CASES ON TORTS AND DAMAGES VER.
1. Umali vs. Bacani, et al. | 69 SCRA 263
An electric plant company which fails to use ordinary
foresight in taking necessary precaution to eliminate tall
banana plants which when blown by a moderate wind
could trigger danger, vis-a-vis, its electric lines; which after
a storm and foreseeable damage to its lines that could
endanger life and limb did not cut off electric power from
its plant; and which, after being made aware, thru one of
its employees, that a live wire had been cut by the action
of the storm, did not take precaution to prevent anybody
from approaching the live wire, is negligent and liable for
damages for death of 3½ year old boy who went to the
place where live wire is located and got into contact with
it.
Where negligence of electric utility plant was proximate
cause of death of child, parental negligence in allowing the
child to go to place where fallen live wire was located is
merely contributory.
Negligence of employee is presumed to be negligence of
his employer who may escape liability only by proof that it
exercised diligence of good father of family to prevent
damage not only in selection of employees but in
adequately supervising their work. This liability of the
employer is primary and direct. In fact, the proper defense
for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is
to prove that he exercised the diligence of the good father
of the family to prevent damage not only in the selection
of his employees but also in adequately supervising them
over their work.
FACTS: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the
Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the
banana plants standing near the transmission line of the
Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the
electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of
which was left hanging on the electric post and the other
fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain
saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him
to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could
not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to
fix it.
Sometime thereafter, a small boy by the name of Manuel
P. Saynes, went to the place where the broken line wire
was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted
and he subsequently died. It was only after the
electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
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ISSUE: WON THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH IS DUE TO
A FORTUITOUS EVENT I.E. THE STORM?
HELD: NO. A careful examination of the records convinces
the SC that a series of negligence on the part of defendants'
employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by
electrocution. With ordinary foresight, the employees of
the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of
moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by
banana plants being blown down.
2. Picart vs. Smith | 37 Phil 809
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in
doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: Would a prudent
man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to
refrain from that course or to take precaution against its
mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is the
constitutive f act in negligence.
Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the
negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an
appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last
reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
FACTS: The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing
an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over
to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile,
however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without
diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He
then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse
that the latter being frightened, jumped around and was
killed by the passing car.
ISSUE: WON SMITH WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE SUCH AS
GIVES RISE TO A CIVIL OBLIGATION TO REPAIR THE
DAMAGE DONE?
HELD: YES. That although the plaintiff was guilty of
negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge, the
defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal
1

damages resulting from the collision, as he had a fair
opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized the
situation created by the negligence of the plaintiff and
failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while the
plaintiff could by no means then place himself in a position
of greater safety.
3. Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company | 59 Phil 758
A railroad company which does not install a semaphore at
a crossing and does not see to it that its flagman and
switchman faithfully complies with his duty of remaining at
the crossing when a train arrives, is guilty of negligence and
is civilly liable for damages suffered by a motorist and his
family who cross its line without negligence on their part.
In order that a husband may recover damages for
deprivation of his wife's assistance during her illness from
an accident, it is necessary for him to prove the existence
of such assistance and his wife's willingness to continue
rendering the same had she not been prevented from so
doing by her illness.
FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for
sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was his first time in the
area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions
of the road and had no knowledge of the existence of a
railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in question,
there was nothing to indicate its existence and, it was
impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or
eight meters from the crossing the plaintiff saw an
autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several
people, who seemed to have alighted from the said truck,
were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down and
sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. With
his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but
he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he
saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned
out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRC’s train. The
locomotive struck the plaintiff’s car right in the center. The
3 victims were injured and were hospitalized.
Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the
complaint, it denies each and every allegation thereof and,
by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the
cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and
recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from
the complaint.
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The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed
said decision, each assigning errors on said judgement.
ISSUE: WON MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY IS LIABLE
FOR DAMAGES
HELD: YES. Upon examination of the oral as well as of the
documentary evidence, this court is of the opinion that the
accident was due to negligence on the part of the
defendant-appellant company alone, for not having had on
that occasion any semaphore at the crossing to serve as a
warning to passers-by of its existence in order that they
might take the necessary precautions before crossing the
railroad; and, on the part of its employees — the flagman
and switchman, for not having remained at his post at the
crossing in question to warn passers-by of the approaching
train
Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity
employed the diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not
employ such diligence in supervising their work and the
discharge of their duties. The diligence of a good father of
a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage,
is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of
subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their
work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.
4. Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company | 27 SCRA 674
The Civil Code making clear .that whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being
negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done.
(Art. 2176) Unless it could be satisfactorily shown,
therefore, that defendant-appellee was guilty of
negligence, then it could not be held liable.
Negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance
which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the
failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
circumstances.
May be attributed to a person who does not exercise
precaution and control in crossing railroads.
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FACTS: Plaintiff´s husband was driving a jeep close to
midnight at the railroad crossing in Pampanga on February
21, 1957. Defendant´s train was passing by and blew it´s
siren. Plaintiff´s husband slowed down his jeep but did not
make a full stop. The jeep collided with the locomotive
engine of the train. Plaintiff´s husband was injured and
died asa a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action
for damages for the death of her husband.
ISSUE: WON THE PLAINTIFF CAN RECOVER DAMAGES?
HELD: NO. A person in control of an automobile who
crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who
does not exercise that precaution and that control over it
as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon
the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence,
providing a collision occurs and injury results.
The accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s
husband and she was not allowed to recover.
5. Culion Ice vs. Phil. Motors Corp. | 55 Phil 129
A person who holds himself out as being competent to do
work requiring special skill is guilty of negligence if he fails
to exhibit the care a prudent person would exhibit who is
reasonably well skilled in the particular work undertaken.
FACTS: Culion Ice and Fish was the registered owner of the
motor schooner, Gwendoline, which it uses for its fishing
trade. In order to save costs in running the boat, Culion Ice
decided to have the engine changed from gasoline
consumer to a crude oil burner. Quest, general manager of
Philippine Motors, a domestic corporation engaged in
machinery engines and motors, agreed to do the job.
Upon inspection, Quest came to conclusion that a
carburetor needed to be installed. In the course of the
work, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding and
that the gasoline and other fuel was trickling freely to the
floor but this concern was dismissed by Quest. During the
boat’s trial run, the engine stopped and upon being
started, a back fire occurred which then instantly spread
and finally engulfed Gwendoline. The crew members safely
escaped but Gwendoline was destroyed. Culion Ice moved
for the recovery of the damages against Philippine Motors.
The trial court ruled for Culion Ice. Philippine Motor asserts
that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT QUEST WAS NEGLIGENT?
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HELD: YES. When a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will
be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care
and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work
which he attempts to do.
The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in
fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does
not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar
work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the
mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the
carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate
impression of the danger of fire.
But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would,
we think have been sufficiently warned from those
circumstances (risks) to cause him to take greater and
adequate precautions against the danger. In other words
Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited
by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on
boats.
There was here on the part of Quest, a blameworthy
antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this
constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline
may be said to have resulted from accident, but this
accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would
not have occurred but for Quest’s carelessness or lack of
skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was
accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from
blame.
6. Vergara vs. CA | 154 SCRA 564
These requisites of a quasi-delict are: (1) damages to the
plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which
defendant, or some person for whose acts he must
respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and
effect between such negligence and the damages.
A mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be considered
as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were
curable and the accident preventable.
Presumption of negligence must be overcome by evidence.
FACTS: A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979,
when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck
belonging to petitioner Vicente Vergara, rammed the
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store-residence of private respondent Amadeo Azarcon,
causing damage assessed at P53,024.22. The trial court
rendered decision in favor of private respondent, ordering
the petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Traveller’s
Insurance and Surety Corporation.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto; hence,
this instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF
QUASI-DELICT?
HELD: YES. It was established by competent evidence that
the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at
bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or
some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty;
and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages.
The fact of negligence may be deduced from the
surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the
police report, "the cargo truck was traveling on the right
side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the
center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then
bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said
cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff."
According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the
brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical
defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap
caused by defective brakes cannot be consideration as
fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable
and the accident preventable.
7. FGU Insurance vs. CA | 287 SCRA 718
To sustain a claim for damages based on quasi-delict, the
following requisites must concur:
(a) Damage suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) Fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
(c) Connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff.
FACTS: A Mitsubishi Colt Lancer owned by FILCAR driven by
a Danish tourist Peter Dahl-Jensen collided with another
Mitsubishi Colt Lancer owned by Lydia Soriano driven by
Benjamin Jacildone. The accident took place at EDSA. The
car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left
side of the car of Soriano. At that time, Dahl-Jensen did not
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CASES ON TORTS AND DAMAGES VER. 7
possess a Philippine driver‘s license. FGU Insurance
Corporation, in view of its contact with Soriano, paid
Soriano.
By way of subrogation, FGU sued Dahl-Jensen and FILCAR
and Fortune Insurance Corporation. Dahl-Jensen was
dropped in the complaint because summons was not
served to him. TC dismissed the case for failure to
substantiate the claim of subrogation. CA affirmed the TC‘s
ruling based on another ground, i.e. only the fault or
negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proceed but not
that of FILCAR.
ISSUE: WON ON THE ACTION BASED ON QUASI-DELICT
PROSPER AGAINST A RENT-A-CAR COMPANY, AND
CONSEQUENTLY, IT’S INSURER FOR FAULT OR
NEGLIGENCE OF THE CAR LEASE IN DRIVING THE RENTED
VEHICLE.
HELD: NO. To sustain a claim based on Article 2176 CC, the
following requisites must concur: a) damage suffered by
the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by
the plaintiff.
It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to
Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other
vehicle his personal liability. FILCAR did not have any
participation therein.
Par. 5 of Art. 2180 in relation to Art. 2184 of the same Code
provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily
liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortune x x x x If the owner was not in the motor vehicle,
the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously,
this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of
the absence of master-driver relationship between
respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has
no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis
of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent
FORTUNE can neither prosper.
8. Singson vs. BPI | 132 Phil 597
Existence of a contract between the parties is not a bar to
the commission of a, tort by the one against the other.
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FACTS: Singson was one of the defendants in a civil case
filed before the CFI Manila. Judgment was rendered
sentencing him and his co-defendants Celso Lobregat and
Villa-Abrille & Co. to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to
Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat appealed,
while the decision became final and executory as to Villa-
Abrille. A writ of garnishment was issued to BPI against the
Villa-Abrille’s account.
The clerk of BPI who received the writ saw the petitioner’s
name and, without reading the full text, wrote a letter for
the signature of the bank President, informing Singson of
the garnishment. Subsequently, Singson issued two checks.
The one issued in favor of B.M. Glass Service was
dishonored, and so petitioner’s account with the latter was
closed.
Singson wrote a letter to the bank, claiming that his
account is not included in the writ of garnishment. Having
confirmed so, the bank President Santiago Friexas
apologized to Singson and rectified the mistake. Singson
filed a claim for damages. The lower court ruled that
damages for quasi-delict cannot be sustained because the
relationship between the parties is contractual. Petitioner
and his wife appealed the case.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DAMAGES BASED ON TORTS
CAN BE AWARDED BASED ON A CONTRACT?
HELD: YES. The existence of a contract between the parties
does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against
the order and the consequent recovery of damages
therefor. The act that breaks the contract may also be a
tort.
9. City of Manila vs. Meralco | 52 Phil 586
AS A GENERAL RULE, a record in a criminal action cannot
be admitted in evidence in a civil action EXCEPT by way of
inducement or to show a collateral fact. The very obvious
reason is that the parties and the issues in a criminal action
and a civil action are not the same. It is rudimentary that
due process must be followed in the trial of all causes. No
man or entity may be condemned without a day in court.
FACTS: On June 8, 1925, there occurred a collision between
a car owned by Meralco and driven by Sixto Eustaquio, and
a truck belonging to the City of Manila. Eustaquio was
prosecuted and found guilty of damage to property and
slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was
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CASES ON TORTS AND DAMAGES VER. 7
sentenced to pay P1788.27 plus fine of P900 and costs,
with subsidiary imprisonment. Not being able to collect
from the convict, the City of Manila proceeded against
Meralco for subsidiary liability. Meralco set up the defense
of a good father of a family. The trial judge thought it
unnecessary to present the witnesses offered by the fiscal,
and took cognizance of the records of the criminal case
decision and the record in the criminal case which
convicted the motorman, all against the protest of counsel
for the Manila Electric Company.
The adverse judgment is now contested on the ground that
the trial court committed two errors, the first in admitting
in evidence the records in the case of the People of the
Philippine Islands vs. Sixto Eustaquio; and the second in not
absolving the appellant from the complaint.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MAY RELY ON THE
RECORDS OF THE CRIMINAL CASE TO RENDER JUDGMENT
ON THE CIVIL CASE?
HELD: AS A GENERAL RULE, a record in a criminal action
cannot be admitted in evidence in a civil action EXCEPT by
way of inducement or to show a collateral fact. The very
obvious reason is that the parties and the issues in a
criminal action and a civil action are not the same. It is
rudimentary that due process must be followed in the trial
of all causes. No man or entity may be condemned without
a day in court. The Manila Electric Company was not a party
at the trial of the criminal case.
ISSUE: WHETHER MERALCO SHOULD BE ABSOLVED FROM
THE LIABILITY?
HELD: NO. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which
civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different
ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by
alleging and proving that the master had exercised all
diligence in the selection and training of its servants to
prevent the damage. That would be good defense to a
strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil
action or misdemeanor.
10. United States vs. Barias | 23 Phil 586
Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of
the interests of another person, that degree of care,
5

precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."
If a moment's attention and reflection would have shown
a person that the act which he was about to perform was
liable to have the harmful consequences which it had, such
person acted with temerity and may be guilty of
imprudencia temeraria
The diligence with which the law requires the individual at
all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the
situation in which he is placed and with the importance of
the act which he is to perform.
A motorman operating a street car on a public street in a
densely populated section of the city of Manila is bound to
know and to recognize that any negligence on his part in
observing the track over which he is running his car may
result in fatal accidents. – He has no right, when he starts
from a standstill, to assume that the track before his car is
clear. It is his duty to satisfy himself of that fact by keeping
a sharp lookout and doing everything in his power to avoid
the danger which is necessarily incident to the operation of
heavy street cars on thoroughfares in populous sections of
the city.
In the absence of some regulation of his employers, a
motorman who has brought his car to a standstill is not
bound to keep his eyes directly to the front while the car is
stopped, but before setting it again in motion it is his duty
to satisfy himself that the track is clear, and for that
purpose to look and to see the track just in front of his car.
The reasons of public policy which impose upon street car
companies and their employees the duty of exercising the
utmost degree of diligence in securing the safety of
passengers, apply with equal force to the duty of avoiding
infliction of injuries upon pedestrians and others upon the
public streets and thoroughfares over which such
companies are authorized to run their cars.
It is the manifest duty of a motorman operating an electric
street car on a public thoroughfare in a thickly settled
district, to satisfy himself that the track is clear
immediately in front of his car before setting it in motion
from a stand-still, and for that purpose to incline his body
slightly forward, if that be necessary, in order to bring the
track immediately in front of his car within his line of vision.
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FACTS: This is an appeal from a sentence imposed by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, for homicide resulting
from reckless negligence.
On November 2, 1911, Segundo Barias, a motorman of
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, was driving his
vehicle car along Rizal Avenue and stopped in near the
intersection of Calle Requesen Street, upon stopping, he
took some passengers and looked backward presumably to
take not whether all the passengers were aboard. At that
moment, Fermina Jose, a child about 3 years old, walked or
ran in front of the car.
She was knocked down and dragged some little distance
underneath the car, which caused her death. Barias
proceeded with his car some distance from the place of the
accident, and apparently knew nothing of it until his return,
when he was informed of what happened. One witness
testified that Barias started the car without turning his
head over the track immediately in front of the car. After
which, a case was filed against him in the Trial Court of
Manila, holding him guilty of Reckless Negligence.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS CARELESSNESS OR
WANT OF ORDINARY CARE?
HELD: YES. The place on which the incident occurred was a
public street in a densely populated section of the city at
about six in the morning, the time when the residents of
such streets begins to move about. Under such conditions
a motorman of an electric street car was clearly charged
with a high degree of diligence in the performance of his
duties.
Barias did not exercise that degree of diligence required of
him. Having brought his car to a standstill it was his
bounden duty to keep his eyes directed to the front. It was
his duty to satisfy himself that the track was clear, and, for
that purpose, to look and to see the track just in front of
his car. This the defendant did not do, and the result of his
negligence was the death of the child.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court convicting and
sentencing the appellant is affirmed. The penalty should be
reduced. So ordered.
11. GAN vs. CA | 165 SCRA 378
The test for determining whether or not a person is
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results
6

to the person or property of another is this: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured
as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer to
take precaution against its mischievous results and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence.
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the
emergency rule. Under that rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if
he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence.
FACTS: In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy
Gan was driving along Manila. There were two vehicles
parked on one side of the road, one following the other. As
the car driven by Gan approached the place where the two
vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the
opposite direction, followed by another which tried to
overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching the lane
of the car driven by Gan. To avoid a head-on collision, Gan
swerved to the right and as a consequence, hit an old man
who was about to cross the street, pinning him against the
rear of one of the parked vehicles. The force of the impact
caused the parked vehicle to move forward hitting the
other parked vehicle in front of it. The pedestrian was
injured, Gan's car and the two parked vehicle suffered
damages. The pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival
at the hospital.
Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence.
On appeal, CA modified the trial court's decision convicting
Gan of Homicide thru simple imprudence.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for
Homicide thru simple imprudence.
HELD: YES. Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly
finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method,
unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence.
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Applying the above test to the case at bar, the SC finds the
petitioner not guilty of the crime of simple imprudence
resulting in Homicide.
12. People vs. De Los Santos | 355 SCRA 415
Instinct tells one “to stop or swerve to a safe place the
moment he sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to
avoid bumping or killing the same,” and more so if the one
on the road is a person.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in
doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man,
in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued?
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless
imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act, taking into consideration:
(1) His employment or occupation;
(2) His degree of intelligence;
(3) His physical condition; and
(4) Other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
FACTS: Around 10:30pm, herein respondent Glenn de los
Santos was asked by a friend and a fellow band member to
provide them with transportation since they were to
participate in the San Miguel sponsored Sabado Nights of
the Lanzones festival. Before travelling on the highway he
drank 3 bottles of beer. Glenn was the one driving the Isuzu
elf.
The guards waived at the defendant when they saw the
truck fast approaching but the latter kept going and ran
over several members of the PNP who were jogging at the
time. They fell like dominos, one after the other, some
were thrown, and others were overrun by the vehicle. The
RTC convicted Glenn of the complex crime of murder,
multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted
murder with the use of a motor vehicle as qualifying
circumstance. He was sentenced to death, thus this
automatic review.
7

ISSUE: WHETHER GLENN SHOULD BE CONVICTED OF
MURDER OR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE?
HELD: Glenn should be convicted of reckless imprudence.
Considering that the incident was not a product of
malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of
reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty of the complex
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious
physical injuries.
Considering that death penalty is involved, the trial court
should be more scrupulous in weighing the evidence.
From the circumstances, the Court believed that the tragic
event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of
a malicious intent.
 PAGASA‘s observed weather report: sky was
overcast – absolutely no break in the thick clouds.
 The joggers were wearing black – no reflectorized
vests or gloves.
 Joggers were facing the same direction as Glenn who
was driving at the correct lane.
 Instinct, to stop or swerve when something on the
road is seen. It would be inconceivable for Glenn, a
then young college graduate with a pregnant wife
and 3 very young children who were dependent on
him for support, to have deliberately hit the group
with his truck.
 Glenn failed to apply the brakes or to swerve his
vehicle to the left or to a safe place the moment he
heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Glenn
showed an inexcusable lack of precaution.
13. Phoenix Construction vs. IAC | 148 SCRA 353
Information gathered by a traffic investigator from persons
who saw how the accident took place is admissible as part
of the res gestae.
The fact that a driver smelled of liquor does not necessarily
mean he is drunk.
The improper parking of truck created an unreasonable risk
for anyone driving on that street for which the truck driver
should be held responsible as the negligence of a car driver
bumping that truck was no more than a foreseeable
consequence of the risk created by the truck driver.
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The negligence of car driver who bumps an improperly
parked truck is merely contributory.
Doctrine of "last clear chance" is a common-law theory
adopted to mitigate the harshness of the "contributory
negligence of the plaintiff rule under which in common-law
countries plaintiff is barred from any recovery, unlike in our
system of law where the Civil Code expressly states that it
will merely reduce the amount to be recovered.
Doctrine of last clear chance in common law cannot be
applied as a general rule in negligence cases in our civil law
system.
Employer's failure to exercise vigilance over its employee
evident from the improper parking of the truck on the
street at night along employee's residence.
Contributory negligence may result in 20% reduction of
damages.
FACTS: In the early morning of 15 November 1975, at about
1:30am, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his
way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his
boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation,
where he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor.
He had just crossed an intersection and while driving down
the street, his headlights were turned off. When he
switched on his headlights to “bright”, he suddenly saw a
Ford dump truck some 2 ½ meters away from his
Volkswagen car. It was later found out that he did not a
curfew pass that night.
The dump truck belonged to co-petitioner Phoenix, and
was parked there by the company’ driver, co-petitioner
Carbonel. It was parked on the right hand side of the lane
that Dionisio was driving on, but it was parked facing the
oncoming traffic. It was parked askew so it was sticking out
onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming
traffic. There were no lights nor were there any “early
warning” reflector devices set anywhere near the truck,
front or rear
Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which
was scheduled to be used the next morning. Dionisio, upon
seeing the truck, tried to avoid a collision by swerving to
the left, but it was too late. His car smashed into the truck.
Dionisio suffered physical injuries, including permanent
facial scars, “a nervous breakdown” and loss of two gold
8

bridge dentures. Dionision filed an action for damages
against Carbonel and Phoenix.
Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident
to respondent’s own negligence in driving at a high speed
without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated.
It invoked the Last Clear Chance Doctrine: Dionisio had the
Last Clear Chance of avoiding the accident and so Dionisio,
having failed to take the last clear chance, must bear his
own injuries alone.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
private respondent.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COLLISION WAS BROUGHT BY
RESPONDENT’S OWN NEGLIGENCE?
HELD: NO. Dionisio is guilty of contributory negligent but
the legal and proximate cause of the collision was brought
about by the way the truck was parked.
The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of
Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in
which the dump truck was parked in other words, the
negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of
Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact
that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk,
to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has
indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are
within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's
negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that
intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not
supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a
defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff
to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the
risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is
run down by a car, even though the car is negligently
driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway
without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when
another negligently drives into it.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
"only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due
care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may
recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts.
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The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the Common Law was
imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is
still a matter of debate whether, or to what extent, it has
found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The doctrine was applied by Common Law because they
had a rule that contributory negligence prevented any
recovery at all by a negligent plaintiff. But in the Philippines
we have Article 2179 of the Civil Code which rejects the
Common Law doctrine of contributory negligence. Thus,
the court in this case stated that it does not believe so that
the general concept of Last Clear Chance has been utilized
in our jurisdiction.
Article 2179 on contributory negligence is not an exercise
in chronology or physics but what is important is the
negligent act or omission of each party and the character
and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for
the rest of the community. To say that Phoenix should be
absolved from liability would come close to wiping out the
fundamental law that a man must respond for the
foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or
omission. Thus, the Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not
applied because the court thinks that it is not applicable in
our jurisdiction.
14. Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. | 7 Phil 329
The test is simple. Distinction must be between the
accident and the injury, between the event itself, without
which there could have been no accident, and those acts
of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing under review was the displacement of the
crosspiece or the failure to replace it.
In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries
to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action
be first prosecuted against the employer or his
representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No
criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil action may
proceed to judgment.
The responsibility of an employer to his employee arises
out of the contractual relations between them and is
regulated by article 1101 and the following articles of the
Civil Code.
The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule,"
exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred
9

through the negligence of a fellow servant of the employee
injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE — The negligence of the
injured person contributing to his injury but not being one
of the determining causes of the principal accident, does
not operate as a bar to recovery, but only in reduction of
his damages. Each party is chargeable with damages in
proportion to his fault.
FACTS: Rakes, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the
employment of Atlantic Gulf, was at work transporting iron
rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard. The
men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. Some
of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain
spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie
broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and
caught Rakes, breaking his leg, which was afterwards
amputated at about the knee. In two particulars, Rakes is
charged with carelessness: First. That having noticed the
depression in the track he continued his work; and Second.
That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car
instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RAKES’ CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE BARS HIM FROM RECOVERING?
HELD: NO. In Fance, the carelessness of the victim did not
civilly relieve the person without whose fault the accident
could not have happened, but that the contributory
negligence of the injured man had the effect only of
reducing the damages.
In the Canadian Province of Quebee, if in the case of
damage there was fault or negligence on the part of the
person injured or in the part of someone else, the
indemnification shall be reduced in the first case, and in the
second case it shall be appropriated in proportion to such
fault or negligence as provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
section 2372.
Article 1304 of the Austrian Code, the victim who is partly
changeable with the accident shall stand his damages in
proportion to his fault, but when that proportion is
incapable of ascertainment, he shall share the liability
equally with the person principally responsible. The
principle of proportional damages appears to be also
adopted in article 51 of the Swiss Code.
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The Court found the theory of damages laid down in the
judgment the most consistent with the history and the
principals of our law in these Islands and with its logical
development.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts
of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes
of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be
between the accident and the injury, between the event
itself, without which there could have been no accident,
and those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it.
This produced the event giving occasion for damages, that
is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.
To this event, the act of Rakes in walking by the side of the
car did not contribute, although it was an element of the
damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been
out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission
of duty, the last would have been one of the determining
causes of the event or accident, for which he would have
been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot
recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes
only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such
injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence.
15. Alba vs. Bulaong | 101 Phil 434, 437
Where the injured employee is offered, by the third party,
compensation which he deems insufficient, he may reject
it and thereafter litigate with such party; or choose instead
to complain against his employer; or accept such
insufficient compensation but expressly reserving at the
same time his right to recover additional damages from his
employer. In the latter case the amount received from the
third party shall be deducted from the amount payable by
the employer.
FACTS: The case revolves around a claim for compensation
from Dr. Bulaong, the petitioners being his employees and
their dependents.
10

Early morning of that day, upon the specific orders of Dr.
Bulaong, the five employees were went to Bulacan to
thresh palay. Suddenly, the thresher collided with a
speeding bus of the Victory Liner, Inc., thereby hitting the
tractor the employees are riding. The employees were
violently thrown out. Two of them died and three of them
sustained physical injuries. With that, five separate claims
were filed. Dr. Bulaong’s defenses were: (a) claimants were
not his employees, but industrial partners, (b) the injuries
were not sustained in the course of employment and (c)
the claims, if any, had been extinguished by virtue of the
monetary settlements which petitioners had concluded
with the Victory Liner Inc.
The referee overruled the defenses, having found the five
to be employees who had died or were injured in the
course of employment. Consequently, he required the
employer to make compensation. On appeal, the
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner absolved Dr.
Bulaong from all liability, because he found that the
claimants had received, after the mishap, various amounts
of money from Victory Liner Inc., each of them having
executed a written release or waiver in favor of said Liner.
A portion of it read: “And I likewise freely and completely
cede and transfer into said Victory Liner Inc. any right given
to me by law against any person or company that should
be liable for the said accident except my right to claim
against Dr. Horacio Bulaong.
Claimants, the Commissioner declared, had elected to hold
the Liner responsible for the accident, and could not
thereafter turn around to recover their employer. He cited
section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, which
states: “In case an employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other person
besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured
employee either to claim compensation from his employer,
under this Act, or sue such other person for damages in
accordance with law; and in case compensation is claimed
and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who
paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the
same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of
recovering from such person what he paid: Provided, That
in case the employer recovers from such third person
damages in excess of those paid or allowed under this Act,
such excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or
any other person entitled thereto, after deduction of at the
expenses of the employer and the costs of the
proceedings.”
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ISSUE: WHETHER THE EMPLOYEES CAN RECOVER FROM
DR. BULAONG DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF A WAIVER
BETWEEN THEM AND VICTORY LINER?
HELD: YES. The plain intent of the law is that they shall not
receive payment twice for the same injuries (from the third
party and from the employer). Hence, if without suing they
receive full damages from the third party, they should be
deemed to have practically made the election under the
law, and should be prevented from thereafter suing the
employer. Full damages means, of course what they would
have demanded in a suit against the third party or what
they would receive in a compensation as complete
settlement. Needless to say, where the injured employee
is offered, by the third party, compensation which he
deems insufficient, he may reject it and thereafter litigate
with such third party. Or choose instead to complain
against his employer.
There is nothing in the law to prevent him from accepting
such insufficient compensation but expressly reserving at
the same time his right to recover additional damages from
his employer. If the third party agrees to the reservation,
such partial payment may legally be made and accepted.
The employer cannot validly object to such reservation by
the employee, because in effect the settlement helps to
reduce the amount he will have to pay.
In the case, the five employees' acceptance of the Victory
Liner's offer of compensation showed they were not
content with the amount received — they did not consider
it sufficient — so they reserved their right to require
additional compensation from their employer. Hence their
action against Dr. Bulaong is not barred by section 6. He
may in turn demand reimbursement from Victory Liner Inc.
There are advantages that Victory Liner may gain from the
settlement. Its driver would not be prosecuted by
petitioners; besides earning such driver's gratitude, the
Liner thereby avoided losses in time and services. And
another, even if it be liable to the employer for whatever
the latter might have to satisfy, the Liner could expect the
settlement between employer and employees to be
reasonable considering their relationship, more
reasonable perhaps than a settlement between itself and
the injured employees.
The Court further ruled that the moneys received from
Victory Liner Inc. did not necessarily have the effect of
releasing Dr. Bulaong. Inasmuch as the five men were his
employees, and they were injured by reason of and in the
11

course of their employment, he must pay compensation to
be fixed in accordance with law. Bearing in mind, however,
the law's intention not to give double compensation, the
amounts they have received from the Victory Liner shall be
deducted from the sums so determined.
16. Calalas vs. CA | 332 SCRA 356
FACTS: Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger
jeepney owned and operated by Petitioner Vicente Calalas.
As the jeepney was already full, she was just given an
“extension seat”, a wooden stool, at the rear end of the
vehicle.
On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off.
Since Sunga was seated at the rear end, she gave way to
the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu
Elf Truck driven by Igclerio Verena and owned by Francisco
Salva, bumped to the left rear end of the jeepney. This
incident cause injury to Sunga.
She filed a complaint for damages against Calalas on the
ground of breach of contract of carriage. On the other
hand, Calalas filed a third-party complaint against Salva,
the owner of the truck.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and
absolved Calalas from liability holding that it was the truck
owner who is responsible for the accident based on quasi-
delict.
However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the
appellate court reversed the RTC’s decision, on the ground
that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a breach of
contract of carriage and not on quasi-delict.
Hence, this appeal from Calalas.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE TRUCK
DRIVER AS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
WHICH NEGATES PETITIONER’S LIABILITY?
HELD: NO. First, the issue in this case is the liability under
contract of carriage.
In this case, the petitioner failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination as a common carrier in violation of
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.
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There is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It
is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision was
the truck driver, because the doctrine of proximate cause
applies only to cases of quasi-delict.
The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing
liability to a person where there is no relation between him
and another party. But in the case at bar, there is a pre-
existing relation between petitioner and respondent in
their contract of carriage. Hence, upon happening of the
accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose on
Calalas’ part, which makes him liable.
17. PCIB vs CA | 350 SCRA 464
FACTS: Ford Philippines filed actions to recover from the
drawee bank Citibank and collecting bank PCIB the value of
several checks payable to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue which were embezzled allegedly by an organized
syndicate. What prompted this action was the drawing of
a check by Ford, which it deposited to PCIB as payment and
was debited from their Citibank account. It later on found
out that the payment wasn’t received by the
Commissioner.
Meanwhile, according to the NBI report, one of the checks
issued by petitioner was withdrawn from PCIB for alleged
mistake in the amount to be paid. This was replaced with
manager’s check by PCIB, which were allegedly stolen by
the syndicate and deposited in their own account.
The trial court decided in favor of Ford.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT HAS FORD THE RIGHT TO
RECOVER THE VALUE OF THE CHECKS INTENDED AS
PAYMENT TO CIR?
HELD: YES. The checks were drawn against the drawee
bank but the title of the person negotiating the same was
allegedly defective because the instrument was obtained
by fraud and unlawful means, and the proceeds of the
checks were not remitted to the payee. It was established
that instead paying the Commissioner, the checks were
diverted and encashed for the eventual distribution among
members of the syndicate.
Pursuant to this, it is vital to show that the negotiation is
made by the perpetrator in breach of faith amounting to
fraud. The person negotiating the checks must have gone
beyond the authority given by his principal. If the principal
12

could prove that there was no negligence in the
performance of his duties, he may set up the personal
defense to escape liability and recover from other parties
who, through their own negligence, allowed the
commission of the crime.
It should be resolved if Ford is guilty of the imputed
contributory negligence that would defeat its claim for
reimbursement, bearing in mind that its employees were
among the members of the syndicate. It appears although
the employees of Ford initiated the transactions
attributable to the organized syndicate, their actions were
not the proximate cause of encashing the checks payable
to CIR.
The degree of Ford’s negligence couldn’t be characterized
as the proximate cause of the injury to parties. The mere
fact that the forgery was committed by a drawer-payor’s
confidential employee or agent, who by virtue of his
position had unusual facilities for perpetrating the fraud
and imposing the forged paper upon the bank, doesn’t
entitle the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the
absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the
drawer.
Note: not only PCIB but also Citibank is responsible for
negligence. Citibank was negligent in the performance of
its duties as a drawee bank. It failed to establish its
payments of Ford’s checks were made in due course and
legally in order.
18. Picart vs. Smith | 37 Phil 809
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in
doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: Would a prudent
man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to
refrain from that course or to take precaution against its
mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is the
constitutive f act in negligence.
Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the
negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an
appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last
reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
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CASES ON TORTS AND DAMAGES VER. 7
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
FACTS: The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing
an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over
to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile,
however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without
diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He
then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse
that the latter being frightened, jumped around and was
killed by the passing car.
ISSUE: WON SMITH WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE SUCH AS
GIVES RISE TO A CIVIL OBLIGATION TO REPAIR THE
DAMAGE DONE?
HELD: YES. That although the plaintiff was guilty of
negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge, the
defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal
damages resulting from the collision, as he had a fair
opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized the
situation created by the negligence of the plaintiff and
failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while the
plaintiff could by no means then place himself in a position
of greater safety.
19. Del Prado vs. Meralco | 52 Phil 901
FACTS: Teodorico Florenciano, Meralco’s motorman, was
driving the company’s street car along Hidalgo Street.
Plaintiff Ignacio Del Prado ran across the street to catch the
car. The motorman eased up but did not put the car into
complete stop. Plaintiff was able to get hold of the rail and
step his left foot when the car accelerated. As a result,
plaintiff slipped off and fell to the ground. His foot was
crushed by the wheel of the car. He filed a complaint for
culpa contractual.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE MOTORMAN WAS NEGLIGENT?
HELD: We may observe at the outset that there is no
obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop
its cars to let on intending passengers at other points than
those appointed for stoppage. Nevertheless, although the
motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the
plaintiff on, it was his duty to do no act that would have the
effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was
attempting to board the car. The premature acceleration
of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty.
13

ISSUE: WHETHER MERALCO IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE?
HELD: The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire
and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and a failure on
the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its
passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa contractual).
Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes
to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well
as to those alighting therefrom.
Where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana),
not involving a breach of positive obligation, an employer,
or master, may exculpate himself by proving that he had
exercised due diligence to prevent the damage; whereas
this defense is not available if the liability of the master
arises from a breach of contractual duty (culpa
contractual). In the case before us the company pleaded as
a special defense that it had used all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by the
plaintiff; and to establish this contention the company
introduced testimony showing that due care had been
used in training and instructing the motorman in charge of
this car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant in view of the
fact that the liability involved was derived from a breach of
obligation.
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE WAS CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF?
HELD: It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in
attempting to board the moving car was not the proximate
cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the
injury was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on
the power prematurely. Again, the situation before us is
one where the negligent act of the company's servant
succeeded the negligent act of the plaintiff, and the
negligence of the company must be considered the
proximate cause of the injury. The rule here applicable
seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which
is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "the last clear
chance." In accordance with this doctrine, the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if
it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of
reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. The
negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to
the accident and must be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.
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20. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad | 16 Phil 8
FACTS: An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye
and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by
his father, his nearest relative. The defendant is a foreign
corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway
and an electric light system in the city of Manila. The
plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received
the injuries complained of, 15 years of age. On the 30th of
September, 1905 David together with his companion
Manuel Claparols went to the company’s premises and
found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
scattered on the ground. They tried to break the cap with
a stone and hammer but failed, so they opened one of the
caps with a knife and finding that it was filed with a
yellowish substance they lighted it with a match and
explosion followed causing them more or less injuries and
to the removal of the right eye of David. So this action
arises and the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
RULING OF THE LOWER COURT: The claim of the plaintiff
shows that evidence in the record sufficiently establishes
the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the
reasonable inference that the caps found on its premises
were its property. Thus, applying the provisions of the
Articles 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles
1902, 1903, and 1908 of that Code, the company is liable
for the damage which was occurred. Not satisfied with the
decision of lower court, counsel for defendant and
appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that
the facts proven at the trial do not establish the liability of
the company under the provisions of these articles.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DAVID IS ENTITLED TO
DAMAGES?
HELD: NO. The Court held that the plaintiff in this case had
sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the
danger to which he exposed himself when he put the
match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in
the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to
understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise
of that degree of caution which would have avoided the
injury resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the
injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct
and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so
that while it may be true that these injuries would not have
been incurred but for the negligent act of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff’s own act was the proximate and principal cause
14

of the accident which inflicted the injury. The Court held
that it is quite clear that the immediate cause of the
explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff’s injury,
was his own act in putting a match to the contents of the
cap, and that having “contributed to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot
recover”.
21. NAPOCOR vs. CA | 161 SCRA 334
FACTS: On August 4, 1964, ECI being a successful bidder,
executed a contract in Manila with the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) to furnish
all the tools, labor, equipment, and materials (not
furnished by the owner) and to construct the proposed 2nd
Ipo-Bicti Tunnel at Norzaragay, Bulacan within 800
calendar days. The tunnel would be passing through the
mountain, from the Ipo river, a part of Norzaragay where
the Ipo Dam of NPC is located.
By September 1967, ECI already completed the tunnel
excavation work. All the equipment not needed at the Bicti
site were then transferred to the Ipo site, where some
projects were not yet completed.
On November 4, 1967, typhoon “Welming” hit Central
Luzon, passing through NCP’s Angat Hydro-electric project
and Dam at Ipo, Norzaragay, Bulacan. Due to the heavy
downpour, the water in the reservoir of the Angat Dam,
was rising perilously at the rate of 60 cm per hour. To
prevent an overflow of water from the dam since the water
level has reached danger heights, the NPC caused the
opening of the spillway gates.
ECI filed a case against NPC. The trial court established the
fact that due to the negligent manner with which the
spillway gates of the dam were opened, an extraordinary
large volume of water rushed out of the gates, and hit the
installations and constructions of ECI at the Ipo Site, as a
result, of which the latter's stockpile of materials and
supplies, camp facilities and permanent structures and
accessories were washed away, lost or destroyed.
CA sustained the factual findings of the trial court. NPC
assailed the CA decision as being erroneous on the ground
that the destruction and loss of ECI's equipment and
facilities were due to force majeure.
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ISSUE: WON THE DESTRUCTION AND LOSS OF THE ECI'S
EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES WERE DUE TO FORCE
MAJEURE?
HELD: NO. NPC was undoubtedly negligent because it
opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the
height of typhoon "Welming" when it knew very well that
it was safer to have opened the same gradually and earlier,
as it was also undeniable that NPC knew of the coming
typhoon at least four days before it actually struck.
Even though the typhoon was an act of God or force
majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because its
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and
damage.
22. LBC Air Cargo vs. CA | 241 SCRA 619
FACTS: At about 11:30 am of 15 Nov 1987, Rogelio
Monterola was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle
towards Mangaggoy on the right lane along a dusty road in
Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van
of LBC, driven by petitioner herein, Tano, Jr., was coming
from the opposite direction on its way to Bislig Airport.
When Tano was approaching the airport entrance on his
left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the
opposite direction. Tano stopped the van and waited for
the 2 vehicles to pass by. The dust made the visibility
extremely bad. Instead of waiting Tano started to make a
sharp left turn and when he was about to reach the center
of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola
suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on
against the LBC van. Monterola died.
ISSUE: WON THE NEGLIGENCE OF MONTEROLA IS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT?
HELD: The proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of petitioner Tano, who, despite poor visibility,
hastily executed a left turn w/o waiting for the dust to
settle.
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear
chance." In the instant case, the victim was travelling along
the lane where he was right supposed to be. The incident
occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed
that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity
to avoid the collision. However, the deceased was
contributorily negligent in evidently speeding.
15

The SC agrees w the CA that there was contributory
negligence on the victim's part that warrants a mitigation
of petitioner's liability for damages.
23. China Airlines vs. CA | 45985 | 1990
Respondents, Antonio Salvador and Rolando Lao planned
to travel to Los Angeles, California to pursue a cable
business deal involving the distribution of Filipino films.
Initially, Morelia Travel Agency booked their flight with
China Airlines (CAL).
Upon discovering that Morelia charged higher rates than
American Express Travel (Amexco), they dropped the
services of Morelia. Lao called Amexco claiming that he and
Salvador had a confirmed booking with CAL. Lao then gave
to Amexco the record locator number that CAL issued
previously to Morelia. CAL confirmed the booking.
When the respondents were at the airport, CAL prevented
them from boarding because their names were not in the
passenger's manifest. CAL cancelled the reservations when
Morelia revoked the booking. But the respondents were
able to get a flight with Northwest Airlines.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A BREACH IN THE
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE?
HELD: YES. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger
confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a
contract of carriage arises. The passenger has every right
to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date.
When CAL did not allow respondents, who were in
possession of the confirmed tickets, from boarding its
airplane because their names were not in the manifest, it
constituted a breach of contract of carriage.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE THERE WAS BAD FAITH?
HELD: NO. Bad faith should always be established by clear
and convincing evidence since the law always presumes
good faith.
In the case, there were three reasons why CAL cancelled
the reservations. First was Amexco's unauthorized use of
the record locator number. Second was CAL's negligence in
confirming the reservations of Amexco. Third was the
absence of the correct contact numbers of private
respondents. There was no concerted effort on the part of
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CAL to cancel respondent's reservations in favor of other
passengers.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CLAIMS
FOR DAMAGES?
HELD: NO. Not entitled to moral damages because not
every case of mental anguish, fright or anxiety calls for the
award of moral damages.
Not entitled to exemplary damages because CAL was not
in bad faith and its employees did not act in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Not entitled to actual damages because respondents did
not shell out any money for their CAL tickets. Respondents
would have been entitled to the price difference between
the tickets of CAL and Northwest had the latter cost more
than the former but this was not the case. Evidence shows
that Northwest tickets ($625) cost less than CAL tickets
($629). The court cannot order reimbursement of the
Northwest tickets because this would have enabled
respondents to fly for free. The cost of the tickets were a
necessary expense that private respondents could not pass
on to CAL.
Entitled to nominal damages of P5,000 when the plaintiff
suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant an
award of actual damages.
24. Exconde vs. Capuno | 10134 | June 29, 1957
FACTS: Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts
Organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary
School he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon
instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school
Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the
same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove
it while the driver sat on his left side.
The jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado
Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiiia, died as a consequence.
Dante Capuno, was found guilty of double homicide
through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro
Caperina and Amado Ticzon. Dante Capuno was only
fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime.
Herein petitioner, Sabina Exconde filed action against
Delfin Capuno and his son Dante asking for damages for the
16

death of her son, Isidoro Caperina. Defendants set up the
defense that if anyone should be held liable for the death
of Isidoro, it should be Dante and not his father Delfin
because at the time of the accident, the former was not
under the control, supervision and custody of the latter.
The defense was sustained by the lower court and the
Court of Appeals, hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER DEFENDANT DELFIN CAPUNO CAN BE
HELD CIVILLY LIABLE, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY WITH HIS
SON DANTE, FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENT
ACT OF MINOR DANTE CAPUNO?
HELD: The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish
Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which provides:
"Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding
articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another
is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor
children who live with them.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable
for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices
while they are under their custody."
It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or
directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody", but this provision only applies to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
educational institution
Here Dante was then a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular
activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal
upon instruction of the city school's supervisor.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father for
any damages that may be caused by the minor children
who live with them, is obvious.
This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority
they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents
the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in
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proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives
them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation"
25. First Malayan vs. CA | GR 91378 | June 9 1992
FACTS: The case revolves around the determination of
liability when motor vehicle registration comes into play.
Crisostomo Vitug filed a civil case against First Malayan
Leasing to recover damages mainly for physical injuries,
loss of personal effects and the wreck of his car resulting
from a three-car collision involving an Isuzu cargo truck
belonging to FMLFC driven by Crispin Sicat, his car and
another car.
The evidence shows that while Vitug's car was at a full stop
at the intersection of New York St. and EDSA, northbound,
the on-coming Isuzu cargo truck bumped, a Ford Granada
car behind him with such force that the Ford car was
thrown on top of Vitug's car crushing its roof. The cargo
truck then struck Vitug's car in the rear causing the gas tank
to explode and setting the car ablaze. Vitug was fortunately
carried out of his car by bystanders before the vehicle
exploded. However, two of his passengers were burned to
death. Vitug's car, valued at P70,000, was a total loss.
When he regained consciousness in the hospital, Vitug
discovered that he had lost various personal articles valued
at P48,950, namely a necklace with a diamond pendant, a
GP watch, a pair of Christian Dior eyeglasses, a gold Cross
pen and a pair of Bally shoes. Vitug also suffered injuries
producing recurring pains in his neck and back. Upon his
physician's advice, he received further medical treatment
in the US which cost him US$8,000.00
At the time of the accident, the Isuzu cargo truck was
registered in the name of FMLFC. However, FMLFC denied
any liability, alleging that it was not the owner of the truck,
neither the employer of the driver Crispin Sicat, because it
had sold the truck to Vicente Trinidad, after the latter had
paid all his monthly amortizations under the financing
lease agreement between FMLFC and Trinidad. The Estate
of Trinidad admitted that the truck was operated by
Trinidad during his lifetime. Nevertheless, it raised the
defense that the estate of Vicente Trinidad was no longer
existing because the same had long been settled and
partitioned extra judicially by his heirs. The trial court then
ruled in favor of Vitug, ordering FMLFC to indemnify Vitug.
17

FMLFC then appealed to the CA, which modified the
Decision of the lower court by by ordering the Estate of
Trinidad to indemnify FMLFC for whatever amount the
latter may pay Vitug.
ISSUE: WHETHER FMLFC SHOULD BE SOLELY LIABLE TO
VITUG?
HELD: YES. The Court ruled that regardless of who the
actual owner of a motor vehicle might be, the registered
owner is the operator of the same with respect to the
public and third persons, and as such, directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences of its operation. In
contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the
employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer
being considered merely as his agent.
It is immaterial whether or not the driver was actually
employed by the operator. It is even not necessary to prove
who the actual owner of the vehicle and the employer of
the driver is. Granting that, in this case, the father of the
driver is the actual owner and that he is the actual
employer, following the well-settled principle that the
operator of record continues to be the operator of the
vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public and
third persons, and as such is responsible for the
consequences incident to its operation, we must hold and
consider such owner-operator of record as the employer,
in contemplation of law, of the driver. The actual operator
and employer is the agent of the operator of record. The
registered owner or operator of record is the one liable for
damages caused by a vehicle regardless of any alleged sale
or lease made thereon.
Were the registered owner allowed to evade responsibility
by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it
would be easy for him by collusion with others or
otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the
same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no
property with which to respond financially for the damage
or injury done.
In order for a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle to
be valid against third persons. it must be recorded in the
Land Transportation Office. For, although valid between
the parties, the sale cannot affect third persons who rely
on the public registration of the motor vehicle as
conclusive evidence of ownership. In law, FMLFC was the
owner and operator of the Izusu cargo truck, hence, fully
liable to third parties injured by its operation due to the
fault or negligence of the driver thereof.
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26. Gelisan vs. Alday 154 SRCA 388
FACTS: Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu entered
into a contract where the former hired the truck of Gelisan
for the purpose of transporting goods at the price of
P18.00. It is also agreed that Espiritu shall bear and pay all
losses and damages attending the carriage of the goods to
be hauled by him. Benito Alday, a trucking operator, had a
contract to haul the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer
Corporation from Pier 4, North Harbor, to its Warehouse in
Mandaluyong.
Alday met Espiritu at the gate of Pier 4 and the latter
offered the use of his truck with the driver and helper at 9
centavos per bag of fertilizer. The offer was accepted by
plaintiff Alday and he instructed his checker Celso Henson
to let Roberto Espiritu haul the fertilizer. Espiritu made two
hauls of 200 bags of fertilizer per trip. The fertilizer was
delivered to the driver and helper of Espiritu with the
necessary way bill receipts, Exhibits A and B. Espiritu,
however, did not deliver the fertilizer to the Atlas Fertilizer
bodega at Mandaluyong.
Subsequently, plaintiff Alday saw the truck in question on
Sto. Cristo St. and he notified the Manila Police
Department, and it was impounded by the police. It was
claimed by Bienvenido Gelisan. As a result of the
impounding of the truck according to Gelisan and that for
the release of the truck he paid the premium of P300 to the
surety company.
Benito Alday was compelled to pay the value of the 400
bags of fertilizer, in the amount of P5,397.33, to Atlas
Fertilizer Corporation so that, on 12 February 1962, he
(Alday) filed a complaint against Roberto Espiritu and
Bienvenido Gelisan with the CFI Manila
Bienvenido Gelisan, upon the other hand, claimed that he
had no contractual relations with the plaintiff Benito Alday.
ISSUE: WHETHER GELISAN BEING A REGISTERED OWNER
IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES?
HELD: YES. The Court has invariably held in several
decisions that the registered owner of a public service
vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from
consequences incident to its operation or that may be
caused to any of the passengers therein.
18

The claim of the petitioner that he is not able in view of the
lease contract executed by and between him and Roberto
Espiritu which exempts him from liability to third persons,
cannot be sustained because it appears that the lease
contract, adverted to, had not been approved by the Public
Service Commission. It is settled in our jurisprudence that
if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or
leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval,
the transfer is not binding upon the public and third
persons.
Bienvenido Gelisan, the registered owner, is not however
without recourse. He has a right to be indemnified by
Roberto Espiritu for the amount that he may be required
to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito Alday,
since the lease contract in question, although not effective
against the public for not having been approved by the
Public Service Commission, is valid and binding between
the contracting parties.
27. CARIAGA vs. LTB Co. | 11037 | 101 PHIL 346 | 1960
An obligor guilty of a breach of contract in good faith is
liable under Art. 2201, NCC for such damages which are the
“natural and probable consequences of the breach and
which the parties had foreseen at the time the obligation
was constituted,” provided such damages, according to
Art. 2199 of the same Code, have been duly proved. This
would be the premise for the award of actual damages.
However, in increasing the award for compensatory
damages, the Court also took in consideration the income
Cariaga would have earned had he been able to finish his
studies and pass the Board because they could have
reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he
boarded the bus No. 133 owned and operated by the LTB.
FACTS: Cariaga was a passenger of the LTB bus bound for
Lilio, Laguna which left Manila at 1:00 pm. At about 3:00
p.m., as the bus reached that part of the poblacion of Bay,
Laguna, where the national highway crossed a railroad
track, it bumped against the engine of a train then passing
by with such terrific force that the first six wheels of the
latter were derailed, the engine and the front part of the
body of the bus was wrecked, the driver of the bus died
instantly, while many of its passengers were injured.
Cariaga was severely injured – he was hospitalized from
June 18, 1952 to January 15, 1953 in four different
hospitals; unconscious for the first 35 days after the
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incident; that he underwent two operations to remove the
fractured bones which lacerated the right frontal lobe of
his brain and to cover the big hole on his head with
titanium plate.
LTB paid the sum of P16,964.45 for all the hospital, medical
and miscellaneous expenses incurred from June 18, 1952
to April, 1953. From January to April 1953, he stayed at a
private residence in Quezon City wherein LTB provided him
with a subsistence allowance of P10.00 daily during his
convalescence, having spent in this connection the total
sum of P775.
A suit was filed against the LTB and MRR for P312,000.00
as actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
and for his parents, the sum of P18,00.00 in the same
concepts. LTB disclaimed liability by arguing that it was the
train driver who’s negligent by not giving any warning at
the crossing. It filed a cross-claim against MRR to recover o
recover the total sum of P18,194.75 representing the
expenses paid to Cariaga.
The trial court held LTB liable and ordered it to pay
P10,490.00 as compensatory damages, with interest at the
legal rate from the filing of the complaint, and dismissing
the cross-claim against the Manila Railroad Company
Both Cariaga and LTB appealed from the decision. Cariaga
said the TC erred in only awarding said sum as
compensatory damages and for not awarding actual and
moral damages.
ISSUE: WHETHER LTB’S CROSS-CLAIM SHOULD BE
GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT?
HELD: No. The trial court relied upon the testimony of the
witness for MRR who testified that the whistle of
locomotive was sounded four times — two long and two
short — "as the train was approximately 300 meters from
the crossing"; and that another LTB bus which arrived at
the crossing ahead of the one where Edgardo Cariaga was
a passenger, paid heed to the warning and stopped before
the "crossing", while — as the LTB itself now admits — the
driver of the bus in question totally disregarded the
warning.
LTB claimed that MRR violated section 91 of Article 1459 of
its charter by not making any warning sounds, but, the
Court held that LTB failed to discharge the burden of
proving that MRR violated the law.
19

ISSUE: WHETHER THE AWARD OF P10,000
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES WAS ADEQUATE?
HELD: No. From the deposition of Dr. Romeo Gustilo, a
neurosurgeon, as a result of the injuries suffered by
Edgardo, his right forehead was fractured necessitating the
removal of practically all of the right frontal lobe of his
brain. According to the testimony of Dr. Jose Fernandez, a
psychiatrist, due to his physical injuries, his mentality has
been so reduced that he can no longer finish his studies as
a medical student; that he has become completely misfit
for any kind of work; that he can hardly walk around
without someone helping him, and has to use a brace on
his left leg and feet.
His injuries reduced his intelligence by 50% and that due to
the replacement of the right frontal bone of his head with
a tantalum plate Edgardo has to lead a quiet and retired
life because if the tantalum plate is pressed in or dented it
would cause his death.
While his scholastic may not be first rate, it is sufficient to
justify the assumption that he could have passed the board
test in due time. As regards the income that he could
possibly earn as a medical practitioner, it appears that,
according to Dr. Amado Doria, a witness for the LTB, the
amount of P300.00 could easily be expected.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES IS PROPER?
HELD: NO. As for the moral damages – Article 2219 of the
Civil Code enumerates the instances when moral damages
may be covered and the case under consideration does not
fall under any one of them. The present action cannot
come under paragraph 2 of said article because it is not one
of the quasi-delict and cannot be considered as such
because of the pre-existing contractual relation between
the Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and Edgardo Cariaga.
As for the attorney’s fees – this case does not fall under any
of the instances enumerated in Article 2208.
The Court also cited Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co.,
Inc. which discussed how an action for damages arising
from a breach of contract of carriage, like in this case,
cannot give rise to moral damages.
The claim made by said spouses for actual and
compensatory damages is likewise without merits. As held
by the trial court, in so far as the LTB is concerned, the
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AS present action is based upon a breach of contract of
carriage to which said spouses were not a party, and
neither can they premise their claim upon the negligence
or quasi-delict of the LTB for the simple reason that they
were not themselves injured.
28. VILLA REY TRANSIT vs. CA | 25499 | 1970
The determination of the amount of damages resulting
from a death of a passenger due to breach of contract of
carriage recoverable by private respondents, heirs of the
deceased, depends, mainly upon two factors, namely: (1)
the number of years on the basis of which the damages
shall be computed and (2) the rate at which the losses
sustained by said respondents should be fixed.
Life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an
important element in fixing the amount recoverable by
private respondents herein. Although it is not the sole
element determinative of said amount, no cogent reason
has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption,
in the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary standard such as a
four-year rule.
The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the
heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed basis.
Much is left to the discretion of the court considering the
moral and material damages involved, and so it has been
said that" (t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for
measuring the value of a human life and the measure of
damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical
calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life
expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary,
whichever is shorter, is an important factor.
29. KOREAN AIRLINES CO. vs. CA | 114061| 1994
FACTS: Juanito Lapuz was contracted for employment in
Saudi Arabia through Pan Pacific Recruiting Services, Inc.
He was supposed to leave via Korean Airlines, but was
initially listed as a “chance passenger”. According to Lapuz,
he was allowed to check in and was cleared for departure.
When he was on the stairs going to the airplane, a KAL
officer pointed at him and shouted, “Down! Down!” and he
was barred from taking the flight. When he asked for
another booking, his ticket was cancelled.
He was unable to report for work and so he lost his
employment. KAL alleged that the agent of Pan Pacific was
20

informed that there are 2 seats possibly available. He gave
priority to Perico, while the other seat was won by Lapuz
through lottery. But because only 1 seat became available,
it was given to Perico. The trial court adjudged KAL liable
for damages. The decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, with modification on the damages awarded.
ISSUES: WHETHER THERE IS ALREADY A CONTRACT OF
CARRIAGE BETWEEN KAL AND LAPUZ TO HOLD KAL
LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT?
HELD: The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was
changed to that of a confirmed passenger when his name
was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight
No. KE 903. His clearance through immigration and
customs clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed
as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a
breach of the contract of carriage between them when it
failed to bring Lapuz to his destination.
A contract to transport passengers is different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation. The business
of the carrier is mainly with the traveling public. It invites
people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages
it offers. The contract of air carriage generates a relation
attended with a public duty. Passengers have the right to
be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled
to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So
it is that any discourteous conduct on the part of these
employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action
for damages against the carrier.
The breach of contract was aggravated in this case when,
instead of courteously informing Lapuz of his being a "wait-
listed" passenger, a KAL officer rudely shouted "Down!
Down!" while pointing at him, thus causing him
embarrassment and public humiliation. The evidence
presented by Lapuz shows that he had indeed checked in
at the departure counter, passed through customs and
immigration, boarded the shuttle bus and proceeded to
the ramp of KAL's aircraft.
In fact, his baggage had already been loaded in KAL's
aircraft, to be flown with him to Jeddah. The contract of
carriage between him and KAL had already been perfected
when he was summarily and insolently prevented from
boarding the aircraft.
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ISSUE: WHETHER MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
SHOULD BE AWARDED, AND TO WHAT EXTENT?
HELD: The Court of Appeals granted moral and exemplary
damages because:
a. The findings of the court a quo that the defendant-
appellant has committed breach of contract of
carriage in bad faith and in wanton, disregard of
plaintiff-appellant's rights as passenger laid the basis
and justification of an award for moral damages.
b. In the instant case, we find that defendant-appellant
Korean Air Lines acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner when it
"bumped off" plaintiff-appellant on November 8,
1980, and in addition treated him rudely and
arrogantly as a "patay gutom na contract worker
fighting Korean Air Lines," which clearly shows
malice and bad faith, thus entitling plaintiff-
appellant to moral damages.
c. Considering that the plaintiff-appellant's entitlement
to moral damages has been fully established by oral
and documentary evidence, exemplary damages
may be awarded. In fact, exemplary damages may be
awarded, even though not so expressly pleaded in
the complaint. By the same token, to provide an
example for the public good, an award of exemplary
damages is also proper.
A review of the record of this case shows that the injury
suffered by Lapuz is not so serious or extensive as to
warrant an award of P1.5 million. The assessment of
P100,000 as moral and exemplary damages in his favor is,
in our view, reasonable and realistic.
30. MCKEE vs. IAC | 114061| 1994
FACTS: A head-on-collision took place between an
International cargo truck, Loadstar and a Ford Escort car
driven by Jose Koh. When the northbound car was about
10m away from the southern approach of the bridge, two
boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and
into the lane of the car.
The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether
to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Koh blew
the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the
lane of the truck, he then switched on the headlights of the
21

car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return
to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the
truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck. RTC
convicted Galang. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR
CHANCE IS APPLICABLE?
HELD: YES. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts
which states that the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown
that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person
who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences
thereof.
In Ong v. Metropolitan Water District (104 Phil. 397, 1958):
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff
was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all
the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the
prior negligence of the plaintiff.
The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to
exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes
the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which
intervenes between the accident and the more remote
negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant
liable to the plaintiff.
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the
purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may
also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages.
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it was the truck driver's
negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the
collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the
collision. As employers of the truck driver, Tayag and
Manalo, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, are directly
and primarily liable for the resulting damages.
The presumption that they are negligent flows from the
negligence of their employee. That presumption, however,
is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible
defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.
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31. WASSMER vs. VELEZ | 20089 | 1964
FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following
their mutual promise of love decided to get married on
September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage,
Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone
their wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore,
Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.
Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer
and was declared in default. Judgement was rendered
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual
damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages,
P2,500 as attorney’s fees.
Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was
given chance but failed, thereby rendered judgment hence
this appeal.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT BREACH OF PROMISE TO
MARRY IS AN ACTIONABLE WRONG IN THIS CASE?
HELD: Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But formally set a wedding and go
through all the necessary preparations and publicity and
only to walk out of it when matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and
unjustifiable to good customs which holds liability in
accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil Code.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the
same, moral and exemplary damages may not be awarded
when it is proven that the defendanr clearly acted in
wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
32. CACHERO vs. MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB | 8721 | 1957
FACTS: On December 13, 1952, Atty. Tranquilino Cachero
boarded a Yellow Taxi driven by Gregorio Mira Abinion. The
taxicab bumped a Meralco post. The plaintiff fell out of the
vehicle to the ground and sustained slight physical injuries.
On January 6, 1953, plaintiff wrote a letter to the
defendant, demanding payment for the sum of P79, 245.65
covering actual transportation and medical expenses,
monetary loss, compensatory and exemplary damages.
Defendant offered to settle the case amicably, but the
parties were not able to agree on the settlement amount.
Plaintiff instituted an action for damages on February 2,
1953.
22

The Court of First Instance awarded: (1) P700 for medical
and transportation expenses, (2) P3,200 unearned
professional fees, and (3) P2,000 moral damages. The
plaintiff filed this instant appeal.
ISSUE: WHETHER MORAL DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED?
HELD: A mere perusal of plaintiff complaint will show that
his action against the defendant is predicated on an alleged
breach of contract of carriage, i.e., the failure of the
defendant to bring him "safely and without mishaps" to his
destination, and it is to be noted that the chauffeur of
defendant's taxicab that plaintiff used when he received
the injuries involved herein, Gregorio Mira, has not even
been made a party defendant to this case.
The defendant herein has not committed in connection
with this case any "criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries". The one that committed the offense against the
plaintiff is Gregorio Mira, and that is why he has been
already prosecuted and punished therefor. We, therefore,
hold that the case at bar does not come within the
exception of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the Civil Code. In
view of the foregoing the sum of P2,000 awarded as moral
damages by the trial Court has to be eliminated, for under
the law it is not a compensation awardable in a case like
the one at bar.
33. FORES vs. MIRANDA | 12163 | 1959
FACTS: Respondent was one of the passengers of a jeepney
driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending
the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive speed, the driver lost
control, and the jeepney swerved to the bridge wall.
Serious injuries were suffered by the defendant. The driver
was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was
sentenced accordingly. Petitioner denies liability for
breach of contract of carriage, contending that a day
before the accident, the jeepney was sold to a certain
Carmen Sackerman.
ISSUE: IS THE APPROVAL OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION NECESSARY FOR THE SALE OF A PUBLIC
SERVICE VEHICLE EVEN WITHOUT CONVEYING
THEREWITH THE AUTHORITY TO OPERATE THE SAME?
HELD: Assuming the dubious sale to be a fact, the court of
Appeals answered the query in the affirmative. The ruling
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should be upheld. The provisions of the statute are clear
and prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or encumbrance of
the property, franchise, certificate, privileges or rights, or
any part thereof of the owner or operator of the public
service Commission. The law was designed primarily for
the protection of the public interest; and until the approval
of the public Service Commission is obtained the vehicle is,
in contemplation of law, still under the service of the
owner or operator standing in the records of the
Commission which the public has a right to rely upon.
ISSUE: TO WHAT DAMAGES IS THE RESPONDENT
ENTITLED?
HELD: The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court
of First Instance of Manila were reduced by the Court of
Appeals to only P2,000, on the ground that a review of the
records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the trial
court's appraisal, since the only evidence presented on this
point consisted of respondent's bare statement that his
expenses and loss of income amounted to P20,000.
On the other hand, "it cannot be denied," the lower court
said, "that appellee (respondent) did incur expenses"' It is
well to note further that respondent was a painter by
profession and a professor of Fine Arts, so that the amount
of P2,000 awarded cannot be said to be excessive. The
attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000 also awarded to the
respondent are assailed on the ground that the Court of
First Instance did not provided for the same, and since no
appeal was interposed by said respondent, it was allegedly
error for the Court of Appeals to award them motu proprio.
Petitioner fails to note that attorney's fees are included in
the concept of actual damages under the Civil Code and
may be awarded whenever the court deems it is just and
equitable. We see no reason to alter these awards.
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the
respondent, the same must be discarded. We have
repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable
in damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of
transportation. Where the injured passenger does not die,
moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that
the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is
clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does
not per se constitute of justify an inference of malice or bad
faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there
is no other evidence of such malice to support the award
of moral damages by the Court of Appeals.
23

34. TAN vs. NORTHWEST AIRLINES | 135802 | 2000
FACTS: On May 31, 1994, Priscilla Tan and Connie Tan
boarded a Northwest Airlines plane in Chicago bound to
the Philippines with a stop-over at Detroit. Upon their
arrival, they found out that their baggage was missing. On
June 3, they recovered the baggage and discovered that
some were destroyed and soiled. They filed an action for
damages, claiming that they suffered mental anguish,
sleepless nights and great damage.
Northwest offered to reimburse the cost of repairs of the
bags or purchase price of new bags. The trial court awarded
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and also attorney’s
fees. The Court of Appeals partially affirmed the decision
by deleting moral and exemplary damages. Hence, Tan
filed this instant petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT AIRLINE IS LIABLE FOR
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR WILLFUL
MISCONDUCT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE?
HELD: We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent
was not guilty of willful misconduct. "For willful misconduct
to exist there must be a showing that the acts complained
of were impelled by an intention to violate the law, or were
in persistent disregard of one's rights. It must be evidenced
by a flagrantly or shamefully wrong or improper conduct."
Contrary to petitioner's contention, there was nothing in
the conduct of respondent which showed that they were
motivated by malice or bad faith in loading her baggage on
another plane.
Due to weight and balance restrictions, as a safety
measure, respondent airline had to transport the baggage
on a different flight, but with the same expected date and
time of arrival in the Philippines. It is admitted that
respondent failed to deliver petitioner's luggage on time.
However, there was no showing of malice in such failure.
By its concern for safety, respondent had to ship the
baggage in another flight with the same date of arrival.
35. ALITALIA vs. IAC | 71929 | 1990
FACTS: Dr. Felipa Pablo, an associate professor in the
University of the Philippines and a research grantee of the
Philippine Atomic Energy Agency, was invited to take part
at a meeting of the Department of Research and Isotopes
in Italy in view of her specialized knowledge in “foreign
substances in food and the agriculture environment”. She
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would be the second speaker on the first day of the
meeting. Dr. Pablo booked passage on petitioner Alitalia.
She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting, but
was told that her luggage was delayed and was in a
succeeding flight from Rome to Milan. The luggage
included her materials for the presentation.
The succeeding flights did not carry her luggage.
Desperate, she went to Rome to try to locate the luggage
herself, but to no avail. She returned to Manila without
attending the meeting. She demanded reparation for the
damages. She rejected Alitalia’s offer of free airline tickets
and commenced an action for damages. As it turned out,
the luggage was actually forwarded to Ispra, but only a day
after the scheduled appearance. It was returned to her
after 11 months. The trial court ruled in favor of Dr. Pablo,
and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES: WHETHER THE WARSAW CONVENTION SHOULD
BE APPLIED TO LIMIT ALITALIA’S LIABILITY?
HELD: Under the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier is
made liable for damages for:
a. The death, wounding or other bodily injury of a
passenger if the accident causing it took place on
board the aircraft or I the course of its operations
of embarking or disembarking;
b. The destruction or loss of, or damage to, any
registered luggage or goods, if the occurrence
causing it took place during the carriage by air; and
c. Delay in the transportation by air of passengers,
luggage or goods.
The convention however denies to the carrier availment of
the provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if the
damage is caused by his willful misconduct, or by such
default on his part as is considered to be equivalent to
willful misconduct. The Convention does not thus operate
as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline's
liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability.
It should be deemed a limit of liability only in those cases
where the cause of the death or injury to person, or
destruction, loss or damage to property or delay in its
transport is not attributable to or attended by any wilful
misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper
conduct on the part of any official or employee for which
the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special
or extraordinary form of resulting injury.
24

In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper
conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner
airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to
her, belatedly, it is true, but without appreciable damage.
The fact is, nevertheless, that some species of injury was
caused to Dr. Pablo because petitioner ALITALIA misplaced
her baggage and failed to deliver it to her at the time
appointed - a breach of its contract of carriage. Certainly,
the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo
cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that
prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the
transport of baggage.
ISSUE: WHETHER DR. PABLO IS ENTITLED TO NOMINAL
DAMAGES?
HELD: NO. She is however entitled to nominal damages
which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right
of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for
the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff that for any loss
suffered and this Court agrees that the respondent Court
of Appeals correctly set the amount thereof at PhP
40,000.00.
The Court also agrees that respondent Court of Appeals
correctly awarded attorney’s fees to Dr. Pablo and the
amount of PhP 5,000.00 set by it is reasonable in the
premises. The law authorizes recovery of attorney’s fees
inter alia where, as here, the defendant’s act or omission
has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or
to incur expenses to protect his interest or where the court
deems it just and equitable.
36. SALUDO vs. CA | 95536 | 1992
The carrier has the right to accept shipper's marks as to the
contents of the package offered for transportation and is
not bound to inquire particularly about them in order to
take advantage of a false classification and where a shipper
expressly represents the contents of a package to be of a
designated character, it is not the duty of the carrier to ask
for a repetition of the statement nor disbelieve it and open
the box and see for itself.
FACTS: Petitioners herein together with Pomierski and Son
Funeral Home of Chicago brought the remains of
petitioners’ mother to Continental Mortuary Air Services
(CMAS) which booked the shipment of the remains from
Chicago to San Francisco by Trans World Airways (TWA)
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and from San Francisco to Manila with Philippine Airlines
(PAL).
The remains were taken to the Chicago Airport, but it
turned out that there were two (2) bodies in the said
airport. Somehow the two (2) bodies were switched, and
the remains of petitioners’ mother was shipped to Mexico
instead.
The shipment was immediately loaded on another PAL
flight and it arrived the day after the expected arrival.
Petitioners filed a claim for damages in court. Petitioners
consider TWA's statement that "it had to rely on the
information furnished by the shipper" a lame excuse and
that its failure to prove that its personnel verified and
identified the contents of the casket before loading the
same constituted negligence on the part of TWA.
The lower court absolved both airlines and upon appeal it
was affirmed by the court.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS
LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR THE SWITCHING OF THE TWO
CASKETS?
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court concluded that the
switching occurred or, more accurately, was discovered on
October 27, 1976; and based on the above findings of the
Court of appeals, it happened while the cargo was still with
CMAS, well before the same was place in the custody of
private respondents.
Verily, no amount of inspection by respondent airline
companies could have guarded against the switching that
had already taken place. Or, granting that they could have
opened the casket to inspect its contents, private
respondents had no means of ascertaining whether the
body therein contained was indeed that of Crispina Saludo
except, possibly, if the body was that of a male person and
such fact was visually apparent upon opening the casket.
However, to repeat, private respondents had no authority
to unseal and open the same nor did they have any reason
or justification to resort thereto.
It is the right of the carrier to require good faith on the part
of those persons who deliver goods to be carried, or enter
into contracts with it, and inasmuch as the freight may
depend on the value of the article to be carried, the carrier
ordinarily has the right to inquire as to its value.
25

Ordinarily, too, it is the duty of the carrier to make inquiry
as to the general nature of the articles shipped and of their
value before it consents to carry them; and its failure to do
so cannot defeat the shipper's right to recovery of the full
value of the package if lost, in the absence of showing of
fraud or deceit on the part of the shipper. In the absence
of more definite information, the carrier has a the right to
accept shipper's marks as to the contents of the package
offered for transportation and is not bound to inquire
particularly about them in order to take advantage of a
false classification and where a shipper expressly
represents the contents of a package to be of a designated
character, it is not the duty of the carrier to ask for a
repetition of the statement nor disbelieve it and open the
box and see for itself.
However, where a common carrier has reasonable ground
to suspect that the offered goods are of a dangerous or
illegal character, the carrier has the right to know the
character of such goods and to insist on an inspection, if
reasonable and practical under the circumstances, as a
condition of receiving and transporting such goods.
It can safely be said then that a common carrier is entitled
to fair representation of the nature and value of the goods
to be carried, with the concomitant right to rely thereon,
and further noting at this juncture that a carrier has no
obligation to inquire into the correctness or sufficiency of
such information. The consequent duty to conduct an
inspection thereof arises in the event that there should be
reason to doubt the veracity of such representations.
Therefore, to be subjected to unusual search, other than
the routinary inspection procedure customarily
undertaken, there must exist proof that would justify cause
for apprehension that the baggage is dangerous as to
warrant exhaustive inspection, or even refusal to accept
carriage of the same; and it is the failure of the carrier to
act accordingly in the face of such proof that constitutes
the basis of the common carrier's liability.
In the case at bar, private respondents had no reason
whatsoever to doubt the truth of the shipper's
representations. The airway bill expressly providing that
"carrier certifies goods received below were received for
carriage," and that the cargo contained "casketed human
remains of Crispina Saludo," was issued on the basis of such
representations.
The reliance thereon by private respondents was
reasonable and, for so doing, they cannot be said to have
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acted negligently. Likewise, no evidence was adduced to
suggest even an iota of suspicion that the cargo presented
for transportation was anything other than what it was
declared to be, as would require more than routine
inspection or call for the carrier to insist that the same be
opened for scrutiny of its contents per declaration.
Nonetheless, the facts show that petitioners' right to be
treated with due courtesy in accordance with the degree
of diligence required by law to be exercised by every
common carrier was violated by TWA and this entitles
them, at least, to nominal damages from TWA alone.
Articles 2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code make it clear that
nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of
loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a
right violated of invaded.
WHEREFORE, with the modification that an award of
P40,000.00 as and by way of nominal damages is hereby
granted in favor of petitioners to be paid by respondent
Trans World Airlines, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in
all other respects.
37. PRUDENCIADO vs. ALLIANCE | 33836 | 1987
FACTS: At about 2:05 p.m. of May 11, 1960, Dra.
Prudenciado was driving her own Chevrolet Bel Air car
along Arroceros Street with the intention of crossing Taft
Ave. in order to turn left, to go to the Philippine Normal
College Compound where she would hold classes. She
claimed that she was driving her car at the rate of 10 kmph;
that before crossing Taft Ave.
She stopped her car and looked to the right and to the left
and not noticing any on-coming vehicle on either side she
slowly proceeded on first gear to cross the same, but when
she was almost at the center, near the island thereof,
Leyson who was driving People's Taxicab owned and
operated by Alliance, suddenly bumped and struck Dra.
Prudenciado's car, thereby causing physical injuries in
different parts of her body, suffering more particularly
brain concussion which subjected her to several physical
examinations and to an encephalograph test while her car
was damaged to the extent of P2,451.27. The damage to
the taxicab amounted to P190.00. After due hearing, the
CFI of Rizal, Quezon City, found Jose Leyson guilty of
negligence in the performance of his duties as taxicab
driver which is the proximate cause of the accident in
question.
26

On the other hand, defendant Alliance failed to prove to
the satisfaction of the court that it had exercised the
required diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection, supervision and control of its employees
including defendant Leyson.
Consequently, both defendants were held jointly and
severally liable for the physical injuries suffered by the
plaintiff Dra. Prudenciado as well as for the damage to her
car, in addition to the other consequential damages prayed
for, by ordering the said defendants, jointly and severally,
to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,451.27 for actual
damages representing the cost for the repair of the car of
plaintiff; P25,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and the further sum of P3,000.00 as
attorney's fees, with costs against the defendants.
The CA concedes that a concussion of the brain was
suffered by Dra. Prudenciado but as to how serious was the
concussion or how it had later become, and the disastrous
extent of the injuries which she alleges to have sustained
as a result of the accident, are seriously doubted by said
Appellate Court thus reducing the amount of moral
damages from P25,000 to P2,000 and eliminating the
award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees but
granting actual damages of P2,451.27.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN REDUCING THE
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES?
HELD: There is no argument that moral damages include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered
if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongful act
or omission.
In the same manner, it is undisputed that the trial courts
are given discretion to determine the amount of moral
damages and that the CA can only modify or change the
amount awarded when they are palpably and scandalously
excessive "so as to indicate that it was the result of passion,
prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. But in
more recent cases where the awards of moral and
exemplary damages are far too excessive compared to the,
actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court
ruled that they should be reduced to more reasonable
amounts.
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Thus, in the case of San Andres v. CA the SC ruled that while
the amount of moral damages is a matter left largely to the
sound discretion of a court, the same when found
excessive should be reduced to more reasonable amounts,
considering the attendant facts and circumstances. Moral
damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in
the category of an award designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer.
In a much later case, the SC, reiterating the above ruling,
reduced the awards of moral and exemplary damages
which were far too excessive compared to the actual losses
sustained by the aggrieved parties and where the records
show that the injury suffered was not serious or gross and,
therefore, out of proportion to the amount of damages
generously awarded by the trial court.
In any case the Court held that "moral damages are
emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the
expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable
the injured party to obtain means, diversion or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
he has undergone, by reason of the defendants' culpable
action."
The award of moral damages must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted. Coming back to the case at bar, a careful
review of the records makes it readily apparent that the
injuries sustained by Dra. Prudenciado are not as serious or
extensive as they were claimed to be, to warrant the
damages awarded by the trial court.
In fact, a closer scrutiny of the exhibits showing a moderate
damage to the car can by no stretch of the imagination
produce a logical conclusion that such disastrous effects of
the accident sought to be established, actually took place,
not to mention the fact that such were not supported by
the medical findings presented. Unquestionably,
therefore, the damages imposed' by the lower court
should be reduced to more reasonable levels.
On the other hand, it will be observed that the reduction
of the damages made by the Court of Appeals is both too
drastic and unrealistic, to pass the test of reasonableness,
which appears to be the underlying basis to justify such
reduction. While the damages sought to be recovered
were not satisfactorily established to the extent desired by
the petitioner, it was nonetheless not disputed that an
accident occurred due to the fault and negligence of the
respondents; that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a brain
27

concussion which although mild can admittedly produce
the effects complained of by her and that these symptoms
can develop after several years and can lead to some,
serious handicaps or predispose the patient to other
sickness.
Being a doctor by profession, her fears can be more real
and intense than an ordinary person. Otherwise stated, she
is undeniably a proper recipient of moral damages which
are proportionate to her suffering.
As to exemplary damages, Article 2231 of the Civil Code
provides: In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with grave negligence.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is,
as the name implies, to provide an example or correction
for the public good. The findings of the trial court in the
case at bar which became the basis of the award of
exemplary damages are to the effect that it is more
apparent from the facts, conditions and circumstances
obtaining in the record of the case that respondent driver
was running at high speed after turning to the right along
Taft Ave. coming from Ayala Boulevard, considering that
the traffic was clear. Failing to notice petitioner's car, he
failed to apply his brakes and did not even swerve to the
right to avoid the collision
The CA conforms to aforesaid findings of the trial court but
is not prepared to accept that there was gross negligence
on the part of the driver to justify the imposition of
exemplary damages.
However, a driver running at full speed on a rainy day, on
a slippery road in complete disregard of the hazards to life
and limb of other people cannot be said to be acting in
anything less than gross negligence. The frequent
incidence of accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers
indeed demands corrective measures.
The Supreme Court modified its judgment insofar as the
award of damages is concerned; and respondents are
ordered to jointly and severally pay the petitioner; (1) the
sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages representing the cost
of the repair of her car; (2) the sum of P15,000.00 as moral
damages; (3) the sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and (4) the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.
38. LOPEZ vs. PAN AMERICAN | 22415 | 1966
RE: NOTES THE SAME IS INTENDED MERELY AS A REVIEWER. READ THE GIVEN MATERIALS FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. | 2019 | VERSION 6
CASES ON TORTS AND DAMAGES VER. 7
FACTS: Reservation for first class accommodation in Pan
American Airlines from Tokyo to San Francisco was made
by Delfin Faustino for then Senator Fernando Lopez and
company. First class tickets were issued and paid for. The
party left Manila for Tokyo as scheduled. Senator Lopez
requested Minister Busuego to contact the airlines
regarding their accommodation. However, they were
informed that there was no accommodation for them.
Because of some urgent matters to attend to in San
Francisco, they were constrained to take the tourist flight
“under protest”.
ISSUES: WHETHER THE DEFENDANT ACTED IN BAD FAITH
FOR DELIBERATE REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS
CONTRACT TO PROVIDE FIRST-CLASS ACCOMMODATION
TO THE PLAINTIFF?
HELD: From the evidence of defendant it is in effect
admitted that defendant - through its agents - first
cancelled plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and thereafter
deliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or
their travel agent the fact of said cancellation, letting them
go on believing that their first class reservations stood valid
and confirmed.
In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets
in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations for
the same, when in fact they had none, defendant willfully
and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to
breach it’s a foresaid contracts with plaintiffs should there
be no last-minute cancellation by other passengers before
flight time, as it turned out in this case.
Such actuation of defendant may indeed have been
prompted by nothing more than the promotion of its self-
interest in holding on to Senator Lopez and party as
passengers in its flight and foreclosing on their chances to
seek the services of other airlines that may have been able
to afford them first class accommodations. All the time, in
legal contemplation such conduct already amounts to
action in bad faith. For bad faith means a breach of a
known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will.
At the time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant,
therefore, in breach of its known duty, made plaintiffs
believe that their reservation had not been cancelled. Such
willful-non-disclosure of the cancellation or pretense that
the reservations for plaintiffs stood - and not simply the
erroneous cancellation itself - is the factor to which is
attributable the breach of the resulting contracts. And, as
28
 CASES ON TORTS AND DAMAGES VER. 7

above-stated, in this respect defendant clearly acted in bad

faith.

ISSUE: WHETHER MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

SHOULD BE AWARDED?

HELD: First, then, as to moral damages. As a proximate

result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts
with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation,
wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. For
plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by
defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class.
At stop-overs, they were expected to be among the first-
class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them, only
to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not be
humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating
to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is
rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking.

The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is,

as the name implies, to provide an example or correction
for public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in
bad faith, the court, as stated earlier, may award
exemplary damages in addition to moral damages. In view
of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to
sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contracts
in the future by defendant or other airlines. In this light, we
find it just to award P75,000.00 as exemplary or corrective
damages.

RE: NOTES THE SAME IS INTENDED MERELY AS A REVIEWER. READ THE GIVEN MATERIALS FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. | 2019 | VERSION 6 29