G.R. Nos.
120744-46 f 25, 2012 Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either
SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 122677
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. REYES and VIRGILIO A. MANGUERRA,
Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 122776
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and ERNESTO PUNO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton
violence is never justified when their duty could be performed otherwise. A "shoot
first, think later" disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized society. Never has
homicide or murder been a function of law enforcement. The public peace is never
predicated on the cost of human life.
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the June 30, 1995 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos.
16612, 16613 and 16614 – cases for murder, frustrated murder and multiple counts of
attempted murder, respectively. The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on
April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the
death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused
were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan, Jr.
(Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the Integrated National
Police (INP)2 stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose
Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of
Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio
Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson),
members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in
Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all charged with
murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in three Informations, the
inculpatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 16612:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy.
Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively,
confederating and mutually helping one another, and while responding to information
about the presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there, with
treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with
automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by
Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily
mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and immediate
death of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 16613:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy.
Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively,
confederating and mutually helping one another, and while responding to information
about the presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there, with
treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
intent to kill, attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and
Raul V. Panlican with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota
Tamaraw jitney ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G.
Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission of murder directly
by overt acts of execution which should produce the murder by reason of some cause
or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 16614:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, all public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy.
Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively,
confederating and mutually helping one another, and while responding to information
about the presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there, with
treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
intent of taking the life of Noel C. Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons
by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva
and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal and having
performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of murder, but which did
not, by reason of causes independent of the defendants’ will, namely, the able and
timely medical assistance given to said Noel C. Villanueva, which prevented his
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities,6 the accused – except Pabalan who died earlier on June 12, 1990,7 and
Yapyuco who was then allegedly indisposed8 – entered individual pleas of not guilty.9
A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at his
arraignment likewise entered a negative plea.10 In the meantime, Mario Reyes,
Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for Bail
relative to Criminal Case No. 16612.11 Said motion was heard on the premise, as
previously agreed upon by both the prosecution and the defense, that these cases
would be jointly tried and that the evidence adduced at said hearing would
automatically constitute evidence at the trial on the merits.12 On May 10, 1991, the
Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612.13 Yapyuco likewise applied
for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May 21, 1991.14
Pamintuan died on November 21, 1992,15 and accordingly, the charges against him
were dismissed.
At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the pre-trial
inquest. 16 Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked up from where the
presentation of evidence left off at the hearing on the bail applications.
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores,
Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests
at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to
leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession had passed. As they
were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive
carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road. With Licup in the
passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney,
Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as
they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly,
Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely. 17
Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim, allegedly did
not see any one on the road flag them down.18 In open court, Flores executed a
sketch19 depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the
residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated on the
right side of the road right after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he
identified said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly
took post and opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell how many
firearms were used. He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and
Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them
Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Naron’s house. Frantic and shaken, he
instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be employees of San
Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when
flagged. At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to
summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He
dashed back to Salangsang’s house as instructed and, returning to the scene, he
observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being
loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital.20 This was corroborated by
Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men,
together with Pamintuan, approached them and transferred him and Licup to another
jeepney and taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.21
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very rapidly
succeeded each other, and that they were given no warning shot at all contrary to
what the defense would say.22 He professed that he, together with his co-passengers,
were also aboard the Sarao jeepney on its way to the hospital and inside it he
observed two men, each holding long firearms, seated beside the driver. He
continued that as soon as he and his companions had been dropped off at the
hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together with his two
armed companions.23 He further narrated that the day after the shooting, he brought
Licup to the Makati Medical Center where the latter expired on April 7, 1988. 24 He
claimed that all the accused in the case had not been known to him prior to the
incident, except for Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wife’s uncle and with
whom he denied having had any rift nor with the other accused for that matter, which
would have otherwise inspired ill motives. 25 He claimed the bullet holes on the
Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there were no other bullet
holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.26
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, affirmed the
presence of his companions at his residence on the subject date and time, and
corroborated Villanueva’s and Flores’ narration of the events immediately preceding
the shooting. He recounted that after seeing off his guests shortly after the procession
had passed his house and reminding them to proceed carefully on the pothole-
studded roads, he was alarmed when moments later, he heard a volley of gunfire
from a distance which was shortly followed by Flores’ frantic call for help. He
immediately proceeded to the scene on his bicycle and saw Pamintuan by the
lamppost just outside the gate of Naron’s house where, inside, he noticed a
congregation of more or less six people whom he could not recognize. 27 At this point,
he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being loaded into another jeepney occupied by
three men who appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved the keys of the Tamaraw
jeepney from Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mother’s house, but before
driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of an owner-
type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the same jeepney which he
remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. He
claimed he spent the night at his mother’s house and in the morning, a policeman
came looking for him with whom, however, he was not able to talk.28
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the electric
post in front of Naron’s house was strangely not lit when he arrived, and that none of
the neighboring houses was illuminated. He admitted his uncertainty as to whether it
was Yapyuco’s group or the group of Pamintuan that brought his injured companions
to the hospital, but he could tell with certainty that it was the Sarao jeepney previously
identified by Villanueva and Flores that brought his injured companions to the
hospital.29
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Camp Olivas, affirmed that she had previously examined the firearms suspected to
have been used by petitioners in the shooting and found them positive for gunpowder
residue. She could not, however, determine exactly when the firearms were
discharged; neither could she tell how many firearms were discharged that night nor
the relative positions of the gunmen. She admitted having declined to administer
paraffin test on petitioners and on the other accused because the opportunity therefor
came only 72 hours after the incident. She affirmed having also examined the
Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most of which had
punctured the door at the passenger side of the vehicle at oblique and perpendicular
directions. She explained, rather inconclusively, that the bullets that hit at an angle
might have been fired while the jeepney was either at a standstill or moving forward in
a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the curve on the road. 30 Additionally,
Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and supply officer of the INP-Pampanga Provincial
Command tasked with the issuance of firearms and ammunitions to members of the
local police force and CHDF and CVO members, identified in court the memorandum
receipts for the firearms he had issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra,
Pabalan and Yapyuco.31
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center, examined
the injuries of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered multiple metal
shrapnel from the occipital region of Villanueva’s head as well as from the posterior
aspect of his chest; he noted nothing serious in these wounds in that the incapacity
would last between 10 and 30 days only. He also located a bullet wound on the front
lateral portion of the right thigh, and he theorized that this wound would be caused by
a firearm discharged in front of the victim, assuming the assailant and the victim were
both standing upright on the ground and the firearm was fired from the level of the
assailant’s waist; but if the victim was seated, the position of his thigh must be
horizontal so that with the shot coming from his front, the trajectory of the bullet would
be upward. He hypothesized that if the shot would come behind Villanueva, the bullet
would enter the thigh of the seated victim and exit at a lower level.32
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On the
patient, he noted a lacerated wound at the right temporal region of the head – one
consistent with being hit by a hard and blunt object and not a bullet. He noted three
(3) gunshot wounds the locations of which suggested that Licup was upright when
fired upon from the front: one is a through-and-through wound in the middle lateral
aspect of the middle portion of the right leg; another, through-and-through wound at
the middle portion of the right forearm; and third one, a wound in the abdomen which
critically and fatally involved the stomach and the intestines. He hypothesized that if
Licup was seated in the passenger seat as claimed, his right leg must have been
exposed and the assailant must have been in front of him holding the gun slightly
higher than the level of the bullet entry in the leg. He found that the wound in the
abdomen had entered from the left side and crossed over to and exited at the right,
which suggested that the gunman must have been positioned at Licup’s left side. He
explained that if this wound had been inflicted ahead of that in the forearm, then the
former must have been fired after Licup had changed his position as a reaction to the
first bullet that hit him. He said that the wound on the leg must have been caused by a
bullet fired at the victim’s back and hit the jeepney at a downward angle without hitting
any hard surface prior.33
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licup’s right forearm must have been caused by
a bullet fired from the front but slightly obliquely to the right of the victim.
Hypothesizing, he held the improbability of Licup being hit on the abdomen,
considering that he might have changed position following the infliction of the other
wounds, unless there was more than one assailant who fired multiple shots from
either side of the Tamaraw jeepney; however, he proceeded to rule out the possibility
of Licup having changed position especially if the gunfire was delivered very rapidly.
He could not tell which of Licup’s three wounds was first inflicted, yet it could be that
the bullet to the abdomen was delivered ahead of the others because it would have
caused Licup to lean forward and stoop down with his head lying low and steady. 34
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) affirmed that the accused police officers Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno
had been administratively charged with and tried for gross misconduct as a
consequence of the subject shooting incident and that he had in fact conducted
investigations thereon sometime in 1989 and 1990 which culminated in their dismissal
from service.35 Dolly Porqueriño, stenographer at the NAPOLCOM, testified that at the
hearing of the administrative case, Yapyuco authenticated the report on the shooting
incident dated April 5, 1988 which he had previously prepared at his office. This,
according to her, together with the sketch showing the relative position of the
responding law enforcers and the Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident, had
been forwarded to the NAPOLCOM Central Office for consideration.36 The
Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these documents together with the joint counter-
affidavits which had been submitted in that case by Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno.
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself
as the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga
and the superior officer of petitioners Cunanan and Puno and of the accused Yu
whose jurisdiction included Barangays Quebiawan and Telebastagan. He narrated
that in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he and his men were investigating a physical
injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon for police assistance from David,
who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a reported presence of
armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station in
San Fernando for reinforcement but at the time no additional men could be
dispatched. Hence, he decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their
uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with them.37
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan
who told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if
sizing up their collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated that he and
barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del Carmen had also brought in a number
of armed men and that there were likewise Cafgu members convened at the
residence of Naron. Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of his
suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road at
the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an
inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was
the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it
down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney
accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police
officers Cunanan and Puno,38 to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing
forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and instantaneously,
gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Naron’s house directly at the
subject jeepney.39
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and
exclaimed at Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding
their fire, Yapyuco and his men then immediately searched the vehicle but found no
firearms but instead, two injured passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and
delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men returned to the
scene supposedly to investigate and look for the people who fired directly at the
jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone.40
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the
time was in bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in the
area who had been ambushed supposedly by rebel elements, 41 and that he frequently
patrolled the barangay on account of reported sightings of unidentified armed men
therein.42 That night, he said, his group which responded to the scene were twelve
(12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan Police Substation, 43
the team composed of Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team headed by
Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of them, including himself, were armed. 44
He denied that they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the
occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would have been killed. 45 He said that the shots
which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or from his
fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members assembled in the residence of
Naron, inasmuch as said shots were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the
spot on the road where they were assembled.46
Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of the
accused after the incident because he was at the time very confused; yet he did know
that his co-accused had already been investigated by the main police station in San
Fernando, but the inquiries did not include himself, Cunanan and Puno. 47 He admitted
an administrative case against him, Cunanan and Puno at the close of which they had
been ordered dismissed from service; yet on appeal, the decision was reversed and
they were exonerated. He likewise alluded to an investigation independently
conducted by their station commander, S/Supt. Rolando Cinco. 48
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Fernando,
Pampanga acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order situation in his
jurisdiction, where members of the police force had fallen victims of ambuscade by
lawless elements. He said that he himself has actually conducted investigations on
the Pamintuan report that rebel elements had been trying to infiltrate the employment
force of San Miguel Corporation plant, and that he has accordingly conducted
"clearing operations" in sugarcane plantations in the barangay. He intimated that days
prior to the incident, Yapyuco’s team had already been alerted of the presence of
NPA members in the area. Corroborating Yapyuco’s declaration, he confessed having
investigated the shooting incident and making a report on it in which, curiously, was
supposedly attached Pamintuan’s statement referring to Flores as being "married to a
resident of Barangay Quebiawan" and found after surveillance to be "frequently
visited by NPA members." He affirmed having found that guns were indeed fired that
night and that the chief investigator was able to gather bullet shells from the scene. 49
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony of
Yapyuco as well as the latter’s documentary evidence. 50 Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes,
Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguera, waived their right to present evidence and
submitted their memorandum as told.51
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the
regular and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order
either as barangay officials and as members of the police and the CHDF, and hence,
could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the
intent of killing them.52 With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno,
Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate
offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as charged in
Criminal Case No. 16612) and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by
Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and
acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted murder charged
in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma. The
dispositive portion of the June 30, 1995 Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario
Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra
y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the offense of Homicide, as defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting all of
them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
without any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of
said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; to indemnify,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased victim Leodevince
Licup in the amounts of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages and
₱600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their
proportionate shares of the costs of said action.
II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the
accused charged in the information, namely, Salvador Yapyuco y
Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol,
 Mario Reyes y David, Carlos David y Bañez, Ruben Lugtu y
Lacson, Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera, Andres
Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby
acquitted of the offense of Multiple Attempted Murder charged
therein, with costs de oficio.
III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y
Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol,
Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio
Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals in the offense Attempted Homicide, as
defined and penalized under Article 249, in relation to Article 6,
paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting them
with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any
aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said accused
is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended party
Noel Villanueva in the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and
compensatory damages, plus ₱120,000.00 as moral/exemplary
damages, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of said
action.
SO ORDERED.53
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva
and which brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners
herein willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and order; 54 that the acts
performed by them preparatory to the shooting, which ensured the execution of their
evil plan without risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to kill the occupants of
the subject vehicle; that the fact they had by collective action deliberately and
consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily performed those
acts negates their defense of lawful performance of official duty; 55 that the theory of
mistaken belief could not likewise benefit petitioners because there was supposedly
no showing that they had sufficient basis or probable cause to rely fully on
Pamintuan’s report that the victims were armed NPA members, and they have not
been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence
when they acted as they did;56 that there was insufficient or total absence of factual
basis to assume that the occupants of the jeepney were members of the NPA or
criminals for that matter; and that the shooting incident could not have been the
product of a well-planned and well-coordinated police operation but was the result of
either a hidden agenda concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and
Pamintuan, or a hasty and amateurish attempt to gain commendation.57
These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements of
prosecution witnesses Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the
circumstances prior to the subject incident. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that the
Tamaraw jeepney would have indeed stopped if it had truly been flagged down as
claimed by Yapyuco especially since – as it turned out after the search of the vehicle
– they had no firearms with them, and hence, they had nothing to be scared of. 58 It
observed that while Salangsang and Flores had been bona fide residents of
Barangay Quebiawan, then it would be impossible for Pamintuan, barangay captain
no less, not to have known them and the location of their houses which were not far
from the scene of the incident; so much so that the presence of the victims and of the
Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsang’s house that evening could not have possibly
escaped his notice. In this regard, it noted that Pamintuan’s Sworn Statement dated
April 11, 1988 did not sufficiently explain his suspicions as to the identities of the
victims as well as his apparent certainty on the identity and whereabouts of the
subject Tamaraw jeepney. 59 It surmised how the defense, especially Yapyuco in his
testimony, could have failed to explain why a large group of armed men – which
allegedly included Cafgu members from neighboring barangays – were assembled at
the house of Naron that night, and how petitioners were able to identify the Tamaraw
jeepney to be the target vehicle. From this, it inferred that petitioners had already
known that their suspect vehicle would be coming from the direction of Salangsang’s
house – such knowledge is supposedly evident first, in the manner by which they
advantageously positioned themselves at the scene to afford a direct line of fire at the
target vehicle, and second, in the fact that the house of Naron, the neighboring
houses and the electric post referred to by prosecution witnesses were deliberately
not lit that night.60
The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores’ sketch depicting the position
of the Tamaraw jeepney and the assailants on the road, and concluded that judging
by the bullet holes on the right side of the jeepney and by the declarations of Dr. Solis
respecting the trajectory of the bullets that hit Villanueva and Licup, the assailants
were inside the yard of Naron’s residence and the shots were fired at the jeepney
while it was slowly moving past them. It also gave weight to the testimony and the
report of Dabor telling that the service firearms of petitioners had been tested and
found to be positive of gunpowder residue, therefore indicating that they had indeed
been discharged.61
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial
evidence pointing to the culpability of petitioners: the nature and location of the bullet
holes on the jeepney and the gunshot wounds on the victims, as well as the trajectory
of the bullets that caused such damage and injuries; particularly, the number, location
and trajectory of the bullets that hit the front passenger side of the jeepney; the
strategic placement of the accused on the right side of the street and inside the front
yard of Naron’s house; the deliberate shutting off of the lights in the nearby houses
and the lamp post; and the positive ballistic findings on the firearms of petitioners. 62
This evidentiary resumé, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified
petitioners’ admission that they did discharge their firearms, but also provided a
predicate to its conclusion that petitioners conspired with one another to achieve a
common purpose, design and objective to harm the unarmed and innocent victims.
Thus, since there was no conclusive proof of who among the several accused had
actually fired the gunshots that injured Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, the
Sandiganbayan imposed collective responsibility on all those who were shown to
have discharged their firearms that night – petitioners herein.63 Interestingly, it was
speculated that the manner by which the accused collectively and individually acted
prior or subsequent to or contemporaneously with the shooting indicated that they
were either drunk or that some, if not all of them, had a grudge against the employees
of San Miguel Corporation;64 and that on the basis of the self-serving evidence
adduced by the defense, there could possibly have been a massive cover-up of the
incident by Philippine Constabulary and INP authorities in Pampanga as well as by
the NAPOLCOM.65 It likewise found very consequential the fact that the other
accused had chosen not to take the witness stand; this, supposedly because it was
incumbent upon them to individually explain their participation in the shooting in view
of the weight of the prosecution evidence, their invocation of the justifying
circumstance of lawful performance of official duty and the declaration of some of
them in their affidavits to the effect that they had been deployed that evening in the
front yard of Naron’s residence from which the volley of gunfire was discharged as
admitted by Yapyuco himself.66
As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was
supposedly not shown how the aggression commenced and how the acts causing
injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring Licup began and developed, and second, this
circumstance must be supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious adoption of
the mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or from
circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The same finding holds true for
evident premeditation because between the time Yapyuco received the summons for
assistance from Pamintuan through David and the time he and his men responded at
the scene, there was found to be no sufficient time to allow for the materialization of
all the elements of that circumstance.67
Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave from
work for 60 days which were all charged against his accumulated leave credits; 68 that
he was earning ₱8,350.00 monthly;69 and that he had spent ₱35,000.00 for the repair
of his Tamaraw jeepney.70 Also, Teodoro Licup had stated that his family had spent
₱18,000.00 for the funeral of his son, ₱28,000.00 during the wake, ₱11,000.00 for the
funeral plot and ₱20,000.00 in attorney’s fees for the prosecution of these cases. 71 He
also submitted a certification from San Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of his
deceased son.72 On these bases, the Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners, jointly and
severally, to indemnify (a) Villanueva ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory
damages and ₱120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate
costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of deceased Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00
as actual damages and ₱600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the
proportionate costs of the action.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present recourse.
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayan’s finding of
conspiracy and labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that the court a quo
has not clearly established that he had by positive acts intended to participate in any
criminal object in common with the other accused, and that his participation in a
supposed common criminal object has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He
believes the finding is belied by Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at the scene only
after the shooting incident when the wounded passengers were taken to the hospital
on his jeepney.73 He also points out the uncertainty in the Sandiganbayan’s
declaration that the incident could not have been the product of a well-planned police
operation, but rather was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted against the
victims by the barangay officials involved or an amateurish attempt on their part to
earn commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the latter alternative, then he could
hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated homicide but rather of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. 74 He laments that,
assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the victims were caused by his
warning shots, he must nevertheless be exonerated because he responded to the
scene of the incident as a bona fide member of the police force and, hence, his
presence at the scene of the incident was in line with the fulfillment of his duty as he
was in fact in the lawful performance thereof – a fact which has been affirmed by the
NAPOLCOM en banc when it dismissed on appeal the complaint for gross
misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno.75 He also invokes the concept of
mistake of fact and attributes to Pamintuan the responsibility why he, as well as the
other accused in these cases, had entertained the belief that the suspects were
armed rebel elements.76
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes claim
that the Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the
assailed decision was based on acts the evidence for which has been adduced at a
separate trial but erroneously attributed to them. They explain that there were two
sets of accused, in the case: one, the police officers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan
and Puno and, two, the barangay officials and CHDFs comprised of David, Lugtu,
Lacson, Yu and themselves who had waived the presentation of evidence. They
question their conviction of the charges vis-a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu, Lacson
and Yu who, like them, were barangay officials and had waived their right to present
evidence in their behalf. They emphasize in this regard that all accused barangay
officials and CHDFs did not participate in the presentation of the evidence by the
accused police officers and, hence, the finding that they too had fired upon the
Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an established fact.77 Also, they believe that the
findings of fact by the Sandiganbayan were based on inadmissible evidence,
specifically on evidence rejected by the court itself and those presented in a separate
trial. They label the assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural and suspicious
and, hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal
prosecution.78 Finally, they lament that the finding of conspiracy has no basis in
evidence and that the prosecution has not even shown that they were with the other
accused at the scene of the incident or that they were among those who fired at the
victims, and neither were they identified as among the perpetrators of the crime. 79
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of conspiracy.
They claim that judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan as
to whether the incident was the result of a legitimate police operation or a careless
plot designed by the accused to obtain commendation, conspiracy has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. This, because they believe the prosecution has not,
as far as both of them are concerned, shown that they had ever been part of such
malicious design to commit an ambuscade as that alluded to in the assailed decision.
They advance that as police officers, they merely followed orders from their
commander, Yapyuco, but were not privy to the conversation among the latter, David
and Pamintuan, moments before the shooting. They posit they could hardly be
assumed to have had community of criminal design with the rest of the accused.80
They affirm Yapyuco’s statement that they fired warning shots at the subject
jeepney,81 but only after it had passed the place where they were posted and only
after it failed to stop when flagged down as it then became apparent that it was going
to speed away – as supposedly shown by bullet holes on the chassis and not on the
rear portion of the jeepney. They also harp on the absence of proof of ill motives that
would have otherwise urged them to commit the crimes charged, especially since
none of the victims had been personally or even remotely known to either of them.
That they were not intending to commit a crime is, they believe, shown by the fact that
they did not directly aim their rifles at the passengers of the jeepney and that in fact,
they immediately held their fire when Flores identified themselves as employees of
San Miguel Corporation. They conceded that if killing was their intent, then they could
have easily fired at the victims directly.82
Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by the
finding of conspiracy as established by the fact that all accused, some of them armed,
had assembled themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as though having
previously known that it would be coming from Salangsang’s residence. It posits that
the manner by which the jeepney was fired upon demonstrates a community of
purpose and design to commit the crimes charged.83 It believes that criminal intent is
discernible from the posts the accused had chosen to take on the road that would
give them a direct line of fire at the target – as shown by the trajectories of the bullets
that hit the Tamaraw jeepney.84 This intent was supposedly realized when after the
volley of gunfire, both Flores and Licup were wounded and the latter died as a
supervening consequence.85 It refutes the invocation of lawful performance of duty,
mainly because there was no factual basis to support the belief of the accused that
the occupants were members of the NPA, as indeed they have not shown that they
had previously verified the whereabouts of the suspect vehicle. But while it
recognizes that the accused had merely responded to the call of duty when
summoned by Pamintuan through David, it is convinced that they had exceeded the
performance thereof when they fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it
turned out, by innocent individuals instead.86
As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the evidence
adduced before the Sandiganbayan as well the findings based thereon should not be
binding on them, the OSP explains that said petitioners, together with Pamintuan,
David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had previously withdrawn their motion for separate trial
and as directed later on submitted the case for decision as to them with the filing of
their memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due process to said petitioners in
view of their agreement for the reproduction of the evidence on the motion for bail at
the trial proper as well as by their manifestation to forego with the presentation of their
own evidence. The right to present witnesses is waivable. Also, where an accused is
jointly tried and testifies in court, the testimony binds the other accused, especially
where the latter has failed to register his objection thereto.87
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences that seem
to rest on loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the records of the case and
found that evidence nonetheless exists to support the penultimate finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
I.
It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at the situs
of the incident on the date and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco, in his
testimony – which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno – as well as Manguerra, Mario
Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits which had been offered in evidence by the
prosecution,88 explained that their presence at the scene was in response to the
information relayed by Pamintuan through David that armed rebel elements on board
a vehicle described to be that occupied by the victims were reportedly spotted in
Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that petitioners now appeal
to justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and under the concept
of mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it was not by accident or mistake but by
deliberation that the shooting transpired when it became apparent that the suspect
vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises as to whether or not there was
intention to harm or even kill the passengers aboard, and who among them had
discharged the bullets that caused the eventual death of Licup and injured Villanueva.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the
criminal.89 To this end, the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the joint
counter-affidavit90 of Andres Reyes and Manguerra; the counter-affidavit91 of Mario
Reyes; the joint counter-affidavit92 of Cunanan and Puno; the counter-affidavit93 of
Yapyuco; and the joint counter-affidavit94 of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno executed
immediately after the incident in question. In brief, Cunanan and Puno stated therein
that "[their] team was forced to fire at the said vehicle" when it accelerated after
warning shots were fired in air and when it ignored Yapyuco’s signal for it to stop; 95 in
their earlier affidavit they, together with Yapyuco, declared that they were
"constrained x x x to fire directly to (sic) the said fleeing vehicle." 96 Yapyuco’s open
court declaration, which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice
discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the subject jeepney after it allegedly
failed to stop when flagged down and second, at the tires thereof when it came clear
that it was trying to escape.97 He suggested – substantiating the implication in his
affidavit that it was "the whole team [which fired] at the fleeing vehicle" 98 – that the
bullets which hit the passenger side of the ill-fated jeepney could have come only
from the CHDFs posted inside the yard of Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and
Andres Reyes admitted having taken post while awaiting the arrival of the suspect
vehicle.99
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it was only
Manguerra from their group who discharged a firearm but only into the air to give
warning shots,100 and that it was the "policemen [who] directly fired upon" the
jeepney.101 Manguerra himself shared this statement.102 Yet these accounts do not sit
well with the physical evidence found in the bullet holes on the passenger door of the
jeepney which Dabor, in both her report and testimony, described to have come from
bullets sprayed from perpendicular and oblique directions. This evidence in fact
supports Yapyuco’s claim that he, Cunanan and Puno did fire directly at the jeepney
after it had made a right turn and had already moved past them such that the line of
fire to the passengers thereof would be at an oblique angle from behind. It also
bolsters his claim that, almost simultaneously, gunshots came bursting after the
jeepney has passed the spot where he, Cunanan and Puno had taken post, and
when the vehicle was already right in front of the yard of Naron’s house sitting on the
right side of the road after the curve and where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres
Reyes were positioned, such that the line of fire would be direct and perpendicular to
it.103
While Dabor’s ballistics findings are open to challenge for being inconclusive as to
who among the accused actually discharged their firearms that night, her report
pertaining to the examination of the ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney affirms the irreducible
fact that the CHDFs posted within the yard of Naron’s house had indeed sprayed
bullets at the said vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes seek to
insulate themselves by arguing that such finding cannot be applied to them as it is
evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted, they may not evade the
effect of their having withdrawn their motion for separate trial, their agreement to a
joint trial of the cases, and the binding effect on them of the testimony of their co-
accused, Yapyuco.104
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only
against said accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the
declarant or admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in
this case, during the trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-
examine the admitter, the admission is admissible against both accused because
then, it is transposed into a judicial admission.105 It is thus perplexing why, despite the
extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latter’s
testimony implicating them in the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to
present evidence when, in fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their
participation or non-participation in the offenses charged. We, therefore, reject their
claim that they had been denied due process in this regard, as they opted not to
testify and be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness in their
affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.
II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of
a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a)
the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right
or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right
or office.106 The justification is based on the complete absence of intent and
negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it
was committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.107 Where invoked, this
ground for non-liability amounts to an acknowledgment that the accused has caused
the injury or has committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be
penalized because the resulting injury or offense is a necessary consequence of the
due performance of his duty or the lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must
be shown that the acts of the accused relative to the crime charged were indeed
lawfully or duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such
hypothesis.
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code do not obtain in this case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate
law enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all
of them – who were either police and barangay officers or CHDF members tasked
with the maintenance of peace and order – were bound to, as they did, respond to
information of a suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs, therefore, is the
specific duty to identify the occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for firearms
inside it to validate the information they had received; they may even effect a
bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their suspects had just
committed, were committing or were bound to commit a crime. While, it may certainly
be argued that rebellion is a continuing offense, it is interesting that nothing in the
evidence suggests that the accused were acting under an official order to open fire at
or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances. Even more telling is the absence
of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as would threaten the
safety of any one of the accused, or having exhibited such defiance of authority that
would have instigated the accused, particularly those armed, to embark on a violent
attack with their firearms in self-defense. In fact, no material evidence was presented
at the trial to show that the accused were placed in real mortal danger in the presence
of the victims, except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were armed and
were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and
whether or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry
inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the prosecution at hand. Besides, even
assuming that they were as the accused believed them to be, the actuations of these
responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations
that arise in the legitimate course of performance of policing duties. The rules of
engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly knowledgeable and for
which he must always exercise the highest caution, do not require that he should
immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his
call. Pursuit without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal
feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more than the lawful
apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process pertains to other
government officers or agencies.108
A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is
reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily
harm.109 United States v. Campo110 has laid down the rule that in the performance of
his duty, an agent of the authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an
extreme case when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance, and finds no other
means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected and obeyed by the
offender. In case injury or death results from the exercise of such force, the same
could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the
officer had used necessary force.111 He is, however, never justified in using
unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to
dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise. 112 People v. Ulep113
teaches that –
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and
under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without
bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge
the necessity to kill. It may be true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a
dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal,
action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of
police officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither
capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear
and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a
sound discretion, and within the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot
countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who indiscriminately employ
force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always bear
in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society
must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights. 114
Thus, in People v. Tabag,115 where members of the Davao CHDF had killed four
members of a family in their home because of suspicions that they were NPA
members, and the accused sought exoneration by invoking among others the
justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court in
dismissing the claim and holding them liable for murder said, thus:
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of
the Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no means be
considered as done in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an office or
in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. Other than
"suspicion," there is no evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and
their children were members of the NPA. And even if they were members of the NPA,
they were entitled to due process of law. On that fateful night, they were peacefully
resting in their humble home expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day. Clearly,
therefore, nothing justified the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the
Magdasals. The massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style execution.116
Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney by claiming
that it failed to heed the first round of warning shots as well as the signal for it to stop
and instead tried to flee. While it is possible that the jeepney had been flagged down
but because it was pacing the dark road with its headlights dimmed missed
petitioners’ signal to stop, and compound to it the admitted fact that the passengers
thereof were drunk from the party they had just been to, 117 still, we find
incomprehensible petitioners’ quick resolve to use their firearms when in fact there
was at least one other vehicle at the scene – the Sarao jeepney owned by Yapyuco –
which they could actually have used to pursue their suspects whom they supposedly
perceived to be in flight.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity justifies
the use of force, and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such necessity. We
find, however, that petitioners failed in that respect. Although the employment of
powerful firearms does not necessarily connote unnecessary force, petitioners in this
case do not seem to have been confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at
the moving jeepney occupied by the victims. No explanation is offered why they, in
that instant, were inclined for a violent attack at their suspects except perhaps their
over-anxiety or impatience or simply their careless disposition to take no chances.
Clearly, they exceeded the fulfillment of police duties the moment they actualized
such resolve, thereby inflicting Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to
Villanueva and exposing the rest of the passengers of the jeepney to grave danger to
life and limb – all of which could not have been the necessary consequence of the
fulfillment of their duties.
III.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces
certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension
of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of
the prosecution.118 Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of
crime where it negates the intent component of the crime. 119 It may be a defense even
if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent.120 The inquiry is into the
mistaken belief of the defendant,121 and it does not look at all to the belief or state of
mind of any other person.122 A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the
mistake be honest and reasonable;123 (b) that it be a matter of fact;124 and (c) that it
negate the culpability required to commit the crime125 or the existence of the mental
state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.126
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United
States v. Ah Chong,127 but in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of
self-defense where the physical circumstances of the case had mentally manifested
to the accused an aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There, the accused,
fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his bedroom door being broken
open and, receiving no response from the intruder after having demanded
identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder
but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed against the door
and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the
intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted
because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused had no evil intent to
commit the charge, the Court explained:
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact
is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in
the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability, provided always there is
no fault or negligence on his part and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." x x x
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with
the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does
not believe them — he is legally guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the facts,
and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words,
and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious
authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that
notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes
self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without
fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly
according to what he thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him
though they are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme
measure. x x x 128
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis129 and Baxinela v. People,130 the justification of an
act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude
negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused. 131 Thus, Ah Chong further
explained that –
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held
criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for
which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed
them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the
actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To
this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such
circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance
or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.132
IV.
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide
has been established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal cases is that
the prosecution is bound by the invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its
own evidence and not on the evidence of the accused. The weakness of the defense
of the accused does not relieve the prosecution of its responsibility of proving guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.133 By reasonable doubt is meant that doubt engendered by
an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the
mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.134 The overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.135
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either
by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence. 136 Corpus delicti
consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the
commission of the act.137 In homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the
death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not
the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the
criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the
death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence,
direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is,
with intent to kill. Such evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and
the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the
killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors,
intent to kill is conclusively presumed.138 In such case, even if there is no intent to kill,
the crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal
law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the
aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. 139 Evidence of intent to kill is
crucial only to a finding of frustrated and attempted homicide, as the same is an
essential element of these offenses, and thus must be proved with the same degree
of certainty as that required of the other elements of said offenses. 140
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is
interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill
the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan, whose
picture depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners’ affidavits
as well as Yapyuco’s testimony are replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan
alone who harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who their
(petitioners’) minds that which they later on conceded to be a mistaken belief as to
the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had once
reported to him that Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with
NPA members and that the San Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were
employed was being penetrated by NPA members. He also affirmed Yapyuco’s claim
that there had been a number of ambuscades launched against members of law
enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas supposedly by NPA
members at around the time of the incident. But as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it
is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died during the pendency of these cases even
before his opportunity to testify in court emerged.141
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance and
materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an element
of a crime. It gains significance when the commission of a crime is established by
evidence purely circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive.142 The question of motive is
important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the
person who committed the act, but when there is no doubt that the defendant was the
one who caused the death of the deceased, it is not so important to know the reason
for the deed.143
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not intend
to kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their service firearms;
and the manner by which the bullets concentrated on the passenger side of the
jeepney permits no other conclusion than that the shots were intended for the
persons lying along the line of fire. We do not doubt that instances abound where the
discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of
intention to kill, and that there are instances where the attendant circumstances
conclusively establish that the discharge was not in fact animated by intent to kill. Yet
the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with which a specific act is committed, it is
always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the
attendant circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence.144
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30
caliber carbine.145 While the use of these weapons does not always amount to
unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level the
bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the possibility of the
passengers thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed that the subject
jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as
much too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to
which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the gunfire was aimed at
the tires – especially considering that petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law
enforcers or unskilled neophytes in encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the
firearms employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver – and in fact
even the driver himself – of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the
least, certain to be precise. This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of
petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to
them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this, their
natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the tires
thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence
we found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners’ actuations leaned towards the
latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was
seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel,
together with all the consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances of the
shooting breed no other inference than that the firing was deliberate and not
attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps v. State146 tells that:
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural
consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men
generally act deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and not from the
impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every man always thus acts, until the
contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed another, if the
circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves show that it was not intended,
but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by
the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.
V.
Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the
deliberate intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyuco’s
alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that he and his co-petitioners must be found
guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide.
Here is why:
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the
killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being the incident of another act performed without
malice.147 People v. Guillen148 and People v. Nanquil 149 declare that a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence. And in People v. Castillo,150 we held that that there can be no frustrated
homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack
of intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime of frustrated homicide cannot exist.
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or
more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not
be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted
with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that
two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once
found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned
or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.151
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to
the occurrence.1a\^/phi1 From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of
the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in
its execution.152 The instant case requires no proof of any previous agreement among
petitioners that they were really bent on a violent attack upon their suspects. While it
is far-fetched to conclude that conspiracy arose from the moment petitioners, or all of
the accused for that matter, had converged and strategically posted themselves at the
place appointed by Pamintuan, we nevertheless find that petitioners had been ignited
by the common impulse not to let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their authority
when it suddenly occurred to them that the vehicle was attempting to escape as it
supposedly accelerated despite the signal for it to stop and submit to them. As
aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were confronted with the convenient yet irrational
option to take no chances by preventing the jeepney’s supposed escape even if it
meant killing the driver thereof. It appears that such was their common purpose. And
by their concerted action of almost simultaneously opening fire at the jeepney from
the posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate environment of the
suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver, they did achieve
their object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on the passenger side of
the jeepney at angular and perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there is no definitive
proof that tells which of all the accused had discharged their weapons that night and
which directly caused the injuries sustained by Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup,
yet we adopt the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that since only herein petitioners were
shown to have been in possession of their service firearms that night and had fired
the same, they should be held collectively responsible for the consequences of the
subject law enforcement operation which had gone terribly wrong. 153
VI.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the
crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup
and for the non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an
acquittal together with the other accused, of the charge of attempted murder with
respect to the unharmed victims.154 The allegation of evident premeditation has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence is consistent with the
fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the minds of petitioners as instantaneously
as they perceived their suspects to be attempting flight and evading arrest. The same
is true with treachery, inasmuch as there is no clear and indubitable proof that the
mode of attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by petitioners.
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion
temporal whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51,
warrants a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for principals in a
consummated homicide. Petitioners in these cases are entitled to the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating
circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the
penalty from six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have denominated the same as
prision mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal.

However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had committed
attempted homicide, a modification of the penalty is in order. The penalty of
attempted homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that of a consummated homicide,
which is prision correccional. Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence to be meted out on
petitioners is within the minimum period of prision correccional, which is six (6)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional,
whereas the minimum of the sentence, which under the Indeterminate Sentence Law
must be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense,
which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.

We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with

prevailing jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to
indemnify the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual
damages and ₱50,000.00 in moral damages. With respect to Noel Villanueva,
petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of ₱51,700.00
as actual and compensatory damages and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages. The
award of exemplary damages should be deleted, there being no aggravating
circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27,
1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer

the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614,
the indeterminate sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years and
four (4) months of prision correccional, as the maximum, and Six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.

(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally,

the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as
actual damages, ₱50,000.00 in moral damages, as well as Noel
Villanueva, in the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and
compensatory damages, and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167147 August 3, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
GENARO CAYABYAB y FERNANDEZ, Appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez was sentenced to death by the
RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 01-1311, for rape
committed against six-year-old Alpha Jane Bertiz.1
Alpha Jane was born on November 26, 1994,2 and the eldest among the six children of
Conrado and Metchie Bertiz.3 She was six years and nine months old when the rape
was committed on August 7, 2001.
On that day, at around 6:00 p.m., Alpha Jane was at home in Manlunas St., Lagoon
Area, Villamor Airbase, PasayCity, taking care of her younger siblings. Her mother went
to buy kerosene, while her father was out. On the guise of teaching arithmetic, appellant
went to the victim's house and asked her to lie down on her father's bed. When she
refused, appellant removed her clothes and his own clothes, then forced her to lie down
on the bed and laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Alpha Jane
shouted in pain which startled the appellant who sprayed her with tear gas and left. 4
Her mother, Metchie arrived shortly thereafter and Alpha Jane told her what had
happened. She immediately reported the incident to the barangay officials and brought
Alpha Jane to the Philippine Air Force General Hospital for medical examination. She
also sought assistance from the police at the 521st Air Police Squadron who, after
gathering information from the victim, arrested the appellant at his house. 5 Alpha Jane
was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at CampCrame the following day, 6 and on
August 10, 2001, to the Child Protection Unit (CPU) at UP-PGH7 for further medical
examinations, which both found hymenal abrasions and lacerations, respectively, on
the victim's genitalia.8
On August 10, 2001, appellant was charged with rape before the
RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity in an Information that reads:
That on or about the 07th day of August 2001, in Pasay City, Metro , Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, GENARO
CAYABYAB Y FERNANDEZ, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously by
means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge of ALPHA JEAN BERTIS Y
JONGCO, a minor six (6) years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that on August 7, 2001,
he was plying his normal route inside the Villamor Airbase as a tricycle driver from 6:00
a.m. until 7:00 p.m.10 After returning the tricycle to its owner Roberto Gabo at the corner
of 14th and 15th Sts., Villamor Airbase, he reached home at around 7:30 p.m and went
to sleep after eating dinner.11 At around 9:30 p.m., he woke up to urinate at the back of
their house when three (3) policemen arrested and mauled him. 12 At the headquarters,
he was forced to admit the rape13 while the victim's father asked for money in exchange
for his release, which he refused.14
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found
the victim's testimony consistent with the medical findings of the doctors from the PNP
Crime Laboratory and CPU, UP-PGH. Moreover, it applied the rule that an
unsubstantiated defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over a positive and
categorical testimony of a minor victim. Finally, it appreciated the qualifying
circumstance of minority and imposed the penalty of death. The dispositive portion
reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt
of the accused Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez beyond reasonable doubt for rape as
defined and penalized under Article 335, paragraph 3 and 4 as the victim herein is only
six (6) years old and hereby sentence accused Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez to
DEATH and to pay civil indemnity in the amount of Php 75,000.00 and moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of Php 50,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.15
The case was directly elevated to this Court for automatic review. However, pursuant
to our decision in People v. Mateo16 modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as direct appeals from the Regional Trial Court to
the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, this case was transferred to the Court of Appeals, 17 which affirmed
in toto the decision of the trial court, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to
suffer the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED in toto, and accordingly certifies
the case and elevate the entire records to the Supreme Court for review pursuant to
Rule124, Section 13[a] of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.
SO ORDERED.18
We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason
to disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate court. There is no doubt that
appellant raped Alpha Jane on August 7, 2001 inside their house at Villamor Airbase,
PasayCity. This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important
aspect of evidence19 which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and Q. Did you follow him?
attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by counsel.
A. No, sir, I did not follow.
On direct examination, Alpha Jane narrated the incident and positively identified
appellant as her assailant, thus: Q. And so what else happened?

Fiscal Barrera: A. He removed my clothes 'hinubaran niya ako; he removed my shorts and panty.

Now at around 6:00 p.m. of August 7, 2001 where were you? Q. After Kuya Jimmy removed your shorts and panty, what happened?

A. I was inside our house. A. 'Pinatungan po niya ako', he laid on top of me.

Q. You mean your house at lagoon area, Villamor Air Base, Pasay City? Q. What happened when he laid on top of you?

A. Yes, sir. A. He inserted his penis inside my private part.

Q. What about you mother and father where were they on that date and time? Fiscal Barrera:

A. My mother bought gas while my father was 'naglalakad ng spray gun for painting. What did you do when this Kuya Jimmy inserted his penis to your private part?

Q. Who were left in your house on August 7, 2001 at 6:00 p.m. while your mother A. I shouted, sir.
bought gas and your father was walking with his spray gun used for painting?
Q. After Kuya Jimmy inserted his penis inside your vagina and you shouted, what
A. My brothers and sisters. happened?

Q. While in your house on said date and time do you know of any unusual incident that A. 'Pinakawalan niya ako', he released me.
happened to you?
Q. Then what happened?
A. Yes, sir.
A. 'Tinergas niya ako.
Q. What was that unusual incident that happened to you?
Q. After Kuya Jimmy teargas you, what happened?
A. Kuya Jimmy entered our house.
A. I run away.
Q. After Kuya Jimmy entered your house, what happened next?
Q. Regarding what Kuya Jimmy did to you, did you report it to your mother?
A. Kuya Jimmy called for me inside our house.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you do when Kuya Jimmy called for you?
Q. This Kuya Jimmy whom you said went inside your house and removed your shorts
A. He asked me one plus one and I answered two. and panty and thereafter inserted his penis inside your vagina on August 7, 2001 can
you point at him if you see him?
Q. After that what else happened?
A. Yes, sir.
A. He asked me to lie down on my father's bed.
Q. If this Kuya Jimmy Cayabyab is inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is he inside the courtroom?
Interpreter:
Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name of Genaro Cayabyab.20
Despite grueling cross-examination by the defense suggesting extortion by the victim's
father, Alpha Jane remained steadfast and consistent that it was appellant who raped
her. The victim's testimony was supported by the medico-legal report of the medico-
legal experts from the PNP Crime Laboratory and CPU, UP-PGH, to wit:
ANO-GENITAL
EXAMINATION
Hymen: Tanner Stage 2, hymenal transection at 5 oclock, Type of Hymen: Anullar
...
IMPRESSIONS
Evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma.
(Exh. 'L', p. 8, Records)
Dr. Baluyut explained that in her findings, the terms hymenal transection at 5 oclock
and laceration at 5 oclock are synonymous (TSN, November 20, 2001, p. 6). Dr. Baluyut
further explained that there was prior injury to the victim's hymen which might have
been caused by the insertion of a blunt object such as an erected penis which was
compatible with the victim's claim that she had been raped (TSN, November 20, 2001,
pp. 6-7).21
The trial court correctly imposed the death penalty.
Rape, such as committed against a 'child below seven (7) years old', is a dastardly and
repulsive crime which merit no less than the penalty of death pursuant to Article 266-B
of the Revised Penal Code. This special qualifying circumstance of age must be
specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information and proven during the
trial; otherwise the penalty of death cannot be imposed.
In the case of People v. Pruna,22 this Court took note of conflicting pronouncements
concerning the appreciation of minority, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance. There were a number of cases where no birth certificate was
presented where the Court ruled that the age of the victim was not duly proved. 23 On
the other hand, there were also several cases where we ruled that the age of the rape
victim was sufficiently established despite the failure of the prosecution to present the
birth certificate of the offended party to prove her age.24 Thus, in order to remove any
confusion, we set in Pruna the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of
the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony
will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.78
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him.25
To paraphrase Pruna, the best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original
birth certificate or certified true copy thereof; in their absence, similar authentic
documents may be presented such as baptismal certificates and school records. If the
original or certified true copy of the birth certificate is not available, credible testimonies
of the victim's mother or a member of the family may be sufficient under certain
circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other authentic documents
and the testimonies of the victim's mother or other qualified relative are unavailable,
the testimony of the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused.
In Pruna, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as the
baptismal certificate of the victim was presented to prove her age. The trial court based
its finding that Lizette was 3 years old when she was raped on the Medico-Legal Report,
and the fact that the defense did not contest her age and questioned her qualification
to testify because of her tender age. It was however noted that the Medico-Legal Report
never mentioned her age and only the testimony of her mother was presented to
establish Lizette's age. The Court found that there was uncertainty as to the victim's
exact age, hence, it required that corroborative evidence, such as her birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be introduced in evidence
in order that the qualifying circumstance of 'below seven (7) years old is appreciated.
Unlike in Pruna, the trial court in this case made a categorical finding that Alpha Jane
was only 6 years old at the time she was raped, based not only on the testimonies of
the complainant and her mother, but also on the strength of the photocopy of Alpha
Jane's birth certificate. It is well to note that the defense did not object to the
presentation of the birth certificate; on the contrary it admitted the same 'as to fact of
birth.
We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis26 that a mere photocopy of the
birth certificate, in the absence of any showing that the original copy was lost or
destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault of the prosecution, does not prove the
victim's minority, for said photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence for that
purpose.
However, there are other exceptions to the 'best evidence rule as expressly provided
under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. ' When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office. [Emphasis supplied]
Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of the local civil
registrar who is a public officer. Clearly, therefore, the presentation of the photocopy of
the birth certificate of Alpha Jane is admissible as secondary evidence to prove its
contents. Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion,
whenever in the case at hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of
the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production. 27
In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the contents of the photocopied birth
certificate; in fact it admitted the same. Having failed to raise a valid and timely objection
against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a primary
evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is bound thereby. 28
In fine, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved that Alpha Jane was only six-
years-old, being born on November 26, 1994, when the rape incident happened on
August 7, 2001.
Anent the award of damages, we sustain the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence that if the crime is qualified by
circumstances which warrant the imposition of the death penalty by applicable
amendatory laws, the accused should be ordered to pay the complainant the amount
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The Court notes that the trial court awarded P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages. Moral damages is distinct from exemplary damages, hence must be awarded
separately. The award of moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases without
need of further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed
that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 29
However, the award of P50,000.00 must be increased to P75,000.00 in accord with
prevailing jurisprudence.30 As regards exemplary damages, we held in People v.
Catubig31 that the presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, entitles the offended party to an award of exemplary damages. Conformably,
we award the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in accord with the
prevailing jurisprudence.32
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in
Criminal Case No. 01-1311, as affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00258, finding appellant Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and imposing the penalty of DEATH33 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is further ordered to pay the
victim P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168168 September 14, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On January 26, 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with
two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape in the complaints which
read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-125
That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant Maricar
Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 10 years of age, against her will
and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Criminal Case No. 96-150
That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in the Municipality of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 12 years
of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Criminal Case No. 96-151
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus
commencing the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but
nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce it, as a
consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due
to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Complainant was born on August 26, 1983, and was 10 years old when she was first
sexually abused in the morning of September 1993. While inside their house in Sucat,
Paraaque, appellant entered her room and laid down beside her. He removed her
clothes and asked her to lie face down then inserted his penis into her anus.
Complainant cried and felt so much pain, but she kept the incident to herself as her
father might hurt her.5
A few days later, appellant again ravished her. After removing his clothes, he asked
her to lie on her side facing him and to place her thigh over his. While in that position,
appellant inserted his penis into her vagina which caused tremendous pain.6 As in the
first incident, complainant kept the ordeal to herself. It was only in November 1995
that she confided the sexual abuses to her mother.
On December 29, 1995, appellant again assaulted her daughter. While leaning on the
kitchen sink, he raised her t-shirt, fondled and kissed her breasts. He then removed
their shorts, fondled her vagina and inserted his penis, but when her brother Edwin
went out of his room, appellant immediately asked her to dress up.7
The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996. Appellant laid
complainant down on the sofa then placed himself on top of her and made pumping
motion even with their shorts on. Appellant stopped only when he heard the arrival of
his wife.8
On January 3, 1996, complainant and her mother visited a relative in Cainta, Rizal,
who upon learning of the abuses done by the appellant, advised them to go to Camp
Crame where they filed a complaint.9 The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime
Laboratory examined complainant and found her to have suffered deep healed
hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin state.10
Appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified that he married Maria
Loreto V. Dimaano on December 25, 1976 and begot three children with her, namely,
Edwin, Eric, and Maricar. He alleged that he worked in several companies abroad 11
but admitted that he was in the Philippines in September 1993. He contended though
that he could not have raped complainant because he was always in the office from
7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. waiting to be dispatched to another assignment overseas.12
He claimed it was impossible for him to rape his daughter on December 29, 1995 or
January 1, 1996 because there were other people in the house. He argued that had
he raped complainant, then she would not have accompanied him to the Paraaque
Police Station and Barangay Hall of San Antonio to apply for police clearance and
barangay I.D., and to Uniwide Shopping Center at Sucat, Paraaque, where they
applied for membership at the Video City Club.13 He also maintained that the fact that
his daughter was in a non-virgin state did not conclusively prove that he was
responsible for it because it is also possible that his daughter had sexual intercourse
with another man her age.14
The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be spontaneous and credible.
She narrated the obscene details of her harrowing experience which no girl of tender
age would have known unless she herself had experienced it. It found the delay in
reporting the rape understandable due to the fear complainant had of her father who
had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the quarrel between complainant's parents was
not sufficient motive for the wife to lodge a serious charge of rape against appellant. It
disregarded the Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng
Sumbong since complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the
same. Besides, she testified in open court that she was pursuing the case against her
father. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Edgardo Dimaano is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of rape (2 counts) and the crime of attempted rape. For the rape
committed in September 1993, he is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
For the rape on December 29, 1995, he is imposed the supreme penalty of death.
And for the crime of attempted rape, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act
No. 4103 as amended), he is sentenced to a penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
prision correccional medium to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor
maximum. He is ordered to indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.15
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257 convicting accused-appellant
Edgardo Dimaano of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
In Criminal Case No. 96-125, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found
guilty of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to a
penalty of reclusion perpetua is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php50,000.00 as moral damages and
Php25,0000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO, as found
guilty of qualified rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, and sentenced to death penalty, is also ordered to
pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php75,000.00
as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 96-151, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found
guilty of attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years
and 1 day to 10 years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused-appellant is also
ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php30,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php25,000.00 as moral damages, and Php10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Amended Rules to Govern Review of
Death Penalty Cases (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 15 October 2004), this case is
CERTIFIED to the Supreme Court for review.
Let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.16
In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE
PROSECUTION HAS OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.
II. WHETHER OR NOR THE VOLUNTARY AND DUE
EXECUTION OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE BY THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DULY
CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR WHICH PUT TO DOUBT THE
REASONS BEHIND THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES
OF RAPE AGAINST HEREIN ACCUSED.17
Appellant contends that if complainant's accusations were true, then she could have
reported them to the authorities when she accompanied him to Paraaque Police
Station and the Barangay Hall of San Antonio or to their relatives when she had the
opportunity to do so. He also argues that had the trial court considered the
Compromise Agreement and Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng Sumbong, it
would have known that complainant was only pressured by her mother into filing the
complaint.
We are not persuaded.
This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect of
evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude during direct
and cross-examination by counsel.18 Absent any showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility deserves the
appellate court's highest respect.19
It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally given full
weight and credit, more so if she is a minor. The revelation of an innocent child whose
chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the
trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her
complaint. In so testifying, she could only have been impelled to tell the truth,
especially in the absence of proof of ill motive.20
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the A: Because he might hurt me.
testimony of the complainant who was only 12 years old when she narrated to the
court the violations of her person as follows: Q: After that incident in September 1993, do you recall any other incident that
occurred?
For rape committed in September 1993:
A: There is, Maam.
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
Q: When was it?
When was the first time that he committed sexual assault upon you?
A: After a few days after the first incident.
A: September 1993.
Q: After he entered your room, what happened next?
COURT:
A: He laid beside me and he removed my clothes.
No specific date?
Q: What did your father do with the clothes he was wearing?
A: I cannot remember, Maam.
A: He removed his clothes.
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
Q: After removing his clothes, what happened next, if any?
Can you remember how old were you at that time?
A: We were lying in my bed and he asked me to lie on my side ' pinatagilid niya ako.
A: 10 years old, Maam.
Q: After he asked you to lie down on your side, what happened next, if any?
Q: So, after he removed your T-shirt, bra and pan(t)y and shorts, what happened
next, if anything happened? A: He asked me to raise my right leg and placed it on his side because he was then
lying on his side.
A: He asked me to lie face down. Pinadapa po niya ako.
Q: After he asked you to place your right thigh over his left thigh, what happened
Q: After he asked you to lie face down, what happened next? next, if any?

RECORD: The witness is crying. A: He inserted his penis into my organ.21

A: He inserted in my anus ' ipinasok niya ang titi niya sa puwet ko. For rape committed on December 29, 1995:

Q: Did you tell anybody about what happened to you? Q: On December 29, 1995, do you remember of any unusual incident that happened?

A: No, Maam. A: There was, Maam.

Q: Why not? Q: What is that incident?

A: Because I was afraid of my father. A: I was raped by my father on that day.

Q: Why are you afraid of your father? Q: Where were you on that day when you said he raped you?
A: I was then at the kitchen of our house. A: He held my organ.

Q: What were you doing at the kitchen at that time? ATTY. MALLARES:

A: I was then sitting at our dining set. At this juncture, Your Honor, may we request witness to be more specific with respect
to organ.
Q: What about your father, what he doing?
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
A: He was cooking.
When you say organ', what do you mean?
Q: What happened while sitting at the dining set, if any?
A: Pekpek.
A: He told me to approach him.
COURT: Proceed.
Q: After you approached him, what happened next?
ANSWER:
A: I was leaning then at the kitchen sink and he asked me to embrace him.
After he held my vagina, he also put down his shorts and brief.
Q: What happened after you embraced him?
Q: After putting down his shorts and brief, what happened next?
A: After that, he raised my T-shirt.
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.22
Q: After raising your T-shirt, what happened next?
For Attempted rape committed on January 1, 1996:
A: He held my breast.
Q: Do you recall of any incident that happened on Jan 1, 199[6] 3:00 to 4:00 P.M.?
Q: After that, what happened next?
A: We were in our sala on the sofa.
A: He kept kissing my breast.
Q: When you say 'we', who are those you are referring to?
Q: How many times did he kiss your breast?
A: Me and my father.
A: Many times.
Q: While you and your father were in the living room and on the sofa, what
Q: What happened next after he kissed you breast? happened?

A: He put my shorts down.
Q: After putting your shorts down, what happened next, if any?
A: He also put down my panty.
Q: After putting down your panty, what happened next, if any?
A: While we were on the sofa, my father was then raising my T-shirt and kissing my
breast.
Q: What were you wearing at that time?
A: Shorts, T-shirt, bra and panty.
Q: What did your father do with your shorts, T-shirt and bra?
A: He raised them.
Q: What about your father, how was he dressed at that time?
A: Shorts and T-shirt.
Q: After raising your bra and T-shirt, what happened next?
A: While he was kissing my breast, we were already lying on the sofa, then he went
on top of me.
Q: After he went on top of you, what happened next, if any?
A: He was forcing to insert his penis while we were still wearing shorts.
Q: So, you mean to say, you were still wearing shorts at that time?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: What happened next when he was forcing to push his penis into your vagina?
A: It did not push through because my mother suddenly arrived.23
The trial court believed the complainant and held that:
The testimony of Maricar of her ignominious experience contains all the indicia of
truth. It is spontaneous, direct and clear. It is vivid and complete with details. Her
testimony is truthful and convincing. Her credibility is beyond question.
The Court believes that at her tender age, Maricar could not make public the offense,
undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying
to all its gory details if she has not in fact been raped. The Court believes that a girl
who is only twelve (12) years old would not ordinarily file a rape complaint against
anybody, much less her own father, if it is not true.24
We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason
to disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
Contrary to appellant's assertion, complainant's credibility was not diminished by her
failure to report the sexual abuses to the authorities and her relatives despite
opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting the rape incidents, especially in the face of
threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim, more so when the
lecherous attacker is her own father. Strong apprehensions brought about by fear,
stress, or anxiety can easily put the offended party to doubt or even distrust what
should otherwise be a positive attitude of bringing the culprit to justice. The Court has
thus considered justified the filing of complaints for rape months, even years, after the
commission of the offense.25
In the case at bar, the delay of more than two years is not an indication that the
charges were fabricated for complainant's reactions were consistent with reason. Her
complete obedience to appellant, her lack of struggle and the studied silence she kept
about her ordeal were all brought about by genuine fear posed by her own father
against her.
Appellant's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant
consideration. A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no
persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. The
unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible
that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the appellant arrested by the
police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the
humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, repeating her accusations in
open court and recounting her anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare
that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case.26
Too, complainant repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that
no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature 27 and had shown her resolve to
continue with the prosecution of the cases.28 Besides, the trial court is not bound to
dismiss the cases, as it is still within its discretion whether or not to proceed with the
prosecution,29 considering that the compromise agreement and the affidavit of
desistance were executed long after the cases have been filed in court.
Moreover, a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the State
belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes.30 By itself, an affidavit of
desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in
court. A private complainant loses the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the
rape charge should proceed, because the case was already filed and must therefore
continue to be heard by the trial court.31
In addition, a careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance reveals that complainant
never retracted her allegation that she was raped by her father. Neither did she give
any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about the rape. All she stated in the
affidavit was that she had decided to withdraw the complaints after the appellant
agreed not to disturb the complainant; to consent to annul his marriage; allow his wife
to solely manage the conjugal properties; and entrust the custody of his children to
his wife. Rather than contradict, this affidavit reinforces complainant's testimony that
appellant raped her on several occasions.
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and
without consent.1âwphi1 If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and
consent becomes immaterial not only because force is not an element of statutory
rape, but the absence of a free consent is presumed. Conviction will therefore lie,
provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at
the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it was
done through force, violence, intimidation or threat. 32
We have ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not
even be employed where the overpowering moral influence of appellant, who is
private complainant's father, would suffice. The moral and physical dominion of the
father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires.33 The
instant case is no exception. Appellant took advantage of his moral and physical
ascendancy to unleash his lechery upon his daughter.
Hence, under the above circumstances, we affirm the trial court's conviction in
Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150 for the crimes of rape committed in
September 1993 and on December 29, 1995. However, we acquit appellant in
Criminal Case No. 96-151 for the crime of attempted rape for failure to allege in the
complaint the specific acts constitutive of attempted rape.
The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is again quoted as
follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus
commencing the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but
nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce it, as a
consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due
to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.34
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.35 What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.36 The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts
and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of
alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his
defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.37
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not
allege specific acts or omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither
does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts
of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to
rape the complainant does not satisfy the test of sufficiency of a complaint or
information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted the complaint.
This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of
conviction; otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of
the nature of the accusation against him.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case
No. 96-125 as the rape was committed in September 1993 prior to the effectivity of
R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, on December 31, 1993.
Prior to R.A. No. 7659, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for the the crime of rape, when committed against a woman who is
under 12 years old or is demented. Anent the rape in Criminal Case No. 96-150 which
was committed on December 29, 1995, Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
thus applies. It provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, appellant was correctly sentenced to death as the
special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were properly alleged in
the information and proved during trial by the testimonies of the complainant, her
mother and the appellant himself; they were also supported by the photocopy of the
marriage certificate and birth certificate, respectively.
In the case of People v. Cayabyab,38 this Court, in affirming the death penalty, held
that a photocopy of the birth certificate is admissible to prove the age of the victim, as
the original thereof is a public record in the custody of a public officer. The admission
of this secondary evidence is one of the exceptions to the 'best evidence rule under
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Further, we held that
production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion,
whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and
no other useful purpose will be served by requiring its production.

Indubitably, the marriage and birth certificates are public records in the custody of the
local civil registrar who is a public officer. The presentation, therefore of their
photocopies is admissible as secondary evidence to prove their contents. It is also
well to note that appellant did not dispute their contents when offered as evidence to
prove relationship and minority. Having failed to raise a valid and timely objection
against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a primary
evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is bound thereby.39

Anent the awards of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the awards of
civil indemnity and exemplary damages, which the trial court lumped together for all
the crimes committed, by separately awarding the sums of P50,000.0040 and
P75,000.0041 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150,
respectively, and P25,000.0042 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape, in line
with the prevailing jurisprudence.

The award of civil indemnity, which is in the nature of actual or compensatory

damages, is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.43 On the other hand, exemplary
damages is awarded when the commission of the offense is attended by an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. 44

Finally, the awards of P50,000.0045 and P75,000.0046 as moral damages in Criminal

Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, by the Court of Appeals are also
sustained in line with the prevailing jurisprudence. The award of moral damages is
automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the
commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 47

WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.00263

affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, finding appellant Edgardo Dimaano GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his own daughter,
Maricar Dimaano, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and DEATH,
respectively; and ordering him to pay the complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-125
the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and in Criminal Case No. 96-150 the amounts of
75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED. Appellant is however ACQUITTED for the crime
of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for failure of the complaint to allege
the specific acts or omissions constituting the offense.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142944. April 15, 2005
EDENBERT MADRIGAL AND VIRGILIO MALLARI, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND JOSE MALLARI, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45488, to wit:
1. Decision dated 15 October 1999,1 affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial
Court at Olongapo City in a suit for annulment, redemption and damages with prayer
for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, thereat commenced by
the herein private respondent against the petitioners; and
2. Resolution dated 10 April 2000,2 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The case is cast against the following factual backdrop:
Private respondent Jose Mallari and his wife Fermina Mallari are the owners of a 340-
square meter residential lot with a 2-storey residential house erected thereon, situated
at Olongapo City. The couple had ten (10) children, five (5) of whom are staying with
them in the same house while the other five (5) are either residing abroad or elsewhere
in the Philippines.
In need of money for his wife’s planned travel to the United States, Jose thought of
mortgaging the above property with a bank. However, his son Virgilio Mallari who is
residing with his own family somewhere in San Ildefonso, Bulacan convinced Jose not
to proceed with the intended mortgage and to instead assign to him a portion of the
same property, assuring his father that the latter could continue in occupancy of the
property and that he will allow his sister Elizabeth who operates a store thereat to
continue with the same. Virgilio told his father, however, that he will occupy one of the
rooms in the house in case he goes to Olongapo City on vacation and that he will
renovate the other room and reserve it for his mother when she comes back from the
States. Virgilio assured his father that he will not dispose of the property without his
father’s consent and that the latter could redeem the said property any time he acquires
money.
And so, finding no reason to doubt Virgilio’s words, Jose did not anymore proceed with
his original idea of mortgaging the property with a bank. Instead, on 22 October 1987,
he and his wife Fermina executed a document denominated as "Deed of Absolute
Sale", whereunder the couple appeared to have conveyed to their son Virgilio Mallari
the house and lot in question for a consideration of ₱50,000.00 although the property
easily commands much more at that time. Worse, the deed of conveyance described
the properties sold as a one-storey residential house and the 135-square meter lot
whereon it stands even as the subject properties actually consist of a 2-storey
residential house sitting on a 340-square meter parcel of land.
Things turned for the worse to the unsuspecting Jose Mallari when, without his
knowledge, his son Virgilio, via a document bearing date 25 June 1988 and entitled
"Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan", sold the same property for the same amount of
₱50,000.00 to Edenbert Madrigal, a longtime neighbor of the Mallaris in the area.
True enough, sometime thereafter, to Jose’s great shock, he was demanded by
Edenbert Madrigal to vacate the subject property. It was then that Jose came to know
for the first time of the sale of his property by his son Virgilio in favor of Edenbert
Madrigal thru the aforementioned June 25, 1988 "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan".
It was against the foregoing backdrop of events when, on 7 September 1988, in the
Regional Trial Court at Olongapo City, Jose Mallari filed against his son Virgilio Mallari
and Edenbert Madrigal the complaint for annulment, redemption and damages with
prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order in this case. In his
complaint, docketed in the same court as Civil Case No. 481-0-88 and raffled to Branch
72 thereof, plaintiff Jose Mallari prayed that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him
and his wife Fermina on 22 October 1987 in favor of their son Virgilio Mallari be
declared null and void, or, in the alternative, that he be allowed to redeem the subject
property at a reasonable price. He likewise prayed the court for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or to issue ex parte a temporary restraining order enjoining defendants
Virgilio Mallari and Edenbert Madrigal from entering, demolishing or introducing
improvements on the subject properties, plus an award of actual and moral damages
and attorney’s fees.
After due proceedings, the trial court, in a decision dated 29 September 1993,3
rendered judgment for plaintiff Jose Mallari by ordering defendant Edenbert Madrigal
to allow the former to redeem the subject property based on the same amount it was
sold to him by his co-defendant Virgilio Mallari, and for the two (2) defendants jointly
and severally to pay plaintiff Jose Mallari moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and the cost of suit. More specifically, the trial court’s decision dispositively reads:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds and so holds that since plaintiff has
sufficiently established preponderance of evidence against the defendants, judgment
is hereby rendered ordering defendant Edenbert Madrigal to allow plaintiff to redeem
the subject property based on the consideration of sale marked as Exhibit ‘B’; and for
defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff (1) moral damages in the sum of
₱15,000.00; (2) exemplary damages of ₱5,000.00; (3) ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
and (4) to pay the cost of suit.
All claims of defendants are denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."
Obviously dissatisfied, both defendants went on appeal to the Court of Appeals whereat
their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 45488.
As stated at threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in a decision dated 15 October
1999,4 affirmed en toto the appealed decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding that the lower court did not err in issuing the assailed
Decision, this Court hereby AFFIRMS the same in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
In time, appellants Virgilio Mallari and Edenbert Madrigal moved for a reconsideration
but their motion was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution of 10 April 2000.5
Hence, their present recourse, submitting for our consideration the following issues:
"I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE IS A MORTGAGE
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
PETITIONER EDENBERT MADRIGAL WAS A BUYER ON (sic) GOOD FAITH
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S DECISION AWARDING MORAL, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT"
We DENY.
Petitioners fault the two (2) courts below for construing the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by private respondent Jose Mallari and his wife Fermina Mallari in favor of
their son Virgilio Mallari as an equitable mortgage and not as an outright sale as the
document itself proclaims.
We rule and so hold that both courts correctly construed the aforementioned Deed of
Absolute Sale as an equitable mortgage and not a sale, as it purports to be. As aptly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision of 15 October 1999, to which
we are in full accord:
"xxx. Evidence clearly shows that there was indeed no intent to sell the subject
property. Rather, what transpired between the parties, who were father and son, was
only a mortgage involving ₱50,000.00 over a portion of a lot with a house in Olongapo
City. Circumstances surrounding the transaction between [respondent Jose Mallari]
and [petitioner] Virgilio Mallari pointed only to one thing, that [respondent Jose Mallari]
was in need of money to finance the US trip of his wife and he planned to mortgage the
subject property with a bank but he was prevailed by his son, herein [petitioner] Virgilio
Mallari, not to proceed with his plan and he gave a tempting offer to his father which
the latter cannot refuse. In dire need of money, coupled with the fact that the one who
offered help was his son who agreed to all the conditions such as, the property will not
be disposed without the consent of [respondent]; petitioner [Virgilio Mallari]will renovate
a room which will be used by his mother upon her return from the US; [petitioner Virgilio
Mallari] will allow his sister to continue using a portion of the property as a store; one
room will be for [petitioner Virgilio Mallari’s] use while on vacation; and [respondent
Jose Mallari] would redeem the property as soon as his finances will improve and for
[petitioner Virgilio Mallari] to return the same, [respondent Jose Mallari] signed a
document, a Deed of Sale, although the agreement was only a mortgage. The
consideration appearing in the Deed of Sale is grossly inadequate considering the
location of the property, the area and the fact that it was a two-storey building or house.
If the intention was really to sell, why was there a need for [petitioner Virgilio Mallari] to
seek the consent of [respondent Jose Mallari] if the property will be sold to third
person?"
Consistent with their thesis that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Virgilio’s parents is clearly a document of sale as its very language unmistakably states,
petitioners fault the trial court for receiving parol evidence to establish that the
instrument in question is actually one of equitable mortgage. Indirectly, petitioners also
put the Court of Appeals to task for giving weight to those evidence instead of rejecting
them, conformably with the Parol Evidence Rule under Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, we cannot view the Deed of Absolute Sale in question in isolation of the
circumstances under which the same was executed by Virgilio’s parents, more so in
the light of his father’s disavowal of what the document, on its face, purports to state.
Then, too, there is the ruling of this Court in Lustan vs. CA6 to the effect that even if
the document appears to be a sale, parol evidence may be resorted to if the same does
not express the true intent of the parties. In the very words of Lustan:
"Even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property
may prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the
fact that the document does not express the true intent of the parties. In this case, parol
evidence then becomes competent and admissible to prove that the instrument was in
truth and in fact given merely as a security for the repayment of a loan. And upon proof
of the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the agreement or understanding
in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the
contract".
In any event, at bottom of petitioners’ first submission is their inability to accept the
factual findings of the two (2) courts below that the transaction between petitioner
Virgilio Mallari and his parents, albeit denominated as one of absolute sale, is in reality
an equitable mortgage. In short, petitioners would want us to revisit the factual findings
of both courts, scrutinize and examine those findings anew and calibrate the validity of
their conclusions on the basis of our own factual assessment.
The desired task cannot be done. Time and again, we have made it clear that this Court Unfortunately for the petitioners, however, we have made a close hard look into this
is not a trier of facts, and that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of case and found none of the foregoing exceptions as obtaining herein to warrant our
law may be raised in this Court. To reiterate what we have said in Bernardo vs. CA:7 departure from the established norm.

"The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have
been committed by the lower court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It leaves
these matters to the lower court, which have more opportunity and facilities to examine
these matters. This same Court has declared that it is the policy of the Court to defer
to the factual findings of the trial judge, who has the advantage of directly observing the
witnesses on the stand and to determine their demeanor whether they are telling or
distorting the truth."
And again in Remalante vs. Tibe:8
"The rule in this jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. ‘The jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising
the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive.’ [Chan vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, reiterating a long line of
decisions]. This Court has emphatically declared that ‘it is not the function of the
Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being
limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court’
[Tiongco v. De la Merced, G.R. No. L-24426, July 25, 1974, 58 SCRA 89; Corona vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62482, April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 865; Banigued vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47531, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 596]."
Nor are we inclined to disturb the findings of the two (2) courts below that petitioner
Edenbert Madrigal is not buyer in good faith. Again, a reversal of such finding would
impose upon us a reevaluation of the same set of facts appreciated by said courts in
arriving at their common conclusion that Madrigal, contrary to what he proclaims
himself to be, is not a buyer in good faith. At any rate, we nonetheless took the pains
of reviewing the factors taken into account by both courts in rejecting Madrigal’s claim
of being a buyer in good faith and found no reason to disagree with their rejection
thereof.
With the view we take of this case, petitioners’ lament against the award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in favor of respondent Jose Mallari, based as
their lament is on their contention that respondent has no cause of action against them,
must simply fall.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

We do acknowledge that the rule thus stated is not casts in stone. For sure, it admits
of exceptions. So it is that in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. Vs. CA,9 we
wrote:

"[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the
Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering
that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However,
the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion."
G.R. No. 141311 May 26, 2005
BERNICE LEGASPI, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES RITA and FRANCISCO ONG, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Bernice Legaspi
seeking to annul and set aside the Decision dated July 30, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals (CA)1 reversing the decision of the trial court and ruling that the deed of sale
with right to repurchase executed by respondent spouses in favor of petitioner over
the subject property was an equitable mortgage; and its Resolution dated January 4,
20002 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Respondent spouses Francisco and Rita Ong were owners of a parcel of land located
at 375 Matienza Street, San Miguel, Manila with an area of 1,010 square meters and
a two-storey house. They mortgaged the subject property with the Permanent
Savings and Loan Bank (PSLB) to secure their loan. For their failure to pay their loan,
PSLB foreclosed the mortgage on the subject property and thereafter sold it in a
public auction where the bank emerged as the highest bidder. Respondent spouses
failed to redeem the property within the redemption period, thus, the title was
consolidated in the name of PSLB under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
182956 on November 10, 19883 but respondent spouses continued to occupy the
premises. When PSLB was subsequently ordered liquidated by the Monetary Board
of the Central Bank, PSLB’s acquired assets were required to be disposed of to pay
its debts, thus respondent spouses, being the original owners of the subject property,
were given first priority by the Central Bank Liquidator to buy back their property in
the amount of P2,655,000.00 on or before June 13, 1989. Since respondent spouses
had no money then, they approached petitioner’s father, Stephen Hong, a classmate
and friend of respondent Francisco, and sought his help to pay and redeem the
subject property. Petitioner and her father were shown the title of the subject property
in respondent Rita’s name. After some deliberations thereon, the parties’ agreement
was reduced into writing denominated as a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase 4
drafted by petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Bienvenido Rillo, in the following terms and
conditions:
...
The title to above-described property is presently held by the
Central Bank of the Philippines and the latter has given VENDOR
the privilege of getting back the title to the above-described
property by paying them the amount of TWO MILLION SIX
HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND (P2,655,000.00) PESOS;
VENDOR has offered to sell this property to VENDEE on condition
she be allowed to repurchase this property subject to the terms and
conditions hereinafter recited:
1. VENDEE shall pay the Central Bank of the Philippines the
amount of TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND
(P2,655,000.00) PESOS for and in behalf of VENDOR;
2. VENDOR shall have the right to repurchase the above-described
property within a period of four (4) months, without interest, which
shall be extended by another month upon request of the VENDOR;
3. During the four (4) month period or its extension VENDOR shall
have the right to re-sell the said property to any party, other than
the VENDEE, who may desire to purchase the property;
4. In the event VENDOR should fail to repurchase the property
within the four (4) months agreed upon then VENDEE,
notwithstanding the extended period, shall pay interest at the rate
of four (4%) percent per month reckoned from the execution of this
document;
5. In the event VENDOR shall repurchase the property at any time
before the expiration of four (4) months or its extended period the
VENDOR shall pay interest on the amount at the rate of four (4%)
percent per month reckoned from the signing of this Agreement;
6. Should VENDOR fail to comply with the foregoing terms and
conditions then the property shall by virtue thereof become the
property of VENDEE;
7. All expenses to be incurred as a result of this transaction such as
documentary stamps, transfer fee, capital gains tax and
documentation fees, shall be for the account of VENDOR;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing,
VENDOR hereby sells, cedes, transfers and conveys unto the
VENDEE the above-described parcel of land together with all the
improvement thereon fall (sic) from any lien and encumbrances.
VENDOR hereby warrants the property is not devoted to the
cultivation of palay or corn nor is it covered by the priority
development program of the government.5
which respondent spouses and petitioner signed on June 13, 1989. Immediately after
the deed was signed, and since it was the last day to redeem the property, petitioner,
with her lawyer, Atty. Rillo, and respondent Francisco went to the Central Bank and
with petitioner’s check paid the amount of P2,655,000.00 to the bank for and in behalf
of respondents. A Deed of Absolute Sale6 was executed between PSLB’s Liquidator,
Renan V. Santos, and respondent spouses, as original owners, over the subject
property on June 13, 1989. Respondent Francisco then wrote 7 the Deputy Liquidator
of PSLB, Central Bank, to release the Deed of Sale and the title to the subject
property to petitioner as his authorized representative. Petitioner received the
documents on June 19, 1989.8
On September 26, 1989, petitioner wrote respondents a letter 9 reminding them that
the four-month period to repurchase the subject property will expire on October 12,
1989 and that failure to pay the amount of P2,655,000.00 on its due date will force
her to take the corresponding action to consolidate title on the property in her name.
On November 23, 1989, petitioner’s counsel wrote respondents a letter 10 informing
them that petitioner, acting on their request for extension of a week’s time to
repurchase the subject property, consented to give them up to November 28, 1989.
However, respondent spouses failed to redeem the subject property from petitioner
within the period given them. Despite the expiration of the period to repurchase,
petitioner still granted respondent spouses opportunity to repurchase the subject
property in a letter dated April 14, 1990, where petitioner’s counsel demanded for the
payment of the amount of P2,655,000.00 plus all the interest due thereon within five
days from receipt otherwise, necessary legal action will be taken to transfer
ownership in petitioner’s name.11
In October 1990, petitioner filed a petition for consolidation of ownership 12 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, which was raffled to Branch 39,13 docketed as
Civil Case No. 90-54623. Petitioner prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. 182956
and for the issuance of a new title in her name, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim,14 respondent spouses alleged that the
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase did not reflect the true intention of the parties
because the document was actually an equitable mortgage with illegal provision, i.e.,
pactum commissorium; that petitioner has no cause of action against respondents;
that there was non-joinder of the real party-in-interest; that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the case; that relief sought will cause undue enrichment on
respondents as the subject property claimed was worth P15 million.15 They prayed for
the dismissal of the petition and asked for damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the
suit as counterclaim.
On July 6, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision16 in favor of petitioner, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the consolidation of title in the name of petitioner
Bernice Legaspi and the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila is
hereby ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 182956,
issued in the name of Permanent Savings and Loan Bank, and in
lieu thereof, a new one be issued in the name of petitioner
BERNICE LEGASPI upon payment of the corresponding charges.
Respondents are hereby ordered to pay attorney’s fees in the sum
of P25,000.00.
Respondents’ counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
With costs against respondents.17
In arriving at its decision, the trial court made the following disquisition:
The main controversy centers on the true nature of Exhibit "C", the
Deed of Absolute Sale with Right to Repurchase. The Court
examines Exhibit "C", and finds it clear, unambiguous and
unequivocal. If the terms of the contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of the stipulation shall control (Art. 1370 CC). The
intention of the parties is to be deduced from the language
employed by them and the terms of the contract found
unambiguous, are conclusive in the absence of averment and proof
of mistake, the question being not what intention existed in the
minds of the parties but what intention is expressed by the
language used. When the words of a contract are plain and readily
understandable, there is no room for construction (Dihiasan, et al.
vs. CA, G.R. 49839, Sept. 14, 1987).
According to Rita Ong who admitted having signed the document
she trusted Mr. Hong as her husband’s former classmate. There is
a presumption in law that a person takes ordinary care of his
concern (Rule 131, Sec. 5(d), Revised Rules of Evidence). It is to
be presumed that Rita Ong a pharmacy and medical technology
graduate would not sign a document without being satisfied of the
contents thereof. She knew fully well what she was signing. Rita
Ong admitted on the stand that the matter was discussed in the
residence of the petitioner in the presence of her husband and Mr.
Hong. She was completely aware, therefore, that she was
executing a document, a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase. If
she did not like its contents, she could easily refrain from signing
the document. After signing the document, she cannot now be
heard to complain that the parties to said exhibit intended the same
to be loan with mortgage contrary to what are clearly expressed
therein. The natural presumption is that one does not sign a
document without first informing himself of its contents. It is the duty
of every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a
contract before he signs and delivers it. He owes this duty to the
other party to the contract because the latter may probably pay his
money and shape his action in reliance upon the agreement. To
permit a party when sued on a written contract to admit that he
signed it but to deny that it expresses the agreement he made or to
allow him to admit that he signed it but did not read it or know its
stipulation could absolutely destroy the value of all contracts. (Tan
Tun Sia vs. Yu Bin Sentua, 56 Phil. 711).
The Court rejects respondents’ Exhibits "11", "11-A" and "12" to
show the inadequacy of the price considering that evaluation of
P4,500.00 per square meter and the appraisal of P15M were not
made on or before June 13, 1989, the date the contract was
executed by the parties. The evidence shows that the lot in
question is titled in the name of Permanent Savings and Loan Bank
for P2,655,000.00 and was paid by the petitioner in such amount.
 Said amount is approximately 50% of their total assessed value of
P1,016,580.00 (Exhibit "D") as appearing in the tax declaration. A
difference in value is not always a decisive factor for determining
whether or not the contract is one of sale with right to repurchase or
equitable mortgage.
After the sale on June 13, 1989, Spouses Ong did not pay the real
estate taxes on the land.
The records show that after the expiration of respondents’ right to
repurchase the lot, demands were made but were completely
ignored, hence, the filing of this case and the unlawful detainer with
the Metropolitan Trial Court (Exhibit "E").
Assessing the evidence on record, the Court declares that the
contract entered into by the petitioner and respondents Spouses
Ong is one of a sale with right to repurchase, as supported by the
evidence on record. Respondents Ongs had already parted with
their property when the mortgage was foreclosed by Permanent
Savings and Loan Bank for P2,655,000.00 which was the price of
the lot and, therefore, having discussed the transaction with the
petitioner prior to the preparation of the contract, respondents
cannot now repudiate what they have done. Since petitioner was
forced to litigate to enforce her right under the contract, respondent
spouses Ong should pay reasonable attorney’s fees. 18
Respondent spouses’ motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated
November 25, 1993.19
At the time that the proceedings for the petition for consolidation of ownership were
on-going, petitioner, on February 14, 1991, claiming her right to possess the subject
property on the basis of respondents’ failure to repurchase the subject property had
filed an unlawful detainer case against respondents 20 before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Branch 19, Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 134770-CV. The MeTC
decided against respondent spouses on September 1, 1993 21 whereby respondent
spouses were ordered to vacate the subject property and surrender possession
thereof to petitioner; to pay P25,000.00 a month from February 13, 1991 as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the subject property until
possession is surrendered to petitioner; and attorney’s fees plus cost of the suit. The
MeTC granted the motion for execution filed by petitioner and issued a writ of
execution on October 8, 1993.22 Possession of the subject property was delivered by
the sheriff to petitioner’s father on October 11, 1993.23 Respondent spouses’ appeal
with the RTC was dismissed in an Order dated March 9, 1994 24 for being moot and
academic as the respondents had already abandoned the property and possession
thereof was turned over to petitioner and ordered that the records be remanded to the
court a quo for execution of its own judgment.
As respondents were aggrieved by the decision of the RTC granting the consolidation
of title in petitioner’s name, respondent spouses appealed to the CA. During the
pendency of respondents’ appeal, petitioner filed a motion for execution pending
appeal of the RTC’s decision dated July 6, 1993. The appellate court granted the
motion for execution pending appeal in a Resolution 25 dated December 1, 1994,
subject to the posting of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. It anchored its judgment
on the following findings:26 (1) the property had been adjudged by the trial court to be
owned by petitioner who paid the purchase price to the bank; (2) the ejectment case
filed by petitioner against respondents was decided by the MeTC in favor of the
former by ordering respondents to vacate the property, to pay P25,000.00 a month
from February 13, 1991, as compensation for the use of the property and to surrender
possession, in addition to attorney’s fees; (3) possession of the property was already
delivered to petitioner and that respondents had already abandoned the premises
"much earlier"; (4) upon inspection made by the sheriff, it was found that the house
was destroyed, cannibalized and stripped of vital fixtures and furnitures; (5) major
repairs had to be undertaken at "quite staggering cost"; (6) realty taxes were not paid
by respondents from 1989 up to the present nor did they pay the capital gains tax,
transfer fee, documentary stamps and documentation fees even though there was an
agreement for such payment; (7) taxes due on the property, and surcharges on
overdue payment continue to accumulate which endangered the property and the
possibility of its being lost through auction sale; and (8) the grant of execution
pending appeal would then bind the petitioner to preserve the property and to return it
to respondents should the appeal be in their favor.
Respondent spouses filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated June 30, 1995.27 As a consequence, the Register of Deeds
of Manila cancelled TCT No. 182956 in the name of PSLB and issued TCT No.
219397 in petitioner’s name.
On July 30, 1998, the CA rendered herein assailed decision reversing the RTC
decision dated July 6, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the decision
of the court a quo dated July 6, 1993 in Civil Case No. 90-54623
and dismissing the complaint of plaintiff-appellee.
The appellants are hereby ordered to redeem the property from
appellee in the amount of P2,655,000.00 with legal interest
computed from the time the sale of redemption fell due up to the
time the obligation is fully paid.
Appellee is hereby ordered to pay appellants the monthly rent of
the subject premises from October 1993 up to the time possession
thereof is turned over to appellant, which is hereby fixed in the
amount of P25,000.00 a month; attorney’s fees in the amount of
P100,000.00; and the cost of suit.28
The appellate court’s reversal was based on the following findings:
Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage, in any of the following cases:
 (1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is
unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or
otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to
repurchase another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the
purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the
thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that
the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall
secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any
other obligation.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to
be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered
as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.
From the aforecited provisions, it is clear that the contract executed
between the parties is one of equitable mortgage. The law requires
anyone, and not the concurrence of all the circumstances
mentioned therein to conclude that the transaction is one of
equitable mortgage. It is clear from the records of the case, that
appellants remained in possession of the property even after the
execution of the contract, aside from the fact that the amount in the
document purportedly the consideration of the sale was only P2.6
Million, while the property commands the price of P16 Million (Exhs.
12-12-U; TSN, August 12, 1992, pp. 16-17, 19), hence, there was
gross inadequacy of the price. Likewise, the deed stipulates the
payment of interest (TSN, April 27, 1992, p. 40; TSN, May 28,
1992, p. 31), and there were a number of extensions of time given
by the appellee for the payment by appellants of the sum of P2.6
Million (TSN, Sept. 30, 1991, pp. 5-6, 54-56).
These circumstances proven by the appellants to show that the
agreement was not sale with right to repurchase but one of
equitable mortgage are conclusive. On the other hand, appellee
failed to rebut these pieces of evidence.
...
The extensions of the original period of redemption as contained in
pars. 2, 3 and 5 of the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase are
indicative that the instrument was one of equitable mortgage. As
ruled by the Supreme Court in Reyes vs. De Leon, 20 SCRA 639
and Burdalian vs. CA, 129 SCRA 645, it said that –
It is well-settled that extension of the period of redemption
is indicative of equitable mortgage.
After a careful evaluation of the above-stated circumstances, this
Court finds the present case to exhibit several of the familiar
badges of a concealed mortgage enumerated by Art. 1602 of the
Civil Code. According to the said provisions of the Civil Code,
presence of any of the circumstances enumerated would be
sufficient enough to declare the transaction of absolute sale as one
impressed with an equitable mortgage. In the instant case there is
even more than one circumstance indicating an equitable mortgage
...
It has also been convincingly shown that appellants were badly in
need of money at the time of the transaction because they wanted
to redeem the property and the deadline within which to do that had
almost been up. This circumstance is likewise conclusive of the fact
that "a pacto de retro sale may be deemed an equitable mortgage
when executed due to urgent necessity for money of the apparent
vendor."29
The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated January
4, 2000.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari on the question of whether a
Deed of Sale with Right To Repurchase may be interpreted as one of equitable
mortgage as found by the CA.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, nonetheless factual issues may be entertained by this Court in
exceptional cases. These include instances where the findings of fact are conflicting
or when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court, 30 as in the
present case. We are constrained to go over the records of the case and examine the
arguments of the parties in their pleadings.
We have consistently decreed that the nomenclature used by the contracting parties
to describe a contract does not determine its nature.31 Decisive for the proper
determination of the true nature of the transaction between the parties is the intent of
the parties,32 as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by
all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situations of the parties at that
time; the attitudes, acts, conduct, and declarations of the parties; the negotiations
between them leading to the deed; and generally, all pertinent facts having a
tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding.33
Even if a contract is denominated as a pacto de retro, the owner of the property may
still disprove it by means of parol evidence, provided that the nature of the agreement
is placed in issue by the pleadings filed with the trial court. It must be stressed,
however, that there is no conclusive test to determine whether a deed absolute on its
face is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage. In fact, it is often
a question difficult to resolve and is frequently made to depend on the surrounding
circumstances of each case. When in doubt, courts are generally inclined to construe
a transaction purporting to be a sale as an equitable mortgage, which involves a
lesser transmission of rights and interests over the property in controversy. 34
Art. 1602 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when a contract, regardless of
its nomenclature, may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage. They are as
follows: (a) when the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(b) when the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (c) when upon or
after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period
of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (d) when the purchaser retains
for himself a part of the purchase price; (e) when the vendor binds himself to pay the
taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that
the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a
debt or the performance of any other obligation. Art. 1603 provides that in case of
doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed
as an equitable mortgage.
The presence of even one of the above-mentioned circumstances as enumerated in
Article 1602 is sufficient basis to declare a contract of sale with right to repurchase as
one of equitable mortgage. As stated by the Code Commission which drafted the new
Civil Code, in practically all of the so-called contracts of sale with right of repurchase,
the real intention of the parties is that the pretended purchase price is money loaned
and in order to secure the payment of the loan, a contract purporting to be a sale with
pacto de retro is drawn up.35
The CA found the presence of four circumstances in the transaction on which bases it
ruled that the transaction was an equitable mortgage, to wit: (a) respondents
remained in possession of the subject property even after the execution of the
contract; (b) there was gross inadequacy of price of P2,655,000.00 as contract price
since the property commands the price of P16 million; (c) extensions of the original
period of redemption; and (d) stipulation of interest.
We agree with the finding of the CA that the transaction between respondents and
petitioner was not a sale with right to repurchase but an equitable mortgage.
Petitioner argues that Article 1602 does not apply in the instant case; that petitioner
was the one who purchased the subject property from PSLB, the registered owner,
for and in behalf of respondents; that since the ownership had been consolidated in
PSLB and the title was in PSLB’s name as early as November 10, 1988, respondents
were no longer the owners of the subject property at the time the Deed of Sale with
Right To Repurchase was executed by respondents in favor of petitioner on June 13,
1989; that respondents can no longer constitute a mortgage on the subject property;
that respondents had the personality to sell the property only because they were the
original owners who were favored by the Bank with the first option but it was
petitioner’s money that was used in buying back the subject property. Petitioner also
claims that there was never any loan between the parties as money was not given by
one to the other since petitioner paid her money directly to the bank, thus debt which
is a condition sine qua non of an equitable mortgage was absent.
We are not persuaded.
While it is true that the title to the subject property was consolidated in PSLB’s name
as early as 1988, the property was bought back by respondent spouses, the original
owners, who were given the first option to buy it during PSLB’s liquidation.
Respondents were given up to June 13, 1989 to buy back the property and since they
had no money, they had to approach petitioner’s father to help them in their
predicament. As respondents were able to redeem the subject property with the use
of petitioner’s money, a deed of sale was executed by the Liquidator in favor of
respondent spouses on June 13, 1989, the last day given to respondents to buy back
the property. Since the money came from petitioner, respondent spouses, as owners,
had executed a document, which was denominated as a Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase, which was prepared by petitioner’s counsel and signed by the parties
also on June 13, 1989. It can be seen that the transactions are intimately related and
they were even embodied in the deed of sale with right to repurchase, to wit:
The title to above-described property is presently held by the
Central Bank of the Philippines and the latter has given VENDOR
the privilege of getting back the title to the above-described
property by paying them the amount of TWO MILLION SIX
HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND (P2,655,000.00) PESOS;
VENDOR has offered to sell this property to VENDEE on condition
she be allowed to repurchase this property subject to the terms and
conditions hereinafter recited:
1. VENDEE shall pay the Central Bank of the Philippines
the amount of TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE
THOUSAND (P2,655,000.00) PESOS for and in behalf of
VENDOR;
Clearly, the deed of sale with right to repurchase was precisely executed by
respondents to secure the money paid by petitioner for and in behalf of respondents
to PSLB Liquidator to buy back the subject property, i.e., as equitable mortgage.
Notably, respondent spouses bought back the subject property in the amount of
P2,655,000.00 and sold the same to petitioner at exactly the same amount they paid
to PSLB Liquidator. If the intention of the respondent spouses were to sell, they could
have at least earned some profit or interest on such sale, otherwise, they could have
just allowed PSLB Liquidator to sell it to anybody in a public bidding. Respondents
wanted to hold on to their property and not to part with it by selling the same.
Petitioner claims that respondents expressly recognized their intention to sell the
subject property to her when they executed a letter36 requesting the bank Liquidator
to release the Deed of Sale executed between the bank and respondents as well as
the duplicate copy of the title to petitioner.
We are not impressed.
Respondent Francisco wrote Deputy Liquidator Leopoldo Ramos and requested him
to release the deed of sale and title to the subject property to petitioner as his
authorized representative. There was nothing in the letter that would show that
respondents acknowledged petitioner as the new owner of the property.
Although, we do not agree with the CA that the price of the sale with right to
repurchase is grossly inadequate since the appraisal of the property in the amount of
more than P16 million was not made on or before June 13, 1989, the date the
contract was executed by the parties, but only on July 24, 1992, 37 we find in the
transaction the presence of some other circumstances enumerated in Art. 1602 of the
Civil Code which would establish that the transaction was an equitable mortgage
rather than sale.
Respondent spouses, as vendors, remained in the possession of the subject property
even after the execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase.38 Well settled to
the point of being elementary is the doctrine that where the vendor remains in
physical possession of the land as lessee or otherwise, the contract should be treated
as an equitable mortgage.39 If the deed executed was really what it purports to be, a
sale with right to repurchase, petitioner should have asserted her right for the
immediate delivery of the subject property to her so that she would have the
enjoyment and possession of the same, since petitioner, during those times, was
renting a place in New Manila, Quezon City,40 and not allowed respondents to freely
stay in the premises.
Notably, in all the letters of petitioner and her lawyer, i.e., reminding respondents that
the period to repurchase was about to lapse and later the extension of period to
repurchase and demands for respondents to repurchase the property in the amount
of P2,655,000.00 plus interest within a certain period, were sent to respondents’
address which is the subject property, without registering any objection on
respondents’ continuous possession of the same. In effect, petitioner acknowledged
respondents’ right to retain possession of the subject property even after the
execution of the "pacto de retro sale." It was only on January 14, 1991 that petitioner
made a demand for respondents to vacate the subject property after respondents
failed to "repurchase" the property.
Another circumstance is the fact that the period to repurchase the subject property
was extended by petitioner. In the letter dated November 23, 1989 41 to respondents
by petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Rillo, he stated that petitioner had consented to
respondents’ request for an extension of time to repurchase the subject property by
giving them up to November 28, 1989. In fact, even in the petition for consolidation
itself, petitioner stated that despite the expiration of the right to repurchase on
November 28, 1989, petitioner still granted respondent spouses opportunity to
repurchase the subject property in a letter dated April 14, 1990 by paying the amount
due thereon. Moreover, petitioner, on cross-examination, even admitted that more
than one extension was given for the respondents to repurchase. 42 It is well settled
that extension of the period of redemption is indicative of equitable mortgage. 43
Petitioner claims that there was no separate instrument extending the period of
redemption granting a new period executed between the parties. Petitioner through
her counsel wrote Exhibit "I" extending the period of redemption. In Claravall vs.
Court of Appeals,44 we held that a note executed extending a period of redemption is
indicative of equitable mortgage.
Also, we find that there was no transmission of ownership to the vendee. As stated in
the deed, to wit:
8. Should VENDOR fail to comply with the foregoing terms and
conditions then the property shall by virtue thereof become the
property of VENDEE;
This stipulation is contrary to the nature of a true pacto de retro sale since ownership
of the property sold is immediately transferred to the vendee a retro upon execution of
the sale, subject only to the repurchase of a vendor a retro within the stipulated
period. Such stipulation is considered a pactum commissorium enabling the
mortgagee to acquire ownership of the mortgaged properties without need of
foreclosure proceedings which is a nullity being contrary to the provisions of Article
2088 of the Civil Code. The inclusion of such stipulation in the deed shows the
intention to mortgage rather than to sell.
Moreover, the following provision, to wit:
3. During the four (4) month period or its extension VENDOR shall
have the right to re-sell the said property to any party, other than
the VENDEE, who may desire to purchase the property;
of the subject deed is a concrete revelation of the real intention of the parties, as
contemplated in paragraph (6) of Article 1602 of the Civil Code, that the transaction
was merely to secure the payment of a debt. A purchaser like the petitioner would not
allow the respondent spouses, as the purported vendors, to re-sell the property to any
party who may desire to purchase the property. This clearly indicates that petitioner
recognized the right of respondent spouses to exercise their ownership of the
property.
Petitioner contends that the assailed decision of the CA runs counter with the findings
of the same appellate court in the Resolution dated December 1, 1994 granting
petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal.
While the appellate court had earlier issued a Resolution granting the motion for
execution pending appeal which upheld the trial court’s findings that the transaction
between the parties was one of sale, such finding did not preclude the same appellate
court from making its final judgment on the appealed case after a review of the
evidence. The nature of the transaction is the very issue raised in the appeal filed by
the respondents. Execution pending appeal does not bar the continuance of the
appeal on the merits,45 for the Rules of Court precisely provides for restitution
according to equity in case the executed judgment is reversed on appeal.46

We find no basis for the CA to order petitioner to pay respondents the monthly rent of
P25,000.00 for the former’s possession of the subject property from October 1993 up
to the time the property is surrendered to respondents. The origin of this petition for
review is the petition for consolidation of ownership filed by petitioner which was
granted by the trial court since it found that the transaction between respondents and
petitioner is a sale. Respondents then filed their appeal with the CA. An examination
of the appellants’ (respondents’) brief filed before the appellate court merely claimed
that they are the ones entitled to the damages and attorney’s fees without mention of
any back rentals. In fact, in the prayer in their brief, respondents merely asked that
another judgment be rendered dismissing the plaintiff’s (petitioner’s) complaint.
Moreover, the appellate court did not make any discussion on the basis of how it
arrived in the amount of P25,000.00 as monthly rental since the same was only
mentioned in the dispositive portion of the decision. Courts in making an award must
point out specific facts which can serve as basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne.47

We also disallow the award of attorney’s fees as the appellate court merely stated
such award in the dispositive portion without explicitly stating in the text of the
decision the legal reason for such award. In Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation
(Solidbank) vs. Court of Appeals,48 we held:

The award of attorney’s fees lies within the discretion of the court
and depends upon the circumstances of each case. However, the
discretion of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines demands factual, legal and
equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion
without a premise and improperly left to speculation and conjecture.
It becomes a violation of the proscription against the imposition of a
penalty on the right to litigate (Universal Shipping Lines Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 188 SCRA 170 [1990]). The reason
for the award must be stated in the text of the court’s decision. If it
is stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same
shall be disallowed. As to the award of attorney’s fees being an
exception rather than the rule, it is necessary for the court to make
findings of fact and law that would bring the case within the
exception and justify the grant of the award. Refractories
Corporation of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176
SCRA 539 [1989].

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that the award of monthly
rentals on the subject property and attorney’s fees in favor of respondents is
DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137232 June 29, 2005 ‘WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff and against defendants who are ordered to pay jointly and severally in favor of
ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS CORPORATION and EDILBERTO YUJUICO, plaintiff, inclusive of stipulated 30% per annum interest and penalty of 3% per month
petitioners, until fully paid, under the following promissory notes:
vs.
HOME BANKERS SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY, respondent.
90-1116 6-20-90 ₱737,088.25 9-18-90

DECISION
(maturity)
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
90-1320 7-13-90 ₱650,000.00 10-11-90
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals dated March 31, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48708 and its Resolution
dated January 12, 1999. 90-1334 7-17-90 ₱422,500.00 10-15-90

The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are: 90-1335 7-17-90 ₱422,500.00 10-15-90

"Sometime in 1989, Rosario Textile Mills Corporation (RTMC) applied from Home 90-1347 7-18-90 ₱795,000.00 10-16-90
Bankers Savings & Trust Co. for an Omnibus Credit Line for ₱10 million. The bank
approved RTMC’s credit line but for only ₱8 million. The bank notified RTMC of the
grant of the said loan thru a letter dated March 2, 1989 which contains terms and 90-1373 7-20-90 ₱715,900.00 10-18-90
conditions conformed by RTMC thru Edilberto V. Yujuico. On March 3, 1989, Yujuico
signed a Surety Agreement in favor of the bank, in which he bound himself jointly and
severally with RTMC for the payment of all RTMC’s indebtedness to the bank from 90-1397 7-27-90 ₱773,500.00 10-20-90
1989 to 1990. RTMC availed of the credit line by making numerous drawdowns, each
drawdown being covered by a separate promissory note and trust receipt. RTMC,
90-1429 7-26-90 ₱425,750.00 10-24-90
represented by Yujuico, executed in favor of the bank a total of eleven (11) promissory
notes.
90-1540 8-7-90 ₱720,984.00 11-5-90
Despite the lapse of the respective due dates under the promissory notes and
notwithstanding the bank’s demand letters, RTMC failed to pay its loans. Hence, on
January 22, 1993, the bank filed a complaint for sum of money against RTMC and 90-1569 8-9-90 ₱209,433.75 11-8-90
Yujuico before the Regional Trial Court, Br. 16, Manila.
90-0922 5-28-90 ₱747,780.00 8-26-90
In their answer (OR, pp. 44-47), RTMC and Yujuico contend that they should be
absolved from liability. They claimed that although the grant of the credit line and the
execution of the suretyship agreement are admitted, the bank gave assurance that the
suretyship agreement was merely a formality under which Yujuico will not be personally The counterclaims of defendants are hereby DISMISSED.
liable. They argue that the importation of raw materials under the credit line was with a
grant of option to them to turn-over to the bank the imported raw materials should these SO ORDERED." (OR, p. 323; Rollo, p. 73)."2
fail to meet their manufacturing requirements. RTMC offered to make such turn-over
since the imported materials did not conform to the required specifications. However, Dissatisfied, RTMC and Yujuico, herein petitioners, appealed to the Court of Appeals,
the bank refused to accept the same, until the materials were destroyed by a fire which contending that under the trust receipt contracts between the parties, they merely held
gutted down RTMC’s premises. the goods described therein in trust for respondent Home Bankers Savings and
Trust Company (the bank) which owns the same. Since the ownership of the goods
For failure of the parties to amicably settle the case, trial on the merits proceeded. After remains with the bank, then it should bear the loss. With the destruction of the goods
the trial, the Court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the bank, the decretal part of by fire, petitioners should have been relieved of any obligation to pay.
which reads:
The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the
bank is merely the holder of the security for its advance payments to petitioners; and
that the goods they purchased, through the credit line extended by the bank, belong to
them and hold said goods at their own risk.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the Appellate
Court in its Resolution dated January 12, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari ascribing to the Court of Appeals the
following errors:
"I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
ACTS OF THE PETITIONERS-DEFENDANTS WERE TANTAMOUNT TO A VALID
AND EFFECTIVE TENDER OF THE GOODS TO THE RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE
DOCTRINE OF ‘RES PERIT DOMINO’ IN THE CASE AT BAR CONSIDERING THE
VALID AND EFFECTIVE TENDER OF THE DEFECTIVE RAW MATERIALS BY THE
PETITIONERS-DEFENDANTS TO THE RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF AND THE
EXPRESS STIPULATION IN THEIR CONTRACT THAT OWNERSHIP OF THE
GOODS REMAINS WITH THE RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED ARTICLE 1370 OF THE CIVIL
CODE AND THE LONG-STANDING JURISPRUDENCE THAT ‘INTENTION OF THE
PARTIES IS PRIMORDIAL’ IN ITS FAILURE TO UPHOLD THE INTENTION OF THE
PARTIES THAT THE SURETY AGREEMENT WAS A MERE FORMALITY AND DID
NOT INTEND TO HOLD PETITIONER YUJUICO LIABLE UNDER THE SAME
SURETY AGREEMENT.
IV
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE SURETYSHIP AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND
EFFECTIVE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE BASIC
LEGAL PRECEPT THAT A SURETY IS NOT LIABLE UNLESS THE DEBTOR IS
HIMSELF LIABLE.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE PURPOSE OF TRUST
RECEIPT LAW IN HOLDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE TO THE RESPONDENT."
The above assigned errors boil down to the following issues: (1) whether the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that petitioners are not relieved of their obligation to pay their
loan after they tried to tender the goods to the bank which refused to accept the same,
and which goods were subsequently lost in a fire; (2) whether the Court of Appeals
erred when it ruled that petitioners are solidarily liable for the payment of their
obligations to the bank; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals violated the Trust
Receipts Law.
On the first issue, petitioners theorize that when petitioner RTMC imported the raw
materials needed for its manufacture, using the credit line, it was merely acting on
behalf of the bank, the true owner of the goods by virtue of the trust receipts. Hence,
under the doctrine of res perit domino, the bank took the risk of the loss of said raw
materials. RTMC’s role in the transaction was that of end user of the raw materials and
when it did not accept those materials as they did not meet the manufacturing
requirements, RTMC made a valid and effective tender of the goods to the bank. Since
the bank refused to accept the raw materials, RTMC stored them in its warehouse.
When the warehouse and its contents were gutted by fire, petitioners’ obligation to the
bank was accordingly extinguished.
Petitioners’ stance, however, conveniently ignores the true nature of its transaction with
the bank. We recall that RTMC filed with the bank an application for a credit line in the
amount of ₱10 million, but only ₱8 million was approved. RTMC then made withdrawals
from this credit line and issued several promissory notes in favor of the bank. In banking
and commerce, a credit line is "that amount of money or merchandise which a banker,
merchant, or supplier agrees to supply to a person on credit and generally agreed to in
advance."3 It is the fixed limit of credit granted by a bank, retailer, or credit card issuer
to a customer, to the full extent of which the latter may avail himself of his dealings with
the former but which he must not exceed and is usually intended to cover a series of
transactions in which case, when the customer’s line of credit is nearly exhausted, he
is expected to reduce his indebtedness by payments before making any further
drawings.4
It is thus clear that the principal transaction between petitioner RTMC and the bank is
a contract of loan. RTMC used the proceeds of this loan to purchase raw materials from
a supplier abroad. In order to secure the payment of the loan, RTMC delivered the raw
materials to the bank as collateral. Trust receipts were executed by the parties to
evidence this security arrangement. Simply stated, the trust receipts were mere
securities.
In Samo vs. People,5 we described a trust receipt as "a security transaction intended
to aid in financing importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or
resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be
able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise
imported or purchased."6
In Vintola vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America,7 we elucidated further that "a trust
receipt, therefore, is a security agreement, pursuant to which a bank acquires a
‘security interest’ in the goods. It secures an indebtedness and there can be no such
thing as security interest that secures no obligation." 8 Section 3 (h) of the Trust
Receipts Law (P.D. No. 115) defines a "security interest" as follows:
"(h) Security Interest means a property interest in goods, documents, or instruments to (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors
secure performance of some obligation of the entrustee or of some third persons to the in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
entruster and includes title, whether or not expressed to be absolute, whenever such
title is in substance taken or retained for security only." x x x."

Petitioners’ insistence that the ownership of the raw materials remained with the bank
is untenable. In Sia vs. People,9 Abad vs. Court of Appeals,10 and PNB vs. Pineda,11
we held that:
"If under the trust receipt, the bank is made to appear as the owner, it was but an
artificial expedient, more of legal fiction than fact, for if it were really so, it could dispose
of the goods in any manner it wants, which it cannot do, just to give consistency with
purpose of the trust receipt of giving a stronger security for the loan obtained by the
importer. To consider the bank as the true owner from the inception of the
transaction would be to disregard the loan feature thereof..." 12
Thus, petitioners cannot be relieved of their obligation to pay their loan in favor of the
bank.
Anent the second issue, petitioner Yujuico contends that the suretyship agreement he
signed does not bind him, the same being a mere formality.
Under this Rule, the terms of a contract are rendered conclusive upon the parties and
evidence aliunde is not admissible to vary or contradict a complete and enforceable
agreement embodied in a document.13 We have carefully examined the Suretyship
Agreement signed by Yujuico and found no ambiguity therein. Documents must be
taken as explaining all the terms of the agreement between the parties when there
appears to be no ambiguity in the language of said documents nor any failure to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties.14
As to the third and final issue – At the risk of being repetitious, we stress that the
contract between the parties is a loan. What respondent bank sought to collect as
creditor was the loan it granted to petitioners. Petitioners’ recourse is to sue their
supplier, if indeed the materials were defective.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48708 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against
petitioners.

We reject petitioner Yujuico’s contentions for two reasons. SO ORDERED.

First, there is no record to support his allegation that the surety agreement is a "mere
formality;" and

Second, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the Suretyship Agreement signed
by petitioner Yujuico binds him. The terms clearly show that he agreed to pay the bank
jointly and severally with RTMC. The parole evidence rule under Section 9, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Court is in point, thus:

"SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of an agreement have

been reduced in writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

G.R. No. 151040 October 6, 2005 Commission (SEC), which petition was docketed as SEC Case No. 2042. Likewise, a
criminal case for Estafa was filed against Marilyn Javier.
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs. Thereafter, the corporation was reorganized, following which the spouses Cheng Yong
CHENG YONG and LILIA GAW, Respondents. and Lilia Gaw were elected as its president and treasurer, respectively. The spouses
Cheng also hold similar positions in another company, the Glee Chemicals Phils., Inc.
x--------------------------------------------x (GCPI), which, incidentally, also had a credit line with Allied Bank.

G.R. No. 154109 Meanwhile, on 27 July 1981, the parties in SEC Case No. 2042 agreed to create and
constitute a management committee, instead of placing Philippine Pacific under
receivership. Hence, in an order dated 14 August 1981, the SEC formally created a
CHENG YONG and LILIA GAW, Petitioners, management committee whose functions, include, among others, the following:
vs.
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION and EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF MALABON,
METRO MANILA, Respondents. 1. To take custody and possession of all assets, funds, properties and records of the
corporation and to prepare an inventory thereof;
DECISION
2. To administer, manage and preserve such assets, funds and records;
GARCIA, J.:
xxx xxx xxx
Before us are these two (2) petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in 7. To acquire, lease, sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber such assets with the prior
CA-G.R. CV 41280, to wit: approval of the Commission.4

1. Decision dated 11 December 2001,1 partially reversing and setting aside an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Makati, Branch 145, in its Civil Case No. 10947;
and
2. Resolution dated 01 July 2002,2 denying Cheng Yong and Lilia Gaw’s motion for
reconsideration.
It appears, however, that two (2) days prior to the constitution of the management
committee, Allied Bank and Philippine Pacific agreed to restructure and convert the
packing credit accommodation into a simple loan. Accordingly, Philippine Pacific
executed in favor of Allied Bank a promissory note dated 12 August 19815 in the same
amount as the packing credit accommodation. Aside from affixing their signatures on
the same promissory note in their capacity as officers of Philippine Pacific, the spouses
Cheng also signed the note in their personal capacities and as co-makers thereof.

The material facts:
Sometime before 1981, Philippine Pacific Fishing Company, Inc. (Philippine Pacific),
through its then Vice-Chairman of the Board and concurrent President Marilyn Javier,
obtained from Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), a packing credit
accommodation amounting to One Million Seven Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Pesos
(₱1,752,000.00).
To secure the obligation, Marilyn Javier and the spouses Cheng Yong and Lilia Gaw
(spouses Cheng, for short), executed a Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety
bearing date 27 March 1981.3
Later, Philippine Pacific, due to business reverses and alleged misuse of corporate
funds by its operating officers, defaulted in the payment of said obligation.
An intra-corporate dispute among its stockholders followed, prompting the filing against
Philippine Pacific of a petition for receivership before the Securities and Exchange
As it turned out, Philippine Pacific failed to pay according to the schedule of payments
set out in the promissory note of 12 August 1981, prompting the spouses Cheng to
secure the note with substantial collateral by executing a deed of chattel mortgage in
favor of Allied Bank over a fishing vessel, "Jean III", a Japanese- manufactured vessel
with refrigerated hatches and glass freezers, owned by the spouses and registered in
their names.
Philippine Pacific again defaulted payment. Hence, on 18 September 1984, Allied Bank
filed with the sheriff of Navotas an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage constituted on "Jean III".
Pursuant thereto, notices of extra-judicial sale dated 21 September 1981 were served
on the concerned parties by the Ex-Officio sheriff of Malabon while the vessel was
moored at the Navotas Fishing Port Complex and under a charter contract with Lig
Marine Products, Inc.
On 27 September 1984, the spouses Cheng, to prevent the auction sale of the vessel,
filed with the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City an action for declaratory relief with
prayer for injunctive remedies. Initially, that court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the sale but later lifted it upon dismissal of the main case for declaratory
relief on 29 March 1985.
In the meantime, the vessel sank at the port of Navotas on 22 June 1985, resulting to
its total loss. As per certification of the Harbor Master of the Philippine Fisheries
Development Authority, the vessel sank due to unnoticed defects caused by its
prolonged stay in the fish port and the abandonment thereof. Shortly before the loss,
charterer Lig Marine Products, Inc. offered to purchase the vessel for Four Million
Pesos (₱4,000,000.00).
On 26 June 1985, the spouses Cheng filed with the Regional Trial Court at Makati a
complaint for Injunction, Annulment of Contracts and Damages with the provisional
remedy of Preliminary Injunction, against Allied Bank and the Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Malabon, therein praying, inter alia, that the promissory note dated 12 August 1981 be
declared void and unenforceable because it was executed without the prior approval
or ratification of the SEC-created management committee in SEC Case No. 2042, and
to declare invalid the deed of chattel mortgage over the vessel "Jean III" for having
been constituted to secure a void or unenforceable obligation. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 10947 and raffled to Branch 145 of the court.
Meanwhile, on 02 August 1985, Allied Bank filed with the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Pasig an
application for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage 6 constituted by the
Cheng spouses over their parcel of land covered by TCT No. (222143) 23843, located
in San Juan, Metro Manila (hereinafter referred to as the San Juan property), together
with the improvement thereon, consisting of a two-storey building belonging to GCPI.
It appears that said property was mortgaged by the spouses in favor of Allied Bank on
31 May 1983 to partially secure the payment of the time loan granted by the Bank to
GCPI. Despite GCPI’s full payment of said loan, Allied Bank refused to release the
mortgage on the San Juan property, theorizing that it also secured the obligation of the
spouses Cheng as Philippine Pacific’s co-makers of the promissory note dated 12
August 1981, in accordance with the stipulation in the deed of mortgage extending
coverage of the guaranty to "any other obligation owing to the mortgagee".
On 22 August 1985, the spouses Cheng filed in Civil Case No. 10947 an amended
complaint praying, among others, that: (a) the promissory note of 12 August 1981 be
declared void and unenforceable; (b) the vessel be declared a total loss; and (c) Allied
Bank be ordered to pay them the value of the loss. And, in order to prevent Allied Bank
and the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Pasig from foreclosing the real estate mortgage over their
San Juan property, the spouses Cheng filed a supplemental complaint with an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. A writ of preliminary injunction was,
thereafter, issued by the trial court.
On 17 October 1985, Allied Bank filed a motion to dismiss the amended as well as the
supplemental complaints.
In its order of 12 March 1986, the trial court denied the motion with respect to the
amended complaint, for lack of merit, while deferring the resolution thereof as regards
the supplemental complaint until after trial because the ground alleged did not appear
to be indubitable.
Eventually, in a decision dated 08 February 1989, 7 the trial court declared both the
promissory note dated 12 August 1981 and the deed of chattel mortgage over the
vessel "Jean III" invalid and unenforceable. Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment declaring both the
promissory Note (Exh. "M") and the Deed of Chattel Mortgage (Exh. "5") not valid and
unenforceable; permanently enjoining defendants Allied Banking Corporation and the
ex-officio sheriff of Malabon and his deputies, agents and representatives from
proceeding with the foreclosure and auction sale of the fishing vessel "JEAN III";
permanently enjoining the defendants-bank and ex-officio sheriff of Pasig from
proceeding with the foreclosure and auction sale of the plaintiffs’ real property covered
by TCT No. (222143) 23843 including the building thereon owned by Glee Chemicals
Philippines, Inc.; ordering defendant bank to pay plaintiffs the sum of Four Million Pesos
(₱4,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for the loss of the aforementioned vessel, the
sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00), Philippine Currency as moral and
exemplary damages, the further sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00),
Philippine Currency, as attorney’s fees; and the costs of the suit.
The motion to dismiss the supplemental complaint filed by defendant is denied for lack
of merit.
Finally, within three (3) days from the finality of this decision, defendant bank is hereby
compelled to execute the necessary release or cancellation of mortgage covering the
aforesaid parcels of land, and deliver the two torrens titles in its possession to herein
plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, Allied Bank went to the Court of Appeals (CA) via ordinary appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 41280.
As stated at the outset hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 11 December
2001, partially reversed and set aside the appealed decision of the trial court insofar as
it (a) declared the promissory note as not valid and unenforceable and (b) ordered
Allied Bank to pay the spouses Cheng the amount of Four Million Pesos
(₱4,000,000.00) for the loss of the fishing vessel and the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱30,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages. In all other respects, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appealed decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE insofar as it (1) DECLARED the Promissory Note dated 12 August 1981
as NOT VALID and unenforceable, and (2) ORDERED appellant Bank to pay to
appellee-spouses Cheng the amount of Four Million Pesos (₱4,000,000.00) for the
loss of the fishing vessel "JEAN III" and the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱30,000.00) for moral and exemplary damages. In all other respects, the decision is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied, Allied Bank immediately filed with this Court its petition for review on
certiorari in G.R. No. 151040, seeking to set aside and reverse only that portion of the
appellate court’s decision which affirmed certain aspects of the trial court’s decision,
i.e., (a) enjoining Allied Bank and the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Pasig from proceeding with
the foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage over the San Juan property; (b) ordering
Allied Bank to execute a release of the same mortgage in favor of the spouses Cheng;
(c) ordering Allied Bank to deliver the two (2) torrens titles in favor of the spouses; and
(d) ordering Allied Bank to pay attorney’s fees and costs. In short, Allied Bank faults the
Court of Appeals for not reversing the trial court’s decision in its entirety. More
specifically, it submits:
In General, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
DID NOT REVERSE AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MAKATI CITY, BRANCH 145 IN ITS ENTIRETY.
In Particular, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED WHEN
IT UPHELD RESPONDENTS’ ASSERTION THAT THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
DATED MAY 31, 1983 CANNOT BE FORECLOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE
OBLIGATION OF PHILIPPINE PACIFIC TO PETITIONER.
For their part, the spouses Cheng filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration, disputing the appellate court’s pronouncement that the August 12,
1981 promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage over the fishing vessel "Jean
III" are valid and enforceable and that the loss of said vessel must be borne by them.
In its resolution of 1 July 2002, the appellate court denied the motion.
Hence, the spouses Cheng’s own petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 154109,
seeking the reversal and setting aside of both the appellate court’s decision of 11
December 2001 and resolution of 01 July 2002, it being their submission that said court
committed a grave and serious reversible error in not holding that:
1. the subject Promissory Note is not valid and enforceable for non-fulfillment of a
suspensive condition and consequently, the Deed of Chattel Mortgage, being a mere
accessory agreement, is likewise not valid and enforceable in the absence of a valid
principal contract; and
2. the Loss of the mortgaged Fishing Vessel "Jean III" must be borne by the respondent
bank considering that the vessel was in its possession and control at the time of the
loss.
Per this Court’s Resolution dated 20 November 2002,8 the two (2) separate petitions
were ordered consolidated, involving, as they do, the same decision of the appellate
court.
As we see it, the common issues to be resolved are:
I. Whether or not the promissory note dated 12 August 1981 is valid;
II. Whether or not the chattel mortgage over the fishing vessel "Jean III" can be
foreclosed for Philippine Pacific’s failure to comply with its obligation under the
promissory note dated 12 August 1981; and
III. Whether or not the real estate mortgage constituted over spouses Cheng’s parcel
of land covered by TCT No. (222143) 23843 [San Juan property] also secured the
spouses’ obligation as co-makers of the promissory note dated 12 August 1981.
In justifying its reversal of the trial court’s finding that the validity and effectivity of the
promissory note dated 12 August 1981 were conditioned upon the ratification thereof
by the SEC-created management committee in SEC Case No. 2042, the appellate
court explained that the terms of the subject promissory note are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the parties. On this score, it ruled that the parole evidence
introduced by the Cheng spouses to the effect that the validity and enforceability of the
note are conditioned upon its approval and ratification by the management committee
should have been discarded by the trial court, consistent with the parole evidence rule
embodied in Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court. 9 Says the appellate court in its
challenged decision:
Instead, We agree with [Allied Bank] that there is no evidence to support the court a
quo’s finding that the effectivity of the promissory note was dependent upon the prior
ratification or confirmation of the management committee formed by the SEC in SEC
Case No. 2042.
To begin with, there is nothing on the face of the promissory note requiring said prior
ratification for it to become valid. Basic is the rule that if the terms of the contract are
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control (Article 1370, Civil Code; Honrado, Jr. vs. CA, 198 SCRA 326).
This basic rule notwithstanding, the court a quo admitted in evidence the alleged verbal
stipulation made by [the spouses Cheng] to the effect that the validity of the promissory
note was dependent upon its ratification by the management committee. Such parole
evidence should not have been allowed as it had the effect of altering the provisions of
the promissory note which are in clear and unequivocal terms.
Under the parole evidence rule, the terms of a contract are conclusive upon the parties
and evidence which shall vary a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a
document is inadmissible (Magellan Manufacturing Corporation vs. CA, 201 SCRA
106).10 (Words in bracket ours).
We agree.
The appellate court is correct in declaring that under the parole evidence rule, when
the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, they are deemed to have
intended such written agreement to be the sole repository and memorial of everything WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED and the challenged decision
that they have agreed upon. All their prior and contemporaneous agreements are and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.
deemed to be merged in the written document so that, as between them and their
successors-in-interest, such writing becomes exclusive evidence of the terms thereof SO ORDERED.
and any verbal agreement which tends to vary, alter or modify the same is not
admissible.11

Here, the terms of the subject promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage are
clear and explicit and devoid of any conditionality upon which its validity depends. To
be sure, Allied Bank was not a party to SEC Case No. 2042 where the management
committee was ordered created; hence, it would not be correct to presume that it had
notice of the existence of the management committee which, incidentally, was still to
be created when the subject promissory note was executed on 12 August 1981.
Notably, while the parties in SEC Case No. 2042 agreed to form the management
committee on 27 July 1981, it was only on 14 August 1981 when the committee was
actually created and its members appointed. Clearly then, the subject promissory note
was outside the realm of authority of the management committee. Corollarily, the
chattel mortgage accessory to it is likewise valid.

We thus declare and so hold that Allied Bank’s foreclosure of the chattel mortgage
constituted over the vessel "Jean III" was justified. On this score, we also rule that the
loss of the mortgaged chattel brought about by its sinking must be borne not by Allied
Bank but by the spouses Cheng. As owners of the fishing vessel, it was incumbent
upon the spouses to insure it against loss. Thus, when the vessel sank before the
chattel mortgage could be foreclosed, uninsured as it is, its loss must be borne by the
spouses Cheng.

We proceed to the third issue. Both the trial court and the appellate court are unanimous
in finding that the real estate mortgage executed by the spouses Cheng over their San
Juan property to secure the loan of GCPI cannot be held to secure the spouses’
obligation as co-makers of the promissory note dated 12 August 1981. We see no
reason to depart from the findings of the two courts below.

Article 2126 of the Civil Code is explicit:

ART. 2126. The mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it
is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose
security it was constituted.

The agreement between the Cheng spouses and Allied Bank as evidenced by the
receipt signed by Allied Bank’s representative is that the San Juan property shall
collateralize the approved loan of GCPI, thus indicating the specific loan to be secured
and nothing else. To be sure, the obligation of GCPI was already paid in full. Hence the
real estate mortgage accessory to it was inevitably extinguished.

All told, we find no reversible error committed by the appellate court in rendering the
assailed 11 December 2001 Decision and subsequent 01 July 2002 Resolution in CA-
G.R. CV 41280.
G.R. No. 155335 July 14, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JESUS MACAPAL, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On review is the conviction of appellant, Jesus Macapal, Jr., for the rape of 23 year
old mentally retarded Ligaya Sarino (the victim).
The Information filed against appellant in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan
City alleged the rape to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the evening of June, (sic) 1996, in Barangay Manapa, Buenavista,
Agusan del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Ligaya R. Sa[r]ino, a
23-year old illiterate who appears to be mentally retarded, against her will.1
On arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.2
From the account of the victim, the following facts transpired one evening in June
1996 at Barangay Manapa, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. While she was walking on
her way home after she bought kerosene from the nearby store of appellant's father,
Jesus Macapal, Sr., appellant suddenly appeared and waylaid her. Holding both her
arms, appellant dragged her to an isolated grassy area where he ordered her to lie
down. Although she wanted to shout, she froze with fear, appellant having poked a
knife at her abdomen and threatened to kill her if she would shout or resist. Appellant
thereafter succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.3
From the rest of the prosecution evidence, the following are gathered: On December
23, 1996, when the victim visited her sister Vilma Sarino Salazar (Vilma), Vilma
noticed the victim's stomach bulging, prompting her to inquire what happened. While
the victim initially refused to answer, she was later prevailed upon to answer upon her
(Vilma's ) insistence and assurance that she would not be harmed. The victim then
revealed what their neighbor, herein appellant, did to her. 4 When Vilma asked her
when the incident happened, the victim answered 'when you just left for Manila which
was, by Vilma's account, on June 3, 1996.
Vilma thus invited to her house appellant's father, the purok leader of the barangay. In
the presence of Vilma's three brothers and her husband, the victim narrated to
appellant's father how his son ravaged her in a grassy area in their barangay. On
hearing the victim's account, appellant's father requested the Sarinos not to report the
incident to the authorities until he had spoken to appellant. Vilma paid no heed to the
request, however, and reported the incident to the barangay captain and then to the
town police5 before which the victim's sworn statement was taken on December 30,
1996.6
A complaint for rape bearing the victim's thumbmark was accordingly filed on January
2, 1997 against appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of Buenavista. 7
Meanwhile, on the request of appellant and his parents, First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Orlando Doyon summoned the complainant and her relatives for a
possible settlement of the case. The parties did appear before the prosecutor on
January 30, 1997 during which the victim, her father Jesus B. Sarino, and her sister
Vilma on one hand, and appellant and his parents on the other, forged a Sworn
Agreement8 whereby the victim and her kins agreed to withdraw the complaint in
consideration of appellant's and his parents' commitment 'to shoulder one-half (') of
the expenses to be incurred . . . in connection with the delivery . . . of the child of [the
victim].
An Affidavit of Desistance9 was in fact executed by the victim stating that 'after mature
deliberation and consultation with [her] father and other relatives, she was
withdrawing her accusation against appellant.
On March 19, 1997, the victim gave birth to a boy. 10
On March 25, 1997, the victim, assisted by her father, filed before the Provincial
Prosecutor's office an 'EX-PARTE MOTION TO RESCIND AND NULLIFY AMICABLE
SETTLEMENT [AND] TO REVIVE THE CASE AND TO ORDER THE REARREST
OF [APPELLANT]11 alleging:
xxx
2. That the undersigned were forced to enter into such agreement
as they were duped and harassed by some policemen in
Buenavista, Agusan del Norte;
3. That even if they were not the victims of trickery and harassment,
they respectfully believe that they can revive the case as there was
nothing in said agreement that would bar them from asking for said
revival;
xxx
Appellant having failed to submit his counter-affidavit and controverting evidence, the
Prosecutor's Office, finding the complaint uncontroverted, filed the information against
appellant on May 2, 1997.
It if further gathered from the evidence for the prosecution that Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, a
psychiatrist at the Northern Mindanao Medical Center who conducted a psychiatric
evaluation of the victim on November 25, 1998, found that 'the patient is suffering
from Mental Retardation, mild to moderate . . . characterized by significantly sub-
average intellectual functioning (IQ 70 or below) accompanied by significant
limitations in adaptive functioning, with an onset below the age of 18.12 And the doctor
opined that while the mental capacity of the victim is comparable to that of a child
between 9 to 12 years old,13 she could testify in court but under closed door and
leading questions should be avoided 'as retarded people may be suggestible and
wish to please others.14
It is gathered furthermore that when Dr. Benjamin B. Selim, Jr. (Dr. Selim), Medical
Officer III of the Butuan Provincial Hospital, examined the victim on January 13, 1997,
he found her to be in a pregnant state and that her hymen was not intact. On the
basis of the ultrasound examination, he opined that she 'had conception probably
third to the last week of June 1996.15
On the other hand, appellant, denying the accusation, claimed as follows: He came to
know for the first time of the charge on December 21, 1996 when he appeared before
the barangay captain16 during which the victim's sister, Vilma, did most of the talking,
she informing that the alleged rape was committed on even date, December 21,
1996. At said meeting, the victim who had a boyfriend named Edsel was asked who
raped her, but she was mum.
To lend credence to appellant's innocence and his suggestion that her boyfriend
could have impregnated the victim, Mansueto Pande, a neighbor of the victim, related
that one afternoon in August 1996, he witnessed the victim and Edsel having sexual
intercourse in the house of Nelson Gultiano where Edsel was then visiting. 17
And Sebastian Bermudez (Bermudez), barangay captain of Magsaysay, Jabonga,
Agusan del Norte, ventured the opinion that appellant could not have committed the
rape in June 1996 as appellant was from May 22 to August 17, 1996 18 in barangay
Magsaysay, in the farm of his (Bermudez's ) uncle, working as a helper in the
operation of a turtle tractor.
Rebutting the defense evidence, the prosecution presented Nelson Gultiano
(Gultiano), the owner of the house where defense witness Mansueto Pande allegedly
saw the victim and a certain Edsel having sexual intercourse. Gultiano denied that the
victim's alleged boyfriend Edsel was ever in his house in August 1996. 19
As surrebuttal witness, the defense presented Edgar Labata who declared that he
was a purok president in barangay Mayapa and he knew that the victim's boyfriend
Edsel was living with Gultiano in 1996.20
Finding for the prosecution, Branch 2 of the RTC of Butuan City convicted appellant
by decision of August 30, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused JESUS MACAPAL, JR. y JACA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape as charged, defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance and it appearing that the accused is not
disqualified from enjoying the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court
hereby sentences said accused JESUS MACAPAL, JR. y JACA to suffer an indefinite
prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as minimum
to Reclusion Perpetua as maximum. The accused is ordered to pay the victim/private
complainant the sum of PhP50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages and to
recognize the child as his illegitimate child whom the accused sired as the natural
consequence of his criminal act.
The accused, in the service of his sentence, shall be credited with the period of his
preventive imprisonment he has undergone pursuant to RA 6127.
SO ORDERED.21 (Underscoring supplied)
Aggrieved, appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed his
conviction but modified the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that the straight penalty of
reclusion perpetua is imposed on the accused-appellant who is further ordered to
pay the offended party the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages. In all other
respects, the same decision stands. Costs against the appellant.
Pursuant, however, to the last paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court refrains from entering the judgment and,
instead, certifies and orders the immediate elevation of the records to the Supreme
Court for review.
SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As the dispositive portion of the appellate decision states, the case was certified to
this Court pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court. 23
Appellant argues that the victim, a mental retardate, is incompetent to establish his
identity for, so he contends, it is not easy to ascertain the identity of a rapist when the
victim is deprived of reason.24 Besides, appellant continues, there was completely no
evidence presented to prove that the incident occurred in June 1996 as the victim
could not recall the year, the time and the day25 of the alleged offense.
Appellant further argues that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the
case despite the absence of evidence to prove the place of the incident.26 At all
events, he claims that the trial court unduly deprived him of his right to fully defend
himself.27
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In rape cases, the victim's credibility is crucial to the determination of the accused's
culpability as the crime generally involves two persons only and usually perpetrated in
seclusion. While it may be difficult to determine the credibility of one who is a mental
retardate, it can still be attained by deducing from the manner he or she testifies in
court as to the surrounding facts of the crime committed.
As long as a witness' testimony is straightforward, candid and unflawed by
inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, and his or her demeanor is
consistent with one who has been victimized to thus bolster credibility with the verity
born out of human nature and experience,28 as in the herein victim's case, credibility
can be accorded to him or her.
Consider the following testimony of the victim which was punctuated with her crying
as she recalled the victim threatening to kill her and the bulging of her stomach.
A I was made to do an errand by my father to buy a (sic) Kerosene, and after I
bought Kerosene, on my way home he waylaid me and brought me to a grassy
area; he made me lie down and he pointed a knife at me and threatened me that
if I would tell my father and siblings he would kill me.
Q After he told you that he would kill you, what happened next?
(Witness is crying.)

PROS. GADANI: A My stomach bulged and then it was after that I told my Ate Vilma Salazar.

Q You said you are Ligaya Sarino, do you know who is this Ligaya Sarino who is the COURT:
private complainant in this case?
Q You said you were raped, will you please tell the court how you were raped?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
A I, Maam.
A He took off my short pants and my panty, and he inserted his penis into my
Q Will you tell the Hon. Court why you file[d] this case against Jesus Macapal, vagina. 29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Jr. alias 'Alot?
Consider too the victim's identification of appellant as the malefactor.
A Because he raped me.
PROS. DAGANI:
ATTY. CHAVEZ:
Q Now, you made mention that the person who was responsible in raping you is
May I request that the word 'Tamastamasan be quoted, your Honor. Jesus Macapal, Jr., alias Alot, do you know this person before he raped you?

COURT: A Yes, Maam.

Q Will you please clarify the word 'Tamastamasan? Q Why do you know him?

A He raped me. A Because he was once our neighbor .

PROS. DAGANI: Q Where were you neighbor with Jesus Macapal?

Q Will you tell the Honorable Court, Ligaya, how you were raped by Jesus Macapal, A In Manapa, Buenavista.
Jr. alias 'Alot?
Q If this Jesus Macapal, Jr. alias Alot is in court, will you be able to identify
A I can. him?

(Witness when answering usually close[s] her eyes.) A Yes, Maam.

Q Please tell the Court? Q Is he in court?

A He is in court.
Q Will you please point to him? discrediting her testimony, given her mental retardation. In fact, testimonial
discrepancies, which could have been caused by the natural fickleness of memory,
(Witness pointing to a lone person seated on the gallery who is the accused tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, credibility as they negate any suspicion of
Jesus Macapal, Jr. alias 'Alot). 30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) rehearsed testimony and do not destroy the substance of the victim's testimony.37

The straightforward narration of the victim of what transpired, accompanied by her As for the defense attack on the prosecution in having allegedly failed to prove the
categorical identification of appellant as the malefactor, sealed the case for the date and place of commission of the rape,38 the same fails.
prosecution.
The records show that when the victim executed a sworn statement before the police
A litany of cases echoes the rule that great respect on the findings of the trial court on on December 30, 1996,39 she was categorical in furnishing the date and place of the
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is accorded. For the trial judge commission of the rape.
observes the behavior and demeanor of the witness in court. His evaluation or
assessment of the credibility of witness and of testimony acquires greater significance xxx
in rape cases because from the nature of the offense, the only evidence that can
oftentimes be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the victim's testimony. 31 It Q: Where and when did this incident happened (sic), if any?
is only in exceptional circumstances that this rule is brushed aside, such as when the
court's evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and substance LIGAYA
which could affect the result of the case.32
A: That was sometimes (sic) in the month of June 1996, in the evening which I could
Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a not remember when the exact time and date, at a grassy portion of a human trail
credible witness.33 The acceptance of his or her testimony depends on the quality of going to our house at Purok 4, Barangay Manapa, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte.
40
his or her perceptions and the manner he or she can make them known to the court.
So this Court held in People v. Guillermo :34
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In People v. Munar (131 SCRA 44, 46[1984]), although the complainant therein was a
19-year old female, with a mental age of a 5-year old, we still held that she was a And during the preliminary examination of the case on January 6, 1997 before
competent witness. We therein relied on the findings of the trial court that Municipal Judge Pancracio N. Escaan, the victim gave the following account:
complainant's answer were intelligible enough to be understood. The complainant
therein could convey her thoughts by words and signs. Furthermore, an examining COURT
physician from the National Mental Hospital was presented in that case who testified
that the mental deficiency of the witness did not prevent her from recalling painful
experiences. In People v. Gerones, (193 SCRA 263, 267 [1991]), we found, upon Q Do you know Jesus Macapal Jr. alias Alot?
close examination of the records, that the victim managed to communicate her ordeal
to the court clearly and consistently. The trial court found the victim therein to have A I know him, your honor.
the mental capacity of a ten-year old. Hence, we declared that we were convinced
that a ten-year old girl could adequately narrate facts which show that she had been
Q How long have you known him?
raped. The acceptance of a mental retardate's testimony, therefore, as in the case of
other witnesses, must still depend on its nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the
quality of the person's perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the A Long time ago, your honor.
court. (Underscoring supplied)
Q Are you neighbors with Alot
Thus, in People v. Limio ,35 the complainant's low intelligence notwithstanding, this
Court entertained no doubt in her testimony, it having categorically showed that 'she A We are neighbors
had been subjected to a harrowing unspeakable experience, which left an indelible
impression in her mind as a rape victim.
Q How far is your house to the house of Alot?

In the case at bar, albeit the victim's testimony was tainted with inconsistencies,36
A Our house is farther from the house of Alot.
these are mere collateral and minor matters which would not compel this Court from
Q Do you recall meeting him last June/96 in the evening? A From the informant including the victim because she was there and they can
only supply me this date.
A I remember, your honor.
Q Are you saying doctor that both the patient and the informant told you about this
Q In what reason (sic) have you met him? date?

A When I bought kerosene. A Yes, maam.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Q Where? And on cross examination, he declared:

A At their store. ATTY. CHAVEZ:

Q What happened at the store of Alot? Q Doctor, according to this medical certificate, you mentioned and indicated the DOI
meaning date of incident. You indicated here June 1996, you made this indication
because you based the age of pregnancy?
A Nothing.
A Not on the basis of the pregnancy. 'But I asked the patient on when meaning the
Q Even after June/96 nothing happen between you and A lot? time and the date of the incident. But the alleged victim can only recall the
month and the year. But the exact date, she cannot .
A There was, your honor.
Q If the alleged victim supplied that information, why was there a need for the ultra
Q When was that? sound?

A I cannot remember. A To determine the exact date of the gestation of the fetus.43 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Q Was it June/96?
On the merits of the defense of denial and alibi, the same must be discredited.
A No answer
Appellant is alleged by defense witness Sebastian Bermudez to have been, in June
Q When you bought kerosene from the store of Alot, what happened? 1996, at barangay Magsaysay, Jabonga, Agusan del Norte of which he (Bermudez')
was a resident,44 working as helper in the operation of a turtle tractor on the farm of
his (Bermudez') uncle. Bermudez following testimony on cross-examination, quoted
A He rape[d] me. verbatim, does not, however, rule out appellant's presence on the date and place of
the commission of the crime:
Q Where?
PROS. DAGANI:
A At the isolated place.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Q Now, you said that you saw Jesus Macapal, Jr. when was this that you saw him
Even Dr. Selim echoed the victim's account to him about the month and year of plowing the field of your uncle?
commission. Thus, on direct examination, the doctor declared:
WITNESS BERMUDEZ
PROS. DAGANI:
A May 25, 1996.
Q When you earlier testified that you asked about the . . . DOI when you stated this in
your certificate, DOI ' meaning date of incident: June 1996, from whom did you get COURT:
this date?
Q On May 25, 1996, you saw Jesus Macapal, Jr., on the following day May 26, 1996?
A They were on my rice land working.
Q From May 25 up to what date did Jesus Macapal stay in your barangay?
A I think it was on August 17 or 27 when I saw Jesus Macapal, Jr. and his aunt
at the waiting shed because the waiting shed is located at the junction of the
road going to my house.
Q So, more or less, Jesus Macapal, Jr. arrived in your barangay in the month of May
and he was there until August when he left, is that correct?
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: Proceed.
PROS. DAGANI:
Q Now , from that period, how many times were you able to actually see Jesus
Macapal, Jr?
A After I have him plowed in the ricefield and the turtle machine broke down, he
stopped working but he again work[ed] for me after one week also when the turtle
was repaired. I could not say how many times because it was intermittently and
he lived in a place far from my house . 45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Alibi is a defense that places the defendant at the relevant time and in a place
different from the commission of the crime, so removed therefrom as to render it
impossible for him to be the guilty party.46 For it to prosper, the following must thus be
established: the presence of the appellant in another place at the time of the
commission of the crime and the physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission.47 The accused must not only prove that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must also convincingly
demonstrate the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the time
of the incident.48
In the case at bar, as earlier stated, the testimony of defense witness Bermudez did
not rule out the presence of appellant on the date and place of the commission of the
crime.
In any event, even assuming that appellant was in barangay Magsaysay from May 25
to August 25, 1996, the distance from barangay Manapa, Buenavista where the crime
took place to barangay Magsaysay, Jabonga is about 75 kilometers, as the trial court
found, with an average travel time of about three (3) hours only, 49 to thus render it not
physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime on the date
and time of its commission.1âwphi1
Moreover, the positive identification by the victim of appellant as the culprit being
categorical and consistent and devoid of any showing of ill motive on her part prevails
over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.50
As for appellant's argument that he was deprived of his right to fully defend himself in
light of the trial court's denial51 of his 'MOTION FOR DNA TEST52 wherein he raised
as 'main issue ' whether he fathered the victim's child ' fails too. The identity of the
father of a rape victim's child is non-issue in a charge for rape, the impregnation of the
victim not being an element of the offense:
More importantly, it should be pointed out that these consolidated cases are criminal
cases for rape, not civil actions for paternity or filiation. The identity of the father of
the victim's child is a non-issue. Even her pregnancy is beside the point. What
matters is the occurrence of the sexual assault committed by appellant on the
person of the victim on four separate occasions . . .53 (Emphasis and italics in the
original)
One last word on appellant's plea of innocence. To the Court, appellant's act of
committing, along with his parents, in the Agreement54 forged with the victim while the
case was on preliminary investigation before the Prosecutor's Office 'to shoulder one-
half (1/2) of the expenses to be incurred by [the victim] . . . in connection with the
delivery of her child is the coup de grace that dissipates any nagging doubts on his
guilt.
Respecting the imposition by the Court of Appeals of a straight penalty of reclusion
perpetua, the same is in order, such penalty being indivisible.55
WHEREFORE, the challenged October 1, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN RAMIREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals dated May 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56154, entitled "Susan Ramirez,
petitioner, versus, Hon. Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr., as Judge RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 72,
and Maximo Alvarez, respondents."
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No.
19933-MN for arson3 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon
City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of
Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand
as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised
no objection.
Esperanza testified as follows:
"ATTY. ALCANTARA:
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your Honor.
COURT:
Swear in the witness.
xxx
ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of proving
that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being
charged particularly that accused Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in
the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila,
the house owned by his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez
after pouring the gasoline on the door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and set it
on fire; that the accused at the time he successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan
Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the family as
well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the accused; that as a
consequence of the accused in successfully setting the fire to the house of Susan
Ramirez, the door of said house was burned and together with several articles of the
house, including shoes, chairs and others.
COURT:
You may proceed.
xxx
DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
xxx
Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of that
scent?
A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the house of
my sister (and witness pointing to the person of the accused inside the court room).
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you know?
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.
Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him?
A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his name, he gave
his name as Maximo Alvarez."4
In the course of Esperanza’s direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed
"uncontrolled emotions," prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion5 to disqualify Esperanza
from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on
marital disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition6 to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the
trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other
witnesses.
On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying
Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.7
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed
Order dated October 19, 1999.8
This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case
No. 19933-MN, to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari9 with application
for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.10
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside
the assailed Orders issued by the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her
husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case
for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or
ascendants."
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at
the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and
unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the other.11
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions,
both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed
by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound
reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule.
For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no
more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the
reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of
interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is
non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life,
which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy home.12
In Ordoño vs. Daquigan,13 this Court held:
"We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid
down in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
‘The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow;
and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes
within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly
attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the
exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other.’"
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal
relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information
for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust,
confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and
flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
"The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan
Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent
of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital
relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act
complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It
underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or
tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is
non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the
law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castañeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no
longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule."
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the
offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact,
they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the
evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between
petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before
the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have
the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the
accused, because (as stated by this Court in Francisco14), "it was the latter himself who
gave rise to its necessity."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court,
RTC, Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify
against petitioner, her husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 52341-46 November 25, 2005
DELIA PREAGIDO and ULRICO BOLOTAULO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed
by petitioners Delia Preagido and Ulrico Bolotaulo seeking annulment of the Decision 1
dated December 28, 1979 of the Sandiganbayan rendered in Criminal Case Nos.
195, 196, 197, 198, 199 and 200 finding them guilty of 6 and 3 counts, respectively, of
estafa thru falsification of official and commercial documents.
In a Resolution dated July 4, 1991, the instant petition was consolidated with another
group of cases which were all petitions for review on certiorari from the joint decision
of the Sandiganbayan dated October 24, 1990 in Criminal Case Nos. 1143-1341 and
5585-5782 finding accused-petitioners therein guilty on different counts of violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
However, the records of Criminal Case Nos. 195-200 were not included in the
voluminous records of the consolidated cases. We learned from our Judicial Records
Office that the original records of Criminal Case Nos. 195-200 were with the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, in a Resolution dated May 6, 2003,2 we
directed the Clerk of Court of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan to elevate the
records of the instant petition. In the same Resolution, we also effected the
separation of the herein petition of Preagido and Bolotaulo from the other
consolidated cases so as not to delay the disposition of the latter and considering that
the instant petition involves the alleged anomalous transactions in the Tagbilaran City
Engineering Office (CEO) committed in 1978 which are entirely different from the
other consolidated cases which involved anomalous transactions in the Cebu Second
Highway Engineering District in 1977 wherein neither of herein petitioners were
accused.
Later, the Executive Clerk of Court III of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Estela Teresita C.
Rosete, submitted the original records and the transcripts of stenographic notes. She
also filed a Manifestation wherein she informed us that despite her earnest efforts to
locate some documentary exhibits, the same could no longer be found. Thus, in a
Resolution dated March 23, 2004,3 we asked the Solictor General to furnish us copies
of the other unlocated exhibits listed in said Resolution as well as the counsel of
herein petitioners to furnish us copies of their exhibits offered and marked for
petitioners. We also directed them to manifest whether they are willing to dispense
with the other unlocated exhibits and to submit the case for resolution on the basis of
the evidence already with us.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation dated July 13, 2004
submitting the case for decision. Atty. Epifanio Bolando, petitioner Bolotaulo’s new
counsel, entered his appearance on December 19, 2004. Atty. Bolando filed his
Compliance dated April 15, 2005 dispensing with the other exhibits and for
submission of the case for resolution. He also informed us that petitioner Preagido
had died on December 16, 2003.
On June 21, 2005, the Solicitor General, pursuant to our Resolution dated March 8,
2005 requiring him to verify and report the alleged death of petitioner Preagido,
submitted a certified true copy of petitioner Preagido’s death certificate issued by the
Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cebu City. Petitioner Preagido’s death during the
pendency of her appeal extinguishes her criminal and civil liabilities. Thus, we will
only resolve the appeal of petitioner Senior Civil Engineer Bolotaulo.
It is noteworthy to mention that when the instant petition was filed in 1980, the other
co-accused of petitioner Bolotaulo in Criminal Case Nos. 195, 198 and 199 had
separately filed their respective appeals which had been decided by us, to wit:
(1) Valentino G. Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines,
G.R.Nos. L-52352-57,4
(2) Jose C. Bagasao vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
L-53813-53818,5
(3) Isidoro Recamadas vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, G.R.
Nos. L-53694-99,6
(4) Rolando R. Mangubat vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines,
G.R.Nos. L-53724-297
where we affirmed the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
We adopt our factual findings in those cases which we now incorporate as an integral
part of herein decision, to wit:
In the regional level, the requisition of funds for public works purposes, especially in
the matter of road and bridge repairs, involves a graduated series of steps. As found
by the respondent Sandiganbayan, it begins with the Sub-Allotment Advices (SAAs),
as well as the Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceilings (ACDCs), issued by the
Ministry of Public Highways in favor of its Highways Regional Offices. These serve as
the Regional Offices' authority to obligate and disburse funds. In turn, these become
the sources of funds of the various Engineering Districts apportioned throughout each
region.
The Engineering District then requests for the release of these funds from the
Regional Director through a Program of Work. The Regional Finance Officer issues a
Letter of Advice of Allotment (LAA), certified as to availability of funds by the Regional
Accountant countersigned by the Regional Director, and addressed to the District (or
City, as the case may be) Engineer. At the same time, he (the Regional Finance
Officer) prepares a Sub-Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDC) for the
Regional Director.
The LAA and SACDC are subsequently entered in a logbook. The funds requested
are then released.
The District Accountant thereafter prepares a Report of Obligation Incurred (ROI) and
a Report of Checks Issued (RCI) to be submitted to the Regional Office and entered
in the journals and the General Ledger thereof. On the basis thereof, the Regional
Accountant prepares a trial balance to be recommended by the Finance Officer and
approved by the Regional Director. The same is then submitted to the Ministry of
Public Highways.

On the strength of such LAA and SACDC, the District then prepares a Requisition for …
Supplies or Equipment (RSE) as well as a Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA),
pursuant to the Program of Work. Both are likewise certified as to availability of funds It appears that from May through June, 1978, the Tagbilaran City Engineering Office
by the Regional Accountant and approved by the Regional Director. (CEO) embarked on certain projects involving the restoration of various roads and
bridges in Tagbilaran City. Pursuant to five LAAs addressed to the Ministry of Public
Thereafter, the Property Custodian or the Purchasing Officer, as the case may be, Highways purportedly issued by the Seventh Regional Highways Office on behalf of
addresses Requests for Sealed Quotations to various suppliers, usually through the Tagbilaran CEO, more specifically described as follows:
newspaper advertisements or notices posted in conspicuous places in the District
concerned. After ten days, the Sealed Quotations are submitted to the Price LAA No. Date Amount
Verification Committee which determines the lowest bid in the presence of 107-780-05-78 April 29, 1978 P 150,0
representatives of the District Engineer and the Auditor. An Abstract of Sealed 107-0780-07-78 No date 26,0
Quotations is then signed by the members of the Committee as well as the said local
107-780-012-78 April 24, 1978 48,1
representatives. Thereafter, and subject to the approval of the District Engineer, the
proper award is made in favor of the lowest bidder. On the basis thereof, the Property 107-780-014-78 April 24, 1978 150,0
Custodian issues a Purchase Order (PO) in favor of the winning bidder, again subject 107-780-011-78 No date 100,0
to the approval of the District Engineer and certified as to availability of funds by the TOTAL P 474,1
Regional Accountant.
as well as six SACDCs, as follows:
The supplies thus to be delivered are thereafter inspected (through Request for
Inspection) by the Property Custodian. The deliveries themselves are recorded in a
SACDC No. Amount
Tally Sheet after which a Record of Inspection, certified by the Property Custodian, is
prepared by the representative of the Auditor and the Property Custodian. 022-78 P 26,000.00
167-78 48,100.00
180-78 48,100.00
Payment to the supplier is evidenced by a General Voucher (GV). Among others, the
GV contains five parts; (1) a certification of receipt of supplies to be accomplished by 193-78 150,000.00
the Property Custodian; (2) a certification of correctness, that is, that the expenses 222-78 150,000.00
are necessary and lawful, and that the prices are not in excess of the current rates in 086-78 225,830.00
the locality, to be accomplished by the Project Engineer; (3) approval by the District TOTAL P 699,930.00
Engineer; (4) a certification, to be accomplished by the Auditor, that the GV has been
properly approved, its account codes proper, and that it is supported by the proper
the Tagbilaran CEO prepared RSEs and ROAs for the procurement of materials and
documents; and (5) a certification that the GV has undergone pre-audit, to be
supplies, specifically, anapog binder, for the projects aforementioned. All five LAAs
accomplished by the Auditor.
were certified as to availability of funds by Rolando Mangubat, allegedly on behalf of
Angelina Escaño, Finance Officer of the Seventh Regional Highways Office
The GV itself must carry with it the following: the RSE, ROA, Program of Work, (Mangubat signed over her typewritten name) and countersigned by Jose Bagasao.
Detailed Estimates, Request for Sealed Quotations, Abstract of Sealed Quotations, The six SACDs were likewise signed by Mangubat for the Regional Director. The
PO, Delivery Receipts, Request for Inspection, Record of Inspection, Test Reports, materials requisitioned were supplied by JV Sand & Gravel & Construction Supply, a
and Tax Clearance of the supplier. private contractorship owned by James Tiu. Six GVs were prepared therefor, as
follows:
The process winds up with the issuance of the check by the Cashier in the name of
the supplier. Like the GV, the check is pre-audited and then released. GV No. Program of Work Amount
 01-780601 Restoration of Shoulders, Tagbiliaran North Road
(TNR), Junction TNR-Airport Road, Junction TNR-
Wharf Road and TCSR
01-780606 Restoration of Shoulders, Tagbilaran North Road
(TNR), Junction TNR-Wharf Road
01-780641 Restoration of Shourders, Tagbilaran Corella-
Sikatuna Road
01-780682 Restoration, Totulan-Ubos-Dauis Bridge
Approaches
01-780684 Restoration, Totulan, Ubos-Dauis Bridge
Approaches
01-780694 Restoration, Junction, Tagbilaran East Road-Dauis
Paulao Central Road Shoulders and Bridge
Approaches
TOTAL
P 299,880.00
========
representing partial payments in favor of JV Sand & Gravel & Construction Supply,
which has been named as a creditor therein. The GVs themselves were accompanied
8
by various supporting papers, among them, the RSEs and ROAs earlier referred to.
… That, in or about and during the period from the months of April to June, 1978, in the
Eventually, the matter reached the Commission on Audit which constituted two teams
to mount an inquiry.
The investigation disclosed that the above mentioned LAAs as well as SACDCs were
spurious documents, and that the six GVs were in fact based on only two LAAs, Nos.
107-780-05-78 and 107-780-014-78. It was further established that the total sum
requested under the said LAAs — ₱474,100.00 — supposedly to cover the
Tagbilaran CEO's unliquidated obligations were not in fact supported by its statement
of accounts, under which its total obligations totalled but ₱160,639.55. Moreover, the
payee, JV Sand & Gravel & Construction Supply, was not listed in the City's books as
a creditor, for which it could have been entitled to the sums released.
The Audit Commission likewise observed certain discrepancies in the GVs in
question, notably, that the Programs of Work had been "split"; that they were dated
after the dates of the RSEs; that while the POs called for 9,369 to 9,375 cubic meters
of anapog binder, the GVs specified but 3,123 to 3,125 cubic meters thereof apiece;
that the Delivery Receipts had been issued "in lump quantities," did not bear
acknowledgment signatures or were not initialled by the auditor or dated after the
dates of the pre-audit; that the biddings were irregular; and that anapog had been
short-delivered.
The Commission on Audit moreover found that the Highways Regional Office, as of
this period, had in fact released "doubtful" allotments to ten districts, the Tagbilaran
CEO among them, in the total sum of ₱24,052,750.00 supposedly to cover
unliquidated obligations, although the statements of account thereof showed a total of
P 49,980.00
only ₱2,735,181.98 as and for unliquidated obligations.
49,980.00
The very books of the Regional Office appeared furthermore to have been doctored.
For while the total unliquidated obligations totalled only ₱2,586,306.78, the entry in
the Regional Office's general ledger was ₱35,509,002.99. And in payment of such
49,980.00
doubtful obligations, the checks issued exceeded the cash disbursement ceiling by
₱6,837,971.35. Apparently, it was Rolando Mangubat who recorded these entries by
49,980.00
way of seven Journal Vouchers (JVs).
49,980.00
It likewise turned out that James Tiu subsequently opened certain savings accounts
at the Allied Bank in favor of Niño Pilayre, Praxedes Lopena, and Miguel Bulac,
49,980.00
although Lopena insists that as far as she was concerned, she knew nothing about
it.9
The Tanodbayan filed six Informations for estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents against nine public officials 10 and two private individuals11 on
the basis of conspiracy. Later, additional public officials 12 were included in some of
these Informations. It is only in Criminal Case Nos. 195, 198 and 199 that petitioner
Bolotaulo is a co-accused. Except for the amounts involved, the quantities of anapog
binder allegedly requisitioned and delivered, the six Informations were uniformly
worded as follows:
City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
public officials, who by reason of the duties of their office, are accountable officers,
and conspiring and conniving among themselves, as well as with their private party
co-accused, after having falsified or caused to have falsified Letters of Advice of
Allotment No. 107-780-05-78 and No. 107-780-014-78, both dated April 24, 1978 and
Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling No. 193-78 dated April 28, 1978 and No.
222-78 dated May 2, 1978, which are all public documents, whereby said accused
made it appear that an amount of Three Hundred Thousand (₱300,000.00) had been
lawfully allocated for the City of Tagbilaran from the MPH Regional Highway Office
No. VII, Cebu City, and made available "For the maintenance of existing and
unabandoned roads and bridges" in the City of Tagbilaran, which falsifications had
been committed in connection with the functions of their respective offices, then
taking advantage of their official positions and committing in relation to the functions
of their respective offices, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify
or cause to have falsified General Voucher,13 covering the sum of Forty-Nine
Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Pesos (₱49,980.00) for the payment of road
shouldering materials (anapog binder), with the use of the aforesaid falsified Letters
of Advice of Allotment and Sub-advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling to support
thereof and other documents, such as the Program of Work/Budget Cost for Roads
and Bridges dated May 8, 1978, Request for Obligation of Allotment dated May 16,
1978, Abstract of Sealed Quotations, Purchase Orders dated June 9, 1978, Record of
Inspection dated June 9, 1978, and other papers in support thereof, by making it
appear that the request for obligation of allotment was regularly prepared and
approved, that the bidding of materials was properly conducted, that the
corresponding purchase order was prepared in favor of the lowest bidder, and that
the materials purchased were duly and fully delivered in accordance with
specifications and duly inspected, when in truth and in fact, as the accused fully knew
well, the foregoing transactions were false and simulated, except that, with the
amount of 3,123 cubic meters of anapog binder having been purchased for the sum
of ₱49,980.00 at the rate of ₱16.00 per cubic meter, accused Jimmy Tiu and his
representative accused Engracio Quiroz, by previous understanding with the accused
officials, had caused the delivery only of (quantity) cubic meters of anapog binders,
hence causing the Government to lose (quantity) cubic meters and worth (amount) at
the rate of ₱16.00 per cubic meter; thus, the said accused having in said manner in a
narration of facts; and that, by means of the aforesaid falsifications, the said accused
were able to demand, collect and receive from the government thru the Tagbilaran
City Engineer’s Office, MPH Regional office No. VII, the value of the vouchers in
question although the amount due should have been only the value of the actual
quantities delivered, and that, after the accused after having demanded, collected and
received, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply,
misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and benefit, and/or consent or,
through negligence, permit other persons to take, misapply, misappropriate, and
convert to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
Government.
All the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. Joint trial thereafter
ensued. In a decision dated December 28, 1979, the Sandiganbayan acquitted
accused Sayson, Budget Examiner II and Quiroz, the employee of accused contractor
Tiu; and convicted the rest of the accused, including Bolotaulo, of estafa thru
falsification of official and commercial documents to six years of prision correccional
to ten years, eight months and one day of prision mayor each case with the
accessories provided by law, pay the fine of ₱3,500.00 for each count and ordered
them to pay certain amounts.14
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners and the other accused on the basis of
conspiracy. It found that they were guilty of conspiring in the falsification of the
following documents, to wit: (1) Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs); (2) Sub-Advice
of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs); (3) Programs of Work (PWs); (4) General
Vouchers (GVs); (5) Requests for Obligation of Allotment (ROAs); (6) Abstract of
Sealed Quotations; (7) Purchase Orders (POs); (8) Delivery Receipts and (9)
Records of Inspections (ROIs); that such falsification facilitated the unauthorized
release of funds; and, the supplies allegedly requisitioned under them were short
delivered or not delivered at all.
As we have stated earlier, the separate appeals of petitioner Bolotaulo’s co-accused
Castillo (City Engineer), Bagasao (Assistant Regional Director), Recamadas
(Property Custodian), and Mangubat (Regional Chief Accountant), were denied and
the decision of the Sandiganbayan was affirmed in Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan,15
Bagasao vs. Sandiganbayan,16 Recamadas vs. Sandiganbayan,17 and Mangubat vs.
Sandiganbayan.18 We found in those cases that the projects turned out to be "ghost"
projects since they did not carry the imprimatur of the then Public Highways Ministry,
the various requisition papers having been falsified to enable the accused to acquire
the necessary funding. Furthermore, the supplies ordered were either short delivered
or not delivered at all. As a result, the government suffered losses in the total sum of
₱240,058.0019
We now resolve the appeal of petitioner Ulrico Bolotaulo, Senior Civil Engineer,
Tagbilaran CEO, Ministry of Public Highways, who was convicted in Criminal Case
Nos. 195, 198 and 199.
Petitioner comes to us raising both questions of law and of fact. The OSG filed its
Answer praying for the denial of the instant petition for review.20
The questions of law are as follows: (1) whether Presidential Decree No. 1486 as
amended by P.D. No. 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan is an ex post facto law and
violates the rights of the accused to due process and equal protection of law; (2)
whether the Sandiganbayan was validly created and constituted.
The first legal issue had already been settled in Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan,21 the very
first case which upheld the constitutionality of the P.D. No. 1486 as amended,
creating the Sandiganbayan. We declared that P.D. No. 1486 as amended was not
an ex post facto law and does not violate the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. Such ruling was reiterated in many subsequent cases. 22
As to the second legal issue, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan was not validly
constituted since at the time it rendered the judgment, it was only composed of one
Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices, thus how could it possibly act in
division when it was never constituted as a whole?
This issue had already been put to rest in De Guzman vs. People,23 where we held:
… Although the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice and eight
Associate Justices, it does not mean that it cannot validly function without all of the
Divisions constituted. Section 3 of PD 1606 provides that "the Sandiganbayan shall sit
in three divisions of three justices each." While Section 5 thereof provides that the
unanimous vote of the three justices in a division shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a judgment.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three Justices each and each
Division functions independently of the other. As long as a Division has been duly
constituted it is a judicial body whose pronouncements are binding as judgments of
the Sandiganbayan.
The judgment convicting petitioner was a unanimous Decision of the First Division
duly constituted. It thus met the requirement for the pronouncement of a judgment as
required by Section 5 PD 1606 supra.24
Petitioner next raises the issue of the sufficiency of evidence upon which his
conviction was predicated. He argues that estafa cannot be committed in the absence
of any statement from the government of fund loss; that the checks covering the
questioned transactions in the Tagbilaran CEO were not dishonored by the drawee
bank; and that there was no concrete evidence shown by the prosecution to establish
underdeliveries.
We are not impressed.
The prosecution had clearly established that because of the fake LAAs, SACDCs and
the general vouchers with all its supporting documents, the government through the
Tagbilaran CEO had disbursed funds for projects which were short delivered. Since
there were short deliveries of anapog binder to the alleged projects sites, it resulted to
the government suffering losses. We quote with approval the findings of the
Sandiganbayan on this matter, thus:
… It is only logical that, if funds are disbursed without any appropriation, there is
actually a payment of money out of the Treasury without any sanction in law. In such
case, the Government suffers a loss of so much as is disbursed. Of course, in the
cases at bar, the People adopted a more realistic approach to the situation. It opted to
hold the perpetrators of the fraudulent transactions liable only up to the amount of the
actual loss sustained, evidently because it concedes that there had been some
deliveries, albeit minimal. And, there can be no question that, if a contract is entered
into with the Government for a given quantity of materials and the entire contract price
is paid but only a quantity less than that contracted for is actually delivered, the
Government would naturally be prejudiced to the extent of the value of the materials
not delivered. This is precisely what happened here. Therefore, it is altogether off-
tangent for the accused to contend that, because no statement of loss consequent to
the transactions here involved had been presented from the National Treasury or
from the Philippine National Bank, no justifiable finding of damage to the Government
can be made. This would be closing one’s eyes to reality. For, the stark reality is that
certain amounts have in fact been paid by the Government for materials that were
short-delivered. Accordingly, we hold that damage to the extent of the value of said
short-delivery was sustained. Considering that it is undeniable that the damage came
about thru the deceitful medium of the multiple falsifications here found to have been
perpetrated, it is ineluctably clear that said falsifications were the means to the
perpetration of a crime of estafa. As correctly formulated in the Informations herein,
the crime committed in each of the cases at bar is estafa thru falsification of public
documents.
This ushers the Court to the determination of the extent of the damage caused to the
Government. On this score, the evidence bears looking into. Restituto Castro,
testifying for the People, detailed the volume of deliveries made to various sections of
the roads and bridge approaches covered by the projects here involved based on his
counting of truckloads of anapog extracted from the Belderol Co and Picmao quarries
and brought to the restoration sites. On the other hand, Assistant Provincial Engineer
Sarmiento also made documented estimates of the volume of anapog delivered and
significantly, enough, even after reckoning with pertinent factors bearing on the
matter-including the time lapse between the date of spreading and the date of
inspection, the effect of erosion, and a shrinkage factor of 20% and 30% as the case
may be- came up with figures higher than those arrived at by Castro. So much so
that, giving the defense the benefit of the doubt, the Court elects to go by the figures
furnished by Engineer Sarmiento as bases for reckoning the damage caused. For this
purpose, the amount to be considered as starting point should be the face value of
the respective checks actually paid to accused Tiu, that is to say, deducting the
amount paid to the City Treasurer for Mining Fees. And, the value of anapog
delivered should be taken at the price it was supposed to have been sold to the
Government, that is ₱16.00 per cubic meter. On this (sic) bases, the damage may be
computed as follows -
Case Amount Delivery Value of DAMAGE
No. Paid Volume Delivery
195- ₱ 47,637.75 566- ₱9,056.00- ₱ 38,581.75
196- 47,636.25 12- 192.00- 47,444.25
197- 47,636.25 624- 9,984.00- 37,652.25
198- 47,637.75 none- none- 47,637.75
199- 47,637.75 1,496- 23,936.00- 23,701.75
200- 47,636.25 106- 1,696.00- 45,940.25
₱ 240,958.0025
It bears stressing that the fraudulent issuances of the LAAs, SACDCs, GVs and its
supporting documents and the journal vouchers and short deliveries are now settled
issues. As we have earlier stated, we upheld the findings of the Sandiganbayan in
four petitions brought to us by the four co-accused of herein petitioners which
involved the same decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 195 to 200
covering the same transactions.26
Thus, the only issue now is whether the Sandiganbayan is correct in finding petitioner
Bolotaulo guilty of conspiracy in committing the crime charged.
Petitioner Bolotaulo was convicted for his signature in the RSEs, in the abstract of
sealed quotations and for signing the general voucher certifying that the expenses are
necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision, and that the price is just
and reasonable and not in excess of the current rates in the locality. He, however,
contends that he merely performed his duties and responsibilities in affixing his
signatures on those documents.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioner, as the Senior Civil Engineer of the Tagbilaran CEO, was the one who
prepared the three Request for Supplies or Equipment (RSEs)27 which were all dated
April 11, 1978 allegedly on the basis of three programs of work he recommended for
approval which were all dated May 8, 1978. Notably, however, the RSEs antedated
the programs of work which is an anomalous circumstance since the RSEs needed
for the prosecution of the projects are only based on the programs of work. In fact,
petitioner, in his cross-examination, admitted that he cannot prepare a RSE without
an approved program of work28 and that it is the normal and regular procedure; 29 that
if the program of work is prepared later than the RSE, there must be something
irregular about it.30
No satisfactory explanation was advanced by petitioner on why the RSEs antedated
the programs of work as all he could say was that it was not his concern which of
these two came ahead as long as that at the time he was signing the general
voucher, the program of work was there.31 As the Sandiganbayan found, it unmasks
the RSEs and/or Programs of Work as falsificiations since the former cannot be said
to be "O.K. as to program of work," as therein stated since at the time of their
preparation, no program of work was yet in existence and that the latter can only be
said to have been subsequently prepared to plug a veritable loophole. 32
In fact, the RSEs are not even in accord with the program of work. While petitioner
recommended the approval of the three programs of work each calling for the use of
3,123 cubic meters of selected borrow (Item 108) as well as the detailed estimates
which also called for the use of selected borrow, the three RSEs which petitioner
prepared called for the use of anapog binder. No explanation was offered as to why
there was such a discrepancy.
Notably, petitioner Bolotaulo recommended for approval three programs of work
which all cost not more than ₱50,000.00 each. As established by the testimony of
prosecution witness, Miguel V. Bulac, this was so since petitioner Bolotaulo’s co-
accused City Engineer Castillo could not approve program of work exceeding
₱50,000.00 because in excess of that amount, the program of work has to be
approved by the Regional Director.33 In fact, Engr. Castillo admitted that program of
work in excess of ₱50,000.00 needs the approval of the region.34 As we earlier
stated, we affirmed the conviction of City Engineer Castillo. 35
Petitioner Bolotaulo signed three GVs certifying that the expenses are necessary,
lawful and incurred under his direct supervision, and that the price is just and
reasonable and not in excess of the current rates in the locality. Attached to these
GVs as supporting documents are the programs of work, the RSEs, the requests for
sealed quotations and the purchase orders among others. He signed the GVs despite
the fact that the RSEs antedated the programs of work. He could not have failed to
notice that there was only one set of request for sealed quotation for the total of 9,369
cubic meters of anapog binders and one purchase order which supported the three
GVs all for amounts less than ₱50,000.00 each to the same contractor/ supplier
James Tiu. The issuance of three GVs for amounts less than ₱50,000.00 each was
resorted to since a higher amount would have required the vouchers to be forwarded
to the Regional Auditor for action and review. The RSEs and the GVs had been split
into uniform amounts of not more than ₱50,000.00 each which is a clear case of
splitting of requisitions and general vouchers prohibited by the Commission on Audit
Circular No. 76- 41 dated July 30, 1976.
As defined by the Circular, "splitting" in its literal sense means dividing or breaking up
into separate parts or portions, or an act resulting in a fissure, rupture, breach. Within
the sphere of government procurement, splitting is associated with requisitions,
purchase orders, deliveries and payments.
Splitting may be in the form of (1) Splitting of Requisi3tions which consists in the non-
consolidation of requisitions for one or more items needed at about the same time by
the requisitioner; (2) Splitting of Purchase orders which consists in the issuance of
two or more purchase orders based on two or more requisitions for the same or at
about the same time by the different requisitioners; and (3) Splitting of payments
which consists in making two or more payments for one or more items involving one
purchase order. These forms of splitting are resorted to in order to avoid (a)
inspection of deliveries, (b) action, review or approval by higher authorities; or (c)
public bidding.
There is also no truth to petitioner Bolotaulo’s certification in the general voucher that
the price of the materials requisitioned is just and reasonable and not in excess of the
current rates in the locality considering that it was established that there was
irregularity in the bidding held on May 24, 1978.36 As the Sandiganbayan found:
…
In the same vein, the record is clear that, prior to the pre-audit of all GVs here
involved, defects and irregularties respecting the bidding conducted in connection
with the procurement of the materials purchased were brought home to the
knowledge of all concerned, particularly the District Auditor. A letter was actually
written by accused Lopeña to accused Castillo officially bringing to his attention the
defects and irregularities aforesaid (Exhibit G-22). Another letter was also written by
accused Lopeña to accused Castillo returning the GVs (Exhibits D, E and H) because
of defects like splitting, lack of ROA, and others. And yet, without anything being done
to correct the defects and/or supply the deficiencies except the mere explanation of
accused Castillo that the defects are mere clerical errors or that the objections are
tardy, the GVs involved herein were nevertheless eventually passed on pre-audit.
Since the bidding is defective, necessarily, the certification as to the justness and
reasonableness of the price and that it is not in excess of the current price in the
locality becomes a falsehood.
We likewise find no merit in petitioner’s claim that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding
the existence of conspiracy in the alleged commission of the crime. We are indeed
convinced that conspiracy has been clearly established by the evidence presented by
the prosecution. The whole scheme started with the issuances of fake LAAs, which
give the authority to obligate, and the SACDCs, the authority to disburse funds, to the
Tagbilaran CEO for the alleged purpose of prosecuting certain projects. The
Tagbilaran Office which was fully aware of the fake LAAs and SACDCs, made it
appear that there were valid requisitions, public bidding and purchase order which all
turned out to be also falsified. General vouchers were prepared and checks pursuant
thereto were issued in payment to the supplier/contractor for materials which turned
out to be short delivered or not delivered at all. As correctly held by the
Sandiganbayan:
… It will readily be discerned from the facts in the case at bar that the defraudation
perpetrated upon the Government was launched with the issuance of the fake LAAs
in the Regional office, gained momentum as it wound its way thru the intricate paces
of the procurement and payment processes in the District Office, and was put to rest
with the execution of the fake JVs also in the Regional office. A veritable umbilical
cord that ties the accused in the Regional office with those in the District Office is thus
unmistakable. Such that even if the acts imputed to each accused may, at first blush,
appear disconnected and separate from those of the others, there is nevertheless that
common thread of sentiment, intent and purpose to attain the same end that runs thru
the entire gamut of acts separately perpetrated by them. After all, conspiracy implies
concert of design more than participation in every act of execution. Like links in a
chain, the role played by each accused is so indispensable to the success of the
fraud that, without any of them, the scheme would have failed. In this posture, a
conspiracy is made out that as a result, the act of one is the act of all. 37

Finally, petitioner argues that assuming that there were admissions from the other co-
accused, the alleged conspiracy must first be proven by evidence other than the
declaration of a co-conspirator citing Section 27 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 27. Admission by conspirator- The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to

the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.

The argument is devoid of merit.

Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or
declarations but not to testimony given on the witness stand at the trial where the
defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.38

All told, we are convinced that the prosecution has successfully established beyond
doubt that petitioner Bolotaulo is guilty of the crimes charged.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan dated December 28, 1979 insofar as petitioner Ulrico Bolotaulo is
concerned is AFFIRMED. The cases against petitioner Delia Preagido are
DISMISSED in view of her demise on December 16, 2003.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185522 June 13, 2012 0012825 Sept. 16, 2000 ₱ 62,200

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, 0008250 Sept. 18, 2000 190,000

vs.
HELEN T. KALALO, Respondent. 0012801 Sept. 25, 2000 190,000

0012802 Sept. 30, 2000 208,162

DECISION
0012826 Sept. 30, 2000 62,200
SERENO, J.:
0012823 Sept. 30, 2000 104,327
This Rule 45 Petition assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 30473. The CA affirmed the Decision 3 and Order4 of the Regional 0012824 Oct. 14, 2000 104,326
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Manila, in Crim. Cases Nos. 04-230278-84, which had in
turn affirmed the Decision5 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 11, Manila, TOTAL ₱ 921,215
in Crim. Case No. 372535-41. The MeTC acquitted respondent Helen T. Kalalo
("Kalalo") of a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, or the Bouncing Checks Law,
but ruled that she was civilly liable to petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the On 19 October 2000, instead of updating the account of respondent Kalalo, petitioner
amount of ₱ 71,009 representing the value of unpaid goods. 6 SMC sent her a demand letter for the value of the seven dishonored checks.11

As culled from the records, it appears that respondent Kalalo had been a dealer of beer
products since 1998. She had a credit overdraft arrangement with petitioner SMC
whereby, prior to the delivery of beer products, she would be required to issue two
checks to petitioner: a blank check and a check to be filled up with an amount
corresponding to the gross value of the goods delivered. At the end of the week, Kalalo
and an agent of SMC would compute the actual amount due to the latter by deducting
the value of the returned empty beer bottles and cases from the gross value of the
goods delivered. Once they succeeded in determining the actual amount owed to SMC,
that amount would be written on the blank check, and respondent would fund her
account accordingly.7
In time, respondent’s business grew and the number of beer products delivered to her
by SMC increased from 200 to 4,000 cases a week. Because of the increased volume
of deliveries, it became very difficult for her to follow and keep track of the transactions.
Thus, she requested regular statements of account from petitioner, but it failed to
comply.8
In 2000, SMC’s agent required Kalalo to issue several postdated checks to cope with
the probable increase in orders during the busy Christmas season, without informing
her of the breakdown of the balance. She complied with the request; but after making
several cash payments and returning a number of empty beer bottles and cases, she
noticed that she still owed petitioner a substantial amount. She then insisted that it
provide her with a detailed statement of account, but it failed to do so. In order to protect
her rights and to compel SMC to update her account, she ordered her bank to stop
payment on the last seven checks she had issued to petitioner, 9 the details of which
are as follows:10
On 5 December 2000, and in the face of constant threats made by the agents of SMC,12
respondent’s counsel wrote a letter (the "Offer of Compromise") wherein Kalalo
"acknowledge[d] the receipt of the statement of account demanding the payment of the
sum of ₱ 816,689.00" and "submitt[ed] a proposal by way of ‘Compromise Agreement’
to settle the said obligation."13
It appears, however, that SMC did not accept the proposal. On 9 March 2001, it filed a
Complaint against respondent for violating the Bouncing Checks Law. 14
In the meantime, Kalalo kept reiterating her demands that SMC update her account.
During trial, and after the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner finally complied.
After tallying all cash payments and funded checks and crediting all returned empty
bottles and cases, the Statement of Account showed that the net balance of the amount
owed to petitioner was ₱ 71,009.15 Respondent thereafter recanted her Offer of
Compromise and stated that, at the time she had the letter prepared, she was being
threatened by SMC agents with imprisonment, and that she did not know how much
she actually owed petitioner.16
After trial on the merits, the MeTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, these cases are hereby dismissed and the accused is hereby acquitted
of all the charges against her. However, it appearing that she still owes the private
complainant, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the amount of ₱ 71,009.00 to private
complainant.17

As the right against double jeopardy prevented an appeal of the criminal aspect of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Date Amount
case, SMC appealed only the civil aspect of the MeTC’s Decision to the RTC. Petitioner
Check No.
claimed that it was entitled to the larger amount of ₱ 921,215.18 After the parties
submitted their respective Memoranda, the RTC found no reversible error in the
MeTC’s Decision, dismissed the appeal of petitioner, 19 and denied the latter’s Motion
for Reconsideration.20
Dissatisfied with the RTC’s Decision, SMC filed with the CA a Rule 42 Petition for
Review, which was eventually dismissed by the appellate court. 21 Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, to no avail.22
SMC thereafter filed this Rule 45 Petition before this Court.23
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the instant Petition and uphold the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
appellate court.
I
The Offer of Compromise may not be considered as evidence against respondent
Kalalo.
Petitioner argues that, in her Offer of Compromise, respondent "unequivocally admitted
her liability to private complainant-appellant duly assisted by her counsel."24
We quote in full Kalalo’s Offer of Compromise addressed to petitioner:
December 5, 2000
Mr. JOSELITO MANALO
GENERAL MANAGER
San Miguel Corporation
Biglang Awa Street
Caloocan City
Dear Sir:
My client, Ms. HELEN T. KALALO of No. 1055-A Dagupan Street, Tondo, Manila,
hereby acknowledges the receipt of the Statement of Account demanding the
payment of the sum of ₱ 816,689.00 representing her unpaid accounts.
The reason why she was not able to pay her accounts on time is because she had
great difficulty in collecting from the following wholesalers:
1. MRS. EVELYN R. MONTILLA/MINES & LYN General Merchandise
624 Chacon St., Tondo, Manila
₱ 413,444.50 amount of Pilsen, Red Horse and Grande Beers (full goods)
₱ 115,500.00 amount of empties.
2. Mr. DANIEL TOMAS/ MRS. FORTUNE TOMAS
Ladies and Rum Gen. Merchandizing (sic)
1501 N. Zamora St., Tondo, Manila
₱ 150,000.00 amount of full goods, Pilsen and Red Horse beers.
She is respectfully submitting her proposal by way of "Compromise Agreement" to
settle the said obligation:
Advance payment for the empties: ₱ 11,500.00
Installment of ₱ 10,000.00 per month for the principal, then later on for the interest
due.
Considering the economic crisis, she is hoping that her proposal merits your kind
consideration and approval.
Very respectfully yours,
SGD
Vicente G. Villamil
Counsel for Helen T. Kalalo25
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the aforequoted letter does not contain an express
acknowledgment of liability. At most, what respondent acknowledged was the receipt
of the statement of account, not the existence of her liability to petitioner.
Furthermore, the fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC
cannot be considered as an admission of liability. In Pentagon Steel Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,26 we examined the reasons why compromise offers must not be
considered as evidence against the offeror:
First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is
entitled to "buy his or her peace" without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her
efforts fail; hence, any communication made toward that end will be regarded as
privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as evidence against a
person who presents it, many settlements would be prevented and unnecessary
litigation would result, since no prudent person would dare offer or entertain a
compromise if his or her compromise position could be exploited as a confession of
weakness.
Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended as
admissions by the parties making them. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal
contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a defendant that he or she is legally
liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless or even doubtful,
since it is made with a view to avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation. It
is the distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively,
hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual concessions. 27 (citations omitted)
Petitioner further argues that respondent’s Offer of Compromise may be received in obligation; that is, the payment of the net value of the goods after the value of the empty
evidence as an implied admission of guilt. 28 It quotes Rule 130, Section 27 of the bottles and beer cases returned to petitioner were deducted from the gross value of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, which states: goods delivered to respondent.1âwphi1

Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. – In civil cases, an offer of compromise As to the amount of ₱ 71,009, both parties admit that the Statement of Account provided
is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. by SMC to respondent showed a liability of only ₱ 71,009. Respondent presented in
evidence the Statement of Account, which petitioner’s witness confirmed to have come
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those from SMC’s accounting department.34
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. We therefore rule that SMC failed to present enough evidence to prove Kalalo’s
indebtedness to it in the amount of ₱ 921,215, but that respondent’s obligation to
We do not agree. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the Offer of Compromise petitioner in the amount of ₱ 71,009 is unrebutted and supported by sufficient evidence.
dated 5 December 2000 was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint against
her on 9 March 2001 for a violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. 29 The Offer of WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error committed by the
Compromise was clearly not made in the context of a criminal proceeding and, appellate court, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED, and the assailed Decision
therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of guilt. and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30473 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
Finally, during the testimony of respondent and after her receipt of the Statement of
Account from SMC, she recanted the contents of the Offer of Compromise. She SO ORDERED.
explained that, at the time she had the letter prepared, the final amount owed to
petitioner SMC was yet undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of
imprisonment from petitioner’s agents. 30 The trial courts and the CA gave weight to her
justification,31 and we find no cogent reason to disturb their findings. We rule, therefore,
that the Offer of Compromise may not be considered as evidence against respondent
Kalalo, nor can it be the basis of her liability to petitioner in the amount of ₱ 921,215.

II

SMC failed to prove that Kalalo is indebted to it in the amount of ₱ 921,215.

SMC claims that it is entitled to collect the amount of ₱ 921,215 representing the value
of unpaid goods from respondent Kalalo. It argues that the MeTC erred in ruling that
respondent was liable to it to the extent of only ₱ 71,009, because the Statement of
Account does not reflect the transactions covered by the dishonored checks, as it only
covers cash transactions.32

We find, however, that aside from its bare assertions on appeal, SMC failed to present
any evidence to prove that cash transactions were treated differently from check
transactions. Respondent correctly argues that if the check transactions were covered
by other statements of account, petitioner should have presented evidence of those
transactions during the proceedings before the lower court. 33

In any event, we cannot allow SMC to recover the amount of ₱ 921,215 from
respondent, as it failed to prove the existence of the purported indebtedness. The
records are bereft of any evidence, other than the dishonored checks, establishing the
existence of that obligation. Checks, however, are not issued merely for the payment
of a preexisting obligation. They may likewise be issued as a guarantee for the
performance of a future obligation. In this case, it was sufficiently established that the
dishonored checks were issued merely to guarantee the performance of a future
G.R. No. 185710 January 19, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ROMULO TUNIACO, JEFFREY DATULAYTA and ALEX ALEMAN, Accused.
ALEX ALEMAN, Appellant.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the requirements of a valid extrajudicial confession and the
establishment of the existence of corpus delicti in murder cases.
The Facts and the Case
The city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused Romulo Tuniaco,
Jeffrey Datulayta, and Alex Aleman with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of General Santos City in Criminal Case 8370.
Based on the findings of the RTC, in the morning of June 13, 1992 some police officers
from the Lagao Police Sub-Station requested police officer Jaime Tabucon of the
Central Police Station of General Santos City homicide division to take the statement
of accused Alex Aleman regarding the slaying of a certain Dondon Cortez. On his arrival
at the sub-station, Tabucon noted the presence of Atty. Ruperto Besinga, Jr. of the
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) who was conversing with those taken into custody for
the offense. When queried if the suspects would be willing to give their statements,
Atty. Besinga said that they were.
Some other police officer first took the statement of accused Jeffrey Datulayta. Officer
Tabucon next took the statement of accused Aleman, whom he observed to be in good
physical shape.
Before anything else, officer Tabucon informed accused Aleman in Cebuano of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel of his own choice
and asked him if he was willing to give a statement. Aleman answered in the affirmative.
When asked if he had any complaint to make, Aleman said that he had none. When
Aleman said that he had no lawyer, Tabucon pointed to Atty. Besinga who claimed that
he was assisting all the suspects in the case. Tabucon warned Aleman that anything
he would say may be used against him later in court. Afterwards, the police officer
started taking down Aleman’s statement.
Accused Aleman said that in the course of a drinking bout with accused Datulayta and
Tuniaco at around 9 p.m. on June 6, 1992, Dondon Cortez threatened to report his
drinking companions’ illegal activities to the police unless they gave him money for his
forthcoming marriage. According to Aleman, Datulayta and Tuniaco had already
planned to kill Cortez in Tupi, South Cotabato, for making the same threats and now
they decided to do it. They got Cortez drunk then led him out supposedly to get the
money he needed.
The three accused brought Cortez to Apopong near the dump site and, as they were
walking, accused Aleman turned on Cortez and stabbed him on the stomach. Accused
Datulayta, on the other hand, drew out his single shot homemade M16 pistol 1 and shot
Cortez on the head, causing him to fall. Datulayta handed over the gun to Aleman who
fired another shot on Cortez’s head. Accused Tuniaco used the same gun to pump
some bullets into Cortez’s body. Then they covered him with rice husks.
After taking down the statement, Tabucon explained the substance of it to accused
Aleman who then signed it in the presence of Atty. Besinga.
On June 15, 1992 the police brought Aleman to the City Prosecutor’s Office where he
swore to his statement before an assistant city prosecutor. In the afternoon, accused
Datulayta and Aleman led Tabucon, the city prosecutor, and a police inspector, to the
dump site where they left their victim’s body. After some search, the group found a spot
covered with burnt rice husks and a partially burnt body of a man. About a foot from the
body, they found the shells of a 5.56 caliber gun and an armalite rifle.
On being arraigned, all three accused, assisted by Atty. Besinga, pleaded not guilty to
the murder charge. After the prosecution rested its case, accused Tuniaco filed a
demurrer to evidence which the Court granted, resulting in the dismissal of the case
against him. On being re-arraigned at his request, accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to
the lesser offense of Homicide. The trial court sentenced him to imprisonment of six
years and one day and to pay ₱50,000.00 to the victim’s family.
For some reason, the trial court had Aleman subjected to psychiatric examination at
the Davao Mental Hospital. But, shortly after, the hospital sent word that Aleman had
escaped. He was later recaptured. When trial in the case resumed, Aleman’s new PAO
lawyer raised the defense of insanity. This prompted the court to require the Provincial
Jail Warden to issue a certification regarding Aleman’s behavior and mental condition
while in jail to determine if he was fit to stand trial. The warden complied, stating that
Aleman had been observed to have good mental condition and did not commit any
infraction while in jail.
Although the prosecution and defense stipulated that Atty. Besinga assisted accused
Aleman during the taking of his extrajudicial confession, the latter, however, recanted
what he said to the police during the trial. He testified that sometime in 1992, some
police officers took him from his aunt’s house in Purok Palen, Labangal, General
Santos City, and brought him to the Lagao police station. He was there asked to admit
having taken part in the murder of Cortez. When he refused, they tortured him until he
agreed to sign a document admitting his part in the crime.
Accused Aleman also testified that he could not remember having been assisted by
Atty. Besinga during the police investigation. He even denied ever knowing the lawyer.
Aleman further denied prior association with accused Tuniaco and Datulayta. He said
that he met them only at the city jail where they were detained for the death of Cortez.
On October 8, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, finding accused Aleman guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The court also ordered him to pay death indemnity of ₱70,000.00
and moral damages of ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of Cortez.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311, the court rendered
judgment on January 21, 2008, affirming the decision of the RTC with the modification
that directed accused Aleman and Datulayta to indemnify the heirs of Cortez, jointly
and severally, in the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages; ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Aleman appealed to this Court.
The Issues Presented
Accused Aleman raises two issues: a) whether or not the prosecution was able to
present evidence of corpus delicti; and b) whether or not accused Aleman’s
extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence.
The Rulings of the Court
1. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or substance of a crime.
The evidence of a dead body with a gunshot wound on its back would be evidence that
murder has been committed.2 Corpus delicti has two elements: (a) that a certain result
has been established, for example, that a man has died and (b) that some person is
criminally responsible for it.3 The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti
beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive
evidence.4
The defense claims that the prosecution failed to prove corpus delicti since it did not
bother to present a medical certificate identifying the remains found at the dump site
and an autopsy report showing such remains sustained gunshot and stab wounds that
resulted in death; and the shells of the guns used in killing the victim.
But corpus delicti need not be proved by an autopsy report of the dead victim’s body or
even by the testimony of the physician who examined such body. 5 While such report or
testimony is useful for understanding the nature of the injuries the victim suffered, they
are not indispensable proof of such injuries or of the fact of death. 6 Nor is the
presentation of the murder weapons also indispensable since the physical existence of
such weapons is not an element of the crime of murder. 7
Here, the police authorities found the remains of Cortez at the place pointed to by
accused Aleman. That physical confirmation, coming after his testimony of the
gruesome murder, sufficiently establishes the corpus delicti of the crime. Of course,
that statement must be admissible in evidence.
2. There is no reason for it not to be. Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary;
b) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; c) express; and
d) in writing.8 These requirements were met here. A lawyer, not working with or was
not beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted accused Aleman during the custodial
investigation. Officer Tabucon testified that he saw accused Aleman, before the taking
of his statement, conversing with counsel at the police station. Atty. Besinga did not
dispute this claim.
Aleman alleges torture as the reason for the execution of the confession. The appellate
court is correct in ruling that such allegation is baseless. It is a settled rule that where
the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any
criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical
evidence of violence was presented, all these will be considered as indicating
voluntariness.9 Here, although Aleman claimed that he bore torture marks on his head,
he never brought this to the attention of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor
who administered his oath.
Accused Aleman claims, citing People v. Galit,10 that long questions followed by
monosyllabic answers do not satisfy the requirement that the accused is amply
informed of his rights. But this does not apply here. Tabucon testified that he spoke to
Aleman clearly in the language he knew. Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga, even signed
a certification that the investigator sufficiently explained to him his constitutional rights
and that he was still willing to give his statement.
Further, Aleman asserts that he was lacking in education and so he did not fully realize
the consequences of a confession. But as the CA said, no law or jurisprudence requires
the police officer to ascertain the educational attainment of the accused. All that is
needed is an effective communication between the interrogator and the suspect to the
end that the latter is able to understand his rights.11 This appears to have been done in
this case.
Moreover, as the lower court noted, it is improbable that the police fabricated Aleman’s
confession and just forced him to sign it. The confession has details that only the person
who committed the crime could have possibly known. 12 What is more, accused
Datulayta’s confession corroborate that of Aleman in important details. Under the
doctrine of interlocking confessions, such corroboration is circumstantial evidence
against the person implicated in it.131avvphi1
The Court notes that, when it modified the award of civil damages to the heirs of Cortez,
the CA made both accused Aleman and Datulayta, jointly and severally liable, for the
damages as modified. But the appeal by one or more of several accused cannot affect
those who did not appeal, except if the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to them.14 Here accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide and the trial court ordered him to pay only ₱50,000.00 in civil indemnity to the
heirs of Cortez. The CA erred in expanding that liability when he did not appeal from
his conviction.15
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals’ judgment
in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311 dated January 21, 2008 against accused Alex Aleman. The
Court, however, DELETES from such judgment the portion increasing the civil liability
of accused Jeffrey Datulayta who did not appeal from the RTC decision against him.
SO ORDERED.