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South Africa’s foreign policy position in BRICS

Article · April 2018

DOI: 10.31920/2050-4306/2018/v7n1a9

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 Journal of African Union Studies (JoAUS)
ISSN 2050-4306 (Online) ISSN 2050-4292 (Print)

• Indexed at: EBSCO, ProQuest, J-Gate and Sabinet

• Accredited by IBSS

Vol. 7, (Issue 1), April 2018

pp 173-188

South Africa’s Foreign Policy Position in BRICS1

Muzi Sipho Shoba
School of Built Environment and Development Studies,
College of Humanities (Howard Campus),
University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Email: muzisipho8@gmail.com

Abstract

The year 2009 marked the swing of South Africa‘s foreign policy focus from
North to South and its renewed interest in emerging economies and developing
countries has increased since the advent of the Jacob Zuma administration
which came with a heightened focus on China and other emerging markets in
the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. The most notable foreign
policy triumph of South Africa was its import to BRICS grouping. However,
this foreign policy accomplishment has been met with scepticism and criticism
from different quarters. The recent slowdown of economic growth for China
and other BRICS members (except India) and the uncertainty surrounding
many deals including the nuclear deal between South Africa and Russia are
among the pivotal checks for the country‘s foreign policy elites and policy
makers. The admittance of South Africa into BRICS formation sponsored by
China and the rise of this formation provides a final, useful case study to
illustrate how South Africa‘s foreign policy has evolved since the demise of
apartheid. The paper focuses on exploring the foreign policy triumph of South
Africa since the end of the apartheid era and its position towards BRICS
formation. The paper focuses on three phases of South Africa‘s foreign policy –
the first phase (1994-1998), the second phase (1999-2008) and the third phase

1
This research is financially supported by the National Institutes of Humanities and
Social Sciences (NIHSS)

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 South Africa’s Foreign Policy Position in BRICS…

(2009-2017). The paper employs a historical analysis of relevant literature of

South African foreign policy.

Keywords: BRICS, South Africa, Emerging Economies, Economy, China, Russia

1. Introduction

The recent slowdown of economic growth for China and Brazil and the
uncertainty surrounding many deals, including the nuclear deal between
Russia and South Africa, are among the pivotal tests for South Africa‘s
foreign policy elites (FPE) and policy makers of today towards the
BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The member-
states face challenges that present potentials for great uncertainty,
volatility and change. Though South Africa holds a unique position
within BRICS, there are various political and economic challenges facing
it. Data provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
national Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) provide insight into
South African weaknesses in light of BRICS‘ economic indicators. It
would seem that South Africa is hampered by domestic issues such as
high unemployment, labour market deficiencies and the consequently
stifled economic growth as described by Jethro and Asuelime (2013). It is
on this basis that it becomes necessary to continually assess the realities
of import of South Africa‘s membership in BRICS grouping and its
foreign policy position towards it.
After this introduction, in Section 2, the paper discusses the historical
background of South Africa‘s diplomacy from the period prior to and
after democratic dispensation. In section 3, the focus is on South
Africa‘s developmental foreign policy pursuit in the post-apartheid era
where the paper discusses the three phases of the country‘s foreign
policy -first phase (1994-1999), the second phase (1999-2008) and the
third phase (2008-2017)- and in sections 4 and 5, the paper provides a
short overview of BRICS and its weakness and strengths. In section 6,
the paper deals with the scepticism and criticism of the grouping with
focus on the import of South Africa‘s membership. In section 7, the
paper presents its concluding remarks.

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2. South Africa: From the Past to the Present

In the African National Congress (ANC) paper titled Perspective on Foreign

Policy in a Democratic South Africa, the party said, ―no longer are we the
pariah of the world. Our policies and programmes have, by and large,
been accepted by the international community as realistic and the
endeavour to transform South Africa into a truly free, peaceful,
prosperous and non-racial society has been acclaimed by the very world
which previously applied sanctions and punitive measures against us‖
(Dube, 1996). During the apartheid era, from 1948 to 1994, the ruling
Nationalist Party, dominated by white Afrikaners, formulated and passed
laws, institutionalised legal segregation, formalised racial categories and
restrictions on movement, and embedded apartheid physically in the
landscape (Findley & Ogbu, 2016). These unjust laws and practices
formulated, passed and applied by the apartheid government led to the
isolation of the country by the international community pressurising the
colonial apartheid government to bow down and free South Africa.
The year 2016 marked twenty-two years since the country made the
transition from apartheid to constitutional democracy. Yet the legacy of
apartheid continues to shape the current economic, political and social
development patterns in the Republic of South Africa (Shivambu, 2014).
Given this unfortunate situation, a vast economic inequality exists among
the majority of the country‘s population, and the government faces an
uphill struggle in extending opportunities to all and improving the
delivery of public services (Yanacopolos, 2010). While the country has
made some significant strides in terms of attaining some of the
Millennium Developmental Goals (MDGs), poverty and inequality
continue to affect the country‘s population, especially those from the
working class. South Africa‘s transition to democracy in the mid-1990s
also helped shape its foreign policy, with development assistance
primarily targeting other African nations.
Landsberg, cited in Chiyemura (2014), noted that the end of
apartheid in 1994 ushered in a new political dispensation of democracy in
South Africa that contributed to the country gaining re-admission into
the international community after 34 years (1960-1994) of political and
economic isolation due to apartheid sanctions. The country‘s former
President Nelson Mandela and his successor Thabo Mbeki sought to
invigorate the conduct of international affairs with reference to South

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Africa's unique transition and its moral stature (Alden & Pere, 2004). In
the main, the country‘s national interest and aim was to regain
confidence, trust and establish new fruitful relations with the
international community. On this, Chiyemura (2014) noted that to regain
its international confidence, South Africa re-invigorated its foreign policy
through the transformation of diplomatic relations and the re-
establishment of relations with other nations (developed and developing)
so as to attract increased trade, aid and investment flows. It can be
argued that this contributed to South Africa‗s participation in regional
(Southern African Development Community-SADC), continental
(African Union-AU) and bilateral and multilateral arrangements. The
country has continued to expand its presence on international platforms
and forums.
Given the participation of the country in many prestigious
international platforms and forums, one may argue that it has now fully
reintegrated itself into the international community. The country has
even taken an active role in trying to forge a new international order, in
particular in Africa and United Nations (UN) where it is serving its
second term on the security council. The country has been able to host
some prestigious international events, such as COPE 17, the football
World Cup in 2010 and the Durban 2001 World Conference Against
Racism. All these attest to its achievements as indeed a legitimate
international actor. The country also regards itself a gateway to Africa,
the messenger and voice of the African continent (Draper & Scholvin,
2012).
Its invitation to BRICS is regarded as one of the best achievements
of the country‘s foreign policy in the past years (Stuenkel, 2013). The
country‘s foreign policy elites, under the leadership of Nelson Mandela,
was based on a commitment to promote human rights, democracy and
on a belief that its foreign policy must mirror a deep commitment to the
consolidation of the country‘s democracy (Dube, 1996). The leadership
of former President Thabo Mbeki emphasised the importance of
domestic economic development, transformation and security concerns.
With this in mind, Landsberg, cited in Chiyemura (2014) argued that the
country‘s foreign policy has not been cohesive and consistent due to this
contradiction in focus from the former presidency to the latter.

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Muzi Sipho Shoba (JoAUS) Vol. 7, (Issue 1), April 2018, Pp 173-188

3. South Africa’s Developmental Foreign Policy Pursuit

South African foreign policy history can be divided into three phases: the
first phase (1994-1999), this is the period beginning from the end of the
apartheid era which ushered in a new democratic dispensation under
Nelson Mandela. The second phase of the country‘s foreign policy
(2008-2014) marked the emergence of Thabo Mbeki, a lauded economist
and the man behind the creation of NEPAD -the New Partnership for
Africa's Development- that has been described as a framework for
Africa‘s renewal. The third phase (2008-2017) saw the advent of Jacob
Zuma. This section will briefly discuss these phases of South Africa‘s
developmental foreign policy pursuit with particular focus on the third
phase that marked the country‘s entry into BRICS formation.
The first phase (1994-1999) of South Africa‘s developmental foreign
policy pursuit focused on the renewal and reorientation of the country‘s
diplomacy, pursuing the re-organisation and participation of the country
in the international community. The country‘s FPE during this period
pursued a two-way strategy that focused on uniting South Africans in the
aftermath of apartheid rule, building a non-racial, non-sexist and non-
discriminatory society as described in Hani (1991), and re-entering and
cementing the already existing alliances with both developed and
developing countries as discussed in Landsberg (2005). The Nelson
Mandela administration colossal task was that of forging a Rainbow
Nation whilst not neglecting the importance of positioning the country
within the international community. The Mandela administration
imagined South Africa becoming a responsible global actor based on: (i)
centrality of human rights in international relations (ii) promotion of
democracy worldwide (iii) primacy of justice and respect for international
law (iv) peaceful resolution of conflicts and, (v) prioritisation of African
interests and concerns in policy choices among others as discussed in
Mabera (2017).
The second phase (1999-2008), the Thabo Mbeki era, focused on the
African renewal framework NEPAD. Since the end of apartheid rule, a
core strategy of South Africa‘s foreign policy has been to position itself,
not only as a voice for less influential African states and developing
countries, but also as a leader in forging strategic alliances to advance
their common interests in global forums and negotiations as discoursed
in Mbeki (2000). The examples are the strategic alliances such as between

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India, Brazil and South Africa, the IBSA dialogue, NEPAD and BASIC.
Unlike his predecessor, who believed that the country‘s foreign
engagements and its foreign policy should be moralistic in its outlook,
the Mbeki administration‘s foreign policy, seemed less concerned with
morals as indicated in its HIV/AIDS denialism which started
immediately Thabo Mbeki assumed office as president in 2008. Mbeki
criticised the scientific consensus that HIV does cause AIDS and instead
described the antiretroviral drugs as poison.
The third phase (2008-2017) of South Africa‘s foreign policy pursuit
marked the paradigm shift in the country‘s foreign policy from North to
South. The advent of Jacob Zuma came with a heightened level of
engagements between South Africa and China and ultimately the BRICS
formation. The admittance of South Africa into BRICS was lauded as a
foreign policy accomplishment of South Africa (Stuenkel, 2015). The
admiration of China and other emerging economies by South African
foreign policy elite (FPE) under the Zuma administration could be seen
in the halls of international community where the South African
government‘s position on a variety of issues mirrored that of China such
South Africa‘s refusal to grant the Dalai Lama a visa to attend
Archbishop Desmond Tutu‘s birthday celebration; its stance on
Zimbabwe; its stance during the climate change conference, among
others. The import membership of South Africa into BRICS grouping
was put to the test during the said Dalai Lama saga and many criticized it
as lacking identity, purpose and inconsistent. The controversies
associated with the country‘s foreign policy under the Zuma
administration can be summarized by two events: the deployment of
troops in the Central African Republic in 2013 and the bizarre voting in
the United Nations Security Council during which Resolution 1973 was
made, permitting the NATO-led operation in Libya (Mabera, 2017).
The admiration of South-South initiatives and more specifically the
China Model of Development (CMD) continues to occupy the minds of
South Africa‘s FPE and has extended to the opposition parties in the
National Assembly. Most recently South African FPE‘s discussed the
CMD in Parliament and some suggested the country establish a
Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) and State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC) and model these in the same way
as those that exist in China. All these show the reverence of China by the
South African government and its FPE as they seek alternative models of

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development in the post-western world era as discussed in Stuenkel

(2016). South African foreign policy makers lauded BRICS as a strategic
alliance for a South Africa in pursuit of reform in global governance. A
former minister of international relations and cooperation in South
Africa said the country‘s foreign policy attitude towards BRICS is
premised on its national interest and the pursuit to ensure the balance
and fair distribution of power in global governance. The beginning of
Cyril Ramaphosa‘s administration will be a pivotal test for South African
foreign policy elites towards BRICS and other South-South initiatives in
the post-Jacob Zuma era.

4. BRICS Overview

BRICS refers to a group of five developing countries and emerging

economies –Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa– who meet
regularly to discuss a wide range of issues including trade, investments,
the global economy, international security, agriculture, innovation, energy
security and global governance reform (BRICS Declarations, 2009–
2015).
Proponents of the group such as Professor Oliver Stuenkel and
economist Jim O‘Neil believe it represents emerging economies and has
the potential to challenge the power of the global north countries in the
near future. While its detractors such as Patrick Bond dismiss the group
as a new sub-imperialist one with no prospect of matching the power of
the North and question its membership in that it excludes important
emerging powers such as Nigeria, Indonesia and Turkey from the serious
talks of the international system.
The group‘s regular meetings enable the heads of states from the
BRICS countries to sit around a table to discuss important global issues.
The forum also enables the ministers, policy makers and think-tanks
from the BRICS countries to engage in discussions and debates on
critical issues, while engaged in peer learning processes which in turn will
help these countries in their quest for importance in the global order
(Fortaleza Declaration, 2014). The BRIC(S) thesis posits that China and
India will become the world's dominant suppliers of manufactured goods
and services, respectively, while Brazil and Russia will become similarly
dominant as suppliers of raw materials (O‘Neil, 2003). BRICS does not
have a formal organisation or any written articles of association.

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However, from the summit declarations, its fundamental aims and

objectives can be outlined. BRICS aims to act as a platform for dialogue
and cooperation amongst its members for the promotion of peace,
security and development in a multi-polar, interdependent and
increasingly complex, globalised world (Fortaleza Declaration, 2014).
O‘Neil‘s point was that the four emerging economies that form
BRIC represent 40% of global population and produce 25% of the global
GDP. O‘Neil was of the view that these four economies are
complementary to each other and have huge potential for growth. The
first report of Goldman Sachs titled ‗Dreaming with BRICS: The Path to
2050‘ made reference to the similarities in these countries and argued
that the complementary nature of their economies would facilitate their
growth in coming years.
The first follow-up report of Goldman Sachs to advance the BRIC
thesis was published in 2004. This report predicted that the number of
middle class people in these countries would rise to 800 million within a
decade, which would fuel economic growth in these countries in a self-
sustained manner. The second follow-up report was published in 2007,
and was mainly concerned with India‘s growth potential in the coming
decades. It postulates that the internal demands for goods and services
would increase due to the rise of an urban middle class population. This
would raise demand for urban infrastructure, real estate and services and
lead to faster economic growth than earlier projected.
The latest report in this series titled, ‗EM Equity in Two Decades: A
Changing Landscape‘ was published in 2010. The report discusses the
financial conditions of the BRIC(S) countries. It says that China might
overtake the US in equity market capitalisation by the year 2030. China is
likely to emerge as the single largest financial market in the world at that
time. The report notes that the combined BRICS countries will account
for 41 percent of world‘s market capitalisation by 2030.
Motivated by the above thesis, these four countries came together
and formed BRIC. The first meeting of foreign ministers of the four
BRIC countries was held in 2008, where the idea of BRIC took concrete
shape. As previously indicated, South Africa joined the group in 2010
and thus the transformation of the ‗BRIC‘ acronym from an investment
term to a household name of international politics and a recently semi-
institutionalised political outfit called ‗BRICS‘ (Stuenkel, 2015).

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5. BRICS: Strength and Weaknesses

There are no specifically defined strengths and weaknesses of BRICS as a

group. However, the strengths and weaknesses of each member states
may be used to define the group. In this regard, the following strengths
and weaknesses are suggestions made by the author based on
observations he has made on the subject. These reports are from BRICS
Joint Statistical Publications of 2013, 2014 and 2015, BRICS Report of
2012, the Gauteng BRICS Report of 2013 and the Global
Competitiveness Report of 2012, 2013 and 2014.

Table 01: Strengths and Weaknesses Breakdown

Country Strengths Weaknesses
BRAZIL Abundant natural resources (iron Lacking economic infrastructure
ore, hydropower, timber, coffee, Poor investment in road, rail ports
soya beans, sugar cane, iron and and energy
crude oil) Very high interest rate (@16.25%
Politically stable average )
Model Democracy High socio-economic inequality
Relatively low unemployment rate Social upheavals which have
engulfed the country recently
RUSSIA Permanent member of UNSC Becoming an authoritarian state
Nuclear power Suspended from the G8 and
Strong military facing sanctions
Stable political environment Stagnant economic growth
Relatively good foreign investment

INDIA Strong information and technology Large Public Debts

and service sector Poor infrastructure
Has coal, manganese and natural Unemployment Rate
gas
Huge human capital base
Model Democracy
Politically stable
Moderate foreign investment - large
market base

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 South Africa’s Foreign Policy Position in BRICS…

CHINA Permanent member of UNSC Non-democratic state (one party

Largest economy in BRICS
BRICS Bank Headquarters in
Shanghai
Very strong manufacturing
Strong foreign financial investment
Most industrialised economy
state)
Increasing income inequality
causing social tensions
Currency undervaluation
Environmental insecurity

South Best constitution in the world High level of unemployment

Africa Stable political environment Most unequal society in the world
Democratic State Labour unrest threating the
Fair electoral system country‘s backbone of the
Member of the G20, UNSC & economy (the mines)
BRICS Poor education system
Regional leader in Sub Sahara Lowest economy in BRICS
Africa
Source: Gauteng BRICS Report, 2013, BRICS Joint Statistical
Publications, 2013, -2014, Global Competitive Index, 2012/13,
Chiyemura Masters report on BRICS: Prospects and Constraints, 2014

6. Critiques of BRICS and South African participation

Since Christmas Eve in 2010 when South Africa was granted an

invitation to join the BRICS club, a serious debate among ordinary
people, politicians, academics and commentators has ensued. Many
people question the motive behind the country‘s invitation. Some did not
miss the opportunity to suggest that the country was in not in any way in
the same league as the other BRICS countries. Among the critics was the
mastermind behind the formation of BRICs, Jim O‘Neil, a notable
economist and former chairman of Goldman Sachs Assets Management.
In the wake of the news that South Africa has scored BRICS
membership, O‘Neil said: ―While this is clearly good news for South
Africa, it is not entirely obvious to me why the BRIC countries should
have agreed to invite it. Surely a more robust and exciting economy —
Turkey, Mexico, or South Korea — would be a better fit?‖ Indeed, the
mentioned countries are the largest and most exciting developing
economies. However, they lack certain characteristics that South Africa
possesses. This quality has been explained in the preceding sections but
will be further described in this part.
The country‘s integration into the group is based on political and
economic grounds, which entails the prospects, pros and cons for the

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country. Analysing the country‘s integration into the group from a

constructivist-informed point of view, one may argue that identity,
norms, beliefs and common interests are the driving factors. Borrowing
from the functionalist thinker of our time, Ernst Haas, one can argue
that cooperation in one area leads to cooperation in another area within
the framework of integration. This point is important for BRICS-South
Africa relations. Leaders of South Africa‘s liberation movements, the
African National Congress, South Africa Communist Party and Pan
African Congress among others, have a particular history with Russia,
China, India and Brazil.
Another critique of BRICS comes from Professor Patrick Bond of
the University of the Witwatersrand, a former director of the Civil
Society Centre at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Professor Bond, like
any other critic of BRICS, particularly the inclusion of South Africa,
seems to bypass certain points and some important epistemological
foundations. On the Links International Journal, there is a series of
articles written by Professor Bond and some co-authored with the
Brazilian political economist Ana Garcia, focusing specifically on BRICS.
Recently, Bond (2015) outrightly dismisses BRICS and its potential to
provide any fundamental change in the world of politics, particularly in
relation to the domination of the international system by the global north
countries.
Instead, they argue that BRICS is mostly (if not already) a new sub-
imperialist. They cite the rise of BRICS in Africa and in particular
China‘s presence on the continent. The actions of Russia in Crimea are
also one of the issues that the two scholars pointed out. In addition, they
cite diversity as one of the limiting factors for the countries. Like any
other detractors of BRICS and most importantly the integration of South
Africa into the group, the two did not miss the opportunity to cite the
fact that South Africa is not like the other BRICS member-nations.
According to them, South Africa does not measure up to the other
BRICS countries in terms of economic size, population etc.
However, while the critics of BRICS do excellently, almost all miss
certain important points. Firstly, for the left thinkers like Patrick Bond to
suggest BRICS as a new ―sub-imperialist‖ colonising other developing
nations and especially the Chinese presence in Africa as an imperialist
project, misses the Marxist understanding of both colonialism and
imperialism. Colonialism, by its popular definition, has to do with control

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over the land, having as a goal what Marx himself called the annihilation
of self-earned private property. On imperialism, the term can be viewed
as a competitive world system, where nations compete for the
diminishing land and for domination and control of key strategic regions.
Now the question is: has BRICS done of any of the latter mentioned
things? Certainly, the answer is no.
Looking at the current world imperialist system as its stands in
relation to the above definition of the terms, clearly and objectively the
major imperialist power is the United States of America and the sub
imperialist ones may be the UK, Germany and France. China may have
the potential of becoming an imperialist power, but currently its nature is
different from the Western capitalist model of military domination and
supremacy, which makes it difficult to classify the country as an
imperialist force. The Chinese put investment and trade at the forefront
of their engagements with the world while the West wants to dominate.
Basically, BRICS want to invest and trade. It is only when Russia or
China begin to build military bases in Africa, Latin America and Europe,
that we may reasonably speak of BRICS being a new ‗sub imperialist‘ or
imperialist power. Furthermore, despite being a very diverse group,
BRICS has some synergies (Ghosh, 2013). These countries do share
similar experiences and common challenges in the international system
and domestically.
The first challenge relates to the continuing global crisis and the near
certainty that the Northern economies led by the US and Europe are
most unlikely to provide stimulus to the global economy (Ghosh, 2013).
The BRICS countries should exploit this area through diversification of
exports and increased bilateral currency trade that would encourage more
trading between the BRICS countries. This is indeed desirable.
However, Ghosh (2013) says that the current state of the global economy
suggests the need for greater ambition from the developing countries and
the BRICS countries (in particularly China and Russia) are uniquely
placed to take this process forward. This process would entail developing
mechanisms in financing imports by countries with low incomes and low
levels of development, simultaneously delivering markets to other
developing nations and more development potential to the recipient
countries (Ghosh, 2013).
The other challenges are domestic ones but they seem to be common
across all the BRICS countries. According to Moody Investors‘ Services,

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cited in Lossan (2015), the common problem with BRICS is that their
economies have become stagnant and are not growing at the same pace.
They indicate that the old GDP growth rate of seven percent per year is
shown only by China and to some extent India, while Brazil and Russia
are experiencing stagnation and recession, and South Africa is struggling.
The BRICS economies share some common domestic and socio-
economic challenges that must be addressed independently of their
group activism in order to accomplish their major goals as a group,
namely inequality (economic, social and political), corruption,
improvements in health care and education, and human rights, to name
just a few. The issue of inadequate productive employment generation
has been a central feature of the past growth processes, and this is clearly
linked with the growing inequality in these countries. Therefore, the
BRICS policy makers must formulate policies with this mind and in
particular how to force the creation of decent working conditions
(Ghosh, 2013).
Finally, BRICS share the challenge of infrastructure deficiency in
their countries and regions. Infrastructure is particularly important for
economic growth and for the emerging economies of the BRICS
countries. In this age of globalisation, infrastructure is important if they
are to have a role to play in the global economy and to participate in the
global value chains. The key areas of infrastructure development needed
in the BRICS countries are in energy, telecommunication, transportation
(particularly road and rail) and access to improved water and sanitation
(Singh & Dube, 2013). The BRICS member-states have made significant
strides in this regard and some are moving toward implementing
infrastructural plans or have implemented such plans already.

7. Conclusion

Post-apartheid South Africa reinvigorated its foreign policy identity after

the collapse of apartheid rule to meet domestic and international
standards. The country‘s developmental foreign policy pursuit under
Mbeki and Mandela and to some great extent under the leadership the
sitting president Zuma was discussed in this paper. It has been said that
in the post-cold war era, many countries have perceived regional
integration as a vehicle to achieve collective objectives. Specifically,
functionalist thinking form and create alliances that will help a country

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improve its economic state and provide a platform for growth and
development. Regional integration is perceived as an effective and simple
way to shield a country‘s interests socially, economically and politically.

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