Supreme Court of the Philippines

273 Phil. 290

EN BANC
G.R. No. 96080, April 19, 1991
ATTY. MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, HON. SILVESTRE H. BELLO III, ATTY. HENRICK F.
GINGOYON, HELEN B. CANOY AND REBECCA B. TAN,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

In this special civil action for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction/restraining order, petitioner seeks to enjoin herein public
respondents from including the former as an accused in Criminal Case No. 86-
39 for multiple murder, through a second amended information, and to restrain
them from prosecuting him.

The records disclose that on October 16, 1986, an information for multiple
murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe
Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe,
Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths on May 1, 1984 of Renato Bucag,
his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however,
transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter No. 87-2-244.

Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the
accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention
and has not been apprehended since then.
In an amended information filed on October 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely
Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas
retained petitioner Paderanga as his counsel.
As counsel for Roxas, petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on
October 14, 1988. The trial court, in an order dated January 9, 1989, denied this
omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor "to conduct another
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the
opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his defense."

In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit,

Felizardo Roxas implicated herein petitioner in the commission of the crime
charged.

The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further
conducting the preliminary investigation against petitioner at the instance of the
latter's counsel, per his resolution dated July 7, 1989. In his first indorsement to
the Department of Justice, dated July 24, 1989, said city prosecutor requested
the Department of Justice to designate a state prosecutor to continue the
preliminary investigation against herein petitioner.

In a resolution dated September 6, 1989,[1] respondent State Prosecutor Henrick

F. Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct of the
preliminary investigation against petitioner, directed the amendment of the
previously amended information to include and implead herein petitioner as one
of the accused therein. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[2] contending that
the preliminary investigation was not yet completed when said resolution was
promulgated, and that he was deprived of his right to present a corresponding
counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of his
alleged "linkage" to the crime charged. The motion was, however, denied by
respondent Gingoyon in his order dated January 29, 1990.[3]

From the aforesaid resolution and order, petitioner filed a Petition for Review[4]
with the Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental
Petition with Memorandum,[5] and then a Supplemental Memorandum with
Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed,[6] attaching thereto an
affidavit of Roxas dated June 20, 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his
affidavit of March 30, 1990 wherein he implicated herein petitioner.

On August 10, 1990, the Department of Justice, through respondent

Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution No. 648[7] dismissing the
said petition for review. His motion for reconsideration having been likewise
denied, petitioner then filed the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition.

Petitioner raises two basic issues, namely: (1) that the preliminary investigation
as to him was not complete; and (2) that there exists no prima facie evidence or
probable cause to justify his inclusion in the second amended information.

Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means

of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is
taken in jeopardy.[8]

The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the
fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court.[9] Hence, the general rule is that an
injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution.[10] The case of
Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al.[11] cites several exceptions to the rule, to wit:

a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid

oppression or multiplicity of actions;

c. When there is a prejudicial question which is subjudice;

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and

j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied.
A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present case, however,
will readily show that the same does not fall under any of the aforesaid
exceptions. Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed.

1. Petitioner avers that he was deprived of a full preliminary investigation by

reason of the fact that at the time the resolution of September 6, 1989 was
issued, there were still several incidents pending resolution such as the validity
of the testimonies and affidavits of Felizardo Roxas and Rogelio Hanopol as
bases for preliminary investigation, the polygraph test of Roxas which he failed,
and the clarificatory questions which were supposed to be propounded by
petitioner's counsel to Roxas and Hanopol. Petitioner likewise claims that he
was deprived of the opportunity to file his counter-affidavit to the subpoena of
April 25, 1989. These contentions are without merit.

Firstly, it will be noted that petitioner had already filed his counter-affidavit,
pursuant to the subpoena issued to him on April 17, 1989, wherein he
controverted the charge against him and dismissed it as a malicious design of his
political opponents and enemies to link him to the crime. We hold that this is
sufficient compliance with the procedural requirement of the Rules of Court,
specifically Section 3(b) of Rule 112 thereof. Besides, petitioner failed to show
that the subpoena issued on April 25, 1989 involved a separate complaint
charging an offense different and distinct from that charged in the complaint
attached to the first subpoena issued to him earlier.

Secondly, the veracity and credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies are
matters of defense best addressed to the trial court for its appreciation and
evaluation.

Thirdly, the right of petitioner to ask clarificatory questions is not absolute. The
fiscal has the discretion to determine whether or not he will propound these
questions to the parties or witnesses concerned. As clearly provided for under
Section 3(e), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:
"(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he
may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so
desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter
may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned."
Lastly, it has been held that "the proper forum before which absence of
preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not
this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of a preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the
regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently
waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate
court."[12]

2. Petitioner further submits that there is no prima facie evidence, or probable

cause, or sufficient justification to hold him to a tedious and prolonged public
trial, on the basis of the following grounds: the questioned resolution of
respondent Gingoyon is full of factual misrepresentations or misapprehensions;
respondent's reliance on the decision of the Regional Trial Court against Felipe
Galarion suffers from constitutional and procedural infirmities considering that
petitioner was not a party thereto, much less was he given any opportunity to
comment on or rebut the prosecution evidence; reliance on Rogelio Hanopol's
testimony is likewise "contemptible," it being merely hearsay in addition to the
fact that petitioner was never given the opportunity to cross-examine Hanopol
at the time he testified in court; and the affidavit of Roxas dated March 30,
1989, which is the only evidence against petitioner, has been rendered nugatory
by his affidavit of retraction dated June 20, 1990.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the

purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well
founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial.[13] The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary
investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded belief" as
to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt
thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.[14] We are in accord
with the state prosecutor's findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie
evidence of petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, it being
sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.

Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner's argument that the testimonies of

Galarion and Hanopol are inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the
opportunity of cross-examination.

It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has

no right to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may
present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the
respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all
other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing
to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-
examine. Thus, even if petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-
examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they were presented to testify during
the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any
legal right to cross-examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely
because such right was never available to him. The admissibility or
inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court
during the trial proper and not in the preliminary investigation.

Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who
has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If
by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we
find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary
rules. In addition, considering that under Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the
record of the case in the Regional Trial Court, then the testimonies of Galarion
and Hanopol may not be admitted by the trial court if not presented in evidence
by the prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the prosecution does present such
testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and the trial court can rule on
the admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial, petition said
court to compel the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of
cross-examination.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 12.

[2] Annex B, id.; ibid., 24.

[3] Annex C, id.; ibid., 36.

[4] Annex E, id.; ibid., 41.

[5] Annex G, id.; ibid., 49.

[6] Annex H, id.; ibid., 61.

[7] Annex I, id.; ibid., 69.

[8] Tandoc, et al. vs. Hon. Resultan, etc., et al., 175 SCRA 37 (1989).

[9] Crespo vs. Mogul et al., 151 SCRA 462 (1987).

[10] Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 103 (1920).

[11] G.R. Nos. 69863-65, December 10, 1990.

Medina vs. Orozco, Jr., etc., 18 SCRA 1168 (1966); Ilagan, et al. vs. Enrile, et al.,
[12]

139 SCRA 349 (1985); People vs. Escober, et al., 157 SCRA 541 (1988).

[13] Section 1, Rule 112, Rules of Court.

[14] Mayuga vs. Maravilla, etc., et al., 18 SCRA 1115 (1966).

 EN BANC

June 30, 1987

G.R. No. L-53373

MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA
CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR
GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case
filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was
elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the
merits.

On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed
an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for arraigment
the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the
filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L.
Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of
August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to
elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the
accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of
August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment
of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General
he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered
by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his
threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall
have finally resolved the petition for review. 7

On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition
for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to
move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial
court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2,
1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.10 On November 24, 1978 the
Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment stating:

ORDER

For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised on
insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex
"A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for
the reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing
obligation the Hability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.

The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on
evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter
that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's
independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and therefore hereby
DENIED.

WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00
o'clock in the moming.

SO ORDERED. 11

The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals
that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued
by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders
from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed
by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15

Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that
said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing
his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the
information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the
said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16

In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the
petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within
ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the
petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply
to the comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the
resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the
Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due
course to the petition.

Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be
reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action
depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information,
follow or not fonow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his
opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The
reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the
complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the
authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the
complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They
have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that
the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima faciecase. 22

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a
puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the
fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a
Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if
he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court
any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since
this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal
who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and
Courts that grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently
move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that
his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge
who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the
defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction,
preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly
administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and
vindictive manner. 30

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is
subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe
and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or
reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When
after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the
trial court and the accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the
Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion
the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been
brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of
the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due
process of law. 36a

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the
Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the
trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon
the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state
prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does
not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the
prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.

The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is
1âwphi1

done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in
spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of
evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent
judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk
from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances
much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private
prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do
is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the
evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution
of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination
of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of
the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action
of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be
left entirely for the determination of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Teehankee C.J., took no part.
Footnotes

1
Copy of information, Annex A to Annex E; pp. 54-55, Rollo

2
Annex C to Annex E; pp. 70-71, Rollo.

3
Annex D to Annex E; p. 72, supra.

4
Annex E to Annex E; pp. 73-108, supra.

5
Annex F to Annex C; p. 109, supra.

6
Annex G to Annex E; pp. 110-118, Rollo.

7
Annex H to Annex E; pp. 119-129, supra.

8
Annex I to Annex E; pp. 130-132, supra.

9
Annex J to Annex E; pp. 133-139, supra.

10
Annex K to Annex E; p. 140, supra.

11
Annex L to Annex E; pp. 141-142, supra.

12
Annex E; pp. 42-53, supra.

13
P. 145, supra.

14
Annex A to petition; pp. 23-26, supra.

15
Annex D, pp. 40-41, supra.

16
Pp. 5-21, supra

Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, now Section 5, Rule 110 of 1985 Rules on
17

Criminal Procedure, People v. Valdemoro, 102 SCRA 170.

18
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846,

19
U.S. vs. Narvas, 14 Phil. 410.

People vs. Sope, 75 Phil. 810; People vs. Liggayu, 97; PhiL 865; Zulueta vs. Nicolas, 102
20

Phil. 944; People vs. Natoza, G.R. L-8917, Dec. 14, 1956.

21
Bagatua vs. Revilla, G.R. L-12247, August 26, 1958.

22
Zulueta vs. Nicolas, supra.

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court; Presidential Decree 911; Sections 1-4,
23

Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

24
People vs. De Moll, 68 Phil. 626.

Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Bataan vs. Dollete, 103 Phil. 914; People vs. Pineda, G.R. No. L-
25

26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.

26
People vs. Natoza, supra; Pangan vs. Pasicolan, G.R. L-12517, May 19, 1958.

27
People vs. Jamisola, No. L-27332, Nov. 28, 1969; People vs. Agasang, 66 Phil.182.

28
People vs. Pineda, supra.

29
Kwong Sing vs.City of Manila, 41 Phil. 103,112.

Dimayuga vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 384, 307; University of the Philippines vs. City Fiscal of
30

Quezon City, G.R. No. L-18562, July 31, 1961.

PD 911, now Section 4, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; Estrella vs.
31

Orendain, Jr., 37 SCRA 650-652, 654-655; Gonzales vs. Serrano, L-25791. Sept. 23, 1968,
25 SCRA 64; Caeg vs. Abad Santos, N-40044, March 10, 1975, 63 SCRA 96; Oliveros vs.
Villaluz, L-33362, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 327; Noblejas vs. Salas, L-31788 and 31792,
Sept. 15, 1975, 67 SCRA 47; Vda. de Jacob vs. Puno, 131 SCRA 144; Circular No. 13, April
19, 1976 of the Secretary of Justice.

Herrera vs. Barreto, 25 Phils. 245; U.S. vs. Limsiongco, 41 Phils. 94; De la Cruz vs. Mujer,
32

36 Phis. 213; Section 1 Rule 110, Rules of Court, now Section 1 also Rule 110, 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure.

33
21 C.J.S. 123; Carrington.

34
U.S. vs. Barreto, 32 Phils. 444.

35
Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Bataan vs. Dollete, Supra.

36
People vs. Zabala, 58 O. G. 5028.

36
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43, 101.

37
People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361 (1976).

38
U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32 Phils. 442; U.S. vs. Gallego, 37 Phils. 289; People vs.
Hernandez, 69 Phils. 672; U.S. vs. Labil 27 Phils. 82; U.S. vs. Fernandez, Phils. 539; People
vs. Velez, 77, Phils. 1026.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 179497 January 25, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
RENANDANG MAMARUNCAS, Piagapo, Lanao del Sur; PENDATUM AMPUAN, Piagapo,
Lanao del Sur;Appellants,
BAGINDA PALAO (at large) Alias "Abdul Wahid Sultan", Accused.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court is the center of this controversy. The
well-known rule, though subject to certain recognized exceptions, is that findings of facts and
assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court. Hence, "[u]nless certain
facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case, the trial court’s assessment must be respected."1

Assailed in the present appeal is the June 30, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00196 which affirmed with modification the July 19, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City, Branch 06 in Criminal Case No. 06-6150 convicting Renandang
Mamaruncas (Mamaruncas) and Pendatum Ampuan (Ampuan) (appellants) of the crime of murder.

On February 9, 1996, the following Information4 for murder was filed against Mamaruncas, Baginda
Palao (Palao) alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and Ampuan.5

That on or about February 1, 1996, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, except for others whose cases are still under preliminary
investigation, conspiring with and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed
with deadly weapon, to wit: a caliber .45 pistol, by means of treachery and evident premeditation,
and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, shoot and wound
one Baudelio R. Batoon, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries, to wit:

• Cardio respiratory arrest

• Hypovolemic shock
• Multiple gunshot wound

which caused his death.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.

Only Mamaruncas and Ampuan appeared at the scheduled arraignment on May 20, 1996. Their co-
accused, Palao alias Abdul Wahid Sultan (Abdul), remains at large. Appellants pleaded not
guilty6 and trial proceeded against them.
Factual Antecedents

The facts of the case, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its brief and
substantiated by the transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings, are as follows:

Around noontime on February 1, 1996, Baudelio Batoon, Richard Batoon, Juanito Gepayo and a
certain "Nito" were working on vehicles inside Baudelio Batoon’s auto repair shop situated along the
highway in Tubod, Baraas, Iligan City.

Baginda Palao then entered the shop accompanied by appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and
Pendatum Ampuan. Baginda Palao wore desert camouflage fatigues; while his two (2) companions
wore Philippine Army tropical green fatigues. Baginda Palao showed Baudelio Batoon an arrest
warrant and told the latter he was serving it against Batoon.

The arrival of Baginda Palao’s group prompted Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon to stop their
work and observe what was happening.

Baudelio Batoon told Baginda Palao to just wait awhile, as they would settle the matter after he
[Batoon] [finishes] tuning-up an engine he had been working on.

Baginda Palao reacted by slapping the victim’s stomach and pointing a .45 caliber pistol at him.
Baudelio Batoon then tried to grab Palao’s gun, causing the two of them to grapple for the same. As
these two wrestled for control of the gun, Renandang Mamaruncas, who was behind Baudelio
Batoon, shot from behind Batoon’s right thigh with a .38 cal. homemade gun. Pendatum Ampuan,
who was also standing behind Baudelio Batoon, followed up by shooting Batoon’s left arm pit with a
.45 cal. [homemade] pistol. Baudelio Batoon fell to the ground and Baginda Palao finished [him off]
with a single .45 cal. shot to the back. Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon saw the entire scene,
stunned and unable to do anything. From their vantage points three (3) to four (4) meters away,
these witnesses had a clear and unobstructed view of the entire incident.

Meanwhile, Police Inspector Graciano Mijares, then Commanding Officer of the Iligan City PNP
Mobile Force Company, was riding a civilian car along the highway, heading towards Iligan City
proper. He was accompanied by his driver, SPO3 William Yee, and SPO3 George Alejo. They heard
the gunshots emanating from the auto repair shop at Baraas, prompting Inspector Mijares to order
his driver to stop the car. They alighted and proceeded to the source of the gunshots. At the repair
shop, they saw three (3) men in camouflage gear with guns drawn and pointed at a person already
lying on the ground. Inspector Mijares’ group shouted at the camouflaged gunmen to stop what they
were doing and to drop their firearms, at the same time announcing that they (Mijares’ group) were
policemen.

The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at the policemen. The latter fired back. During the
exchange of gunfire, Baginda Palao ran behind the Batoon house, while Renandang Mamaruncas
and Pendatum Ampuan ran towards the road and a nearby car. Inspector Mijares was able to hit
Mamaruncas and Ampuan, while SPO3 Yee likewise hit Ampuan. Mamaruncas, who managed to
get inside the car, and Ampuan were then captured by the policemen. The lawmen also gave chase
to Baginda Palao; but he escaped.

Other responding policemen brought Mamaruncas and Ampuan to the hospital for treatment and
they were eventually placed under detention. Baudelio Batoon was brought to the hospital by his
wife; but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Based on the necropsy examination of the victim’s body, Dr. Leonardo Labanen established that the
three (3) gunshot wounds found on the body of Baudelio Batoon (i.e., at the right thigh, left armpit
and back) were inflicted at close range due to the presence, or at least traces, of gunpowder burns.7

Only appellants testified for their defense. Their testimonies, as narrated by the trial court, are as
follows:

Accused Renandang Mamaruncas testified that he is 34 years old, married, carpenter and a resident
of Piagapo, Lanao del Sur. On the morning of February 1, 1996, he was in Marawi City. He decided
to come down to Iligan City to see a movie. He left Marawi at 7:00 a.m. and upon arrival at the
Tambacan terminal in Iligan City, he went to the house of his cousin. Later, he changed his mind
about going to a movie and returned to the Tambacan terminal in order to go back to Marawi City. At
about 11:30 a.m., Abdul Wahid Sultan arrived with Pendatum Ampuan on board a car driven by
Aminola. Abdul Wahid invited him to go with them because he will collect some money and
afterwards they will have some enjoyment. He agreed and sat at the rear seat behind the driver.
Abdul Wahid was at the front seat with Pendatum behind at the back seat. They drove to Baraas.
They stopped at a crossing and Abdul Wahid and Pendatum Ampuan alighted. Before walking away,
Abdul Wahid handed to Renandang a .38 cal[.] revolver with instructions to remain in the car and
[keep] watch. At first he refused but Abdul Wahid insisted so he accepted the gun. Abdul Wahid and
Pendatum walked to the shop leaving the rear right door open. About ten minutes later, he heard
three gunshots. He moved to the rear seat where the door was open and saw policemen, who
arrived and surrounded the car. He placed the gun on the seat and raised his hands as a sign of
surrender. Then with his right hand, he closed the car door. Just as the door closed, the policemen
shot him on the forearm and chest below the right nipple. He lost consciousness and regained it only
at the hospital.

He further testified that Abdul Wahid Sultan is an old friend. He is also known as Baginda Palao.
Pendatum Ampuan is not known as Abdul Wahid Sultan.

He also declared that the statement of Juanito Gepayo that only Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum
Ampuan entered the shop and shot Baudelio Batoon is true and that the testimony of P/Insp. Mijares
that he also shot the victim is not true. He denied any part in the shooting to death of Baudelio
Batoon.

Accused Pendatum Ampuan testified that he is 20 years old, single, student and a resident of
Piagapo, Lanao del Sur. On January 31, 1996 at about 6:00 a.m., he left Marawi City for Iligan City
on board a passenger Armak jeepney. He alighted at the terminal behind the Gaisano Superstore
and at exactly 7:00 a.m., he entered the store and went to the upper storey to shop. When he came
out, he met a friend name[d] Bessah. Together they walked to the Maharlika Theater but then
Bessah expressed the intention to go home to Marawi City. He accompanied Bessah to the
Tambacan terminal. Then he proceeded to the house of his Uncle Ali in Cabaro. (This is a place
North of the city and at the opposite side from Tambacan which is South of the city). He arrived there
at noon. He stayed overnight at his Uncle Ali’s house. At about 9:00 a.m., the following day,
February 1, 1996, he left the house of his uncle. Outside, he met Baginda Palao, who was looking
for a certain Baser, a policeman. He wanted the latter to help him collect a debt. They went to the
terminal at the back of Gaisano store but did not find Baser. Baginda told him to wait while he will
look for Baser inside the Gaisano store. Baginda returned without having found Baser and once
again he told him to wait while Baginda will look for a car. A little later, Baginda returned on board a
car driven by one Aminola Basar. They went to the Tambacan terminal but again did not find Baser.
Instead, they saw Renandang Mamaruncas. Baginda invited the latter to go with them to Baraas to
collect a debt. Renandang entered the car and they proceeded to Baraas. The car stopped at a
place near a shop. Baginda instructed him and Renandang to remain in the car because he was
going out to collect the debt. Baginda left the car and entered the shop. About ten minutes later, he
heard shouting followed by gunfire. He stepped out of the car to verify and saw Baginda Palao
[shoot] the victim. He retreated to the car as the police led by Capt. Mijares arrived. They confiscated
the car key and arrested them except Baginda Palao who escaped. They were taken to the hospital
due to injuries. In his case, the sustained wounds when mauled by the children of the victim but in
another breath he admitted that his injury was a gunshot wound when he was caught in the cross
fire as the police shot Renandang Mamaruncas. He was inside the car when he was hit. He further
admitted that Baginda Palao is known as Abdul Wahid Sultan. He denied shooting Baudelio Batoon.8

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC debunked appellants’ defense of denial and held them guilty as principals by direct
participation in the killing of Baudelio Batoon (Baudelio). It gave full faith and credence to the
evidence of the prosecution especially on the presence of conspiracy among the malefactors and
rendered a verdict of conviction, thus:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murder qualified by treachery defined
and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without the presence of any other
aggravating circumstances and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA with the corresponding accessory penalties attached thereto by law and to indemnify
the Heirs of Baudelio Batoon the sums of:

1. ₱10,200,000.00 for and as loss of support;

2. ₱66,904.00 for and as actual damages;
3. ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity and
4. ₱100,000.00 for and as moral damages

without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Cost against the accused.

Having been under preventive detention since February 1, 1996, the period of such detention shall
be credited in full in favor of said accused in the service of their respective sentences.

SO ORDERED.9

In view of the Notice of Appeal10 filed by the appellants, the RTC forwarded the records of the case to
this Court. By Resolution11 dated January 31, 2000, the Court resolved to accept the appeal. In view
thereof, appellants were required to file their brief.12 Appellants thus filed their brief on November 20,
200013 while the OSG submitted the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee14 on May 2, 2001. Later, however,
consonant with this Court’s pronouncement in People v. Mateo15 the case was transferred to the CA
for appropriate action and disposition.16

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By Decision17 promulgated on June 30, 2006, the appeals court affirmed with modification the RTC
Decision. Said court ruled that the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies pointed
out by the appellants pertain only to minor and collateral matters which do not dilute the probative
weight of said testimonies. Regarding the erroneous designation of appellant Ampuan’s name in the
Information, the court went on to hold that such error was only a formal defect and the proper
correction of which was duly made without any objection on the part of the defense. The CA likewise
held that treachery attended the commission of the crime.

The decretal portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the questioned
Judgment dated July 19, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659 and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellants are
to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Baudelio Batoon the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages and ₱66,904.00
as actual damages.

SO ORDERED.18

Disgruntled, appellants are now again before this Court in view of their Notice of Appeal19 from the
Decision of the CA.

By Resolution20 dated November 19, 2007, this Court notified the parties that they may file their
respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. In their respective manifestations, the
parties opted to adopt the briefs they earlier filed as their supplemental briefs.21

In their brief, appellants assign the following errors:

i. That the trial court erred in convicting [them] when they should have been acquitted for
failure of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; and
ii. The information filed before the trial court was substantially defective.22

The basic thrust of appellants’ first assignment of error is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Appellants contend that the trial court anchored its finding and conclusion on the testimonies of
witnesses Juanito Gepayo (Gepayo), Richard Batoon (Batoon) and P/Sr. Insp. Graciano Mijares
(Mijares), who appear to be inconsistent in their stand and whose credibility is therefore assailable.
They question the prosecution witnesses’ identification of Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same
person and aver that the same only leads to the logical conclusion that said witnesses were perjured
witnesses. They argue that Ampuan failed to grasp the information read to him as he was arraigned
as "Abdul Wahid Sultan alias Pendatum Ampuan".

On the other hand, the OSG in praying for the affirmance of the appealed Decision, opines that
inconsistencies on minor and collateral matters in the testimony of a prosecution eyewitness do not
affect his credibility. It also contends that whatever defect the information subject of appellant
Ampuan’s arraignment has had been cured with the latter’s consent during the trial.

Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

In support of their quest for acquittal, appellants tried to cast doubt on the credibility of witness
Gepayo anchored on the following grounds: (1) there was serious inconsistency in his testimony on
whether he knew Ampuan before the incident; (2) his actuation of just watching the incident without
giving any assistance to his fallen employer as well as his immediate return to work thereafter is
contrary to human nature and experience; (3) while he testified that appellant Mamaruncas was one
of the wounded suspects during the encounter, he failed to identify him in court; and, (4) in his
affidavit, he identified Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person but later on testified to the
contrary.

Credibility of witnesses not affected by minor inconsistencies.

The perceived inconsistency on whether Gepayo knows Ampuan even before the incident is
inconsequential as to discredit the credibility of Gepayo’s testimony. The inconsistency pointed out
by appellants pertains only to collateral or trivial matters and has no substantial effect on the nature
of the offense. In fact, it even signifies that the witness was neither coached nor was lying on the
witness stand. What matters is that there is no inconsistency in Gepayo’s complete and vivid
narration as far as the principal occurrence and the positive identification of Ampuan as one of the
principal assailants are concerned.23 "The Court has held that although there may be inconsistencies
in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details, they do not impair their credibility where there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant."24

It could be true that Gepayo did not retreat to a safer place during the shooting incident and did not
render assistance to his wounded employer. To appellants, this reaction is contrary to human nature.
We believe otherwise. This imputed omission, to our mind, does not necessarily diminish the
plausibility of Gepayo’s story let alone destroy his credibility. To us, his reaction is within the bounds
of expected human behavior. Surely, he was afraid that they might kill him because the malefactors
were then armed with guns.25 Thus, he would not dare attempt to stop them and stake his life in the
process. At any rate, it is settled "that different people react differently to a given situation or type of
situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with
a strange or startling or frightful experience. Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience which
elicits different reactions from the witnesses and for which no clear-cut standard form of behavior
can be drawn."26

The failure of Gepayo to identify Mamaruncas in court does not bolster appellants’ cause. As the CA
correctly pointed out:

x x x We agree with the prosecution’s observation that although he did not positively identify
appellant Mamaruncas as one of the shooters, he was however, able to point out that there was a
third person who accompanied assailants Palao and Ampuan in approaching the victim during the
incident. This is also bolstered by Insp. Mijares[’] testimony that he saw three assailants pointing
their guns at the victim who was already lying prostrate on the ground.27

In any event, even without Gepayo’s identification of Mamaruncas, the unrebutted testimony of
another prosecution eyewitness, Batoon, clearly points to Mamaruncas as one of the assailants.
Thus:

Q: After these three persons rather Abdul Wahid together with two companions, presented
the warrant of arrest to your father, what happened thereafter?

A: They pulled their guns and pointed [them at] my father.

Q: Who pulled out .45 caliber gun [and pointed it at] your father?

A: Abdul Wahid, Sir

 Q: And what happened after the .45 pistol [was] pointed [at] your father?

A: My father tried to [grab] the .45 caliber from Abdul Wahid, Sir.

Q: What happened after?

A: My father was shot by one of his companion[s], Sir.

Q: Who [first shot] your father?

A: (Witness pointing to a person. [W]hen he was asked x x x his name[,] he answered that he
is Renandang Mamaruncas)

xxxx

Q: After this Renandang Mamaruncas shot your father, what happened thereafter?

A: The other companion fired the next shot (witness pointing to a person sitting at the bench
inside the Courtroom and when he was asked x x x his name, he answered that he is
Pendatum [Ampuan].)28

Undoubtedly, the testimonies of eyewitnesses Gepayo and Batoon on material details are
straightforward and consistent with each other. They personally saw appellants at the scene of the
crime at the time it was committed. Their combined declarations established beyond reasonable
doubt the identities of both appellants, along with their co-accused Abdul, as the perpetrators of the
crime.

As to the contention that Gepayo referred to Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan as one and
the same person in his affidavit29 and yet later on testified to the contrary, this Court finds the same
inconsequential and will not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused. In a very recent case,30 this
Court reiterated that as between an affidavit executed outside the court and a testimony given in
open court, the latter almost always prevails. It emphasized therein that:

Discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify the
acquittal of an accused. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness since ex parte
affidavits are often incomplete. They do not purport to contain a complete compendium of the details
of the event narrated by the affiant. Thus, our rulings generally consider sworn statements taken out
of court to be inferior to in court testimony (citation omitted).

The evidence at hand, moreover, clearly points out that it was the police officers who supplied the
names of the suspects in Gepayo’s affidavit.31

Any alleged defect in the Information deemed waived.

Anent the second assigned error, appellants aver that the Information filed before the trial court was
substantially defective considering that it accuses Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person
when in fact they were identified as different persons. As such, Ampuan was not able to comprehend
the Information read to him.

The Court cannot accord merit to this argument. It is well to note that appellants failed to raise the
issue of the defective Information before the trial court through a motion for bill of particulars or a
motion to quash the information. Their failure to object to the alleged defect before entering their
pleas of not guilty amounted to a waiver of the defect in the Information. "Objections as to matters of
form or substance in the [I]nformation cannot be made for the first time on appeal."32 Records even
show that the Information was accordingly amended during trial to rectify this alleged defect but
appellants did not comment thereon, viz:

FISCAL ROBERTO ALBULARIO:

Per manifestation and admission of this witness, the Information be amended from [Renandang]
Mamaruncas and the word and, it should be Bagindo [sic] Palao alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and the
alias Pendatum Ampuan be erased as corrected.

COURT:

Any comment from the accused.

ATTY. FIDEL MACAUYAG:

No comment, Your Honor.33

Treachery correctly appreciated.

From the evidence and as found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, the facts
sufficiently prove that treachery was employed by appellants. The attack on Baudelio was so swift
and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or
defend himself. As ruled by the trial court:

In the above situation, treachery was considered to exist. More so in this case when the victim was
completely without any weapon from the inception of the assault. At the moment when Pendatum
Ampuan and Renandang Mamaruncas shot him, Baudelio Batoon was not in any position to defend
himself. And when Abdul Wahid shot him while lying wounded on the ground, he was utterly
defenseless.34

Hence, both lower courts correctly found appellants guilty of murder in view of the presence of
treachery.

Conspiracy was duly proven.

We also sustain the finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists "when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary x x x [as it] may be shown through circumstantial
evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred
from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest."35

In this case, conspiracy was clearly established. All three accused entered the shop of Baudelio at
the same time. Ampuan shot Baudelio from behind, hitting the latter at his left armpit while
Mamaruncas shot Baudelio on the thigh. When Baudelio fell to the ground face down, Abdul shot
him at the back. These consecutive acts undoubtedly showed appellants’ unanimity in design, intent
and execution. They performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to
unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design in the commission of the crime.
The Court thus sees no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA considering that
they are based on existing evidence and reasonable

conclusions drawn therefrom. It has been held time and again that factual findings of the trial court,
its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the
conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. As a rule, the Court
will not weigh anew the evidence already passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the
CA.36 Though the rule is subject to exceptions, no such exceptional grounds obtain in this case.

Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, appellants could only muster mere
denial. As ruled in various cases by the Court, denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-serving. "As between the categorical
testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held
to prevail."37

The Penalty

Undoubtedly, the crime committed is murder in view of the attending aggravating circumstance of
treachery. Murder, as defined under Article 24838 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, is the
unlawful killing of a person which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that treachery, inter alia,
attended the killing. The presence of any one of the enumerated circumstances under the aforesaid
Article is enough to qualify a killing as murder punishable by reclusion perpetua

to death. Since only the qualifying circumstance of treachery is found to be present, both the RTC
and the CA properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code. Moreover, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 934639 provides:

Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4103 otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

Pursuant to the above provision, appellants are therefore not eligible for parole.

Awards of Damages

The Court modifies the award of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence,40said award is increased to ₱75,000.00. Anent the award of moral damages, the CA
correctly imposed the amount of ₱50,000.00.41 These "awards are mandatory without need of
allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder
or homicide."42

Anent the award of actual damages, the victim’s widow testified that the family spent a total of
₱66,904.00 relative to the wake and burial of the victim. However, the claim for said amount is
supported merely by a list of expenses43personally prepared by the widow instead of official receipts.
To be entitled to an award of actual damages, "it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable x x x."44 "A list of expenses cannot replace receipts when the latter should have been
issued as a matter of course in business transactions."45 Thus the Court deletes the lower courts’
award of actual damages. Nonetheless, since entitlement of the same is shown under the facts of
the case, temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.0046 should be awarded in lieu of actual
damages to the heirs of the victim pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code which provides that
temperate damages "may be recovered when the court finds that pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty."

The CA correctly deleted the indemnity for loss of earning capacity awarded by the trial court. Such
lawphi 1

indemnity cannot be awarded in the absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was
either self-employed or a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws.

As testified to by the widow, Florenda Batoon, the victim was earning a monthly income of
₱20,000.00 and ₱90,000.00 as an auto repair shop and a six-wheeler truck operator, respectively.
The trial court made a conservative estimate of ₱500.00 a day as the net income from the truck
alone after making reasonable deductions from its operation. Thus, ranged against the daily
minimum wage then prevailing in Region X which is ₱137.00 per day pursuant to Wage Order No.
RX-03, this case undoubtedly does not fall under the exceptions where indemnity for loss of earning
capacity can be given despite the lack of documentary evidence.

The Court sustains the award of exemplary damages in view of the proven qualifying circumstance
of treachery. The CA however awarded exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim in the amount
of ₱25,000.00. To conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases this amount to
₱30,000.00.47

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00196 which found appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum
Ampuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is AFFIRMED with further
MODIFICATIONS as follows:

1. Appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole;

2. The award of civil indemnity is increased to ₱75,000.00;

3. The award of ₱66,904.00 as actual damages is deleted;

4. ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded in lieu of actual damages;

5. The award of exemplary damages is increased to ₱30,000.00; and

6. Appellants are further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim interest on all damages
awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
People v. Castel, G.R. No. 171164, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 642, 668.

2
CA rollo, pp. 250-273; penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and concurred in by
Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Sixto C. Marella, Jr.

3
Records, pp. 162-171; penned by Judge Valerio M. Salazar.

4
Id. at 1.

5
Initially, the names of the accused were indicated as "Romandang Mamaruncas, Baginda
Palao and Abdul Wahid Sultan alias Pendatum Ampuan. (Id.) Later, the names of the
accused were properly corrected in the Information as Renandang Mamaruncas, Baginda
Palao alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan, id.; TSN, September 7, 1998, p. 18.

6
Records, p. 34.

7
CA rollo, pp. 185-189. Citations omitted.

8
Records, pp. 165-166.

9
Id. at 171.

10
Id. at 173-175.

11
CA rollo, p. 42.

12
See Notice to File Appellant Brief dated March 6, 2000, id. at 45.

13
Id. at 64-77.
14
Id. at 179-208.

15
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

16
See Minute Resolution dated September 13, 2004, CA rollo, p. 245.

17
Supra note 2.

18
CA rollo, p. 272.

19
Id. at 281-284.

20
Rollo, p. 32.

21
See the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion for Leave to Adopt Brief as Supplemental Brief,
id. at 33-36, and appellants’ Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief), id. at
37-40.

22
CA rollo, p. 65.

23
See TSN, May 20, 1996, pp. 18 and 77.

24
People v. Bernabe, G.R. No. 185726, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 216, 231.

25
TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 47.

26
People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 185841, August 4, 2009, 595 SCRA 379,403.

27
CA rollo, p. 265.

28
Direct Testimony of Richard Batoon, TSN, September 18, 1996, pp. 15-19.

29
Exhibit "1," records, p. 6.

Gemma Ong a.k.a Maria Teresa Gemma Catacutan v. People, G.R. No. 169440,
30

November 23, 2011.

31
TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 88.

32
Panuncio v. People, G.R. No. 165678, July 17, 2009, 593 SCRA 180, 188.

33
TSN, September 7, 1998, p. 29.

34
Records, p. 169.

Mangangey v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147773-74, February 18, 2008, 546 SCRA 51,
35

66.

36
Chua v. People, G.R. Nos. 150926 and 30, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 161, 167.
37
People v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 181599, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 762, 769.

Art. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
38

another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men,
or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity;

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,

derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles,
or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin;

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of

an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other
public calamity;

5. With evident premeditation;

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim,
or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. Took effect on June
39

24, 2006.

40
People v. Agacer, G.R. No. 177751, December 14, 2011.

41
Id.

42
People v. Orias, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 417, 437-438.

43
Exhibit "D", records, p. 72.

44
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 168173, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 412, 446-447.

45
People v. Guillera, G.R. No. 175829, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 160, 171.

46
People v. Agacer, supra note 40.

47
People v. Asis, G.R. No. 177573, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 509, 531.
 Supreme Court of the Philippines

271 Phil. 222

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 88044, January 23, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARTIN
CAGADAS, JR., MACARIO BARBERO, ROMY TULIO, CORITO PIASIDAD,
RENE BALONG, ROBERTO CULTURA AND TATOR SALVADOR,
APPELLANTS.

DECISION

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This case was elevated to this Court on appeal as the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was imposed upon the appellants.

On June 6, 1973, at around 6:30 in the morning, Rex Ballena and his sister,
Lucia Ballena-Tabo, left their residences at Longganapan, San Vicente, Davao,
bound for the capital town of Tagum, to withdraw some money with which to
pay their farm laborers. In order to reach their destination, they had to pass
through Sitio Rizal in Binancian, Municipality of Asuncion, Davao, to take a
jeepney ride to Tagum. While waiting inside the jeep at the Sitio Rizal Terminal,
some members of the Integrated Civil Home Defense Force (ICHDF),
including the accused, approached them and asked where they were bound for
and why. Rex Ballena naively informed them that they were on their way to
Tagum to withdraw money from the bank with which to pay his
farmhands. When asked if they would be returning to Longganapan that day,
Lucia replied that only her brother, Rex, would do so. One of the ICHDF
members who approached them was identified by Lucia Tabo as Martin
Cagadas, Jr.

Rex and Lucia arrived in Tagum at nearly noon. After withdrawing P800 from
his Family Savings Bank Account No. 1517020387, Rex purchased some
necessities for his family, reserving P500 for his workers' wages. He returned to
Longganapan the following day, leaving his sister Lucia in Tagum.

Rex was able to pass Sitio Rizal unmolested. In fact, he met Santiago Vercede,
his neighbor in Longganapan, while travelling on Dalisay Road at around 3:30
that afternoon, proceeding toward Sangab.

The following day, Lucia returned to Longganapan and discovered that her
brother never arrived home and was missing.

On June 9, 1983, at around 8:30 in the morning, Lucia informed their barangay
councilman, Jose Magunot, who was also the deacon of the Iglesia ni Kristo
Church, that she was looking for her brother Rex. Together with other farmers
living near the Bontiqui/Lapatigan Creek, they searched for Rex. On their way
to Rizal, they met members of the ICHDF namely, Miguel Daub, Martin
Cagadas, Jr., Macario Barbero, Romy Tulio, Corito Piasidad, Rene Balong,
Roberto Cultura and Tator Salvador, who inquired about their mission and
dissuaded them from continuing their search for Rex. They were advised to
report the matter to the barangay officials in Binansian, Asuncion, which they
did. However, no action was taken by the said barangay officials.

In the evening of June 10, 1983, due to the very strong stench emitting
therefrom, the decomposed body of Rex Ballena was found lying face down in a
deep ravine below the mouth of the Macjum River about one-half kilometer
away from the Bontiqui Creek. His body bore multiple stab wounds in the
chest and stomach, with the intestines protruding, his throat slashed, and head
smashed with a hard and heavy object. His mouth was still gagged with a red
handkerchief and his hands bound with boracan vines behind his back. His
money was gone but his Savings Account passbook was found beside the
decaying corpse. Without waiting for the Municipal Health Officer's post-
mortem necropsy examination or the Municipal judge's Inquest Report, his
remains were laid to rest the next day.

On November 8, 1984, or more than a year later, an Information for murder

was filed against the armed ICHDF members, namely: Miguel Daub, the
ICHDF team leader, Martin Cagadas, Jr., Macario Barbero, Romy Tulio, Corito
Piasidad, Rene Balong, Jose "Roberto" Cultura and Saturnino "Tator" Salvador,
who had been seen by eyewitnesses leading Rex, with hands hogtied behind his
back and his mouth gagged by a red handkerchief, towards the deep gully where
his decomposing body was found. The ICHDF was a para-military group
organized by local units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and composed
of selected civilians in the locality to assist the Army in its peace-keeping duties.

The amended information, filed on December 3, 1984, reads:

"The undersigned accuses MIGUEL DAUB, MARTIN CAGADAS, JR.,
MACARIO BARBERO, ROMY TULIO, CORITO PIASIDAD, RENE
BALONG, JOSE CULTURA and TATOR SALVADOR of the crime of
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

"That on or about June 6, 1983, in the Municipality of San Vicente, Province of

Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill and armed
with guns and bladed weapons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab one Rex Ballena, thereby inflicting
upon him wounds which caused his death, and further causing actual, moral and
compensatory damages to the heirs of the victim.

"That in the commission of the foregoing offense all the above-named accused
took advantage of their public position as members of the Integrated Civil
Home Defense Force and their superior strength which circumstances aggravate
their crime." (p. 3, Trial Court's decision; p. 24, Rollo.)
The accused were arraigned on December 14, 1984. Each entered a plea of
"Not Guilty" to the charge. At the trial, the prosecution presented five
witnesses and the defense, thirteen. Two prosecution witnesses, Ramos
Magunot and Jose Magunot, testified that they saw on June 6, 1983 at around 4
p.m., from their farm huts situated along the Bontigui Creek in Sitio Rizal, Rex
Ballena, hogtied and being led by the accused toward the Macjum River, where
his corpse was later discovered. Leading the way was Martin Cagadas, Jr.; on
the left side of Rex was Romy Tulio who held the vine tied around Rex's hands;
on the right was Tator Salvador, and directly behind was Macario Barbero, who
held a gun against the victim's back, followed by Corito Piasidad, Rene Balong,
"Jose" Cultura and ICHDF team leader Miguel Daub. Jose Magunot testified
that he was summoned by the ICHDF team the same evening because their
leader (Daub) caught him (Jose) watching when they hogtied Rex. He was
warned not to tell on them at the risk of his own life. There was, however, no
eyewitness to the actual killing.

All the accused put up the defense of alibi, claiming that they could not possibly
have committed the heinous crime imputed to them, for they were not in the
place pointed to by the prosecution witnesses, having either worked in another
ICHDF detachment center or in some other place.

On August 24, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao (Branch 1)
rendered a decision finding all of the accused, excluding Miguel Daub (who died
during the trial) "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
charged, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify the widow, Aquila
Ballena, and the heirs of Rex Ballena P12,000 as compensatory damages, plus
Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos, as and in the concept of moral damages, the
filing fees thereof to stand as lien to the full and complete execution for the
satisfaction of the awards." (p. 50, RTC decision; p. 137, Rollo.)

The defendants appealed to this Court in view of the penalty imposed on

them. They allege that the lower court erred:
1. in convicting them of murder despite the prosecution's failure to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt;

2. in giving credence to the improbable and ill-motivated testimonies of

prosecution witnesses Ramos and Jose Magunot;

3. in convicting the appellants of the crime charged based on purely

circumstantial evidence;

4. in disregarding their defense of alibi;

5. in convicting Roberto Cultura even if he was not one of those charged in the
information; and

6. in finding that the aggravating circumstances of (a) taking advantage of public

position, (b) superior strength, (c) evident premeditation, and (d) treachery were
present in the commission of the crime.
The appeal has no merit.

While it is true that no eyewitnesses to the actual killing were available or brave
enough to come forward and testify against the accused, direct evidence is not
the only basis upon which their guilt may be predicated. Their guilt may be, as it
was, established through circumstantial evidence which suffices for conviction if
the following requisites are present, namely: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 5, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court;
People vs. Alcantara, 163 SCRA 783).

The following facts or circumstances were proven:

1. that Rex was seen by the prosecution witnesses, Ramos Magunot and Jose
Magunot, hogtied and gagged with a red handkerchief in his mouth;

2. that he was being led on foot toward the Macjum river by the appellants;

3. that his body, bearing stab wounds and other injuries, was found at the
Macjum river;

4. that the appellants advised Magunot not to report what he had seen; and

5. that the victim did not have his money on his person when his body was
found.

The inferences to be derived from those facts are: (1) that Rex was gagged and
hogtied by the appellants; (2) that he was killed by the appellants, and, (3) that
he was robbed by the appellants.

The web of circumstantial evidence in this case constitutes an unbroken chain

leading to a reasonable conclusion that the appellants detained the victim while
he was on his way to Sangab that fateful afternoon of June 6, 1983. They
hogtied and gagged him, led him to the gully, and as the decomposed corpse
later revealed, stabbed him to death with multiple knife thrusts. Their individual
participation need not be specified for they were all co-conspirators in the
commission of the crime, hence, the guilt of one or some was the guilt of
all. (People vs. Maralit, 165 SCRA 427; People vs. Newman, 163 SCRA 496;
People vs. Salvador, 163 SCRA 574.)

The trial court did not err in giving full credit to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses for they were disinterested witnesses, not related at all to
the victim. Their testimonies were spontaneous, unrehearsed and unchallenged
even during cross-examination. Their initial reluctance to testify does not affect
their credibility (People vs. Aliocod, 167 SCRA 665) for the killers were
notorious for their lawlessness and barbarity.

The trial court properly rejected the appellants' defense of alibi which is the
weakest of all defenses especially in the absence of proof that it would have
been physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime
(People vs. Masangkay, 157 SCRA 320). Moreover, the testimonies of the
defense witnesses are not only replete with material inconsistencies but are also
incompatible with one another. The Certification signed by the barangay and
purok officials on September 27, 1984, attesting to the presence of the accused
in a detachment center in Davao is highly unreliable, as it was not based on
personal knowledge of the affiants but on unconfirmed reports or hearsay.

Appellants' contention that the trial court erred convicting Roberto Cultura for
he was not one of those indicted in the information but "Jose" Cultura (his
father's name), has no merit. The erroneous designation of his name in the
information will not vitiate it, as it was clearly proven that the accused, Roberto
Cultura, was part of the group that arrested, hogtied and killed the
victim. Besides, Cultura did not raise this question of his identity during the
arraignment. His acquiescence to be tried under the name "Jose" at that stage of
the case is deemed to be a waiver on his part to raise the question of his identity
as one of the accused for the first time on appeal (People vs. Maravilla, 165
SCRA 392; People vs. Torres, 165 SCRA 702).

All the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
qualified by treachery and aggravated by the circumstance of taking advantage of
their public positions. There was treachery in the commission of the offense for
the victim was gagged and his hands were tied before he was slain, thereby
rendering him completely helpless. Furthermore, the appellants abused their
office as Civil Home Defense members, who are supposed to be peace officers
tasked with maintaining law and order and of protecting life and property in
their community. They instead turned out to be murderers and brigands.

The penalty of murder under the 1987 Constitution is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua (People vs. Alpetche, 168 SCRA
670). Appellants cannot avail of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering
the penalty actually imposed.

WHEREFORE, the decision a quo, being in full accord with the evidence and
the law, is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 144340-42 April 17, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODELIO AQUINO Y RODA, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

Before this Court for automatic review1 is the Joint Decision2 of Branch 163 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, in Criminal Cases Nos. 116859-H, 116860-H and 116861 promulgated on July 13,
2000. In Criminal Case No. 116859-H, the lower court sentenced appellant Rodelio Aquino y Roda
to suffer the death penalty.

The prosecutor charged appellant with two (2) counts of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, committed against appellant's nieces, 5-year old
Charlaine Bautista and 4-year old Charmela Bautista. The prosecutor also charged appellant with
one (1) count of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 7610, committed against appellant's other niece, 6-year old Charmaine Bautista. The
Informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 116859-H

"Sometime in October, 1999 in Taguig, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, being the uncle of the 5-year old Charlaine Bautista, with
lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with said Charlaine Bautista, by then and there touching her vagina and inserting his penis
into her vagina, against the latter's will and consent.

Contrary to law."

Criminal Case No. 116860-H

"On or about or prior to October 12, 1999 in Taguig, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the accused, being the uncle of the 4-year old Charmela Bautista,
with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit[ted] sexual
assault upon the person of said Charmela Bautista, by then and there touching her vagina
and inserting one of fingers (sic) into her vagina, against the latter's will and consent.

Contrary to law."
 Criminal Case No. 116861

"On or about or prior to October 12 1999 in Taguig, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the accused, being the uncle of the 6-year old Charmaine Bautista,
with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
lasciviousness upon the person of said Charmaine Bautista, by then and there touching her
vagina, against the latter's will and consent.

Contrary to law."

On December 7, 1999, the appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to each of the
Informations. After pre-trial, a joint trial on the merits ensued.

Winnie Bautista is a 28-year old, single mother, residing at No. 58-C Lower Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. She has three young daughters: Charmaine who is (6) years old, Charlaine, five (5) years
old, and Charmela, four (4) years old. Winnie is estranged from her husband. The children use the
surname Bautista, Winnie's maiden name, instead of Congollo, their father's surname, although their
birth certificates bear the surname of their father. Winnie testified that appellant Rodelio Aquino is
her brother. She explained during trial that Aquino is their biological father's surname while Bautista
is their stepfather's surname, which she as been using since she was a child.3

Appellant's house is situated about one meter away from the complainants' house.4 The children
would often go to their uncle's house and spend time with him while their mother was at work. This
explains why the children developed a certain fondness for their uncle and called him "daddy" since
he had no children of his own.5

Cherry Lauria, a friend of Winnie, stayed with the latter's family for a few days and was tasked to
look after the children while their mother was at work. It was during Cherry's stay that she learned of
the children's unfortunate experience with "daddy".6

On October 12, 1999, at around 6 p.m., while waiting for the show time of a television soap opera,
Cherry told the children to take their dinner first before watching television. Charmela, the youngest
of the three, did not want to eat and instead told Cherry that she wanted to go to "daddy". Charlaine
suddenly blurted out to Charmela not to go to appellant's house because he might do to her what he
did to Charlaine - rape her. Shocked by what she heard from Charlaine, Cherry turned off the TV
and asked the children one by one what happened.7

It turned out that appellant had been abusing his nieces.

Sometime in October of 1999, Charlaine, then about 5 years old, made one of her usual visits to
appellant's house. No other person was then present at the house except appellant and Charlaine.
Appellant handed to Charlaine a bottle of baby oil and asked her to put some on his penis, a request
which she innocently and obediently followed. Appellant then applied some oil on the vagina of
Charlaine and thereafter inserted his oily penis into Charlaine's vagina.8

Charmaine and Charmela likewise related to Cherry that appellant had fondled their genitals when
they went to his house.9

The children begged Cherry not to tell their mother and grandmother about the incident because
appellant had threatened to kill them.10
The following day, Cherry reported the children's plight to their mother.

Winnie reported the matter to the Taguig Police Station as well as to the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.11 The Taguig Police then requested PNP Crime Laboratory Service at
Camp Crame, Quezon City, to conduct a Physical examination on Charlaine, Charmaine, and
Charmela to determine if they were victims of sexual abuse.12

On October 14, 1999, Dr. Emmanuel Reyes of the PNP Crime Laboratory examined the children. He
found the presence of a healing laceration at a 5 o'clock position on Charlaine's hymen. While he
found both Charmaine and Charmela in a virgin state physically, he noted that their
fourchettes13 were congested. Dr. Reyes said that the most likely explanation for this condition was
that their genitals had been manipulated.14

Appellant asserted the defense of alibi in denying the charges against him. On October 12, 1999, the
day of the alleged incident, accused claimed that he was buying silver at the garbage dumpsite of
Uniden, located at Lower Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Accused stressed that he usually stays at
the dumpsite from 6 a.m. until the afternoon. The accused surmised that his refusal to loan
P5,000.00 to his sister Winnie might have provoked the latter into falsely accusing him.15

The trial court, relying on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the personal testimonies of
the victims themselves, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges against him.
It held, "The three kids, despite their tender age, said in a direct, clear, straightforward and
spontaneous manner that they were violated by the accused."16 The trial court found appellant guilty
of qualified rape and imposed upon him the penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 116859-H. The
trial court also found appellant guilty of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Cases Nos. 116860-H and
116861. The dispositive portion17 of the trial court's decision reads:

"WHEREFORE:

1. In Criminal Case No. 116859-H, this Court finds accused Rodelio Aquino y Roda GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Rape qualified by minority of the victim and her relationship with
the accused, defined under Article 266-I-A and penalized under Art. 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of DEATH. Accused is further ordered
to indemnify Charlaine Bautista for P50,000.00 as indemnity.

2. In Criminal Case No. 116860-H, the Court likewise finds accused, Rodelio Aquino y Roda,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness only defined
under Article 36518 of the Revised Penal Code but is penalized under Sec. 5 (h), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, as amended. Accused is hereby sentenced, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 14 years, 8 months and
1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 16 years, also of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

3. In Criminal Case No. 116861, this Court finds accused Rodelio Aquino y Roda also
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Acts of Lasciviousness defined and penalized under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and Sec. 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, as
amended. Accused is hereby sentenced, there being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 16 years, also of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

With costs against the accused in all these cases.

 SO ORDERED."

Hence, this automatic review.

Appellant made the following assignment of errors:

"I.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF

THE COMPLAINING WITNESSES DESPITE THE CLEAR INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR
NARRATION OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENT AND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED.

II.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY FOR THE
COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSES WHEN THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED TENDS
TO PROVE OTHERWISE."19

At the outset, we find that we cannot, for lack of jurisdiction, entertain the appeals in Criminal Cases
Nos. 116860-H and 116861 where the trial court sentenced appellant to reclusion temporal in each
of these cases. Appellant merely relied on the automatic appeal of Criminal Case No. 116859
wherein the death penalty was imposed. However, this Court has held that an automatic review of
the death penalty imposed by the trial court includes an appeal of the less serious crimes (not
punished by death) only if the lesser crimes are committed on the same occasion or arise out of the
same occurrence as that which gives rise to the more serious offense.20 Section 17 (1) of R.A. 296,
as amended (The Judiciary Act of 1948), provides that-

"SECTION 17. The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in--

(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished,
arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the
accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense,
regardless of whether the accused are charged as principals, accomplices or
accessories or whether they have been tried jointly or separately."

What we have here is a consolidation of three cases brought against the appellant by his nieces.
The two counts of acts of lasciviousness were not committed on the same occasion and did not arise
out of the same occurrence as that which gave rise to the crime of rape. Thus, this Court has no
jurisdiction to review the decision of the trial court on the two counts of acts of lasciviousness jointly
with the automatic review of crime of qualified rape for which the death penalty was
imposed.21 Clearly, for Section 17 (1) of R.A. No. 296 to apply, the lesser offenses must be committed
on the same occasion or must arise out of the same occurrence as that the graver offense which
merited the death penalty. The Informations for three cases merely state that these offenses were
committed on or about October 1999 in Taguig where the appellant and complainants' houses were
located. Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that appellant abused all three children on the
same occasion. In fact, Charlaine even tried to warn Charmela about her unfortunate experience not
knowing that their uncle had already molested her sisters on separate occasions. Thus, the three
offenses were committed during the same period in October but on different dates. For this reason,
appellant should have filed separate notices of appeal for the two counts of acts of lasciviousness.
In People vs. Alay-ay,22 this Court held that the appeal from a judgment rendered by the Regional
Trial Court in its original jurisdiction imposing a penalty other than reclusion perpetua or death must
be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing of a notice of appeal with the trial court and by serving a
copy thereof on the adverse party. Since appellant did not appeal the decision of the Regional Trial
Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 116860-H and 116861 to the Court of Appeals, the decision became
final and executory after the lapse of the 15-day period for perfecting an appeal. With this result, we
now limit our review to Criminal Case No. 116859-H for qualified rape where the trial court imposed
the death penalty.

Appellant faults the trial court for giving credence to the testimony of Charlaine despite the fact that
her testimony was allegedly replete with inconsistencies.

Appellant argues that Charlaine's testimony was a mere product of an orchestrated coaching
initiated by her mother and the prosecutor. To stress his point, appellant directs us to Charlaine's
testimony during cross-examination where she said that appellant did not really insert his penis into
her vagina but merely asked her to apply baby oil on it. When asked whether the prosecutor
instructed her to say that there was penetration, Charlaine answered positively. Thus, appellant
concludes that Charlaine was not really raped.

We do not agree.

Charlaine's testimony during the entire trial clearly shows that appellant indeed raped her. Her
convincing account of how appellant asked her to put baby oil on his penis, and how he applied the
same on her vagina, shows the lecherous intent of her uncle to rape her. It was not logical for
appellant to stop after he had applied baby oil on Charlaine's vagina. The logical implication would
be that the baby oil was a "lubricant" to facilitate the penetration of appellant's penis into Charlaine's
vagina. True enough, Charlaine narrated in court that after appellant applied baby oil on her vagina,
he proceeded to insert his penis into her private organ.

"DIRECT Examination:

FISCAL:

Mayroon ka bang natatandaang ginawang masama sa iyo si Daddy?

INTERPRETER:

Witness shook her head by answering yes (sic).

FISCAL:

Ano iyong masamang ginawa sa iyo ni Daddy?

A. Nagpalagay po siya ng langis sa titi.

Q. Kanino niya sinabi iyon?

A. Sa akin po.

Q. So, nung sinabi sa iyo ni Daddy Rodelio, lagyan mo ng langis ang titi ko, anong
ginawa mo?
 A. Nilagyan ko po.

Q. Pagkatapos mong lagyan ng langis, ano palang langis ang nilagay mo?

A. Baby oil.

Q. Nung nilagyan mo ng langis iyong titi ni Daddy, anong ginawa ni Daddy pagkatapos?

A. Iyong pekpek ko nilagyan niya ng langis.

Q. Pagkatapos ano na ang nangyari nung nilagyan ng langis iyong pekpek mo?

A. Nagsumbong po ako kay Ate Cherry nung gabi po.

xxx

FISCAL:

Nung nagpalagay si Daddy ng langis dun sa titi niya tapos nilagyan ni Daddy ng
langis iyong pekpek mo, anong ginawa ni Daddy sa titi niya?

A. Pinasok niya po sa pekpek ko.

Q. Pagkatapos noon anong nangyari?

A. Nagsumbong po ako kay Ate Cherry.

Q. Nasaktan ka ba noon?

INTERPRETER:

Witness nodded her head by answering yes (sic)."23

Appellant's argument that Charlaine retracted her statement on cross-examination, saying that there
was no "penetration," is rendered illusory by Charlaine's own clarification on re-direct examination
that appellant truly inserted his penis into her vagina.

"RE-DIRECT Examination:

FISCAL:

Q. Hindi ipinasok ni Daddy iyong titi niya sa pepe mo?

A. Pinasok po.

Q. Bakit kanina sabi mo kay Danny hindi ipinasok? Tinanong ka niya, di ba sabi niya
hindi ba ipinasok iyong titi, sabi mo Oo. Alin ang totoo, ipinasok o hindi?

A. Pinasok."24
The alleged lapses on Charlaine's testimony serve to strengthen rather than weaken her
credibility.25 This is particularly true where, as in this case, the rape victim is only five (5) years of age.
In the case of People vs. Baygar,26 this Court gave full credence to the testimony of a five-year old
minor who was raped, thus:

"The victim, Joanna, was only five years old at the time of the rape. At such a tender age,
she could not be expected to weave with uncanny recollection such a complicated tale as the
sexual assault that Lito unconscionably perpetrated on her. Even on cross-examination,
Joanna's candor and honesty were evident; her language simple and spontaneous,
consistent of and befitting someone her age testifying to such a horrible experience."

It did not help either that appellant's counsel was obviously trying to mislead Charlaine into retracting
her testimony. However, this notwithstanding, we uphold the trial court in giving full credence to
Charlaine's original statement and her confirmation on re-direct examination that appellant indeed
raped her. It is improbable for a girl of tender age like Charlaine, not exposed to the ways of the
world, to impute a crime as serious as rape to her own uncle, if it were not true.27

Moreover, the medical findings of Dr. Emmanuel Reyes ("Dr. Reyes" for brevity), medico-legal officer
of PNP Crame, support the testimony of Charlaine. Medico Legal Report No. M-2616-99 on
Charlaine reveals the presence of a "deep healing laceration at a 5 o'clock position and findings
compatible with recent loss of physical virginity."28 Dr. Reyes explained in court that the deep healing
laceration could have been caused by the insertion of a hard blunt object similar to an erect penis
penetrating the vagina during a sexual intercourse.

"Q. With respect to your findings as to the hymen there is a presence of a deep healing
laceration at 5:00 o'clock position, what do you mean by deep healing laceration?

A. By healing means a duration any day within a four (4) day period before the time of
my examination. And by deep means that it extended beyond one half of the width of the
hymen.

Q. What would have caused the deep healing laceration?

A. It could have been caused by the insertion of a hard blunt object similar to an
erectment (sic) penis as in the process of sexual intercourse

Q. The deep healing laceration could have been caused by an insertion of a penis
right?

A. Yes, ma'am."29

Thus, Charlaine's positive testimony, corroborated by Dr. Reyes' medical findings, suffices to support
a conviction against appellant.30

Appellant further contends that the statement in the medico-legal report, which says that Charlaine
bore "no external signs of recent application of any form of physical trauma,"31 negates the fact of
sexual abuse.

Admittedly, there was no sign of any physical trauma on Charlaine. This could be attributed to the
fact that there was no resistance on her part. Nevertheless, such fact does not exculpate appellant
from his beastly act. Charlaine grew up without her real father and she turned to her uncle for
paternal guidance. She even calls appellant "daddy".32Thus, it cannot be denied that appellant
exercised a great amount of influence and authority over Charlaine. We have held that resistance is
immaterial in a rape committed by an uncle against his own niece, since the uncle's moral
ascendancy and influence over his niece sufficiently take the place of violence or intimidation.33 Even
intimidation leaves no traces of struggle which could indicate that the victim fought off her attacker.34

The absence of external signs of physical trauma does not negate the fact of sexual abuse.
Jurisprudence has shown that the absence of any external sign of physical injury does not
necessarily negate the occurrence of rape, proof of injury not being an essential element of the
crime.35 Notwithstanding this, however, we hold that the laceration in Charlaine's hymen confirms the
fact of sexual abuse. We have held that lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical
evidence of forcible defloration.36

Appellant, moreover, asserts that granting that his penis touched Charlaine's vagina, it does not
satisfy the "penetration" required under existing jurisprudence. Appellant's main argument relies on
the testimony of the child-victim that she neither felt pain, nor cried, or saw blood on her underwear,
at the time appellant raped her. According to appellant, it was incredible that none of these events
transpired, considering that Charlaine was a mere five-year (5) old and appellant was an adult.
Appellant argues that a penetration of that sort would have provoked those reactions.

We do not agree. The "penetration" which ensued in this case fulfills the requirement under existing
jurisprudence. The case of People vs. Campuhan,37 cited by the appellant, provides the criterion in
determining whether there was penetration sufficient to warrant a rape conviction. This case states,
"There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into
the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be
convicted of consummated rape."38

We reiterate that Charlaine manifested in the lower court that appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina. To borrow the words of Charlaine, "pinasok niya po sa pekpek ko."39 This categorical
statement is sufficient to support the conclusion that there was penetration. This testimony is even
buttressed by physical evidence since the medical finding on Charlaine showed that she suffered a
recent loss of physical virginity. Add this to the fact that Charlaine's hymen was lacerated. It would
have been improbable for Charlaine's hymen to be lacerated if appellant's penis merely stroked the
external surface, or mons pubis, of her vagina.

Dr. Reyes explained that the laceration could have been caused by the insertion of a hard blunt
object similar to an erect penis, or even a smaller sized hard blunt object provided there was a "more
extensive manipulation."40 Thus, the fact that there has to be an extensive manipulation by a blunt
object in order to produce the kind of laceration inflicted on Charlaine's vagina rules out the
suggestion that appellant's penis merely grazed the external surface of Charlaine's private organ.

Furthermore, appellant's contention that Charlaine's reaction during the sexual abuse was atypical of
a victim of rape deserves no credit. We have repeatedly held that different people react differently to
a given type of situation. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, mysterious, startling or frightful experience, such as when the crime of
rape is perpetrated by a person with moral ascendancy over the victim who is a child of tender
age.41 In the case of People vs. Gajo,42 this Court held that-

"The defense capitalizes on the victims admission that she did not cry at all when she was
being raped, which is contrary to human nature. But persons react differently when
confronted with situations like this one. One cannot expect a child of five (5) years to act the
same way a ten (10)-year old or an older woman would. Crying is almost always brought
 about by the horrifying experience a woman has undergone and the shame and scandal that
she has to go through after the dastardly act has been committed. Not so in the case of a
five (5)-year old who has not fathomed the ways of man. If she did not cry while she was
being raped, it could be because she was afraid of what was being done to her. Fear would
oftentimes overwhelm the victim or stupefy her into inaction. This kind of apprehension
comes to one when somebody older and close to her does something she does not
comprehend but she just keeps quiet because the other person might get mad."

This Court also had several occasions to accord credence to a child-victim's testimony that she was
raped even without a showing that she felt pain or saw blood during the sexual act, for we have held
that pain or vaginal bleeding is not an element of rape.43 However, it was not correct for appellant to
say that Charlaine did not feel pain during the sexual abuse. Charlaine told the judge in court that
she felt pain when appellant inserted his penis into her vagina.44 It was possible, however, that the
penetration was not extremely painful, as may have been expected, considering that baby oil
lubricated their genitalias before appellant inserted his penis into Charlaine's vagina. People differ on
the degree of pain that they could bear. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have
undergone traumatic experiences by the norms expected under the circumstances from mature
persons.45 The range of emotions shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by the calculus. It
is thus unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from rape victims.

Finally, for his part, appellant can only offer the alibi that he was at the garbage dumpsite in Taguig,
from 6:00 a.m. to sometime in the afternoon, at the time of the incident.46 Even granting that he was
indeed at that place, at that time, it still does not rule out the possibility that he committed the sexual
abuse on Charlaine since he could have done it in the evening when he went home from work. The
Information shows the time of the commission of the crime to be "sometime in October 1999" without
giving the exact day of commission. Considering the many occasions where Charlaine went to
appellant's house, the rape could have been committed during any of those occasions. Even
appellant himself testified that his house is only one (1) meter away from the house of his niece.47

Appellant attributes the charge against him to his refusal to lend P5,000.00 to his sister, the mother
of Charlaine.

Again, we are not convinced. Not a few accused in rape cases have attributed similar motives to
those who brought the charges against them.48 However, courts are seldom, if at all, convinced that a
mother would stoop so low as to subject her daughter to physical hardship and shame concomitant
to a rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt feelings.49 No amount of money is worth letting
one's daughter undergo all the anguish and shame of a rape trial, not for the measly sum of
P5,000.00.

The Court therefore finds that the trial court did not err in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to death.

To warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in qualified rape under Article 266-B (1) of
the Revised Penal Code,50 the concurrence of the minority the victim and her relationship to the
offender must be specifically alleged and proved with equal certainty as the crime itself.

In the instant case, the Information alleges that the child-victim was a five (5)-year old minor and
appellant was the child-victim's uncle. The prosecution presented Charlaine's birth certificate51 to
prove her age. This undisputed circumstance, standing alone, qualifies the rape. Under Article 266-B
(5) of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty is mandated in rape cases "when the victim is a
child below seven (7) years old" The qualifying circumstance of relationship was also undisputedly
proven by the prosecution. The child-victim's mother, Winnie Bautista, testified in court that appellant
is her brother, making appellant a blood relative of the victim within the third civil degree. Moreover,
appellant categorically admitted during trial that the child-victim is his niece.52

With regard to the civil liability of appellant, the indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded by the lower court
should be increased to P75,000.00, in line with recent case law.53 The amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages is also awarded, without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.54 We have
also held that the presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles
the offended party to an award of exemplary damages, hence, the amount of P25,000.00.55

WHEREFORE, the ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163 in Criminal Case No.
116859-H, finding the accused Rodelio Aquino y Roda GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape
qualified by the minority of the victim and his relationship with the complainant, and imposing the
penalty of DEATH,56 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 be
raised to P75,000.00, and appellant shall further pay complainant Charlaine Bautista P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No.
7659, upon finality of this decision, let certified true copies of the records of this case be forwarded
forthwith to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Acting C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De

Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., abroad, on official leave.
Corona, J., took no part in the deliberations.

Footnotes

1
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No.
7659.

2
Penned by Judge Librado S. Correa.

3
TSN, April 11, 2000, p. 7.

4
TSN, May 30, 2000, p. 15.

5
TSN, March 7, 2000, p. 30.

6
TSN, February 22, 2000, p. 11.

7
TSN, February 22, 2000, pp. 5-6.

8
TSN, March 7, 2000, pp. 31-36.

9
TSN, March 14, 2000, pp. 5-6; March 22, 2000, pp. 6-7.
10
TSN, February 22, 2000, p. 6.

11
Records of Criminal Cases Nos. 116859-H-116861, Exhibit "H", "H-1", "H-2", pp. 104-105.

12
Rollo, p.19.

13
A membrane at the posterior junction of the labia minora.

14
Rollo, pp. 78-80.

15
Rollo, p. 42.

16
Rollo, p. 20.

17
Rollo, p. 22.

18
This should read Art. 336.

19
Rollo, p. 42.

20
People vs. Francisco, G.R. Nos. 135201-02, March 15, 2001.

21
Sec. 3, Rule 122, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, states as follows:

"How appeal taken. - (a) x x x.

(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the
Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or where a lesser
penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose
out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by
filing a notice of appeal x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

22
G.R. Nos. 137199-230, August 31, 2001.

23
TSN, March 7, 2000, pp. 31-32, 34.

24
TSN, March 7, 2000, p. 40.

25
People vs. Garigadi, 317 SCRA 399 (1999).

26
318 SCRA 358 (1999).

27
Ibid.

28
Records of Criminal Cases Nos. 116859-H-116861, Exhibit "C", p. 16.

29
TSN, March 7, 2000, pp. 9-10.

30
People vs. Brondial, 343 SCRA 600 (2000); People vs. Rosales, 313 SCRA 757 (1999).
31
Ibid.

32
TSN, March 7, 2000, p. 29.

33
People vs. Bentonio, 297 SCRA 532 (1997).

34
Ibid.

35
People vs. Abella, 315 SCRA 36 (1999); People vs. Patriarca, 319 SCRA 87 (1999).

36
People vs. Acala, 307 SCRA 330 (1999); People vs. Espinoza, 247 SCRA 66 (1995).

37
People vs. Campuhan, 329 SCRA 270 (2000).

38
Ibid.

39
TSN, March 7, 2000, p. 34.

40
TSN, March 7, 2000 p. 17.

41
People vs. Pedres, 306 SCRA 579 (1999); People vs. Lopez, 302 SCRA 669 (1999).

42
327 SCRA 612 (2000), citing People vs. Dominador Tabion, 317 SCRA 126 (1999).

People vs. Garigadi, 317 SCRA 399 (1999); People vs. Nagsagaray, 319 SCRA 622
43

(1999).

44
TSN, March 7, 2000, p. 42.

45
People vs. Nagsagaray, 319 SCRA 622 (1999).

46
TSN, May 30, 2000, p. 4.

47
Ibid, p. 5.

48
People vs. Marcelo, 305 SCRA 105 (1999); People vs. Gagto, 253 SCRA 455 (1996).

49
People vs. Batoon, 317 SCRA 545 (1999); People vs. Marcelo, 305 SCRA 105 (1999).

50
Under Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A No. 7659, the
death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

"1.) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."

51
Record of Criminal Cases Nos. 116859-60-H-116861, p. 101.

52
TSN, May 30, 2000, p. 2.
 People vs. Nerio, G.R. No. 142564, September 26, 2001; People vs. Agustin, G.R. Nos.
53

135524-25, September 24, 2001.

54
Ibid.

55
Ibid.

56
Three members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of
the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should be
accordingly imposed.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992

CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitioner principally seeks: (1) to
nullify the order 1 of respondent judge admitting the amended information for murder filed in Criminal
Case No.
91-4606; (2) to nullify the arraignment and the plea of not guilty entered by order of respondent
judge when petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information for lack of preliminary
investigation therefor; (3) to nullify the appointment of a counsel de oficio/PAO lawyer to represent
petitioner; (4) to prohibit respondent judge from "over-speedy and preferential scheduling of the trial
of the aforementioned criminal case;" and (5) to compel respondent judge to order preliminary
investigation of the crime charged in the amended information.

Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information 2 for the crime of frustrated
murder allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of July 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, thereby inflicting
gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the death of said Maureen
Navarro Hultman, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it
by reason of cause or causes independent of her will, that is, due to the timely and
able medical assistance rendered to said Maureen Navarro Hultman which
prevented her death.

After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a
demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman
died.

Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion 3 for leave of court to
file an amended information and to admit said amended information. The amended
information, 4 filed on October 31, 1991, reads:
 That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y. Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and
evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen
Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which
directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman.

Petitioner filed an opposition 5 thereto, as well as a rejoinder 6 to the reply 7 of the prosecution. On
November 13, 1991, the trial court issued the questioned order admitting the amended information.

At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991, petitioner refused to be arraigned on the
amended information for lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. By reason of such refusal,
respondent judge ordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner.

Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. When petitioner's
counsel manifested that he would not take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised,
the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio to represent herein petitioner.

Petitioner now raises the following issues before us:

(a) Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment,

without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original
information, may legally and validly be admitted;

(b) Whether or not a counsel de oficio may legally and validly be appointed to
represent an accused who is represented by counsel of choice who refuses to
participate in the proceedings because of a perceived denial of due process and after
a plea for appellate remedies within a short period is denied by the trial court; and

(c) Whether or not a particular criminal case may legally and validly be rushed and
preferentially scheduled for trial over and at the expense and sacrifice of other,
specially older, criminal cases. 8

In our resolution of January 14, 1992, we required the Solicitor General to file a comment to the basic petition. It appearing from a further
review of the record that the operative facts and determinant issues involved in this case are sufficiently presented in the petition and the
annexes thereto, both in regard to the respective positions of petitioner and respondents, the Court has decided to dispense with the
aforesaid comment to obviate needless delay in fairness to petitioner.

I. Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in the amended information, as herein underscored,
that the accused ". . . did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting
mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman . . ." constitutes a
substantial amendment since it involves a change in the nature of the offense charged, that is, from
frustrated to consummated murder. Petitioner further submits that "(t)here is a need then to establish
that the same mortal wounds, which were initially frustrated (sic) by timely and able medical
assistance, ultimately caused the death of the victim, because it could have been caused by a
supervening act or fact which is not imputable to the offender." 9 From this, he argues that there
being a substantial amendment, the same may no longer be allowed after arraignment and during
the trial.

Corollary thereto, petitioner then postulates that since the amended information for murder charges
an entirely different offense, involving as it does a new fact, that is, the fact of death whose cause
has to be established, it is essential that another preliminary investigation on the new charge be
conducted before the new information can be admitted.

We find no merit in the petition. There are sufficient legal and jurisprudential moorings for the orders
of the trial court.

Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in

substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion
of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon
the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119,
Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy
and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the
second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.

It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made
before or after the defendant pleaded, but they differ in the following respects:

1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily
involves a substantial change from the original charge;

2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution
of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed;

3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation
and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary
investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and

4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence
substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the
objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke
double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information
involves a different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original
charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.

In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of
Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is
that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first information, and amendment of the information is
sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different
from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense
would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the
same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this
connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And,
vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. 10

Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the
crime of murder, hence the former is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the
essential element of intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident
premeditation, be alleged in both an information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby
meaning and proving that the same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the
informations filed for both. This is because, except for the death of the victim, the essential elements
of consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein petitioner for
the offense of frustrated murder.

In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the
amended information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses
charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to
consummated murder. This is being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information
will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper.

Petitioner would insist, however, that the additional allegation on the fact of death of the victim
Maureen Navarro Hultman constitutes a substantial amendment which may no longer be allowed
after a plea has been entered. The proposition is erroneous and untenable.

As earlier indicated, Section 14 of Rule 110 provides that an amendment, either of form or
substance, may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge and, thereafter,
as to all matters of form with leave of court.

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. 11 Thus, the
following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only
to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; 12 (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; 13 (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as
to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to
invoke prescription. 14

We repeat that after arraignment and during the trial, amendments are allowed, but only as to
matters of form andprovided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. 15 The test of
whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment has
been said to be whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence the accused might
have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other; if the answer is in
the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. 16

Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will
readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an
additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to
aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a
felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is no
question that whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original information for
frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information for murder. Under the circumstances
thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information for murder is, at most, an amendment
as to form which is allowed even during the trial of the case.

It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the
second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the
accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation does
not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and
to be protected from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses
and anxiety of a public trial. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a
surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it charges essentially the same offense
as that charged under the original information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime
originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit
substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary
investigation is not necessary. 17

We find nothing irregular in the appointment by the trial court of a counsel de oficio for herein
petitioner whose counsel of record refused to participate in the proceedings because of an alleged
legal issue. Such issue having been demonstrated herein as baseless, we apprehend his refusal to
participate in the trial as causative of or contributive to the delay in the disposition of the case. And,
finally, for as long as the substantial rights of herein petitioner and other persons charged in court
are not prejudiced, the scheduling of cases should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, it being clearly apparent that respondent judge did not commit the errors speciously
attributed to him, the extraordinary writs prayed for are hereby DENIED and the instant petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 18-19.

2 Annex B, id.; ibid., 20-21.

3 Annex C, id.; ibid., 22-23.

4 Annex G, id.; ibid., 37-38.

5 Annex D, id.; ibid., 27-29.

6 Annex F, id.; ibid., 34-36.

7 Annex E, id.; ibid., 30-33.

8 Rollo, 4-5.

9 Ibid., 10.

10 Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950); Section 5, Rule 120, 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

11 Almeda vs. Villaluz, et al., 66 SCRA 38 (1975).

12 Id., ibid.

13 Guinto vs. Veluz, et al., 77 Phil. 801 (1946).

14 Vega vs. Panis, et al., 117 SCRA 269 (1982).

15 People vs. Montenegro, et al., 159 SCRA 236 (1988).

16 42 C.J.S., Indictment and Information 1250.

17 People vs. Magpale, 70 Phil. 176 (1940).