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By invitation--NATO's future: Growing the alliance

Javier Solana Madariaga. The Economist. London: Mar 13, 1999. Vol. 350, Iss. 8110; pg. 23, 3 pgs

Abstract (Summary)
As a geopolitical landmark, its significance can hardly be overstated - the admission to the Atlantic alliance of the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, which was due to be formalized on March 12, six weeks before the summit
to celebrate NATO's 50th anniversary. It means that in the new Europe, destiny is no longer determined by
geography. It signals the return of a Europe of sovereign and self-confident nations. The NATO summit on April 23
will demonstrate that NATO's adaptation to change throughout the 1990s has been something more than a reactive
process, or a scramble to ensure a soft landing after the cold war. The summit will show the policies and initiatives
NATO set on track throughout this decade were not quick fixes, but investments in its collective ability to meet the
challenges of the 21st century. Some features of today's alliance must be consolidated: 1. North America and
Europe must remain linked in security. 2. There is a need to develop, in concrete ways, a more robust European
personality in security matters. 3. NATO will have to continue its policy of enlargement.

Full Text (2574 words)

Copyright Economist Newspaper Group, Incorporated Mar 13, 1999

[Headnote]
Javier Solana, secretary-general of NATO, argues that the alliance's expansion will help to reshape Europe's security system
for the 21st century

[Photograph]
The newcomers smarten up

AS A geopolitical landmark, its significance can hardly be overstated-the admission to the Atlantic alliance of the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, which was due to be formalised on March 12th, six weeks before the summit
to celebrate NATO'S 50th anniversary.

It means that in the new Europe, destiny is no longer determined by geography. It signals the return of a Europe of
sovereign and self-confident nations, which are no longer the object of other countries' ambitions, but determine
their own fate. It means that Europe is growing togetherand that this process is now irreversible.

The accession to NATO of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland is only one aspect of Europe's wider
transformation-a transformation which the Atlantic alliance has helped push forward and which has, in turn,
significantly influenced NATO'S own evolution. As part of this transformation, we at NATO have developed solid ties
with nations across the whole of Europe; we have launched an ongoing NATO enlargement process; we have
established new relations with Russia and Ukraine; and we have engaged in a dialogue with nations from the
southern Mediterranean region. Last but not least, we have engaged ourselves-politically and militarily-in resolving
the conflicts in the Balkans.

None of these steps was taken without intense debate, sometimes even controversy. Whether we were discussing
enlargement, Russia, Bosnia or Kosovo, no decision was made lightly. We knew that without the political and
military compass of the cold war, our decisions had an element of improvisation. We knew that, in such a period of
change and uncertainty, no nation and no institution could claim a monopoly on wisdom. And we knew that no
grand theory would guide us through these uncharted waters.

Indeed, had we listened to theory, we would not have come half as far. Theory told us that NATO enlargement and

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a NATo-Russia relationship would be mutually exclusive goals. Practice proved otherwise. Theory said that NATO
acting "out-ofarea" would be legally impossible and politically dangerous. Again, practical experience in Bosnia
proved otherwise.

In essence, throughout the 1990s, theory was following practice-not vice-versa. But now we have an opportunity to
bring theory and practice back together again. Our summit in Washington on April 23rd will demonstrate that
NATO's adaptation to change throughout the 1990s has been something more than a reactive process, or a
scramble to ensure a "soft landing" after the cold war. On the contrary, NATO has been actively preparing for the
future. As the summit will show, the policies and initiatives NATO set on track throughout this decade were not
quick fixes, but investments in our collective ability to meet the challenges of the 21st century. What initally may
have looked like a set of random initiatives is now coming together to form a coherent whole: a set of instruments
tailored to shape the security environment for many years to come.

In short, the summit will demonstrate that at 50-after 40 years of east-west standoff and one post-cold war decade-
NATO is now positioning itself to be a promoter of security, as well as a guarantor against aggression. To play such
an ambitious role requires vision and self-confidence. NATO has both; it remains the cornerstone of transatlantic
security, and it has a longterm strategic agenda for a long-term strategic alliance.

If NATO is to play this role in the 21st century, however, there are some features of today's alliance that we must
consolidate, and others that we must develop. First, North America and Europe must remain linked in security. The
transatlantic relationship remains the most successful example of a community of shared values and interests, and
of pragmatic problem-solving. North America and Europe have all the ingredients for a successful security policy in
the modern age: a strong commitment to democratic values, a penchant for economic innovation and competition-
coupled with generosity towards less fortunate neighbours-and effective military tools to cope with new challenges.
With this combination of assets, NATO can assist in establishing a democratic and prosperous Eastern Europe,
binding Russia into the European security system, promoting stability and confidence in the Mediterranean,
preventing and managing regional conflicts, and coping with other new challenges such as the proliferation of
deadly weapons.

Second, we will need to develop, in concrete ways, a more robust European personality in security matters. A self-
confident, more mature Europe will be a more useful security partner to North America. A Europe capable of
coherent military action is a precondition for the alliance's long-term health. NATo's efforts to build a European
Security and Defence Identity within the alliance must come to fruition; for NATO'S European members, the option
of drawing upon NATo's assets and capabilities for European-led peacekeeping and crisis-management missions
must become real, not remain hypothetical.

The initiative launched by the United Kingdom and France at their summit in St Malo last December has put the
European Defence and Security Identity at the top of the political agenda in the European Union as well as in
NATO. It is essential that this political impetus be followed up by concrete proposals, particularly as to how the EU
and NATO will work together on the security issues of the future.

Keeping the door open

Third, NATO will have to continue its policy of enlargement. In this way, we can continue to encourage both good-
neighbourly relations and broader reform efforts in a number of Central and Eastern European countries as they
prepare themselves for possible NATO membership. Keeping this powerful incentive for reform alive will mean
maintaining the momentum of the enlargement process, through a credible "open door" policy. This policy must
strike a balance between ensuring NATO'S effectiveness, the legitimate aspirations of the new democracies, and
overall security and stability in Europe.

Just a few years ago, NATO enlargement was one of the most hotly debated issues at security-policy conferences
and in newspapers such as The Economist. Claims were made that opening the alliance to the new democracies of
the east would weaken NATO'S security core, draw new dividing lines in Europe and permanently alienate Russia.
Some even predicted a new syndrome of confrontation in Europe. As we prepare to welcome the three new
members to our Brussels headquarters on March 16th, it is fair to say that none of these dire predictions has come
true. The three new members have already demonstrated that they take the burdens as well as the benefits of
NATO membership seriously. They have been active and constructive participants in meetings of the North Atlantic
Council, and have made enormous strides in restructuring their armed forces and bringing them under civilian
control. Moreover, whenever NATO has needed their help, for instance in deploying forces to help bring peace to
Bosnia or Kosovo, they have been among the first to make their contribution. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that
bigger means weaker, or that an enlarged alliance will necessarily be less cohesive or capable of effective action.

It is equally difficult to argue today that NATo's first post-cold war enlargement has created new dividing lines.

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Rather the entry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic has built bridges, connecting NATO to the states that
lie farther to the east. Nine countries in this region wish to become members of NATO and virtually all countries in
the Euro-Atlantic area, whether candidates or not, have continued to take advantage of the many opportunities for
practical co-operation in our Partnership for Peace. Enlargement has not been a zerosum game in which more
security for some is bought at the price of less security for others. All have benefited from NATo's greater presence
at the very heart of Europe. A successful first round of enlargement will also create the best conditions for other
rounds in the future. In the meantime, co-operation between NATo and non-NATO countries must deepen further.
If future crises and conflicts are to be tackled by a wider coalition of NATo allies and partners, we need
mechanisms to set up such coalitions rapidly and effectively. For these reasons, NATo's policy of partnership and
outreach will continue, moving on from dialogue and confidence-building to practical, operational issues.

Nor has NATO'S enlargement led to the isolation of Russia that many feared. When we took the decision to invite
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO at Madrid in July 1997, we had already signed the NATo-
Russia Founding Act with President Boris Yeltsin in Paris six weeks earlier. The relationship that we have
developed since then confirms that both Russia and NATO see a strategic interest in talking to each other, and in
developing practical co-operation. Even at moments when we have had major disagreements, such as during the
Kosovo crisis, Russia has sent its envoys to meetings at NATO and has preferred to try to convince us of its
position rather than walk away from the process. I see this as an encouraging sign.

Moreover, NATO has repeatedly reassured Russia that its forthcoming enlargement will not jeopardise the strategic
situation in Europe. NATO has ruled out the permanent stationing of substantial numbers of forces or of nuclear
weapons on the territory of its new members. Instead, it will defend them, if need be, with reinforcements from the
existing members. In addition, the allies are working hard in Vienna to conclude a revised treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe which will give Russia substantial guarantees that its legitimate security interests are being
respected.

The Russian Federation has to be included in building security in Europe. Russia will probably remain a country of
contradictions-but nevertheless we must build on all the possibilities for co-operation that exist and prevent our
disagreements from turning into crises. Manifestly, a close NATO-Russia relationship will not mean agreement in
each and every case. We must achieve a mature and pragmatic relationship where disagreement in one area does
not prevent progress in another. Such a relationship is already within reach. Our common interests in areas such
as managing regional crises, discussing terrorism, coping with natural disasters or preventing proliferation are clear.
The stage is set for a pragmatic, strategic partnership to emerge.

Bosnia and beyond

A fourth key role for NATO will be to establish long-term stability in the Balkans. The former Yugoslavia is one area
of Europe where the end of the cold war has not brought about the general trend towards openness, democracy
and integration that we have seen elsewhere. Ending this anomaly will mean looking beyond the timeframe of
NATO'S Stabilisation Force in Bosnia. Once the parties realise that settling differences peacefully and
democratically really is the only viable option, then Bosnia and other countries in the region will have the right to
the fullest integration into the international community. We need a "partnership for prosperity" in the Balkans.

In Kosovo, where the world community is facing humanitarian, political and legal dilemmas, a solution must be
found that allows the Kosovar Albanians more autonomy within the confines of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
In finding such a solution, we must avoid a situation where moral considerations are pitted against international law.
And we must remember that a security policy that does not take as its point of reference the needs of humanity
risks suffering the worst possible fate-a slide into irrelevance.

In Kosovo's immediate neighbourhood, NATO has helped to provide stability, as well as assistance in coping with
refugees, to both Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The latter country is hosting a NATO
extraction force, ready to support the verification mission deployed in Kosovo by the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. Hopefully, the prospect of long-term stability, coupled with the desire for economic benefits,
will draw the entire Balkans back into the European mainstream. The alliance will be ready to assist this return.

A fifth and final task for NATO will be to cope with future dangers which may threaten European security, while
originating beyond Europe. Chief among these is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means
of delivery. As recent examples show, the proliferation of non-conventional weapons (nuclear, chemical or
biological) could emerge as one of the greatest security challenges of the next decade. Such weapons can pose a
big risk to our national territories and populations, as well as to our troops deployed on peace-support operations.

To deal with all these challenges, there is a need for further improvements in the inter-operability and sustainability

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of alliance forces. In future, the military forces of NATO allies will need to be on the same wavelength, able to move
effectively and quickly, to communicate with one another-service to service, as well as ally to ally-in a world where
information technologies are becoming part of the modern soldier's basic kit. The Strategic Defence Review,
adopted by the British government last July, is a coherent and forward-looking blueprint for the structural reforms
and procurement priorities that all allies will need to embrace. The future of NATO lies in having rapidly deployable
capabilities to fulfil an increasing range of missions.

The Washington summit will address all ofthese issues. In addition to welcoming our three new members, we will
unveil a package of measures to help prepare future aspirants and deepen our relations with partner countries. We
will launch a new effort to share information about the spread of weapons of mass destruction and stem their
proliferation. And there will be an initiative to maintain NATO'S military excellence by boosting our forces' ability to
communicate with one another and sustain longer military operations.

All these points will be embedded in a revised Strategic Concept. This document will confirm the allies' commitment
to the core function of collective defence, and the transatlantic link. But it will also provide a synthesis of NATO'S
many political and structural innovations with its enduring tasks and principles. The concept will define the balance
between NATO's traditional role of collective defence and its new roles in crisis management. It will recognise that
major aggression against an ally is very unlikely in the current and foreseeable strategic environment, but the
security of the Euro-Atlantic area remains subject to a wide variety of unpredictable risks. Developments outside
NATO territory could still threaten the allies' security, and they may choose to respond collectively.

The document will also emphasise that NATO should act only where it really can offer added value; it should not
take on the role of global policeman. At the same time, the importance of adequate military strength and a clear will
to act collectively will be reaffirmed. In short, the summit will draw the individual items on NATO'S agenda into a
single, coherent framework.

Which brings us back to enlargement. It may be tempting to see the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland mainly as a righting of historical wrongs, as the final step in overcoming the division of Europe which
followed the Yalta agreement in 1945 and Stalin's imposition of an iron curtain in the heart of Europe. Yet such a
view would miss the real significance of enlargement-which lies not only in correcting past injustices but in
preparing for a common future.

[Photograph]
Putting them through their paces: an American-Polish war game

[Author Affiliation]
Javier Solana Madariaga, a former Spanish foreign minister, has held NATO's top political post since December 1995. He has
played a lead

[Author Affiliation]
ing role in the Bosnian peace process and also in NATO's expansion.

Indexing (document details)

Subjects: Alliances, National security, Manycountries, Expansion
Classification Codes 9175, 9190, 9176, 9550
Locations: Europe, US, Eastern Europe
Companies: NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Author(s): Javier Solana Madariaga
Author Affiliation: Javier Solana Madariaga, a former Spanish foreign minister, has held NATO's top political post since
December 1995. He has played a lead

ing role in the Bosnian peace process and also in NATO's expansion.
Document types: Feature
Publication title: The Economist. London: Mar 13, 1999. Vol. 350, Iss. 8110; pg. 23, 3 pgs
Source type: Periodical
ISSN: 00130613
ProQuest document ID: 39755127

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Text Word Count 2574

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