Civil Law Review 1 | A.Y. 2019-2020 | Case Digest - Supplementary - Art.

1-36

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY

WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided . . .;"
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the
Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme
Court in Tañada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed
that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership";
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation
could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals
are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly"; and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be
amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it
is otherwise provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines,"
and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official
Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty-seven.

When shall law take effect?

1. 15 days following the completion of their publication in either:
a. Official Gazette
b. Newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
c. Unless otherwise provided

Why the change?

—because of Official Gazette’s erratic release and limited readership
—newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the
people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly.

De Roy vs CA
(Prospectivity of laws)

Facts:
Firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of private respondents (PRs), resulting in injuries to PRs and the death of Marissa

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Bernal (daughter). PRs had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the PRs failed to do so.

RTC— found petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to PRs
IAC— affirmed RTC’s decision
On Sept. 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), which was eventually denied by the CA.

Issue:
WON IAC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners’ motion for extension of time
to file MR?

Held:
No. IAC correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. vs Japzon that the 15-day period
for appealing or for filing a MR cannot extended. In its Resolution denying the MR, promulgated on July
30, 1986, the Court en banc restated and clarified the rule that beginning 1 month from promulgation of
the Resolution (July 30, 1986), no motion for extension of time to file an MR may be filed with MeTC/
MTC/RTC/IAC. Such motion may be filed only in cases pending w/ SC as the court of last resort, w/c
may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
Bacaya vs IAC explained the operation of the grace period. There is a 1-month grace period from the
promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court’s Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June
30, 1986, w/in w/c the rule barring extensions of the time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration
is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
In the instant case, petitioners’ motion for extension of time was filed on Sept. 9, 1987, more than a year
after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. hence, it is no longer w/in the coverage of the
grace period.

On the contention of petitioners that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette —
there is no law requiring the publication of SC decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding
and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law to
keep abreast of the decisions of SC particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in advance reports of SC decisions and SCRA and law journals.

Topic(s) covered:
Art. 2 — Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette, or in newspaper of general circulation in the PH, unless it is otherwise provided.
Art. 4 — Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.

Abunado vs People
(Prejudicial Question)

Facts:
Salvador Abunado married Zenaida Binas in 1955 and they separated in 1966. He contracted a second
marriage to Narcisa Arcena in 1966 then Narcisa went to Japan. While Narcisa was in Japan, he married
Zenaida for the second time in 1989.
Narcisa came home in 1992 and discovered Salvador’s affair with Fe Corazon Palto and his second
marriage to Zenaida. The event was followed by Salvador’s filing of an annulment case and the other
hand, Narcisa filed for bigamy against Salvador.
In his defense, Salvador contended that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida and that the
bigamy case should be suspended since the annulment case is prejudicial.

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Issue:
Is the resolution of the annulment case a requisite for the bigamy case to prosper?

Held:
Annulment has no bearing upon determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in bigamy. The only
requirement for bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting when the second marriage was
contracted.
Even void and voidable marriages shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise by the Court.
Salvador’s marriages to Zenaida and Narcisa are both subsisting, which makes him guilty of bigamy.
A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action considering that a crime is committed
against the state. Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced by even a civic-spirited citizen who
may come to know of it.

Cojuangco vs Palma
(Prejudicial Question)

Facts:
• The complainant Eduardo Cojuangco is a client of ACCRA, (Angara Concepcion Regala and Cruz
Law Offices  ) w h o a s s i g n e d t h e c a s e t o A t t y. P a l m a , t h e r e s p o n d e n t . T h e
f o r m e r h i r e d t h e l a t t e r a s h i s p e r s o n a l c o u n s e l f o r h i s business. Atty. Palma
becomes very close to the family of Cojuangco, and he dines and goes with them
abroad. He even tutored, complainant’s 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco
(Lisa), 22 years of age.
• On June 22, 1982, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong without the knowledge of
the complainant and despite the facts that the former is already m a r r i e d a n d w i t h
three (3) children.
• In the celebration of respondent’s marriage with Lisa he misrepresented himself as a bachelor.
• On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage.
• Subsequently complainant filed a disbarment complaint on the ground of grave abuse
and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
• Respondent in his answer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of  action. As he contends
that complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation
of his lawyer’s oath.
• On March 23, 1983, the case was referred to the OSG
• Dec 28, 1983,the 1st division of this court declared the marriage between respondent and Lisa null
and void ab initio;
• On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings on
the ground that the final outcome of Civil Case No. Pq0401-P poses a prejudicial question to the
disbarment proceeding. It was denied.
• Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Restraining
Order.   In the Resolution dated December 19, 1984, we enjoined the OSG from continuing the
investigation of the disbarment proceedings.
• (1998)The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines  Commission  on  Bar  Discipline. Commissioner issued the following order:
Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending and as a practical
measure to ease the backlog of this Commission, the parties shall within ten (10) days
from notice, manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case or
supervening events have transpired which render this case moot and academic or
otherwise, this case shall be deemed closed and terminated.
• complainant manifested and confirmed his continuing interest in prosecuting his complaint for
disbarment against respondent.

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• On March 20, 2003, the IBP Commissioner submitted a Report and Recommendation finding
respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer and
recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.



The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and Recommendation, but
reduced the penalty of suspension to only one (1) year.

Issue:

WON the civil case (validity of his marriage to Lisa) poses a prejudicial question to the present
disbarment proceeding. (There are other issues but kani raman siguro related sa atong topic. Huhu)

Held:
NO. A subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment
proceeding. For it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court
into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative
of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect
its course, then the judgment of annulment of respondents marriage does not also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof --- clear preponderance of evidence ---
in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches. Furthermore,
although his previous marriage was annulled, it cannot erase the betrayal of trust and abuse of
confidence he committed against complainant.

Pimentel vs Pimentel
(Prejudicial Question)

Facts:
Maria Chrysantine Pimentel (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against
Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner) before the RTC QC on October 25,2004.
Petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC Antipolo, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC QC on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender
and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the case filed in RTC Antipolo would have a
bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC QC.
The RTC QC held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question.
Petitioner filed a MR. RTC QC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA dismissed the petition.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC.

Issue:
W/N the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner?

Held:
NO. Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide.
Under the Criminal procedure, prejudicial question has 2 elements, to wit;
1. the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and
2. the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Basically, the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. Here, the criminal
case was filed first before the civil action.

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There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists
in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim.
In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all
the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. Thus, even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is annulled by RTC Antipolo, petitioner could still be held criminally liable, since at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
The reliance of the petitioner on the case of Tenebro v. Court of Appeals is of no moment. The said case
states that the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned. However it cannot applied in the present case because first, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of
the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case.
Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that there is a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that
case that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is
of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.

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