G.R. No.

200370

MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari, 1 Mario Veridiano y Sapi (Veridiano) assails the
Decision2 dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution3 dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 33588, which affirmed his conviction for violation of Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 9165.4

In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna, 5 Veridiano was charged
with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Information read:

That on or about January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being permitted or authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody
one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2. 72 grams of dried marijuana leaves, a
dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial on the
merits ensued.7

During trial, the prosecution presented PO 1 Guillermo Cabello (PO 1 Cabello) and POI Daniel Solano
(POI Solano) to testify. 8

According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain
P03 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain alias
"Baho," who was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. 9

P03 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO I Cabello and P02 Alvin Vergara (P02 Vergara)
who were both on duty. 10 Chief of Police June Urquia instructed POI Cabello and P02 Vergara to set up a
checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna. 11

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.

They allowed some vehicles to pass through after checking that he was not on board. 12 At around 10:00
a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. 13 They
flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. 14 The police officers instructed the
passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of
their pockets.15

The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be
marijuana." 16 POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials. 17 Veridiano was
arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. 18 He was then brought to the police station. 19
At the police station, PO 1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO 1 Solano, who also placed his
initials. 20 PO 1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with
the seized tea bag to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory. 21 The contents of the tea bag
tested positive for marijuana.22

For his defense, Veridiano testified that he went to the fiesta in San Pablo City on January 15,
2008.23 After participating in the festivities, he decided to go home and took a passenger jeepney bound
for Nagcarlan.24 At around 10:00 a.m., the jeepney passed a police checkpoint in Barangay Taytay,
Nagcarlan.25 Veridiano noticed that the jeepney was being followed by three (3) motorcycles, each with
two (2) passengers in civilian attire. 26

When the jeepney reached Barangay Buboy, Nagcarlan, the motorcyclists flagged down the
jeepney.27 Two (2) armed men boarded the jeepney and frisked Veridiano. 28 However, they found nothing
on his person.29 Still, Veridiano was accosted and brought to the police station where he was informed
that "illegal drug was ... found in his possession. "30

In the Decision dated July 16, 2010,31 the Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Accordingly, he was sentenced to suffer a penalty
of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00.32

Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested." 33 He argued
that the tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a poisonous
tree. "[['34]] Veridiano further argued that the police officers failed to comply with the rule on chain of
custody. 35

On the other hand, the prosecution asserted that "[t]he legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction
of the court over [the person of the accused]." 36 Thus, by entering his plea, Veridiano waived his right to
question any irregularity in his arrest. 37 With regard to the alleged illegal warrantless search conducted
by the police officers, the prosecution argued that Veridiano' s "submissive deportment at the time of
the search" indicated that he consented to the warrantless search. 38

On November 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 39 affirming the guilt ofVeridiano. 40

The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in jlagrante delicto" of having marijuana in his
possession.41Assuming that he was illegally arrested, Veridiano waived his right to question any
irregularity that may have attended his arrest when he entered his plea and submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.42 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that Veridiano consented to the
warrantless search because he did not protest when the police asked him to remove the contents of his
pocket.43

Veridiano moved for reconsideration, which was denied in the

Resolution dated January 25, 2012.44

On March 16, 2012, Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.45

Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was seized in violation of his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 46 He asserts that his arrest was illegal.47 Petitioner was merely
seated inside the jeepney at the time of his apprehension. He did not act in any manner that would give
the police officers reasonable ground to believe that he had just committed a crime or that he was
committing a crime. 48 Petitioner also asserts that reliable information is insufficient to constitute
probable cause that would support a valid warrantless arrest. 49

Since his arrest was illegal, petitioner argues· that "the accompanying [warrantless] search was likewise
illegal."50Hence, under Article III, Section 2,51 in relation to Article III, Section 3(2)52 of the Constitution,
the seized tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the fruit of a poisonous
tree."53

Nevertheless, assuming that the seized tea bag containing marijuana is admissible in evidence, petitioner
contends that the prosecution failed to preserve its integrity. 54 The apprehending team did not strictly
comply with the rule on chain of custody under Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165.55

In a Resolution dated June 13, 2012, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the
petition. 56 In the Manifestation and Motion dated August 1, 2012, 57 respondent stated that it would no
longer file a comment.

The following issues are for this Court's resolution:

First, whether there was a valid warrantless arrest;

Second, whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner; and

Lastly, whether there is enough evidence to sustain petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.

The Petition is granted.

The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c)
any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as
constitutionally inadmissible.

Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised through a
motion to quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived
and an accused is "estopped from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest." 58

The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation
during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. 59 The reason for this rule is
that "the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused." 60

Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from
questioning the admissibility of evidence seized. 61 The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected
when an accused fails to question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in atimely manner.
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate
and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.
As a component of the right to privacy,62 the fundamental right against unlawful searches and seizures is
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 63

To underscore the importance of an individual's right against unlawful searches and seizures, Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution considers any evidence obtained in violation of this right as
inadmissible. 64

The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and seizures. 65 It is only directed
against those that are unreasonable.66 Conversely, reasonable searches and seizures fall outside the
scope of the prohibition and are not forbidden. 67

In People v. Aruta, 68 this Court explained that the language of the Constitution implies that "searches
and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant
of arrest."69 The requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution and reiterated in Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. 70

However, People v. Cogaed71 clarified that there are exceptional circumstances "when searches are
reasonable even when warrantless." 72 The following are recognized instances of permissible warrantless
searches laid down in jurisprudence: (1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest," 73 (2) search
of "evidence in 'plain view,"' (3) "search of a moving vehicle," (4) "consented warrantless search[es]," (5)
"customs search," (6) "stop and frisk," and (7) "exigent and emergency circumstances." 74

There is no hard and fast rule in determining when a search and seizure is reasonable. In any given
situation, "[w]hat constitutes a reasonable ... search ... is purely a judicial question," the resolution of
which depends upon the unique and distinct factual circumstances. 75 This may involve an inquiry into
"the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which
the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured." 76

II

Pertinent to the resolution of this case is the determination of whether the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner was caught in flagrante
delicto of having marijuana in his possession making the warrantless search lawful. 77

This Court disagrees. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is
made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be
reversed."78 For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant.
Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a warrant.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. -A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this
warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test 79 as explained in Cogaed:

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer." 80

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an inflagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm.
In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused
did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of
illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended. 81

The warrantless search in People v. Racho82 was also considered unlawful.83 The police officers received
information that a man was in possession of illegal drugs and was on board a Genesis bus bound for
Baler, Aurora. The informant added that the man was "wearing a red and white striped [t]-shirt." 84 The
police officers waited for the bus along the national highway. 85 When the bus arrived, Jack Racho (Racho)
disembarked and waited along the highway for a tricycle. 86 Suddenly, the police officers approached him
and invited him to the police station since he was suspected of having shabu in his possession. 87 As
Racho pulled out his hands from his pocket, a white envelope fell yielding a sachet of shabu. 88

In holding that the warrantless search was invalid, this Court observed that Racho was not "committing a
crime in the presence of the police officers" at the time he was apprehended. 89 Moreover, Racho's arrest
was solely based on a tip.90 Although there are cases stating that reliable information is sufficient to
justify a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, they were covered under the other exceptions
to the rule on warrantless searches.91

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. 92 The rule requires that an
offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time." 93 That a crime was in fact
committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule. 94 An arrest under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is committed up to the
point of arrest.

Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it.
People v. Gerente95 illustrates a valid arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court.
In Gerente, the accused was convicted for murder and for violation of Republic Act No. 6425. 96 He
assailed the admissibility of dried marijuana leaves as evidence on the ground that they were allegedly
seized from him pursuant to a warrantless arrest. 97 On appeal, the accused's conviction was
affirmed.98 This Court ruled that the warrantless arrest was justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the
Rules of Court. The police officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the
accused killed the victim:

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found
the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen
and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and
two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed
his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions
did.99 (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement that law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts surrounding the commission
of an offense was underscored in In Re Saliba v. Warden. 100

In Re Saliba involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police officers suspected Datukan Salibo (Salibo)
as one (1) of the accused in the Maguindano Massacre. 101 Salibo presented himself before the
authorities to clear his name. Despite his explanation, Salibo was apprehended and detained. 102 In
granting the petition, this Court pointed out that Salibo was not restrained under a lawful court process
or order. 103 Furthermore, he was not arrested pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest: 104

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his
name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the
presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to
commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. 105 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante delicta arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was
merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that
would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they
received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act
from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed,
or is about to be committed.10

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating
that petitioner had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge
of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime.
This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

III

The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and
frisk" searches.

A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua 107 as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband." 108 Thus, the allowable scope of a
"stop and frisk" search is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for weapons." 109

Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure specifically directed towards
crime prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 110

Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While probable
cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or
hunch. 111 Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the
particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be afoot. 112 Reliance on one (1)
suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search. 113

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 114 the police officers conducted surveillance operations in Caloocan City
Cemetery, a place reportedly frequented by drug addicts. 115 They chanced upon a male person who had
"reddish eyes and [was] walking in a swaying manner." 116 Suspecting that the man was high on drugs, the
police officers approached him, introduced themselves, and asked him what he was holding. 117 However,
the man resisted. 118 Upon further investigation, the police officers found marijuana in the man's
possession. 119 This Court held that the circumstances of the case gave the police officers justifiable
reason to stop the man and investigate if he was high on drugs. 120

In People v. Solayao, 121 the police officers were conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the
presence of armed persons within Caibiran. 122 They met a group of drunk men, one (1) of whom was the
accused in a camouflage uniform. 123 When the police officers approached, his companions fled leaving
behind the accused who was told not to run away. 124 One (1) of the police officers introduced himself
and seized from the accused a firearm wrapped in dry coconut leaves. 125 This Court likewise found
justifiable reason to stop and frisk the accused when "his companions fled upon seeing the government
agents." 126

The "stop and frisk" searches in these two (2) cases were considered valid because the accused in both
cases exhibited overt acts that gave law enforcers genuine reason to conduct a "stop and frisk" search. In
contrast with Manalili and Solayao, the warrantless search in Cogaed127 was considered as an invalid
"stop and frisk" search because of the absence of a single suspicious circumstance that would justify a
warrantless search.

In Cogaed, the police officers received information that a certain Marvin Buya would be transporting
marijuana. 128 A passenger jeepney passed through the checkpoint set up by the police officers. The
driver then disembarked and signaled that two (2) male passengers were carrying marijuana. 129 The
police officers approached the two (2) men, who were later identified as Victor Cogaed (Cogaed) and
Santiago Dayao, and inquired about the contents of their bags. 130
Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered three (3) bricks of marijuana in Cogaed's
bag. 131 In holding that the "stop and frisk" search was invalid, this Court reasoned that "[t]here was not a
single suspicious circumstance" that gave the police officers genuine reason to stop the two (2) men and
search their belongings. 132Cogaed did not exhibit any overt act indicating that he was in possession of
marijuana. 133

Similar to Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act
that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession.
Reasonable persons will act in a nervous manner in any check point. There was no evidence to show that
the police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything
suspicious.

IV

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the
warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered
through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and
convincing evidence. 134 Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given ... [and unattended] by duress or coercion." 135

The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of the circumstances. 136 This
may involve an inquiry into the environment in which the consent was given such as "the presence of
coercive police procedures."137

Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which
amounts to no consent at all. 138 In Cogaed, this Court observed:

Cogaed's silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment
brought about by the police officer's excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the
police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing,
intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed. 139

The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that petitioner consented to the warrantless
search.

Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle. The rules governing
searches and seizures have been liberalized when the object of a search is a vehicle for practical
purposes.140 Police officers cannot be expected to appear before a judge and apply for a search warrant
when time is of the essence considering the efficiency of vehicles in facilitating transactions involving
contraband or dangerous articles. 141However, the inherent mobility of vehicles cannot justify all kinds of
searches.142 Law enforcers must act on the basis of probable cause. 143

A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. 144 Due to the number of cases involving
warrantless ·searches in checkpoints and for the guidance of law enforcers, it is imperative to discuss the
parameters by which searches in checkpoints should be conducted.

Checkpoints per se are not invalid. 145 They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the lives
of individuals and ensure their safety. 146 They are also sanctioned in cases where the government's
survival is in danger. 147 Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist'sright to 'free
passage'"148 to a certain extent, they must be "conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists." 149 The
extent of routine inspections must be limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law
enforcers carte blanche to perform warrantless searches. 150

In Valmonte v. De Villa, 151 this Court clarified that "[f]or as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search[es]."152 Thus, a search where an "officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which
is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein" is not
unreasonable. 153

However, an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law enforcers have
probable cause to believe that the vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains
instruments of an offense. 154

Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if they are limited to a visual
search. This holds especially true when the object of the search is a public vehicle where individuals have
a reasonably reduced expectation of privacy. On the other hand, extensive searches are permissible only
when they are founded upon probable cause. Any evidence obtained will be subject to the exclusionary
principle under the Constitution.

That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle does not justify an extensive
search absent probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or
tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on tipped information,
there have been other circumstances that justified warrantless searches conducted by the authorities.

In People v. Breis,155 apart from the tipped information they received, the law enforcement agents
observed suspicious behavior on the part of the accused that gave them reasonable ground to believe
that a crime was being committed.156 The accused attempted to alight from the bus after the law
enforcers introduced themselves and inquired about the ownership of a box which the accused had in
their possession. 157 In their attempt to leave the bus, one (1) of the accused physically pushed a law
enforcer out of the way. 158 Immediately alighting from a bus that had just left the terminal and leaving
one's belongings behind is unusual conduct. 159

In People v. Mariacos, 160 a police officer received information that a bag containing illegal drugs was
about to be transported on a passenger jeepney. 161 The bag was marked with "O.K."162 On the basis of
the tip, a police officer conducted surveillance operations on board a jeepney. 163 Upon seeing the bag
described to him, he peeked inside and smelled the distinct odor of marijuana emanating from the
bag. 164 The tipped information and the police officer's personal observations gave rise to probable cause
that rendered the warrantless search valid. 165

The police officers in People v. Ayangao166 and People v. Libnao167 likewise received tipped information
regarding the transport of illegal drugs. In Libnao, the police officers had probable cause to arrest the
accused based on their three (3)-month long surveillance operation in the area where the accused was
arrested. 168 On the other hand, in Ayangao, the police officers noticed marijuana leaves protruding
through a hole in one (1) of the sacks carried by the accused. 169

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits
of warrantless searches.1âwphi1 They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any
law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that
may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The
checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

There are different hybrids of reasonable warrantless searches. There are searches based on reasonable
suspicion as in Posadas v. Court of Appeals 170 where this Court justified the warrantless search of the
accused who attempted to flee with a buri bag after the police officers identified themselves. 171

On the other hand, there are reasonable searches because of heightened security. In Dela Cruz v.
People, 172 the search conducted on the accused was considered valid because it was done in accordance
with routine security measures in ports. 173 This case, however, should not be construed to apply to
border searches. Border searches are not unreasonable per se; 174 there is a "reasonable reduced
expectation of privacy" when travellers pass through or stop at airports or other ports of travel. 175

The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag containing
marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his conviction, petitioner must be
acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 16976-SP
and the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 33588 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is
hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee,

vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of
their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous drugs is more apparent
than real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what could have
been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of society.

Squarely raised in· this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless
arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that were not based on their
personal knowledge. The information as to the accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text message.
The accused who never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly contained the
contraband was required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and without the accused
having been fully apprised of his rights. This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the
Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop and frisk" action.
The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and without improper
pressure or coercion.

The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with Article III, Section
3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence, the accused should be acquitted.

According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio
Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message
from an unidentified civilian informer" 2 that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be
transporting marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La
Union.4

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." 5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime
Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting
area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City. 6 A passenger jeepney from Barangay
Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. 7 The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1
Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana. 8 SPO1 Taracatac approached
the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa
Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag. 10

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. 11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1
Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their
barriomatenamed Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of
what looked like marijuana.13Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti
nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag." 14 "SPO1 Taracatac
arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police station." 15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still
carrying their respective bags"16 inside the station.17

While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit)
requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags. 18 Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of
suspected marijuana fruiting tops," 19 and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana. 20

PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing. 21 PSI Bayan personally delivered
the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. 22 Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector
Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed
marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from Cogaed’s blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5 grams. 24 The
marijuana from Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1 grams. 25 The marijuana collected from Dayao’s bag
weighed 5,092 grams.26 A total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaed’s and Dayao’s bags. 27

According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney to
take him"28to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide. 29 He boarded a jeepney and
recognized Dayao, his younger brother’s friend. 30 Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and
Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaed’s] help in carrying his things,
which included a travelling bag and a sack." 32 Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the
market.33 This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed
what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know. 34SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao,
however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation. 35 Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and
Cogaed and brought them to the police station. 36 These facts were corroborated by an
eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot where Cogaed was
apprehended.37

At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head." 38 The bags were also
opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside. 39

It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165. 40 The information against them
states:

That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La
Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VICTOR COGAED Y
ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN DOE,conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their control, custody and possession dried
marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen thousand,four hundred twenty-nine and
sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.

CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165
(otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"). 41

The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La Union. 42 Cogaed and
Dayao pleaded not guilty.43 The case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at
that time and was exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or
Republic Act No. 9344.44 Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision 45 dated May 21, 2008, the Regional
Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002") and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one
million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).46

The trial court judge initially found Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time was not,
at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that he was about to do so or that had
just done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also be considered
illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived
his right to object to such irregularity" 49 when "he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying
himself, asked him to open his bag."50

Cogaed appealed51 the trial court’s decision.However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and
affirmed the trial court’s decision.52 The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against
warrantless searches when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his
bag."53 Hence, this appeal was filed.

The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS
SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING
OFFICER’S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING
OFFICER’S FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS
DRUGS.54

For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of
marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through the search should be
admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.

In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the requirements on
the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary. 55

We find for the accused.

II

The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many
dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and seizures are
"reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of
this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be
determined by a judge.56The existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after asking
searching questions and answers.57Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense
alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers. There must
be a particular description of the place and the things to be searched. 58

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. 59 In the Rules of
Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. 60 This court has
taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured." 61 The known
jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consentedwarrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. 62 (Citations omitted)

III

One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches
are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court. 63 Searches
incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no
weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence. 64

On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For
instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals 65 was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose
object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status
quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." 66 This court stated that the
"stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal
situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant." 67

The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches 68) are necessary for law enforcement.
That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However,
this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police officer. Experienced
police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should
have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is
acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her
personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially informed about a place frequented by
people abusing drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes and
[who was] walking in a swaying manner." 71 The suspicion increased when the man avoided the police
officers.72 These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on drugs. 73 These
were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and] investigate." 74

In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk. 76 This man was also "wearing a
camouflage uniform or a jungle suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the man fled. 78 His flight added to the
suspicion.79After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed "homemade firearm" 80 in his
possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly
have procured a search warrant first." 82 This was also a valid search.

In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a
man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a
person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding
something as well.

The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda
jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The
assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver
who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:

COURT:

Q So you don’t know what was the content while it was still being carried by him in the passenger jeep?

WITNESS:

A Not yet, Your Honor.83

SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:

COURT:

Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason to believe that the
accused were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:

A No, Your Honor.84

The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified by the police officers
otherwise.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a
person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary
to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. 85 Anything less than this would
be an infringementupon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.

IV

Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to
determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 86 one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop
and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious circumstances as
probable cause:

The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag
there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and
duty of the police officers to inspect the same. 87 (Emphasis supplied)

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicionsupported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged." 88

Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause,but
it cannot be mere suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine reason"91 to serve the purposes of the "stop and
frisk" exception:92

Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk,"
it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. 93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes
omitted)

In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely on a
single suspicious circumstance.95 There should be "presence of more than oneseemingly innocent
activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." 96 The Constitution
prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." 97 Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance
or none at all will not result in a reasonable search. 98

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the
probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was noteven the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched
was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag
to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason
to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
V

Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is
compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting
the public. As stated in Malacat:

[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)

The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting
dangerous weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving
dangerous drugs.

The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta. 102 In that case, an informant told the
police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. 103 At the bus
terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. 104 The informant pointed at a woman crossing the
street105 and identified her as "Aling Rosa."106 The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that
she allowed them to look inside her bag. 107The bag contained marijuana leaves.108

In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. 109 There were no suspicious
circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the subsequent search and seizure. 110 It was only the
informant that prompted the police to apprehend her. 111 The evidence obtained was not admissible
because of the illegal search.112Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.113

Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police’s informant,
who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. 114 Here, the National Bureau
ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs. 115 The NBI
waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat. 116 Like in
the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin’s bag and found bundles of what turnedout to be
marijuana leaves.117 The court declared that the searchand seizure was illegal. 118 Aminnudin was
acquitted.119

People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been
receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles
City."121 One night, the police received information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing drugs at the
Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. 122 A car "arrived and parked"123 at the hotel.124The
informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs. 125 The man alighted from
his car.126 He was carrying a juice box.127 The police immediately apprehended him and discovered live
ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding. 128

Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua’s situation when the
police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no valid‘stop-and-frisk’." 129
VI

None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be admissible. The
facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to
be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, withouta
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made. At the
time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a
crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." 130 Both elements were missing when Cogaed
was arrested.131 There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that
Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.

Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last
allowable warrantless arrest.

VII

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object
when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated:

Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to
the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.132(Citations omitted) Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection was a
natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into
his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such
waivers are not to be presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be discerned again from the
testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:

ATTY. BINWAG:

Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents of their bags, is it not?

WITNESS:

A Yes, ma’am.

Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?

A Yes, ma’am.

Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?

A None, ma’am.

Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the contents ofthe bag, you
have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?

A It seems they were frightened, ma’am.

Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in opening the bags, is it not?

A Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised. 133 (Emphasis supplied)

The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s responses to Judge Florendo’s
questions:

COURT:

....

Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?

A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was somewhat
frightened.1âwphi1 He was a little apprehensive and when he was already stepping down and he put
down the bag I asked him, "what’s that," and he answered, "I don’t know because Marvin only asked me
to carry."134

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police
officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer.1âwphi1 The police officer must also
inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of his
or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must
communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to waive his or her
constitutional rights. There must be anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy
requires no less.

VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 135

Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional
provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. 136 This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that
encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures
should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures." 137 It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s
person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a
pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.

Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law
enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better. However, we
cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution.
Otherwise, we will be seen as slowly dismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to
protect.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union and of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence
to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being heldfor some other legal
grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also
zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 Any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power
to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no
statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. 2

On appeal is the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, affirming the Judgment 4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31 March 2004 finding petitioner Arsenio
Vergara Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No.
9165)5 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum and ordering him to pay a fine of ₱350,000.00. 6

I.

On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of R.A. No. 9165 in an
Information7which reads:

That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody dried marijuana
leaves wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper page, weighing more or less twenty-five (25) grams,
without first securing the necessary permit, license or prescription from the proper government agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the
prosecution presenting the three (3) barangay tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union namely,
Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo Ordoño (Ordoño), who arrested
petitioner.

Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting the routine
patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas
and Ordoño when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed
that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They thus
approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under
arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where
he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioner’s bag allegedly contained
a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper
and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation. 9

Aratas and Ordoño corroborated Bautista’s testimony on most material points. On cross-examination,
however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the contents of petitioner’s bag before petitioner
was taken to the house of Mercado.10 Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercado’s house, it was petitioner
himself who brought out the contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoño
testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open petitioner’s bag and that it was then that
they saw the purported contents thereof. 11

The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the forensic chemist who
conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that
the specimen submitted to him for analysis, a sachet of the substance weighing 23.10 grams and
contained in a plastic bag, tested positive of marijuana. He disclosed on cross-examination, however,
that he had knowledge neither of how the marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how the said
substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose marking was on the inside
of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves. 12

The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defense’s sole witness, he testified that at around 8:30
p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Curro-oy, Santol, La Union. After alighting
from the bus, petitioner claimed that he went to the house of a friend to drink water and then
proceeded to walk to his brother’s house. As he was walking, prosecution witness Ordoño, a cousin of
his brother’s wife, allegedly approached him and asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he
was going to his brother’s house. Ordoño then purportedly requested to see the contents of his bag and
appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting all the
contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of
Mercado. It was Aratas who carried the bag until they reached their destination. 13

Petitioner maintained that at Mercado’s house, his bag was opened by the tanod and Mercado himself.
They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner
denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he
did not give the prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for them to apprehend such person.
As petitioner declined, he was brought to the police station and charged with the instant offense.
Although petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out the contents of his bag at his
friend’s house, he averred that it was one of the tanod who did so at Mercado’s house and that it was
only there that they saw the marijuana for the first time. 14

e. replied that he was going to his brother'en proceeded to walk to his brother'w

Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered
judgment against him and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate imprisonment ranging from eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal
medium as maximum and ordered him to pay a fine of ₱350,000.00. 15

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.1âwphi1 On 28 July 2005,
the appellate court affirmed the challenged decision. The Court of Appeals, finding no cogent reason to
overturn the presumption of regularity in favor of the barangay tanod in the absence of evidence of ill-
motive on their part, agreed with the trial court that there was probable cause to arrest petitioner. It
observed further:

That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana is of no moment.
Such circumstance finds prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited drugs is denied. In
this case, accused-appellant himself testified that the marijuana wrapped in a newspaper was taken
from his bag. The corpus delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the marijuana and his possession
thereof, was amply proven by accused-appellant Valdez’s own testimony. 16

In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime charged had not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first time on appeal, that the
warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless
search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the marijuana
leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded great respect and weight, in the absence of any clear showing that some facts
and circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case have been
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied.17

After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on hand, however, the Court finds and so
holds that a reversal of the decision a quo under review is in order.

II.

At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by petitioner to the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial
of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over his person.18 Petitioner’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his
acquittal.

However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain
whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it
was without a warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest. 19 Evaluating the evidence
on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner
without a warrant is not lawful as well.

Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod and asked to show the
contents of his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to the house of the barangay
captain. On their way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership over the contraband
allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he saw it for the first time at the barangay captain’s house.

Even casting aside petitioner’s version and basing the resolution of this case on the general thrust of the
prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioner’s arrest stands out just the same.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on which a person
may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of these
circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was
not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then
committing an offense.20 The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioner’s warrantless
arrest.

For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be
present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer. 21 Here, petitioner’s act of looking around after getting off the
bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run
away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge
the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away
but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him.

Even taking the prosecution’s version generally as the truth, in line with our assumption from the start,
the conclusion will not be any different. It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the
street at night, after being closely observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons, would
attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. 22 Of persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court when it
ruled in People v. Shabaz23 that "[f]light alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other
circumstances because flight alone is inherently ambiguous." Alone, and under the circumstances of this
case, petitioner’s flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one.

Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud,24 "[t]he phrase ‘in his presence’ therein, connot[es]
penal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any
unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most
basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of
arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by
law."25

Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed
as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest. 26 If at all, the
search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-
and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioner’s behavior. However, a
stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,27 must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the
person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.28

Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves
allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during
a warrantless search which was not lawful. 29 As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an —

A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible
by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver
or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests
effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. 30

When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a
crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the
warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from the warrantless search being
incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to the search. We are not convinced. As we
explained in Caballes v. Court of Appeals 31 —

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention
and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear
and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1)
the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected
to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place;
and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has the
burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it
was freely and voluntarily given.32

In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution— albeit based on conflicting testimonies on
when petitioner’s bag was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was already under the coercive
control of the public officials who had custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the consent was asked and
how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." Even
granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoño asked to see its contents, his implied
acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or
intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered no consent at all within the contemplation of the
constitutional guarantee.33 As a result, petitioner’s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search
and seizure.34

III.

Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful
search is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the prosecution. We likewise find that it
has failed to convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken from
petitioner’s bag.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements must concur: (1)
proof that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug
as evidence.35 The existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal
sale of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crime. 36

In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecution’s case its failure to prove that the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the accused. 37 There can
be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item
confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug. 38 As we
discussed in People v. Orteza39 , where we deemed the prosecution to have failed in establishing all the
elements necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu –

First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers complied with the proper
procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team
having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or
confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if
there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement raises doubt whether
what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from
appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police
officers.

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after
the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-
narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court
concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place
markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the procedure
and take custody of the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to when
and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created
reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to
the prosecution’s failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.

In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay tanod, the records only show that he was
taken to the house of the barangay captain and thereafter to the police station. The Joint
Affidavit40 executed by the tanod merely states that they confiscated the marijuana leaves which they
brought to the police station together with petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt 41 issued by the Aringay Police
Station merely acknowledged receipt of the suspected drugs supposedly confiscated from petitioner.

Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of when petitioner’s bag was opened,
they also gave conflicting testimony on who actually opened the same. The prosecution, despite these
material inconsistencies, neglected to explain the discrepancies. Even more damning to its cause was the
admission by Laya, the forensic chemist, that he did not know how the specimen was taken from
petitioner, how it reached the police authorities or whose marking was on the cellophane wrapping of
the marijuana. The non-presentation, without justifiable reason, of the police officers who conducted
the inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if such was the case, is fatal to the case. Plainly,
the prosecution neglected to establish the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana
leaves from the time they were first allegedly discovered until they were brought for examination by
Laya.

The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody
over the seized marijuana as such "[f]inds prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited
drug is denied."42We cannot agree.

To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on petitioner’s testimony that the marijuana
was taken from his bag, without taking the statement in full context. 43 Contrary to the Court of Appeals’
findings, although petitioner testified that the marijuana was taken from his bag, he consistently denied
ownership thereof.44Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of ownership of the seized drugs
before the principle of chain of custody comes into play.

The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In conjunction with this, law
enforcers and public officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the chain of custody over the
seized drugs. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and
recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence.
Each person who takes possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was cared for,
safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to prevent alteration or replacement while in
custody. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes to the very
heart of his fundamental rights.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the prosecution and relied
upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.45 Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most
primordial yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This elementary principle accords
every accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the prosecution.

Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this "[c]annot be
used to advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense." 46 Moreover, where the
circumstances are shown to yield two or more inferences, one inconsistent with the presumption of
innocence and the other compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the
reason that the evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is inadequate to support a
judgment of conviction.47

Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as "an especially vicious crime," 48 and "one of the most
pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society," 49 for those who become addicted to it "not only
slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of law-
abiding members of society,"50whereas "peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction." 51 Indeed,
the havoc created by the ruinous effects of prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of society cannot be
underscored enough. However, in the rightfully vigorous campaign of the government to eradicate the
hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run roughshod over an accused’s right
to be presumed innocent until proven to the contrary and neither can it shirk from its corollary
obligation to establish such guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the presumption of
innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the
offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in petitioner’s exoneration from criminal liability.

IV.

A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to exercise the highest degree of
diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of accused persons brought before them,
especially in light of the fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to
give more serious consideration to certain material issues in the determination of the merits of the case.
We are not oblivious to the fact that in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting
evidence to extract information or even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts are duty-bound to be
"[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses."52 In the same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers and
public officials alike to perform their mandated duties with commitment to the highest degree of
diligence, righteousness and respect for the law.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the
immediate release of petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform
the Court of

the date of his release, or the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 205926 July 22, 2015

ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated October 20, 2011 and the
Resolution 3dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813, which
affirmed in toto the Judgment 4dated July 28, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 213 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. MC-03-7242-D convicting petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales
(Comerciante) of the crime of illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section
11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 5 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.

The Facts

On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante of violation of Section
11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:

That on or about the 30th day of July 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not having been lawfully authorized to
possess any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly have
in his possession, custody and control Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet (sic) each
containing 0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (sic) of white crystalline substance with a total of 0.43 grams
which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu",
a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LA W. 6

According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan
(Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Bienvy Calag II (P03 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle,
patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City.
Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10
meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla 7 (Dasilla) - standing and
showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other.
Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante
and Dasilla At a distance of around five (5) meters, P03 Calag introduced himself as a police officer,
arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 8

After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC,
thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC
considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence. 9

In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a
notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a
jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police officers
claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their release.
When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to undergo
inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. 10

The RTC Ruling

In. a Judgment 11 dated July 28, 2009, the RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and ordered him to pay a fine
in the amount of ₱300,000.00.12

The R TC found that P03 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante, which yielded two
(2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this relation, the R TC opined that there was probable cause to
justify the warrantless arrest, considering that P03 Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante was
carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach and apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found
that absent any proof of intent that P03 Calag was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be
presumed to have properly performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante. 13

Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision 14 dated October 20, 2011 the CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. It held that P03 Calag
had probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest of Comerciante, given that the latter was committing
a crime in flagrante delicto; and that he personally saw the latter exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla.
According to the CA, this was enough to draw a reasonable suspicion that those sachets might be shabu,
and thus, P03 Calag had every reason to inquire on the matter right then and there. 15

Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration 16 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution 17 dated February 19, 2013. Hence, this petition. 18

The Issue before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's
conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.

In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that P03 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest
on him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic
sachets containing shabu should be rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal. 19

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the Philippines,
maintains that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to the "stop and frisk" rule,
especially considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs. 20

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Section 2, Article III 21 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the
absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 3 (2), Article III 22 of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words,
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. 23

The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. 24 In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be
reversed. 25 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful
warrantless arrests, as follows:

SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Section 7 of Rule 112.

The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully
effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a
crime which had just been committed; ( c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving
final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. 26

For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and ( b) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. 27 On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the
time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. 28

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section (b), he
knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. 29

A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been no lawful
warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. P03 Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle
cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing
around and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets
to the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided to effect an arrest. P03 Calag's testimony on
direct examination is revelatory:

Pros. Silao:

Q: Now on July 30, 2003 around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, kindly tell the court where were you?

A: We were then conducting our patrol on a motorbike ma' am.

xxxx

Q: And who were with you while you were patrolling?

A: Eduardo Radan, Ma' am.

Q: And who is this Eduardo Radan?

A: He is an agent of the Narcotics Group, ma'am.

Q: While you were along Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City, what unusual incident that happened if
any?

A: We spotted somebody who was then as if handing a plastic sachet to someone.

xxxx

Q: Now how far were you when you saw this incident from these two male persons you already
identified?

A: About ten (10) meters away ma'am.

Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw them in that particular act?

A: They were quite facing me then.

0: What was the speed of your motorcycle when you were traversing this Private Road, Hulo,
Mandaluyong City?

A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour, ma'am.

Q: And who was driving the motorcycle?

A: Eduardo Radan, ma'am.

Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each other, what did you do?

A: We stopped ma'am.

Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped, more or less?

A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped ma'am.

Q: And after you passed by them and you said you stopped, what was the reaction of these two male
persons?

A: They were surprised, ma'am.

xxxx

Q: And what was their reaction when you said you introduced yourself as police officer?

A: They were surprised.

Q: When you say "nabigla" what was their reaction that made you say that they were surprised?

A: They were stunned.

Q: After they were stunned, what did you do next, police officer?

A: I arrested them, ma' am. I invited them.

Q: What did you say to them? How did you invite them? In short, napakasimple Lang ng tanong ko sa yo
eh. Did you say anything?

Court:

Mr. Witness, stop making unnecessary movements, just listens.

Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? May sakit ka ba o wala? Witness: Wala po.

Pros. Silao: Eh, bakit di ka makapagsalita?

Court: You keep touching your eyes. Just relax. Answer the question, ano sinabi mo sa kanila?

Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? Wala ka bang sakit?

Witness: Wala po.

xxxx

Q: From what portion of his body, I am referring to Alvin Comerciante did you recover the plastic sachet?

A: From his hand ma'am.

Q: Left or right hand?

Pros. Silao: You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. Sabihin mo Kung Hindi mo matandaan, no problem.
Kaliwa, kanan or you cannot recall? 30

(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that P03 Calag, even assuming that
he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of
around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour -
miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by
Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante
as to rouse suspicion in the mind of P03 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over
something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and
his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same
would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 31 That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that
he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars
on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that
what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu. 32

Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113,
have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. As already discussed, the
factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that P03 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime
had been indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have
been committed first, which does not obtain in this case. 33

In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk" search
made on Comerciante untenable. In People v. Cogaed, 34 the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively
explain "stop and frisk" searches:

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement.1a\^/phi1 That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of
citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself or
herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police
officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have
the ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves observe - whether an individual is acting in a
suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

xxxx

Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to
determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop
and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious circumstances as
probable cause:

The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right
and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause, but
it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk"
exception:
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk,"
it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely on a
single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity,
which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits
"umeasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at
all will not result in a reasonable search. [35]] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante' s acts of standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts.1âwphi1 These circumstances are
not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a "genuine
reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk"
search made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.

In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of
the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, 'the Decision dated October 20, 2011 and the
Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other
reason.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 2011 2 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the prosecution, are
as follows:

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a
traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, he
saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road,
Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for
violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving
said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he
flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused
was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the
accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it;
that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-
like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1)
pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to
open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath
it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which
turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2)
contained suspected shabu.3

Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial
ensued.

During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution.
On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and
extortion.

In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs5 committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had
been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the
discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his
defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion
of its Decision held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
(1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱ 300,000.00).

The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its
proper disposition and destruction in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.6

Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a
comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.

Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:

(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.

(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER
CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.

(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN
COMPROMISED.

(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic). 7

Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He
claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a
citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he
claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.

On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:

It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police Officers
Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash
helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for
violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he
was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is
legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the
latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012.
In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could
therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x. 8

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal
cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct
errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. 9

First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter:

SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies
duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any
regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any
provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and
issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period
not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in
the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his
case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or
revocation of his license.

Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual 12 provides the following procedure for
flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:

SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general
concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following,
when applicable: x x x

m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation
Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any
of the vehicle’s occupants;

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to
have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of
his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner
was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court,
PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner
had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience
that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.

In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the
roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered
custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation,
nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of
the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:

It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of
the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime
either to ignore a policeman’s signal to stop one’s car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission. x x x

However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by
respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only
in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we
must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his
free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional
rights.

Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention
of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of
roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorist’s expectations, when he sees a policeman’s light
flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and
waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but
that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident
to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is
prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his
interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451.

Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels
completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed,
uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a
citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects
of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is
public, at least to some degree. x x x

In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of
detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject
to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold
that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of
Miranda.

xxx xxx xxx

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that
the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is
curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983)
(per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to
treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of
protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).
(Emphasis supplied.)

The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest
questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody
(such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be
fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here
be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being made.

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure
to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a
warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a
fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an
offense.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an
intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody,
the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer’s issuance (or
intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.

Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being
flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements
for a valid arrest were not complied with.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any.
Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement they might make could be used against them. 14 It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person
apprehended due to a traffic violation:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or
trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the
custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist," and as much as
possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact,
whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody
questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of
felonies.

If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic
violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested
for a second time—after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugs—as he was already in their
custody.

Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.15 None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest,
are applicable to this case.

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in
"plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the
evidence was not immediately apparent. 16

Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
shown by clear and convincing evidence.17 It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3
Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC
found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket. 18

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7)
the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9)
the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at
three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against
a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.

Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a
police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act
may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons. 20

In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding
and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize
the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a
full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct
minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:

In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception:
(1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve
evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to
arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.

We have recognized that the first rationale—officer safety—is "‘both legitimate and weighty,’" x x x The
threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a
custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of
"the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the
police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from
the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for
arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is
more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S.
420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest . . .
a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to
destroy incriminating evidence").

This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic
stop.1âwphi1 It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the
concern for officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a
driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion
attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other,
independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they may
order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414;
perform a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed
and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain
immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full
search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest,
New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).

Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrest—the need to
discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the
evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive
speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of
the car. (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the
illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not,
however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. 22

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at
times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without
contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. 24

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. 25 The drugs are the very corpus delicti
of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and
calls for the acquittal of the accused.26

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court,
5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from
detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 176077 August 31, 2011

ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated October 13,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846, which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66765 convicting
petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

In an Information2 dated November 11, 2002, petitioner Abraham C. Miclat, Jr. was charged for Violation
of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 08th day of November 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the authority of law, did then
and there willfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control [Methamphetamine]
Hydrochloride (SHABu) weighing 0.24 gram, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug under the
provisions of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)3

Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa (P/Insp Dela
Rosa), Forensic Chemical Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO,
Caloocan City Police Station and Police Officer 3 Rodrigo Antonio (PO3 Antonio) of the Caloocan Police
Station – Drug Enforcement Unit. The testimony of the police investigator, PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3
Moran), was dispensed with after petitioner’s counsel admitted the facts offered for stipulation by the
prosecution.

On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness. The testimonies of Abraham
Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the father and sister, respectively, of the petitioner was dispensed
with after the prosecution agreed that their testimonies were corroborative in nature.

Evidence for the Prosecution

First to testify for the prosecution was P/Insp. Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa, Forensic Chemical Officer of the
PNP Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City Police Station who, on the witness stand, affirmed his
own findings in Physical Science Report No. D-1222-02 (Exhs. "D," "D-1," and "D-2") that per qualitative
examination conducted on the specimen submitted, the white crystalline substance weighing 0.05 gram,
0.06 gram, 0.07 gram, and 0.06 gram then contained inside four (4) separate pieces of small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets (Exhs. "D-4" to "D-7") gave positive result to the test for Methylamphetamine
(sic) Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

Also, thru the testimony of PO3 Rodrigo Antonio of the Caloocan Police Station-Drug Enforcement Unit,
Samson Road, Caloocan City, the prosecution further endeavored to establish the following:

At about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, P/Insp. Jose Valencia of the Caloocan City
Police Station-SDEU called upon his subordinates after the (sic) receiving an INFOREP Memo from Camp
Crame relative to the illicit and down-right drug-trading activities being undertaken along Palmera Spring
II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat, Wily alias "Bokbok" and one Mic or Jojo (Exhs. "E,"
"E-1," and (sic) "E-3," and "E-4"). Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a surveillance team headed by
SPO4 Ernesto Palting and is composed of five (5) more operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit,
namely: PO3 Pagsolingan, PO2 Modina, PO2 De Ocampo, and herein witness PO3 Antonio. After a short
briefing at their station, the team boarded a rented passenger jeepney and proceeded to the target area
to verify the said informant and/or memorandum.

When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring II, Caloocan City at around 3:50 o’clock that
same afternoon, they were [at] once led by their informant to the house of one Alias "Abe." PO3 Antonio
then positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members of the group
deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped
inside and there at a distance of 1½ meters, he saw "Abe" arranging several pieces of small plastic
sachets which he believed to be containing shabu. Slowly, said operative inched his way in by gently
pushing the door as well as the plywood covering the same. Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio
forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while "Abe," on the other hand, after being informed of
such authority, voluntarily handed over to the former the four (4) pieces of small plastic sachets the
latter was earlier sorting out. PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect under arrest and brought him
and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance to their headquarters
and turned them over to PO3 Fernando Moran for proper disposition. The suspect was identified as
Abraham Miclat y Cerbo a.k.a "ABE," 19 years old, single, jobless and a resident of Maginhawa Village,
Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City. 4

Evidence for the Defense

On the other hand, the [petitioner] has a different version of the incident completely opposed to the
theory of the prosecution. On the witness stand, he alleged that at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
November 8, 2002, while he, together with his sister and father, were at the upper level of their house
watching the television soap "Cindy," they suddenly heard a commotion downstairs prompting the three
(3) of them to go down. There already inside were several male individuals in civilian clothes who
introduced themselves as raiding police operatives from the SDEU out to effect his (Abe) arrest for
alleged drug pushing. [Petitioner] and his father tried to plead his case to these officers, but to no avail.
Instead, one of the operatives even kicked [petitioner] at the back when he tried to resist the arrest.
Immediately, [petitioner] was handcuffed and together with his father, they were boarded inside the
police vehicle. That on their way to the Bagong Silang Police Station, PO3 Pagsolingan showed to
[petitioner] a small piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline substances allegedly recovered by
the raiding police team from their house. At around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, [petitioner] was
transferred to the Sangandaan Headquarters where he was finally detained. That upon [petitioner’s]
transfer and detention at the said headquarters, his father was ordered to go home. 5

On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the elements of the
offense charged, rendered a Decision6 convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No.
9165, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, from the facts established, the Court finds the accused ABRAHAM MICLAT Y CERBO
"GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of possession of a dangerous drugs (sic) defined and
penalized under the provision of Section 11, sub-paragraph No. (3), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
and hereby imposes upon him an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment, in view of the absence of aggravating circumstances. The Court likewise orders
the accused to pay the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00) as fine.

Let the 0.24 gram of shabu subject matter of this case be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government and to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)7

Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, which appeal was later docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
28846.

On October 13, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision 8 affirming in toto the decision of the RTC, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)9

In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence
presented by the prosecution were all admissible against him. Moreover, it was established that he was
informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. Hence, the CA opined that the prosecution
has proven beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements necessary for the conviction of the petitioner
for the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

Hence, the petition raising the following errors:

1. whether or not a police surveillance team sent to determine the veracity of a camp crame
memorandum of shabu trading activity at caloocan city, which converted their mission from surveillance
to a raiding team, can validly make an arrest and search without a valid warrant having been first
obtained from a court of competent jurisdiction.

2. whether or not peeping thRough a curtain-covered window is within the meaning of "plain view
doctrine" for a warrantless seizure to be lawful.

3. whether or not the belief of po3 antonio that the four (4) pieces of plaStic sachets allegedly being
arranged by petitioner contained shabu justified his entry into the house and arrest petitioner without
any warrant.
4. whether or not arranging four (4) pieces of plaStic sachets constitute as a crime within the meaning of
section 5 (3), rule 113 of the rules of court.

5. whether or not petitioner was properly appraised (SIC) of his constitutional rights to be informed of
the cause and nature of his arrest and right to be assisted by counsel during the period of his arrest and
continued detention.

6. whether or not the conviction by the lower court of the petitioner, as affirmed by the honorable court
of appeals, on the basis of an illegal search and arrest, is correct. 10

Simply stated, petitioner is assailing the legality of his arrest and the subsequent seizure of the arresting
officer of the suspected sachets of dangerous drugs from him. Petitioner insists that he was just
watching television with his father and sister when police operatives suddenly barged into their home
and arrested him for illegal possession of shabu.

Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic sachets inside their house by
one of the arresting officers who was peeping through a window is not sufficient reason for the police
authorities to enter his house without a valid search warrant and/or warrant of arrest. Arguing that the
act of arranging several plastic sachets by and in itself is not a crime per se, petitioner maintains that the
entry of the police surveillance team into his house was illegal, and no amount of incriminating evidence
will take the place of a validly issued search warrant. Moreover, peeping through a curtain-covered
window cannot be contemplated as within the meaning of the plain view doctrine, rendering the
warrantless arrest unlawful.

Petitioner also contends that the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs was highly questionable,
considering that the plastic sachets were not marked at the place of the arrest and no acknowledgment
receipt was issued for the said evidence.

Finally, petitioner claims that the arresting officer did not inform him of his constitutional rights at any
time during or after his arrest and even during his detention. Hence, for this infraction, the arresting
officer should be punished accordingly.

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates
that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any
defect in his arrest.11 An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise
this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment.
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.12

In the present case, at the time of petitioner’s arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the
irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In
effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient
cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.13
True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that of an arrest
made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant. Such
warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.  a peace office of a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;14

For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must
be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 15

In the instant case, contrary to petitioner’s contention, he was caught in flagrante delicto and the police
authorities effectively made a valid warrantless arrest. The established facts reveal that on the date of
the arrest, agents of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Caloocan City Police Station were
conducting a surveillance operation in the area of Palmera Spring II to verify the reported drug-related
activities of several individuals, which included the petitioner. During the operation, PO3 Antonio,
through petitioner’s window, saw petitioner arranging several plastic sachets containing what appears to
be shabu in the living room of their home. The plastic sachets and its suspicious contents were plainly
exposed to the view of PO3 Antonio, who was only about one and one-half meters from where
petitioner was seated. PO3 Antonio then inched his way in the house by gently pushing the door. Upon
gaining entrance, the operative introduced himself as a police officer. After which, petitioner voluntarily
handed over to PO3 Antonio the small plastic sachets. PO3 Antonio then placed petitioner under arrest
and, contrary to petitioner’s contention, PO3 Antonio informed him of his constitutional rights. 16 PO3
Antonio then took the petitioner and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets to their headquarters and
turned them over to PO3 Moran. Thereafter, the evidence were marked "AMC 1-4," the initials of the
name of the petitioner. The heat-sealed transparent sachets containing white crystalline substance were
submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug examination, which later yielded positive results for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA No. 9165.

Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of the petitioner,
petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting officer.

As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the established exceptions.
Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained
therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17 The right against warrantless
searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view";

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. 18

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial

question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. 19

It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain
sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police
officer. The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only
incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are
subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view"
doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position
from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and
hand and its discovery inadvertent. (Emphasis supplied.) 20

It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since
petitioner’s arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and
the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and
seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged.

As to petitioner’s contention that the police failed to comply with the proper procedure in the transfer of
custody of the seized evidence thereby casting serious doubt on its seizure, this too deserves scant
consideration.
Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination;

x x x x.

Corolarilly, the implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, provides:

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

x x x x.21

From the foregoing, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with the rule is not
fatal. It does not render petitioner’s arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him
inadmissible.22 What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused."23

Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the integrity of the drugs seized
from the petitioner was preserved. More importantly, an unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited
drugs taken from the petitioner was sufficiently established. The factual antecedents of the case reveal
that the petitioner voluntarily surrendered the plastic sachets to PO3 Antonio when he was arrested.
Together with petitioner, the evidence seized from him were immediately brought to the police station
and upon arriving thereat, were turned over to PO3 Moran, the investigating officer. There the evidence
was marked. The turn-over of the subject sachets and the person of the petitioner were then entered in
the official blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of the SDEU, Police Senior Inspector Jose Ramirez Valencia,
endorsed the evidence for laboratory examination to the National Police District PNP Crime Laboratory.
The evidence was delivered by PO3 Moran and received by Police Inspector Jessie Dela Rosa. 24 After a
qualitative examination of the contents of the four (4) plastic sachets by the latter, the same tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 25

An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been established by the prosecution
from the arresting officer, to the investigating officer, and finally to the forensic chemist. There is no
doubt that the items seized from the petitioner at his residence were also the same items marked by the
investigating officer, sent to the Crime Laboratory, and later on tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.

For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. 26 Based on the evidence submitted by the
prosecution, the above elements were duly established in the present case. Mere possession of a
regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession – the onus probandi is shifted to
the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.27

It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, credence
is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner.28 Although not constrained to blindly accept the findings of fact of trial
courts, appellate courts can rest assured that such facts were gathered from witnesses who presented
their statements live and in person in open court. In cases where conflicting sets of facts are presented,
the trial courts are in the best position to recognize and distinguish spontaneous declaration from
rehearsed spiel, straightforward assertion from a stuttering claim, definite statement from tentative
disclosure, and to a certain degree, truth from untruth. 29

In the present case, there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of fact of the trial court. No
evidence exist that shows any apparent inconsistencies in the narration of the prosecution witnesses of
the events which transpired and led to the arrest of petitioner. After a careful evaluation of the records,
We find no error was committed by the RTC and the CA to disregard their factual findings that petitioner
committed the crime charged against him.

Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, petitioner merely denied the accusations against
him and raised the defense of frame-up. The defense of denial and frame-up has been invariably viewed
by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defense of denial and
frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. 30

As to the penalty, while We sustain the amount of fine, the indeterminate sentence imposed should,
however, be modified.

Section 11, Article II, RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, provides:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the
following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:

x x x x.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated
as follows:

x x x x.

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three
hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00), if the quantities
of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or
other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those
similarly designed or newly-introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value
or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300)
grams of marijuana.31

From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a
fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱400,000.00). The evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner had in his possession 0.24 gram of shabu, or less than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug,
without any legal authority.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable penalty shall not fall
below the minimum period set by the law; the maximum period shall not exceed the maximum period
allowed under the law; hence, the imposable penalty should be within the range of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated October 13, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

G.R. No. 188611 June 16, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
BELEN MARIACOS, Appellant.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
02718, which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La
Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La
Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit or authority from the proper government agency
or office.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, the
following were stipulated upon:

"1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information as Belen Mariacos;

2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;

3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted from a passenger jeepney;

4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused contained in two (2) bags were
submitted for examination to the Crime Lab;

5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted for examination gave positive
result for the presence of marijuana;

6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic) and submitted for examination
weighed 7,030.3 grams;

7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by the accused; and

8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the accused family (sic): Lyn Punasen,
Mercedes Tila and Magdalena Carino."

During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:

On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union, conducted a
checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana
from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2
Lunes B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the checkpoint did
not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay
Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic).

At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the
Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a
passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and
one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an "O.K." marking. PO2
Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in
motion, he found the black backpack with an "O.K." marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2
Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top
of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers.
Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a
few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already
being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a
policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got away.

PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen Mariacos,
and the bags to the police station. At the police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San
Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the
bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of
marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered.

Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime
laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all
tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.

When it was accused-appellant’s turn to present evidence, she testified that:

On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani Herbacio,
was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still at the terminal
waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao-ang"), her neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags
which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded
later when she was told that she would only be carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion,
Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang
suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them. Without
explanation, they were brought to the police station. When they were at the police station, Lani
Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police station that accused-appellant discovered the true
contents of the bags which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the
bags and that she did not know what were contained in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed
a Counter-Affidavit.3

On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and sentences here (sic) to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.

The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court personnel and media.

SO ORDERED.4

Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in considering the
evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility. 5 She claimed that her right against an
unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the
bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that
PO2 Pallayoc’s purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one
he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was no probable cause for
her arrest.6

Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. 7 She
alleged that the apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of
1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the
custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The said
regulation directs the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs and/or
paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be required to sign copies of
the inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the
identity of the items allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to
prove that the items allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of
custody over the same.

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the
warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and legal, 8 justified as
a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information from
their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of
marijuana.9 The OSG also argued that appellant was now estopped from questioning the illegality of her
arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of "not guilty" upon arraignment and participated in the trial
and presented her evidence.10 The OSG brushed aside appellant’s argument that the bricks of marijuana
were not photographed and inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel immediately after
confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending team, whichever was practicable. 11

In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellant’s appeal and affirmed the RTC decision
in toto.12It held that the prosecution had successfully proven that appellant carried away from the
jeepney a number of bags which, when inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA
ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of "carrying and conveying" the bag that contained
the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellant’s warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate court
ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags when he was
aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana was on
board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed
only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-appellant carrying the
bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.

xxxx

Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is misplaced. At
the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified
owner. He asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus,
there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.

Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has been trying to
intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was
tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse
than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.

Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving vehicle
has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to
move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2
Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags
which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no
use because the motor vehicle had already left the locality. 13

Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.

Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the State’s agents to conduct searches
and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down the rules on searches and seizures, providing,
more or less, clear parameters in determining which are proper and which are not.1avvphi1

Appellant’s main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence used against
her. She claims that her constitutional right against unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the
apprehending officer.

Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been probable cause
for the warrantless arrest of appellant.

Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule
126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. 14

Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the search was
conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.

Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable cause. 15

In People v. Bagista,16 the Court said:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a
moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a
judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to
do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a
warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. 17 Without probable cause, the articles seized
cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested. 18
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be
searched.19

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 20

Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant
could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of
the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is
used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. 21

This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made
in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when
the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly
be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought. 22

Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that
carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick
decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting
the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no
time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for
its destination.

It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellant’s arrest, the police received
information that marijuana was to be transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a
checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met
the secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of marijuana
was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable
cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.

This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus,
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant. 23

For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is
necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112.24

Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede
the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 25

Given that the search was valid, appellant’s arrest based on that search is also valid.

Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:

SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a
fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to a
neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no consequence.

When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership
thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary. 26

Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and
good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this
case.27 Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable
under the Dangerous Drugs Act.28
Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience
designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to
crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed not against
particular individuals, but against public order. 29

Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to another." 30 There is no
definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish
the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question
as to the perpetration of the criminal act. 31The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a
finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of
destination is reached.32

Moreover, appellant’s possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the disputable
presumption33that she is the owner of the packages and their contents. 34 Appellant failed to rebut this
presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her
possession is insufficient.

Appellant’s narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely asked her
and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the packages contained and
where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked
from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran after him to give him the bags he had
left with them, and not to continue on their journey without knowing where they were taking the bags.

Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In particular,
she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to follow the procedure in the custody of seized
prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine
qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of that crime. 35

Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and disposition of seized
dangerous drugs, to wit:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.

PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her to the police
station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor to witness the opening of the bags seized from
appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front of appellant and the other police
officers. The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while the plastic bag
yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops. 36 PO2 Pallayoc identified the
bricks. He and PO3 Stanley Campit then marked the same. Then the seized items were brought to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not
accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present.
However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will
not render an accused’s arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. 37

Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellant’s arrest, she was immediately brought to the
police station where she stayed while waiting for the Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages,
revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter marked and sent to the police crime laboratory the
following day. Contrary to appellant’s claim, the prosecution’s evidence establishes the chain of custody
from the time of appellant’s arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.

While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-
compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellant’s arrest was illegal or that the
items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not
question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial. 38 Even assuming that
the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial
court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not.
Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.
Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody,
enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts accord credence
and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties
regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary. 39

In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellant’s guilt. Thus, her conviction must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

G.R. No. 93828 December 11, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SANTIAGO EVARISTO and NOLI CARILLO, accused-appellants.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires, Cavite, * in Criminal
Case No. NC-267, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo," finding the
accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
accordingly sentencing them to the penalty of life imprisonment.

The information indicting the accused-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the appellants) reads:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses SANTIAGO EVARISTO AND NOLI CARILLO of the crime
of VIOLATION of P.D. 1866, committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd. day of August 1988, in the Municipality of Mendez, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being private
persons not authorized by law did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously manufacture,
repair and kept (sic) in their possession, custody and control one (1) caliber 38 revolver (paltik) with two
live ammunition and one (1) empty shell of said caliber, two (2) 12 gauge home made shot guns, one (1)
caliber 22 revolver (sumpak) and two (2) vise grips and one (1) plier use (sic) in the manufacture and
repair of said firearms without any permit or license from competent (sic) authority.

CONTRATRY (sic) TO LAW.

Cavite City, August 30, 1988. 1

Appellants having entered a plead of not guilty, trial thereupon commenced, with the prosecution and
the defense presenting their respective witnesses and evidence to support their divergent versions of
the events leading to the arrest of the appellants.

A careful review of the records and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, Sgt. Eladio Romeroso
and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of the Philippine Constabulary, indicates that on the day in question, a
contingent composed of Romeroso and Vallarta, together with a Sgt. Daniel Maligaya, also of the
Philippine Constabulary, and two (2) members of the Integrated National Police, were on routine patrol
duty in Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At or about 5:50 in the afternoon, successive bursts of gunfire were
heard in the vicinity. Proceeding to the approximate source of the same, they came upon one Barequiel
Rosillo who was firing a gun into the air.

Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant Evaristo prompting the lawmen to pursue
him. Upon approaching the immediate perimeter of the house, specifically a cement pavement or porch
leading to the same, the patrol chanced upon the slightly inebriated appellants, Evaristo and Carillo.
Inquiring as to the whereabouts of Rosillo, the police patrol members were told that he had already
escaped through a window of the house. Sgt. Vallarta immediately observed a noticeable bulge around
the waist of Carillo who, upon being frisked, admitted the same to be a .38 revolver. After ascertaining
that Carillo was neither a member of the military nor had a valid license to possess the said firearm, the
gun was confiscated and Carillo invited for questioning.

As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought Evaristo's permission to scour through
the house, which was granted. In the sala, he found, not Rosillo, but a number of firearms and
paraphernalia supposedly used in the repair and manufacture of firearms, all of which, thereafter,
became the basis for the present indictment against Evaristo.

For their part, the appellants dispute the above narration of the events in question, alleging that they
were forcibly taken into custody by the police officers and even subjected to physical and mental
indignities. They denied ownership or knowledge of any of the firearms presented in evidence,
contending that these were purposely planted in their possession by the prosecution witnesses and
other police authorities.

After evaluation of all the evidence, the trial court rendered the now-assailed decision dated 18 April
1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, for having possessed firearms in violation of P.D. No. 1866, accused Santiago Evaristo and
Noli Carillo are hereby sentenced to serve the penalty provided for under Sec. 1 thereof. The full period
of their preventive imprisonment shall be deducted from the aforementioned penalty.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED. 2

Hence, this petition, assigning the following as errors of the trial court:

1. The lower court gravely erred in admitting Exhibits "B" to "F" in evidence considering that those are
illegally seized evidence;

2. The lower court gravely erred in finding that said illegally seized evidence are firearms as
contemplated in Presidential Decree No. 1866; and
3. The lower court gravely erred in giving credence to the arresting officer's testimonies which are
patently contradictory and half truths (sic) testimonies. 3

First, on the issue of illegal search. The pertinent rule on the matter is Article III of the Constitution, the
relevant portion of which provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. (1) . . . .

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

It is to be noted that what the above constitutional provisions prohibit are unreasonable searches and
seizures. For a search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a search warrant validly
issued by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a
valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for jurisprudence has recognized several
exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among
these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view, adopted by this jurisdiction from the
pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Harris vs. U.S.4 and Coolidge vs. New
Hampshire. 5 Thus, it is recognized that objects inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who
has the right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced in
evidence. 6

The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to
enter his house. The officer's purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge therein.
Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was not Romerosa's purpose in entering the house,
thereby rendering his discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent and even accidental.

With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court sustains the validly of the
firearm's seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on authorized warrantless arrests.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
For purposes of the present case, the second circumstance by which a warrantless arrest may be
undertaken is applicable. For, as disclosed by the records, the peace officers, while on patrol, heard
bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to investigate the matter. This incident may well be within the
"offense" envisioned by par. 5 (b) of Rule 113, Rules of Court. As the Court held in People of the
Philippines v. Sucro, 7 "an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within
the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO
THE SCENE THEREOF."8

The next inquiry is addressed to the existence of personal knowledge on the part of the peace officer of
facts pointing to the person to be arrested as the perpetrator of the offense. Again, reference to the
records resolves said query. Giving chase to Rosillo, the peace officers came upon the two (2) appellants
who were then asked concerning Rosillo's whereabouts. At that point, Sgt. Vallarta discerned the bulge
on the waist of Carillo. This visual observation along with the earlier report of gunfire, as well as the
peace officer's professional instincts, are more than sufficient to pass the test of the Rules. Consequently,
under the facts, the firearm taken from Carillo can be said to have been seized incidental to a lawful and
valid arrest.

The next area to be addressed is the allegation of the appellants that the statute's coverage does not
extend to firearms that are not functional or serviceable. The Court does not agree.

Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 penalizes "any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, orpossess any firearms, PART OF FIREARM, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used
or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." 9 It is clear that the law makes
no distinction as to serviceable or functional firearms. Indeed, the possession of even a part of a firearm
is sufficient to come within the prohibitive ambit of the statute. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus.

Lastly, the appellants challenge the veracity of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, maintaining
that these were inconsistent with each other, thereby giving rise to the conclusion that the entire
incident was a contrivance on their part. Specifically, they point to the apparent conflict in the statement
of the prosecution witnesses that there were only three (3) individuals in the vicinity (aside from the
peace officers) as opposed to the testimony of another peace officer, testifying as a hostile witness, that
aside from the appellants, and Rosillo, there were also other people in the vicinity, such as Evaristo's
mother, brother and other farmers.

The Court sees no such conflict. A recourse to the trial court proceedings easily shows that the two (2)
prosecution witnesses, Sgt. Romerosa and CIC Vallarta, testified in a straightforward and candid manner,
categorically identifying the appellants as the two (2) individuals they had apprehended and clearly
narrating the circumstances of such apprehension. The defense has given no possible reason or
motivation for these peace officers to make false accusations against the appellants. Absent the
presentation of such defense evidence, the testimony of the peace officers should deserve full credence.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court of Trece Martires, Cavite in Criminal Case No. NC-267
finding the accused Santiago Evaristo and Noel Carillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Illegal
Possession of Firearms as defined in Presidential Decree No. 1866, is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and other incidental paraphernalia found in the
possession of the appellants, in favor of the Philippine National Police (PNP) to be disposed of in
accordance with law.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD
MUNOZ,Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the
decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution 2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CAG.R. SP No. 91541.

The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and
Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedent Facts

The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation
ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street,
Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside. 3

Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to report the
incident.4Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02
Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. 5 SP02 Javier,
together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez,
arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation 6 and they saw Atty.
Generoso badly beaten.7

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police
officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. 8 The petitioners
went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. 9 At the inquest proceeding, the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty.
Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10

In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified
with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt
acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but
said accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is,
said complainant was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation 12 on the
ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place
since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They
also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was
improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. 13

On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 15

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the
denial of their motion for preliminary investigation. 16

The Assailed CA Decision

On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. 17 The CA ruled
that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a
command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty.
Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an
inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based,
pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently
explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17,
2008;18 hence, the present petition.

The Issues

The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO
THE POLICE PRECINCT.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR
FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.

The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued;
they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the
Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "

The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112,
Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers
actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless
arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.

The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings against the
petitioners should now proceed.

It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its
resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the proceedings
and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.

But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this
case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the
Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present
case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable
interpretation.

I. Brief history on warrantless arrests

The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902, 19 and the 1935,20 197321 and
198722Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. " 23

This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke 24 and The Great
Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the
bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215. 25 The Magna Carta Libertatum
limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain liberties 26 under the
feudal vassals' threat of civil war. 27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later
became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 28 It
provides:

No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised 29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs,
or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him,
but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny
or defer to any man either Justice or Right. 30 [Emphasis supplied]

In United States v. Snyder, 31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision does
not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are
unreasonable.32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of
reasonableness.33

In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The
Court based these rulings on the common law of America and England that, according to the Court, were
not different from the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on
the provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines. 35

In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson 36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the Charter of
Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of
Manila was concerned.

In The United States v. Vallejo, et al., 38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under
statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the officers
established under the common law of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a
warrant in the Philippines.

The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos 39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were based on
common sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then
Administrative Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of
public offenses.

In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 30 43 of the Provisional Law for
the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.

These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which
states that: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forth
with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot
pursuit" arrest.44

For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in the present case.
This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its
interpretation in our jurisprudence.

We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine
jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application.

II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113

A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court

Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on
warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza, 45 the Court cited Rule
28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:

Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons whom
there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well
as of their agents, to arrest:

First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.

Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of
confinamiento.

Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of
confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption that
he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives sufficient
bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be
presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested, although no
formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the following circumstances are present:

First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act, amounting to a
crime had been committed.

Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested
participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila, which provided that
certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest
without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably
tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the
peace.

In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer may arrest persons
walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime,
although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.

The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for an
arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing
that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another
requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested
person turned out to be innocent.

Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary
for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What was
necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having
the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be
detained participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the old court rulings that the phrase
"reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would
be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach. 48

In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting
person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or
circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.

It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless
arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable
cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its
commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer.
However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.

B. The 1940 Rules of Court

(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially
incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows: 50

SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Notably, the
1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual
commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too,
the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to
whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.

However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual
commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of
the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed
the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion
in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-worded
and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced
under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the commission
of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This
limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering
information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the
incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on
whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that:

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section
S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word
"just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested
should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of the
arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested
committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on
mere suspicion or hearsay.51

As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it.

For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the element of
probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, and the arresting
officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the
crime.

i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause

The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting
officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of
determining whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests

In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable.
According to State v. Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of
violating the law is not a violation of due process.

The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States 54 that the Fourth Amendment
limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not
whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the
arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and
"reasonable grounds."55

In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough
investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis
supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a
case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless
arrest is based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on
the information acquired later.56

In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical
questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to
be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved. 57

In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his
fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of
showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable
cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting
officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the
circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information. 58

In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for
triat.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge
of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the
respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his
witnesses.62

On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.

Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence
submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review
in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally
evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause 63 to issue a warrant of arrest.

In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to
actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the arrest.

The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, 64 or an actual belief or reasonable
ground of suspicion, based on actual facts. 65

It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer
arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the
case may be.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable cause,"
within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts
and circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use the same standard of a
reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon
which they must determine probable cause.

Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of
probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination
on the evidence submitted by the parties.

In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available
information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.

Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable cause in
warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that one
should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle
reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must
act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. 67

ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:

The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it

We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows
that these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless
arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only
on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the
supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and
Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be
said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be
arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.

Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a
threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to
arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only
information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It
cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.

In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed
means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed
and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was
arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the
arresting officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They
became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial
investigation.

In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on
the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.

In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime was held
invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The
information upon which the police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That
information did not constitute "personal knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In this
case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his
investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.

In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the
violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The
warrantless arrest was held valid.

In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received
information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting
officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the
man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v.
Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the scene of the crime
found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the
shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the
death of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless
arrest was held valid.

In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately
responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort
Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the
group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was
valid.

In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then
given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio
message. When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated the report about
the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby
area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the
complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was
held valid.

In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.

In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia
about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident.
SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was
implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita
III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to
go with him to the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III
agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him
up as he was about to run towards his house.

The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened
the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the
firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled
with the incident report which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the
part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these discussions, it
appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and
''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it" depended
on the particular circumstances of the case. However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary,80"circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances
may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the
police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone
actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the
circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause
and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the
crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the
required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This
required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers
would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an
exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime
to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and
subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of
immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police
officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds
another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of
circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for
a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's
exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and
circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause
objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the
Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.

Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present
petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has
the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these
facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would
a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was
committed by the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.

III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest

We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its
decision.81From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a
warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in the
present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of
the petitioners.

Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged
crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police
Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20,
2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.

The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour
from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2)
hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.

The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of
the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from
petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas, 83 although they asserted that they did it in
self-defense against Atty. Generoso.

Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate 84 that was issued by East
Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso
that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings: "Contusion
Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye;
Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand;
Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In
addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma,
periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.

To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty.
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one
(1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso
and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for
his mauling and, notably, the petitioners 85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood;
more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny
their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what
transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the
time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These
circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of
the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within
their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson, 88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso
in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who
mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with
the police officers.

This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr. 89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily
went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have
been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what transpired.

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to
consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable
cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.

The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately
dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim. 90 This fact alone
negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime
had been committed - the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had
been committed.1âwphi1

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited
provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough
that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has recently committed the crime.

Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion,
the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place,
the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest
proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.

IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to

mean as an authoritative command

After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second
issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 91 Thus, application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and
the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. 92

Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, 93 SP02 Javier could not but have the
intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to
apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police
station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be an
alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.

To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired personal
knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners
as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a
particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of
the charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. 94

V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary

investigation is valid

In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the petitioners'
urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article
VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution 95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. 96

The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the
evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and
convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to
pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."

We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving
the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary
matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary
incidents leading up to the trial.

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required
to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the
proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's
order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby
AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with
the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial
Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon
Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St.
Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or
"wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly
bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car.
Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to
take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the
shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol.
Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.

The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had
come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the
shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the
cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he
positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant
was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner.

On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports
that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith
detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively
identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his
lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such
waiver.

On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be
filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).

Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide,
filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the
bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an
omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, 4 alleging that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail.
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the motion
itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of
P100,000.00.

On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to expedite action
on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on
the same date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was
in fact released that same day.

On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended.
He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus
motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The
Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.

Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation
and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded
its preliminary investigation.

On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the following:
(1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of
the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to
conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for
immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and
set for hearing on 23 July 1991.

On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme
Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and void because no
preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process.
Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme
Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge.

On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.

By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.

On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of
petitioner on 23 August 1991.

On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment.

On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of
Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was
arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not
guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on
2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. 11

On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He alleged
that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him,
after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released
on habeas corpus.

On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were
subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain
his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.

On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first
witness.

On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14 dismissing the two (2)
petitions, on the following grounds:

a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and charged
had been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation. At the time he
showed up at the police station, there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation
at the San Juan Police Station, one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.

b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his
right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the Rules.

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the trial
court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to
law and justice.

d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment order
(issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to
the custody of the Provincial Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.

On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for
petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.

On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the
Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal
case below until further orders from this Court.

In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful
warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second,
whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these
issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner had
been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon
Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested
six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station
Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a
warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which
Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section
7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the
information for murder even without preliminary investigation.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went
to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner
argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of
the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly
none had the "personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had
been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only
exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.

The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of
this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the
warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the
offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were
subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case,
the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced
and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting
of Maguan was a "continuing crime."

Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case
falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as
follows:

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge." 18

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning
of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:

Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed
by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and
in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver,
he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the
accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a
preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in
this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)

is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police
Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication
he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the
police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately
scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed
under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to
waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a
preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since
petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released
forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.

Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary
investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information for murder was
filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate
release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should
have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should
accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver
of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The
preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is
true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already
been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of
this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this
Court held:

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the
criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation
of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the
finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action.While
it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition
the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of
the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of
the accused., or the right of the People to due process of law.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. . . . 20 (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied)

Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for
a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file
with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude
that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal clear was that
petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without
such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the
petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's
prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition
apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-
day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with.

We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While that
right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by
statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk
of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.
The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to
speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to
hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be
to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process.

The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the
instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to
preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a
plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to
preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already
before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamusprecisely asking for a preliminary
investigation before being forced to stand trial.

Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his
right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived
their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and
proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary
investigation." 24 In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for
preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his
release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on
the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary
investigation was a legitimate one.

We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary
investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of
criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the
trial court. 25

It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This
was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his
hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling
his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours
from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and certainly
no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the
recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on
bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case, trial on
the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact
upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be
released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in
respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail?

Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a
preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be
suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 26 It is
true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude
that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion
that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional
point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due
process. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary
investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If
he submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking .
During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of
petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and
objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary investigation. 28 So energetic
and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an obviously angered court and
prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. During
the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once again reiterated
his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his
"continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and
prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the
lawfulness of his detention.30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the
prosecution's witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de
oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use
what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process.

In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be
released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt
be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for
cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective
assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.

To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation
and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to
legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong
or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the
vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary
investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But
the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not be idleceremony; rather, it would
be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its
obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the trial
court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary
investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary
investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of
the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation.

Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that
the trial court may issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at
the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Medialdea, Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.