FOCUS - 2 of 4 DOCUMENTS

IN RE: ACTOSÆ (PIOGLITAZONE) PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.

This Document Applies To: Allen, et. al. v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals North America,
Inc., et al., (Case No. 12-cv-00064)

MDL No. 6:11-md-2299,Case No. 12-cv-00064

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF

LOUISIANA, LAFAYETTE DIVISION

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1194

January 6, 2014, Decided

January 6, 2014, Filed

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Motion denied by Allen v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc. (In re ActosÆ (Pioglitazone)
Prods. Liab. Litig.), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1681 (W.D. La., Jan. 7, 2014)

PRIOR HISTORY: Allen v. Takeda Pharms. North Am., Inc. (In re Actos (Pioglitazone)), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1126
(W.D. La., Jan. 6, 2014)

COUNSEL: [*1] For Gary J Russo, Special Master: Gary J Russo, LEAD ATTORNEY, Jones Walker et al (LAF),
Lafayette, LA; Carmen M Rodriguez, Jones Walker (LAF), Lafayette, LA; Kenneth W DeJean, Office of Kenneth W
DeJean, Lafayette, LA.

For Executive Committee, Plaintiff: Paul J Pennock, LEAD ATTORNEY, Weitz & Luxenberg (NY), New York, NY;
Richard J Arsenault, LEAD ATTORNEY, Neblett Beard & Arsenault, Alexandria, LA; Dawn Barrios, Barrios Kingsdorf
& Casteix, New Orleans, LA; Mark P Robinson, Jr, Robinson Calcagnie et al, Newport Beach, CA; Patrick C Morrow,
Morrow Morrow et al, Opelousas, LA; Stephanie O'Connor, Douglas & London, New York, NY.

For Plaintiffs Steering Committee, Plaintiff: Paul J Pennock, LEAD ATTORNEY, Weitz & Luxenberg (NY), New York,
NY; Richard J Arsenault, LEAD ATTORNEY, Dawn M Chmielewski, Neblett Beard & Arsenault, Alexandria, LA; A J
De Bartolomeo, PRO HAC VICE, Girard Gibbs, San Francisco, CA; Andy D Birchfield, Beasley Allen et al,
Montgomery, AL; Christopher A Seeger, Seeger Weiss, New York, NY; Daniel S Robinson, Robinson Calcagnie et al,
Newport Beach, CA; Dianne M Nast, Nast Law, Philadelphia, PA; Donald C Arbitblit, Lieff Cabraser et al (CA), San
Francisco, CA; Jayne Conroy, [*2] Hanly Conroy et al, New York, NY; Jerrold S Parker, Parker Waichman (FL),
Bonita Springs, FL; Neil D Overholtz, Aylstock Witkin & Sasser (Pensacola), Pensacola, FL; Nicholas J Drakulich,
Drakulich Firm, San Diego, CA; Stephen B Murray, Murray Law Firm, New Orleans, LA; Tara Tabatabaie, Sill Law
Group, Edmond, OK; Troy A Rafferty, Levin Papantonio et al, Pensacola, FL; Vance R Andrus, Andrus Hood &
Wagstaff, Denver, CO; W Mark Lanier, PRO HAC VICE, Law Offices of W Mark Lanier, Houston, TX; W James
Singleton, Singleton Law Firm, Shreveport, LA.

For Takeda Pharmaceutical Co Ltd, Defendant: Sara J Gourley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Sidley Austin (IL), Chicago, IL;
Amy Sherry Fischer, Foliart Huff et al, Oklahoma City, OK; Andrew W Cary, Brett T Moroney, J Dominic Campodon-
ico, Jack B McCowan, Kai Peters, Gordon & Rees (SF), San Francisco, CA; Bruce Robert Parker, Jason Charles Rose,
Shannon Elizabeth Beamer, Venable (MD), Baltimore, MD; Charles A Deacon, Fulbright & Jaworski (SA), San
Antonio, TX; D'Lesli M Davis, H Douglas Wabner, Jonathan B Skidmore, Katherine P Lett, Kristin Turner, Fulbright &
Jaworski (DAL), Dallas, TX; Dell P Chappell, John D Martin, Nelson Mullins et al (COL), Columbia, SC; [*3] Donna
L Boyce, Adams & Reese (MEM), Memphis, TN; E Paige Sensenbrenner, Jaimme Angelle Collins, Lawton Cole
Callihan, Megan Haggerty Guy, Kathleen Fontenot Drew, Adams & Reese (NO), New Orleans, LA; Eben S Flaster,
Goodell DeVries et al (PA), Philadelphia, PA; Gerry Lowry, Randall Shirres Richardson, Fulbright & Jaworski (HOU),
Houston, TX; James A Frederick, PRO HAC VICE, Michael A Pichini, Goodell DeVries et al, Baltimore, MD; James W
Mizgala, Jana D Jobes, Nathan A Huey, Sidley Austin (IL), Chicago, IL; Jeffrey R Lilly, Kenneth J Ferguson, Michael R
Klatt, Gordon Rees (AUS), Austin, TX; Jennifer A Foster, Sherry Ann Knutson, Sidley Austin (Chicago), Chicago, IL;
Jennifer Blakely D Kiefer, Wyrick Robbins et al, Raleigh, NC; John E McElligott, Jr, Davidson Meaux et al, Lafayette,
LA; Jude Philip Calabrese, Squire Sanders & Dempsey (OH), Cleveland, OH; K Michele Anderson, Tucker Ellis,
Denver, CO; Neva G Lusk, Spilman Thomas & Battle, Charleston, WV; Rebecca J Schwartz, Scott W Sayler, Shook
Hardy & Bacon (KC), Kansas City, MO; Richard C Harlan, Alycia Degen, Sidley Austin (LA), Los Angeles, CA;
Stephen D Martin, Nelson Mullins et al (NC), Raleigh, NC; Victoria L Vance, Tucker Ellis [*4] (OH), Cleveland, OH;
Gerald J Corcoran, Montgomery McCracken et al (NJ), Linwood, NJ; James M Campbell, Campbell Campbell et al
(MA), Boston, MA; Robert A Limbacher, Goodell DeVries et al (PA), Philadelphia, PA.

For Takeda Pharmaceuticals America Inc, Defendant: Sara J Gourley, LEAD ATTORNEY, James W Mizgala, Jana D
Jobes, Nathan A Huey, Sidley Austin (IL), Chicago, IL; Alycia Degen, Richard C Harlan, Catherine Valerio Barrad,
Sidley Austin (LA), Los Angeles, CA; Andrew W Cary, Brett T Moroney, J Dominic Campodonico, Jack B McCowan,
Kai Peters, Gordon & Rees (SF), San Francisco, CA; Bruce Robert Parker, Shannon Elizabeth Beamer, Jason Charles
Rose, Venable (MD), Baltimore, MD; Carol Dan Browning, Stites & Harbison, Lexington, KY; Charles A Deacon,
Fulbright & Jaworski (SA), San Antonio, TX; Colin J Garry, James D Arden, Sidley Austin (NY), New York, NY;
D'Lesli M Davis, H Douglas Wabner, Jonathan B Skidmore, Katherine P Lett, Kristin Turner, Fulbright & Jaworski
(DAL), Dallas, TX; David J Walz, Edward Walter Gerecke, Carlton Fields (FL), Tampa, FL; Dell P Chappell, John D
Martin, Nelson Mullins et al (COL), Columbia, SC; Donna L Boyce, Adams & Reese (MEM), Memphis, TN; E Paige
Sensenbrenner, [*5] Jaimme Angelle Collins, Lawton Cole Callihan, Megan Haggerty Guy, Kathleen Fontenot Drew,
Adams & Reese (NO), New Orleans, LA; Eben S Flaster, Robert A Limbacher, Goodell DeVries et al (PA),
Philadelphia, PA; Gerry Lowry, Randall Shirres Richardson, Fulbright & Jaworski (HOU), Houston, TX; James A
Frederick, PRO HAC VICE, Michael A Pichini, Goodell DeVries et al, Baltimore, MD; Jeffrey R Lilly, Kenneth J
Ferguson, Michael R Klatt, Gordon Rees (AUS), Austin, TX; Jennifer Y Dukart, Joseph M Price, Faegre & Benson
(MN), Minneapolis, MN; Jennifer A Foster, Sherry Ann Knutson, Sidley Austin (Chicago), Chicago, IL; Jennifer
Blakely D Kiefer, Wyrick Robbins et al, Raleigh, NC; John E McElligott, Jr, Davidson Meaux et al, Lafayette, LA; Jude
Philip Calabrese, Squire Sanders & Dempsey (OH), Cleveland, OH; K Michele Anderson, Tucker Ellis, Denver, CO;
Lawrence H Cooke, II, Venable (NY), New York, NY; Mary Nold Larimore, Nancy Menard Riddle, Ice Miller et al,
Indianapolis, IN; Neva G Lusk, Spilman Thomas & Battle, Charleston, WV; Rebecca J Schwartz, Scott W Sayler,
Shook Hardy & Bacon (KC), Kansas City, MO; Stephen M Brooks, Nelson Mullins et al (Atlanta), Atlanta, GA;
Stephen D Martin, Nelson [*6] Mullins et al (NC), Raleigh, NC; Victoria L Vance, Tucker Ellis (OH), Cleveland, OH;
Camille N Johnson, Snow Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, UT; Gerald J Corcoran, Montgomery McCracken
et al (NJ), Linwood, NJ; J Bennett Fox, Jr, Adams & Reese (MEM), Memphis, TN; James M Campbell, Campbell
Campbell et al (MA), Boston, MA; John E Galvin, III, Jonathan H Garside, Fox Galvin, St Louis, MO.

For Eli Lilly & Co, Defendant: Alycia Degen, Catherine Valerio Barrad, Richard C Harlan, LEAD ATTORNEYS,
Sidley Austin (LA), Los Angeles, CA; Camille N Johnson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Snow Christensen & Martineau, Salt
Lake City, UT; Gerald J Corcoran, LEAD ATTORNEY, Montgomery McCracken et al (NJ), Linwood, NJ; J Bennett
Fox, Jr, LEAD ATTORNEY, Donna L Boyce, Adams & Reese (MEM), Memphis, TN; James M Campbell, LEAD
ATTORNEY, Campbell Campbell et al (MA), Boston, MA; Kathleen Fontenot Drew, LEAD ATTORNEY, E Paige
Sensenbrenner, Jaimme Angelle Collins, Megan Haggerty Guy, Adams & Reese (NO), New Orleans, LA; Lindsey N
Oswalt, Sharon F Bridges, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Adams & Reese (RL), Ridgeland, MS; Robert A Limbacher, LEAD
ATTORNEY, Eben S Flaster, Goodell DeVries et al (PA), Philadelphia, PA; Sara J Gourley, [*7] LEAD ATTORNEY,
James W Mizgala, Jana D Jobes, Nathan A Huey, Sidley Austin (IL), Chicago, IL; Scott W Sayler, LEAD ATTORNEY,
Rebecca J Schwartz, Shook Hardy & Bacon (KC), Kansas City, MO; Alan Daniel Mathis, James C Barton, Jr, Johnston
Barton et al (AL), Birmingham, AL; Amy B Alderfer, Greenberg Traurig (CA), Santa Monica, CA; Amy Sherry Fischer,
Andrew M Bowman, Foliart Huff et al, Oklahoma City, OK; Andrew W Cary, Brett T Moroney, J Dominic Campodon-
ico, Jack B McCowan, Kai Peters, Gordon & Rees (SF), San Francisco, CA; Bruce Robert Parker, Jason Charles Rose,
Shannon Elizabeth Beamer, Venable (MD), Baltimore, MD; Charles A Deacon, Fulbright & Jaworski (SA), San
Antonio, TX; Christiana C Jacxsens, Greenberg Traurig (GA), Atlanta, GA; Colin J Garry, Sidley Austin (NY), New
York, NY; D'Lesli M Davis, H Douglas Wabner, Jonathan B Skidmore, Katherine P Lett, Fulbright & Jaworski (DAL),
Dallas, TX; David J Walz, Edward Walter Gerecke, Carlton Fields (FL), Tampa, FL; Dell P Chappell, John D Martin,
Nelson Mullins et al (COL), Columbia, SC; Gerry Lowry, Randall Shirres Richardson, Fulbright & Jaworski (HOU),
Houston, TX; James D Arden, Sidley Austin (NY), New York, NY; James A Frederick, [*8] PRO HAC VICE, Goodell
DeVries et al, Baltimore, MD; Jeffrey R Lilly, Kenneth J Ferguson, Michael R Klatt, Gordon Rees (AUS), Austin, TX;
Jennifer Y Dukart, Joseph M Price, Faegre & Benson (MN), Minneapolis, MN; Jennifer A Foster, Jose Antonio Isasi, II,
Sherry Ann Knutson, Sidley Austin (Chicago), Chicago, IL; Jennifer Blakely D Kiefer, Wyrick Robbins et al, Raleigh,
NC; John E McElligott, Jr, Davidson Meaux et al, Lafayette, LA; Jude Philip Calabrese, Squire Sanders & Dempsey
(OH), Cleveland, OH; K Michele Anderson, Tucker Ellis, Denver, CO; Lauren P Buford, Greenberg Traurig (Chicago),
Chicago, IL; Lawrence H Cooke, II, Venable (NY), New York, NY; Lawton Cole Callihan, Adams & Reese (NO), New
Orleans, LA; Lori Chang, Greenberg Traurig (CA), Santa Monica, CA; Lori G Cohen, Greenberg Traurig (GA), Atlanta,
GA; Mary Nold Larimore, Nancy Menard Riddle, Ice Miller et al, Indianapolis, IN; Michael A Pichini, Goodell DeVries
et al, Baltimore, MD; Neva G Lusk, Spilman Thomas & Battle, Charleston, WV; Stephen M Brooks, Nelson Mullins et
al (Atlanta), Atlanta, GA; Stephen D Martin, Nelson Mullins et al (NC), Raleigh, NC; Victoria L Vance, Tucker Ellis
(OH), Cleveland, OH.

For Takeda Pharmaceuticals [*9] International Inc, Defendant: Sara J Gourley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Nathan A Huey,
Sidley Austin (IL), Chicago, IL; Alan Daniel Mathis, James C Barton, Jr, Johnston Barton et al (AL), Birmingham, AL;
Alycia Degen, Amanda Victoria Lopez, Sidley Austin (LA), Los Angeles, CA; Amy Sherry Fischer, Foliart Huff et al,
Oklahoma City, OK; Carol Dan Browning, Stites & Harbison, Lexington, KY; Colin J Garry, James D Arden, Michael P
Morrissey, Sidley Austin (NY), New York, NY; D'Lesli M Davis, H Douglas Wabner, Jonathan B Skidmore, Katherine P
Lett, Fulbright & Jaworski (DAL), Dallas, TX; David J Walz, Edward Walter Gerecke, Carlton Fields (FL), Tampa, FL;
Dell P Chappell, John D Martin, Nelson Mullins et al (COL), Columbia, SC; Donna L Boyce, J Bennett Fox, Jr, Adams
& Reese (MEM), Memphis, TN; E Paige Sensenbrenner, Jaimme Angelle Collins, Megan Haggerty Guy, Kathleen
Fontenot Drew, Adams & Reese (NO), New Orleans, LA; Eben S Flaster, Goodell DeVries et al (PA), Philadelphia, PA;
Jane Thompson Davis, Nelson Mullins et al (SC), Charleston, SC; Jennifer A Foster, Sherry Ann Knutson, Sidley Austin
(Chicago), Chicago, IL; Jennifer Blakely D Kiefer, Wyrick Robbins et al, Raleigh, NC; John E McElligott, [*10] Jr,
Davidson Meaux et al, Lafayette, LA; Randall Shirres Richardson, Fulbright & Jaworski (HOU), Houston, TX; Richard
C Harlan, Sidley Austin (LA), Los Angeles, CA; Stephen M Bressler, Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, AZ; Stephen D Martin,
Nelson Mullins et al (NC), Raleigh, NC; William Stevens Brown, Nelson Mullins et al (GV), Greenville, SC; Gerald J
Corcoran, Montgomery McCracken et al (NJ), Linwood, NJ; John E Galvin, III, Jonathan H Garside, Fox Galvin, St
Louis, MO; Jude Philip Calabrese, Squire Sanders & Dempsey (OH), Cleveland, OH; Lindsey N Oswalt, Sharon F
Bridges, Adams & Reese (RL), Ridgeland, MS; Scott W Sayler, Shook Hardy & Bacon (KC), Kansas City, MO.

For Takeda Pharmaceuticals L L C, Defendant: Sara J Gourley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Nathan A Huey, Sidley Austin (IL),
Chicago, IL; Alan Daniel Mathis, James C Barton, Jr, Johnston Barton et al (AL), Birmingham, AL; Alycia Degen,
Amanda Victoria Lopez, Richard C Harlan, Sidley Austin (LA), Los Angeles, CA; Amy Sherry Fischer, Foliart Huff et
al, Oklahoma City, OK; Carol Dan Browning, Stites & Harbison, Lexington, KY; Colin J Garry, James D Arden,
Michael P Morrissey, Sidley Austin (NY), New York, NY; Dell P Chappell, John D Martin, Nelson [*11] Mullins et al
(COL), Columbia, SC; Donna L Boyce, J Bennett Fox, Jr, Adams & Reese (MEM), Memphis, TN; E Paige Sensenbren-
ner, Jaimme Angelle Collins, Megan Haggerty Guy, Kathleen Fontenot Drew, Adams & Reese (NO), New Orleans, LA;
Eben S Flaster, Goodell DeVries et al (PA), Philadelphia, PA; Jane Thompson Davis, Nelson Mullins et al (SC),
Charleston, SC; Jennifer A Foster, Sherry Ann Knutson, Sidley Austin (Chicago), Chicago, IL; John E McElligott, Jr,
Davidson Meaux et al, Lafayette, LA; Stephen M Bressler, Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, AZ; William Stevens Brown,
Nelson Mullins et al (GV), Greenville, SC; Gerald J Corcoran, Montgomery McCracken et al (NJ), Linwood, NJ; John
E Galvin, III, Jonathan H Garside, Fox Galvin, St Louis, MO; Jude Philip Calabrese, Squire Sanders & Dempsey (OH),
Cleveland, OH.

For Takeda San Francisco Inc, Defendant: Sara J Gourley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Sidley Austin (IL), Chicago, IL; Sherry
Ann Knutson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Sidley Austin (Chicago), Chicago, IL; Alycia Degen, Richard C Harlan, Sidley
Austin (LA), Los Angeles, CA; Jude Philip Calabrese, Squire Sanders & Dempsey (OH), Cleveland, OH; Nathan A
Huey, Sidley Austin (IL), Chicago, IL.

For Takeda Ventures Inc, Defendant: [*12] Sara J Gourley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Sidley Austin (IL), Chicago, IL; Sherry
Ann Knutson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Sidley Austin (Chicago), Chicago, IL; Alycia Degen, Richard C Harlan, Sidley
Austin (LA), Los Angeles, CA; Dell P Chappell, John D Martin, Nelson Mullins et al (COL), Columbia, SC; Megan
Haggerty Guy, Adams & Reese (NO), New Orleans, LA; Jude Philip Calabrese, Squire Sanders & Dempsey (OH),
Cleveland, OH; Nathan A Huey, Sidley Austin (IL), Chicago, IL.

For Takeda Pharmaceuticals International L L C, Defendant: Megan Haggerty Guy, Adams & Reese (NO), New
Orleans, LA.
For Takeda Pharmaceuticals U S A Inc, formerly known as Takeda Pharmaceuticals North America Inc, Defendant: K
Michele Anderson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Tucker Ellis, Denver, CO; Sara J Gourley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Sidley Austin
(IL), Chicago, IL; Andrew W Cary, Brett T Moroney, J Dominic Campodonico, Jack B McCowan, Kai Peters, Gordon
& Rees (SF), San Francisco, CA; Bruce Robert Parker, Jason Charles Rose, Shannon Elizabeth Beamer, Venable (MD),
Baltimore, MD; Charles A Deacon, Fulbright & Jaworski (SA), San Antonio, TX; D'Lesli M Davis, Jonathan B
Skidmore, Katherine P Lett, Fulbright & Jaworski (DAL), Dallas, TX; Dell P Chappell, John [*13] D Martin, Nelson
Mullins et al (COL), Columbia, SC; Donna L Boyce, J Bennett Fox, Jr, Adams & Reese (MEM), Memphis, TN; Eben S
Flaster, Robert A Limbacher, Goodell DeVries et al (PA), Philadelphia, PA; Gerry Lowry, Fulbright & Jaworski (HOU),
Houston, TX; Jaimme Angelle Collins, Lawton Cole Callihan, Megan Haggerty Guy, Kathleen Fontenot Drew, Adams
& Reese (NO), New Orleans, LA; James M Campbell, Campbell Campbell et al (MA), Boston, MA; James A Frederick,
PRO HAC VICE, Michael A Pichini, Goodell DeVries et al, Baltimore, MD; James W Mizgala, Jana D Jobes, Sidley
Austin (IL), Chicago, IL; Jeffrey R Lilly, Michael R Klatt, Gordon Rees (AUS), Austin, TX; Jennifer A Foster, Nathan
A Huey, Sherry Ann Knutson, Sidley Austin (Chicago), Chicago, IL; John E McElligott, Jr, Davidson Meaux et al,
Lafayette, LA; Lawrence H Cooke, II, Venable (NY), New York, NY; Mary Nold Larimore, Nancy Menard Riddle, Ice
Miller et al, Indianapolis, IN; Neva G Lusk, Spilman Thomas & Battle, Charleston, WV; Rebecca J Schwartz, Scott W
Sayler, Shook Hardy & Bacon (KC), Kansas City, MO; Sandy M Eloranto, Tucker Ellis, Denver, CO; Victoria L Vance,
Tucker Ellis (OH), Cleveland, OH; Amanda Victoria Lopez, Catherine [*14] Valerio Barrad, Sidley Austin (LA), Los
Angeles, CA; E Paige Sensenbrenner, Adams & Reese (NO); Gerald J Corcoran, Montgomery McCracken et al (NJ),
Linwood, NJ; H Douglas Wabner, Fulbright & Jaworski (DAL); Jude Philip Calabrese, Squire Sanders & Dempsey
(OH), Cleveland, OH.

For Takeda Industries Inc, Defendant: Jennifer A Foster, Sidley Austin (Chicago), Chicago, IL.

For Springer Clinic Inc, Defendant: Thomas H Hull, Jr, F Will DeMier, Jeffrey Lee Wilson, Parker Huntington Foster,
Barkley Law Firm, Tulsa, OK.

For Takeda California Inc, formerly known as Takeda San Diego Inc, Defendant: Sara J Gourley, LEAD ATTORNEY,
James W Mizgala, Jana D Jobes, Sidley Austin (IL), Chicago, IL; Sherry Ann Knutson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Jennifer A
Foster, Nathan A Huey, Sidley Austin (Chicago), Chicago, IL; Andrew W Cary, Brett T Moroney, J Dominic
Campodonico, Jack B McCowan, Kai Peters, Gordon & Rees (SF), San Francisco, CA; Bruce Robert Parker, Jason
Charles Rose, Shannon Elizabeth Beamer, Venable (MD), Baltimore, MD; Charles A Deacon, Fulbright & Jaworski
(SA), San Antonio, TX; D'Lesli M Davis, Jonathan B Skidmore, Katherine P Lett, Fulbright & Jaworski (DAL), Dallas,
TX; Dell P Chappell, John D Martin, [*15] Nelson Mullins et al (COL), Columbia, SC; Donna L Boyce, Adams &
Reese (MEM), Memphis, TN; Eben S Flaster, Goodell DeVries et al (PA), Philadelphia, PA; Gerry Lowry, Fulbright &
Jaworski (HOU), Houston, TX; Jaimme Angelle Collins, Megan Haggerty Guy, Kathleen Fontenot Drew, Adams &
Reese (NO), New Orleans, LA; James M Campbell, Campbell Campbell et al (MA), Boston, MA; James A Frederick,
PRO HAC VICE, Michael A Pichini, Goodell DeVries et al, Baltimore, MD; Jeffrey R Lilly, Michael R Klatt, Gordon
Rees (AUS), Austin, TX; John E McElligott, Jr, Davidson Meaux et al, Lafayette, LA; K Michele Anderson, Tucker
Ellis, Denver, CO; Kenneth W DeJean, Office of Kenneth W DeJean, Lafayette, LA; Lawrence H Cooke, II, Venable
(NY), New York, NY; Nancy Menard Riddle, Ice Miller et al, Indianapolis, IN; Neva G Lusk, Spilman Thomas &
Battle, Charleston, WV; Rebecca J Schwartz, Scott W Sayler, Shook Hardy & Bacon (KC), Kansas City, MO; Victoria L
Vance, Tucker Ellis (OH), Cleveland, OH; Amanda Victoria Lopez, Sidley Austin (LA); E Paige Sensenbrenner, Adams
& Reese (NO); Gerald J Corcoran, Montgomery McCracken et al (NJ), Linwood, NJ; Jude Philip Calabrese, Squire
Sanders & Dempsey (OH), Cleveland, [*16] OH.

For Takeda America Holdings Inc, Defendant: Sara J Gourley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Nathan A Huey, Sidley Austin (IL),
Chicago, IL; Dell P Chappell, John D Martin, Nelson Mullins et al (COL), Columbia, SC; Jude Philip Calabrese, Squire
Sanders & Dempsey (OH), Cleveland, OH); Megan Haggerty Guy, Adams & Reese (NO), New Orleans, LA; Sherry
Ann Knutson, Sidley Austin (Chicago), Chicago, IL.

For Alabama C V S Pharmacy L L C, Defendant: J Allen Sydnor, Jr, LEAD ATTORNEY, Huie Fernambucq & Stewart,
Birmingham, AL.

For Warren Clinic Inc, Defendant: Jeffrey Lee Wilson, Parker Huntington Foster, Barkley Law Firm, Tulsa, OK.

For Takeda Development Center Americas Inc, formerly known as Takeda Global Research & Development Center Inc,
Defendant: Sara J Gourley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Nathan A Huey, Sidley Austin (IL), Chicago, IL; E Paige Sensenbren-
ner, Jaimme Angelle Collins, Kathleen Fontenot Drew, Adams & Reese (NO), New Orleans, LA; James M Campbell,
Campbell Campbell et al (MA), Boston, MA; Jennifer A Foster, Sherry Ann Knutson, Sidley Austin (Chicago), Chicago,
IL; Jonathan B Skidmore, Fulbright & Jaworski (DAL), Dallas, TX.

JUDGES: REBECCA F. DOHERTY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HANNA.

OPINION BY: REBECCA F. DOHERTY [*17]

OPINION

MEMORANDUM RULING: JENNIFER SOUTHGATE, PH.D.

This multidistrict litigation arises from product liability claims against the manufacturer and marketer of ActosÆ
and other drugs containing pioglitazone. Pending before this Court is the Defendants' Motion to Exclude Testimony of
Plaintiffs' Expert, Jennifer Southgate , Ph.D.1 For the following reasons, the Defendants' Motion will be denied.

1 Rec. Doc. 3468. This motion has been urged on behalf of all named defendants in this matter. The Memoran-
dum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert Jennifer Southgate, Ph.D. is
found at Rec. Doc. 3468-1 ["Memorandum"]; the Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert Jennifer Southgate, Ph.D. is found at Rec. Doc. 3611
["Opposition"]; and the Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiffs'
Expert Jennifer Southgate, Ph.D. is found at Rec. Doc. 3667 ["Reply"]. For these purposes only, the Court will
make no distinction between and among defendants as, for these purposes, there is no legal distinction.

EVIDENCE AT ISSUE
Dr. Southgate is a molecular biologist [*18] whose specialty includes epithelial cancer cells, molecular carcinogen-
esis, bladder tissue (specifically including PPARs, or peroxisome proliferator-activated receptors). She is the Chair of
Molecular Carcinogenesis at the University of York and the Director of the Jack Birch Unit of Molecular Carcinogene-
sis. She has been designated by the Plaintiffs as an expert with the following areas of expertise: molecular biology/
biologic oncology, epithelial cell biology, bladder carcinogenesis and mechanisms of action with particular expertise in
peroxisome proliferator-activated receptors (PPARs), experimental animal studies and human relevance.
Her Report 2 presents the following conclusions (which this Court interprets as her opinions):

Pioglitazone is a dual agonist and functions to derail the normal homeostatic balance of proliferation
and differentiation in urothelium by interfering with the PPAR-gamma regulated differentiation. Whereas
PPAR-gamma activation can function to promote tumour development in genotoxic carcinogenesis, the
cumulative evidence indicates that as a dual agonist pioglitazone has a far more sinister role as a non-
genotoxic or epigenetic modifier. Thus, by activating [*19] PPAR-alpha+gamma simultaneously, it
rebalances the tumour suppressive differentiated environment of the urothelium towards a tumour-
conducive regenerative environment.
This leaves important implications for the interpretation of the clinical trials. In particular, given that
patients were randomised into the different treatment arms of Takeda's clinical trials, there is no
justification in excluding less than one-year exposure urothelial cancer cases on the basis of biological
implausibility. This is not a classic genotoxic agent and its receptor-mediated effects mean that the
classical dormancy period associated with other cancers (e.g., smoking related cancers), is not relevant
here.
Because the nature of the epigenetic changes associated with non-genotoxic carcinogenesis is that it
involves reprogramming of gene expression, it is possible that any changes to the urothelium are not
simply reversed upon withdrawal of the drug. The implications that this carries for the future risk of
developing urothelial cancer remain to be determined.
In sum, and on the basis of the evidence discussed above, it is my opinion with a reasonable degree
of scientific certainty that pioglitazone causes [*20] bladder cancer in rats and humans. It is also my
 opinion that there are biologically plausible mechanisms by which pioglitazone exerts carcinogenic
effects on the urothelium chiefly through receptor-mediated effects that are relevant in humans. None of
the mechanisms discussed has anything to do with the rat phenomenon known as the "crystal
hypothesis." The lack of scientific rigor and diligence with which Takeda addressed the issue when
brought to their attention by regulators on both sides of the Atlantic is apparent. The ready acceptance of
the crystal hypothesis and the claim of selective PPAR gamma activity (as opposed to dual agonism)
have in fact blinded investigation from other, scientifically valid pathways to bladder cancer in rats and
in humans.3

2 "The Southgate Report" was submitted by the Plaintiffs as Exhibit 1 to the Opposition, and was submitted by
the Defendants as Omnibus Exhibit C13.
3 Southgate Report, at 23.
The Defendants do not challenge, in any way, Dr. Southgate's expertise in the areas for which she has been tendered
as an expert. Furthermore, they do not challenge her qualifications to opine with in the scope of her proffered expertise.
Finally, they do not challenge [*21] the relevance of her opinions. Rather the Defendants have challenged Dr.
Southgate's qualifications and expertise to proffer only one, specific opinion: that "epidemiologic and randomized
clinical data demonstrate that Actos causes bladder cancer in humans.4

4 Memorandum, at 1.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. APPLICABLE LAW
While state law governs the Plaintiffs' claims in this matter, the Federal Rules of Evidence control the admission of
expert testimony.5 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "relevant" evidence is admissible, while irrelevant evidence
not admissible.6 Evidence is "relevant" if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence, and the fact being proven or disproven is of consequence in determining the action.7 The party
seeking to have expert opinion testimony admitted into evidence bears the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the expert's findings and conclusions are based on the scientific method and, therefore, are reliable.
8

5 Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009), citing Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir.
2002).
6 F.R.E. 402.
7 F.R.E. 401.
8 Moore v. Ashland Chemical. Inc.. 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) [*22] (en banc).
The Federal Rules of Evidence require that a judge, faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, must begin
by determining, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to (i) testify to scientific knowledge (ii) that
will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine fact in issue.9 This will require a preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.10 This requirement is found in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which reads as follows in its entirety:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
 (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

9 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796,125 L.Ed.2d 469
(1993).
10 Id., 509 U.S. at 592-93; [*23] Moore, 151 F.3d at 276.
In the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court
acknowledged the existence of a federal court's gatekeeping role with regard to expert scientific opinion testimony,
characterizing that role as one ensuring that such evidence meet the requirements of both reliability and relevance.11
"Reliability" as discussed in Daubert refers to evidentiary reliability, i.e., trustworthiness, rather than scientific
reliability, which asks whether application of the principle produces consistent results, a distinction often blurred by
Defendants' arguments. In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability is based upon scientific validity,
which asks whether the principle supports what it purports to show.12

11 Moore, 151 F.3d at 275.

12 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9.
The objective of this requirement is to make sure that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional
studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert in the relevant field.13 The Supreme Court identified several non-exclusive factors a court [*24]
should consider in determining whether proffered scientific opinion testimony is sufficiently reliable to permit
admission into the record.14 Those factors are:

o whether the expert's theory can be or has been tested;

o whether the theory has been subject to peer review and publication;
o the known or potential rate of error of a technique or theory when applied;
o the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and
o the degree to which the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific communi-
ty.15

Several years later, the Supreme Court clarified when it held the gatekeeping role applied to all types of expert opinion
testimony, not just scientific evidence, and revisited the reliability analysis.16 Moreover, the Supreme Court reiterated
that a court must have considerable leeway in deciding, in a particular case, how to go about determining whether
particular expert testimony is reliable.17 Therefore, the test of reliability is flexible and there is no necessary or
exclusive list of factors that must exist in order for a particular opinion to be admissible.18
Daubert makes clear that the factors it mentions do not constitute a definitive checklist or test. Daubert
[*25] adds that the gatekeeping inquiry must be tied to the facts Of a particular case. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the facts identified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability,
depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.
The conclusion, in our view, is that we can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the
applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so for subsets of cases categorized
by category of expert or by kind of evidence. Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the
particular case at issue.19

13 Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999). See
 also Brown v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.. 705 F.3d 531, 535 (5th Cir. 2013).
14 See discussion, 509 U.S. at 594-595.
15 Moore, 151 F.3d at 275.
16 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141-142.
17 Id. at 152.
18 Id., at 141-142,149.
19 Id., at 150 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In the Fifth Circuit, "[t]o determine whether proffered testimony is reliable, the trial court must make 'a preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology [*26] underlying the testhnony is . . . valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.'"20 Further, "[t]o establish reliability under
Daubert, an expert bears the burden of furnishing 'some objective, independent validation of [his] methodology.'"21 In
doing so, "[t]he expert's assurances that he has utilized generally accepted [principles] is insufficient."22

20 Brown v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.. 705 F.3d 531, 535 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at
592-93).
21 Brown, 705 F.3d at 536 (quoting Moore, 151 F.3d at 276).
22 Id. (quoting Moore, 151 F.3d at 276).
In Brown the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion where an expert testified that offered
opinions were reliable merely upon and because of "education and experience" and did not engage in or rely upon a
credible methodology, particularly in the face of evidence in opposition to those opinions. Standing alone then, it is
insufficient for an expert to base his or her opinion on education and experience alone, especially in the face of evidence
to the contrary.

II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden on this issue, thus, this Court will first [*27] look to Plaintiffs' prima facie
showing. The task for this Court within this Motion, as the gatekeeper, is to determine whether the Plaintiffs' experts
will have the necessary qualifications, employed a required process, methodology, rely upon sufficiently sound
scientific evidence and comport with the inquiry and factors identified in Daubert, within their respective areas of
expertise so as to be allowed to pass the gatekeeper inquiry. The specific analysis of this issue will begin with
consideration of the Plaintiffs' evidence in support of their prima facie case, and then proceed to consideration of the
Defendants' specific challenges.

A. Dr. Southgate's Report, Opinions, and Supporting Evidence

The body of the Southgate Report is 23 pages in length, with an attached list of the 57 references to published
studies and reports upon which she relied in developing her opinions. She also submitted a separate list of the case
materials she reviewed in developing her opinions and producing her report. The Southgate Report contains:

o a description of her qualifications;23

o a brief introduction to the basic facts of the urothelium;24
o a description of the methodology she used in developing [*28] her opinions;25
o her consideration of the published evidence;26
o a discussion of other relevant issues, including the route of exposure, receptor-mediated effects of
pioglitazone, dual agonism of pioglitazone, how the body uses pioglitazone, gender-related differences,
and mutagenicity studies;27
o a description of the biologically-plausible mechanisms that pioglitazone might use to promote
tumor growth; and 28
o her conclusions.29
 23 Southgate Report at 1-4.
24 Id. at 2.
25 Id. at 5.
26 Id. at 6-14.
27 Id. at 14-18.
28 Id. at 18-22.
29 Id. at 23.
This Court has conducted an exhaustive review of the briefs, the exhibits submitted in support of both parties'
arguments, and all studies and reports, including those of Dr. Southgate that are under challenge through the current
motion. This Court finds, as a threshold matter, that Dr. Southgate is qualified to develop the opinions she has reached
in this case, that as a threshold matter, she relied on standards and accepted scientific methods in formulating those
opinions and again, as a threshold matter, the studies, publications and data which she relied upon were sufficiently
reliable as to overcome the Defendant's threshold challenge. In making this [*29] determination, this Court has
considered the five illustrative factors noted below and identified in Daubert and concluded that they either weigh in
favor of the admissibility of Dr. Southgate's opinions and foundational underpinnings, or, alternatively, do not weigh in
favor of the exclusion of the challenged opinions and foundational underpinnings.

B. Rule 702/Daubert Factors

After full review of all argument, evidence and supporting documentation, this Court finds the five factors
identified in Daubert, either weigh in favor of admissibility of Dr. Southgate's causation opinions or do not weigh in
favor of exclusion of the challenged evidence.

o Testability. Dr. Southgate relies heavily on studies that have been published in peer-reviewed
literature. As a threshold matter, the testability of the foundational underpinnings of her theory supports a
finding of admissibility. The fact that Dr. Southgate has not engaged in independent testing of pioglita-
zone in humans, but relies on published studies, is not fatal under the circumstances of this case because
she has used an acceptable methodology of review of otherwise tested and testable studies, and the
underlying foundational undeipinnings [*30] have been tested.
o Peer Review. Dr. Southgate has cited a great many peer-reviewed publications that provide
scientific support for her opinions. While it does not appear that Dr. Southgate's specific opinions in this
case have been subjected to peer review, this Court finds the underlying studies relied upon,
incorporated, and used as foundational support for her conclusions, are and have been sufficiently subject
to peer review and are accepted within the relevant scientific community. The absence of peer review for
Dr. Southgate's opinions, in and of itself, does not invalidate those opinions when otherwise accepted
methodology has been employed to extrapolate information and analysis from peer-review publications.
Dr. Southgate's heavy reliance on identified peer-reviewed publications, studies, and information lend
strong support for the argument in favor of admissibility of her opinion and foundational support for her
conclusions, as a threshold matter.
o Rate of Error. The published studies relied upon by Dr. Southgate have error rates attached to
them and are readily available for review and cross examination. The absence of a rate of error as to her
specific opinions should [*31] not be fatal in light of the availability of such error rates for the
underlying studies on which she relies.
o Standards and Controls. Dr. Southgate is a highly-qualified molecular biologist who has
conducted her investigation and developed her opinions, in this matter, in compliance with the standards
and controls under which she normally operates in her professional life. This Court finds that those
standards and controls lend strong support for the argument of/for reliability of Dr. Southgate's opinions,
as a threshold matter.
o General Acceptance. The Southgate Report provides ample evidence that her methodology is
generally-accepted in the scientific community and that her investigation (while it hasn't been conducted
or replicated by any third party) is consistent with those generally-accepted principles. Dr. Southgate's
process employed, conclusions reached, and opinions posited have been guided by scientifically-
 accepted processes found within the accepted scientific method, and stand upon a foundation of
independent peer-reviewed studies and articles. Consequently, this factor argues for allowing presenta-
tion of Dr. Southgate's opinions to the trier of fact.

This Court notes, [*32] that the Defendants have raised an ipse dixit challenge similar to the one discussed in Brown.
This challenge will be discussed supra. For present purposes, this Court would simply note that the Southgate Report
reveals that Dr. Southgate relies on many studies and publications, as well as extensive data, in reaching each of
opinions. This Court finds that the Plaintiffs have met their prima facie burden of demonstrating, as a threshold matter,
that Dr. Southgate's opinions are admissible.

30 Submitted by the Defendants as Omnibus Exhibit B11.

C. The Defendants' Challenges

As noted above, the Defendants argument is clear that they do not intend to challenge Dr. Southgate, her
qualifications, or her methodology with regard to any opinion that falls within the scope of her expertise for which the
Plaintiffs have proffered her. Rather, they seek to preclude her from testifying that epidemiological data demonstrate
Actos causes bladder cancer in humans. This Court has very carefully reviewed both the Southgate Report and the
Southgate Deposition 30 and has concluded that neither the report nor the deposition establish reason to believe that
either Dr. Southgate or the Plaintiffs have intention [*33] of eliciting testimony from Dr. Southgate about epidemiologi-
cal data and what it does or doesn't show as her opinion. While this conclusion raises a distinction which might not be
an obvious one, this Court directs the parties' attention to the fact that all of Dr. Southgate's discussions are of
epidemiological studies not created by her and their findings, while the Defendants' motion discusses epidemiological
data and what it does or doesn't prove within those studies. A close reading of the briefing on the current motion makes
it rather clear the Defendants want to preclude Dr. Southgate from serving as, in effect, a surrogate expert epidemiolo-
gist, and equally clear that the Plaintiffs do not intend to use Dr. Southgate as a surrogate epidemiologist, having
epidemiologist for that purpose. Plaintiffs do not, from their briefing, in any way, indicate Plaintiffs will elicit testimony
from Dr. Southgate as to epidemiological data and its meaning. Rather, Dr. Southgate might refer to and incorporate
epidemiological studies and publications within her overall opinion -- an accepted practice by experts.
Both Dr. Southgate and the Plaintiffs' counsel have been clear Dr. Southgate is not [*34] an epidemiologist and
neither intends to have her testify as though she had such expertise.31 This Court agrees that, were any effort made to
proffer Dr. Southgate as an epidemiologist, or have her testify as to the underlying epidemiological validity or lack
thereof, of the epidemiological studies she might reference, this Court likely would sustain an objection and preclude
Dr. Southgate from presenting such testimony. The Southgate Report and the Southgate Deposition, however,
demonstrate that epidemiological studies play only two, limited roles in Dr. Southgate's opinions:

o First, Dr. Southgate includes, in the section of her Report where she provides the Court with a general
introduction to PPARs, a description of the findings from four epidemiological studies/clinical trials not
conducted by her. The discussion of these studies seems to illustrate, in part, the role that PPARs play in
bladder cancer in animals and in humans. In this discussion, Dr. Southgate does not discuss the
underlying epidemiological data produced by the authors of the cited studies; she does not conduct an
independent evaluation of the data; and she [*35] does not offer an opinion as to the quality of those
studies. Rather, she reports that she conducted some research in the literature, reports on the existence of
the studies that she located, and reports the findings in those studies. The Defendants have not sought to
exclude such evidence or testimony by Dr. Southgate.
o Second, Dr. Southgate's conclusions contain a brief discussion of the impact that her findings
could be expected to have on clinical studies of pioglitazone. Dr. Southgate opined that, as a result of her
demonstration of a different mechanism by which tumor development could occur -- suggesting that the
classical assumptions about bladder cancer no longer necessarily hold true -- the interpretation of clinical
trials would, necessarily, be impacted. Again, the discussion does not suggest Dr. Southgate intends to
opine as to the proper interpretation or creation of epidemiological data. Her opinion is, rather, that such
interpretations would, in future, necessarily be impacted by her recent discovery of this alternative
mechanism by which bladder tumors can develop. Again, the Defendants have not sought to exclude this
evidence and testimony.
Thus, neither of the discussions [*36] of epidemiological studies found in the Southgate Report fall within the scope of
the Defendants' motion, nor do they suggest that the Plaintiffs intend to present the testimony that the Defendants have
challenged. Consequently, the Court is once again perplexed as to the purpose and argument of Defendants' motion.

31 See Southgate Deposition, at 23, 215.

Additionally, Dr. Southgate's deposition testimony demonstrates:

o she isn't an epidemiologist and can't perforin like one;32

o she is "fairly certain" that the authors of epidemiological studies don't declare causation on the
basis of one study, no matter how strong the evidence;33
o she has been reviewing epidemiological studies for over 30 years as part of her normal research
process, and so is well-trained by long experience to read, understand, and interpret study findings such
as the ones at issue in this case;34 and
o she read studies and took information from them in the form of their findings and results, but did
not conduct any analysis of the underlying data to reach any independent conclusions about what those
data prove or do not prove.35

The record establishes that Dr. Southgate has reviewed published reports of several epidemiological [*37] studies and
that she considered those findings as an important part of the total package of evidence upon which her opinions are
based. It is without dispute experts have the right to consider all different types of facts or data that might impact then
opinions, and Dr. Southgate, in particular as a molecular biologists when exploring causation, certainly may and likely
should rely on or consider all such data other molecular biologists reasonably would rely upon in these circumstances.36
Her descriptions of the role that the epidemiological data played, on their face, demonstrate that her consideration of
that data falls soundly into the accepted role of consideration of data reasonably relied upon pursuant to F.R.E. 703. The
Defendants' arguments have not suggested otherwise, and the Court is perplexed as to the true challenge and nature of
Defendants' objection to Dr. Southgate's actual opinions rendered.

32 Southgate Deposition, at 23-24, 147-49, 215.

33 Id. at 216-17.
34 Id. at 23-24.
35 See, e.g., id. at 148-49, 215.
36 F.R.E. 703.
Dr. Southgate will, therefore, be free to testify as to her research, the findings that she considered, the impact of
those findings on her analysis and her [*38] conclusions, and similar explanations of the role of the epidemiological
studies in assisting her to reach her conclusions. However, Plaintiffs' counsel are cautioned that they are to limit their
questioning to the role that the studies and the study findings played in her analysis and conclusions and not a
discussion of the proper interpretation of the epidemiological data upon which those findings are based. The
Defendants are similarly counseled that, if they attempt to use the questioning of Dr. Southgate as an method of attack
on the Plaintiffs' epidemiological evidence generally, they likely will have opened the door to precisely the type of
questioning that they seek to exclude in the current motion.

III. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

The Defendants requested this Court agree to hear live testimony from the experts prior to ruling on the instant
motion; this Court carefully considered the Defendants' request. The decision of how to go about ruling on the instant
motion is squarely within this Court's discretion.

The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert's reliability, and to
decide whether and when special briefing or other proceedings are needed [*39] to investigate
reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether or not that expert's relevant testimony is reliable. Our
 opinion in Joiner makes clear that a court of appeals is to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when it
reviews a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony. That standard applies as much to the
trial court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion. Otherwise, the trial
judge would lack the discretionary authority needed both to avoid unnecessary "reliability" proceedings
in ordinary cases where the liability of an expert's methods is properly taken for granted, and to require
appropriate proceedings in the less usual or more complex cases where cause for questioning the expert's
reliability arises. Indeed, the Rules seek to avoid unjustifiable expense and delay as part of their search
for truth and the just determination of proceedings.37

37 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152-53 (emphasis in original) (citations and quotations omitted).
This Court reviewed the extensive briefing provided by both parties, as well as the large number of exhibits,
including expert reports, depositions, and other documents, and concluded [*40] the nature of the challenges presented
and the arguments made did not illustrate a need for live testimony. Live testimony would not be likely to contribute to
any greater understanding of the nature of the dispute than can be and has been found in a careful reading and analysis
of the briefs and accompanying evidence and documentation. The request for an opportunity to present live testimony in
an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' Motion to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert, Jennifer Southgate,
Ph.D., shall be DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 6 day of January, 2014.
/s/ Rebecca F. Doherty
REBECCA F. DOHERTY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ORDER
Considering the Memorandum Ruling signed the 6th day of January, 2014.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Defendants' Motion to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert, Jennifer Southgate ,
Ph.D., [Rec. Doc. 3468] is hereby DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 6 day of January, 2014.
/s/ Rebecca F. Doherty
REBECCA F. DOHERTY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE