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PAUL DE MAN
of the same substance as the fire of the stars"' has now been
split in fragmentsthat are " nothingbut the historicalformof the
alienation (Entfremdung) between man and his works (seine
Gebilden) ." And the followingtextcould take its place among the
greatelegiac quotationsof the earlynineteenthcentury:" The epic
individual, the hero of the novel, originatesin the alienation from
the outside world. As long as the world is inwardlyone, no real
qualitative distinctionsoccur among its inhabitants;theremay well
be heroes and scoundrels,worthymen and criminals,but the great-
est hero only risesby a head's lengthabove his fellow-men, and the
noble words of the wise can be understoodeven by the fools. The
autonomyof inwardnessbecomespossible and necessaryonly when
the differences betweenmen have grownto be an unbreachablegap;
when the gods have grown silent and no sacrificeor prayeris ca-
pable of loosening their tongues; when the world of action loses
contact with that of the self, leaving man empty and powerless,
unable to grasp the real meaning of his deeds . . .: when inward-
ness and adventureare foreverdistinct." We are much closerhere
to Schillerthan to Marx.
A definitelypost-Hegelianelement is introducedwith Lukacs's
insistenceon the need fortotalityas the inner necessitythat shapes
all worksof art. The unityof the Hellenic experienceof the world
has a formalcorrelativein the creationof closed, total forms,and
this desire for totalityis an inherentneed of the human mind. It
persistsin modern,alienated man, but instead of fulfillingitselfin
the mere expressionof his given unitywith the world, it becomes
instead the statementof an intentto retrievethe unityit no longer
possesses. Clearly,Lukacs's idealized fictionof Greece is a device to
state a theoryof consciousnessthat has the structureof an inten-
tional movement. This implies, in turn, a presuppositionabout
the nature of historicaltime,to which we will have to returnlater.
Lukacs's theoryof the novel emergesin a cogent and coherent
way out of the dialectic between the urge for totalityand man's
alienated situation. The novel becomes " the epic of a world from
which God has departed" (p. 87). As a result of the separation
between our actual experience and our desire, any attempt at a
total understandingof our being will stand in contrastto actual
experience,which is bound to remain fragmentary, particularand
1All quotations from Die Theorie des Romans, Zweite Auflage, Berlin 1963.
The firstedition is from 1920.
For this reason, Lukacs can state that irony actually provides the
means by which the novelist transcends,within the form of the
work, the avowed contingencyof his condition. "In the novel,
ironyis the freedomof the poet in relation to the divine . . . for
it is by means of ironythat,in an intuitivelyambiguous vision,we
can perceivedivine presencein a world forsakenby the gods." This
concept of irony as the positive power of an absence also stems
directlyfromLukacs's idealist and romanticancestors;it revealsthe
influenceof FriedrichSchlegel,of Hegel and most of all of Hegel's
contemporarySolger. Lukacs's originalityresidesin his use of irony
as a structuralcategory.
For if irony is indeed the determiningand organizingprinciple
of the novel's form,then Lukacs is indeed freeinghimselffrom
preconceivednotions about the novel as an imitation of reality.
Irony steadilyunderminesthis claim at imitation and substitutes
for it a conscious,interpretedawarenessof the distance that sepa-
rates an actual experience fromthe understandingof this experi-
ence. The ironiclanguage of thenovel mediatesbetweenexperience
and desire,and unitesideal and real withinthe complexparadox of
the form. This formcan have nothingin commonwith the homo-
geneous, organic formof nature: it is founded on an act of con-
sciousness,not on the imitationof a natural object. In the novel
. . . the relationshipof the parts to the whole, although it tries
to come as close as possible to being an organic relationhip,is in
fact an ever-suspendedconceptual relationship,not a trulyorganic
one" (p. 74). Lukacs comes veryclose, in statementsof this kind,
to reachinga point fromwhich a genuine hermeneuticof the novel
could start.
His own analysis,however,seemsto move in a different direction;
the second part of the essay contains a sharp critical rejection of
the kind of inwardnessthat is associatedwith a hermeneutictheory
of language. In the 1961 prefacewhichLukacs added to the recent
reissue of his essay,he scornfullyrefersto the phenomenological
approach as a " right-wing epistemology,"that runs counterto left-
wing ethics. This criticismwas alreadyimplicitin the originaltext.
When he comes closestto dealing with contemporarydevelopments
in the novel and with momentsin which the novel itselfseems to
become consciousof its real intent,a revealingshiftin the argument
takes place. He shows us, convincinglyenough, how inwardness
for its own sake can lead to an evasion of the novel into a falsely
Utopian realm "a Utopia which, from the start,has a bad con-
scienceand a knowledgeof its own defeat" (p. 119). The romantic
novel of disillusion (Desillusions-romantik)is the example of this
distortionof the genre, in which the novel loses contact with em-
pirical reality;Lukacs is thinkingof Novalis, who was attackedin
similar termsin an essay fromthe earlier book Die Seele und die
Formen, but he also gives examples fromJacobsen'sNiels Lyhne
and Gontcharov'sOblomov. He fullyrealizes,however,that these
examples do not account for other developments in European
fictionin which the same themeof disillusion is obviouslypresent
and which he neither can nor wishes to dismiss. Flaubert's
SentimentalEducation, of course, is the most strikinginstance,a
trulymodern novel shaped by the overpoweringnegativityof an
almostobsessiveinwardnessbut whichnevertheless, in Lukacs's own
judgment,represents the highestachievement of the genre in the
nineteenth century. What is present in Flaubert's Sentimental
Education that saves it frombeing condemned togetherwith other
post-romantic novels of inwardness?
At this momentin the argument,Lukacs introducesan element
that had not been explicitlymentioned up till now: temporality.
In the 1961 Preface,he points withpride to the original use of the
categoryof time, at a moment when Proust's novel was not yet
known to the public. For the decadent and belated romantic,time
is experiencedas pure negativity;the inward action of the novel
is a hopeless "battle against the erosive power of time." But in
Flaubert, according to Lukacs, this is preciselynot the case. In
spite of the hero's continuous defeats and disappointments,time
triumphsas a positive principle in the SentimentalEducation, be-
cause Flaubert succeeds in recapturingthe irresistiblefeeling of
flowthat characterizesBergsonianduree. " It is time which makes
possible this victory. The uninterruptedand irrepressibleflow of
time is the unifyingprinciple that gives homogeneityto the dis-
jointed parts,by puttingthemin a relationshipthat,althoughirra-
tional and ineffable,is neverthelessone of unity. Time gives order
to the randomagitationof men and confersupon it the appearance
of organic growth. .." (p. 128). On the level of true temporal
experience,the ironic discontinuitiesvanish and the treatmentof
time itself,in Flaubert,is no longer ironic.
Can we admit Lukacs's interpretationof the temporalstructure
of the SentimentalEducation? When Proust, in a polemical ex-
Cornell University