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JEWISH POLITICAL THEORY - HILKHOT MELAKHIM

SHIUR #1: The Commandment to Appoint a King

by Rav Mosheh Lichtenstein

With the establishment of the Jewish state, the nation of Israel has been confronted by the
challenge of establishing practical rules and regulations for many areas of Halakha which
were for thousands of years totally theoretical. The need to transform entire areas of
Halakha from the realm of the ideal to the practical world has re-invigorated the halakhic
debate regarding these disciplines, as the practical realities involved in the new situation
rise to the fore, requiring a re-examination and issuance of guidelines which can satisfy
both the halakhic and practical needs.

One of these areas is the issue of government. Aside from scattered remarks in various
sources, the only systematic exposition of the laws pertaining to Jewish government is the
Rambam's Hilkhot Melakhim (Laws of Kings and their Wars). Though the Torah devoted
an entire section to the laws of kingdom, subsequent discussions in Chazal (the Talmudic
Sages) still leave many issues, some of which have attracted much attention in our times,
unresolved.

This series of shiurim will attempt to deal with the various issues relating to Jewish
government as recognized by Halakha. Starting from the biblical sources and working
our way down to modern poskim (halakhic authorities), we will concern ourselves with
the system as developed by Chazal and with its applications to our current-day realities.
[At this point, it is only proper that we acknowledge our debt to an outstanding secondary
source, Prof. G. Blidstein's "Ekronot Medini'im be-Mishnato shel Ha-Rambam," which
provided much needed sources and organization in this uncharted field.]

The starting point for our discussion must obviously be the section in Sefer Devarim
which deals with the appointment of a king by the people of Israel. In a famous passage,
the Torah states: "You shall appoint yourselves a king" (Devarim 17:15), after which it
details the halakhot regulating royal policy and behavior.

The most fundamental question relating to these verses (pesukim) is whether the
statement regarding the appointment of a king - "Som tasim alekha melekh" - is an
imperative command, establishing the fact that there is a positive commandment (a
mitzva) to appoint a king, or is the Torah only regulating the conduct of a potential ruler,
should the people of Israel appoint one of their own accord? The gemara (Sanhedrin 20b)
registers a machloket (dispute) between the Tannaim on this issue. R. Yehuda and R.
Yossi claim that the appointment of a king is a positive command, imperative on the
people of Israel upon entry into Eretz Yisrael, while R. Nehorai is of the opinion that the
Torah doesn't require a monarchial system at all, and that all the laws relating to royal
affairs are no more than the recognition and regulation of a pre-existing state of affairs.
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Most Rishonim (medieval Sages) accept the majority position that a monarchy is the
desired form of government, with the notable exception of the Abarbanel (Don Yitzchak
Abarbanel, 15th century, Spain) who forcefully argues against this position. (See his
commentary on the section in Devarim and his introduction to Sefer Shemuel.)

In analyzing this machloket, we must first undertake to understand the opinion of those
who reject the monarchial system. Are they denying that the Torah has taken an interest
in any form of government or are they merely unaccepting of monarchy as the desired
form of government? For, actually, there are two separate issues which confront us here.

A) Does the Torah have anything to say about forms of human government or not? Is the
regulation and organization of society a concern of the Torah or does it consider these to
be practical matters of human convenience which Divine Wisdom need not concern itself
with? B) Even if we accept the premise that the Torah interests itself with practical
human affairs, it must still be decided which of the various forms of government the
Torah chose, and whether monarchy is indeed the desired system.

Obviously, R. Yossi and R. Yehuda, the Rambam (R. Moshe ben Maimon, 12th century,
Egypt) and Sefer HaChinukh (author unknown, 13th century, Spain) and all those
commentators who are of the opinion that there is a mitzva to appoint a king, answer both
of these questions in the affirmative. Implied in their opinion are both the fact that the
Torah involves itself in the regulation of human affairs and that it chose to endorse
monarchy as the proper form of government.

Rejection, though, of EITHER of these two premises will result in the opinion that the
Torah does not mandate the appointment of a king. Therefore, R. Nehorai's dissenting
view that the Torah did not require the people of Israel to anoint a king can be understood
as expressing total detachment from political affairs or as a more limited position which
argues only that the Torah is unwilling to accept the specific form of monarchial
government as being preferable to other alternatives.

Though the sources don't provide much help in resolving this safek (doubt), it would
seem that the latter alternative should be adopted. The Torah constantly involves itself
with human affairs and devotes much space to mitzvot whose purpose is to regulate
various aspects of human society. Moreover, a considerable amount of the Torah itself
revolves around the political situation current in the time of the Nevi'im (prophets). To
assume apathy towards the political system which is the fundamental regulatory
mechanism of human society seems to run counter to the entire grain of Torah and
mitzvot. Therefore, it would seem that all agree that the Torah requires good government.

[The Rambam, who admittedly cannot serve as an indicator since he holds that the
appointment of a king is a mitzva, describes the regulation of human affairs as one of the
Torah's two primary goals, albeit the lesser one (Guide of the Perplexed III:27; see also
II:40): "The Law as a whole aims at two things: the welfare of the soul and the welfare of
the body ... [t]he second aim is prior in nature and time. The latter aim consists in the
governance of the city and the well-being of the states of all its people ... [A]n individual
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can only attain [the things needed for the governance of his body] through a political
association, it being already known that man is political by nature." Nevertheless, his
overall claim rings true and seems in accordance with the Torah's general direction.]

Moreover, we must examine the situation in the pesukim. The pesukim in Sefer Devarim
are phrased in a style similar to so many other mitzvot detailed in Devarim, "Ki tavo ...
som tasim," – when you arrive in the land, the following must be done. "Som tasim" is
formulated in lashon tzivui, the imperative mode. This would seem to imply that there is
a mitzva to appoint a king. On the other hand, though, there are numerous indications in
Tanakh that the request for a king was frowned upon, both by leaders such as Gidon and
Shemuel, and by God Himself who told Shemuel that the appointment of a king is
tantamount to rejection ("me'isa") of Him. (See Shoftim 8:22-23 and Shemuel 8:1-22.)
Actually, the pesukim in Devarim also present the need to appoint a king as a function of
pressure from the people ("ve-amarta asima alai melekh") rather than initiated from
above. R. Nehorai's solution to these conflicting signals, based upon our previous
analysis, is quite simple. The Torah endorses and commands shilton but not melukha, i.e.
establishing a government is a mitzva (unlike the negative state of anarchy described in
Sefer Shoftim as "everyone did as he pleased"), but the specific form of the governing
body is not mandated by the Torah. The word melekh in thpasuk is thereby interpreted as
malkhut – government.

R. Yehuda and R. Yossi disagree with R. Nehorai and claim that the Torah specifically
wanted a monarchial system. Why? What is there in a monarchy which is lacking in other
forms of government?

One answer to this question is offered by Sefer HaChinukh (mitzva 71 and 497 in the
Machon Yerushalayim edition). He views the Torah's preference for a monarch as a
choice based upon utilitarian considerations. In his opinion, a single absolute ruler,
capable of action and leadership, will be better able to protect society against enemies
and tensions (both from within and without) than a system of government which relies
upon the opinions and actions of many people to formulate and implement policy. Thus,
the Chinukh does not view monarchy as having any intrinsic metaphysical value; its
entire advantage is practical.

Such a position raises an obvious difficulty. Aside from the issue of whether the Torah
involves itself with decisions regarding the utilitarian advantages of different systems, the
question which immediately cries out is: Are monarchies really indeed as benevolent and
praiseworthy as the Sefer HaChinukh makes them out to be? Though the Platonic vision
of the philosopher-king is an exalted one, history is replete with examples of regal
misbehavior in all countries and all ages. Acton's dictum that "Power corrupts, absolute
power corrupts absolutely," seems, unfortunately, to reflect a basic (and base) aspect of
human nature. Moreover, the damage and suffering created by a tyrant are far more
severe than the benefits to be derived from a benevolent and efficient king. In short, a
reality check would seem to dispute the Chinukh's claim that there are practical
advantages to be gained by choosing a monarchial system and, therefore, from a purely
utilitarian perspective, it is hard to justify opting for a monarchy.
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In response to the Chinukh, one of two approaches can be taken. A) Either we accept his
premise that there should be a utilitarian motive behind the choice of government, yet
disagree with him as to the desirability of a single ruler, and, therefore, conclude that
there is no mitzva to appoint a king, or B) we can claim that there is a mitzva to appoint a
king, but that the rationale is not a utilitarian one.

Abarbanel expresses the first viewpoint, appealing to historical experience and human
nature to dispute the Chinukh's claim. Contrasting the Italian republics to the monarchies
of his time, Abrabanel points out that even from a geopolitical perspective, the republican
model is more prosperous; moreover, the dangers inherent in a tyrannical despot are
vividly described by Abarbanel. Throughout this machloket, the political sophistication
and the hard-headed recognition of political realities of Abarbanel, who tasted political
life in the Portuguese and Spanish courts, stands in sharp contrast to the innocent naivete
of the Chinukh, who is drawing upon literary sources.

Clearly, if the monarchial model is to be judged by a utilitarian standard, the yardstick by

which to decide the machloket should be the historical reality as the Abarbanel claims,
and he certainly seems to have gotten the better of the argument in his disagreement with
the Chinukh.

Therefore, if we would like to explain the opinion that there is a mitzva to appoint a king,
we should seek another interpretation of R. Yehuda's position. To do so, we must turn our
attention to a passage in Sanhedrin (20b) which states that the phrase "Ki yad al keis
Kah" ("Hand upon the throne of the Lord," Shemot 17:16) refers to the king: "Ve-ein
kisei ela melekh she-ne'emar Vayeshev Shelomo al kisei Hashem le-melekh" - "'Throne'
refers to the king, as it is written, 'Shelomo sat on the throne of the Lord as king' (I Divrei
Ha- yamim 29:23)." (See also Ramban ad loc., who adopts this position.) The upshot of
this statement, further emphasized by the gemara's subsequent statement that "Be-tchila
malakh Shlomo al ha-elyonim she'ne'emar vayeshev Shlomo al kisei Hashem le-melekh"
("At first Shelomo ruled over the the upper spheres"), is that the king is not solely a
human figure serving the needs of his countrymen, but rather he is also a sacral figure,
representing Divine interests in the human world. Just as the Kohen Gadol (High Priest)
is the Divine representative in the religious sphere, serving as a "shelucha de-rachmana"
(emissary of God) no less than a "shelucha didan" (emissary of man), so too is the
melekh an ambassador of God in the political sphere. The Heavenly Throne (kisei
Hashem) serves as a symbol of Divine involvement in the human world and, therefore,
the description of the king as sitting upon this throne serves to establish his rule as a
manifestation and executor of Divine Will in our world. In this context, mention should
already be made of the fact that the king, as the kohen, is anointed with shemen ha-
mishcha (the anointing oil). [A fuller discussion of this issue will follow in the next
shiur.]

If we accept this line of reasoning, the Torah's interest in a royal head of state is not due
to his practical utility to human society, but rather is due to the fact that a royal figure is a
better representative of God on Earth. By adopting such a position, we are able to
understand the need for a king, despite the drawbacks which Abarbanel pointed out. To
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offset those, the Torah added a whole list of regulations and mitzvot designed to distance
the monarch from "gavhut ha- lev" (arrogance), involvement with earthly affairs and the
temptations of power (i.e. women, money and horses) and to instill in him and his
subjects the sense of a Divine mission (the need to constantly have a Torah scroll at his
side).

Thus, to summarize, we have seen a machloket whether there is a mitzva to appoint a

king or not, and a further machloket as to the rationale of the mitzva (if there is such a
mitzva).

JEWISH POLITICAL THEORY - HILKHOT MELAKHIM

SHIUR #2: The Special Status of the Davidic Dynasty

by Rav Mosheh Lichtenstein

In the last shiur, we explored whether there is a mitzva to appoint a king, and, if so, why.
It now seems proper to suggest a distinction between two forms of Jewish monarchy: the
Davidic monarchy (malkhut Beit David) and other Jewish/Israelite kings (malkhei
Yisrael).

The background for this distinction is the discussion in the last shiur. On the one hand,
the claim for a monarchial system based upon the utilitarian calculus is highly
problematic, as seen previously. However, rejection of the concept of monarchy as
intrinsically valuable is also a difficult solution. Anyone who has ever opened a siddur or
has any inkling of Jewish tradition is well aware of the central role that the restoration of
the Jewish monarchy fulfills in our hopes and aspirations for the future. Two entire
berakhot (blessings) of Shemoneh Esrei are devoted to the future restoration of Jewish
sovereignty, as are many other liturgical expressions. Thus, Abarbanel's opinion that
there is no positive value at all in kingship, is quite problematic. This led us to the
Ramban's opinion that the king is a representative of God and, therefore, our tradition is
so interested in the restoration of Jewish monarchy.

However, as is clear from our prayers etc., it is malkhut Beit David (the Davidic
monarchy/dynasty) to which we aspire. Actually, Tanakh itself describes David
HaMelekh as A) having a special covenant with the Kadosh Barukh Hu (the Holy One,
blessed be He), and B) possessing an element of kedusha (sanctity) due to God's choice
of him. (See Shemot 23:1-7; Tehillim 132; and especially Tehillim 89.) The following
quote will suffice to make this point: "Matzati David avdi, be-shemen kodshi
meshachtiv" (Tehillim 89:21). David is anointed with the sacral oil - "shemen kodshi."
The comparison to the Kohen Gadol (High Priest) is unmistakable. As seems evident
from all of the above sources in Tanakh, in which David praises the Kadosh Barukh Hu
for the unique status and commitment which he has been granted, this status is unique to
David alone, and to his descendants.
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This point is clearly formulated by the Rambam, who writes: Three crowns were
conferred upon Israel: the crown of Torah, the crown of priesthood, and the crown of
royalty. Aaron merited the crown of priesthood, as [Numbers 25:13] states: "And it will
be an eternal covenant of priesthood for him and his descendants after him." David
merited the crown of royalty, as [Psalms 89:37] states: "His seed will continue forever,
and his throne will be as the sun before Me." (Hilkhot Talmud Torah 3:1)

In this halakha, kingship is not treated as a utilitarian function but as a keter (crown)
which the people of Israel received as a gift from the Kadosh Barukh Hu, comparable to
kehuna (priesthood). The common element of all three gifts is that they are
manifestations of God's presence in our world, and what is common to kehuna and
malkhut (in contrast to Torah, as the Rambam himself elaborates in the conclusion of the
halakha) is that they are restricted to specific people. The same point is made by the
Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvot as well. There (Mitzvat Lo Ta'aseh 362), the issur
(prohibition) of appointing a stranger (ish nokhri) as a king is applied to all non-Davidic
descendants and is explicitly compared by the Rambam to a non-kohen functioning as a
priest.

Two halakhot express the difference between Davidic and non-Davidic kings, and the
status of the Davidic monarchs as sacral figures:

a) Halakhot concerning anointment. Davidic kings are anointed with the shemen ha-
mishcha (anointing oil) used to anoint kohanim while other rulers are appointed by means
of shemen afarsimon (persimmon oil), which serves to designate them as kings without
granting them the personal status of kedusha, which can only be conferred by the shemen
ha-mishcha. In other words, meshicha (anointing) performs a dual function: 1)
appointment of the ruler and establishing his authority; 2) endowing him with personal
kedusha. A non-Davidic king can achieve only the STATUS of a functional sovereign,
appointed for the utilitarian benefits which he can provide. For these purposes, shemen
afarsimon suffices. However, the Davidic king is anointed with kedusha and, therefore,
he receives the shemen ha-mishcha of the kohanim. The gemara (Keritot 6b) makes it
clear that the use of shemen ha-mishcha for a Davidic king is related to its similar use by
the Kohanim and is not mere coincidence. The gemara states that the prohibition of using
the shemen ha-mishcha for other purposes, a prohibition which is punishable by karet
(excision), is inapplicable, according to R. Yehuda, to a king and a kohen, since they are
not total strangers to the shemen ha-mishcha ("ve-melekh ve- kohen mei-ikara lo zarim").
Since the prohibition of using the sacral oil is associated with its usage in the Beit
HaMikdash, determining that the melekh is not considered a stranger to the sacral oil is a
significant statement.

b) A second halakha supports this same conclusion. The gemara states that it is prohibited
to sit in the Mikdash; the respect and awe due to the Kadosh Barukh Hu dictate to lowly
man proper decorum in the house of God. However, Davidic kings are excluded from this
regulation - "ein yeshiva be- azara ela le-malkhei David bilvad" (see the Mishneh La-
melekh Hilkhot Beit Ha-bechira 7:6, for a discussion of this halakha); they may sit in the
sanctuary. Why? Because they are not considered representative of Man alone but are
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functioning also as the Kadosh Barukh Hu's delegates. Therefore, they are not strangers
or guests but rather belong in the Mikdash (as do the Kohanim). Thus, though this is not a
central halakha regarding the laws of kingship, it is symptomatic of a basic point
regarding malkhei Beit David.

Returning to the Rambam, we can see this dual principle in action in his ruling in Hilkhot
Melakhim (1:7). The Rambam states there as follows:

When a king is appointed, he must be anointed with the shemen ha-mishcha... Once he
has been anointed, he has acquired kingship both for himself and for his descendants
forever, for monarchy is dynastic... Anyone who takes precedence regarding inheritance
takes precedence regarding monarchy, and an older son precedes a younger son. Any
position of authority or appointment in Israel, and not just monarchy, is passed on as an
inheritance to one's son and then on to his son forever; but this is true only if the son is as
wise and Godfearing as his father. If he is as Godfearing but not as wise, he may take his
father's place and then must be taught. But if he is not Godfearing, then even if he is
extremely wise, he may not be appointed to any position in Israel. Once David was
anointed, he acquired the crown of kingship, and the kingship is his and sons' forever...
However, he acquired the kingship only for his worthy sons... Even though he acquired
kingship only for his worthy sons, the monarchy will never be abrogated from the seed of
David, for God promised him this...

At a first glance, the Rambam seems to repeat himself unnecessarily. The halakha begins
by stating that once a king is anointed, his descendants are included in the appointment
and should succeed him upon his death. After concluding this point and expanding it, he
includes other appointments. The Rambam then starts afresh, telling us that David
received the privilege of kingdom for his entire dynasty, etc. This, though, is seemingly
redundant - since we have already been told that any king transfers his sovereignty to his
sons, why does the Rambam have to devote a separate passage to establishing this for the
Davidic monarchy?

The answer to this problem is the principestablished above. The first half of the halakha
deals with the procedure of choosing a king as an officeholder serving human needs, and
the method of selection is inheritance. The appointment of the king's son as his successor,
be the reason for it as it may be, is not unique to monarchy and is not due to the need to
transfer the personal status of a sacral figure. Therefore, the Rambam can apply the
halakhot which were formulated regarding kings to other positions as well. The entire
process of selection is a mechanism to appoint officeholders fulfilling the functions of
human society. However, the Rambam felt a need to address the issue of transmission in
the Davidic monarchy separately, since there is an additional element involved in it.
Here, the inheritance mechanism must be able to transfer the personal status of the king,
as well as the functions of the sovereign. The analogous model to the succession
mechanism in the Davidic monarchy is succession by kohanim. It should be noticed that
the Rambam's phrase regarding David is "zacha be-keter malkhut," which of course, is
the same phrase which was used in Hilkhot Talmud Torah when he described kingship as
analogous to kehuna (priesthood) and Torah. Thus, the transmission of the royal position
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to one of David's descendants involves a double element, and must be addressed

independently.

In conclusion, let us now summarize the main points of the previous two shiurim.

a) There is a dispute whether the appointment of a king is a mitzva or not. b) Those who
hold that it is a mitzva are divided as to whether the need for a monarchy is rooted in
utility or whether it is supposed to serve a higher function: the king acts as the
representative of the Kadosh Barukh Hu in the earthly political sphere. c) It was
suggested that there is a difference regarding this point between Davidic and non-Davidic
kings. d) The utilitarian claim is problematic; had this been the only yardstick, it would
be more reasonable to agree with the Abarbanel who rules that there is no requirement to
appoint a king.

What is the significance of all this for our current situation of a democratic Jewish state
headed by a Prime Minister rather than a monarch? To answer this question, we must
examine the perspectives of both the Chinukh and the Rambam.

According to the Chinukh, the need for a king is utilitarian. Therefore, there is no basic
qualitative difference between monarchy and democracy, and there is no spiritual loss if
there is no king. For the Rambam, though, the replacement of the Davidic monarchy by a
democratic head of state entails the loss of the opportunity for a human to reign in God's
name and for him to sit on "the throne of God" and act as the Kadosh Barukh Hu's earthly
representative. Therefore, the current situation is much more problematic according to the
Rambam.

However, a second point must be made. The above judgment holds true only when
contrasting the past with the present or the present with an ideal future. Regarding the
present historical situation as such, it is the Rambam who paradoxically can more readily
accept it. For according to the Rambam, currently malkhut Beit David has become an
eschatological hope, part of our grand vision for the future. Though passionately
committed to this vision and intensely hoping and praying for its speedy implementation,
we are not engaged in an attempt to realize it. As we pray for the rebuilding of the
Temple, the ingathering of the exiles etc., so too do we pray for the restoration of Davidic
monarchy, yet we currently accept our present historical situation as is. Therefore, if we
assess our possibilities in the present without the realization of the vision of the End of
Days, there is no preference for a monarchy over other forms of government. The
Davidic monarchy is desired due to its unique character. If that is unavailable, there
should be no mitzva to choose one system over another.

According to the Chinukh, though, the Torah gave us a practical guideline that a
monarchial system is more efficient. So although there is no qualitative spiritual
difference between democracy and monarchy and the current situation need not be
perceived as a regression, the imperative to prefer a monarchy over a democracy should
still be binding. For if the wisdom of the Torah determined that from a purely functional
point of view a king should be appointed, who are we to argue?
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Thus, though Rambam views the current situation as much worse than the hoped-for
ideal, he can more readily accept the present system as being halakhically valid for our
times, until historical circumstances will change. The Chinukh will dispute this, claiming
that a mitzva to appoint a king is still binding upon us, yet he will not view the current
democratic situation as fundamentally at odds with the Torah, but rather the non-
fulfillment of a specific mitzva. $

JEWISH POLITICAL THEORY - HILKHOT MELAKHIM

SHIUR #3: Practical and Sacral Elements of Kingship

by Rav Mosheh Lichtenstein

In previous shiurim, we examined the mitzva of appointing a king and attempted to put
forward the thesis that there is a dual element involved in the mitzva: a) appointment of a
sovereign who has the authority of government as the state's executive arm; and b) the
personal election of a monarch as representative of Divine action and presence upon
earth. In this capacity, he is a sacral figure, sharing certain common characteristics with a
kohen (gadol). This latter role is unique to the Davidic lineage and does not apply to
other monarchs.

Having established this general principle, we must now elaborate the ramifications of
these dual elements.

The first of these is the status of a non-Davidic king. Based upon the above, all powers of
government required for the state to function are invested in a legitimate acting ruler,
even if he is not of Davidic lineage or even a monarch. The gemara in Yoma (73b) states
that only a king can submit requests to the Urim Ve-tumim, and that the source for this
are the verses relating to Yehoshua bin Nun:

"'Only the king or the Head of the Court or one whom the community requires may
inquire of the Urim Ve-tumim' (Mishna Yoma 71b) - From where do we learn this? R.
Abbahu answered: From the verse, 'And he [Yehoshua] shall stand before the kohen, who
shall ask counsel for him after the judgment of the Urim ... [at his word they shall go out,
and at his word they shall come in, both he, and benei Yisrael with him, even all the
congregation' (Bemidbar 27:21): 'he' refers to the kohen anointed for war; 'even all the
congregation' refers to the Sanhedrin."

This, though, raises an obvious question. The gemara proves that only a king can use the
Urim Ve-tumim by citing a verse relating to Yehoshua, who wasn't a king himself but
rather a shofet (leader). At first glance, it would seem that rather than proving its point,
the gemara is actually contradicting itself. However, the answer is simple. Had the
privilege of using the Urim Ve-tumim been due to the sacral element of the kingship,
which would have enabled him to communicate with God in a more direct manner
(similar to the halakha permitting him to sit in the mikdash), then it would indeed apply
only to bona fide Davidic kings. However, if use of the Urim Ve-tumim is not a personal
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prerogative but rather a tool available to the public to assist ii in determining public
policy, then it is available to any person leading the public on issues of public security.
Since Yehoshua was the head of government, it is he who can use the Urim Ve-tumim,
and for these purposes he is called "melekh," which here means "head of government."
Therefore, we can conclude that Yehoshua and other non-Davidic rulers are considered
melekh (sovereign) on all issues of government, but not on issues of personal status.
Thus, the Rambam (Hilkhot Melakhim 1:3) cites the example of Yehoshua as a source
for the halakhot regulating the election of a king, since he deals with the selection process
as a mechanism to choose a head of government, and not as a means of designating God's
chosen.

This principle is explicit in the Rambam's treatment of the status of a non-Davidic king.

"If a prophet appointed a [non-Davidic] king, and that king followed the path of the
Torah and the mitzva and fought God's battles, then he is [indeed] a king and all the laws
of monarchy apply to him, despite the fact that kingship principally applies to David and
there will be a king of his seed. For Achiya Ha-shiloni appointed Yeravam king and told
him, 'If you hearken to all that I command you ... then I will build you a sure house, as I
built for David ...' (I Melakhim 11:38). And Achiya also told him, 'And to [Shlomo's] son
I will give one tribe, that my servant David may have a lamp always before Me in
Jerusalem ...' (11:36)."

As can be seen, such a king has legitimacy, yet is inferior to a Davidic king regarding the
dynastic element and the form of anointment. The legitimacy is due to his capacity as an
active ruler, while the lack of a dynastic element reflects the fact that the perpetuation of
the monarchy in a single family is not an issue of government but of personal status. This
same point, though cloaked in somewhat different terminology is made by the Ra'avad
(Hilkhot Melakhim 1:9) and especially by the Ramban (Bereishit 49:10) who states that
"Even though Israel may appoint themselves a king from another tribe, according to the
needs of the hour, this king is not to be anointed, so that he will lack the splendor of
majesty and will instead be like a judge or officer."

This is exactly the point that he is making: for the practical needs of government
("tzorekh ha-sha'a"), such a person is the recognized ruler, but he lacks the glory ("hod
malkhut") since that is a function of the kedusha inherent the melekh as a sacral figure
which is unique to Davidic kings.

The same principle holds true in he opposite case, i.e., a Davidic king who has lost his
practical authority. If the issue at hand is an issue of government, then he is not
considered a king, while if we are dealing with a halakha relating to his personal status,
then he retains his status as a royal. (To make the same point in "yeshivish"/Brisker
terminology, he has a chalut shem melekh be-gavra but he cannot perform the ma'aseh of
governing.)

This distinction is brought home by the sugyot relating to the nasi (ruler). The nasi, if he
sins, does not bring the usual korban chatat (sin offering) but rather a special chatat,
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specifically designated for him (see Vayikra 4:22-26), just as the kohen gadol brings a
korban which is unique to him. As explained in the mishna in Horayot (10a), the nasi
referred to in the pasuk is the king: "Who is the 'nasi?' It is the king, as it is written ... [If
he transgresses any of the commandments of the Lord HIS God.'" Thus, both the king and
the kohen gadol have special korbanot. However, the opening mishna of the third perek
in Horayot determines that a retired kohen gadol (mashuach she-avar) brings the special
kohen gadol korban, while a retired (or deposed) king does not. Based upon the above,
the meaning of this is that the kohen gadol's sacrifice is a function of his personal sanctity
and is not due to his job as the chief kohen. This is attested to by the fact that the mishna
there states that only a kohen gadol who has actually been appointed brings the special
korban and not a functioning kohen gadol who hasn't been anointed (merubeh begadim),
the difference between them being in their respective levels of kedusha and not in their
functions in mikdash.

The status of nasi, however, is not a function of one's personal kedusha but of his office.
This is attested to by the very fact that he is described as a nasi rather than a melekh (i.e.,
he is defined in terms of the authority of his position rather than his royal title) and by the
fact that the gemara (11a) considers various people in positions of authority (such as the
tribal nasi) and determines that the level of authority is the deciding factor. (See
Rambam, Hilkhot Shegagot 9:10.)

Therefore, if the king is an active king, accompanied by all the dangers and temptations
of abuse of power, there is a special chatat to emphasize the dangers involved in his
power, while a retired king, who has forfeited his power, brings a regular individual
chatat. Actually, any king stripped of his authority reverts to the regular chatat. Thus, the
Yerushalmi in Horayot states in a famous passage that even David Ha- melekh himself
did not bring a royal chatat during the period that he was in exile escaping from
Avshalom's revolt.

In conclusion, a few observations should be made regardithe application of this principle

in relation to various biblical episodes.

A. Yehoshua, as mentioned above, was a functional king without the personal status of
the melekh as a meshiach Hashem (anointed of God). Therefore, whatever halakhot of
kingship apply to him can be understood to relate to all rulers. The practical ramifications
of this will be dealt with in future installments (bli neder).

Though this interpretation is the one which we have adopted and which seems to explain
the status of Yehoshua as presented in the biblical and rabbinic sources, mention must be
made of the fact that the Mekhilta (Shemot 17:14) claims that Yehoshua was actually
anointed. (However, it doesn't specify if shemen ha-mishcha was used or not.)

B. The status of Shaul is unclear. Was he intended to be only a functional ruler or also a
royal king with the kedusha of malkhei beit David? This, too, will be dealt with at a later
stage of the course (bli neder).
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C. The verses describing the loss of Rechavam's kingdom are careful to use the phrase
"mamlakha" which denotes only the power of government Yerovam is handed over the
reins of power, but a symbolic enclave of Yerushalayim and its surroundings is left to
Rechavam, as the offspring of David, who represents the element of the election of beit
David (see I Melakhim 11).

D. The Rambam recognizes the legitimacy of later sovereigns, though non-Davidic.

Thus, aside from the halakha quoted above regarding non-Davidic kings, the Rambam
also mentions the fact of Hasmonean monarchy as a positive value (Hilkhot Chanuka 3:1)
and describes the Exilarch (Reish Galuta) as having kingly authority (Hilkhot Sanhedrin
4:13).

Thus, the dual element of kingship expresses itself on all levels. In following shiurim we
shall examine many of the details of monarchy and government, exploring both the ideal
system the Halakha wishes to set up as well as the practical significance of these laws.