
And so, soon, picture and symbol will simultaneously
saturate the mind with intensity never before experi-
enced. Computers are already being injected into the
elementary schools, where kids respond avidly to them,
as might be expected from man's unique gift for play
with symbols. Is it not important, then, to inquire in
what ways TV and the home computer relate to each
other in their effects on the people who use them? Are
they complementary, so that one compensates for the
weaknesses of the other? Or, are they antagonistic in
combination, and likely to create stresses and strains in
the user? In what ways can TV and computers be com-
bined so as to be most useful and helpful in man's in-
tellectual development? I suggest one way is in allowing
man to express himself by means of visual images with
a facility never before possible. Let me explain.
If we could begin over, placing uppermost the full
consideration of human needs for communication and
thought, rather than the historical peculiarities of a
particular technology, could the functions of TV and
the computer be integrated into some new device so
as to be most useful and helpful in man's intellectual
development? One may envision a device which is like
a TV in that it is capable of generating visual images
of rich and wonderous variety as well as displaying
symbolic forms, while it is also like a computer in that
it invites active participation of the viewer by enabling
him to enter into the generation and control of the
information being displayed. Then, for the first time,
man would have the ability to create visual images
easily for communicating ideas that he hitherto had
little or no facility for expression.
The relation between visual imagery and symbolic
modes of thought has been examined by Arnheim [5].
Arnheim begins his fascinating and timely study by
examining the historical origins of the age-old prejudice
that visual perception does not involve thought. He
writes: "The Liberal Arts, so named because they were
the only ones worthy of being practiced by a free man,
dealt with language and mathematics. Specifically,
Grammar, Dialectic and Rhetoric were the arts of words;
Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music were
based on mathematics. Painting and Sculpture were
among the Mechanical Arts, which required labor and
craftsmanship. The high esteem of music and the dis-
dain of the fine arts derived, of course, from Plato, who
in his Republic had recommended music for the educa-
tion of heroes because it made human beings partake
2 In the article "Question Is: Will the Tube Become Reality?,"
Judv Bachrach asks: "Will outer-tube events assume fictive dimen-
sions just as inner-tube events are assuming nonfiction dimensions to
ladies who write letters (to TV actors) .... Will all these realities
eventually blend into each other so that any occurrence, be it a
political campaign, an advertisement, a soap opera, or a war, will
become grand theater on a miniature screen to be launched, played
out and wrapped up in a living room while we sit back and watch?"
(Baltimore Sun, April 30, 1971).
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EDUCATION, NOVEMBER 1971
in the mathematical order and harmony of the cosmos,
located beyond the reach of the senses; whereas the
arts, and particularly painting were to be treated with
caution because they strengthened man's dependence
on illusory images." (One wonders what Plato would
have thought of TV?)
Arnheim continues: "Today, the prejudicial discrimi-
nation between perception and thinking is still with
us.... Our entire educational system continues to be
based on the study of words and numbers. In kinder-
garten, to be sure, our youngsters learn by seeing and
handling handsome shapes, and invent their own shapes
on paper or in clay by thinking through perceiving. But
with the first grade of elementary school, the senses
begin to lose educational status. More and more the
arts are considered as . . . entertainment and mental
release.... By the time the competition for college
placement becomes acute, it is a rare high school that
insists on providing for the arts the time needed to
make their practice at all fruitful.... This educational
blackout persists in college, where the art student is
considered as pursuing separate and intellectually in-
ferior skills. . . . The arts are neglected because they
are based on perception, and perception is disdained
because it is not assumed to involve thought."
Study of the relation between visual imagery and
symbolic forms such as natural language is currently
enjoying a revival among American psychologists who
at last seem to have overcome the classical prejudices
which earlier in this century led them to separate per-
ception from thought. (The inappropriateness of this
separation is clear to anyone who has studied L. G.
Roberts' important, but neglected, doctoral dissertation
[6]. The mechanisms which Roberts describes provide
an elegant model of the process of perception. And since
logical operations are explicit in this model, it is evident
that perception likewise involves thought (albeit at a
subconscious level) in much the same way as that dis-
cussed by Arnheim.) Of particular interest is the major,
recent work of Bugelski [7], who supports Arnheim's
thesis that visual imagery plays a central role in think-
ing when he writes: "My current leaning is toward the
belief that few of us, if any, actually think in abstract
terms when we are doing our everyday routine think-
ing. I rather suspect, with Mowrer [8] and Bower [9],
that we think with our gut and some rather individual
imagery and that our idiosyncratic reactions are re-
sponsible for the considerable lack of communications in
conversations that relate to serious social problems.
Words have a way of arousing images and, if the images
are not the same, communication fails." He concludes
that: "all words are both abstract and concrete in that
they are first symbols to begin with, which makes them
all abstract as divorced from things and events. They
are all concrete in that they arouse a kind of activity
in our neural mechanisms that was active at some prior
time when we saw or heard something and words were
also used at the same time. The revival of these former
sensory-perceptual and emotional responses appears to
be the meaning of the words that arouse them. These
HUGGINS: ICONIC COMMUNICATIONS 161

each part; for other pictures the experimenter named

i\(MIND) / Innate
Sy mbolic-Public lainguage and
private representations.
Iconic -Perceptual organization an(l
spatial imagery.
Enactive-Manipulative and touchi.
Fig. 1. Brunler's three modes of communication.
the parts but the child was not asked to do so. We
found a clear difference: no image or only a poor brief
image would form of those pictures for which the child
had named the parts.... This seems to imply that
eidetic children retain information either in the formii
of an image or in the form of a verbal memory... but
are unable to do both at once.

meanings can be shared or communicated among those Neglect of Imagery

with similar backgrounds, but will, in all probability, If imagery is as essential to human thought as some
never be identical. While we are all opposed to 'pollu- of the recent psychological work suggests, why has the
tion.' l think of it in terms of the creek near my home. effective employment of visual images eluded the com-
What do you think of?" puter scientist? Some personal observations (which I
The relation between symbol and picture has been believe significant although unsupported by controlled
described from still another point of view by J. S. scientific experiment) suggest that the elusiveness is
Bruner [10, see especially ch. 1 and 2], who suggests unacknowledged, general, and almost complete.
that acquisition and understanding of information may First, why has it taken 20 years to provide generally
proceed through three stages as shown in Fig. 1. useful visual displays for human communication with
In the life course of a human being, the mind seems the computer? The answer to this question is, I believe,
to develop along these three levels. At the left of the not unrelated to the fact that most speakers at com-
figure, an arrow directed upward is used to suggest an puter graphics conferences exhibit poor graphic aids
innate tendency forcing man up this inverted pyramid and slides. I can only conclude that practitioners of
to symbolize his experiences. By giving symbolic names computer science, unlike those of other disciplines,
to his perceptual and enactive experiences, he is able to seem to be able to function entirely at the symbolic
abstract certain aspects of these experiences in a form level with no need to communicate at the iconic or
that may be communicated and recorded. By so doing enactive levels of human experience. Their world is
he stabilizes and socializes his private perceptions (see apparently a syntactical structure of symbol strings.
[5, ch. 13]). Second, over the past two years, I have led a seminar
Following Bruner, I have drawn the symbolic mode in Iconic Communications at The Johns Hopkins Uni-
of communication at the "highest" level, resting upon versity. In addition to exploring some of the topics
the iconic and enactive levels for definition and ultimate which are the subject of the present paper, I have re-
meaning [I1]. Some psycholog-ists currently involved in quired each of the participants to produce a computer-
the revival of interest in imagery (Paivio and Rohwer), animated film showing some abstract idea purely by
propose a modification of the figure to indicate that a the use of animated pictures without relying on tradi-
phase of iconic development continues simultaneously tional words and symbols. The participants have re-
with symbolic development. The exact order is of less vealed marked differences in their abilities to accomi-
concern to me than the consensus among many workers plish this assignment. Those who were highly skilled in
concerning the importance of imagery in human thought. computer programming appeared to be the least able
The drive to symbolize carries with it some puzzling to express an idea iconically, and in most instances,
and fascinating implications. Research on vision sug- they gave up and created instead either a pretty graph-
gests that there is a short-term storage of the visual ical design or wrote a programming language that pre-
image in its full photographic detail, and that this in- sumably might be of use to someone else for this as-
formation is almost at once encoded in some way. (See signed purpose.
for instance, [12, ch. 1 and 2].) It is as though the de- Third, this same difficulty is apparently experienced
tails of the picture are encoded into some more efficient by specialists in computer science elsewhere. Recently,
form permitting internal classification and subsequent I had the privilege of visiting the computer-graphic
processing. For most persons, this iconic storage is research laboratory of a major computer manufacturer.
short lived (of the order of a few tenths of a second), After being shown the extensive hardware and software
but for some individuals with eidetic imagery, the facilities that would permit one to produce on-the-spot
photographic-like image can be retained for long periods a computer-animated sequence to explain some diffi-
of time and examined later for details not originally cult-to-visualize scientific phenomenon, I inquired if
perceived. any of their scientists had done so. The answer, as you
Eidetic imagery is common in very young children. may have already guessed was: "No! But we will be
In a fascinating article, R. N. Haber has reported [13], glad to provide you with this equipment so you can use
that: "if, while the child is looking at the picture, he it in your educational endeavors!"
names, labels, rehearses or otherwise actively attends Finally, shortly thereafter, I was invited by a neigh-
to the items (seen), he will not have an image.... In boring university to participate in the doctoral exami-
viewing some pictures, a child would be asked to name nation of a young computer scientist who had developed
 162
a very ingenious interactive programming system to
make computer-animated films using a small minicom-
puter. My single question to the candidate was: "Have
you produced a significant film using this system?"
Again, the answer was "No!"
From these observations I must conclude it is un-
fortunate that present development of computer-
graphic facilities for purposes of iconic communication
(as distinct from mechanical drafting) rests largely in
the hands of computer science specialists because I find
that skills for visual expression seem to be curiously
lacking among practitioners of that discipline. Although
I support the development of a Computer Animation
Resources Center (CARC) described elsewhere in this
issue by D. Weiner, I question whether it is the lack of
adequate facilities or our inability to express our ideas
visually that accounts for the slow development of com-
puter animation for educational purposes. If the latter,
what can be done?
The basic issues here are crucial to education. Whereas
exposure to television has oriented students increasingly
to iconic modes of communication, classroom instruc-
tion in many disciplines has become increasingly math-
ematical, symbolic, and abstract. Gone are laboratories
and demonstrations of the real thing. For students in
these disciplines, the subject matter may indeed appear
to be little other than strings of symbols obeying mys-
terious syntactical rules. Furthermore, some of the ex-
amples of computer-aided instruction that I have seen
make it appear even more so. As an exercise in learning
the structure of formal systems, such developments
may be ideal, but for developing intuitive understand-
ing on which creativity so much depends, it may be
tragically deficient. Is it possible that the students' call
for "relevance" is really a cry for help in assigning some
meaning to the sea of undefined symbols that engulfs
them? Is "relevance" not only to be interpreted in a
social context but also cognitively?
A Reconciliation?
In the previous section, we suggested that some in-
nate drive forces man to symbolize and, once done, to
ignore the steps up the enactive and iconic ladder that
he himself had climbed in giving meaning to his own
symbolic constructions. For the educator, these tenden-
cies pose a particularly serious hazard because having
learned and relearned his material, he may have com-
pletely suppressed modes of thought he used to achieve
his present state of expertise. He may underestimate
the necessity of providing sufficient enactive and iconic
experience to permit the learner to function at the
learners happiest symbolic level. If the learner has a
well-defined symbolic system that matches that of the
teacher, it may be possible to bypass the first two
stages and communicate purely at the symbolic level.
But too often, the learner may not possess the imagery
to fall back upon when his symbolic transformations
fail to solve the problem. For many persons, it may be
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EDUCATION. NOVEMBER 1971
impossible to rely on a completely symbolic mode of
communication. Also, who knows what new implica-
tions and structures for problem solving might come
from an appropriate iconic translation?
Perhaps the distinction between the symbolic and
iconic modes of thought is not as sharp as we have been
suggesting. Listen to P. R. Halmos, mathematician
who knows of what he writes when he states [14]: "Per-
haps the closest analogy is between mathematics and
painting. The origin of painting is physical reality and
so is the origin of mathematics.... Talk to a painter
(I did) and talk to a mathematician, and you'll be
amazed at how similarly they react. Almost every as-
pect of the life and of the art of mathematics has its
counterpart in painting, and vice versa." Earlier in this
delightful paper, Halmos admits that: "Mathematics-
this may surprise you or shock you some-is never de-
ductive in its creation. The mathematician at work
makes vague guesses, visualizes broad generalizations,
and jumps to unwarranted conclusions. He arranges and
rearranges his ideas, and he becomes convinced of their
truth long before he can write down a logical proof....
When a mathematician wants to prove a theorem about
an infinite-dimensional space, he examines its finite-
dimensional analogue, he looks in detail at the 2- and
3-dimensional cases, he often tries out a particular
numerical case, and he hopes that he will gain thereby
an insight that pure definition-juggling has not yielded.
The deductive stage, writing the result down, and
writing down its rigorous proof are relatively trivial
once the real insight arrives; it is more like the draft-
man's work, not the architect's." (Italics added.)
Nature has endowed man with the ability to create
speech and to listen, and the rate at which speech may
be produced is within the same order of magnitude as
that at which it can be perceived. Now, contrast this
with vision wherein our eyes can take in information at
an enormously greater rate than we are able to produce
visual images naturally. Through gestures and facial
expressions we may ornament our own speech produc-
tion, but for the most part we are aware only of our own
voice and not of our visual gestures which remain
largely unconscious [15]. It seems likely to me that it is
this inability to produce visual images on the one hand,
and the excess ability to acquire visual information on
the other, that has led to all input and no output-and
hence, the notion that we think in terms of words. For
it is words that we hear ourselves speak when we com-
municate, as echos of what others have said to us. But
our mental imagery remains private, unseen, and un-
identified with the self [16].
However, most children do like to draw and, if en-
couraged, are able slowly to produce charming visual
communications of their thoughts and ideas. What is
needed is a facility to produce images as readily and as
easily as one can babble. We have seen that television
and the computer are complementary in that television
puts the viewer in a passive role whereas the computer
HUGGINS: ICONIC COMMUNICATIONS
invites active control and participation. Suppose a
minicomputer were built into every TV set so that it
would display not only the familiar program material
but also the visual results of a locally executed com-
puter program. Imagine, if you will, how a child might
react if at various points in Sesame Street, an appro-
priate, carefully designed, single-concept computer pro-
gram were transmitted to this internal minicomputer
along with the video information, and the child then
given control so that he may draw figures, select the
sixth object rather than the seventh, and generally
interact directly and actively with the subject matter
in an iconic rather than symbolic mode.
The development of such a TV computer presents
not so much a technological problem as a perceptual
and educational one. What kinds of images and schemes
can be used to show approval of the child's responses,
illustrate cause-effect relations and other abstract ideas
so important to understanding the world? We need
fundamental research on new visual conventions that,
on the one hand, will make full use of motion and other
novel features inherent in computer-generated images,
and on the other hand, will be economic and easily
realized with extant technology. Perhaps the computer
could be controlled by vocal as well as manual signals.
If so, for the first time man could produce images with
the same facility that he has always used to produce
speech sounds. Could it be that children in using such a
prosthetic aid for matching visual productions to sym-
bolic thought might acquire unsuspected skills at vis-
ualization that have waited until now for the TV and
the computer for their realization? Could it be? Could
itbe... ?
163
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author wishes to thank Prof. Doris Entwisle for
her important contributions to many of the ideas ex-
pressed in this paper. The author also wishes to thank
those who read earlier drafts of this paper for their
critical comments and the students in his seminars
wherein much of the material was developed.
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[4J T. Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture. New York:
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[51 R. Arnheim, Visual Thinking. Berkeley, Calif.: University of
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[61 L. G. Roberts, "Machine perception of three-dimensional solids,"
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[71 B. R. Bugeiski, "Words and things and images," Amer. Psychol.,
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[81 0. H. Mowrer, Learning Theory and the Symbolic Processes.
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