Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
VOLUME 17
Editorial Committee
General Editor
Alvin A. Lee
Associate Editor
Jean O'Grady
Editors
Joseph Adamson
Robert D. Denham
Michael Dolzani
A.C. Hamilton
David Staines
Advisers
Robert Brandeis
Paul Gooch
Eva Kushner
Jane Millgate
Ron Schoeffel
Clara Thomas
Jane Widdicombe
Northrop Frye's Writings
on the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries
VOLUME 17
Printed in Canada
ISBN 0-8020-3824-7
This volume has been published with the assistance of a grant from
Victoria University.
Preface
xi
Credits
xv
Abbreviations
xvii
Introduction
xix
On Romanticism
ii John Keats
206
12 Kathleen Hazel Coburn
215
13 How It Was
218
14 In the Earth, or In the Air?
219
18 Review of lolanthe
237
19 Review of Bradbrook's Ibsen the Norwegian
239
20 James, LeFanu, and Morris
240
21 An Important Influence
241
22 Review of Joan Evans's John Ruskin
242
23 Emily Dickinson
245
24 The Problem of Spiritual Authority in the Nineteenth Century
271
25 Dickens and the Comedy of Humours
287
26 The Meeting of Past and Future in William Morris
309
27 The World as Music and Idea in Wagner's Parsifal
326
28 Some Reflections on Life and Habit
341
Notes
355
Emendations
383
Index
385
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Preface
volume. For instance, Canadian spellings have been substituted for Ameri-
can ones, commas have been added before the "and" in sequences of
three, titles of poems have been italicized, and the presentation of dates
has been made consistent throughout. Sometimes, where editors have
added commas around such expressions as "of course," these have been
silently removed to conform with the more characteristic usage in the
typescript.
Notes identify the source of all quotations. Shakespearean and Biblical
sources have been placed in square brackets in the text; and, in review
items, citations from the text under review are also provided in square
brackets in the text. Notes provided by Frye himself are identified by
"[NF]" following the note. Square brackets in Frye's original texts have
been replaced with braces. Within quotations, where necessary, punc-
tuation has been silently altered to conform with the edition cited in the
notes; more significant changes, however, are noted in the emendations.
Authors and titles mentioned in passing are not annotated, but life dates
and date of first publication of books are provided in the index.
Acknowledgments
The Trustees of Boston University for "How It Was" and "The Meeting of
Past and Future in William Morris," from Studies in Romanticism (1982).
The Carleton Germanic Papers for "The World as Music and Idea in
Wagner's Parsifal" (1984).
Columbia University Press for "Foreword" and "The Drunken Boat: The
Revolutionary Element in Romanticism," from Romanticism Reconsidered:
Selected Papers from the English Institute (1963).
With the exception of those listed above, all works are printed by cour-
tesy of the Estate of Northrop Frye/Victoria University.
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Abbreviations
The culmination of this phase of Frye's thinking was The Secular Scripture
(1976), his full-length study of romance, which is not included in the
present volume but is an indispensable adjunct to it.2 The notebooks
make clear that Frye conceived Rencontre as a study of the counter-
movement to myth that is always implicit in romance but becomes an
actualized cultural force after Romanticism. Rencontre, as Dolzani says,
could be understood as Frye's account of the fall into history, after
mankind is acknowledged as the source of his own myths.3 As with most
things in Frye, there are two sides to such a fall. One is the fortunate
discovery that heaven, or all we need to know of it, is eternally present to
us and consists in a shift in our own consciousness. But the nightmarish
counterpart is the response to the end of myth that conjures demonic
parodies of myth, visions of the shattering of all meaning, that is appar-
ent in a great deal of modernist writing, including The Waste Land and
Ulysses. As we shall see, both aspects of the "fall into history" are every-
where apparent in Frye's writings on Romanticism and its aftermath; but
the "Third Book" context for Frye's major statements on Romanticism
helps explain why those statements differ in some important respects
from the passing remarks on Romanticism that we find in "Towards
Defining an Age of Sensibility" (no. 2) and other early pieces. In these
early pieces Frye maintains a rigid distinction between the romance
vision of Blake, where innocence is everywhere apparent to those with
the eyes to see it, and the Romantic sublime, where innocence is a lost
childhood state recoverable only fitfully through memory. Later Frye
narrows this distinction and sees both phenomena as stages in the lib-
eral-humanising of myth.
II
If Frye had never written any of the books and essays that made him the
most influential English-speaking literary theorist of the second half of
the twentieth century, he would still have a permanent place among the
canonical critics of eighteenth-century literature and culture. The foun-
dation for that claim, of course, is Fearful Symmetry, a text whose mar-
shalling of the cultural, philosophical, political, and economic mainstreams
of eighteenth-century thought remains, for me, its most underrated fea-
ture. But a second foundation for the claim is "Towards Defining an Age
of Sensibility," Frye's most influential essay on a literary period. Paul J.
Hunter, writing in 1990, thirty-six years after the essay appeared, de-
xxii Introduction
Studies in 1990-91. Reflecting on the fact that the eighteenth century does
not do as well as some periods in Anatomy of Criticism, in terms of
number of examples, Frye says that it was natural for him in the Anatomy
to focus on the "great mythopoeic periods" in English literature: "the
Renaissance period from Spenser to Milton, the Romantic period from
Blake to Keats and Shelley, and the great early twentieth-century period
of Eliot, Joyce, Yeats, and Pound from 1920 to 1950." But he adds: "I
thought it was rather a compliment to the eighteenth century that I felt I
could let it speak for itself."6
This may explain why the question of history, and its shaping of
literature, obsesses Frye in his considerations of this period. The eight-
eenth century, as a period in which literature is heavily "displaced," to
use Frye's term, away from the mythopoeic and towards the realist end
of the spectrum, constantly challenges him to make good a claim that is
as basic to his approach as any other: that literary history is not the same
thing as social history, because however displaced a work or a period, it
is still part of the literary universe and hence a child of myth rather than
of social history. These issues confront Frye directly in his review of
Bonamy Dobree's history of eighteenth-century literature (no. 3), a book
that gives up more of the game to social history than Frye would like.
Repeatedly in the review, Frye returns to the question of what literary
history is supposed to do. Its task, he says, is not simply to chronologize,
but "to reawaken and refresh our imaginative experience" (17). To do
justice to the greatest writers of any period, the literary critic must be
able to take the measure of the "interlocking relevance" of all the peri-
od's literature "conceived as a unit of culture complete in itself" (20).
Dobree's chronological method lacks "that final unification of material
which is the mark of the completely realized history" (23). In his re-
sponse to the reassessment of his work by eighteenth-century scholars,
too, Frye makes it clear that the historical method of an earlier generation
of eighteenth-century scholars was part of what led him in the other
direction, towards a "specifically literary history."7 Oddly, perhaps, this
ability to see the underlying principle of unity in a body of material,
which Frye abundantly possesses but finds lacking in scholars like Dobree,
he finds present in a historian of the period itself, James Boswell. In his
article on Boswell's London journal (no. i), a piece that showcases his
gifts as a book reviewer, Frye admires Boswell's ability to grasp the
"organic consistency" in Samuel Johnson's character (4)—in other words,
to see the myth of Johnson.
xxiv Introduction
Ill
In his 1959 essay on Byron (no. 7)—which, like the encyclopedia article
on Keats (no. 11), is a fine example of the clarity and ease with which
Frye can perform the role of the ordinary, jobbing critic—Frye says that
Byron's poetry challenges our critical presuppositions "because it con-
tains nothing that 'modern' critics look for: no texture, no ambiguities, no
intellectualized ironies, no intensity, no vividness of phrasing, the words
and images being vague to the point of abstraction" (56). It is a clear
reference to the, by then, decadent New Critics.
Of course there are unmistakably Romantic elements to Frye's own
outlook, including a militantly idealistic account of the revelatory func-
tion of the poetic imagination, outlined in The Educated Imagination and
many other places. Because the poetic imagination reveals, beneath the
corrupt forms of our existing societies, an ideal permanent society, there
is the argument, common to Frye and the major Romantic writers, that
poetry has become the chief medium through which religion may be
understood. It is a visionary, not a positivistic, criticism that is required
to approach this truth. Thus, Frye is to the criticism of the second half of
the twentieth century what Wallace Stevens is to its poetry: his "order of
words" and Stevens's "supreme fiction" are as close to being examples of
the Romantic sublime as the period affords.
But Frye's reservations about High Romanticism are as profound as
his affinities with it, and they are pointedly stated in the closing remarks
on Collins's Ode on the Poetical Character, Smart's Jubilate Agno, and Blake's
Four Zoas in "Towards Defining an Age of Sensibility":
In these three poems, especially the last two, God, the poet's soul, and
nature are brought into a white-hot fusion of identity, an imaginative fiery
furnace in which the reader may, if he chooses, make a fourth. All three
poems are of the greatest complexity, yet the emotion on which they are
founded is of a simplicity and directness that English literature has rarely
attained again. With the 1800 edition of Lyrical Ballads, secondary imagina-
tion and recollection in tranquillity took over English poetry and domi-
nated it until the end of the nineteenth century. (14)
Only recently have we learned how much Frye himself kept "hugged to
his bosom." And we may detect similar buried echoes of identification in
Introduction xxix
tions of belief, but the precious portents of our own powers" and that
"The greatest truth we could hope to discover . . . is that man's truth is
the final resolution of everything."14
Frye begins A Study of English Romanticism with the claim that Roman-
ticism is pre-eminently a cultural term and represents "a new kind of
sensibility" that "comes into all Western literatures around the later part
of the eighteenth century" (93). As Robert D. Denham has pointed out
(SE, 473n. 7), these ideas are contained in embryo in Frye's 1933 student
essay on Romanticism. While that essay is written in a heightened "philo-
sophical" voice that does not resemble the mature Frye—"What is born
must live; what lives must die/' it begins (SE, 12)—it is interesting
primarily as a reminder of the philosophical underpinning of Frye's
major statements on Romanticism. The 1933 essay is in fact much more
interested in Romantic philosophy than literature, and was after all an
essay in a Philosophy subject. But if Frye's eighteenth-century essays are
a corrective to the view that Frye separates literature from history, the
references to Sartre and Heidegger in A Study of English Romanticism
discountenance the suggestion that his criticism is not philosophically
informed. Frye is deeply interested in Continental philosophy and, like
his notebooks, his review of Paul de Man (no. 14) shows his attempt, late
in life, to come to an accommodation with deconstruction. That accom-
modation is finally unsuccessful, although, as we see in A Study of English
Romanticism, Frye has noticed, before de Man's work on the "aesthetic
ideology," the conflict between Romanticism's claim to historical central-
ity and its demand for "a purely disinterested aesthetic response" (106).15
But Frye's earlier interpenetration with the mid-twentieth-century phi-
losophy of consciousness and Being runs deep, and is a driver of his view
that what we see in Romanticism is an adventure of consciousness itself.
Indeed, years before Harold Bloom's influential account of Romanticism
as "internalized quest romance,"16 Frye has seen that the Romantic poet
is undertaking a consciousness quest in which the movement is "inside
and downward" ("Drunken Boat," 85). The central Romantic theme is "a
romance with the poet for hero" in which the object is "the attaining of an
expanded consciousness, the sense of identity with God and nature"
(117). It is also his ease with Continental philosophy that engenders such
startling and original insights as seeing Mary Shelley's Frankenstein as a
precursor of Camus's The Outsider (122).
But what really lies between the 1933 student essay and Frye's mature
take on the Romantic movement is, of course, the idea of myth. "What I
Introduction xxxi
see first of all in Romanticism," he says in "The Drunken Boat," "is the
effect of a profound change, not primarily in belief, but in the spatial
projection of reality" (78). For Frye, spatial projections of reality are the
dialectical structures of imagery, and cyclical structures of narrative, that
are expressed directly in mythology, and in displaced form through
literature. As expounded most fully in Fearful Symmetry, the Third Essay
of Anatomy of Criticism, and The Educated Imagination, the work of imagi-
nation, parallel to that of civilization itself, is to create a human home out
of a hostile environment. It performs this operation, first, by the dialecti-
cal separation of the world mankind most desires from that which he
most rejects, creating "levels" of reality; and second, by figuring cyclical
movements, between the levels, which impose upon human affairs the
pattern of the seasons. These movements, or narratives, are what Frye
calls myths.
This is why the first chapter of A Study of English Romanticism is titled
"The Romantic Myth." There, in "The Drunken Boat," and in the Byron
essay too, Frye sets out the revisions that the Romantic revolution effects
on the four-tiered schema—incorporating a heaven, a lost paradise, a
fallen world, and a hell—that had dominated Western mythology for
centuries. While the Romantic projection retains four levels, they are
looser and more flexible, as well as being morally ambiguous. And while
the heavens are now a cold and forbidding place, or home to a man-
hating deity such as Blake's Nobodaddy, all movements towards reinte-
grated consciousness and intensity of being are, as we have noted, "inside
and downward," in the direction of a mysterious source of hidden crea-
tive energy. As Frye shows (89), this will leave major nineteenth-century
thinkers such as Marx, Kierkegaard, and Freud all committed to visions
in which dangerous but creative revolutionary energies are construed as
bubbling up from below and threatening to smash the polite daylight
world, which rushes along on the surface like a "drunken boat."
The levels of reality are morally ambiguous because at each of them
the "recovery of projection" may succeed or falter: or, in other words, the
subject-object dualism, mainstay of Western philosophy since Plato, may
be successfully broken down, or reinstated. In his notebooks, Frye talks
about Rencontre, the dimension of the ogdoad in which Romanticism
and romance are usually included, as tracing the "fragmentation" of
Western culture—its descent into the self-consciousness and anarchy
that will result in modernism. In the student essay of 1933, this is still
conceived in Spenglerian terms. Romanticism, there, is part of the de-
xxxii Introduction
The Romantic myth is the form in which the Romantic poet expresses the
recovery, for man, of what he formerly ascribed to gods, heroes, or the
forces of nature. When man is recognized to be a myth-making animal,
mythical language is also recognized to be the language, not for what is
true, but for what could be made true. Mythology, thus, with Romanticism,
as we have seen, ceases to be fables about the actions of superior powers
and becomes a structure of human concern. It thereby takes over some
aspects of religion. This does not mean that poetry becomes a religion or a
substitute for religion. It means that what was formerly a structure of belief
understood rationally, through doctrinal and conceptual statement, is now,
from the Romantic movement onward, increasingly understood and inter-
preted imaginatively, as a structure of what might and could be true.
Naturally, this change from what we have called a "closed" to an "open"
social use of mythology is bound to make changes in the structure of
comprehension itself, chiefly in the direction of making it more flexible.
(177)
IV
The connection of the essays on Morris, Wagner, and Butler (nos. 26,
27, and 28) to romance is obvious, given that each of these figures was
either a collector, and/or a reinterpreter, and/or an author of romance
texts. Frye once told me that he wrote Fearful Symmetry during the years
of the Second World War to ensure that people would understand that
Blake's idea of myth had nothing to do with fascism.19 Wagner's work
faced the same threat of appropriation, but here too Frye firmly estab-
lishes romance, and the recovery of divine projection, as the correct
context: "At the end of Gotterdammerung the gods have had it, and the
new reign of man is prophesied . .. and no other conclusion for the Ring
was conceivable except a humanistic one. What kind of man would
genuinely deserve to succeed the gods?" (334). A careful reading of these
three essays will reveal that the connecting threads between them are
memory, craft, and design—all themes that lead back to the deepest
origins of Frye's thinking in his study of Blake.
Morris is a writer who obsesses Frye, largely, I think, because the
tension between his overt or conscious socialistic drive, and the vision of
a social order much more individualistic and anarchistic embedded in
his romances, is so productive for Frye's thinking about the political
tensions of the succeeding "modern century." As he says in "The Impact
of Cultural Movements," Morris "provides an interesting fusion of aes-
thetic and pragmatic interests" (SE, 291): the young Frye doesn't say so,
but there is an obvious parallel with Blake. Like Blake and Wagner,
Morris is also the exponent of a skill or craft, and Frye is fascinated both
by the "design" it produces and by the "art of unconscious intelligence"
that produces it. This art of unconscious memory is the same thing as the
inherited "practice memory" that is the subject of the Butler essay: it is an
inbuilt, coded principle in the mind that produces certain kinds of shapes
and mandalas, not only in physical objects and the plastic arts, but also in
the plot structures of literary narrative. In both writers it emerges from
the recourse to "creative evolution" that is part of the nineteenth centu-
ry's search for new meanings: the existence of practice memory deep
within ourselves is, paradoxically, the closest we can hope to come to an
"external" datum for the existence of higher spiritual authority. Frye's
Jungian affinities have been overstated, but they do exist, and by medi-
tating on the inherited structure of human memory in these three pieces,
all written in the final decade of his life, Frye is tracing a romance journey
to mankind's recognition scene with his own buried identity, which
is what the recovery of projection means. He is also winding his way
xxxviii Introduction
back to Blake's insight that "Man brings All that he has or Can have
Into the World with him. Man is Born Like a Garden ready Planted &
Sown This World is too poor to produce one Seed."20 This collective
inherited memory of mankind's buried innocence, expressed through
the total shape of the arts, is a different faculty entirely to the "reproduc-
tive" memory of Wordsworth and Coleridge.
If Frye uses his own acquired skill as a pianist as an example of
"practice memory" in the Butler essay, most readers will nevertheless
think first of the extraordinary power of memory that marks every phase
of his critical achievement. Frye was well aware that his own critical
system could provide important clues to the structure of inherited
memory. He is much less hostile to memory than Blake, and much less
intent upon maintaining a strict borderline between memory and imagi-
nation. Anatomy of Criticism is a study of the narrative structures em-
ployed again and again by the literary imagination; but it is also a study
of the structure of the memory of Northrop Frye, and of the cultural
memory of the West. In an unpublished letter to Frank Kermode in 1967,
responding to Kermode's review of Fools of Time, Frye wrote: "I was
interested in your word 'mnemotechnical,' because it has occurred to me
that my overall critical structure is in many respects very like a classical
memory theatre."21 The present volume illustrates as well as any other of
the Collected Works the astonishing powers of Frye's critical recollec-
tion: he may have forgotten a detail in the dialogue he quotes from
Bernard Shaw's one-act play of 1913, The Music Cure (95), but most Shaw
enthusiasts have forgotten that he wrote a one-act play called The Music
Cure. When Frye says in his unpublished speech (no. 12) on Coleridge's
editor, Kathleen Coburn, that "for annotating Coleridge only one re-
quirement is needed, namely omniscience" (216), he may be winking
mischievously at his own future annotators—though fortunately they
are in possession of a tool, the internet, that Kathleen Coburn lacked.
For many readers of this volume, and I confess for its editor, the
highlight will be the two virtuoso pieces of practical criticism that Frye
produced in the 19605; "Emily Dickinson" (no. 23) and "Dickens and the
Comedy of Humours" (no. 25). While each of the essays is freestanding
and complete as a study of its chosen subject, each is also intimately tied
up with Frye's meditation on romance and Romanticism. The Dickinson
piece is alive to subtleties and nuances in precisely the way that some of
Frye's detractors claimed was lacking in his criticism. The poet's search
for numinous tokens, fragments of "circumference" within her own con-
Introduction xxxix
strained orbit, places her very much in Frye's romance tradition. Indeed,
when we think of Dickinson and Frye, we understand better why Frye
chose a French word that means "encounter" for the chapter of the
ogdoad dealing with romance, and why he saw "fragmentation" as one
of its defining characteristics: like the sensibility poets, Dickinson deals
in "the brief or even the fragmentary utterance" as a way of capturing
her momentary encounters with spiritual authority. Dickinson provides
a late-Romantic, romance example of the humanistic condition in which
"separateness" and "identity" have become the two poles of the imagi-
nation and the organizing categories of the narrative cycle. In Dickinson's
imaginative world, once again, a projected heaven has been recovered:
"It is attainable; the poet has attained it; it is not, therefore, a 'superhu-
man site,' nor could it survive the extinction of the human mind" (264). It
is fascinating, too, that years before Harold Bloom found agon to be such
a productive metaphor to describe the relation of the poet to his tradi-
tion, particularly in the post-Romantic word, Frye closes this essay by
saying that Dickinson "fought her angel until she had forced out of him
the crippling blessing of genius" (270).
Finally, "Dickens and the Comedy of Humours" is a powerful correc-
tive to those who have suggested that, as practical interpretation, Frye's
archetypal method can only lead to pigeonholing. There is not a page of
this essay that does not ripple with original insight—insights that could
not have been achieved except by the putting into action of Frye's con-
ceptual frame. It is Frye's "system," applied to these novels, that allows
us to see Dickens's plots as displaced versions of New Comedy, and
Dickens himself as a fully achieved romancer, rather than as a failed
realist. Once that insight has been established, hundreds of previously
unseen connections emerge, both internally—between Dickens's plots
and characters—and externally, between Dickens and the traditional
plot- and character-types of the comedy and romance traditions. Dick-
ens's particular emphasis is on the "humours," or obsessive minor char-
acters, who provide a blockage to the achievement of the comic action,
but also, frequently, its key.
George Eliot or Jane Austen would do as well as Dickens to illustrate
the realist displacement of the New Comedy. But Dickens is a popular
romance writer and thus illustrates what The Secular Scripture will argue
a decade later: that romance is "the structural core of all fiction" (SeS, 15).
Dickens is a romancer working within a post-Romantic myth, and in-
stead of the "green world" set over against the humorous world that we
xl Introduction
take final precedence over what ought to be" (308). Implicit in that
assertion is that the larger human story, too, is a man-wrought history,
and not a divine given.
In its combination of individual insights with a broad coordinating
perspective, there is a kind of perfection about "Dickens and the Comedy
of Humours" that would surely earn it a place in an anthology of the
indispensable practical criticism of the twentieth century. And while
almost any of the longer pieces in Northrop Frye's Writings on the Eight-
eenth and Nineteenth Centuries would fit the purpose, I think that this is
the essay that I would give to a young student of literature today to show
him or her what modern criticism in its heyday, and in the hands of its
central critic, could do.
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On the Eighteenth Century
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1
The Young Boswell
Spring 19511
clo is to give us some idea of how this strange creature with his spastic
will managed to keep sprawling and shambling up to the top of one of
the dizziest technical pinnacles of art.
In the art of Boswell's biography two things are remarkable. One is the
endless patience and skill with which he drew Johnson out through
cunningly chosen questions and situations: Johnson comes to life as a
result of what one can only call an exhaustive biographical dialectic, a
Platonic dialogue in reverse. The other is his powerful grasp of the
organic consistency of Johnson's character: his ability to show that the
tenderness and the brutality, the outraged bellows and the flashing
epigrams, the heartiness and the misanthropy, were inseparable parts of
the same man. He saw the wistful Quixote behind the coffee-house
buccaneer, and he saw that Johnson's arrogance was really a high cour-
age because of the loneliness it had to conquer. Boswell possessed a very
rare kind of sympathetic Einfiihlungg[empathy! which he applied to
others besides Johnson. He succeeded in gaining introductions to both
Rousseau and Voltaire by writing a Rousseauist letter, exclamatory and
self-deprecating, to Rousseau and a Voltairean one, witty and epatant
[sparkling, provocative], to Voltaire. To call the motive for these letters
snobbery gets us nowhere: we might as well call it original sin. It is at
least fairer to Boswell to notice how well he understood the weaknesses
of these men, and how uncynical and tolerant that understanding was. In
this journal, after a day of letter-writing, he says: "I have touched every
man on the proper key, and yet have used no deceit" [328].
Tolerance, like charity, begins at home in self-tolerance, a quite differ-
ent thing from self-indulgence or self-conceit, however much of either
Boswell also had. The present journal gives one more respect for Yeats's
"mask" conception of the psychology of the writer.2 The writer, says
Yeats, compensates for his personal deficiencies by projecting an ideal
self which is the exact opposite of his real self; his ability as a writer then
crystallizes around and expresses this ideal self. Boswell, at twenty-two,
noted in himself an infantile confidingness, a desperate urgency to be
noticed, and a wit that seemed to come off best when the victim of it was
himself. And so, being like other self-conscious young men much preoc-
cupied with social rhythms, he tried to become as exquisitely poised and
disciplined as Castiglione's courtier. He assumed that it was possible to
grow into the character of "what God intended me and I myself chose"
[62] by an act of conscious will. Because his social defences were apt to
fall with a crash at the first moment of contact, he stresses the importance
The Young Boswell 5
of being what he calls retenu [cautious]. No one ever died for a backslapper:
the magnetic personalities are those who can suggest by their manner
that other people should come to them. "I am always resolving to study
propriety of conduct" [272], he says; and "[I] pride myself in thinking
that my natural character is that of dignity" [258!. There follows a more
rueful entry: "Dempster and Erskine breakfasted with me. . . . I said I
wanted to get rid of folly and to acquire sensible habits. They laughed"
[281-2].
In this deadlock a third character takes over, cold, precise, and ruth-
less: the character of Boswell, the writer. Boswell the writer works the
same miracle of recreation on himself that he was later to work on
Johnson, and he does it by the same process of inspired listening, except
that here he is able to eavesdrop on thoughts as well. Boswell the writer
listens to Boswell reflecting on a spasmodic act of charity: "The creature
did not seem so grateful as I could have wished" [127]. He listens to
Boswell contemplating his ideal image after telling off the mistress who
gave him gonorrhea: "During all this conversation I really behaved with
a manly composure and polite dignity that could not fail to inspire an
awe" [160]. Then he records how he wrote her to get back his entrance fee
of two guineas. And so on. The editor, Mr. Pottle, explains that the
journal was, like Swift's Journal to Stella, sent to a friend as correspond-
ence and hence written for a reader, and he notes that Boswell will often,
writing several days after an event, build up narrative interest by exclud-
ing his later knowledge. Boswell noted his own selectivity, and remarks
that he wants his journal "to contain a consistent picture of a young
fellow eagerly pushing through life" [206]. But the sinewy narrative
drive of the journal and its constant impression of being humorously
aware and emotionally on top of all situations comes, not from the man,
but from the mask that conceals the man and reveals the artist.
The result, as Mr. Pottle also remarks, is quite different both from
Rousseau's (and Goethe's) factitious manipulation and from the almost
inhuman self-extroversion of Pepys. It is quite different too from the only
other English prose writer of the age of sensibility who ranks with
Boswell: Sterne. Sterne, like Boswell, is a connoisseur of unstudied sim-
plicity, and, though we know that Toby's reactions will always be mili-
tary, each one is fresh and spontaneous. "Ilus," says Walter Shandy,
rationalizing the disaster of little Tristram and the window-sash, "cir-
cumcised his whole army one morning.—Not without a court-martial?
cry'd my Uncle Toby."3 But Sterne himself is cunning and artful. Boswell
6 On the Eighteenth Century
the subject is naive rather than simple, and Boswell the writer is corre-
spondingly candid.
Naive, because, being a prey to conflicting moods, he allows each
mood to project its own image of himself and the world in turn. He tries
to get a commission in the Guards, and remarks, "I do think my love of
form for its own sake is an excellent qualification for a gentleman of the
Army" [128]. He climbs into bed with Louisa and says, "I surely may be
styled a Man of Pleasure" [140]. And candid, because he records all his
moods, and does not conventionalize himself. Aristotle remarks that
morally there is little to choose between the boaster and the ironic or self-
deprecating man, as they both lie about themselves.4 And, from a literary
point of view, they both produce rather facile autobiographies. Boswell
shows an uncanny knack of hitting a tone exactly in the middle, vain and
ironic at the same time. "I have an honest mind and a warm friendship.
Upon my soul, not a bad specimen of a man. However my particular
notions may alter, I always preserve these great and worthy qualities"
[80]. Or, perhaps with more obvious artfulness: "I really conducted this
affair with a manliness and prudence that pleased me very much. The
whole expense was just eighteen shillings" [140]. This kind of thing is the
very essence of human self-revelation, and is far above a mere willing-
ness to tell the worst of oneself.
It is fascinating too to read the famous 1763 bits of the Lifeein relation to
Boswell instead of Johnson. Like most people who struggle for impossi-
ble masks, Boswell had father-trouble, and this journal polarizes him
between his own father and a new father-figure. We notice for the first
time how Boswell's opening conversations with Johnson turn on the
relation of father and son, and on the limits of obedience and authority.
Boswell's own father, Lord Auchinleck, was a provincial Scotch Presby-
terian who despised literature in general and Boswell's writings in par-
ticular, and insisted that Boswell should go into law (which, Boswell
observes, would force him "to be obliged to remember and repeat dis-
tinctly the dull story, probably of some very trivial affair" [202]). Johnson
was a Londoner, an Episcopalian monarchist, and a literary figure who
specifically encouraged Boswell to keep a journal. A letter to Boswell
from his father is printed in an appendix: it is the first document of a long
tradition, culminating in Macaulay's essay, which can see nothing in the
man Boswell but a deplorable ass.5 Meanwhile, Boswell had been com-
posing, with all his usual tact and skill, his letter of introduction to
posterity, which has taken much longer to be delivered, but should give
him the last word.
2
Towards Defining an Age of Sensibility
June 1956
The period of English literature which covers roughly the second half of
the eighteenth century is one which has always suffered from not having
a clear historical or functional label applied to it. I call it here the age of
sensibility, which is not intended to be anything but a label. This period
has the "Augustan" age on one side of it and the "Romantic" movement
on the other, and it is usually approached transitionally, as a period of
reaction against Pope and anticipation of Wordsworth. The chaos that
results from treating this period, or any other, in terms of reaction has
been well described by Professor Crane in a recent article in the Univer-
sity of Toronto Quarterly.1 What we do is to set up, as the logical expres-
sion of Augustanism, some impossibly pedantic view of following rules
and repressing feelings, which nobody could ever have held, and then
treat any symptom of freedom or emotion as a departure from this. Our
students are thus graduated with a vague notion that the age of sensibil-
ity was the time when poetry moved from a reptilian Classicism, all cold
and dry reason, to a mammalian Romanticism, all warm and wet feeling.
8 On the Eighteenth Century
As for the term "pre-Romantic," that, as a term for the age itself, has
the peculiar demerit of committing us to anachronism before we start,
and imposing a false teleology on everything we study. Not only did the
"pre-Romantics" not know that the Romantic movement was going to
succeed them, but there has probably never been a case on record of a
poet's having regarded a later poet's work as the fulfilment of his own.
However, I do not care about terminology, only about appreciation for
an extraordinarily interesting period of English literature, and the first
stage in renewing that appreciation seems to me the gaining of a clear
sense of what it is in itself.
Some languages use verb tenses to express, not time, but the difference
between completed and continuous action. And in the history of litera-
ture we become aware, not only of periods, but of a recurrent opposition
of two views of literature. These two views are the Aristotelian and the
Longinian, the aesthetic and the psychological, the view of literature as
product and the view of literature as process. In our day we have ac-
quired a good deal of respect for literature as process, notably in prose
fiction. The stream of consciousness gets careful treatment in our criti-
cism, and when we compare Arnold Bennett and Virginia Woolf on the
subject of Mrs. Brown we generally take the side of Virginia Woolf.2 So it
seems that our age ought to feel a close kinship with the prose fiction of
the age of sensibility, when the sense of literature as process was brought
to a peculiarly exquisite perfection by Sterne, and in lesser degree by
Richardson and Boswell.
All the great story-tellers, including the Augustan ones, have a strong
sense of literature as a finished product. The suspense is thrown forward
until it reaches the end, and is based on our confidence that the author
knows what is coming next. A story-teller does not break his illusion by
talking to the reader as Fielding does, because we know from the start
that we are listening to Fielding telling a story—that is, Johnson's argu-
ments about illusion in drama apply equally well to prose fiction of
Fielding's kind. But when we turn to Tristram Shandy we not only read
the book but watch the author at work writing it: at any moment the
house of Walter Shandy may vanish and be replaced by the author's
study. This does break the illusion, or would if there were any illusion to
break, but here we are not being led into a story, but into the process of
writing a story: we wonder, not what is coming next, but what the author
will think of next.
Sterne is, of course, an unusually pure example of a process writer, but
Towards Defining an Age of Sensibility 9
and the fact that these are deliberate discords used for parody indicates
that they are normally not present. Johnson's disapproval of such de-
vices in serious contexts is written all over the Lives of the Poets.
When we turn from Pope to the age of sensibility, we get something of
the same kind of shock that we get when we turn from Tennyson or
Matthew Arnold to Hopkins. Our ears are assaulted by unpredictable
io On the Eighteenth Century
take than the kind of agony which is expressed with an almost definitive
poignancy by Smart in Jubilate Agno:
For in my nature I quested for beauty, but God, God hath sent
me to sea for pearls.15
ism of Blake and Smart revived in France with Rimbaud and Gerard de
Nerval, but even this development had become conservative by the time
its influence reached England, and only in a few poems of Dylan Thom-
as, and those perhaps not his best, does the older tradition revive. But
contemporary poetry is still deeply concerned with the problems and
techniques of the age of sensibility, and while the latter's resemblance to
our time is not a merit in it, it is a logical enough reason for re-examining
it with fresh eyes.
3
Nature Methodized
August 1960
achieved its ends. Charles's view of it was shrewd and accurate and
Milton's was preposterous; but it was Milton's apocalyptic fantasies that
made him Milton. And if great literature is always out of historical focus,
the literary careers of minor or more retired writers are hardly in history
at all. Mr. Dobree's book has a chronological table of the main literary
events of his period—publications, birth and death dates of authors, and
the like—and this useful but hardly fascinating apparatus is really all that
literary history, considered as a branch of ordinary history, amounts to.
No: The point of literary history is not to articulate the memory of
mankind by putting a mass of documents into an ordered and coherent
narrative. Its documents are far better worth reading than any history of
them could ever be. Its task is to reawaken and refresh our imaginative
experience by showing us what unexplored riches of it lie within a
certain area. In every age there is a large group of writers who seem to be
more or less all the same size. Those who eventually turn out to be the
greatest writers are seldom wholly ignored in their own day; but even
more seldom are they regarded as greatly superior to their contemporar-
ies. The tragedies of Webster remind us of Shakespeare at every turn
because our imaginations are possessed by Shakespeare. But Webster
himself lists his influences as first Chapman, then Ben Jonson, then
Beaumont and Fletcher, then Shakespeare, Dekker, and Heywood, and
we have no reason to suppose that he was being disingenuous. Many
decades have to elapse before the final comparative standards emerge.
Even Dryden, while writing with great accuracy about Shakespeare,
could still say, "[H]owever others are now generally preferr'd before
him."2 Comparative standards are established by what may be called the
usefulness of the writer to the culture that follows and absorbs him, the
slow and gradual discovery, in general cultural practice, that he is indis-
pensable. They cannot be established by the value judgments of indi-
vidual critics, which are the effects and not the causes of his usefulness.
Once they are established, the dilettante is apt to assume that any
writer he has not heard of has been "forgotten," and that anyone who has
been forgotten deserved to be, because posterity, including himself, is
infallible in such matters. The literary historian, trying to absorb himself
into the period he is studying, finds himself recapturing some of its
perspective, and discovers at once that posterity is the laziest and most
incompetent of critics. If, for instance (to switch to another art: the princi-
ples of every mode of cultural history are the same), he is writing the
history of eighteenth-century music, it is no sign of his feeling for the
i8 On the Eighteenth Century
period if he likes Bach and Mozart: it is merely a sign that he is not quite
a fool. If Soler or Mattheson or Cimarosa also burst on him with astonish-
ment and delight; if he has an insatiable zest for rediscovering the most
obscure music and the most humdrum composers; if he can sympathize
with (which does not mean agreeing with) the councillors of Leipzig in
their desire to get Telemann or Graupner for their organist rather than
Bach, then he has some claims to historical sense. For even the errors of
an age are inseparable from its integrity. A critic who loves Keats may
produce fine criticism on Keats; but he will not have a genuinely histori-
cal approach to Keats unless he can understand why Croker reviewed
Endymion as he did,3 and feels that he might well have written much the
same review in the same situation.
This is not to say that the literary historian should not use his hind-
sight, but merely that literary history does not consist entirely of hind-
sight. For bringing our imaginative experience of the past to life there can
be no substitute for history. The Rape of the Lock, embalmed in a freshman
survey course, may well seem to the freshman to be little more than a
long poem in heroic couplets about airy fairies. There is a limit, in other
words, to what a limited literary experience can get out of any poem.
And if such a poem is removed from its historical context and presented
as one of the few memorable works of its age, limited experience, gazing
at itself in the mirror of the poem, may only conclude that the other
works must be pretty dismal. If one has read, with gradually increasing
relish, and without worrying about any comparative standards, Gay's
Trivia, Mandeville's Grumbling Hive, Philips's Splendid Shilling, and Mat-
thew Green's The Spleen, then The Rape of the Lock will grow, with its
reader's experience, into something more like its proper proportions.
The literary historian is the man who has read everything in his field
with equal interest: he has lost his sense of comparative values in order
to find them again in their genuine form, when the greatest writers of an
age are seen to be mountain peaks and not passing clouds. And moun-
tain peaks should be reached by climbing and descent, not by dropping
on and off in a twentieth-century helicopter.
The literary historian begins in the "background" which is the subject
of the second part of Mr. Dobree's book, in the buzzing gossip of letters
and memoirs, the random impressions of travellers, the network of allu-
sions and value judgments in criticism and history writing. The literary
historian needs a sharp eye for the historical epiphany, as a student of
Joyce might call it: for the kind of remark that sums up not only the
Nature Methodized 19
Poetry is an Art; for since it has a certain End, there must be some certain
Way of arriving at that End. No Body can doubt of so evident a Truth, that
in all Things, where there may be a Right and a Wrong, there is an Art, and
sure Rules to lead you to the former, and direct you to avoid the latter.
biop
Every age produces these "there must be" statements, full of the desper-
ate pathos of the effort to find values that time and chance will not
happen to. But only the eighteenth century could have grounded a
defence of the "rules" in so uncertain a pun on "certain."
From "background," the literary historian goes on to the foreground,
the periodicals and magazines like The Tatler and The Spectator, where the
cultural tastes of the age are formed and reflected, where literary and
critical issues are discussed and the thought of the time is absorbed into
polite conversation. Addison, that round peg in the round hole of his
time, is a storehouse of the kind of cultural aphorism that characterizes
an age. The arts, says Addison, "are to deduce their Laws and Rules from
the general Sense and Taste of Mankind, and not from Principles of those
Arts themselves; or in other Words, the Taste is not to conform to the Art,
but the Art to the Taste."5 Nothing could be more wrong, or more
characteristic of the culture Addison is reflecting, with its confidence in
its taste, its absence of any sense of the shaping power of tradition, its
conviction that every artist starts all over again to grapple directly with
Nature.
From this we go on to the intellectual issues of an age, as literature
treats them. What Newton and Berkeley meant is important, certainly;
but what their contemporaries thought they meant is at least equally
important to the literary historian. Nowadays many people feel that
there is something about "relativity" or the "principle of indeterminacy"
that gives them the best of both worlds: an up-to-date scientific doctrine
which enables them to preserve their moral and religious intuitions. But
this is tame compared to the kind of excitement that Newton aroused,
2O On the Eighteenth Century
with his mathematical genius and his deep religious convictions, his
irrefutable laws of motion and his suggestion that space was the senso-
rium of God.6 Hence, as one poet said, "Newton demands the Muse," the
title of a lively study by Miss Marjorie Nicolson7 that Mr. Dobree follows
in his penultimate chapter, which deals with the great mass of philo-
sophical poetry in the period, from James Thomson down. Such
Newtonian poetry raises an interesting critical problem. Mr. Dobree
quotes several passages such as this:
Why does this kind of writing not come through to us, when Pope's
Essay on Man, certainly no better intellectually, does? To answer this one
would need a clear insight into the difference between poetry and discur-
sive writing, between the poet's task of putting words into patterns and
the philosopher's task of putting them into propositions, between poetic
language of analogy and identification and the scientist's language of
accurate description.
All this is the literary historian's underpainting, so to speak, the tem-
pering of tones and colours that makes the greatest achievements of an
age shine in depth. Here the literary historian meets his real test. It is
extremely easy to belittle writers by a historical treatment, through some
such formula as this: "Swift and Pope are rationalistic writers in contrast
to the Romantics, who put imagination and emotion in the ascendancy."
Such formulas assume that a writer's age limits him to half a reality,
however great he may be. There is no such blither in Mr. Dobree's book,
but there is plenty of it in the kind of pseudohistorical material that
inexperienced students are afflicted with. To make a great writer gain
rather than lose by a historical treatment takes a sense of the interlocking
relevance of all the literature of his age, conceived as a unit of culture
complete in itself. The true literary historian can see, under the surface,
the conflict of party interests and of social and cultural cliches taking the
form of an imaginative vision of life which the great masterpiece reveals.
Thus Defoe is an overworked journalist writing incessantly about free
trade and inflation and the cost of living and the rise and decline of
manufacturing. In his age, the stereotype of the middle-class Englishman
was formulated in Arbuthnot's History of John Bull. The paradoxes of
Nature Methodized 21
between Blifil and Tom Jones, or between Joseph and Charles Surface, is
closely related.
The age of wit became an age of satire because human beings are what
they are, and it became an age of satire by subordinating the vertical
perspective of literature, the sense of worlds above and below normal
human experience. Poets had been told by Boileau that the revelations of
Christianity were too high for poets and the puerilities of Classical my-
thology too low.3 Eighteenth-century literature in England begins with
the final chorus of Dryden's Secular Masque:
These lines are addressed respectively to Diana, Mars, and Venus, and
are linked, however obliquely, with a marked decline of interest in
mythological language. The Olympian personnel were not totally dis-
missed like the false gods in the Nativity Ode: the elitism of eighteenth-
century culture kept mythology in the poetic vocabulary. But it became
increasingly unfunctional: Cowper's reference to Philomela's "mechanick
woe"5 and the fact that Gray's line "And reddening Phoebus lifts his
golden fire"6 was so obviously trade slang for "the sun rises" indicate
that we are close to Wordsworth's demythologizing of poetic diction.
True, Wordsworth's revolution did not outlive him, but it ends a period
when Ovid went, comparatively speaking, out of fashion, and Horace,
the incarnation of the man of the world, dividing his time between his
rural retreat and the streets of Rome, moved into the foreground.
Dryden and Pope were more interested in religious themes than Boileau
would have recommended, but Dryden is concerned with the authority
of tradition and the social, even the political, application of religious
principles. So far as any enthusiasm for adventuring into the mysteries of
revelation is concerned, Religio Laid starts with the word "dim" and goes
on from there. Pope's Messiah, though a superb paraphrase of Isaiah [9:2-
7; 11:1-9] and Virgil's Fourth Eclogue, similarly does not express the
direct impact of religion on experience, like the hymns of Watts, Wesley,
and Cowper later in the century, and Swift tends to think of Christian
dogma and ritual as a kind of leash necessary to restrain a particularly
vicious dog.
The aspect of the eighteenth century that we associate with Gold-
Varieties of Eighteenth-Century Sensibility 27
But the stimulus of new discovery was a genuine one, and it extended
from the writer to his reader. This was the first age in which the critic
moved up to a position of major importance in literature, as the spokes-
man of a public that looked first and last for entertainment in its litera-
ture and demanded to be pleased. Many writers of the time, including
notably Addison, tell us that literature in every age must conform to the
expectations of its readers, that the taste of the age is the formal cause of
poetry. The famous proof-text here is, of course, Johnson's couplet:
Granted that this is perhaps more obviously true of drama than of any
other genre, the principle was assumed to apply everywhere. Literature
was closely associated with a background of good talk and cultivated
conversation, verbal communication preserved in amber. In the second
of the Night Thoughts Edward Young concludes a panegyric on language
in phrases that may sound more ambiguous now than they would have
done in his time:
one eventually runs out of marble. We notice at once in reading the Essay
on Dramatic Poesy that, Dutch fleet or no Dutch fleet, English literature is
entering an intensely progressive period, where the crudities of the Eliza-
bethan writers, including Shakespeare, will be out of fashion and a new
age of refinement and perfected craftsmanship will succeed. Pope's Es-
say on Criticism and Peri Bathous are devoted to this craftsmanship in
poetry, the sublime tact that succeeds in definitively expressing meaning
instead of merely throwing words in the direction of meaning. Such
craftsmanship works within a convention: it is the responsibility of a
cultivated public to understand and respond to the subtleties in the
convention, to hear all the harsh clustered consonants in such a line as:
qualities. All Berkeley had to do with this modern discovery was to deny
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities to arrive at his
purely subjective idealistic position of esse est percipi, "to be is to be
perceived."18 If we feel convinced, as Johnson was, that things still have a
being apart from our perception of them, that, for Berkeley, is because
they are ideas in the mind of God. It is fortunate both for the permanence
of the world and for Berkeley's argument that God, according to the
Psalmist, neither slumbers nor sleeps [Psalm 121:4]. But Berkeley indi-
cates clearly the isolated individual at the centre of Augustan society
who interpenetrates with that society.
The same sense of interpenetration comes into economic contexts. In
the intensely laissez-faire climate of eighteenth-century capitalism there
is little emphasis on what the anarchist Kropotkin called mutual aid:19
even more than the nineteenth century, this was the age of the work
ethic, the industrious apprentice, and the entrepreneur: the age, in short,
of Benjamin Franklin. A laissez-faire economy is essentially an amoral
one: this fact is the basis of the satire of Mandeville's Fable of the Bees, with
its axiom of "Private Vices, Publick Benefits."20 The howls of outrage that
greeted Mandeville's book are a little surprising: it looks as though the
age was committed to the ethos of capitalism, but had not realized the
intensity of its commitment. The reaction to Mandeville is oddly similar
to the reaction to The Shortest Way with the Dissenters, where Defoe's hoax
form was the only possible way of showing bigots how brutal their
prejudices were.
Of course much has to be allowed for the polemical and strident tone
of Mandeville: later in the century Adam Smith could say that avarice
was the spur of industry, and say it to general applause. And of course
Mandeville may have been raising issues far beyond the amoral nature
of the open market. Browning's poem on Mandeville celebrates him as a
prophet who penetrated a false antithesis of good and evil to discern that
God brings good out of evil.21 At least I think that is what the poem says,
but as it is written in the gabbling doggerel of Browning's later idiom, it
is hard to be sure.
The same feeling of the interaction of good and evil in the economic
world accounts for the eighteenth-century vogue for picaresque fiction.
The heroes and heroines of Defoe may be thieves and whores to begin
with, though Defoe carefully explains how they got that way, and shows
how it was practically impossible that they could have been anything
else. They do not like being thieves and whores, and fully intend to
Varieties of Eighteenth-Century Sensibility 31
repent and become respectable as soon as they can afford it. But the
implacable ferocity of the will to survive carries them on. It is no good
preaching morality unless morality coincides with self-interest, to say
nothing of self-preservation. As William the Quaker says in Captain
Singleton, "I would as soon trust a Man whose Interest binds him to be
just to me, as a Man whose Principle binds himself."22
George Borrow, one of the few Victorian writers who felt any affinity
with the picaresque, tells us in Lavengro of his encounter with an old
apple-woman whose Bible is Moll Flanders, and who would not sell it to
him for any money, because "without my book I should mope and
pine."231 say Bible advisedly, because what she sees in the book is the
parable of a prodigal daughter, often wretched and despairing, yet push-
ing on in the hope of welcome and acceptance at the end. Later in
Lavengro Borrow meets a Welsh parson who is sure that he has commit-
ted the unpardonable sin against the Holy Spirit. Borrow picks out of
him the perversity of pride that has flattered him into believing that he
has done something blacker and more Satanic than any other man, and
points out that sin is a very common, not to say vulgar, condition that no
one escapes. He does this by referring to the apple-woman and the
heroine he calls "Blessed Mary Flanders,"24 whose life repeats the situa-
tion of the forgiven harlots in the Gospels.
Not many novels have the driving power of Defoe's best fiction, but
the theme he treats so often is not confined to him. Fanny Hill, for
example, though it is certainly no Moll Flanders, also presents us with a
young woman unceremoniously dumped in London without resources,
so that she has to face the dilemma of whoring or starving. Her decision
in favour of life is quite as moral as Moll's, whatever amusement the
author or his reader may get from the result. And perhaps the contrast
with Pamela is not so great as Richardson would have thought. Pamela is
in much the same position as Moll at the beginning of the book, and the
energy and resourcefulness with which she gets Mr. B on the bottom line
of a marriage contract is by no means free of ruthlessness.
Moll Flanders, Roxana, Pamela, Clarissa, all in very different ways
reflect the ethos of an age when women, more particularly working-class
women, were especially vulnerable to social injustice, and the will to
survive had to be an especially powerful one for females. In many of the
novels of the Victorian giants, including George Eliot, female characters
are presented mainly in relation to the male ones, instead of being
representatives of the human race in their own right. The tradition that
32 On the Eighteenth Century
runs through Defoe and Richardson and spills over into Jane Austen
seems to me in this respect a more mature one.
In a novel of Robert Bage two heroines, one conventional and the other
pragmatic, are discussing the position of women in a Turkish harem. The
conventional one says, "I prefer death a thousand times," and the prag-
matic one says, "And I prefer a thousand times—to death."25 In Bage's
much better-known Hermsprong the heroine is an insipid idiot of a type
common in the minor fiction of the time, with a morbid sense of duty to a
father who has no claim to it. But as she is contrasted with a considerably
more sensible friend, and as her lover makes a point of the fact that he
has not only read but been impressed by Mary Wollstonecraft, it seems
clear that deliberate satire is involved. The vogue for horror fiction
produces many situations that play a sadistic cat-and-mouse game with
its heroines, keeping them surrounded with menace and threats of viola-
tion, even though they are often rescued by a divine providence heavily
disguised as a public demand on the author. Nevertheless, we occasion-
ally get a glimpse of the frustration and helplessness of an isolated
female in a society where she is unable to manipulate any of the social
machinery to her advantage, and the glimpse is far more genuinely
horrifying than the conventional scary props.
The male picaresque heroes of Defoe and Smollett are more obviously
related to the ethos of an expanding empire, being adventurers who are
often close to being pirates. There is seldom, understandably, the empha-
sis on violated innocence that we get so often with female protagonists.
In Smollett's novels, especially Ferdinand Count Fathom, they are not very
likeable, but then Smollett is a tough satirist, and is not out to make you
like his characters, but to drive home a thesis closely parallel to
Mandeville's. Ferdinand of course "repents" at the end, but that is only
to get his repellent story finished, and to satisfy a public like the one
assumed to be clamouring for a reprieve at the end of The Beggar's Opera.
However, it is only such a time that could have produced the gigantic
Robinson Crusoe, the story of the solitary individual cast away on an
island who proceeds to reconstruct every element of the expanding
British imperial power he belongs to. He makes clothes, surrounds a
space to make some privacy for himself, opens a journal and ledger, and
governs the "native" Friday with the greatest assurance. As long as the
British Empire possessed the will to govern there was never any question
of "going native." In his brief reference to Robinson Crusoe in Das Kapital,
Marx underlines the interpenetration of individual and social themes in
Varieties of Eighteenth-Century Sensibility 33
II
First follow nature; but what is nature? For the ethos I have been loosely
calling Augustan it embraced two levels: the physical environment, which
human beings are in but not of, and an upper level of a specifically
human nature. It is natural to man, though not to any other being in the
physical world, to wear clothes and engage in rational discourse. Specifi-
cally human qualities are all that is left of the paradise that God origi-
nally designed for man, and structures of authority, both spiritual and
temporal, have to be established because man is no longer capable of
living in paradise. Such structures are all that we have as criteria of the
humanly natural; hence the only answer to the question, What is unnatu-
ral for man? is, Whatever established authority tells you is unnatural.
Even for the revolutionary Milton in Paradise Lost, the state of Adam and
Eve before the fall was simple but civilized, with angels dropping in for
lunch: they do not resemble anything like noble savages until after their
fall.
We saw that Locke, like Descartes before him, based his philosophy on
a philosophical man abstracted from his social context, in short a theo-
retical primitive. Also that Robinson Crusoe was an allegory of another
abstract primitive, the economic man of capitalist theory, whose outlines
are fairly complete already in Adam Smith. These are the individual
primitives at the core of Augustan culture. But such primitives have
voluntarily entered a social contract and a historical tradition. For this
attitude nothing in the area of culture can develop except on the other
side of the social contract: literature and the other arts are rooted in a
historical context in both time and space.
But there were other cultural traditions that implicitly raised the ques-
tion, Granted that man is not an animal and cannot live like one, can he
not find a common ground between the reasonable and the natural in the
present physical world? There is no Biblical evidence for any such doc-
trine as the total depravity of nature. And as certainly no one ever denied
that human civilization is both corrupt and over-complicated by luxury,
perhaps some simplifying and cleansing process might bring us within
34 On the Eighteenth Century
eenth, and one very relevant to our present theme: the destruction of the
primitive tribal Highland culture by the Hanoverian middle-class estab-
lishment in England.
But with all this we have in England and Scotland no visionary of a
natural society, on a single level of nature, remotely comparable in scope
to Rousseau (or, in a very different way, Diderot) in France, Vico in Italy,
or Herder in Germany. The closest approach in English-speaking coun-
tries, and he is not very close, is Thomas Jefferson, across the Atlantic.
Blake, for example, accepted none of the standard Augustan values, but
his distrust of anything called natural was equally great. The Marriage of
Heaven and Hell does not prophesy a natural society: it ushers in the
world of Freud and Marx and Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Blake comes
much closer to an idealized relation of humanity to nature when he
speaks of building a new Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant
land. Here nature is incorporated into human civilization, which has
stopped exploiting, dominating, and polluting nature and has begun to
cherish and foster it. This hymn expresses as close an approximation in
English poetry as I know to what a book of fifty years ago called the
heavenly city of the eighteenth-century philosophers.29 Otherwise, the
natural society remains unborn, not only as a society, but as a conception
or model of one. Perhaps, however, it was this unborn society, a classless
society where the distinction of elite and popular has disappeared, that
Wordsworth was really invoking in his Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, as
the ideal society for whom he was writing and whose language he was
endeavouring to speak.
If Robinson Crusoe, alone on his island and transforming it into a
replica of what for him was his real world, is an allegory of one aspect of
the eighteenth-century culture, then Tristram Shandy, complacently soak-
ing in amniotic fluid for half of his autobiography, may represent Crusoe's
Hegelian antithesis. When I was about sixteen my favourite novel, by
long odds, was Tristram Shandy, though I did not know why at the time. I
know now: Tristram Shandy is among other things an allegory of a writer
waiting to get born. What really forms Tristram's environment is a world
of words, a verbal abstract expressionism represented by the marbled
page that Sterne calls his "motley emblem."30 Walter Shandy lives en-
tirely on words: if irritable, he can be soothed at once if he makes a smart
repartee, even to the most inane remark of a servant: he believes in the
hidden significance of names like Trismegistus, in meanings concealed
in an author's subject—in short, he believes in practically every verbal
38 On the Eighteenth Century
fallacy there is. Surrounding him is the verbalism of the book itself. If we
look at some of the inserted stories—the man who drops a hot chestnut
into his open fly; the abbess and novice who try to start a pair of balky
mules by shouting obscene words at them (again turning on a linguistic
fallacy, that certain words are inherently obscene apart from their con-
text)—we may say that, however exquisitely told, these stories as regards
content are simply nothing. Yet we cannot say that they are all style and
no substance, because style is itself substantial. We never emerge into a
"real world" here, because reality itself has become verbal. Sterne prefig-
ures the cosmos of Mallarme where the function of everything that exists
is to border on (aboutir) a book. More immediately, he prefigures the
change from eighteenth-century discourse into nineteenth-century lan-
guage, from wit and Hartleian association into verbal organism, a proc-
ess completed by Coleridge when he turned against Hartley and began
his great treatise on imagination and the Logos, which also remained in
embryo.
I began the Anatomy of Criticism long ago by remarking that every
serious subject, including criticism, seems to go through a kind of induc-
tive metamorphosis, in which what has previously been assumed with-
out discussion turns into the central problem to be discussed [15]. Thus
biology assumed that it was a study of the forms of life, but it was only
when forms of life became the study instead of the basis of the study that
evolution developed and biology became a fully mature science. Years
later, when I came to read Michel Foucault's Order of Things, I saw a
parallel though greatly expanded thesis in it: that up to the end of the
eighteenth century humanity had been assumed to be the basis for study-
ing everything in the human cosmos, and that from the nineteenth cen-
tury on we have been living in a world in which humanity itself is the
study. Therefore, says Foucault, "Before the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, man did not exist."311 confess to being puzzled, even baffled, by this
way of putting it: it leaves me very unsure what Pope thought the proper
study of mankind was. But if the conception "man" emerged after the
eighteenth century, it must have been developing during it, which would
be sufficient reason for re-examining it, even as tentatively as I have just
tried to do.
On Romanticism
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5
CBC Goethe Salute
7 October 1949
surely a far more genuinely tragic situation. Goethe's Egmont calls him-
self, in a remarkable speech, a kind of sun-god driven to a predestined
heroic career by an overmastering force.1 But it is difficult to disentangle
this force from the force represented by Alva, the solemn and owlish
march of stupidity and cruelty over all man's efforts to gain peace and
freedom. Alva also talks about destiny, and has also a romantic attach-
ment, the fruit of which, his bastard son Ferdinand, is an irresolute
weakling who hankers to be like Egmont. In short, Egmont accepts too
much of Alva's attitude to life to illustrate the complete contrast between
liberty and tyranny which is the play's theme.
Lister Sinclair's adaptation seemed excellent, and preserved an archaic
quality in the language which, for an English listener, is well suited to a
play that has so many echoes of Shakespeare (especially Julius Caesar).
The reading was excellent too: perhaps one may make special mention of
Margot Christie for building up the minor figure of Margaret of Parma
into an integral part of the play.
6
Long Sequacious Notes
Winter 1953
been coming into view. His letters, his table talk, his Shakespearean and
other literary criticism, all form big collections, and Miss Kathleen Coburn,
who has already edited his Philosophical Lectures, is now, as she says,
"working towards an edition of Coleridge's note books" [23], of which
there must be at least fifty-four, the highest number in her references.
Preparatory to this, she offers us a collection of over three hundred
numbered short notes and aphorisms, gathered partly from the unpub-
lished notebooks and marginalia, partly from prose writings not re-
printed in this century, such as The Friend and Aids to Reflection. It makes
excellent reading, and though the editing is unobtrusive, the selection
could not have been made without a complete and thoroughly well-
proportioned knowledge of Coleridge. For the student of English litera-
ture I should say it was practically indispensable, even though some of it
can be found in other Coleridge collections. By the time all of Coleridge
has been printed, we shall be unlikely ever to ask again, Why couldn't he
finish anything he started? If we have a question of such a type, it is more
likely to be, Why did a man who may well have had a profounder mind
than Goethe, and was at least intellectually nearly as versatile, have
failed so utterly to make Goethe's impact on modern culture?
Coleridge's thoughts obviously came to him much as the images of
Kubla Khan and The Ancient Mariner did, as a series of aphorisms crystal-
lizing from his reading. Because these aphorisms contained his essential
ideas, the process of translating them into a continuous prose narrative
was, in theory, a mechanical piece of copying, to be done at any leisure
time. In practice, of course, it turned out to be a deadly dull and painful
drudgery, in which he found that he had, so to speak, no gear low
enough to keep him moving. Hence he would assert that books were
finished because, in one sense, that was true, though in any sense that
would interest a publisher they had not been begun. His reputation has
suffered from the fact that literature has not yet developed anything
analogous to the sculptor's stonecutter.
Everyone is familiar with the way that he floundered through the
Biographia Literaria. He hung a donkey's carrot in front of himself in the
form of a great chapter on the imagination, to which the earlier chapters
were the prolegomena. Eventually the chapter arrived, "On the Imagina-
tion, or Esemplastic Power," followed by three portentous harrumphs in
English, Latin, and Greek quotations, and a preliminary flourish on the
history of philosophy. Then his will power digs its heels in and balks; his
pen trails off: he writes a long letter to himself advising himself to
Long Sequacious Notes 45
she gives to the aphorisms, and no. no, where Coleridge says, "It is still
the great definition of humanity, that we have a conscience," she has
headed "Conscience—Freedom to Will and Think." But a careful reading
of the paragraph shows that while Coleridge may mean that too, he also
means conscience in its unregenerate sense of a please-mamma moral
compulsion—the conscience of which Huck Finn complained that it
nagged him even when it knew no more about the situation than he did.5
In the same paragraph he distinguishes "the turbulent heat of temporary
fermentation from the mild warmth of essential life." It is important to
notice that when he expresses one of his major literary ambitions, his
mood is usually turbulent and fermenting. (Compare the project for six
hymns in the Gutch Memorandum Book: "In the last Hymn a sublime
enumeration of all the charms or Tremendities of Nature—then a bold
avowal of Berkeley's System!!!")6 One can get becalmed not only through
failing to love God's creatures, but through being too anxious to help
them hatch their eggs.
Miss Coburn also emphasizes the modernity of Coleridge in her intro-
duction, and in expressing it she favours the rhetorical question. "[W]as
he not groping towards a Gestalt psychology before the gestaltists? . . .
had he not a glimmering of Freudianism before Freud? . . . would he not
have recognized in Jung's doctrine ..." [15]—and so on. True, no doubt,
and one could fall into the same rhythm almost ad libitum. Does he not
anticipate Newman when he distinguishes positiveness from certainty,
no. no; Kierkegaard in his note on Dread, no. 37; Schopenhauer in his
conception of will and reason, no. 235; the logical positivists when he
stresses the necessity of "criterional logic," no. 88; perhaps even
Wittgenstein's opening aphorism when he says, "The phrase, true in all
cases, is preferable to universal," no. 92; etc., etc.? I am not one of those,
however, who feel that the ultimate justification of something great in the
past is its relevance to the present instead of its own greatness. For in-
stance, in the Biographia, chapter 6, where Coleridge cites the case of a
hysterical girl to prove that, taking in all levels of consciousness, we never
forget anything, he does show "a glimmering of Freudianism before Freud."
He goes on to suggest that this total recollection of experience may actually
be the last judgment we experience as we pass from flesh to spirit7—an
idea that no Freudian would get a glimmering of in a million years. And
I think the "seminal" quality in Coleridge's thought, the quality that will
keep the reader of Miss Coburn's anthology finding good things in it for
months after he buys it, can be explained in another way.
48 On Romanticism
Miss Coburn remarks, "The more one reads Coleridge the more im-
pressed one becomes with what can only be called a psychological ap-
proach to all human problems" [14], and goes on to suggest that the
whole shape of Coleridge's thought is psychological. Her opinion is
authoritative, and she doubtless has reams of evidence for her statement
in the notebooks of which I know nothing. But such an approach to
Coleridge seems to me to be bound up with the indefensible view that in
Coleridge, as in Blake, the central coordinating principle is the psycho-
logical one of imagination. The imagination is instrumental in Coleridge:
it is the power that unifies, but not the thing to be unified, the real
coordinating principle. The latter is the Logos, and every aspect of
Coleridge's thought is an application of this conception. It leads him, in
politics, to see human destiny as emanating from the Incarnation, in
contrast to the "psilanthropic" liberal humanism that starts by trying to
improve human nature.8 It leads him in religion to the same perspective,
and to a theism which makes the knowledge of nature depend on reason,
and reason on the presence of the Logos in the mind (see no. 99). It leads
him in philosophy to hail the "second triumphant Coming" of medieval
realism, after a reign of nominalism that ran through Bacon and Descartes
to the French philosophes (no. 99, and compare the powerful analysis of
Cartesianism in no. 52). It leads him in criticism to the conception of all
literature as contained within an order of words identical with one
personal Word—perhaps his greatest legacy to modern thought, and one
still unexplored. It leads him even in science to a type of speculation
aimed at restoring the system of analogies and correspondences on which
medieval symbolism was based (compare no. 185). And although
Coleridge's thought remains fragmentary, the fragments are priceless
not because they are imaginative but because they are logia. Just as Blake
urges us to see the world in a grain of sand, so in Coleridge we have to
see the vast ramifying body of the Logos in all the brilliant facets and
prisms of these aphorisms, as they come tumbling over one another in a
wonderful sweep of mental richness, like the drops in the Cumberland
waterfalls that he loved so much to watch.
The reader unacquainted with The Notebooks of Matthew Arnold should
be told immediately not to expect anything like Miss Coburn's "basket of
plucked plums and windfalls" [23], as she calls it. There is hardly any-
thing by Arnold in them; they are not strictly his notebooks but his
commonplace books, lists of sentences quoted from his reading. They are
in Greek, Latin, French, German, Italian, and English, the first five being
Long Sequacious Notes 49
left untranslated "By the wishes of the members of Arnold's family and
of the publishers" [xiv], according to the preface. Such lists of adagia or
sententiae are a normal part of the training of a humanist scholar: they
help him to see his reading as a program of life, and focus in his mind the
best that has been thought in the way in which it has best been said. They
throw a light too on Arnold's stylistic habit of repeating a thematic
phrase all through a book. Along with the supplementary lists provided
by the editors at the end of the book, it forms a valuable guide to
Arnold's reading. Otherwise it is difficult to know what to say about this
book, which has been edited with great pains and erudition, and is
clearly the product of a touching personal devotion to Arnold. The long
series of sentences in Greek from the New Testament and Marcus Aurelius,
for instance, do not seem to illustrate the way Arnold read them as his
published writings do. One can, perhaps, build up a picture of a harassed
nineteenth-century contemplative, turning eagerly to Senancour and a
Kempis, but forced to listen also to Goethe bellowing into his other ear
about the vast and vague merit of getting something done. The conclu-
sion of the main part of the book, a series of quotations dated a week
after his death [see 438], has in it the melancholy withdrawing roar of the
sea of faith, leaving beached a number of shored fragments like those at
the end of The Waste Land:
When the dead is at rest, let his remembrance rest; and be comforted
for him when his spirit is departed from him. (Ecclesiasticus [38:23])
ing many a later critic a somewhat dubious cliche about the "persisting
Calvinism" in Byron's mind. When Byron was three his father died;
when he was six his cousin, the heir to the Byron title, was killed; and
when he was ten his great-uncle, who held the title, died and the poet
became the sixth Lord Byron. The fact that Byron made so professional a
job of being a lord is perhaps the result of his entering on that state when
he was old enough to notice the difference his title made in the attitude
that society took toward him.
He was then educated at Harrow and at Trinity College, Cambridge.
The most important of the friendships he formed there was with John
Cam Hobhouse, in later life Lord Broughton, who founded a "Whig
Club" at Cambridge, and whose influence had much to do with Byron's
left-of-centre political views. Byron's chief athletic interests were swim-
ming and pistol-shooting, the latter a useful accomplishment in the days
when gentlemen were expected to fight the odd duel, and he got around
a regulation against keeping a dog at Cambridge by keeping a bear
instead. What with his extravagance, his lack of discipline, and the
liberties he took with his rank, he was anything but a model student. He
announced more than once that he wished he had gone to Oxford in-
stead, and the Cambridge authorities must often have wished so too.
However, he acquired the usual gentleman's Classical education, and
while still an undergraduate he produced a slim volume of melodious if
not very arresting lyrics. This volume was, after some vicissitudes, pub-
lished in 1807 under the title given it by the publisher, Hours of Idleness.
Hours of Idleness got roughly handled in the Edinburgh Review, and the
result was Byron's first major satire, English Bards and Scotch Reviewers
(1809). Although the motivation for this poem was revenge on the Edin-
burgh reviewer, Byron took the opportunity to satirize most of his poetic
contemporaries, including Scott, Southey, Wordsworth, and Coleridge.
Meanwhile Byron had been planning a variant of the "Grand Tour"
that it was fashionable for young well-to-do Englishmen to take. Instead
of the usual journey to France and Italy, he decided to go first to Portugal
and Spain, bypass Italy by way of Malta, and then travel in what were at
that time Turkish dominions: Greece, Asia Minor, and the practically
unknown Albania. He set out with Hobhouse on 2 July 1809, on the
"Lisbon Packet." The Peninsular War was in progress, but life was made
easy for people in Byron's social position, and one would never dream
from his letters that this was the time and place of Goya's Disasters of
War. The travellers passed through Malta, where a Mrs. Spencer Smith
52 On Romanticism
the last statement, incredible as it may seem now, was true when he
wrote. Nobody would turn to poetry for stories nowadays, but in Byron's
Lord Byron 53
day there was a popular demand for verse tales that Byron did not
create, though he did much to expand it. The melancholy misanthropy,
so full of romantic frisson, the pirates and the harems, the exotic
Orientalism, the easy and pleasant versification, swept London as they
were later to sweep the Continent. As a celebrity Byron could hold his
own even in the most absorbing period of the Napoleonic War. The
Corsair sold 10,000 copies on the day of its publication by John Murray,
and ran through seven editions in a month. Byron probably made more
money from his poetry than any other English poet, though being a lord
who derived his income from rents, he often gave his royalties away to
friends. The first money he accepted on his own account was £700 for the
copyright of Lara.
Apart from literature Byron had many other activities, both serious
and scandalous. Before he had left England he had taken the seat in the
House of Lords that his title gave him, and he now became active in
Whig circles. His first speech was made in defence of the "framebreakers,"
or workers who had destroyed some textile machines through fear of
unemployment. He also supported a number of other liberal causes,
including the relief of Catholics in Ireland. When Napoleon was ban-
ished to Elba, Byron wrote an ode on him in which he contrasted him
unfavourably with Washington as a fighter for liberty. (There is an
impressive musical setting of this ode, for orchestra and Sprechgesang
solo, by Arnold Schonberg.)2 But his hatred of the reactionary English
government, especially Lord Castlereagh, was strong enough to give him
a considerable admiration for Napoleon, even to the point of regretting
the outcome of Waterloo: he had hoped, he said, to see Castlereagh's
head on a pole. In fact his attitude to Napoleon always retained a good
deal of self-identification.
Meanwhile Byron was carrying on some highly publicized affairs with
several women of fashion. Lady Caroline Lamb, always something of an
emotional exhibitionist, kept London, which on Byron's social level was
still a small town, buzzing with gossip over her pursuit of Byron, her
visits to him disguised, her tantrums, and her public scenes. Lady Ox-
ford, whose children, in an erudite contemporary joke, were known as
the Harleian Miscellany, was another mistress of his,3 and there were
briefer encounters with others. Despite his crowded schedule, Byron
began seriously to consider marriage, making a trusted confidante of
Lady Melbourne, Caroline Lamb's mother-in-law, to whom he wrote
many frank and unaffected letters. Given Byron's temperament, he could
only marry some kind of femme fatale; and the only really fatal type of
54 On Romanticism
but for all the scepticism he ascribes to Byron, he was unable to convince
him that Christianity was less reasonable than his own brand of Platonism.
In the fall of 1817 Byron went over the Alps and settled in Venice. His
Ode to Venice, Beppo, the opening of the fourth canto of Childe Harold, and
two of his dramas, Marino Faliero and The Two Foscari, are some of the
evidence for the fascination that this dreamlike World's Fair of a city had
for him. At Venice he plunged into an extraordinary sexual debauch, but
he also wrote some of his best poetry, including the fourth canto of Childe
Harold and the beginning of his greatest work, Don Juan. In the spring of
1819 he met Teresa Guiccioli, the wife of an elderly count, who was both
attractive enough to hold Byron and astute enough to keep other women
away from him. Byron moved into the Guiccioli household in Ravenna,
and settled down with Teresa into what by Byronic standards was practi-
cally an old-fashioned marriage. Ravenna saw the composition of
Sardanapalus and Cain, as well as The Vision of Judgment, but his poetic
energies were increasingly absorbed by Don Juan.
At that time the two great centres of Classical civilization, Greece and
Italy, were under foreign occupation: Greece was a Turkish dependency,
and most of northern Italy was controlled by Austria. Byron and Shelley
were passionate supporters of the efforts of Italian and Greek national-
ists to get free of their foreign yokes. Teresa's family, the Gambas, were
also Italian nationalists in sympathy, and hence were, as was Byron,
closely watched and reported on by the Austrian police. The Gambas
were forced to move from Ravenna to Pisa, and Byron followed them. At
Pisa Byron rejoined the Shelleys, and here Shelley, on 8 July 1822, was
drowned at sea and cremated on the shore. The cremation was carried
out by Byron and their friend Edward Trelawny, an extraordinarily
circumstantial liar who had reconstructed his past life along the general
lines of a Byronic hero. Meanwhile Byron had broken with his publisher
John Murray, and had formed an alliance through Shelley with Leigh
Hunt, whom he brought to Pisa. The plan was to found a literary and
left-wing political magazine, and this magazine, called The Liberal, printed
a good deal of Byron's poetry, including The Vision of Judgment, in its four
numbers. Hunt, however, was somewhat irresponsible (he is the original
of Harold Skimpole in Dickens's Bleak House), and his absurd and even
more Dickensian wife and their demonic children helped to keep rela-
tions strained.
Eventually the Gamba-Byron menage was forced to move on to Genoa,
where Byron wrote some unimportant poems and finished what we
56 On Romanticism
II
The main appeal of Byron's poetry is in the fact that it is Byron's. To read
Byron's poetry is to hear all about Byron's marital difficulties, flirtations,
love for Augusta, friendships, travels, and political and social views.
And Byron is a consistently interesting person to hear about, this being
why Byron, even at his worst of self-pity and egotism and blither and
doggerel, is still so incredibly readable. He proves what many critics
declare to be impossible, that a poem can make its primary impact as a
historical and biographical document. The critical problem involved
here is crucial to our understanding of not only Byron but literature as a
whole. Even when Byron's poetry is not objectively very good, it is still
important, because it is Byron's. But who was Byron to be so important?
Certainly not an exceptionally good or wise man. Byron is, strictly,
neither a great poet nor a great man who wrote poetry, but something in
between: a tremendous cultural force that was life and literature at once.
How he came to be this is what we must try to explain as we review the
four chief genres of his work: the lyrics, the tales (including Childe Harold),
the dramas, and the later satires.
Byron's lyrical poetry affords a good exercise in critical catholicity,
because it contains nothing that "modern" critics look for: no texture, no
ambiguities, no intellectualized ironies, no intensity, no vividness of
phrasing, the words and images being vague to the point of abstraction.
The poetry seems to be a plain man's poetry, making poetic emotion out
of the worn and blunted words of ordinary speech. Yet it is not written
Lord Byron 57
(If the reader would like a clue to the caressing rhythm of this stanza, he
should read the iambic metres so as to give the stresses twice the length
of the unstressed syllables. Then the lines will fall into four bars of three-
four time, beginning on the third beat, and the rhythm of a nineteenth-
century waltz will emerge.) We notice that while Byron's amateur
predecessors wrote in a convention and Byron from personal experience,
58 On Romanticism
the central character an inscrutable figure with hollow cheeks and blaz-
ing eyes, wrapped in a cloud of gloom, full of mysterious and undefined
remorse, an outcast from society, a wanderer of the race of Cain. At times
he suggests something demonic rather than human, a Miltonic Satan or
fallen angel. He may be a sinister brigand like the Corsair, or an aloof and
icily polite aristocrat like the Lucifer of The Vision of Judgment, but he is
always haughty and sombre of demeanour; his glance is difficult to meet;
he will not brook questioning, though he himself questions all estab-
lished social standards, and he is associated with lonely and colourful
predatory animals, as ordinary society is with gregarious ones like sheep
and domestic fowl. "The lion is alone, and so am I," says Manfred [canto
3, st. 2]. The name of the Corsair is "Link'd with one virtue, and a
thousand crimes" [canto 3, st. 24]: the virtue is manifested when he
refuses, as a prisoner, to assassinate his captor to escape being impaled.
Fortunately his mistress Gulnare was less scrupulous. As for Lara, who is
the Corsair returned from exile to his estates:
This type of character is now known as the "Byronic hero," and wherever
he has appeared since in literature there has been the influence, direct or
indirect, of Byron. And if we ask how a witty, sociable, extroverted poet
came to create such a character, we can see that it must have arisen as
what psychologists call a projection of his inner self, that inner self that
was so mysterious and inscrutable even to its owner.
It happened that this type of character had already been popularized
in the "Gothic" thrillers or "horrid stories" of Mrs. Radcliffe, M.G. Lewis
(a friend of Byron's, known as "Monk" Lewis from his violent and
sadistic tale The Monk), John Moore, whose Zeluco, a much more serious
work, Byron greatly admired, and lesser writers. The period of their
greatest popularity was the last decade of the eighteenth century, but
they survived through Byron's lifetime. Jane Austen's Northanger Abbey
was written as a parody of them in 1798, but it still had a point when it
was published in 1818. These thrillers were intended for an English
Protestant middle-class reading public: consequently their horrid sur-
roundings were normally Continental, Catholic, and upper-class, though
Oriental settings also had a vogue. Into such settings stalked a character
type, sometimes a villain, sometimes presented in a more sympathetic,
60 On Romanticism
The sails were fill'd, and fair the light winds blew,
As glad to waft him from his native home . . .
And then, it may be, of his wish to roam
Repented he, but in his bosom slept
The silent thought, nor from his lips did come
One word of wail, whilst others sate and wept,
And to the reckless gales unmanly moaning k e p t . . . [canto i, st. 12]
62 On Romanticism
thropic hero, and Byron's heroines, like the heroines of Gothic romance
in general, are insipid prodigies of neurotic devotion.
But if Byron's plays are not practicable stage plays, they are remark-
able works. Manfred, based on what Byron had heard about Goethe's
Faust, depicts the Byronic hero as a student of magic whose knowledge
has carried him beyond the limits of human society and given him
superhuman powers, but who is still held to human desire by his love for
his sister (apparently) Astarte. At the moment of his death the demons he
has controlled, with a sense of what is customary in stories about magi-
cians, come to demand his soul, but Manfred, in a crisp incisive speech
which retains its power to surprise through any number of rereadings,
announces that he has made no bargain with them, that whatever he has
done, they can go to hell, and he will not go with them. The key to this
final scene is the presence of the Abbot. Manfred and the Abbot differ on
all points of theory, but the Abbot is no coward and Manfred is no villain:
they face the crisis together, linked in a common bond of humanity
which enables Manfred to die and to triumph at the same time.
Two of Byron's plays, Cain and Heaven and Earth, are described by
Byron as "mysteries," by which he meant Biblical plays like those of the
Middle Ages. Wherever we turn in Byron's poetry, we meet the figure of
Cain, the first man who never knew Paradise, and whose sexual love was
necessarily incestuous. In Byron's "mystery" Cain is Adam's eldest son
and heir, but what he really inherits is the memory of a greater disposses-
sion. "Dost thou not live?" asks Adam helplessly. "Must I not die?"
retorts Cain [act \, sc. i]. Adam cannot comprehend the mentality of one
who has been born with the consciousness of death. But Lucifer can, for
he too has been disinherited. He comes to Cain and gives him what he
gave Adam: fruit of the tree of knowledge, of a kind that Raphael, in the
eighth book of Paradise Lost, warned Adam against: a knowledge of other
worlds and other beings, a realization that the fortunes of humanity are
of less account in the scheme of things than he had assumed. From such
knowledge develops the resentment that leads to the murder of Abel and
to Cain's exile. And just as Milton tries to show us that we in Adam's
place would have committed Adam's sin, so Byron makes us feel that we
all have something of Cain in us: everybody has killed something that he
wishes he had kept alive, and the fullest of lives is wrapped around the
taint of an inner death. As the princess says in The Castle of Otranto, "This
can be no evil spirit... it is undoubtedly one of the family."15
The other "mystery," Heaven and Earth, deals with the theme of the
64 On Romanticism
Armed with this new technique, Byron was ready to tackle a narrative
satire, and in narrative satire he found not only a means of exploiting all
his best qualities, but of turning his very faults as a poet into virtues. He
could digress to his heart's content, for digression is part of the fun in
satire—one thinks of Tristram Shandy and the "Digression in Praise of
Digressions" in A Tale of a Tub. He could write doggerel, but doggerel in
satire is a sign of wit rather than incompetence. He could be serious if he
liked, for sudden changes of mood belong to the form, and he could
swing back to burlesque again as soon as he was bored with seriousness,
or thought the reader might be. It is particularly the final couplet that he
uses to undercut his own romantic Byronism, as in the description of
Daniel Boone in canto 8:
Ill
Byron has probably had more influence outside England than any other
English poet except Shakespeare. In English literature, though he is
always classified with the Romantic poets, he is Romantic only because
the Byronic hero is a Romantic figure: as we have seen, he has little
technically in common with other English Romantics. But on the Conti-
nent Byron has been the arch-Romantic of modern literature, and Euro-
pean nineteenth-century culture is as unthinkable without Byron as its
history would be without Napoleon. From the painting of Delacroix to
the music of Berlioz, from the poetry of Pushkin to the philosophy of
Nietzsche, the spell of Byron is everywhere. Modern fiction would be
miserably impoverished without the Byronic hero: Balzac, Stendhal,
Dostoevsky, have all used him in crucial roles. In the more advanced
political atmosphere of England, Byron was only a Whig intellectual,
whereas in Greece and Italy he was a revolutionary fighter for freedom, a
poetic Mazzini or Bolivar, though, like them, not a class leveller. As he
said:
has taken place in English literature, too, and nearly all of it is of the
Romantic Byron. Melville (whose Ishmael is in the line of Cain), Conrad,
Hemingway, A.E. Housman, Thomas Wolfe, D.H. Lawrence, W.H.
Auden—these writers have little in common except that they all Byronize.
The most important reason for Byron's great influence is that he was a
portent of a new kind of sensibility. For many centuries poets had as-
sumed a hierarchy of nature with a moral principle built into it. For
Dante, for Shakespeare, for Milton, there was a top level of divine provi-
dence; a level of distinctively human nature which included education,
reason, and law; a level of physical nature, which was morally neutral
and which man could not, like the animals, adjust to; and a bottom level
of sin and corruption. This hierarchy corresponded to the teachings of
religion and science alike. But from Rousseau's time on a profound
change in the cultural framework of the arts takes place. Man is now
thought of as a product of the energy of physical nature, and as this
nature is subhuman in morality and intelligence and capacity for pleas-
ure, the origin of art is morally ambivalent, and may even be demonic.
The Byronic hero, for whom, as for Manfred, pride, lack of sympathy
with humanity, and a destructive influence even in love are inseparable
from genius, dramatizes this new conception of art and life alike more
vividly than anything else in the culture of the time. Hence it is no
exaggeration to say that Byron released a mainspring of creative energy
in modern culture.
Byron's immediate influence in his own country, on the other hand,
though certainly very great, was qualified in many ways, by queasiness
about his morality, by a refusal to separate him from his posing heroes,
by a feeling that he lacked the sterner virtues and wrote with too much
pleasure and too few pains. The first canto of Don Juan centres on the
nervous prudery of Donna Inez, who is, not surprisingly, modelled on
Byron's wife. But Donna Inez was Britannia as well. The sands of the
Regency aristocracy were running out, the tide of middle-class morality
had already set in, and the age that we think of as Victorian, with its
circulating libraries, its custom of reading aloud to large family circles, and
its tendency not to be amused, at any rate by anything approaching the
ribald, was on the way. As Byron admitted ruefully of the opening cantos:
A more important barrier was raised by the lack of any sense of moral
involvement in Don Juan, already mentioned. With the British Empire
developing, and a greater number of poets and intellectuals issuing
stentorian calls to duty, such detachment seemed inadequate, except for
the fact that Byron himself took matters out of Don Juan's hands and
died for a cause in Greece. In Sartor Resartus Carlyle summed up the later
view of Byron as a poet who had gone through a gloomy stage of denial
and defiance, an "Everlasting No," had then moved into a "Centre of
Indifference," but had never gone on to the final "Everlasting Yea." For
this final stage, Carlyle recommended, "Close thy Byron; open thy
Goethe."21
However, Carlyle himself hardly succeeded in closing his Byron, as
when he went on to work out his conception of the Great Man what he
actually produced was a vulgarization of the Byronic hero. The author of
The Corsair would have raised a quizzical eyebrow at Carlyle's hero
journeying forward "escorted by the Terrors and the Splendours, the
Archdemons and Archangels."22 This tendency to underestimate Byron
without surpassing him has recurred more than once. Bernard Shaw, in
the preface to his Don Juan play, Man and Superman, dismissed Byron's
Don Juan as a mere "vagabond libertine."23 Yet Byron had certainly
anticipated Shaw's central idea, that woman takes the lead in sexual
relations and that Don Juan is consequently as much a victim as a
pursuer. No, Byron will not stay closed. It is a better idea to open Goethe,
and when we do we find a more liberal view of Byron. Goethe in fact was
fascinated by Byron, who dedicated Sardanapalus to him, and he referred
to him in the second part of Faust as Euphorion, a kind of Eros-figure
whose passion for liberty, if self-destructive, is also an acceptance of life
simply because it is there, and has nothing of the compulsion to justify
existence that is often close to a distrust of its worth.
We have not yet shaken off our nineteenth-century inhibitions about
Byron. A frequent twentieth-century jargon term for him is "immature,"
which endorses the Carlyle view that Byron is a poet to be outgrown.
One thinks of Yeats's penetrating remark that we are never satisfied with
the maturity of those whom we have admired in boyhood.24 Even those
who have not admired Byron in boyhood have gone through a good deal
of Byronism at that stage. There is certainly something youthful about
the Byronic hero, and for some reason we feel more defensive about
youth than about childhood, and more shamefaced about liking a poet
who has captured a youthful imagination. If we replace "youthful" with
Lord Byron 71
the loaded term "adolescent" we can see how deeply ingrained this
feeling is.
Among intellectuals the Southey type, who makes a few liberal ges-
tures in youth to quiet his conscience and then plunges into a rapturous
authoritarianism for the rest of his life, is much more common than the
Byron type, who continues to be baffled by unanswered questions and
simple anomalies, to make irresponsible jokes, to set his face against
society, to respect the authority of his own mood—in short, to retain the
rebellious or irreverent qualities of youth. Perhaps it is as dangerous to
eliminate the adolescent in us as it is to eliminate the child. In any case
the kind of poetic experience that Byronism represents should be ob-
tained young, and in Byron. It may later be absorbed into more complex
experiences, but to miss or renounce it is to impoverish whatever else we
may attain.
8
Foreword to Romanticism Reconsidered
1963
This book consists of four papers read at the English Institute in Septem-
ber, 1962, under my chairmanship. The four contributions are entirely
independent of one another, and whatever similarity there may be, such
as the fact that the first three papers all quote the same passage from
Wordsworth, is pure accident. Consequently the resemblances among
them, and the unity which they present, are all the more significant.
The anti-Romantic movement in criticism, which in Britain and America
followed the Hulme-Eliot-Pound broadsides of the early 19205, is now
over and done with/ and criticism has got its sense of literary tradition
properly in focus again. That this movement should ever have had so
much authority is an impressive negative tribute to the coherence of
critical theory in our time. There are a few references to the movement in
my own paper, which is intended to serve as a general introduction both
to the topic and to the three papers that follow. But it was not the
influence of this movement which was the main reason for holding a
session on the subject of "Romanticism Reconsidered" at this date. The
main reason was to examine the degree of real content which the term
"Romanticism" has. It is a datum of literary experience that when we
cross the divide of 1798 we find ourselves in a different kind of poetic
Foreword to Romanticism Reconsidered 73
world, darker in colour, so to speak, than what has preceded it. Our
initial attempts to define the difference may be very vague: "more emo-
tional," "more sense of nature," and the like. At this stage, as Mr. Wellek
remarks, an "extreme nominalism" like that of Lovejoy,2 in demonstrat-
ing that there is no conceptual unity to the term "Romanticism" at all,
seems unanswerable. But the feeling of difference remains, and critical
theory has not done its job until it accounts for the feeling.
Mr. Abrams's paper singles out one difference so concrete and well
documented that it is unanswerable evidence for the other side. The
Romantic movement found itself in a revolutionary age, of which the
French Revolution was the central symbol. The impact of this event is
testified to on all sides, and (as Mr. Abrams remarked in the discussion
afterwards) it is always a sound critical method to assume that serious
poets mean what they seriously say. The fact of revolution was linked in
many poetic minds with the imminence of apocalypse—the association
of ideas that Mr. Abrams quotes from Coleridge as: "The French Revolu-
tion. Millennium. Universal Redemption. Conclusion" [48].3 But the apoca-
lyptic word did not remain revolutionary flesh for very long: anticlimax
and disillusionment quickly followed. Mr. Abrams connects the frequent
later Romantic theme of the plunging of hope into despair with this
disillusionment, and shows that, as the only place in which hope springs
eternal can be the human mind, the theme of revolution fulfilling itself in
apocalypse had to be transferred from the social to the mental world. The
only part of the mind to which such conceptions as revolution and
apocalypse belong is the creative imagination; hence Wordsworth's real
revolution was a literary one, a "levelling" revolution in diction, and in
the location of archetypes in common rather than heroic life. Such a feat
was not a neurotic subjective substitute for revolution, but the articulat-
ing of a new kind of imaginative power—and also, of course, the bring-
ing into literature of that new movement which we know as Romanticism.
The pattern of an outburst of enthusiasm followed by disillusionment
is picked up again, and greatly extended, in Mr. Trilling's essay. Here the
attitude of Wordsworth and Keats toward pleasure is seen as an element
in the new consciousness of the central importance of the arts and of
what they can yet do for man. The sense of the goodness of pleasure,
even of a frankly luxurious kind, is part of the exuberance of individual-
ity which is present in both poets. But the same thing happens to Roman-
ticism that happens to Satan in Paradise Lost: the separation of
consciousness from what supports it is exhilarating at first, and then
restrictive. The individual becomes the ego, and the ego turns to a kind of
74 On Romanticism
problem was more complex, and Milton's heaven and hell are outside
the cosmos, in a kind of absolute up and down. After Milton comes
Newton, and after Newton ups and downs become hopelessly confused.
What I see first of all in Romanticism is the effect of a profound change,
not primarily in belief, but in the spatial projection of reality. This in turn
leads to a different localizing of the various levels of that reality. Such a
change in the localizing of images is bound to be accompanied by, or
even cause, changes in belief and attitude, and changes of this latter sort
are exhibited by the Romantic poets. But the change itself is not in belief
or attitude, and may be found in, or at least affecting, poets of a great
variety of beliefs.
In the earlier framework, the disorder of sin, death, and corruption
was restricted to the sublunary world of four elements. Above the moon
was all that was left of nature as God had originally planned it before the
fall. The planets, with their angel-guided spheres, are images of a di-
vinely sanctioned order of nature which is also the true home of man.
Hence there was no poetic incongruity in Dante's locating his Paradise in
the planetary spheres, nor in Milton's associating the music of the spheres
with the song of the angels in the Nativity Ode, nor in using the same
word "heaven" for both the kingdom of God and the sky. A post-
Newtonian poet has to think of gravitation and the solar system. New-
ton, Miss Nicolson has reminded us, demanded the muse,6 but the
appropriate muse was Urania, and Urania had already been requested
by Milton to descend to a safer position on earth for the second half of
Paradise Lost.
Let us turn to Blake's poem Europe, engraved in 1794. Europe surveys
the history of the Western world from the birth of Christ to the beginning
of the French Revolution, and in its opening lines parodies the Nativity
Ode. For Blake all the deities associated with the planets and the starry
skies, of whom the chief is Enitharmon, the Queen of Heaven, are projec-
tions of a human will to tyranny, rationalized as eternal necessity and
order. Christianity, according to this poem, had not abolished but con-
firmed the natural religion in the Classical culture which had deified the
star-gods. The doom of tyranny is sealed by the French Revolution, and
the angel who blows the last trumpet as the sign of the final awakening
of liberty is Isaac Newton. The frontispiece of Europe is the famous vision
of the sky-god Urizen generally called the Ancient of Days, holding a
compass in his left hand, and this picture is closely related to Blake's
The Drunken Boat 79
Quincey seem vehicular in the same sense. It is curious that there seems
to be so little mythopoeic theory in Romantic poets, considering that the
more expendable critics of the time complained as much about the
obscurity of myth as their counterparts of today do now.
One striking feature of the Romantic poets is their resistance to frag-
mentation: their compulsion, almost, to express themselves in long con-
tinuous poems is quite as remarkable as their lyrical gifts. I have remarked
elsewhere that the romance, in its most naive and primitive form, is an
endless sequence of adventures, terminated only by the author's death or
disgust [AC, 186]. In Romanticism something of this inherently endless
romance form recurs. Childe Harold and Don Juan are Byron to such an
extent that the poems about them can be finished only by Byron's death
or boredom with the persona. The Prelude, and still more the gigantic
scheme of which it formed part, has a similar relation to Wordsworth,
and something parallel is beginning to show its head at once in Keats's
Sleep and Poetry and Shelley's Queen Mob. We touch here on the problem
of the Romantic unfinished poem, which has been studied by Professor
Bostetter.21 My present interest, however, is rather in the feature of
unlimited continuity, which seems to be connected with the sense of
vehicular energy, of being carried along by a greater force, the quality
which outside literature, according to Keats, makes a man's life a con-
tinual allegory.22
We have found, then, that the metaphorical structure of Romantic
poetry tends to move inside and downward instead of outside and
upward; hence the creative world is deep within, and so is heaven or the
place of the presence of God. Blake's Ore and Shelley's Prometheus are
Titans imprisoned underneath experience; the Gardens of Adonis are
down in Endymion, whereas they are up in The Faerie Queene and Comus;
in Prometheus Unbound everything that aids mankind comes from below,
associated with volcanoes and fountains. In The Revolt of Islam there is a
curious collision with an older habit of metaphor when Shelley speaks of
The Kubla Khan geography of caves and underground streams haunts all
Shelley's language about creative processes: in Speculations on Metaphys-
ics, for instance, he says: "But thought can with difficulty visit the intri-
cate and winding chambers which it inhabits. It is like a river whose
86 On Romanticism
rapid and perpetual stream flows outwards.... The caverns of the mind
are obscure, and shadowy; or pervaded with a lustre, beautifully bright
indeed, but shining not beyond their portals."23
In pre-Romantic poetry heaven is the order of grace, and grace is
normally thought of as descending from above into the soul. In the
Romantic construct there is a centre where inward and outward manifes-
tations of a common motion and spirit are unified, where the ego is
identified as itself because it is also identified with something which is
not itself. In Blake this world at the deep centre is Jerusalem, the City of
God that mankind, or Albion, has sought all through history without
success because he has been looking in the wrong direction, outside.24
Jerusalem is also the Garden of Eden where the Holy Word walked
among the ancient trees; Eden in the unfallen world would be the same
place as England's green and pleasant land where Christ also walked;
and England's green and pleasant land is also Atlantis, the sunken island
kingdom which we can rediscover by draining the "Sea of Time and
Space"25 off the top of the mind. In Prometheus Unbound Atlantis reap-
pears when Prometheus is liberated, and the one great flash of vision
which is all that is left to us of Wordsworth's Recluse uses the same
imagery:
In The Pilgrim's Progress, Ignorance is sent to hell from the very gates of
heaven. The inference seems to be that only Ignorance knows the precise
location of both kingdoms. For knowledge, and still more for imagina-
tion, the journey within to the happy island garden or the city of light is a
perilous quest, equally likely to terminate in the blasted ruin of Byron's
Darkness. In many Romantic poems, including Keats's nightingale ode, it
is suggested that the final identification of and with reality may be or at
least include death. The suggestion that death may lead to the highest
knowledge, dropped by Lucifer in Byron's Cain, haunts Shelley continu-
ally. A famous passage in Prometheus Unbound associates the worlds of
creation and death in some inner area, where Zoroaster meets his image
in a garden [11. 191-202]. Just as the sun is the means but not a tolerable
object of sight, so the attempt to turn around and see the source of one's
vision may be destructive, as the Lady of Shalott found when she turned
away from trie mirror. Thus the world of the deep interior in Romantic
poetry is morally ambivalent, retaining some of the demonic qualities
that the corresponding pre-Romantic lowest level had.
This sense that the source of genius is beyond good and evil, that the
possession of genius may be a curse, that the only real knowledge given
to Adam in Paradise, however disastrous, came to him from the devil—
all this is part of the contribution of Byron to modern sensibility, and part
of the irrevocable change that he made in it. Of his Lara Byron says:
the naked nature red in tooth and claw29 which haunted a later genera-
tion. Even the episode of the dog and the hedgehog in the Prelude is told
from the point of view of the dog. But the more pessimistic, and perhaps
more realistic, conception of nature in which it can be a source of evil or
suffering as well as good is the one that gains ascendancy in the later
period of Romanticism, which extends to our own day.
The major constructs which our own culture has inherited from its
Romantic ancestry are also of the "drunken boat" shape, but represent a
later and a different conception of it from the "vehicular form" described
above. Here the boat is usually in the position of Noah's ark, a fragile
container of sensitive and imaginative values threatened by a chaotic
and unconscious power below it. In Schopenhauer, the world as idea
rides precariously on top of a "world as will" which engulfs practically
the whole of existence in its moral indifference. In Darwin, who readily
combines with Schopenhauer, as the later work of Hardy illustrates,
consciousness and morality are accidental sports from a ruthlessly com-
petitive evolutionary force. In Freud, who has noted the resemblance of
his mythical structure to Schopenhauer's, the conscious ego struggles to
keep afloat on a sea of libidinous impulse. In Kierkegaard, all the "higher"
impulses of fallen man pitch and roll on the surface of a huge and
shapeless "dread." In some versions of this construct the antithesis of the
symbol of consciousness and the destructive element in which it is im-
mersed can be overcome or transcended: there is an Atlantis under the
sea which becomes an Ararat for the beleaguered boat to rest on.30
I give an example from Auden, partly to show that the Romantic
structures of symbolism are still ours. In Freud, when the conscious mind
feels threatened by the subconscious, it tries to repress it, and so devel-
ops a neurosis. In Marxism, the liberal elements in an ascendant class,
when they feel threatened by a revolutionary situation, develop a police
state. In both cases the effort is to intensify the antithesis between the
two, but this effort is mistaken, and when the barriers are broken down
we reach the balanced mind and the classless society respectively. For the
Time Being develops a religious construct out of Kierkegaard on the
analogy of those of Marx and Freud. The liberal or rational elements
represented by Herod feel threatened by the revival of superstition in the
Incarnation, and try to repress it. Their failure means that the effort to
come to terms with a nature outside the mind, the primary effort of
reason, has to be abandoned, and this enables the paradise or divine
presence which is locked up inside the human mind to manifest itself
9O On Romanticism
after the reason has searched the whole of objective nature in vain to find
it. The attitude is that of a relatively orthodox Christianity; the imagery
and the structure of symbolism is that of Prometheus Unbound and The
Marriage of Heaven and Hell.
In Romanticism proper a prominent place in sense experience is given
to the ear, an excellent receiver of oracles but poor in locating things
accurately in space. This latter power, which is primarily visual, is asso-
ciated with the fancy in Wordsworth's 1815 preface, and given the subor-
dinate position appropriate to fancy. In later poetry, beginning with
symbolisme in France, when there is a good deal of reaction against earlier
Romanticism, more emphasis is thrown on vision. In Rimbaud, though
his Bateau ivre has given me my title, the poet is to se faire voyant,^ the
illuminations are thought of pictorially; even the vowels must be visually
coloured. Such an emphasis has nothing to do with the pre-Romantic
sense of an objective structure in nature: on the contrary, the purpose of it
is to intensify the Romantic sense of oracular significance into a kind of
autohypnosis. The association of autohypnosis and the visual sense is
discussed in Marshall McLuhan's book, The Gutenberg Galaxy?2 Such an
emphasis leads to a technique of fragmentation. Foe's attack on the long
poem is not a Romantic but an anti-Romantic manifesto, as the direction
of its influence indicates. The tradition of symbolisme is present in imagism,
where the primacy of visual values is so strongly stated in theory and so
cheerfully ignored in practice, in Pound's emphasis on the spatial juxta-
posing of metaphor, in Eliot's insistence on the superiority of poets who
present the "clear visual images" of Dante.33 T.E. Hulme's attack on the
Romantic tradition is consistent in preferring fancy to imagination and in
stressing the objectivity of the nature to be imitated; less so in his primi-
tivism and his use of Bergson.34 The technique of fragmentation is per-
haps intended to reach its limit in Pound's publication of the complete
poetical works of Hulme on a single page.35
As I have tried to indicate by my reference to Auden, what this anti-
Romantic movement did not do was to create a third framework of
imagery. Nor did it return to the older construct, though Eliot, by stick-
ing closely to Dante and by deprecating the importance of the prophetic
element in art, gives some illusion of doing so. The charge of subjectivity,
brought against the Romantics by Arnold36 and often repeated later,
assumes that objectivity is a higher attribute of poetry, but this is itself a
Romantic conception, and came into English criticism with Coleridge.
Anti-Romanticism, in short, had no resources for becoming anything
The Drunken Boat 91
Preface
The essays on the three poems have grown out of a series of public
lectures delivered to the Graduate School of Western Reserve University
in May 1966. I am much indebted to my hosts there for stimulating
discussions and criticisms. I am also indebted to the Canada Council for
a grant which enabled me to work on this and other projects.
N.F.
Toronto, 1967
phorical nature of the god who is both a person and a class of natural
objects makes myth, rather than folk tale or legend, the direct ancestor of
literature. It also gives to myth, in primitive cultures, a particular impor-
tance in establishing a society's views of its own origin, including the
reasons for its divisions into different classes or groups, its legal sanc-
tions, and its prescribed rituals. The canonical significance which distin-
guishes the myth from less important fictions also causes myths to form
large unified structures, or mythologies, which tend to become encyclo-
pedic in extent, covering all aspects of a society's vision of its situation
and destiny. As civilization develops, mythology divides into two main
aspects. Its patterns of stories and images, attracting and absorbing those
of legend and folk tale, become the fictions and metaphors of literature.
At the same time, there are also germs of conceptual ideas in myths
which extend into theology, philosophy, political theory, and, in earlier
ages, science, and become informing principles there as well.
There are thus two structures in a culture which descend from mythol-
ogy: one is literature, which inherits the fictional and metaphorical pat-
terns of mythology, and the other is a body of integrating or cohering
ideas, also mainly fictional, in religion, philosophy, and kindred disci-
plines. At any given period of literature the conventions of literature are
enclosed within a total mythological structure, which may not be explic-
itly known to anyone, but is nevertheless present as a shaping principle.
In every age, the most ambitious literary structures, such as the works of
Dante, Milton, Victor Hugo, or Joyce, tend to become cosmological, and
hence nearest to suggesting what the total structure is like. Such
cosmological works have conceptual forms analogous to and roughly
contemporary with them: thus Dante's Commedia has a conceptual anal-
ogy in the summa form of St. Thomas. In Western Europe an encyclopedic
myth, derived mainly from the Bible, dominated both the literary and
the philosophical traditions for centuries. I see Romanticism as the begin-
ning of the first major change in this pattern of mythology, and as fully
comprehensible only when seen as such.
The starting point of most mythologies is a creation myth, the story of
how things came to be. This myth has normally two parts, a cosmological
myth of the origin of the world, and a proto-historical myth of the origin
of man. It is probable that the earliest creation myths were sexual and
cyclical in shape, assuming that man and the world simply came into
existence in the same way that babies are born and seeds grow in spring.
The etymology of the Latin natura and the Greek physis connects them
The Romantic Myth 95
with ideas of growing and being born. Such myths tend to become
mother-centred myths, where nature is an earth-goddess renewing her
vitality (in more sophisticated versions her virginity) every spring. If the
role of the male in conception is understood, the earth-goddess may be
thought of as impregnated by sun or wind or rain, or she may be at-
tended by a subordinate male figure who is successively her son, her
lover, and eventually her sacrificial victim. The mother-goddess seems to
be morally a most ambiguous figure, who, depending on her phase, may
be anything from the blushing bride of the Song of Songs to the ferocious
Cybele of Catullus's Attis Ode.
We can only guess about these ancient myths from their vestiges in
historical times. The mother-centred myth has always been attractive to
poets, and the creation stories of Ovid and Lucretius owe a great deal to
it. But the more aggressive myths of Judaism, Christianity, and Plato's
Timaeus reflect an urban, tool-using, male-dominated society, where the
central figure usually develops out of a father-god associated with the
sky. Poets, said Horace, are born and not made: Bernard Shaw remarks
that that is a rather silly thing to say, in view of the fact that everybody is
born and not made.1 But not according to the most influential of the
mythological structures which have controlled our thinking from the
dawn of history to the middle of the eighteenth century. This mythology
said that the world was made, as an artefact or creature, by a divine
artisan or demiurge; and that whatever may be true of men and women
now, the first man and the first woman were also made, as watches and
tables and pictures are made. The alternation of chicken and egg has to
stop somewhere, and Christianity, along with most other religions and
philosophies, stopped it firmly with the chicken.
In the centuries preceding Romanticism, especially during the Middle
Ages, the mythology that begins with this artificial creation myth reached
its highest point of development. According to it, man and nature were
both creatures of God: there are no gods in nature, and what man should
look at nature for is the evidence for the intelligent design in its creation
that it presents. This attitude naturally gave central prominence to the
subject-object relationship, and stressed the rational in contrast to the
empirical attitude to nature. The subject-object relation is most marked,
and the sense of design clearest, in the study of the stars. The movements
of the stars were, so to speak, the diagram of the universe as a created
order, and astronomy was the one science that a learned medieval poet,
such as Dante or Chaucer, would naturally be assumed to know. Dante's
96 A Study of English Romanticism
In its fully developed form this myth was, down to the seventeenth
century, comprehensive enough to unite the theologian and the philoso-
pher with the poet and the scientist. The poet, on the whole, accepted an
attitude to the world which put faith and reason above the response to
poetry, but the scientist was in a more difficult position. The attitude to
nature as an objective system is congenial enough to the scientist, for
whom nature is always the world out there, to be studied by the rational
consciousness. At the same time, the scientist was working within a
mythological construct which had been founded on identity and anal-
ogy, on correspondences and simple symmetries. His sciences, in short,
were full of myths, in which astronomy and chemistry had not yet been
completely separated from astrology and alchemy. To the scientist, myth
is simply illusion: or perhaps one should say that science creates its own
mythology. Sooner or later, as science developed, it was bound to break
loose from the mythological construct. And in proportion as it took on its
own form, it forced poets to look for another construct, and, in doing so,
to realize that all myths are poetic in origin.
For example: we said that for the sense of nature as created order the
primary images were those of the heavenly bodies, all that is now left of
nature as God had originally designed it. But from the point of view of
science, such imagery rested on illusion, the illusion of a geocentric
universe, of planets revolving in symmetrical spheres, probably guided
by angels, of mysterious correspondences of the seven planets with the
seven metals and seven aspects of human temperament. When the new
science of Copernicus and Galileo began to make its impact, this illusion
became more and more of a historical relic. Newton spiced his scientific
and mathematical findings with philosophical and religious speculations
which aroused great enthusiasm at the time. But the enthusiasm was
temporary and the poetry it inspired mediocre.4 The old feeling of heaven,
in the sense of the sky, as an image of heaven in the sense of the place of
the presence of God, was undeniably going, and could never return in
quite the same form. The more man learned about the heavenly bodies,
the less emotionally convinced he could be that they were different in
kind from the sublunary nature he was more familiar with. They were
not made out of quintessence, but out of the same elements as the lower
world; they did not move in perfect circles or symbolize an immortal
purity from corruption. The sky seemed just as indifferent to human
concerns, just as permeated with mindless law, as the least conscious
The Romantic Myth 99
part of the earth. An apocalyptic vision of a day when the sun would be
turned into darkness and the moon into blood had to give place to a
science which turned the sun into a blast furnace and the moon into a
stone. The crystal spheres of Milton's Nativity Ode, making up full con-
sort with the angelic symphony, eventually become Thomas Hardy's
Much more is involved here than merely the loss of a traditional poetic
metaphor. Poets are dependent on images, and the image of the order
and harmony of the "up there" was the guarantee of the order and
harmony of the "out there," the sense of nature as a structure or system, a
vertical chain of being, looked at by the rational and conscious subject.
Once the heavenly bodies come to be seen as a dead and mechanical part
of creation, the highest aspect of nature that man can perceive becomes
the living part of it, the world of organisms, of animals and plants, and of
man so far as man is an organic and vital being. One's relationship to the
rest of life then becomes a participating relationship, an identity of process
rather than a separation of subjective and objective creatures or products.
When we start reading Wordsworth and Coleridge we are struck with
the way in which the old subject-object relationship has been demoted.
The reason founded on a separation of consciousness from nature is
becoming an inferior faculty of the consciousness, more analytic and less
constructive, the outside of the mind dealing with the outside of nature;
determined by its field of operation, not free; descriptive, not creative.
The artist, the Aristotelian tradition had said, imitates nature: this means,
according to Coleridge, not that he studies the natura naturata, the world
out there, like the scientist, but that he "imitates" the natura naturans or
living process of nature by seeking a union of himself, as a living and
creating being, with nature as process or genesis.6 Here physical nature
becomes symbolically related to human nature; as Beddoes says:
Of all the great English Romantic poets, William Blake was the one
who grasped the implications of this change in mythology most com-
pletely. For Blake, the God who created the natural order is a projected
God, an idol constructed out of the sky and reflecting its mindless mecha-
nism. Such a God is a figment of man's alienation, for the tyranny of an
absurd and meaningless nature suggests and guarantees the tyranny of
exploiting ruling classes. Thus the projected sky-god is really Satan, the
accuser of man and the prince of the power of the air. The true God is
Jesus, who is identified with struggling and suffering humanity. In Eu-
rope (1794) Blake shows how the tyranny of the Roman Empire, backed
by the mysterious hierarchy of star-gods, was threatened by the Incarna-
tion, how eighteen centuries of institutional Christianity had managed to
contain the threat, and how, after Newton had blown the last trumpet for
its mythology, revolution had begun again in "the vineyards of red
France."8
Similarly Shelley argues for the "necessity of atheism,"9 and urges in
his notes to Queen Mob that "All that miserable tale of the Devil, and Eve,
and an Intercessor, with the childish mummeries of the God of the Jews,
is irreconcilable with the knowledge of the stars."10 Whatever one thinks
of this argument, Shelley is right in maintaining that the miserable tale is
not an integral part of the modern science of astronomy, as it is, for
example, of the astronomical speculations of Dante's Convivio. At the
same time "the hypothesis of a pervading Spirit co-eternal with the
universe"11 remains unaltered for Shelley. That is, God, if he exists at all,
can exist only as existence, as an aspect of our own identity, and not as a
hypothesis attached to the natural order. In Prometheus Unbound Jupiter
is a projected sky-god of the same type as the sky-gods in Blake, Urizen,
Nobodaddy, and Satan. In Byron's Vision of Judgment and the Prologue to
Goethe's Faust the traditional conception of God as a miraculous juggler
of planets is only a subject for parody.
We are now in a position to see that one central element of this new
mythological construction is a recovery of projection. In the older myth,
God was ultimately the only active agent. God had not only created the
world and man: he had also created the forms of human civilization. The
traditional images of civilization are the city and the garden: the models
of both were established by God before Adam was created. Law, moral
principles, and, of course, the myth itself were not invented by man, but
were part of God's revelation to him. Gradually at first, in such relatively
isolated thinkers as Vico, then more confidently, the conviction grows
The Romantic Myth 101
that a great deal of all this creative activity ascribed to God is projected
from man, that man has created the forms of his civilization, including
his laws and his myths, and that consequently they exhibit human im-
perfections and are subject to human criticism. For Hooker in Eliza-
bethan times, law had its origin in the divine mind: the perfection of
natural law was a part of it, and obedience to laws of church and state
followed deductively from certain mythical premises like "natural right."
In the Romantic period an iconoclastic development of legal reform took
place (although very little of it was carried out by people that we think of
as Romantics), and the assumption of this reform was that such mythical
premises were mostly rationalizations of class privilege. Again, liberty,
for Shelley, is what man wants and what the gods he invents out of
cowardice and superstition oppose his getting. But in the pre-Romantic
period,12 even for the revolutionary Milton, liberty is what God wants for
man, and not anything that man naturally wants for himself.
Romanticism, thus considered, is the first major phase in an imagina-
tive revolution which has carried on until our own day, and has by no
means completed itself yet. (It may look from my account as though it
would be complete when everything formerly ascribed to God has been
transferred to man or nature, but that would in my opinion be far too
simple a solution.) This means that everything that has followed Roman-
ticism, including the anti-Romantic movements in France and England
of fifty to sixty years ago, is best understood as post-Romantic. Many
aspects of Romanticism become much more clearly understood if we
look forward to what later writers did with them. In particular, I find that
the major works of loyce, Eliot, Proust, Yeats, and D.H. Lawrence pro-
vide essential clues to the nature of literary trends and themes that began
with the Romantics. Then again, many Romantic writers, both philo-
sophical and literary, were deeply interested in contemporary science,
and made heroic efforts to unify the humanistic and scientific perspec-
tives, usually on some basis of a philosophy of organism. In English
literature, the social sciences13 had as much if not more prestige than the
physical sciences, De Quincey's enthusiasm for Ricardo being as typical
in its way as Goethe's interest in colour perception and comparative
anatomy.14 But with the hindsight of another century and a half, one
century of which has been after Darwin, we can see that the scientific
vision of nature was inexorably splitting away from the poetic and
existential vision of Romantic mythology. Every generation since then
has produced a cosmology attempting to unite the two again (Teilhard
1O2 A Study of English Romanticism
nature, hence his identity was primarily a social one, and the symbol of
that social identity was, as said above, the city. In his evolution as a child
of God, the city of God came first, then the garden of man. as its suburb.
Milton thinks of man's original nature in Eden as simple and pastoral but
nevertheless civilized; Adam, for Milton, does not become the archetypal
noble savage until after his fall. Rousseau had suggested that perhaps the
anomalies and injustices of civilization were so great as to make one
doubt whether this city-garden order is the right one or not. Perhaps man
should seek an identity with nature first, not nature in its humanized
form of a garden or park but simply nature as physical environment.
After that, the genuine form of human society may have a chance to
emerge. The sense of antagonism to the city, as a kind of cancerous
growth destroying the relation of man and nature, which later comes out
so strongly in Baudelaire's fourmillante cite, Eliot's "unreal city," and
Verhaeren's villes tentaculaires,16 is already emerging in the London scenes
of Wordsworth's Prelude. By contrast, it is rude or uncultivated nature,
nature "unspoiled" by man and not transformed into a narcissistic image
of himself, that comes to be thought of as complementing human nature
and completing its being.
In Wordsworth also man first finds his identity in his relation to
physical nature, in its rude or uncultivated form. In the older myth there
were two levels of nature: an upper level of human nature, represented
by the Garden of Eden and the Golden Age, which God had originally
intended for man, and a lower level of physical nature, permeated by
death, corruption, and, for man at least, sin, which man fell into. Accord-
ing to this construct, man is in the physical world but not of it, and only
an elaborate social training, comprising education, law, morality, and
religion, can help to raise him toward his proper level. In Wordsworth
the existing social and educational structure is artificial, full of inert
custom and hypocrisy. Nature is a better teacher than books, and one
finds one's lost identity with nature in moments of feeling in which one is
penetrated by the sense of nature's "huge and mighty forms."17 Thus
already in Wordsworth it is the "pagan" or latent numinous powers in
nature that man turns to. Wordsworth shook his head over the Hymn to
Pan in the first book of Keats's Endymion and called it "a very pretty
piece of paganism."18 But Wordsworth had done much, was probably
the decisive influence, in making the Hymn to Pan possible, and Keats in
his turn helped to create a new sensibility that ultimately led to the
rebirth of Eros and Dionysus in Yeats and D.H. Lawrence.
The Romantic Myth 105
who is both destroyer and preserver, in the phrase of Shelley's Ode to the
West Wind [1. 14], which adopts the traditional Christian image of the
Holy Spirit, the wind, but transfers it to nature. The interaction of benefi-
cence and savagery in nature is so obvious that no poet can altogether
avoid the fact that nature is a moral riddle, and that the more directly it is
contemplated, the less easy it is to believe in it as something essentially
related to the moral structure of human life. Wordsworth's assertion that
the "external world is fitted to the mind"31 carries less conviction (except
for science, which is not what Wordsworth is talking about) than
Baudelaire's suggestion of a teasing, unpredictable, and ambivalent rela-
tion. But even so, such pre-Romantic symbolism as that of Spenser's
allegory of the Castle of Alma or Bunyan's Holy War, which depicts the
temperate or virtuous soul as a fortress beleaguered by an external
environment and resisting it on all fronts, gives place to the feeling that
the soul has much to learn from parleying with its traditional enemies.
The paradoxical relation of civilized and rude nature, a relation partly
antithetical and partly complementary, is often expressed in Romantic
fiction and drama by some variant of the struggle-of-brothers theme.
This has several Biblical archetypes—Cain and Abel, Esau and Jacob,
Ishmael and Isaac—which become important in its development. In the
conventional interpretation of the Bible the figures of the social establish-
ment, Isaac and Jacob, are the accepted ones; with Romanticism, there
comes a transfer of sympathy to their exiled brethren. The so-called
Byronic hero is often a Romantic version of the natural man, who, like
Esau or Ishmael, is an outcast, a solitary much given to communing with
untamed nature, and who thus represents the potentially expanding and
liberating elements in that nature. He has great energy, often great pow-
ers of leadership, and even his vices are dignified enough to have some
aesthetic attraction. He is often aristocratic in birth or behaviour, with a
sense that, like Esau, he is the dispossessed rightful heir—here the theme
combines with the sense of nostalgia for a vanished aristocracy. When he
is evil, there is often the feeling that, as with Byron's Cain, his evil is
comprehensible, that he is not wholly evil any more than society is
wholly good, and that even his evil is a force that society has to reckon
with. The greatest of all his incarnations in English literature, Emily
Bronte's Heathcliff, has in full the sense of a natural man who eludes all
moral categories just as nature itself does, and who cannot be simply
condemned or accepted. In contrast, the Jacob-figure, the defender of the
establishment, often seems unheroic and spoiled by a soft or decadent
The Romantic Myth 113
In the Vision of Judgment Lucifer is an icily polite aristocrat: his rival does
not appear, but while the prince of darkness is a gentleman, St. Peter is
not quite a gentleman, and his chief is clearly operating a somewhat
square and bourgeois establishment, one that finds George III easier to
absorb than Wilkes.
In the older structure, human nature was almost invariably thought of
as above physical nature, in imagery as in value. Eden is usually on a
mountain-top, and the structure of civilization and social discipline raises
man above the level of physical nature, in imagery as in conceptual
metaphor. In Wordsworth physical nature has inherited a good deal of
the older conception of the lost state of innocence, hence it is easier to
think of it as above the state of experience. Wordsworth's Ode on Intima-
tions of Immortality follows the same general pattern as the poems by
Vaughan and Traherne in the seventeenth century, in which the infant
soul descends to a lower world. This spatial schema recurs later in
Nietzsche's Zarathustra, in Strindberg's Great Highway, in Ibsen's When
We Dead Awaken, where the mountain-top carries similar associations of
an escape from the limitations of ordinary experience. But for a more
conservatively pessimistic Romantic, such as Schopenhauer, it is easier
to think of the structure of civilization, or the state of experience, as on
top of a subhuman and submoral "world as will," an ark or bateau ivre
carrying the cargo of human values and tossing on a stormy and threat-
ening sea. This figure becomes the prevailing one later in the nineteenth
century, both for the revolutionary optimists, with Marx at their head,
who see the traditional privileges of a ruling class threatened with de-
struction from below, and for more sombre thinkers—Schopenhauer
himself, Freud, Kierkegaard—all of whom think of the values of intelli-
ii4 A Study of English Romanticism
the depth
And labyrinthine home of the still soul,
Where the seen thing is imaged, and the whisper
loints the expecting spirit. [3.3.76-80]
prince or patron in whose court or hall the poet recites his poems or
performs his dramas. In this setting the hero becomes a legendary figure
from an earlier age, and predominantly a tragic figure as well, like the
heroes of Ossian who went forth to battle, but always fell. This is as true
of Beowulf as it is of Achilles, and it is still true of King Lear and Hamlet.
In Shakespeare the balancing social figure, Queen Elizabeth or King
James, remains offstage, or is symbolized in such figures of comedy as
Duke Theseus in the last act of A Midsummer Night's Dream.
The Romantics take the next step. In their age the patron is beginning
to disappear, and the poet is becoming immersed in society as a whole.
But though he loses his traditional specific social functions (unless he
preserves them by accident, like Goethe in Weimar), he gains a more
important function, at least in his own eyes. He sees society as held
together by its creative power, incarnate in himself, rather than by its
leaders of action. Thus he himself steps into the role of the hero, not as
personally heroic but simply as the focus of society. For him, therefore,
the real event is no longer even the universal or typical historical event,
but the psychological or mental event, the event in his own conscious-
ness of which the historical event is the outward sign or allegory. This
involves a rejection of history, which becomes a "gilded cheat" in Keats,33
a "devil's scripture" in Byron,34 and the literal Word of God (with over-
tones of St. Paul's observation that the letter kills) in Blake, as the main
source of poetic fictions.
It may seem very strange to describe Romanticism as antihistorical,
when we think of how central historical novels and narrative poems are
to it. Yet when we look more carefully at the historical fictions in Roman-
ticism, we see that earlier ages of history are being recreated in a specifi-
cally Romantic form, as symbols of certain aspects of the poet's own age.
In Schiller's terms, an age thought of as comparatively "naive" is ren-
dered in a self-conscious or "sentimental" way.35 Scott, in Ivanhoe and
elsewhere, and, later, William Morris both write historical fictions about
the Middle Ages. They are by no means uninformed about the Middle
Ages: Morris at least could be called a medieval specialist. But they are
not interested in rendering the Middle Ages directly. There is nothing in
the language of Middle English, for example, that corresponds even
remotely to Morris's brocaded Teutonic diction or to Scott's antiquated
lingo. What is being rejected, one feels, is the social reality of the earlier
age; what is being preserved is a latent or potential Utopia in it: a social
ideal with some meaning for the writer's attitude to his own time. Scott is
The Romantic Myth 117
Notice how natural it is for a Romantic poet to use the word "darkly" in
connection with thought. The archetype of all such brooding outcasts is
Rousseau, and Rousseau's Confessions illustrates two recurring features
of the Romantic tragic formula. The formula often expresses itself in a
confessional genre, where the main figure is apt to be a perfunctory mask
for the author himself, and it often uses the image of the lost mother as a
symbol for the fall into excessive awareness. The role of various maternal
figures in Rousseau, notably Madame de Warens, has much more than a
simply biographical significance. Perhaps the overtones of "Childe" in
Childe Harold also have echoes beyond the allusion to medieval ro-
mance: certainly Byron himself, and his publisher, were well aware of
the appeal of such heroes to women readers.
Other confessional forms, such as De Quincey's Confessions of an Eng-
lish Opium-Eater, gain considerably in significance if one relates them to
their proper context. We said that the central theme of Romanticism is
that of the attaining of an expanded consciousness, and this phrase, to a
reader in the 19605, suggests current talk about the virtues of LSD and
marijuana. But even from the point of view of Romanticism with its
isolated visionaries, there is still a distinction between the genuine or
creative consciousness and the introverted or subjective one. De Quincey's
account of his miserable exile from the maternal figure of Lady Carbery,
of his sterile union in bitter cold with Ann, and of the way in which his
vision broke up, under the influence of opium, into a shower of tantaliz-
ing and elusive glimpses, is, seen in relation to Romanticism as a whole,
The Romantic Myth 121
America and Western Europe, Marxist countries, and fascist and nation-
alist movements, all of which have political principles derived from
different aspects of Romantic mythology translated into programs of
social action, have tried to overcome this situation in different ways,
sometimes with the help of some of the poets, as our comments on
Carlyle show. But the residual anarchism at the heart of the Romantic
movement is still with us, and will be until society stops trying to sup-
press it.
What follows are brief studies of the structure and imagery of three
major works of English Romantic literature. The sequence is not chrono-
logical, but is a series of phases of myth,40 in which each work in the
sequence takes in a wider scope than its predecessor. All three are works
of second-generation Romanticism, and all three take a liberal, some-
times a revolutionary attitude to religion and politics, in which the break
with the older symbolic language is easier to see. Beddoes revolves
around the heart of Romantic imagery, at the point of identity with
nature of which death is the only visible form. Shelley deals with the
theme of Romantic comedy as outlined above, the regenerating of the
alienated community through a renewed understanding of nature as the
complement of humanity. The theme of Keats's Endymion is the bringing
to birth of the imagination as the focus of society. The whole sequence
should give some idea of the range and scope of the mythical structure
within which the literature of our own day is still operating, and which
with the Romantic movement completed its first major phase.
of publishing it then,41 and making it the bridge between Keats and the
early Tennyson, he kept working at it and revising it until his suicide in
1849. As he had been living in Germany and studying medicine, he had
become a somewhat peripheral figure in English literature by the time of
his death. Hence Death's Jest-Book crept into English poetry almost unno-
ticed, an easy victim for the kind of generalizer who calls it "morbid." To
put such an epithet against this gorgeous plum pudding of a poem, filled
to bursting with heady lines and breathtaking images, is a sufficient
comment on the accuracy of critical cliches.
From the beginning Beddoes was possessed, not so much by death, as
by the idea of the identity of death and love, Thanatos and Eros. Both
states are themselves identifications of an isolated and conscious being
with something else not itself. The imagery of such songs as Dirge and
Hymeneal or The Two Archers tells us that the darts of love and death are
aimed at the same target, that all lovers are demon lovers, all brides
incarnations of Mother Earth. Frustration in love (as the character Athulf,
in Death's Jest-Book, shows us in particular) is very apt to turn into a
death wish. Thus the highest and most intense aspects of life, which
love represents, are not the opposite of death, but part of the drive
toward death which is the momentum of life itself. The complete iden-
tity with nature, which is the fulfilment of life, is achieved visibly only
by death; hence death is the most accurate symbol of the ultimate
meaning of life.
The question whether life drives to death or through it remains, for
most of us, an unanswerable question. Beddoes answers, not that there is
a "life after" death, but that life and death are different aspects of the
same world, related as day is to night, summer to winter. Man, says
Beddoes, is the seed of a ghost, and just as Samuel Butler remarks that a
chicken is an egg's way of producing another egg,42 so Beddoes presents
us with a world in which a human life is a ghost's way of producing
another ghost. The matter is not as straightforward as this, even in
Beddoes, but one principle is clear enough to go on with. In our account
of the Romantic myth we spoke of two orders of nature, one the world of
ordinary social human experience, the other a world connected with
uncultivated nature, the physical environment outside society. This lat-
ter world is the world of the "sublime," and it is Wordsworth's benevo-
lent teacher, but we noted that in later Romanticism it is often more
pessimistically regarded. It becomes, for example, Schopenhauer's world
as will. Beddoes makes a startling and yet oddly suggestive identifica-
Yorick: The Romantic Macabre 127
tion. For him the world of experience is the world of life, which has its
focus and climax in love, and the world outside it becomes, quite simply,
the world of death. The demon-lover theme is thus, in his work, the
symbol of a life-death identity which he calls eternity. This identity can
manifest itself only in the form of an antithesis, the antithesis we know as
life and death. Its main symbol in Beddoes, as so often elsewhere in
Romanticism, is that of the struggle of brothers, of which one represents
ordinary life driving toward death, the other death seeping back into life.
The Bride's Tragedy is based on the theme of the demon lover. The
villain hero, significantly named Hesperus, loves Floribel, who is called a
nymph of the wood and is associated with Diana. Their secret meeting at
sunset in the forest opens the play, and it soon becomes clear that, for
Hesperus, Floribel is going to be not a Diana but a Proserpine. A story
is told about a bee and a red rose with the conventional dying-god
conclusion:
And yet one feels that there is something sacrificial about all the deaths
in the play, the direction of the sacrifice being not, as with ritual sacrifice,
to safeguard the living, but to strengthen the community of death. Hints
are thrown out about forms of life beyond life, and Olivia's attendant
tries, as she says, to
Several other contrasts are involved, including one rather like that of
Mark Antony and Octavius. Orazio is a Dionysus, a lord of love and
wine, spilling over with life and energy; Marcello is a votary of Apollo,
who prays to a god he thinks of as remote and withdrawn:
case his poetic instinct would have led him to a much more ambiguous
treatment of the death-fool theme than he suggests here.
The plot of Death's Jest-Book, which was not essentially altered by
revision, revolves around two brothers, Wolfram and Isbrand, disguised
as a knight and a court fool respectively, in the service of Melveric, Duke
of Miinsterberg. Isbrand has a melancholy and sardonic temperament
like the "malcontent" type popularized by Marston: more generally, he
is the kind of highly articulate tragic hero who can act as chorus to his
own action, of the family of Hamlet, Bosola, and Vendice.45 Isbrand is
dedicated to revenge on the Duke, who has killed their father: Wolfram,
a saintly and chivalric spirit, has renounced revenge and in a compli-
cated action, which takes place in Egypt, saves the Duke's life after the
Duke has tried to poison him, out of rivalry over the heroine Sibylla.
Exasperated by Wolfram's invulnerable virtue and his sense of inferior-
ity to it, the Duke finally succeeds in murdering him and returns to
Miinsterberg with Sibylla, followed by Isbrand. Once home, the Duke's
love slips back to the memory of his dead wife, in a way typical of
Beddoes's dramatic actions. Similarly, Hesperus can only love what he is
about to try to destroy, and Orazio does not really love the heroine
Valeria until after he has neglected her to the verge of killing her with a
broken heart.
The late Duchess's body, in a grisly scene, is exchanged for that of
Wolfram by Isbrand. The Duke attempts to call up the ghost of his wife
by necromancy; he thus, because of the exchange, calls up Wolfram
instead, who cannot be dismissed because he has been definitely sum-
moned. Wolfram's ghost, like the Sweet William of the ballads, renews
his earthly love for the now neglected Sibylla, who dies to join him.
Isbrand organizes a conspiracy against the Duke and is temporarily
successful, but once vested with authority he becomes tyrannical. The
main action for the latter half of the play shifts to the Duke's two sons, the
dutiful and heroic Adalmar and the self-indulgent Athulf. Isbrand has
planned their deaths as part of his revenge, but their love for the same
woman, Amala, which repeats the main theme in counterpoint, leads to
the same climax, with Athulf murdering his brother. In the amazing final
scene, where a danse macabre painted on the walls of a crypt comes to life,
Athulf stabs himself, Isbrand is killed by a blind devotee of liberty
named Mario, and Wolfram, who replaces Isbrand as fool in the last
scene, pulls the Duke down into his grave, "still alive, into the world o'
th' dead" [5.4.357], "dead" being appropriately the last word in the play.
Yorick: The Romantic Macabre 131
This account gives little indication of the skill with which Beddoes man-
ages to make all these deaths individually plausible and cumulatively
convincing to the emotions.
It has been noticed that every great Romantic poet in English literature
leaves some major and central work unfinished, or revises and reworks it
incessantly.46 The reasons naturally vary, but some features recur. By-
ron's Childe Harold and Don Juan are unfinished because they are, in very
different moods, parodies of the Romantic completed quest. That is, they
are endless poems in their very inception, and could only be abandoned
when the author tired of the persona. Keats's Hyperion, Blake's Four Zoas,
and Wordsworth's Prelude were revised and reworked partly because
they were, in a sense, definitive poems, expressing the heart of what their
creators had to say. Both these reasons apply to Death's Jest-Book, and
with Beddoes something also has to be allowed for personal tempera-
ment. He tells us little about himself in his letters, but a tone of self-
deprecation recurs which suggests some doubts about his ability ever to
finish his work to his own satisfaction. There is nothing neurotic in his
writing, but an increasingly self-destructive streak in him, which de-
stroyed first a large body of his work and then his life, links him more
closely than any other English Romantic to some of the tormented and
self-mutilated geniuses of German Romanticism, such as Kleist and
Holderlin. A more technical reason for the long delay in giving Death's
Jest-Book to the world, however, was Beddoes's desire to make it a real
stage play, to be acted in a theatre. True, there was an audience for verse
tragedies in his time—Keats even had a notion that Otho the Great would
make money—but it is hard to see how Death's Jest-Book could have
succeeded on the stage. Yet, before we assign Beddoes to that unhappy,
obsessed, and somewhat masochistic band of modern poets who have
tried to "revive poetic drama," we should glance at the courage and
common sense with which he defines his attitude:
tragic with a comic mood that T.S. Eliot calls "farce," and recognizes in
The Jew of Malta.*8 Similarly, although Death's Jest-Book is subtitled "The
Fool's Tragedy," its pervading tone is not so much tragic as a combina-
tion of the tragic and the comic which we may call the grotesque. What
Beddoes was trying for was a tragic action based on the mood of the
porter scene in Macbeth, or, again, the grave-digging scene in Hamlet in
which Yorick, or at least his skull, appears. Perhaps it is really the
discovery of the tragicomic grotesque that Beddoes is announcing in the
verse letter referred to above, a discovery as crucial for him as that of the
comic rhyme was for Byron.
The root of the conception of the grotesque is the sense of the simulta-
neous presence of life and death. Ghosts, for example, are at once alive
and dead, and so inspire the kind of hysteria that is expressed equally by
horror and by laughter. The grotesque is also the expression in literature
of the nauseated vision, man's contemplating of himself as a mortal body
who returns to nature as "dung and death," in the phrase of East Coker [1.
46]. Death, so far as it is a physical process, is always firmly attached by
Beddoes to complete dissolution and a return to the nitrogen cycle:
"Turning to daisies gently in the grave."49 The most concentrated symbol
of this aspect of the grotesque is perhaps the cannibal feast, the subject of
two strategically placed lyrics in the play, one sung by Isbrand and the
other by Wolfram, both in their character as fools. Isbrand's song
"Harpagus, hast thou salt enough?" [4.4.63-98] deals with the theme,
used by Seneca in Thyestes and imported into Shakespeare's Titus
Andronicus, of serving up an enemy's children to him as food, tradition-
ally the most shocking of all tragic themes, and therefore close not only to
tragedy but to "farce," in Eliot's sense. The other song uses the slightly
less nauseating theme of ravens eating dead bodies: the ravens, however,
are called Adam and Eve [5.4.95-118]. Other similar images evoke a
vision of nature as a vast cannibal banquet of the same kind, a Hieronymus
Bosch landscape in which men turn into animals and animals into men.
As Isbrand says:
Some one of those malicious Gods who envy Prometheus his puppet
show have taught all confounded sorts of malcontent beasts, saucy birds
and ambitious shell-fish, and hopping creatures of land and water, the
knack of looking human to the life. How? is the mystery of the cookery-
book. [1.1.116-20]
Yorick: The Romantic Macabre 133
as a stage play, Beddoes saw clearly that tragedy could not be perma-
nently "revived" except in a grotesque, and consequently antiheroic,
context. To attempt a play in which death has the role of jester makes
Beddoes a precursor of the theatre of the absurd.
It was hardly possible for Beddoes to create such a theatre in his time,
but it is easiest to understand certain features of Death's Jest-Book in the
light of later theatrical developments. The play begins with an epigraph
from Aristophanes' Frogs, and The Frogs is perhaps closest of any earlier
play to Beddoes in its portrayal of a world of the dead related to the
world of life in a way that makes us wonder which is really which.
Beddoes's characters live in a kind of subterranean world like that of
Eliot's Waste Land, where the life of ordinary consciousness is, like the life
of the isolated Ancient Mariner, a life in death, the cemetery of reality.
The ship which carries the chief characters from Egypt to Germany is
called the Ban's, the name of Charon's ferry boat in the underworld, and
the fact that Isbrand and the Duke are both in disguise helps to empha-
size the feeling that the actors are "hollow men," or shadows. Wolfram
the ghost is no more but no less solid than the other characters; Ziba, the
necromancer who is the Duke's servant, is said to have been found in the
underworld, and Mandrake expresses the complementary view about
living people: "there is many a fellow with broad shoulders and a goodly
paunch who looks and behaves as if he were alive, although in soul and
spirit he be three times more dead than salt fish in Lent" [2.2.111-14].
We are constantly in a twilight world between life and death, like the
world of Beckett, or a world between physical objects and mysterious
forces of which the objects are symbols, like the world of lonesco, or a
world like the "Bardo" world between death and rebirth which Yeats
imported from the Orient.52 One of the most haunting songs in the play is
actually about reincarnation, in its grotesque form of rebirth into ani-
mals, and the three characters we meet in the first scene, Mandrake the
zany, whose name of Homunculus suggests something deformed or
dwarfish, the saintly Wolfram, and the court fool Isbrand, remind us of
the approaching chaos of the end of Yeats's lunar cycle of which "Hunch-
back and Saint and Fool are the last crescents."53 Yeatsian too is the sense
of a world moving from life to death interpenetrating with another
world moving in the reverse direction through dreams, in a continuous
weaving shuttle or "double gyre."
The characters in Elizabethan and Jacobean tragedy, however melan-
choly and withdrawn in temperament they may be, are, we said earlier,
Yorick: The Romantic Macabre 135
O world, world! The gods and fairies left thee, for thou wert too wise; and
now, thou Socratic star, thy demon, the great Pan, Folly, is parting from
thee. The oracles still talked in their sleep, shall our grandchildren say, till
Master Merriman's kingdom was broken up: now is every man his own
fool, and the world's cheerless. [1.1.40-5]
Other versions of the last three words are "Fate for us all" and "the
world's sign is taken down."59 Mandrake, a lively person exploring
death (his continuous vitality is much insisted on) is a contrast to Ziba
the necromancer, who is moving in the opposite way, from death to life,
and whose crucial act is to raise the avenging spirit of the dead Wolfram.
The Ziba-Mandrake contrast is repeated, on a much larger scale, by
the contrast of Wolfram and the Duke. The Duke, Melveric, is a remark-
able creation, very like the successful rulers of Shakespeare. He has a
deep sense of political responsibility, and has the ruthlessness that goes
with success in action. He controls rebellion by a skilful use of disguise
and spying, and with the infallible sense of timing that is characteristic of
the successful ruler. He is constantly engaged in direct action, but his
engagement is at the same time a profound detachment. His is the
courage of the born leader who attracts devotion from his followers
because he can suggest that he has no need of it, and yet his very self-
sufficiency represents something that they profoundly do need. The
successful ruler's mind is always inscrutable, but the Duke gives us a
hint of the kind of the strength that there is in it:
that turns one to the past or the future. As he says to his son:
Think of now.
This Hope and Memory are wild horses, tearing
The precious now to pieces. [4.2.148-50]
It is also typical of a person whose real life is in his actions that whenever
he does reflect he should become the blackest of pessimists. As soon as
his world is separated from him and becomes objective, it turns into hell.
When he reflects, the horror of the past and the nothingness of the future
come crowding in on him and annihilate the exuberant rhythm of present
action:
And yet at the same time a nihilism of spirit is always with him: this is
symbolized by Wolfram's haunting of him. When Wolfram first appears
he reacts with great courage, saying that he refuses to believe what is in
front of him and threatening to turn Wolfram into "my fool, ghost, my
jest and zany" [4.1.42], in the tonality of the central death-fool theme. But
he is entirely unable to avert Wolfram's appearance, partly because he is
already possessed by death.
The heroine Sibylla is first introduced to us as essentially a creation of
the Duke's, who has raised her out of prison and given her her first
glimpse of her brave new world. He talks of taking her home and
bestowing her on some lover destined for her, but as soon as the destined
lover turns up in the person of Wolfram, the Duke forgets his generosity
and begins to hate Wolfram. The implication is that what he loves is less
Sibylla than something in himself that he can make Wolfram a sacrifice
to. Later, as mentioned, Sibylla is carried off to the underworld by
Wolfram while the Duke turns to seek his own underworld bride, his
buried wife, who, being naturally older than Sibylla, is something of a
Demeter to her Proserpine.60 In his brooding over her grave the Duke
reminds us a little of the old man in Chaucer's Pardoner's Tale who keeps
begging his mother Earth to readmit him to her body.
Isbrand is the chief spokesman for the death-fool equation, and, being
disguised as a fool, he is, for most of the play, closer to the human sense
of the identity of wisdom and folly. He is more reflective than the Duke
Yorick: The Romantic Macabre 141
It was ever
My study to find out a way to godhead,
And on reflection soon I found that first
I was but half created; that a power
Was wanting in my soul to be its soul,
And this was mine to make. Therefore I fashioned
A will above my will, that plays upon it,
As the first soul doth use in men and cattle. [5.1.47-54]
He speaks well and convincingly, but he has lost his sense of irony, and is
betraying the essential humanity in himself which his fool's role symbol-
ized. Hence he is falling into the attitude of mind that he hated in the
Duke, though without the Duke's sense of detachment about doing a job
that he neither likes nor dislikes. Isbrand and the Duke are both quixotic
characters, men trying to be angels or gods, and consequently they are
arbitrary rulers, pulling away from the democracy that death the leveller
represents. The link between them is expressed by Isbrand when he
speaks of doing with his ambition what the Duke tried to do with his
wife:
But of the three "brothers" (for Wolfram and the Duke are spoken of as
blood brothers), only Wolfram, with his gentle and forgiving spirit, so
compassionate that he even refrains from haunting the Duke until com-
pelled to do so, achieves a genuinely human combination of detachment
and engagement. The interpenetration of life and death, therefore, so
central in Beddoes's imagery, is not quite the same thing as the interpen-
etration of good and evil. We have already referred to the significance of
Byron in popularizing a new sense of moral ambiguity: the sense of the
curse of genius, the isolation caused by the possession of greater powers
than ordinary. In Byron this theme is treated more or less aesthetically:
that is, it is seen from a distance, and we can read about the Corsair's one
virtue and thousand crimes without being troubled by what the charac-
ters in The Playboy of the Western World felt to be an important distinction
after they had experienced both: the distinction between "a gallous story
and a dirty deed."62 This aesthetic approach to the moral complexity of
the human situation is reflected in Byron's style. Byron himself was a
witty, sociable, extroverted poet of great common sense and (much the
same thing) relatively few anxieties, hence it was easy for him to adopt,
in Don Juan, a persona of detached ironic amusement. At the same time
he could project the Byronic hero, as a kind of demonic shadow of
himself, into his tales and tragedies, including Childe Harold. But to have
identified the two would have destroyed his sense of identity, and he
never achieved or even attempted the fusion of the two moods in the
grotesque as Beddoes did (except perhaps in the last canto of Don Juan,
and there only on an Ingoldsby-Legends level).63
Beddoes's grotesque is thus an inseparable part of a less aesthetic and
more existential approach than Byron's, an approach which naturally
ensured that he would never be, like Byron, a popular poet. For Beddoes,
Yorick: The Romantic Macabre 143
we are plunged into a world which, in spite of all the violence and irony,
is still a world of morally significant choices:
This is the Duke talking himself into murdering Wolfram, and it is clear
that Beddoes understands what some philosophers of resolute decision
and Augenblick have not understood: that most resolute decisions are
perverse and that a philosophy founded on the conception of resolute
decision is off its head.64 The real resolute decision is much more likely to
be a refusal to act rather than an action, like Wolfram's renunciation of
revenge. This is a point that we shall find more fully developed in
Shelley, from whom Beddoes partly derived it.
At the moment when the Duke determines on Wolfram's death he
says:
The words "being," "time," and "world" appear together at least three
times in Death's Jest-Book, and there are many passages, here and else-
where in Beddoes, where we have one or two of them, along with some
synonym of the others. Being, in Beddoes, refers primarily to an eternity
beyond death, a "great round Ever" [4.4.48] or ground of reality out of
which both life and death emerge. What we see, the "world," we see as
we see the moon, with only its lit-up half turned to us. In The Second
Brother eternity is described under the figure of the ouroboros, the world-
serpent whose tail of death and crown of life meet together, when the
death-figure Marcello meets the life-figure Orazio:
Eternity, which includes both life and death, is the world of our full
144 A Study of English Romanticism
It appears, then, that birth is a shifting of the centre from the universe
to the individual ego. To be born is to acquire a lost soul: everybody
therefore has a lost soul, and the important thing is to make sure that it
gets lost. The crimes, first of the Duke, then of his son Athulf, and the
hybris of Isbrand after his revolt, show that they are clinging to this lost
soul, and seeking identity through it. Hence, though in one sense they die
in the moment of their crimes, in another sense they are really trying to
resist the surrendering act of death, trying, once again, to be gods or
angels or demons in an egocentric eternity. Wolfram and Sibylla, on the
other hand, understand that "It is the earth that falls away from light"
[2.2.40] (elsewhere "day"), and for them death is the dragon guarding
the treasure of identity. For those who achieve that identity, death is the
death of death.
Time is what enables being to appear as the world, and the world is
Yorick: The Romantic Macabre 145
eternity so far as we see it extended in space. But time itself is also death
and illusion, the power that carries everything away into nothingness.
The appearance of time in our world is symbolized in Beddoes, as it so
often is in Romantic and modern poets, by a river flowing to the sea of
eternity. As the world is what we see of eternity, the rest of eternity, the
world of death that we cannot see and so assume to have been annihi-
lated, is mostly the part of it that has been carried away by time. Many of
Beddoes's most remarkable images are based on the sense of the liquid-
ness of life, of the living body as a continuous stream which is never the
same twice. Athulf says of Amala, for instance:
The river reflects the world above it, as the pool did Narcissus, and the
preoccupation of life with death is symbolized by reflection and mirrors.
Thus it is said of knights in armour that their "shields, like water, glassed
the soul-eyed maidens" [2.3.6]. Echoes of the Biblical deluge and of the
Red Sea that hungers for ghosts, referred to by Mandrake at the begin-
ning of the play, usually linger around such passages. In one extraordi-
nary fragment, beginning "And many voices marshalled in one hymn,"66
there appears to be an association between the vision of eternity and
the Israelites moving through the sea. The contrasting images are those
of mountains, towers, and rocks that stand in the sea and refuse to be
dissolved: they represent the kind of criminal titanism that tries to
escape from the surrender of death by recklessness and despair. Thus
Athulf, after he murders his brother, feels like "a wild old wicked
mountain in the sea" [4.3.383], and the Duke is told that for his murder
of Wolfram:
which flicker up
Out of the sun's grave underneath the world.68
The voice of this buried world has the peculiarly ambivalent quality of
Yorick: The Romantic Macabre 147
the grotesque: it is at once oracular and witty, inspiring awe and yet
provoking the laughter of the intelligence. Strange rumours come to us
from this world, rumours of some indefinitely repeated process going on
in both nature and human life, of rebirth and reincarnation, of man's
present body as a seed of the tree of ghosts, of dreams as the spirits of the
dead living in us.
Simple and primitive societies, one character in the play suggests, are
more apt to be haunted by the dead because the dead of such societies
are lonely, and make their way back to a community of greater cheerful-
ness. As time goes on the dead become the majority—migravit ad plures
was a stock phrase about one recently dead—and great cities have been
formed in the dead world, so we may expect that "There will be no more
haunting" [3.3.396!. In proportion as death has become populous, it has
become the past of which our own knowledge is a recollection. It is the
realm of the permanent achievements of mankind, which are not lost in
time as they appear to be, but are simply carried away by time. Thus the
world of death acquires through time a kind of moral stability which
helps to balance our own lives.
It is an old assumption of tragedy that time—that is, death—will
discover crimes and that revenge may come through ghosts. In ordinary
life conscience and remorse are evidence of the permanence of what has
been done in the vanished past: of conscience Isbrand says that it "doth
prattle with the voices of the dead through the speaking trumpet of the
winds" [2.2.119-20]. Similarly, a man may conceal a crime from the
world of the living, as the Duke did his murder of Wolfram, but such a
crime makes one visible to the world of the dead, hence the tradition of
murderers being haunted by their victims. Athulf, after his murder of his
brother, understands how a "mortal" sin is in fact a death of the soul,
killing the sinner without making any apparent change in his status:
This is the end, for Athulf, of what we have been calling angelism, the
attempt to dominate one's world by a self-transcending will instead of
148 A Study of English Romanticism
I do begin to feel
As if I were a ghost among the men,
As all I loved are; for their affections
Hang on things new, young, and unknown to me:
And that I am is but the obstinate will
Of this my hostile body. [4.1.67-72]
Yorick: The Romantic Macabre 149
The play ends with the identity of life and death expressed in its most
complete antithesis. Wolfram is a ghost who has unwillingly come back
into life, bringing with him the love and the justice that proceed from the
invisible world; the Duke is a living man who is at the same time
eternally dead, and who, like the Wandering Jew, cannot find the peace
of real death. To the ignorant, death is solemn, the king of terrors; for the
Duke, it is a repose denied him; to Wolfram, it is the supreme joke, the
sudden emergence of what we ordinarily keep repressed and yet know
to be really there. It is a practical joke in bad taste, like Yorick's practical
joke on the grave-digger, but it establishes the limits of what is human,
and makes those who attempt the inhuman, the subhuman, or, like
Isbrand, the superhuman, look like unsuccessful fools.
What Beddoes contributes to Romanticism is, perhaps, the most com-
plete and searching poetic reaction to the Romantic sense of the limita-
tions of ordinary experience. The shadow of Kant's riddle72 falls across
the whole Romantic movement. The world that we see and understand is
not the noumenon, the world in itself, but only the world as phenom-
enon, as adapted to our categories of perception and reasoning. The
inference is that real reality, so to speak, cannot be known, at least not by
the subject-object relationship. The proud boast of the subjective reason,
that a perfect being must exist because the mind can conceive the possi-
bility of its existence, no longer carries much conviction. The Romantic
sense of something outside ordinary experience which nevertheless com-
pletes experience, symbolized by "nature" in Wordsworth and else-
where, must be something mysterious, because it cannot be directly
apprehended. It is obvious that the Kantian distinction affords a justifica-
tion for imaginative, as distinct from rational, knowledge, and for sym-
bolism. The phenomenon, which represents a reality that it does not
exhaust, is a symbol of what is really there, but it is a fixed and invariable
symbol, perceived involuntarily and unalterable as a perception. Poetry
creates for the imagination a flexible language of symbols, and expands
our range of experience accordingly, in a way that sense and reason
cannot do.
On this basis, various poetic and philosophical reactions to the Kantian
position are possible. For some, the noumenal world is a world of mysti-
cal identity. I know the table I write on as a phenomenon, but if I could
know the table as it really is in itself I would be that table. For others, we
are related to the noumenal world by our existence, and we experience
noumenal reality through the engagements of our existence. For Carlyle,
150 A Study of English Romanticism
more specifically, the noumenal world is the naked world under the
clothes of phenomena which both conceal it and reveal it. But Beddoes,
identifying this invisible and underlying reality with death, seems, if I
may put it so, to have hit a bullseye that many of his contemporaries saw
but tried not to hit. He anticipates later preoccupations with the relation
of being and nothingness more directly than most Romantics. When
Sartre tells us that man essentially is, not what he has done, but what he
is about to make of himself, his life thus moving onward to an identity
which can be reached only by death,73 he is formulating the same kind of
paradox as Beddoes. The feeling that the moment of death is also a crisis
of identity is probably as old as human consciousness, and certainly as
old as written literature. But it starts out on a new and lonelier journey
with the Romantic movement, a journey with a continuous sense that, as
Eliot says, the moment of death is every moment, and that absurdity is
the only visible form of the meaning of life. It is Beddoes, as far as English
literature is concerned, who brings us most directly into contact with the
conception of the absurd in a way that permits of compassion but ex-
cludes self-pity.
Once they understand this, she remarks pointedly, their attitudes toward
a number of other things will also change:
In any case, a poet who devotes himself, as Shelley did, not merely to
mythopoeic poetry but specifically to man's recovery of his own myth-
making powers, is bound to find his mythology consolidating on the
figure of Prometheus, whose name traditionally means imagination ("fore-
152• A Study of English Romanticism
thought"), and who was martyred by the gods for his friendship to man.
Similarly, Prometheus's deliverance is achieved when the projected Jupi-
ter falls back into the cave of myths whence he originated, and becomes
identical with his phantasm, in accordance with Prometheus's remark to
the phantasm:
It is not surprising that Shelley's first major effort, Queen Mob, should be
in large part an essay in versified scientism, celebrating the superseding
of religion by a more rational and secular attitude.
Yet Queen Mob is so obviously not on the direct path of Shelley's poetic
development that we have to look further than the mere immaturity of
the poem itself for the reasons. A personal God, it is true, has no status in
the scientific vision: he is replaced by natural law, and natural law
operates most freely in the world of the dead or inanimate. In the world
of time and space, then, God is dead: he was of course never alive there,
but any God who can die is much better dead. But what we are then left
with is the scientific vision of law, in which the human mind confronts a
subhuman world. It is in the realm of the automatic and predictable that
science moves with most assurance, but human beings themselves clearly
belong, at least in large part, to a different realm, and we can perceive
nothing externally that is, to put it crudely, any better than we are. We
may gain intuitions of a superhuman process which unites us with
nature, but we do not perceive any such process as a conscious subject.
What we perceive, or rather infer from what we perceive, is what Queen
Mab, quite logically and consistently, leads up to: a vision of "Nature's
[elsewhere "Necessity's"] unchanging harmony."74
But this gives us a view of the human situation which is very like an
extremely rigorous Christian view, with nature substituted for God.
Nature forms a harmonious order from which man alone is excluded.
Man in his present state is the scapegoat or pharmakos of nature, the only
unnatural being, and nothing can help him except reconciliation with
nature. Nature's gospel is nature's law, which when accepted becomes
freedom as well as necessity. As with more conventional creeds, the
difficulty and complexity of regeneration is got around by being trans-
ferred to an anxiety symbol which substitutes for it. The eating of meat
occupies the same place in Shelley's poem that similar fetishes do in
Prometheus: The Romantic Revolutionary 153
of as objective, as set over against him. It is not set over against him,
however, but is part of himself, hence he is engaging in his old projecting
game of enslaving himself to what he creates. Or, as Shelley says, "man,
having enslaved the elements, remains himself a slave."79 The automo-
tive boats and unidentified flying objects in Shelley, on the other hand,
represent rather a physical and mental identity with nature, where space
is receding because the human mind and its powers are expanding. The
swift vehicles are symbols of desire, and are swift because human emo-
tions are swift: as the Spirit of the Hour says of his "coursers":
The same feeling comes into Shelley's natural imagery as well. In The
Cloud, to take a familiar example, we feel that we ourselves are riding on
the cycle of nature, participating in what might better be called its chang-
ing harmony; and similarly with the loving description in Prometheus
Unbound of the spirits of the elements riding up through the water in
bubbles and then going back again to repeat the process.
We notice that in painting, as well as in poetry, a new sense of man's
relation to nature is developing. With Rembrandt, painting reflects a
culture in which the subject-object relation is primary: in his pictures we
are looking at an objective order. Coleridge's conception of the artist
imitating nature by identifying himself with the natura naturans or living
process of nature, which we referred to in the first chapter, is implicit in
his remarks on the painting of Washington Allston.80 The remarks have
little to do with Allston, but, considered in connection with painting,
have a good deal to do with the pictorial development which began with
late Turner and carried on through the Impressionists. In such painting
we are still in the area of representation, even of "realism," but it is a
realism that renders a sense of rhythm and movement in nature, and that
demands a physical sense of participating in this rhythm from us. In
some of Shelley's colour fantasies something of the pictorial feeling of
late Turner is anticipated:
The negative or ironic pole of the poetic vision is the sense of nature as
objective and separated from the consciousness, but looked at by the
consciousness in the light of imagination and desire and not of reason.
Seen by the reason as an objective order, nature makes rational sense.
Seen by imagination, creativity, and desire, it makes no sense at all. It
presents us with an endless expanse of mindlessness: where it is alive it is
cruel; where it is dead it is empty. It presents us, therefore, with the sense
of the anguished and the absurd. This is the inevitable consequence, for
Shelley, of dropping the projected God of nature, and is foreshadowed in
the notes to Queen Mob: "But if the principle of the universe be not an
organic being, the model and prototype of man, the relation between it
and human beings is absolutely none."81
In Prometheus Unbound we have again what we had in Queen Mob, man
as the scapegoat of nature, the only power that resists Jupiter. But Shelley
has reversed his earlier notion of seeking reconciliation with Jupiter.
Prometheus is now the human mind confronting the objective world
with its own desire, and Jupiter is the mental block which prevents man
from trying to conceive and reshape a world beyond that order. The
reason that man clings to the notion of a personal God in nature as an
objective counterpart of himself is that, once this deity goes, he then
confronts a moral chaos, an absurdity. To be aware of the creation, as it
now is, is to be aware of anguish. In the notes to Queen Mob there occurs
the extraordinary phrase, "The supereminence of man is like Satan's, a
supereminence of pain,"82 and this is especially true of Prometheus. Yet
pain is the condition which keeps Prometheus conscious, and conscious-
ness is the only power that can be a threat to Jupiter. If man could lose his
specifically human consciousness, he would also lose his specifically
human pain and misery; but it would be a poor exchange.
Prometheus Unbound is based on two contrasting visions of nature. The
Jupiter death vision is the objective order perceived by what is in every
sense of the word a subject. The source of all error in religion is the notion
Prometheus: The Romantic Revolutionary 157
human order of nature from which Ariel is excluded. For Shelley the
liberation of man and the liberation of nature are different aspects of the
same thing, and emancipated man finds himself in a world of emanci-
pated spirits whose poetic originals are clearly Ariel and Puck.
Second: the green world of Shakespeare is a Dionysian world, a world
of energy and exuberance. Even in some of the tragedies there is a similar
kind of world, though in tragedy it loses out to its narrower and harsher
rival. In Romeo and Juliet, for example, the world of Queen Mab's dreams,
the passion of the lovers, and the wild energy of Juliet's speech to the
night are destroyed by the daylight feud, and in Antony and Cleopatra
Mark Antony's extravagant vitality is contrasted with the calculated
discipline of Rome, which in a tragic situation is certain to defeat it.
Shelley's use of "Queen Mab" as a title for his first long poem indicates
his affinity with this theme in Shakespeare, however little use he makes
of Queen Mab herself. In Prometheus Unbound athe green world is not only
a world of elemental spirits, but is explicitly Dionysian: the two "fauns"
who watch the spirits playing like the released Ariel are followers of
Silenus, and the entire drama gives us the sense of a prodigious re-
pressed "enthusiasm" in nature, in the literal sense of a Dionysian divine
presence, which is impatiently awaiting the signal of release.
In comedy, again, the absurd or tyrannical characters who block the
hero's marriage are upsetting the social order which the audience sees to
be the right and proper one. Consequently, the comic action leads to a
restoration of that order, which may be thought of as hypothetical or as
preceding the action of the play. Similarly, the victory won by Prometheus
over Jupiter is a victory over the kind of religion now associated with the
names of Jehovah and Jesus, and a restoration of many of the elements of
pre-Christian Greek culture. For Shelley, the canon of imaginative rev-
elation was Greek rather than Hebrew. In a draft of A Defence of Poetry he
says of the century preceding the death of Socrates: "It is as if the
continent of Paradise were overwhelmed and some shattered crag re-
mained covered with asphodel and amaranth which bear a golden
flower."85 The phraseology transfers to Greece the orthodox Christian
beliefs about the originality of Hebrew and Biblical traditions. We can
see in many German Romantics how, as soon as the Christian Creator of
nature begins to fade into projection, the Greek gods leap into an almost
obsessive vitality, not as gods, but as images of a human wholeness and
spontaneity which has been destroyed by self-consciousness. Shelley is
the closest of all English poets to this "tyranny of Greece," as it has been
160 A Study of English Romanticism
called.86 Greek religion for Shelley was more flexible and less pedantic in
imposing belief; it preserved the intuitive sense of identity with natural
forces; its polytheism enabled the scientific and philosophical views of
the world to develop independently. The climax of Greek culture, the
age of Pericles, brought with it a belief in liberty, not, like the age of the
New Testament, a belief in the necessity of submission to tyranny. The
prospect of the political independence of Greece from Turkey thus seemed
to Shelley to be a genuine form of the crusade, and it stirred up specula-
tions in him about the world's great age beginning anew. The Wandering
Jew, who enters Queen Mob and re-enters Hellas, is a symbol for Shelley of
man enduring the tyranny of God until a better era dawns. For, accord-
ing to Queen Mob, the Wandering Jew was cursed out of pure malice by a
Christ who was only pretending to suffer on the cross.
Here we touch on the feature of Shelley's thought that so delighted
Yeats, the prophecy of a new religion "antithetical" to Christianity and
reverting to many features of Greek thought and culture. Shelley's ver-
sion of this new culture is, to speak plainly, much less vulgar than
Yeats's: it does not rest on a facile cyclicism or rationalize everything
brutal and degenerate in both Greek and modern culture as part of a
"tragic" or "heroic" way of life that is to be reintroduced, for Yeats, by
fascism. But still there are points in common, and Yeats was doubtless
right in seeing in Shelley's Prince Athanase ("immortal"), with his mother
and mysterious father, his tragic sense of life, and his courageous loyalty
to the destroyed pagan faith, an aesthetic and "antithetical" counterpart
to Christ, the tower under the moonrise being the antithesis of the cross
under the sunset. Prince Athanase's literary ancestor is, as Yeats says, the
pensive Platonist of Milton, reading Greek tragedies, pondering over
what spirits, whether of the elements or not, may transcend the Christian
cosmos, and eventually adopting a purely aesthetic religion of organ
music and stained glass windows.87 Milton, naturally, drew his penseroso
figure as the creature of a mood, not as the creator of reality, but for
Romanticism both penseroso and allegro narrators create the worlds
they are in, instead of merely responding to them, and hence are some-
thing much more significant than mere "humours." We shall meet this
point again in Keats.
In the original myth Prometheus was crucified by Zeus for not reveal-
ing a secret he held: that Zeus by marriage to Thetis would beget a son
greater than himself. Eventually Prometheus did reveal the secret, was
released, and Thetis was married off to a mortal, Peleus, their son being
Achilles, who, as a warrior, was an agent of, not a threat to, Zeus's
Prometheus: The Romantic Revolutionary 161
From this pair proceeds a "Spirit" who dwells with man and helps to
prevent him from doing anything dangerous. If we start with the real
starting point for Shelley, man on the earth, this Christian Trinitarian
myth goes into reverse.88
According to the notes to Queen Mob, there is no "creative Deity," but
"the hypothesis of a pervading Spirit co-eternal with the universe re-
mains unshaken."89 That is, the name God may legitimately be applied
to whatever it is that identifies man and nature in a participating unity.
This Spirit is the "Daemon of the World" of the salvaged portion of
Queen Mob, and he enters Prometheus Unbound as Demogorgon. When
Demogorgon rises from his cave he is transformed from a Spirit into a
risen Son of Jupiter. Evidently the Son proceeds from the Spirit, not the
other way round. But Demogorgon, in Yeatsian language, adopts the
"antithetical" role of an Oedipus who destroys his father, not that of a
"primary" Christ who obeys him. He is the successful Lucifer, the dis-
possessed elder son, who takes Jupiter back to the human imagination
that gave birth to him.
The starting point of most Romantic imagery about the spirit of the
world or nature with whom man identifies himself is the speech of the
Erdgeist near the beginning of Goethe's Faust. The Attendant Spirit of
Comus, however, who comes from a higher region in an earlier structure
of symbolism, also echoes through this speech of a Spirit in Shelley's
unfinished drama:
If life is the dream of the Earth-Spirit, the poet is the interpreter of that
dream, who creates for us a version of the world which is much closer to
reality than the world we see. Unity with the Earth-Spirit is the primary
or existential identity of man; poetry creates a secondary identity which
has, in the words of the preface to Prometheus Unbound, "some intelligible
and beautiful analogy with those sources of emotion and thought."91 The
vision of reality which emerges from the caves of the imagination in
dreams, oracles, prophecies, and poems seems to us, from the point of
view of ordinary, or Jupiter-dominated, experience, a futile and hopeless
shadow-world, a Hades of gibbering bloodless bats. But that, in turn, is
what our world is like from its point of view. According to the allegory of
the cave in Plato, it is in ordinary experience that we find ourselves
staring at the flickering shadows of an objective world which is the
underworld of reality.
The traditional Christian virtues are faith, hope, and love: of these,
faith is the primary virtue, the response to God which enables the other
two to develop. Love is the greatest of the virtues, and Christian love is
love in the sense of agape or caritas, man's reproduction of the love that
God has for him. In Shelley hope and love retain their place, but his
refusal to regard faith as a virtue leads to some uneasy triads: we have
"Love, Hope, and Self-esteem" in the Hymn to Intellectual Beauty [1. 37]
and "Hope, Love and Power" in Prometheus Unbound. For Shelley, love is
the primary virtue, and it begins in the human soul. It is therefore, as
mentioned, love in the sense of eros, the love of Plato's Symposium and
Dante's Vita Nuova, a human love founded on the sexual instinct. The
virtues in Shelley travel in the opposite direction from Christianity:
virtue begins in love and flows through hope into whatever Shelley's
equivalent of faith is.
Love still has for Shelley a great deal of its earlier speculative associa-
tions with attraction, an association still preserved in our word "like."
"Like" is the sign of analogy, and analogy is a weakened form of the
identity which is the fulfilment of love. "Love makes all things equal,"
which means, not that it makes everything uniform, but that it is the
power of creating unity out of the disparate and divided. In Epipsychidion
the union of lover and beloved identifies them into one person, and this
union in its turn is the matrix of the genuine creation concealed within
the chaos of ordinary experience. With the release of Prometheus this
creation reappears, from "its chaos made calm by love, not fear"
[Prometheus Unbound, 4.1.171] and man assumes the traditional power of
Prometheus: The Romantic Revolutionary 163
the creator to command the chaos and "walk upon the sea" [2.5.110]. We
call the poet creative because poetry is the real form of the creative word
formerly projected on Christ. The language of love is the imaginative
language of the poet, and the imagination is, in the words of the preface
to The Cenci, "the immortal God which should assume flesh for the
redemption of mortal passion."92 The aesthetic preference of unity to
multiplicity which we find in great philosophers, notably Plato, is not a
merely intellectual preference, but the preference of the creation of love
over the disintegration achieved by fear.
There are books which explain the difference between Plato's eros and
Paul's agape,93 but unfortunately there is only one Greek word for hope,
elpis, which covers both the hope of St. Paul and the hope at the bottom of
Pandora's box in Hesiod. The studies of eros and agape seem to have no
counterpart, except by implication, in studies of elpis and elpis prime, yet
the hope which proceeds from human love is clearly different from the
hope which proceeds from faith in God. A hope based on human love
becomes a future-directed hope for the earthly and social regeneration of
all mankind. In theory, this belongs to Christian hope too, but in practice
Christian hope tends to become centred on the individual's hope for his
own future life in Christ, and hence to become restricted to a hope
primarily for the people of God. The petition to bring the Kingdom of
God on earth remains in the Lord's Prayer, but serious attention to it
tends to be regarded as a somewhat pagan and secular hope, based on
illusions of "perfectibility" and going too far beyond the perfectly proper
hope of converting everybody to the Christian faith. Shelley's future-
directed hope for a transcendence of the human condition on earth may
be illusory, but it is the same in kind as the revolutionary hope which has
proved since his day to be immensely stronger than Christianity. The
view taken of Christ in Prometheus Unbound is much more charitable than
that in Queen Mob: in the later poem Jesus is a saintly teacher of humanity
whom the mob of Jupiter not only put to death, but destroyed more
effectually by annexing his teachings to the Jupiter vision. Even so, of
course, this view makes the crucified Christ a type of Prometheus, in
contrast to the view of Christianity in which Prometheus would be a type
of Christ.
What is Shelley's equivalent of faith? Clearly it is, as our first chapter
has suggested, some form of gnosis. At first this gnosis is a secret,
perilous, and forbidden knowledge, like that of Adam in Eden, snatched
from under the nose of a jealous Jupiter, and transmitted through the
164 A Study of English Romanticism
For liberty is the actualization of the new world that the arrest of
Prometheus's habitual revenge energy has brought into being.
The liberating of Prometheus is, up to a point, something like a Hegelian
liberation, an expanding of consciousness which destroys the antithesis
of subject and object and creates a larger identity, as the "mask" falls
from man and the "veil" from nature. The transcending of opposites in
Shelley is expressed by the myth of the marriage with a sister-bride. The
release of Prometheus also releases the Eros-figure of the Spirit of the
Earth, who differs from Ariel in being a partaker of human and sexual
love. His sister-bride is the snow-maiden of the moon, now ready to be
thawed out and brought to life like Hermione or Pygmalion's statue.
Similarly in Epipsychidion the antithesis of Death and Life is also de-
scribed as "twin babes, a sister and a brother" [1. 303]. The symbol of the
sister-bride has a scandalous and incestuous sound to unemancipated
ears, but what it represents is the unifying power of Eros. In the state of
the bound Prometheus, fear is primary, and we love only what we fear
the least. Genuine love does not, like the soul in Emily Dickinson, select
its own society and shut the door: wherever it exists it creates liberty,
equality, and, along with fraternity, sorority. "Incest," says Shelley de-
Prometheus: The Romantic Revolutionary 169
murely, "is like many other incorrect things a very poetical circum-
stance."98
For the state of the bound Prometheus the obvious complementary
symbol is that of the coy, teasing, elusive femme fatale, representing an
objective world that man never really possesses. Shelley understands
this symbol, but he has a strong moral dislike of it. Twice it appears
offstage. It is the source of Alastor's nympholepsy, and in Julian and
Maddalo a discussion about what it is that prevents man from becoming
free focuses on a symbol of a madman whose madness and imprison-
ment have resulted from a sinister female influence. The Medusa image
also appears in some of the shorter lyrics. But in general the female in
Shelley is an "epipsyche," or what Blake would call an emanation, the
beauty that embodies the vision of love, the "Asia" or "married land" of
the Biblical Beulah. In Shelley, as in Blake, the mother, especially the
Mother Earth of Prometheus Unbound, usually represents a state of imper-
fection which has yet to be transcended.
Naturally, the antithesis of earth and heaven is also transcended in the
liberation of Prometheus. The three main stages in passing through this
antithesis are recorded in the Ode to Heaven, a poem closely related to
Prometheus Unbound. Here a first spirit speaks of Heaven as an abode
Fourth Eclogue and the Bible, where Behemoth and Leviathan are explic-
itly linked with Egypt and Babylon.
Yet a miraculous transformation of the order of nature is clearly not as
consistent with Shelley's poetic postulates as it would be with Dante's,
for example, where an omnipotent will could be invoked to bring about
the transformation. Much in Shelley's account of the released exuberance
and inner happiness of subhuman nature, and of man's freedom in it,
depends, like the corresponding themes in Wordsworth, on a distanced
and aesthetic view of nature, a north-temperate-zone view, as it has been
called, of a nature largely tamed by human settlement. What is being
described is the attaining of an identity with the inner process of nature
and a transcendence of the old subject-object separation. But the terms of
the description ignore most of what seems to us the real inner process of
nature, the cruelty and ruthless fight to survive which impress us so
deeply in this post-Darwinian age, and revert to a new kind of contem-
plative objectivity. One often finds in Shelley, perhaps most explicitly in
Mont Blanc, a sense that the theme of the renewal of man and nature by a
union between them, which poetry attempts to communicate through
emotions of serenity, sublimity, and the like, does not fit into the concep-
tual language of the same and the other. It is no good rejecting a tyranni-
cal Jupiter merely to fall into a childish belief that God has really designed
nature for our convenience.
The question involved here, which meets us again in Keats, is central
to the whole Romantic movement, and needs to be formulated with
some care. Of course Shelley's main theme is the emancipation of man, to
which the spirits of nature form a chorus. The suggestion is that a great
deal of what we see in nature reflects our own condition: we see cruelty
and ojppression because that is our own state, and if we could escape
from this state we might see many of the same things as exuberance and
joy. A liberated vision would show us that things shine by their own
light, not by the reflection of ours. The suffering in nature is identical
with the suffering of man; and similarly, the creative power of man is
identical with the beauty and splendour of nature.
We have spoken of the importance of occult imagery in Romanticism
as symbolizing the new kind of natural knowledge that man is develop-
ing, and to this imagery Shelley's nature-spirits and the like belong.
When Hamlet says to Horatio, apropos of his father's ghost, that there
are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philoso-
phy [1.5.166-7], he is thinking of "philosophy" as the knowledge of a
Prometheus: The Romantic Revolutionary 171
At the end of The Revolt of Islam, the hero and heroine, who are appar-
ently being burned alive at the stake as sacrifices to superstition, are
really sailing down a river in a boat toward Paradise. T.S. Eliot later
developed a similar imagery of the shadow of life rejoining its substance
at death out of Christian sources, more particularly Dante. Marina and
Ash-Wednesday are much indebted to the passage in the Purgatorio where
Dante, entering Eden, becomes as he would have been had man not
fallen. Yet Eliot recognized his similarity to Shelley also on this point,
and quotes the Zoroaster passage in The Cocktail Party in connection with
the martyrdom of Celia.100
As soon as Prometheus's deliverance is under way, Asia, like the
lovers in The Revolt of Islam, finds herself on an enchanted boat travelling
in the reverse direction from ordinary experience, like the poet's up-
stream movement at the end of Yeats's Tower, or Eliot's Phlebas who
"passed the stages of his age and youth"101 while being drowned:
172 A Study of English Romanticism
The real world of death being that of ordinary life proceeding toward
death, the world which is mysterious and hidden from us is the world of
immortality. In his earlier essay On a Future State, and elsewhere, Shelley
rejects the conception of the survival of the individual ego after physical
death. But he retains his own view of immortality, a view which is more
closely related to the Phaedo than to the New Testament. His immortality
is not that of individual lives, but of such human states as love and joy
and desire and the perception of beauty, which are eternally a part of
man's identity with the Earth-Spirit, or whatever God is. From these
states human life is projected, and back to them life is withdrawn. These
immortal states or moods of humanity were formerly called gods, and
were perverted into different kinds of tyranny. Properly understood, it is
only the states connected with hope and love and knowledge that are
immortal: Venus is immortal, but Jupiter and Mars are not. To reverse
the aphorism of Browning,102 there must be heaven; meanwhile there is
hell. In The Sensitive Plant Shelley describes a paradisal garden under the
care of a lady like Dante's Matilda: both lady and garden die in the cycle
of nature, but the conclusion is:
his ducal power, which merely subjects Isbrand to the same kind of
nemesis. What liberates Prometheus is a state of consciousness, an act of
vision, which enables the creative power of man to emerge. Political
rebellions may be the effects of such an act, but they cannot cause it.
Shelley's sympathy with the national or self-determining revolutions
that followed the French Revolution has much to do with being closer to
them in time, feeling that he can take their results for granted ("The
Spanish Peninsula is already free," as he says in the Preface to Hellas).103
The Revolt of Islam, whose theme is professedly political, has very little in
it that one can directly attach to contemporary or even predicted political
events, and even the politically inflammatory poems, such as Song to the
Men of England, are not attached to a suggested program of action. He
does have an early manifesto of human rights, but it would not be easy to
base a political or revolutionary party on it. All this is extremely obvious,
but it is not always realized that a deficiency in a nonpoetical area may
be, not merely irrelevant to a poet, but a positive source of strength in his
poetry.
When Mary Shelley remarks that "Shelley believed that mankind had
only to will that there should be no evil, and there would be none,"104 the
word "only" reflects the perplexity of most people confronted with apoca-
lyptic thinking—and perhaps too the perplexity even of those engaged in
it. The effort of will she speaks of, which is, like the corresponding will in
Christianity, more of a renunciation of will than an exercise of it, is the
supreme effort to which all mankind's history has been leading up. After
it has been made, perhaps, we can say, Was this all we had to do? but
before it occurs we should not underestimate its difficulty. Yet Prometheus
Unbound, even so, leaves us with the feeling of something left out. The
emancipation of man it portrays is purely spatial, and, so to speak,
scientific. As man's mind expands into the secrets of nature in a mental
consummation, we simply pass from the night of the present into the
light of the future. As the spirits say in the hideous but cheerful doggerel
in which most of the fourth act is written:
But there is no temporal dimension; the dead past simply buries its dead;
the oracles of tyranny fall silent like the similar oracles in Milton's Nativ-
ity Ode, and what time has annihilated remains annihilated. It is true that
the motive force of Prometheus's liberation is the car of the "Spirit of the
Hour," but it is not clearly explained how it gets to be the right hour, at
least in the context of history. Like Dante, we scramble out into the light
of day on the other side of the earth, leaving the hell of history behind us
like a bad dream. History is a nightmare from which we awake, as the
very Shelleyan Stephen Dedalus remarked.105 Yet the feeling that any
genuine liberation would also be a harrowing of hell, a liberation of the
past and of history, clearly haunted Shelley: it is central to Hellas and to
the troubled and unfinished Triumph of Life. It is also central to the
argument of A Defence of Poetry.
Though never explicitly stated, one of the central ideas in A Defence of
Poetry is that of an authentic response to poetry, reading it not merely as
a product of its age, but as the prophetic voice of human imagination
itself. Every great work of literature speaks with this prophetic voice
under the disguise of the limitations and anxieties of its own time. Thus it
is imagination mixed up with, and concealed by, a more conceptual type
of thinking. The contemporary age, according to the essay of Peacock
which provoked Shelley's "defence," is a "brazen age" in which the poet
is a vestigial survival of an antiquated way of thinking.106 To Shelley, on
the contrary, it is an age when modern thinking can finally become
completely separated from poetic thinking. A good deal of modern
thought, as represented by the "Paley and Malthus" referred to in the
preface to Prometheus Unbound [207!, is aggressive: it attacks and defends
and refutes, and its chief motivation is ultimately to rationalize arbitrary
power in whatever form.
There are of course liberal conceptual thinkers—Locke, Gibbon, Voltaire,
Rousseau, and others listed in the Defence. But even they are of limited
social value compared to the great poets and to the more visionary
philosophers, because they preserve the aggressive and argumentative
form of thinking that can hardly, by definition, present anything except
half-truths. In the Essay on Christianity Rousseau's doctrine of equality is
compared with the genuine teachings of Jesus, before their perversion by
Christianity, and the comparison of course is intended to be high praise
for Jesus. But in The Triumph of Life Rousseau appears to have become the
typical bastard poet, whose influence promoted political instead of im-
aginative revolution, and who consequently merely helped to prolong
Prometheus: The Romantic Revolutionary 175
repetition prophesied by the final chorus is not a vision of the same thing
happening again, but of the old renewed. When Ahasuerus says
The Past
Now stands before thee like an Incarnation
Of the To-come [11. 852-3]
moral force working iri them either to express an ideal, illustrating such a
world positively, or to become ironic, illustrating it negatively by con-
trast. The ideal aspect of poetry seemed more obvious to the Romantics,
just as the ironic aspect seems more obvious to us. Everybody needs a
sense of reality about the world out there, but, for the Romantics, every-
body also needs some kind of vision of a better world that man can
create. We can use this vision as a standard by which we can judge the
"real" world according to our ideals; as a model to work from when
acting according to an ideal vision; and as a means of recognizing a
better order of things when it is presented to us, whether in the arts or in
life.
The Romantic myth is the form in which the Romantic poet expresses
the recovery, for man, of what he formerly ascribed to gods, heroes, or
the forces of nature. When man is recognized to be a myth-making
animal, mythical language is also recognized to be the language, not for
what is true, but for what could be made true. Mythology, thus, with
Romanticism, as we have seen, ceases to be fables about the actions of
superior powers and becomes a structure of human concern. It thereby
takes over some aspects of religion. This does not mean that poetry
becomes a religion or a substitute for religion. It means that what was
formerly a structure of belief understood rationally, through doctrinal
and conceptual statement, is now, from the Romantic movement on-
ward, increasingly understood and interpreted imaginatively, as a struc-
ture of what might and could be true. Naturally, this change from what
we have called a "closed" to an "open" social use of mythology is bound
to make changes in the structure of comprehension itself, chiefly in the
direction of making it more flexible. In his speculations about the world
as a "vale of soul-making,"111 Keats makes it clear that he thinks of his
poetry as going in the direction of becoming the interpreter of a religion
more tolerant and more genuinely catholic than any institutional form of
religion.
Traditionally, man is born with a myth of a golden world or lost
paradise built into him, through his descent from Adam. From the Ro-
mantic point of view, this is an alienation myth expressing man's sense
that his consciousness has made him lose his identity with nature. Man
should learn to think of this pastoral myth as a vision of innocence, not
an innocence forever lost under a curse, but an innocence which is
present in the mind and is a potentially creative power. Such innocence
can, when guided by the poetic imagination, be realized in experience,
178 A Study of English Romanticism
and can thereby assimilate experience to its own form. When man is
born, the sense of identity with nature remains unborn, and the quest of
the soul is to bring it to birth.
The opening lines of Endymion explain to us how this Edenic myth
exists in our own minds, in the form of an awareness of beauty. Such an
awareness is not a mere solace in sorrow, though it is also that, but a
more intensely experienced kind of reality. The elements of ordinary
experience, our realization of the world out there, are consciousness and
sensation, and these, at a pitch of greater mental intensity, become joy
and the perception of the beautiful. In ordinary experience truth is what
we see and understand: in more intense experience, where truth is cre-
ated as well as recognized, truth is beauty. Whoever is saying this in the
Ode on a Grecian Urn, Keats is certainly saying it in Endymion. The poem is
devoted to the theme of realizing beauty, making it true by creating it.
Keats, like Shelley, thinks in triads, and in a letter he divides reality into
three aspects: real things, "semireal" things "which require a greeting of
the Spirit to make them wholly exist," and "Nothings" which are "digni-
fied by an ardent pursuit."112 Without the third element, nothing made
something by effort, the distinctively creative aspect of experience would
not be there: without the other two, creation would be a private and
subjective fantasy identical with the dream.
Keats was, of course, deeply interested in the relation between sleep
and poetry, the dreaming and the creative operations of the mind. This is
partly the reason for his attraction to Endymion as a hero, for in the
myths Endymion spends most of his time asleep. A remarkable passage
in the fourth book of Endymion connects the wish-fulfilment element in
dreams with the ambition of the poet which drives him to realize his
aims. What is real about the dream is its illusion, its absence of objectiv-
ity, and the poet, like the dreamer, strives to contain his world. But
ultimately "The poet and the dreamer are distinct."113 The imagination,
Keats says, is like the dream of Adam, who awoke to find his dream
true.114 Art, as Plato says, is a dream for awakened minds [Sophist, 266c],
and the poet's function is to make the vision of beauty the awakened and
conscious opposite of a dream.
The student of Endymion finds it a difficulty that Keats was so rigorous
a critic of his own work, and felt so quickly that he had outgrown
Endymion. If he had felt more like defending it, instead of going on to
even greater things, we should at least have had more hints from him
about what he was trying to do in it. As it is, there are only three of much
Endymion: The Romantic Epiphanic 179
a different place from the ordinary world, but the same world in which
the moral and imaginative realization of a higher kind of experience
takes place. Similarly, Dante's Eden is on the top of the mountain of
purgatory, which is on the surface of the same world that we live in.
Spenser's interest in the realization of the greater powers of the soul is,
for most of the poem, moral rather than imaginative in its expression and
imagery. In other words, Faerie in Spenser is mostly a purgatorial world,
like the corresponding world in Dante. But Spenser does have one great
vision in which it is the imaginative rather than the moral powers that
are realized. The first book of the poem as we have it outlines the central
Biblical myth of redemption, in the traditional terms of a movement
from God to man through grace and the Word; the last or sixth book
seems to be focused on the human counterpart of this, the legend of
courtesy, where grace and .healing words appear in their human context.
The poet himself, symbolized as Colin Clout, plays a part in the climactic
scene in this legend on Mount Acidale. Keats's special fondness for the
sixth book, the story of Calidore, is obvious enough.
The action of Endymion begins in the second of four worlds, the world
corresponding to Spenser's Faerie and to Dante's and Milton's Eden,
where Adam had his dream. In the earlier poets this is the world man
lost long ago, and can regain only through a long process of discipline. In
Keats, who is adapting the traditional structure to a Romantic outlook, it
is the world of the pastoral myth in which poetic creation begins, a world
still present and potential. It is the state that we work from, not the place
we return to: in his letters Keats calls it the "chamber of maiden
thought."117 The word "maiden" indicates a youthful and presexual
aspect of life, which the prominence given to Endymion's sister empha-
sizes. The phrase also indicates the reason for a curious feature of the
poem, a feature that has put off many readers, including, to judge from
his revised preface, Keats himself. We first meet the poet-hero in a state
of deep melancholy, and recognize the old Courtly Love convention.
This is the same state of helpless pining grief in which we first meet
Romeo; fair enough. But why should a poet as vigorous as Keats, who so
disliked the thought of being made "a pet lamb in a sentimental farce,"118
have created a hero so languid that his sister has to move the branches
out of his way as he walks through the woods?
The reason is that Endymion's world is the imprisoning, paralysing
world of dream, the dream being partly about a great achievement in the
future, and so accompanied by all the anxieties that go with the disloca-
•Endymion: The Romantic Epiphanic 181
tion of time. We have said that when man is born, his vision of innocence
remains unborn, and has to be brought to birth. Endymion is not literally
unborn, but his achievement is, and his world has the fragility that goes
with something that is only potentially alive. We may compare The Book
of Thel, by the equally vigorous Blake, with its shadowy dissolving im-
agery, where things melt into other things without taking on definite
existence, a world Thel could have escaped from by getting born, which
she fails to do. Similarly, the first book of Endymion introduces us to a
world in which spirits "melt away and thaw" [i.5Oi],119 as though the
mind and its moods had no permanent reality:
The purpose of his quest is to strike these roots into experience. Besides,
these lower worlds are also worlds of Diana, in her full extent as the great
diva triformis who is the moon in heaven, the virgin huntress of the forests
of earth, and the queen of the underworld. Rilke compares the poet to an
angel who contains all time and space, but is blind and looks into him-
self, the circumference of a total imaginative vision.123 Keats, speaking of
the blind Homer, also thinks of the poet as encompassing the entire
184 A Study of English Romanticism
world of the diva triformis from the moon-drawn sea to the moon:
—and the physical ups and downs of the landscape correspond roughly,
though by no means invariably, to the symbolic ups and downs of the
four levels. The two middle worlds of the cosmos are associated mainly
with the colour green, the heavenly and submarine extremities with
blue. The middle two both belong to the cycle of nature, the images of
Endymion's pastoral home being more particularly related to the earlier
phases of the cycle, youth, spring, and dawn. It is sexual love that makes
the cycle of nature go round, and the central image of this driving force
in Spenser (though in Spenser it is located in the world of Faerie above) is
the place of seed, or Garden of Adonis, where Adonis sleeps and dreams
through the winter and revives to life in summer. Endymion's coming at
the turn of the season helps to revive Adonis (unless his arrival at that
time was coincidence, which seems unlikely), and several other figures
of the same type of seasonal and dying-god mythology are introduced,
including a reference to Vertumnus and Pomona and a beautiful if
somewhat inconclusive vision of Cybele. In A Midsummer Night's Dream
there is a reference to "a fair vestal throned by the west" [2.1.158], with
the customary overtones of Queen Elizabeth, Diana, and the moon.
Cupid shoots an arrow at her, which falls short of her: its trajectory,
symbolizing the cycle of life and death under the moon, falls on a flower
and turns it purple, the red or purple flower being the emblem of the
Eros-Thanatos world of the gods of sexual love and death. This symbol
Endymion: The Romantic Epiphanic 185
appears in the bed of "ditamy, and poppies red" [1.555] in the prelude to
Endymion's vision, and a "cloudy Cupid" [1.799] with his arrows is also
introduced toward the end of the first book. The rhythm of vegetable life
reviving from death is picked up in the image of green plants bursting
through what appears to be the floor of a temple in the second book.
The visions of the earth, then, have two aspects: one a stage in the
developing and maturing of Endymion's mind, the other a stage in the
discovery of the conditions of a lower and more sinister world than the
one he was brought up in. The positive stage is represented by Endymion's
own sexual experience with the Indian maid, the story of Alpheus and
Arethusa forming a chorus to it. The initiation into the world of Eros is
both a fall (loss of innocence) and an advance to a greater maturity.
Arethusa is a nymph of Diana, who on this level is the elusive virgin
huntress, occasionally glimpsed but never possessed, and Arethusa's
complaints tell us how sexual union brings about a desire for a still more
complete union which it cannot satisfy; hence it is as much a frustration
and an upsetting of balance as it is a satisfaction. And yet the reality of
the experience as an incarnation of love is unanswerable: Endymion's
possession of the Indian maid is for him what birth would have been for
Blake's Thel, a new life which, although it is also a form of death, as
every new life is, also gives him the roots in experience that he lacked
before:
The other aspect of this journey through the earth, the discovery of a
lower phase of being, follows the normal Romantic pattern. We said that
the Romantic myth sees man as fallen from an identity with nature into a
state of individual and subjective consciousness, identity as himself.
When Endymion descends into the earth he also descends into this more
subjective state, cutting off the more intimate contact with his natural
environment that he possessed earlier. Such phrases as "The journey
homeward to habitual self" [2.276], "The goal of consciousness" [2.283],
and a reference to a loss of "freedom" [1.167] indicate the general direc-
tion of the journey, as does the imagery of jewels in the centre of the
earth, like the "orbed diamond" [2.245] whose illumination proceeds
186 A Study of English Romanticism
thing it wants and loves is at its greatest, another version of the world of
the bound Prometheus.
Even in the world of earth above, the love of Venus for Adonis is
already much more possessive than the love of Phoebe for Endymion,
much more that of a Blakean "female will" who keeps the lover bound to
a cycle of possession and loss. But Glaucus turns from his loved Scylla to
Circe, a Jungian "terrible mother" who puts him into a "specious heaven"
[3.477] where he is a pure subjective consciousness. Like Milton's Satan
after he separates himself from the community of God, Glaucus finds the
new feeling of individuality exhilarating at first:
To interknit
One's senses with so dense a breathing stuff
Might seem a work of pain; so not enough
Can I admire how crystal-smooth it felt,
And buoyant round my limbs. At first I dwelt
Whole days and days in sheer astonishment;
Forgetful utterly of self-intent. [3.380-6]
caping lovers in the bitter chill of The Eve of St. Agnes, including the
Bedesman who remains "aye unsought for" in spite of all his prayers [st.
42]. A similar group appears to be clustering in The Eve of St. Mark.
During the illness which forcibly separated him from Fanny Brawne,
Keats felt that he himself had fallen into a world which he describes as
Saturn uses the word in a similar sense in Hyperion. Of course the deci-
sive temperament may be found in creative people too: for Keats it
certainly is in Byron, and there is a touch of it in the "egotistical sub-
lime"129 of Wordsworth. The purest creative temperaments, however,
notably Shakespeare, show least admixture of it.
The point is that there are two kinds of identity. They might be distin-
guished as identity as and identity with, and they represent respectively
the two poles of Endymion's cosmos, the worlds of Circe and of Phoebe.
Endymion: The Romantic Epiphanic 189
its in the prisons of subject and object alike. There are also echoes of
Hercules releasing Theseus in the lower world, and a good deal of
imagery suggesting a version of the Theseus story in which all the
previous sacrifices to Minos were delivered from the labyrinth. Echoes of
the Christian Harrowing of Hell are less explicit. References to Arion in
book 2 and to Amphion, who appears to be assimilated to Arion, in book
3, and images of whales and dolphins, suggest the stories of Jonah and
other voyagers to the viscera of Leviathan. The dolphin, however, is
traditionally the image of salvation from the water, and reminds us
rather of Lycidas, who visited the bottom of the monstrous world but
became a protecting genius of the shore and also a saint in heaven.
Lycidas makes a remarkable reappearance in the lively little poem Staff a,
one of the figures in the more Shelleyan cosmos that Keats began to
develop after Endymion, in which renewed powers rise from below.
During his descent Endymion had feared the total loss of his identity,
and that he would suffer the traditional sparagmos fate of the god in the
underworld and be torn "piece-meal" [3.263]. But instead it is the scroll
that is torn up and that fertilizes the sunken world with a new life. The
student of Romantic poetry should compare the image of the torn-up
fertilizing scroll with the almost identical image in the speech of Ore in
Blake's America, plate 8.
The anabasis, or return to the upper states, has all the expected images
of rebirth. We have Atlantis, the rainbow following the deluge, the
reappearance of the sea-born Venus, and the description of Neptune's
throne as "emerald" [3.812], which indicates a reunion of the sphere of
water with that of the green earth. The hymn to Bacchus in book 4, sung
by the Indian maid, balances the hymn to Pan in book i, but is a product,
not simply of a state of innocence, but of a new energy that has returned
to that world from experience. Endymion then takes to the air, and seems
ready for his final ascent to the fire world of the gods where Phoebe is.
But overtones of Icarus and Bellerophon in the imagery warn us that all
is not plain flying, and Endymion receives an abrupt check. He attempts
a renewed pastoral life of the "Come live with me and be my love" type
with his sister and the Indian maid, attempting to consolidate his gains
and stay where he is, like Peter on the Mount of Transfiguration. It seems
a sensible enough solution: it is clear that the four levels of the poem's
cosmos are not a Platonic ladder, as Platonism is generally understood. It
would be inconsistent with everything we know of Keats to assume that
we ascend from the body into a higher world of the soul, abandoning the
Endymion: The Romantic Epiphanic 191
sexual basis of Eros, a basis which is also the matrix of all one's love and
compassion for society. The only real Phoebe, on Keats's own postulates,
would be an incarnate Phoebe, identical with the Indian maid. In Eliot's
Burnt Norton, the "still point of the turning world" [1. 136] is a middle
point identical both with the zenith of the vision of correspondence
preceding it, and the vision of death under the yew tree following it.
Similarly, as truth and beauty are the same thing, the goal of the quest for
beauty above and the goal of the quest for truth below would be the
same point, and that point in turn identical with the worlds of Peona and
the Indian maid in the middle.
The trouble is that Endymion's quest cannot be completed by an act of
will. That was why the Courtly Love tradition, although it demanded the
most strenuous efforts from the poet-lover, still made his ultimate suc-
cess depend on the grace of his lady. Hence Endymion has to wait until
he is "spiritualiz'd" [4.993] by an "unlook'd for change" [4.992], at which
point Phoebe, like Ligeia in Poe/31 takes over the Indian maid, and
carries Endymion off to her own world. The world of this final assump-
tion is still continuous with the physical and sexual world, but has
transformed it in a metamorphosis which goes in the opposite direction
from those celebrated by Ovid. The conclusion repeats an earlier theme
in the fourth book. Endymion had previously found himself, just after his
abortive flight, in the cave of Quietude, a cave of dreams like the Cave of
Nymphs in the Odyssey from whence Ulysses returned home, a cave
which also can be entered only involuntarily:
Enter none
Who strive therefore: on the sudden it is won. [4.531-2]
The fully awakened vision of the poet, which includes truth or knowl-
edge as well as beauty, depends, like the dream, on something beyond
the conscious will, and the unlooked-for change at the end resolves the
theme of "sleep and poetry" on which so much of Endymion turns. As
Keats says in the Letters: "The difference of high Sensations with and
without knowledge appears to me this—in the latter case we are falling
continually ten thousand fathoms deep and being blown up again
without wings and with all [the] horror of a bare shoulderd Creature—
in the former case, our shoulders are fledge, and we go thro' the same
air and space without fear."132 The reference to Milton's Satan indicates
that "knowledge," the element of truth which is part of beauty, makes
192 A Study of English Romanticism
the difference between sleep and poetry, dream and vision, chaos and
creation.
An extraordinary number of fascinating mythical themes are touched
on, explicitly and implicitly, in the fourth book of Endymion. Coming so
late in the poem, they seem almost to suggest the need of a fresh start,
and in fact there are signs of impatience and of a desire to begin again
with the story of Apollo. Different as Endymion is from The Prelude, it is
equally a poem about the growth of the poet's mind. The process of
growth is presented through myth and archetype, and consequently has
an impersonal and universalizing quality about it: it deals with the poet
rather than, like The Prelude, with a poet. But the direction of the theme,
and its personal reference to Keats, are both unmistakable:
spirits of the elements. The next step takes us into the world of the
awakened imagination, where we pass beyond the elemental spirits to
become united with the gods. This last stage of Endymion's pilgrimage is
illustrated by the divine figures with which Hyperion and the great odes
are so largely concerned.
Scylla, the beloved of Glaucus who is killed by Circe and brought to
life again by this liberating magic, represents the theme of the deliver-
ance of the bride from imprisonment in the lower world, which we meet
so often in myth, from Proserpine to Beddoes's Sibylla. The theme of the
failure of ascent is included in the fourth book of Endymion, as we saw,
and the most famous myth of such a failure is the story of Orpheus and
Eurydice. Keats returns to this aspect of his mythology in Lamia, a story
which is pathetic rather than cautionary. But, of course, the major at-
tempt to rewrite the anabasis of Endymion in terms of a different mythol-
ogy is Hyperion, the theme of which is announced in Endymion itself.
Hyperion is Miltonic in its structure as Endymion is Spenserian. The
fallen Titans, however, have not, like the devils in Milton, fallen outside
the earth into a hell far below it: they are at the bottom of the ladder of
identity, like the sea world of Circe. They are gods of power who are now
imprisoned, traditionally under volcanoes, actually in the objectivity of
nature. Hyperion, still undeposed, corresponds to the Father-God of
Milton who is still presiding over his court in heaven although all real
authority has been transferred to the Son. Out of this chaos of impotent
power emerges Apollo, a Logos-figure who is both divine and human,
and has achieved the poet's awareness of identity with his world. Prob-
ably a confrontation like the Son-Father confrontation of Demogorgon
and Jupiter in Shelley, though in a very different context, would have
come next, a struggle for the sun rather than the ocean.
The poetic universe of Hyperion is less traditional and more typically
Romantic than the universe of Endymion. Keats had really two structural
problems to solve for a complete Hyperion. One was the adapting of the
old Miltonic up-and-down universe to a Romantic in-and-out one, where
the presence of God, or what corresponds to God, is identified with the
creative power in the poet's mind. The other was the adapting of the old
spatial chain-of-being conception to a temporal one. For Hyperion also
has a "historical" or "evolutionary" scheme, with one power succeeding
another in time, which looks forward to a later phase of Romanticism,
like that represented by Victor Hugo's Legende des siecles. Hyperion be-
gins, as all good epics should, in the middle. To solve the first problem
19 sh Romanticism
the poet would need to work backward to the beginning in the poet's
mind, as The Fall of Hyperion attempts to do; to solve the second he would
need to go on with the story, in a narrative that would have taken him at
least through the "second war" of metamorphosis.
It is clear from what we have said that one essential function of poetry,
for Keats, is to help us move upward on Keats's version of the chain of
being, toward an identity with, or communion. The poetry that brings to
birth the unborn vision of beauty, we said, is the opposite in theme of the
poetry of metamorphosis, or the separating of subject and object, com-
memorated in Ovid and Apuleius, which is based on an alienation or fall
archetype. We should not read the great odes, for example, as subjective
contemplations of objects, which is the exact opposite of what they were
designed to be. They are rather a recovery, by poetry, of the myth
formerly projected as the worship of a god or numinous presence. In
Christianity this act of worship is expressed in a symbolic act of com-
munion, in the response of faith to a revelation symbolized by a divine
Word, and in the forming of a church, or community of response. The
Romantic counterparts of these would be, respectively, communion, or
the identity of the poet and his theme which the poem itself articulates;
communication, or the reader's understanding of the poem; and commu-
nity, or the forming of a society of readers, or a literary tradition.
If I say "this pencil is green," I am making a statement about a sensa-
tion of my own, identifying the pencil with my own experience, that I
cannot directly share with others. What makes it a statement of fact, or
enables it to pass for one, is a verbal consensus: other people agree when
I say it is green, though for all I know they may be seeing what I would
call red. Thus communication is a by-product of communion, the verbal-
izing of the identity of one's inner life. Communication in its turn is the
focus of community. As long as everyone agrees when I say this pencil is
green, the possibility of their seeing what to me is red is one I can afford
to ignore. And however trivial a statement about the colour of a pencil
may be, it is obvious that the verbal consensus which makes statements
of fact possible is the basis of human culture. A statement of imagination
is more flexible than a statement of fact, but the same three principles are
involved. (The argument from here on has a few parallels with Heidegger's
essays on Holderlin, where three similar principles are described as
world, language, and history.)133
The poem, then, begins in the poet's experience of communion or
identity with. This seems to be a private and subjective communion in
Endymion: The Romantic Epiphanic 195
which only the poet is involved, and so in one context it is. But the
language of poetry is not a subjective language, nor is it objective like
descriptive language, even when it uses the same words. It is the magical
or spellbinding language of symbol essences, the voice of the world
where the mind behind the subject and the world behind the objects are
united, where nature and personality are at one, as they formerly were in
the sea-gods and sky-gods of ancient mythologies. We began this chapter
by saying that in the Romantic period poetry becomes, not a substitute
for or another form of religion, but, increasingly, the medium for under-
standing religion, as the sense of reality in religion slowly shifts over
from the doctrinal and conceptual to the imaginative and mythical.
Hence the analogies we have mentioned between Romantic poetry, as
exemplified by both the theory and the practice of Keats and Shelley, and
the Christian religion of their cultural milieu, go quite a long way. In
religion, communion takes place within the body of a divine man who is
also a liberating and creative Word, and whose home is Paradise. In
these poets, the divine man is not the poet, but Man, the universal human
mind of Shelley's Prometheus; the liberating Word is the voice of the
imagination which speaks through poetry, and its task is to awaken the
vision of the beauty of the uncreated world we have in ourselves, so that,
like Adam who really was in Paradise, we awake to find the dream true.
The great odes, with their heavily brocaded texture and their sense of
utter absorption in meditation, are the finest poems of communion, in
the Romantic context, that the Romantic movement achieved. Like the
great twentieth-century poems of meditation, Eliot's Quartets, they do
not deal directly with the world of ordinary experience or with the
demonic world. These worlds are there by implication, but in a context
where their reality becomes unreal, just as the subway passengers in
Burnt Norton, though their prototypes are in contemporary London, are
present only as shadows in a fantastic Hades. Whenever the demonic
world appears in Keats—in the terrible clarity of La Belle Dame Sans
Merci, in the tragedy of Isabella, whose basil pot is a parody of the one-
pointed contemplation of the odes, in Lamia—it is seen, like the foul
monsters in Spenser's fairyland, from within the charmed circle of ro-
mance.
One obvious characteristic of communion poetry is a tendency to
synaesthetic imagery as represented by the line in Isabella, "And taste the
music of that vision pale" [st. 49,1. 8]. Such imagery includes the contact
senses of taste and smell and feeling along with the more conventional
196 A Study of English Romanticism
a constant motif and where the identity of delight and melancholy, of joy
and frustration, of escape and annihilation, of the allegro and penseroso
moods everywhere, is constantly present.
But while joy and sorrow are different aspects of the same thing,
beauty and ugliness are not. The identification of beauty and truth means
that ultimately the conception of beauty would have to embrace the
ironic vision as well as the romantic one, applying as much to Swift as to
Keats. But in Keats's practice, as in general usage, the vision of beauty is
a vision of loveliness, of the attractive world, the unborn Paradise. We
noticed that the sinister and tragic in Keats are seen within the conven-
tions of romance, which means that they are often seen as incomplete
forms of the vision of beauty. Lamia, for instance, as previously sug-
gested, is in some respects almost a Eurydice figure: perhaps if Lycius
had not made two mistakes, one of listening to a Platonist who preferred
thoughts to sensations, the other of letting in the public too soon, he
might have gone all the way from Circe's world to Phoebe's, taking
Lamia with him. The poetry of Keats as we have it is set against the
world of experience, as something which is in that world but not of it. We
see this particularly in Keats's style. The odes in particular depend on
magic spells and charms, on the marking off of special holy places and
the building of private temples in the mind, on escape from noise and
vulgarity, on a watchword of favete Hnguis [keep a religious silencel and
on an intensely hieratic rather than a demotic consciousness. The style of
such poetry has to be a rhetorical tour de force, kept up to a uniform level.
Either we surrender to its spell or we leave the poem alone, and even if
we do surrender to it, the tiniest variation in the mood would disturb us.
Such a style was not Keats's own ideal: his ideal was that of a com-
pletely flexible style, a style with the dramatic versatility of Shakespeare's.
The hieratic or uniform style of Hyperion is associated by Keats, not
strictly with Milton, but with Milton's influence on him. The revisions in
The Fall of Hyperion, so far as style and diction are concerned, seem to
have as their general aim the moving away from the homogeneity of
Hyperion toward a more relaxed tone, one which suggests a story being
told, as well as less striving for the invariably impressive rhetoric of
deity. Keats associates this more flexible style not only with Shakespeare
but with Chatterton, to whom he dedicated Endymion. Evidently he felt
that the archaism of Chatterton could be the basis of a more concrete and
specific style, capable of the familiar as well as the impressive, than the
archaism of Milton with its more Latin bias. What we may feel to be the
198 A Study of English Romanticism
Keats could get little help here either from a Christian monotheism or
a Greek polytheism. For analogies to the kind of assumptions underlying
his poetry we have to turn to Oriental religions, and when Keats in his
2oo A Study of English Romanticism
letters says that "any one grand and spiritual passage serves [man] as a
starting post towards all 'the two-and-thirty Pallaces/"141 the Oriental
sound of the last phrase is significant. There are types of lyrics in Chinese
and Japanese literatures which seem to be doing something deceptively
simple, merely observing or recording a scene in nature. There is a
famous Japanese haiku, for example, which says in effect, in seventeen
syllables, only "Frog; pool; splash." But such poems do not really present
the seeing of objects by subjects: the poet's mind surrounds and contains
what he describes, and as his mind, according to the principles of most of
the philosophies and religions contemporary with such poetry, is united
to a universal mind in which all things are, he is presenting a scene of
nature in its proper context, where it is both what the poet creates and
what is really there.
The traditional term for the appearance of a divine presence in human
life is "epiphany," a term used in Christianity for certain appearances of
Christ, in particular to the Magi. Joyce uses the word as a critical term in
Stephen Hero, and appears to have adopted it because of his full agree-
ment with the Romantic tendency to associate all manifestations of di-
vinity with the creative spirit of man. But Joyce seems to have thought of
the basis of the epiphany, in its literary context, as an actual event,
brought into contact with the creative imagination, but untouched by it,
so that it preserves the sense of something contained by the imagination
and yet actual in its own terms. As Stevens says, one is more apt to
confide in what has no concealed creator.142 Wordsworth was the great
pioneer, almost the discoverer, of epiphany in this sense, as something
observed but not essentially altered by the imagination, which yet has a
crucial significance for that imagination. Such poems as Simon Lee are
based on epiphanies in Joyce's usual sense of actual (or, at least, readily
credible) incidents, and The Prelude is in the same sense an epiphanic
sequence, a series of incidents in the poet's life which by their arrange-
ment take the form of an imaginative quest. The more recent cults of
"found objects" in the visual arts, of "happenings" in the dramatic ones,
and of chance progressions in music, testify to the continued vitality of
the association between the random and the oracular.
Joyce and Wordsworth are mainly concerned with the kind of poetry
of experience that Keats did not develop. Keats's odes are epiphanic in a
narrower and more traditional sense. They are not concerned with ob-
jects or experiences found at random, but with icons or presences which
have been at once invoked and evoked by a magical spell, and held as a
Endymion: The Romantic Epiphanic 201
paradisal vision in the context of the fall: for them it was something man
has lost, and cannot regain through his own efforts. His efforts are
essential, but they are moral efforts: man cannot create or recreate para-
dise, though God may put him back into it after the moral quest has been
completed. Dante's Eden is explicitly on top of the mountain of purga-
tory, but Spenser's Faerie and Milton's "Paradise within thee, happier
far,"151 also, we saw, belong to a Purgatorio rather than a Paradiso.
Similarly, Keats speaks in his Epistle to Reynolds of the imagination being
lost in a "Purgatory blind" [1. 80], and the vale of soul-making spoken of
in the letters is also a purgatorial conception. The moral earnestness of
Keats drew him closer to these predecessors than to any direct tran-
scendence of experience. The kind of nature mysticism we have just
associated with Wordsworth, Shelley, and Zen Buddhism seems to be
talking about a nature which, like the myth of Paradise itself, is more of a
picture of nature than existential nature, something to be contemplated
but not lived in. It may be true as far as it goes, but if we compare it with
the ferocity and horror that nature, including human nature, actually
exhibits, once we enter into its processes, our "natural piety" would soon
make Dr. Pangloss look like a realist by comparison.152 In the soul-
making passage Keats says: "But in truth I do not at all believe in this sort
of perfectibility—the nature of the world will not admit of it—the inhab-
itants of the world will correspond to itself. Let the fish philosophise the
ice away from the Rivers in winter time and they shall be at continual
play in the tepid delight of summer."153 In the Epistle to Reynolds, just
mentioned, he goes on to speak of "an eternal fierce destruction" as the
essence of his vision of nature [1. 97!.
The traditional solution of the problem of attaining an innocent vision
in the midst of a ferocious nature is, of course, that the real end of the
innocent vision is not in this life at all, but in what Keats calls this life's
"spiritual repetition"154 in another world. The soul, Keats says, achieves
its identity through the interaction of three principles, a mind or intelli-
gence, a "heart," and the "World or Elemental space."155 It is this last in
particular that is the purgatorial element. The interpenetrating world,
just described, is clearly a world without space, and once the soul's
identity has been achieved, the "World or Elemental space" would dis-
appear. In the world of immortality, Keats says, "there will be no space,"156
and nothing left of what Blake calls the cloven fiction of subjects and
objects. This brings us to the great vision which is at the heart of Endymion,
the upper world that Endymion finally attains, described in a passage
Endymion: The Romantic Epiphanic 203
feeling that every argument he advanced on the point was one in the eye
for atheism, scepticism, and "psilanthropism."160 In Burke we see, much
more clearly than in Coleridge, that this new sense of identity does have
a real enemy. Burke identifies the enemy with the Jacobinism of the
French Revolution. Burke's view of the French Revolution itself, how-
ever, is not very rewarding: what is important is his prophetic vision of
the kind of society that we now call totalitarian, where the sense of
identity is restricted to society, where the sense of the continuity of
tradition is annihilated, and where the general will of society is uncondi-
tioned by any reference to a goal beyond the immediate objects of those
in power.
The Romantic poets, especially Keats, preserve the feeling that at the
heart of the best and fullest life is something antisocial, or more accu-
rately something beyond society which is still essential to human iden-
tity. It is not important what we call this, or rather, it is important that
different people should call it different things. Today, technology has
created for us a society in which each man is made aware of an entire
world of experience, interpenetrating with the awareness of all his neigh-
bours. Human nature being what it is, its first response to this situation is
to create out of it a hell of unparalleled hysteria. We can no longer live in
the relatively comfortable and quiet hell of The Waste Land, where "each
man fixed his eyes before his feet" [1. 65!, but are plunged into the
whirlwind of the mob itself, where there is no rest and no escape. When
we search for the inner resources that the sane mind can draw on in
trying to deal with a demonic interpenetrating world, poetry takes on a
new importance, especially the poetry that seems most directly opposed
to it. Thus the Romantic vision of Keats itself acquires, in the course of
time, the militant and crusading quality of a poetry of experience.
This is merely a special case of the general principle that no poetry of
high intensity covers a part only of the imaginative world: it covers its
entire range, by implication at least. We saw how the impetus of Keats's
imagination was carrying him in the direction of a poetry of concern and
compassion, of songs of experience in which the connection of sleep,
with its wish-fulfilment dreams, and poetry had finally been broken off.
But in the course of time his written poetry becomes also, for us, what his
unwritten poetry would have been. When the poet has done all he can in
communion and communication, the responsibility for forming the third
element of literature, the community of response, rests on us. In the
Bhagavadgita Arjuna, fighting his kinsmen on a battlefield, wanted to
Endymion: The Romantic Epiphanic 205
escape from the fight to a world of greater reality. His charioteer, the god
Krishna in disguise, convinced him that there was nowhere to go, and
after that, Arjuna saw on the battlefield the epiphany of the universe in
the body of Krishna. The song of the nightingale, the "cold Pastoral" of
the Grecian urn [1.45], the magic casements in the castle of the soul that
open to the warm love rising from the perilous seas seem to us, at first,
images of a poetry of refuge, a dream of a lost paradise. That is a possible
but shallow response: the disciplined response understands that these
poems are visions on and of the battlefield itself, not the subjective
fantasies of retreat. Only a community which has disciplined itself to
respond can even hear the voice of Keats's whispering democracy, the
voice of a society which includes both nature and humanity, a being
solidly rooted in a ground of being, and uniting death to life.
11
John Keats
1968
KEATS (kets), John, English poet: born London, England, October 31,
1795; died Rome, Italy, February 23,1821. He was born at the Swan and
Hoop livery stable, Finsbury Pavement, and baptized at St. Botolph's
Church, Bishopsgate, on December 18, 1795, where in the baptismal
register the date of his birth is given as above. His father Thomas Keats,
who kept the livery stable, had married Frances Jennings, the daughter
of his former employer, a fairly well-to-do businessman. John was the
eldest of four children surviving infancy: George was born in 1797,
Thomas in 1799, and Frances (Fanny) in 1803. In 1804 his father died as a
result of being thrown from a horse on the night of April 15/16. The
mother was remarried in June to a William Rawlings, but this marriage
was evidently a mistake, and the family moved to the home of her
mother, Mrs. Jennings, in Edmonton. John had been sent in 1803 to a
school at Enfield, two miles away, where he remained until 1811, and
where the son of the headmaster, Charles Cowden Clarke, became a
close friend. The poet's mother died in 1810, and as a result of a will
drawn up by Mrs. Jennings (who died herself in 1814), two guardians for
the Keats children were appointed of whom one, Richard Abbey, a tea
merchant, seems to have assumed full responsibility.
At school Keats is said by a schoolmate to have been chiefly interested
in fighting the other boys, although he won book prizes and is said to
have completed by 1811 a prose translation of the Aeneid, now lost. He
John Keats 207
was not a prodigy, but his earliest extant poem, Imitation of Spenser, may
date from 1812, and indicates the early impact of one of his major poetic
influences. In 1811, on leaving school, he was apprenticed to a surgeon,
Thomas Hammond, and although he speaks later of having had a quar-
rel with Hammond, he went on with his medical studies, interning in
two London hospitals, Guy's and St. Thomas's. He was entered at Guy's
in October 1815, was appointed dresser to a hospital surgeon named
Lucas on March 3, 1816, and passed an examination at Apothecaries'
Hall in July 1816, obtaining his license to practise. It was not until he had
come of age, at the end of 1816, that he announced to his guardian his
intention of abandoning medicine for poetry.
Meanwhile Keats had been forming a circle of literary friends in Lon-
don, of whom two were of particular importance to him at this time: the
painter Benjamin Robert Haydon and the poet and critic Leigh Hunt. In
the controversy then raging over the Elgin marbles, Haydon was largely
responsible for having them purchased and their authenticity accepted,
and it was through Haydon that Keats first made contact with Greek
plastic art that had so profound an effect on his poetry. Leigh Hunt and
his magazine, the Examiner, formed the centre of a London coterie which
was liberal in politics and Romantic in literature and was called by the
opposing Tory periodical Blackwood's Magazine the "Cockney School."
Hunt had been imprisoned as a result of an alleged libel on the prince
regent, and his release from imprisonment in February 1815 was cel-
ebrated by Keats in a sonnet. Hunt is referred to several times in Keats's
early poems as "Libertas." Of critics, Keats most admired the radical
William Hazlitt, who later became a personal friend: through Hunt,
Keats met the even more revolutionary Shelley. On May 5,1816, Keats's
first published poem, a sonnet, O Solitude, appeared in the Examiner, and
the finest of his early poems, the sonnet On First Looking into Chapman's
Homer, written in October, appeared in the same periodical on Decem-
ber i. By the end of 1816, Keats had written enough to fill the volume of
Poems which was published by Charles and James Oilier on March 3,1817.
There is little in the 1817 volume of major importance, but the book
announced a new poet of great promise and fresh insight and clearly
defined his sympathies. After a dedication to Leigh Hunt, it opened with
a sketch of the theme of the myth of Endymion which had already begun
to haunt Keats, a poem beginning "I stood tiptoe upon a little hill." There
followed an abortive tale of chivalry, Calidore (the name of the chief
knight in the sixth book of Spenser's Faerie Queene), then some juvenile
208 On Romanticism
details are not clear: Abbey may have invented difficulties, though his
actual dishonesty seems unlikely. Haydon had been pressing hard for a
loan which Keats finally made, but certainly could not afford. Keats was
compelled to begin borrowing money from Brown and to try to turn his
pen to more profitable use. In July 1819 he began a five-act tragedy, Otho
the Great, in collaboration with Brown, who dictated the plot while Keats
versified it. The friends hoped to make money out of this play by offering
it to Kean, and Keats was much disappointed when Kean left in Septem-
ber for an American tour. Otho the Great is not a very interesting piece
except in the fifth act, when Keats assumed more control of the action,
and it has probably never been produced on the stage. Another dramatic
venture, King Stephen, never got beyond four admirably vigorous scenes.
In November Keats was writing the unfinished potboiler known as The
Cap and Bells, an allusive satire told as a fairy tale, in a vein of synthetic
whimsy profoundly uncongenial to him.
Fortunately Keats devoted his evenings and other spare time to work
more in his own idiom. Lamia, a sinister tale of a serpent-maiden based
on a passage in one of his favourite books, Robert Burton's Anatomy of
Melancholy,w was begun in July when Keats was living in the village of
Shanklin on the Isle of Wight, and completed in September. On Septem-
ber 19, 1819, at Winchester, in a final magnificent flareup of his genius,
he wrote To Autumn. He was then faced with the problem of what to do
with Hyperion. A letter of September 21 announced that he had given up
the poem, finding that its strongly Miltonic diction was making it in-
creasingly an imitative tour deforce.^ However, he attempted to recast it
as The Fall of Hyperion: A Dream. In this form the poem begins with a
prelude which puts the events of the original poem into a vision shown
to the poet by the goddess Moneta, and then goes on with a revised
version of Hyperion, the changes being almost invariably for the worse, as
far as line 217. It was natural that some critics should take The Fall of
Hyperion to be the earlier of the two versions, but this view has been
thoroughly examined and is no longer accepted.
Brief as Keats's life was, his productive career, which for all practical
purposes ended with the ode To Autumn, was still briefer. Ever since the
Scottish tour he had suffered recurrent attacks of sore throat; he had
nursed Tom through his fatal illness; he had had a year of creative
activity unmatched in the history of English poetry, and it is not surpris-
ing that the winter of 1819-1820 found him greatly lowered in vitality. In
January 1820 he was listless and moody, and a brief return of George
212 On Romanticism
from America to collect his share of the family legacy did little for his
spirits and nothing for his purse. On February 3 came an attack of blood-
spitting which Keats, with his medical training, recognized for what it
was. "I know the colour of that blood," he said to Brown: "it is arterial
blood—I cannot be deceived in that colour; that drop of blood is my
death-warrant—I must die."12
In March he was ordered by his doctor to give up all work, and in a
few months a poet of bounding health and energy had become a passive
invalid. His greatest misery was caused by the hopelessness of his love
for Fanny Brawne. Though some of Keats's friends disliked her, there is
no reasonable doubt of her devotion to him, but she had health and he
had not; she engaged in social activities he could not share in, and his
letters and poems to her often show a desperately possessive jealousy.
With the good services of his publishers and the barrister Richard
Woodhouse, a most competent editor, transcriber, and critic, who from
the beginning had recognized Keats as the greatest genius since Milton,
Lamia, Isabella, The Eve of St. Agnes, and Other Poems was published in the
beginning of July. The "other poems" included Hyperion and the great
odes to the Nightingale, the Grecian Urn, Melancholy, Psyche, and Au-
tumn. La Belle Dame Sans Merci was not included: it was first published in
the Indicator, another magazine of Leigh Hunt's, on May 20, over the
gloomy pseudonym of "Caviare" (echoing Hamlet's "caviare to the gen-
eral" [Hamlet, 2.2.436-7!). The 1820 volume, as it is usually called, had a
considerably better critical reception than Endymion, but Keats was past
caring, in spite of a rally in health which deceived his doctor. Hemorrhages
set in again on June 22, and he moved restlessly about, taking shelter
with Leigh Hunt and then with Fanny Brawne and her mother.
As it seemed obvious that another winter in England would be a death
sentence, plans were made to get the ailing poet away. Offers of help
came from various quarters, including a very generous one from a total
stranger, a Scotsman named John Aitken. Shelley invited Keats to his
home in Pisa, an invitation which Keats, who never warmed up to
Shelley, put aside, in the letter which contains the famous phrase, "[Y]ou
might curb your magnanimity and be more of an artist, and 'load every
rift' of your subject with ore."13 Keats sailed for Italy on September 18,
1820, in the company of the painter Joseph Severn, a friend of long
standing, enduring a rough voyage, quarantine, and a badly equipped
ship, and arriving in Naples on October 21. Keats took a dislike to what
he considered an atmosphere of tyranny in Naples, and in November
John Keats 213
Citation for an honorary degree from the University of Toronto, from the
typescript in NFF, 1988, box 6, file o. Coburn was a long-time colleague of
Frye's in the Department of English at Victoria College. She had become general
editor of Coleridge's Collected Works, and exemplified a type of scholarship that
was at the opposite pole from Frye's, involving meticulous documentation and
textual work.1 Frye refers in the text to her anthology of Coleridge's writings,
Inquiring Spirit (1951, reviewed in no. 6, above), and also to two of her public
lectures: the 1979 Alexander Lectures at the University of Toronto, published as
Experience into Thought: Perspectives in the Coleridge Notebooks (1979),
and the 1973 Riddell Memorial Lectures at the University of Newcastle, pub-
lished as The Self-Conscious Imagination (1974).
Mr. Chancellor:
In a forthcoming CBC documentary on the Massey family, Hart Massey
is quoted as saying, "My mind was formed by Victoria College." I think
Miss Coburn's mind was also formed, if not by Victoria College, at least
at it, because hers is one of those proud generations in which this univer-
sity possessed two powerful mind-forming agencies, the autonomous
college and the structured Honour Course. Having squandered these,
the university can no longer form the minds of its arts students on such a
scale, though it may occasionally catch one and train it. Miss Coburn
knows very well how fortunate she has been, and has said so in her
charming autobiography, In Pursuit of Coleridge, which I warmly com-
mend to your attention. She entered the Philosophy and English Honour
Course, where her chief mentors were G.S. Brett in philosophy and
Pelham Edgar in English. For Edgar the sun rose and set on the great
216 On Romanticism
English Romantics, and for Brett the keystone of the history of philoso-
phy was Kant; hence, for a lively and imaginative student mind exposed
to such influences, a special interest in Coleridge was a natural enough
development.
She went on to Oxford, and, by a series of accidents which were clearly
not really accidents, she gained access to the fifty-odd notebooks of
Coleridge in possession of the Coleridge family, and later discovered the
lost manuscript of Coleridge's Philosophical Lectures, an edition of which
was her first publication. I was a student at Oxford myself at the time,
and remember something of the consternation caused by the news of her
taking so commanding a place in Coleridge studies.2 Besides being young
and unknown, she was, after all, a woman, and in those days some
Oxford professors would still walk into a classroom half full of women
and begin their lecture with the word "gentlemen." Then again, she was
a colonial, and the illiteracy of colonials was a favourite topic of Oxonian
senior common rooms. What those who did not know her missed was
what everyone who did know her recognized at once: the quiet authority
which conveyed that, of the dozens of academics panting to edit the
Coleridge notebooks, or at any rate sit on them to keep others from doing
it, this was the one who could, who should, and who would.
She made the courageous but obviously right decision to get the whole
editorial strategy clear in her mind before publishing the first volumes,
which delayed their publication but made them permanent when they
did appear. Annotation was simpler in principle, because for annotating
Coleridge only one requirement is needed, namely omniscience. Largely
through her efforts, scholarly interest in Coleridge expanded to the point
at which a collected edition of his works became a practical possibility,
and Miss Coburn, of course, became general editor of this colossal enter-
prise. In shorter compass, there are two anthologies of Coleridge and two
volumes of public lectures, one the brilliant series of Alexander Lectures
given on this campus last fall. She has also edited the letters of Sara
Hutchinson and has a most comprehensive knowledge of the whole
Romantic period, but her centre of gravity has always been Coleridge,
and she has done more than anyone else to make us realize that, even in a
period of such incredible vitality, Coleridge is the one who comes nearest
to Goethe in the range and versatility of his mental powers.
The study of the humanities without the possession of humanity is a
mockery, and I refer you to her own writings for a sense of the personal-
ity behind all this industry, erudition, and organizing skill. It comes out
Kathleen Hazel Coburn 217
Mr. Chancellor, in the name of the Governing Council I ask you to confer
the degree of Doctor of Letters, honoris causa, on Miss Kathleen Coburn.
13
How It Was
Winter 1982
When I was a very green student in the graduate school here, sometime
around 1935 or 1936, we had a Graduate English Club, and I remember a
very bright paper on Shelley, full of such remarks as the word "unpre-
meditated" in the Skylark poem being more suggestive of a typewriter
than a bird. It was quite a bright paper, as I say, but I had read Eliot's
early essays by that time, and suddenly in the middle of it I realized that
I was watching a bandwagon going by. Incredible as it sounds, it had
never occurred to me before that the study of English literature could be
just as full of vogues and fashions as anything else. So I decided to
develop an interest in the Romantics (I was already interested in Blake)
as much out of perversity as anything else. That is, I was damned if I was
going to start rushing this way and that in obedience to a trend. The seed
of doubt in the importance of value judgments generally was also deeply
implanted in me at this point.
14
In the Earth, or in the Air?
17 January 1986
Paul de Man's last book is, like its predecessors Blindness and Insight and
Allegories of Reading, a collection of essays concerned with practical and
explicatory criticism in the Romantic and post-Romantic periods. Con-
sidered as a single volume, it is a better book than de Man himself
suggests. He speaks in his preface of having written a series of essays,
each one coherent in itself, but not carrying over from one to the next or
working out what he calls a parataxis, a linear sequence that accumulates
as it goes on and presents the reader with a whole that is more than the
sum of its parts. Perhaps this is true, but as his is simply not this kind of
book, the fact need not be a deficiency. What is interesting is that the
assumption in Blindness and Insight that such books were theoretically
very dubious no longer seems to be an assumption.
What we have is a set of variations on a protean theme, the theme
being an antithetical dialectic—symbol and allegory, image and emblem,
anthropomorphism and figuration, aesthetics and violence—which ex-
ists in every area of Romanticism, but never really becomes anything
more than an antithesis, either in the Romantic period or in ours. The
sixteenth-century Anabaptist Hans Denck remarked that "Whoever leaves
an antithesis without resolving it lacks the ground of truth."1 Brave
words, but they are the words of a theologian who must put all things
under his feet. It is a tribute to de Man's integrity that, writing in a
century that has failed to resolve any of its most formidable antitheses,
he leaves things that way.
220 On Romanticism
misses its own main point. The physical location of this place of the new
relation is the old heaven, which in pre-Romantic ideology was both the
place of the presence of God and the metaphor for that presence, the
lower heaven or the sky. De Man notes the religious colouring of the
language in all three poets he quotes, but not the curious parody (it really
amounts to that) of the older vision of natura naturata, the structure or
system of nature that traditionally forms a second word of God.
A very deep-seated dilemma for the poet appears here. As long as it
continues to use words, literature can never be as purely abstract an art
as painting or music. Nouns and verbs still have to name things and
actions, and if a poet feels that his world is divided between an earth
where words grow like flowers and some kind of ionosphere where there
are no phenomena any more, what kind of words can he use for the
latter? He can stare at this world with fear, reverence, or dislike; he can
talk about its emotional effect on him; but he can't incorporate it into his
poetry without using clay-born imagery. The only alternative is an occa-
sional tour de force, such as Mallarme achieves in speaking of the terrify-
ing and haunting "azur" in the poem [L'Azur] that so bewildered his
contemporaries. De Man denies that Mallarme's "azur" really belongs to
this nonphenomenal conception of nature, because he is anxious to keep
Mallarme among the earth-based poets. But when no poet can get off the
ground and sustain himself in the "azur" anyway, I doubt if this objec-
tion means much.
In another essay de Man starts off with a remark of Nietzsche's that
truth is metaphor, metonymy, and anthropomorphism, and then analy-
ses two sonnets of Baudelaire that are clearly intended to form a contrast,
the famous Correspondances and Obsession. The first tells us that nature
communicates infinite mysteries; the second tells us that nature com-
municates nothing at all with any human relevance. Nobody who thinks
of this kind of thing as a "contradiction" ought to be reading poetry: de
Man sees the contrast, which is what it is, as the same contrast as the one
between nature as man's home and nature as the alienating otherness
just mentioned.
We notice that de Man does not take the word "apocalypse" seriously
(in striking contrast to, for instance, Meyer Abrams's Natural Super-
naturalism), as describing a form of imaginative comprehension, although
it appeared in the quotation from Wordsworth in the opening essay.
Apocalypse is revelation, and to reveal is to be at a distance, communi-
cating, but suggesting an infinite possession—from which the revelation
In the Earth, or in the Air? 223
The earlier Blindness and Insight was a much more theoretical book,
concerned mainly with such critics as Poulet, Derrida, Binswanger,
Blanchot, and Lukacs. Some readers felt that it was also a rather negative
book, setting out all the things that words can't and shouldn't be ex-
pected to do, and giving the effect of a ceaseless driving around a strange
city in a tangle of one-way streets and unmarked dead ends. I don't feel
this: I feel that it is concerned to show that the conflict of ideologies in
Romanticism I spoke of springs from a sense that the old subject-object
paradigm of experience did not work any more, at any rate in anything
approximating literature. The reader is not a simple subject: the text he is
reading is not a simple object. We may postulate a verbal world interme-
diate between subject and object, but that creates a fresh set of difficul-
ties: one may easily treat a verbal structure as though it were a natural
object, as the "formalists" do when they make a cult of organic whole-
ness. Poems are organic wholes for the same reasons that pills are round:
not because roundness is their essence, but because that shape favours
assimilation.
The word "blindness" suggests the fable of the six blind men and the
elephant. Some critics seize on the prophetic element in Romanticism,
others on the impersonality or transcendence of the subject, others on the
redemptive potential in literature in leading us to God or Marx. All these
are "rhetorics of blindness," in the sense that the elephant does have a
trunk and a tail besides being an elephant, and the fact that he is per-
ceived to have these things constitutes an insight. But who can show us
the real and the whole beast?
Most Romantic-centred critics have one figure that they use as a
Virgilian guide through its contradictory mazes; and for de Man that
figure is Rousseau. He says, basing the statement on Holderlin but clearly
endorsing most of it himself, that "it is Rousseau's turning away from
sense perception towards the 'sentiment of existence' that he [Holderlin]
sees as the crucial moment in the development of Western thought" [38].
And later, "Rousseau represents a turning point in the history of Western
consciousness because he was the first to attempt a way out of this
impasse" [40]. That is, the impasse created by the subject-object duality
in which the objective is the master.
The second half of Allegories of Reading concentrates entirely on
Rousseau, and in Blindness and Insight the crucial essay is concerned with
Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau's essay on the origins of writing—
a very carefully selected text from Derrida's point of view. Assuming
226 On Romanticism
Review of Gilbert and Sullivan's Patience and John Galsworthy's The Silver
Box, from the "Monocle" section of Ada Victoriana, 56, no. 5 (March 1932):
32-4. This article and the next were written during f rye's undergraduate years
for the student literary magazine of Victoria College. During the 1931-32
academic year, Frye's third, he and Mary Morton were "Monocle editors," in
charge of the section that reviewed college activities and productions. The Music
Club's annual productions of a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta were an important
part of student life. They were directed by Thomas ("Tommy") James Crawford
(1877-1955), distinguished composer, choral director, and organist at Timothy
Eaton Memorial Church, who conducted the Music Club at Victoria from 1927
to 1942.
Patience
This year the Music Club have selected an opera from the Gilbert and
Sullivan repertoire which in many ways is a sharp contrast to the one of
the preceding year. Whereas the plot of The Gondoliers1 was a mere
skeleton framework on which Sullivan hung a long string of fluent and
graceful melodies, Patience, on the contrary, is primarily a biting satire on
the more precious of the fin de siecle esoteric cults and its music is almost
incidental. The result was that the Music Club, in emphasizing, perhaps
overemphasizing, the purely musical aspect of the work, assimilated the
comparatively simple choruses and solos quite thoroughly and made
them essential, while the satire of the piece was slurred over into the
burlesque. This was no doubt more or less inevitable in view of the fact
that the follies it attacks are largely obsolete, but if it was inevitable, then
230 On the Nineteenth Century
the choice of the piece was not a wise one. That seemed to be the general
impression. I should like to quote with approval the words of one of the
principals: "The closer the Music Club keeps to the Pirates of Penzance
sort of thing, the better off they will be."
In spite of this initial difficulty, and in spite too of their very obvious
lack of depth of insight into the music, the Club put on a capable and
entertaining performance. Easily the best work was done by Bessie Moun-
tain as Lady Jane—probably the most difficult part as well. Her truly
superb piece of restrained clowning was not only the highlight of the
performance, but toned down almost to the vanishing point the glaring
weakness of Gilbertian comedy—the theory that it is uproariously funny
to make fun of an old woman. Aubrey Smith as Bunthorne was fairly
effective, but in him the regrettable tendency spoken of above to over-
burlesque the performance found its clearest expression. Space precludes
detailed mention of other principals, all of whom sang well and carried
off their parts admirably. The best acting, among those who had a chance
to act, was probably done by Bessie Mountain, Ray McKnight, and Roy
Wood.
The main attractiveness of the performance was in the performers
themselves rather than in the work they did. The freshness, enthusiasm,
spontaneity, and wholesomeness of the stage atmosphere, combined
with a technique sufficiently good not to be in itself positively jarring or
annoying, disarms criticism and results in the Club getting far better
write-ups than they deserve. It is easy enough for anyone with a pair of
ears to say sarcastic things about inaccurate singing, sloppy diction,
badly balanced group work, unexpected modulations, and obvious nerv-
ousness, but in the last analysis no one can resist the kids in the Music
Club. Their faults aid rather than hinder this, which accounts for the
patronizing way in which the Toronto papers criticize them. I think,
therefore, that Mr. Crawford would have been quite justified in giving
to, say, Patience and Saphir the parts they had whether they could have
sung them acceptably or not.
I should like to recommend that the Music Club repertoire be confined
to Gilbert and Sullivan. Light and catchy music is essential to keep up the
interest, and these operas are greatly preferable to the long and involved
works of German composers or Ethel Smyth, which are far too difficult
for the organization. American light opera is often, as with De Koven,
at best a feeble imitation of their work, or else lacks the breezy and
diatonic straightforwardness which appeals so strongly to the musi-
Review of Patience and The Silver Box 231
In the days when the career of the writer of this article was more closely
bound up with the Dramatic Society than it is now,3 the choice of the play
for last year was greeted by a Hart House director with, "Why in hell will
you pick an English play?" The answer is, of course, that it is quite
impossible to pick anything else. A big play, which articulates the year's
efforts of a Dramatic Society, must be of sufficiently high standard to be
worth trying and at the same time suitable to the occasion. Ignore the
first rule, and you may put on a cheap American farce, which, when
amusing, is as far as that country goes dramatically; ignore the second,
and you may put on a grim and awful tragedy of the school of Strindberg
or Ibsen, or a classic play by anybody since Euripides, or even (in a spirit
of frenzied enthusiasm and intellectual jingoism) a Canadian drama.
Observe these rules, and you are brought face to face with contemporary
British productions of high standard—Shaw, Barrie, Galsworthy, Milne
in part, and the rest. This is worth pointing out for the benefit of those
who feel slightly irritated by the English accents provided by the Society.
They are necessary evils.
So I think Galsworthy's Silver Box an excellent choice of play, though
by no means the best choice. The theme is one admirably adapted to the
tone of the college—the people in it are alive, natural, and sincerely
human, and the play has a background of solid reality which is well
worth getting into. The earnest, moralizing tone makes it more and not
less suitable as a Victoria College production.
As for the actual performance, there is really not much to say about it
except that it was quite good. There was a curtain-raiser—Houghton's
Fancy Free. An amusing little sketch which depends for its effect chiefly
on its swift movement, this piece, put on by four people, lagged rather
badly the first night, but was considerably improved the second time.
A similar improvement was impossible in the case of The Silver Box.
The genius who thought up the idea of double-casting this play would
not be well advised to patent it. This iniquitous system greatly weakened
both performances, as the "first night" of an amateur show is a very
different thing from the professional variety, and The Silver Box had two
first nights. It is true that double the number of people became interested
232 On the Nineteenth Century
in the Society, and perhaps it facilitated the sale of tickets, but the major
production calls for the best players and for them only—players, more-
over, who can work as a unit and have a coherent conception of the piece,
which those who were present on both nights would miss. The first
performance was easily better than the second, the stars in it being Hal
Vaughan, Muriel Code, R.W. Christie, and Olive Smith. All the parts
were quite acceptably filled. Hal Vaughan was on both nights, and not
only turned in a good performance of his own, but in some unaccount-
able way took the edge off the very obvious immaturity of the produc-
tion. Muriel Code probably gave the best consistent piece of acting of the
two nights. The play was, on the whole, a decided success. It is far better
than anything else we have ever seen the Society do; perhaps even better
than we ever expected to see it do. The unfortunate organization seems
to be on the right track at last.
16
Review of H.M.S. Pinafore
April 1933
Review of Gilbert and Sullivan's H.M.S. Pinafore. From the "Monocle" section
of Ada Victoriana, 57 (April 1933): 34-5. Frye was at this time in his last year
and the editor of Ada.
artistic conscience of the Music Club rises to defend itself, and I listen
with the respectful attention it deserves. If there ever was a time when
Pinafore could be well done, it argues, that time has long since passed.
Considered as a whole the farce is clumsy and ill-conceived, besides
being unendurably hackneyed, and it simply cannot be sustained on its
own momentum. No human power can prevent that unspeakable finale
from dragging painfully and dismally to a limping and inept close. All
the standard actors of the Music Club are good for lots of entertainment,
says the conscience, but they could do nothing with their parts; they had
to kick them off the stage and substitute themselves. The cast of charac-
ters in Pinafore are all stuffed shirts and artificially bulged chemises, O
critic, but those who took their places are wholesome happy youngsters
who are all friends of yours, and you for one know that the fairy
changelings are infinitely more attractive.
This sounded plausible, and I began to review the principals in accord-
ance with this idea. Bessie Mountain as Lady Jane I had acclaimed last
year for doing that very thing. But she was helpless in Buttercup's iron
grip; she did all she could, in fact she did all there was to be done, but the
part was too badly written for her to do much. Aubrey Smith was more
fortunate in having a role large enough to replace the effete stock figure
of Sir Joseph Porter by the stocky but by no means effete figure of Aubrey
Smith, and to say that the audience appreciated the substitution would
be putting it mildly. Jean Welford knew that she was Jean Welford,
beautiful, graceful, and an exquisite singer, and she has as little interest
as her audience in the anemic and fatuous mid-Victorian bore Gilbert
meant her to represent. But Betty Oram, who as a singer and stage figure
is perhaps the Club's most valuable asset, could do nothing but stand
around and help the chorus. Dick Jolliffe, if somewhat immature as yet,
gave the chorus a rich carpet of bass to walk on, but the biggest thrill of
his performance was his low D which Sullivan had not thought of.
Murray Babe's part was large enough for him to fill it comfortably and
Johnny Copp's high fluent tenor quite adequate for anything he had to
sing. The one figure who seemed to grow naturally out of his part was
John Bates as Dick Deadeye.
Hence, if John was the best performer on the stage, as he indubitably
was, it should not be forgotten that he was the only one who had a part
he could do anything with. For the rest, including the chorus, some
impetus stronger than that supplied by the opera itself was necessary.
The more I think of Pinafore, the more I see the necessity for extraneous
Review of H.M.S. Pinaforee 235
(pardon me, spontaneous) humour. I respect the Music Club for their
sincere and genuine effort to act Pinafore off the stage. Taken in small
doses, of course, the opera, though still easily the worst of the Gilbert and
Sullivan repertoire, is not so bad as all this. Some of Gilbert's work is
brilliant and clever; there is much excellent satire on the blackguardism
which Victoria is trying to fight at the present time, and many of the
songs, notably the one beginning "An Englishman is a soaring soul," are
delightful. The music, though less distinguished, is catchy and pleasing
enough at times, and Sir Joseph Porter's part-song is in Sullivan's best
vein of parody. A cross-section almost anywhere in Pinafore would
probably yield something fairly amusing. But what I am talking about is
the organic unity of the opera, the sense of form that makes it go across
with a swing and gives to the characters vitality and interest. From this
point of view—and it is the one by which the work must, finally as well
as initially, be judged—Pinafore is an unqualified flop.
The Music Club as it stands has very little right to its name. One of the
members of the executive-elect has asked my opinion concerning the
organization, on the side, of a glee club after the manner of the Hart
House and WUA [Women's Undergraduate Association] songsters, but
yielding a more systematic training. This is a reform long overdue. A
great musician visiting Toronto would no doubt be delighted at the large
amount of good music played and listened to here, but if he were further
informed that there was only one "Music Club" on the campus and that
it spent all its energy in the production of one Gilbert and Sullivan light
opera a year he might get a rude shock. I am not opposed to the annual
production, if one at all worth four months' work is chosen, because
there is a colour and glamour, an excitement and wholesome fun about
the big performance which it would be a pity to take away. But its value
as a training in or appreciation of music is negligible. The college has
matured a good deal in its attitude to music and an awakening of
intelligent and critical interest in the most magnificent of all arts is
obvious. It is incumbent upon a "Music Club," therefore, to aid this
interest and meet its challenge.
17
lolanthe
December 1935
The Music Club goes back this year to Gilbert and Sullivan, which is a big
relief. The peculiar combination required for light opera seems to be tart,
acrid, witty satire in the libretto and graceful, fluent, good-humoured
music. This is the relation between the bitter and neglected Gilbert and
the Sullivan who was the darling of Queen Victoria's court; as it is to
some extent, on another plane, the relation of Beaumarchais and Mozart.
Without satire the light opera is apt to become insipid, as the last two
productions of the Music Club undoubtedly did.
There is no doubt the Music Club can do lolanthe; they have done it
before, and they have done more difficult things. The same thing hap-
pens every year: there will be uneasy intonation in the chorus, discordant
squawks at decent intervals from the principals, and probably the usual
irresponsible horseplay on the last night; but there will also be an enor-
mous good time had by all, performers and audience. No other activity
quite provides the thrill and excitement of the annual opera. That, I
think, is the essential function of the Music Club, so that those who feel
that a Music Club should train students in music as a Dramatic Society
trains them in drama and a Debating Society in debating are doubtless
arguing from a false analogy.
18
Review of lolanthe
April 1936
Mr. Crawford knows well enough by this time how to manoeuvre his
rather restless marionettes, and the general effect of lolanthe was, as
usual, that of a very good show. It was probably as well managed as
anything the Music Club has done: I do not remember having ever seen a
performance by this organization with so few major errors in it.
On the part of the chorus this competence was carried out on a rather
mezzanine level, and was achieved somewhat at the expense of sponta-
neity. Whether it was the larger auditorium, or inhibitions resulting from
a satire on a venerable institution, or a general feeling of cuteness in-
spired by the atmosphere of a rococo fairyland, I am unable to say; but I
seemed perpetually conscious of large reserves of enthusiasm that were
not going over the footlights. The opening chorus of fairies was sweet but
not strong enough really to grip the attention; the chorus of peers, on
which the whole first act turns, was rather grumbling and monotonous;
and the two finales were uneven. The words, as a result, were muzzy and
confused, a good third of them being stillborn.
The principals, however, were well chosen. Charlie Jolliffe as the Lord
Chancellor was perhaps the best clown I have ever seen in the Music
Club; his control over his voice at all times was remarkable, his acting
and stage appearance excellent. The celebrated "When you're lying
awake" song might have been more than twice as intelligible had it been
half as fast, but it was nonetheless convincingly funny. As a general
principle, however, I hardly think the Music Club well advised to take
238 On the Nineteenth Century
more than one encore for each song, as the usual practice is for the actors
to hit the first encore with everything they possess and make the others
an anticlimax. Gord Turner, though a little heavy in the part of Strephon—
two-thirds mortal, shall we say—had a clear, forceful voice and got all of
his lines across; Evelyn David as lolanthe struggled bravely with a col-
ourless part; Pat Lundy as Phyllis left little to be desired in both her
singing and her stage presence. Dick Jolliffe and Marg Da vies, with their
impressive resonant voices and their commanding and awe-inspiring
appearances, provided a punch that a good deal of the performance
lacked, and the clarity of their utterances rescued much of the dialogue
from a chaos of whispers and sibilants; their singing was occasionally
marred by poor intonation, but no one could feel uneasy when they were
on the stage. Arthur Steed and Fred Ongley filled their roles well, to the
great advantage of the play: it is precisely this type of part which is apt to
be slurred over in an amateur performance. Their quartet in the second
act with the Sentry and Phyllis provided, I think, the best singing of the
evening.
Of the sets, the first was neutral, the second excellent. And may I
protest that a recitative, which looks easy, is really quite difficult to sing
properly. This was perhaps the most neglected feature of the singing,
and as a result the scenes depending for their effect on its proper han-
dling, such as the summoning of lolanthe in the first act, sounded rather
sloppy.
I think that this level of performance, depending for its effect on the
enthusiasm of the actors rather than on anything resembling professional
competence, is one that the Music Club would do well to stay on. If it gets
any worse, the audience will complain; if it gets any better, the faculty
will complain. As it is, the Music Club can go on indefinitely without
worrying anybody but Mr. Crawford.
19
Review of Bradbrook's
Ibsen the Norwegian
27 August 1947
Now that publishing has become big business, the legitimate book is in
danger of being crowded out by erotic bestsellers, and the serious reader
finds it more and more difficult to buy the kind of book he wants to see
on his shelves. Good new books are rare enough at any time, but they
will always appear somehow or other: it is the keeping of good old books
in print that is important. A certain number of publishing houses, like
Random House in its Modern Library, have gone in for selling the
classics, but that does not help—it rather hinders—other classics which
happen not to be on the curricula of enough universities. The inaccessi-
bility of the sort of charming and mellowed book that one reads for
pleasure rather than instruction constitutes a bad enough problem here
and an absurd one in England, where the small ration of paper has
almost ruined the reprint trade. Most of what paper there is goes into
new books, and it is probably harder to buy Shakespeare in England
right now than Sir Oswald Mosley's new book on the futility of democ-
racy.1 One is therefore all the more grateful for and appreciative of the
Chiltern Library, published by John Lehmann, which so far contains
twelve excellently chosen titles, including the three listed above, two
other novels of Henry James, and two of Mrs. Gaskell, along with her
famous life of Charlotte Bronte.
21
An Important Influence
July 1948
Review of Joan Evans's John Ruskin (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954). From
Canadian Forum, 34 (March 1955): 285.
There was a strong family feeling among the Dickinsons, and neither
Emily nor her younger sister Lavinia married or left home. The older
brother, Austin, went to Harvard Law School, where Emily pelted him
with affectionate letters telling him how much he was missed, then
returned to Amherst to practise law. Gossip said that the father's posses-
siveness kept his daughters beside him ministering to his domestic com-
forts, but this may not be true. The image of awful integrity he inspired,
which made his daughter say at his death, "His Heart was pure and
terrible, and I think no other like it exists" [1,418], may have grown on her
gradually, as her youthful remarks in letters to Austin sound normally
bratty. Thus: "Father and mother sit in state in the sitting-room perusing
such papers, only, as they are well assured, have nothing carnal in them"
[L63]. Her mother she was never close to until later years. Austin's wife,
Susan Gilbert, was another person whom Emily Dickinson seems always
to have loved passionately, in spite of a good deal of tension and occa-
sional open ruptures. To Sue, across the fence, Emily sent nearly three
hundred poems, besides messages, epigrams, gifts, and other symbols of
affection.
At seventeen, Emily left the Amherst Academy and went to Mount
Holyoke College, or Seminary, as it was then called, a few miles away in
South Hadley. The discipline there was strict but humane, and she seems
to have enjoyed herself in spite of the religious instruction, but her father
withdrew her after a year. Emily thus had, for a poet, relatively little
formal education. It is unlikely that she read any language except her
own. She knew the Bible (involuntarily), she knew Shakespeare, she
knew the Classical myths, and she took a good deal of interest in contem-
porary women writers, especially Elizabeth Browning, George Eliot, and
the Brontes. The Bronte references in earlier letters are to Charlotte, but
"gigantic Emily Bronte" [1,742] haunts the later ones. Dickens and Robert
Browning appear in her rare literary allusions; there are one or two
echoes of Tennyson; and, of the more serious American writers, she
knew Emerson and something of Thoreau and Hawthorne. Her main
literary instructors, however, were her dictionary and her hymnbook.
She has a large vocabulary for a poet so limited in subject matter, and
most of her stanzas, as has often been pointed out, are the ordinary hymn
stanzas, the eight-six-eight-six "common metre" and the six-six-eight-six
"short metre" being especially frequent.
Creative people often seem to need certain types of love or friendship
Emily Dickinson 247
that make manifest for them the human relations or conflicts with which
their work is concerned. A poet of Shakespeare's day could hardly set up
in business without a "mistress" to whom he vowed eternal devotion,
though this mistress might have little if any part to play in his actual life,
and very seldom had anything to do with his marriage. Emily Dickinson
seemed to need in her life an older man to act as her "preceptor" or
"master," to use her own terms, who could keep her in touch with
qualities she did not profess to have: intellectual consistency, sociability,
knowledge of the world, firm and settled convictions. Benjamin F. New-
ton, a lawyer who had articled with her father, was apparently her first
"preceptor." Her letters to him have not been preserved, but he seems to
have awakened her literary tastes, expanded her cultural horizons, and
perhaps given her a more liberal idea of her religion—at any rate she
refers to him as a "friend who taught me Immortality" [L,26i]. He died in
1853, before Emily had started to write poetry in earnest.
Then came Charles Wadsworth, a Presbyterian clergyman whom Emily
may have heard on her trip to Philadelphia, and who, for all his married
and middle-aged respectability, seems to have been the one great love of
the poet's life. It is unlikely that the kind of love she offered him would
have interfered with his marriage or social position, but some pathetic
drafts of letters addressed to a "Master," if they were intended for
Wadsworth, indicate something of the tumult of her feelings. In 1862
Wadsworth accepted a call to a church in San Francisco, a removal which
seems to have been a profound shock to the poet, for reasons we can only
guess at—again the correspondence has not survived. The name of the
church he went to—Calvary—became the centre of a drama of loss and
renunciation in which the poet becomes "Empress of Calvary" [iO72],2
and the bride of an invisible marriage followed immediately by separa-
tion instead of union.
But Wadsworth, whatever her feeling for him, could hardly have had
more than a perfunctory interest in the poetry that was now becoming
the central activity of her life. In her early years she seems to have written
little except letters and the occasional valentine, of which two most
elaborate and ingenious efforts have been preserved. In the later 18505
she began writing poetry consistently, binding her completed poems up
into packets, and sometimes sending copies to Sue or enclosing them in
letters to other correspondents. In addition to her fair copies, there are
many worksheet drafts scribbled on anything within reach—once on the
248 On the Nineteenth Century
good will and affection in her letters, however oblique in expression. One
feels something Oriental in her manner of existence: the seclusion, the
need for a "preceptor," the use of brief poems as a form of social commu-
nication, would have seemed normal enough in the high cultures of the
Far East, however unusual in her own. And even her culture was one in
which the telephone had not yet destroyed the traditional balance be-
tween the spoken and the written word.
Of her friends, some were well-known writers in their day, apart from
Higginson. She was much attached to Samuel Bowles, editor of the
Springfield Republican, one of the liveliest of the New England local
papers, and representing a type of highly articulate journalism now
practically extinct. Helen Hunt Jackson, born in Amherst in the same
year as Emily Dickinson and a childhood playmate, came back into her
life in later years. Mrs. Jackson was also a disciple of Higginson, and was
the author of the Indian romance Ramona and the Saxe Holm stories.
Whatever this may mean to the contemporary reader, it meant in her day
that she was at the top of the literary tree. Another novel, Mercy Philbrick's
Choice, and a short story, seem to have made some use of Emily Dickinson's
smothered love affair for copy. She told Emily that she was a great poet
and was defrauding her public by not publishing, and finally, after
strenuous efforts, got one poem, Success is counted sweetest, into a collec-
tion of anonymous verse called A Masque of Poets, many readers taking it
to be Emerson's.
In the last decade of Emily Dickinson's life her father's friend Judge
Otis P. Lord became a widower, and his friendship with the poet quickly
ripened into love. Though, as usual, the letters themselves have disap-
peared, we do have a few drafts of letters to him among her papers
which put the fact beyond doubt. After living as she had, the adjustment
needed for marriage would have been formidable, probably impossible.
But she was deeply in love, which indicates that her retired life was the
choice of her temperament, not a dedication. She was not a nun manquee,
even if she does call herself a "Wayward Nun" [722]. Conscious human
perception is, we are told, highly selective, and very efficient about
excluding whatever threatens its balance. "Strong" people and men of
action are those for whom such perception functions predictably: they
are made strong by habit, by continually meeting the expected response.
Creative abilities normally go with more delicate and mysterious nu-
ances of awareness, hence they are often accompanied by some kind of
250 On the Nineteenth Century
To be alive—is Power—
Existence—in itself—
Without a further function— [677]
But she realized that there was danger as well as ecstasy in so sensitive a
response. "Had we the first intimation of the Definition of Life," she says,
"the calmest of us would be Lunatics!" [^492]. To reverse a well-known
phrase from Lewis Carroll, it took all the staying in the same place she
could do to keep running.3 The intensity of her ordinary consciousness
left her with few reserves to spend on a social life.
In a life so retired it was inevitable that the main events should be the
deaths of friends, and Emily Dickinson became a prolific writer of notes
of condolence. Her father, her mother, Sue's little boy Gilbert (struck
down by typhoid fever at the age of eight), Bowles, Wadsworth, Lord,
Helen Jackson, all died in the last few years of her life. As early as 1883
she had a nervous collapse, and observed, "The Crisis of the sorrow of so
many years is all that tires me" [L8731. Two years later a more serious
illness began. In the second week of May, 1886, she wrote to her cousins
Louisa and Fanny Norcross:
Little Cousins,
Called back.
Emily. [LiO46]
it would be a literal-minded reader who would infer that she had actu-
ally taken up cigar-smoking, yet this would be no more far-fetched than
many other biographical inferences. A poet is entitled to speak in many
voices, male, female, or childlike, to express many different moods and
to develop an experience in reading or life into an imaginative form that
has no resemblance whatever to the original experience. Just as she made
the whole of her conception of nature out of the bees and bobolinks and
roses of her garden, so she constructed her drama of life, death, and
immortality, of love and renunciation, ecstasy and suffering, out of tiny
incidents in her life. But to read biographical allegory where we ought to
be reading poetry is precisely the kind of vulgarity that made her dread
publication and describe it as a foul thing. Higginson's comment on her
Wild Nights! that "the malignant" might "read into it more than that
virgin recluse ever dreamed of putting there,"4 indicates that glib specu-
lations about the sexual feelings of virgins are much older than the
popularizing of Freud. But whenever they are made they are incompe-
tent as literary criticism.
It would be hard to name another poet in the history of the English
language with so little interest in social or political events. The Civil War
seemed to her "oblique," outside her orbit, and her only really peevish
letter describes her reaction to a woman who told her that she ought to
use her gifts for the good of humanity. There are one or two patriotic
poems, but they show no freshness of insight. "My Business is Circum-
ference," she told Higginson [L268]. She concerned herself only with
what she felt she could surround. It is characteristic of lyrical poetry to
turn its back on the reader: the lyrical poet regularly pretends to be
addressing his mistress or friend or God, or else he is soliloquizing or
apostrophizing something in nature. But lyrical poetry also tends to
create its own highly selected and intimate audience, like the sonnets and
love poems of Shakespeare's day that circulated in manuscript among
friends long before they reached print. For Emily Dickinson poetry was a
form of private correspondence: "This is my letter to the World" [441], is
what she says of her poetry, and she describes the Gospel as "The
Savior's . . . Letter he wrote to all mankind" [Liocu]. Such a correspond-
252 On the Nineteenth Century
ence forms what, for Emily Dickinson, was the only genuine kind of
human community, the small body of friends united in love and under-
standing. "Please to need me," as she wrote to Bowles [L3OO].
By a flower—By a letter—
By a nimble love—
If I weld the Rivet faster—
Final fast—above—
II
At her death Emily Dickinson was the author of seven published poems,
all anonymous, some issued without her authorization, six of them at
least in what she would have considered garbled versions, altered by
editors to make them more conventional. Her friends knew that she
wrote poetry, but nobody, not even her sister Lavinia who had lived with
her all her life, had any notion that she had written close to eighteen
hundred poems. She left instructions to Lavinia that her "papers" were
to be destroyed, as was customary at that time, but no instructions were
given about the piled-up packets of verse that Lavinia, to her astonish-
ment, discovered in her sister's room. Lavinia took the packets to Sue,
with a demand that they be transcribed and published immediately,
meeting all complaints about the length and difficulty of the task with,
"But they are Emily's poems!"5 Sue proved to be indolent, and perhaps
jealous, and after a long wait Lavinia took them to Mrs. Mabel Loomis
Todd, wife of an Amherst professor of astronomy, an attractive and
highly accomplished young woman, who knew Emily, so to speak, by
ear, having played the piano in the Dickinson house while the poet sat
invisibly in the dark hall outside and commented on the music.
Higginson's help was enlisted. At first he felt that it would be a
mistake to publish Emily Dickinson, perhaps thinking of an appeal she
had made to him to talk Helen Jackson out of publishing Success. But he
gradually became, first interested, then fascinated, by what he found,
and helped publicize her by writing articles about her. The two editors,
Emily Dickinson 253
she is using what medieval poets called "aureate diction," big soft bum-
bling abstract words that absorb images into categories and ideas. She
does not—like, for example, D.H. Lawrence—try to get inside the bird's
skin and identify herself with it; she identifies the bird with the human
consciousness in herself. Many of her poems start out by making some
kind of definition of an abstract noun:
and most of her best-loved poems are in one of the oldest and most
primitive forms of poetry, the riddle or oblique description of some
object. In A route of evanescence there is no explicit mention of a humming-
bird, because the poem tries to catch the essence of the feeling of the bird
without mentioning it. Similarly with the snow in It sifts from leaden
sieves, and with the railway train in I like to see it lap the miles.
Such popular features in her work have their own difficulties, and
there are others inherent in her peculiar style. She has for the most part
no punctuation, except a point represented in the Johnson edition by a
dash, which, as the editor points out, is really a rhythmical beat, and is of
little use in unravelling the syntax. She also shows a curious preference
for an indirect subjunctive form of expression that appears in such phrases
as "Beauty be not caused" [516], and she has what seems a most unrea-
sonable dislike of adding the s to the third person singular of verbs. The
effect of such sidelong grammar is twofold: it increases the sense of
epigrammatic wit, and it makes her poetry sound oracular, as though the
explicit statements of which her poetry is so largely made up were
coming to us shrouded in mystery. As she says:
The result is not invariably success: sometimes we may agree with en-
thusiasm:
at other times we can only say, with the captain in Pinafore confronted
with a similar type of gnomic utterance, "I don't see at what you're
driving, mystic lady":
Recover it to Nature
And that dejected Fleet
Find Consternation's Carnival
Divested of its Meat. [1658]
Every age has its conventional notions of what poetry ought to be like,
and the conventional notions of Emily Dickinson's day were that poetry
should be close to prose in its grammar and syntax, and that its vocabu-
lary should be more refined than that of ordinary speech. Thus Robert
Louis Stevenson was outraged by the word "hatter" in a poem of
Whitman's, and asserted that using such a word was not "literary tact."7
Emily Dickinson deliberately flouts both conventions. Her beat punctua-
tion and offbeat syntax go with an abrupt and colloquial diction. The
tang of her local speech comes out in such spellings as "Febuary" and
"boquet," in such locutions as "it don't" and "it is him," and in such
words as "heft" for "weight." Speaking of heaven, she writes:
meaning railway checks, the guarantee the conductor gives that one is
proceeding to the right destination. Her editors altered this to "chart,"
which was a more conventionally poetic word, being slightly antique.
Emily Dickinson could easily have provided such a word herself, but
preferred to form her diction at a humorously twisted angle to the
conventional expectations of the reader.
There is little in Emily Dickinson, then, of the feeling that a writer must
come to terms with conventional language at all costs. When she meets
an inadequacy in the English language she simply walks through it, as a
child might do. If the dictionary does not provide an abstract noun for
"giant," the poet will coin "gianture" [641]; if the ordinary "diminution"
does not give her enough sense of movement, she will substitute
"diminuet" [1615]. Similarly the fact that there is no singular form for
"grass" or "hay" does not stop her from speaking of "every Grass"
[1037],or from writing, to Higginson's horror,
III
The most cursory glance at Emily Dickinson will reveal that she is a
deeply religious poet, preoccupied, to the verge of obsession, with the
themes of death and of immortality—the latter being, as she called it, the
"Flood subject" [1.319]. Even in her use of the Bible, her most frequent
references are to the passages in Corinthians and Revelation usually read
at funeral services; and Paul's remark, that we now see in a riddle,
translated as "through a glass darkly" [i Corinthians 13:12], is echoed in
her recurrent use of the words "Riddle" and "Disc":
Yet another glance at her letters will also show that in her evangelical
surroundings she steadily resisted all revivals, all spiritual exhortations,
all the solicitous and charitable heat that, at home, at school, and at
church, was steadily turned on the uncommitted. Like Huckleberry Finn,
whom she resembles in more ways than one, Emily Dickinson had a
great respect for orthodox religion and morality, did not question the
sincerity of those who practised it, and even turned to it for help. But she
never felt that the path of social conformity and assent to doctrine was
her path. Her resistance gave her no feeling of superiority: even her
schoolgirl letters are full of a wistful regret that she could not feel what
her friends all asserted that they felt. As she recalled later: "When a Child
and fleeing from Sacrament I could hear the Clergyman saying 'All who
loved the Lord Jesus Christ—were asked to remain—.' My flight kept
time to the Words" 1X412]. She belonged in the congregation but not in
the Chuch.
Her elders referred her to the Bible: she read the Bible and took an
immediate dislike to the deity that she calls "Burglar! Banker—Father!"
[49]—that is, the legal providential God who seems to ratify everything
260 On the Nineteenth Century
that is meaningless and cruel in life. She remarked to Higginson that her
family were all religious except her, "and address an Eclipse, every
morning—whom they call their 'Father'" [L26i]. She read with distaste
the stories of Elisha and the bears ("I believe the love of God may be
taught not to seem like bears") [L230], of the sacrifice of Isaac, of the
drowning of the world in a divine tantrum and the corresponding threat
to burn it later:
No vacillating God
Created this Abode
To put it out; [1599]
Awe is not a dogmatic God, and is tolerant enough to satisfy not only the
poet's Christian longings but the paganism that makes her feel that there
ought to be a god for every mood of the soul and every department of
nature:
Emily Dickinson 263
In fact he may even be female, a sheltering mother. "I always ran Home
to Awe when a child . . . He was an awful Mother, but I liked him better
than none" [1.405].
In Christian terms, this divine Awe, as she well understood, is the
third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, symbolized in the Bible by
two of her favourite images, the bird and the wind, the giver of life to
nature and of inspiration to humanity, the creative force that makes the
poet's verses "breathe," and the "Conscious Ear" [733! that imagination
hears with. The conventional Biblical image for the Holy Spirit is the
dove, and the poet, picturing herself as Noah sailing the flood of experi-
ence, associates the dove who brought him news of land with the fact
that the name of another well-known navigator, Christopher Columbus,
also means dove:
Father or the Son, but with the wind that bloweth where it listeth:
The confusion with a female principle, as when she says that "the Little
Boy in the Trinity had no Grandmama, only a Holy Ghost" 1X979], is at
least as old as the apocryphal Gospels, where Jesus speaks of the Holy
Spirit as his mother.13 When she says, "The Bible dealt with the Centre,
not with the Circumference" [1.950], she means apparently that the Bible
considers man in his ordinary state of isolation, separated from God by a
gulf that only God can cross. Such a God is thought of as coming from the
outside; but while God is known "By his intrusion" [1462], his movement
in the human soul is to be compared rather to the tides moving in the sea.
"They say that God is everywhere, and yet we always think of Him as
somewhat of a recluse" 1X551]. If so, it takes a recluse to find him, and to
discover him as the inmost secret of consciousness.
The first fact of Emily Dickinson's experience, then, was that whatever
the Bible may mean by Paradise or Eden, the world of lost innocence and
happiness symbolized by the unfallen Adam and Eve, it is something
that is already given in experience. It is attainable; the poet has attained
it; it is not, therefore, a "superhuman site" 1X391], nor could it survive the
extinction of the human mind. Earth is heaven, whether heaven is heaven
or not: the supernatural is only the natural disclosed: the charms of the
heaven in the bush are superseded by the heaven in the hand—to para-
phrase almost at random. To her the essence of the Gospel was the
proclamation of the paradisal vision in such passages as "consider the
lilies" [Matthew 6:28]. But the Bible also speaks of regaining this Para-
dise and living in it eternally after death. If so, then the experience of
Paradise in life is identical with the experience of eternity.
The people we ordinarily call mystics are the people for whom this is
true. Eternity to them is not endless time, but a real present, a "now"
which absorbs all possible hereafters. Emily Dickinson also often speaks
with the mystics of death as a rejoining of heaven, of "Forever" as
"composed of Mows" [624], of an eternal state of consciousness symbol-
ized by a continuous summer and noon, of a coming "Aurora," a dawn
that will have no night. But in her background there were two powerful
Emily Dickinson 265
Inebriate of Air—am I—
And Debauchee of Dew—
Reeling—thro endless summer days—
From inns of Molten Blue— [214]
The liquor responsible for this state is usually called rum, or some
synonym like "Domingo," "Manzanilla," or "Jamaica." When it is the
266 On the Nineteenth Century
Like Blake, with whom she has been compared ever since Higginson's
preface to the 1890 volume, Emily Dickinson shows us two contrary
states of the human soul, a vision of innocence and a vision of "experi-
ence," or ordinary life. One is a vision of "Presence," the other of "Place";
in one the primary fact of life is partnership, in the other it is parting.
Thus she may say, depending on the context, both "Were Departure
Separation, there would be neither Nature nor Art, for there would be no
World"1* and
But she has nothing of Blake's social vision, and the state that he associ-
ates with child labour, Negro slavery, prostitution, and war she associ-
ates only with loneliness.
Her two states are often associated with summer and winter, or, less
frequently, with day and night. Often, especially in poems addressed to
Sue, she speaks of a "Summer—Sister—Seraph!" [18] who inhabits the
Emily Dickinson 267
In Insecurity to lie
Is joy's insuring quality. [1434]
Two recurring words in her poems are "suspense" and "expanse." The
former refers to the shadow that falls between an experience and the
realization that it has happened, the shadow that adumbrates death; the
latter to the possession of the spiritual body which, for us, brings vision
but not peace. "These sudden intimacies with Immortality, are expanse—
not Peace—as Lightning at our feet, instills a foreign Landscape" [L64i].
She deals mainly with the virtues of faith, hope, and love, but her life had
shown her that love, which normally tends to union, may incorporate a
great deal of its opposite, which is renunciation. Similarly with faith and
hope: "Faith is Doubt" 1X912], she says, and hope is the thinnest crust of
ice over despair:
Like the Puritans before her, who refused to believe that their own
righteousness would necessarily impress God into recognizing them,
Emily Dickinson refused to believe that her own vision of Paradise
guaranteed the existence of Paradise, even though she had nothing else
to go on. And—Puritan to the last—she even faced the possibility that the
Spirit of life within her might turn out to be Death, hence the ambiguous
tone of such poems as Doubt Me! My Dim Companion! and Struck, was I,
nor yet by Lightning. She told Sue that if Jesus did not recognize her at the
last day, "there is a darker spirit will not disown it's child" 1X173]. She
means death, not the devil, though her pose recalls the demonic figures
in Hawthorne. There are many poems about the physical experience of
Emily Dickinson 269
dying, some tranquil, some agonizing, some dealing with death by ex-
ecution, by warfare, by drowning—in at least two poems the poet is an
Andromeda swallowed by a sea monster. The region of death to be
entered, or traversed, is usually a sea, sometimes a forest, or a "Mael-
strom—in the Sky" [721], or simply "a wild Night and a new Road"
[1,332], and in I never told the buried gold, it is an underworld guarded by a
dragon.
The world of death is not one that we have to die to explore: it is there
all the time, the end and final cause of the vision of the centre, just as
Awe is the end and final cause of the vision of circumference. "I suppose
there are depths in every Consciousness," she says, "from which we
cannot rescue ourselves—to which none can go with us—which repre-
sent to us Mortally—the Adventure of Death" [1.555]. Some of her psy-
chological poems take us into this buried jungle of the mind. There are a
few about ghosts, where the two aspects of the self are treated in the vein
of Henry James's The Jolly Corner. But Emily Dickinson's sharp inquiring
mind has little in common with the ectoplasmic, and these poems im-
press us as made rather than born. A more genuine fear comes out at the
end of this:
This is as near to hell as she ever brings us, as the original version of the
last two lines indicates:
Yet even such a hell as this has a place and a function. Its presence is in an
odd way the basis of vision itself, for "the unknown is the largest need of
the intellect" [1471], and "could we see all we hope—there would be
270 On the Nineteenth Century
madness near" [1,388]. Emily Dickinson has a poem about Enoch and
Elijah, the two Biblical prophets who were taken directly to heaven, but
the figure she identifies herself with is Moses, standing on the mountain
top with the wilderness of death on one side and the Promised Land on
the other, able to see his Paradise if not to enter it:
In state many things at first are crude and hard to digest, which only time
and deliberation can supple and concoct. But in religion, wherein is no
immaturity, nothing out of season, it goes far otherwise. The door of grace
turns upon smooth hinges, wide opening to send out, but soon shutting to
recall the precious offers of mercy to a nation.3
274 On the Nineteenth Century
there: prudence is the greatest of political virtues, and prejudice the only
valuable form of deductive thinking. It is the revolutionary action lead-
ing to tyranny which is deductive, like the "metaphysical" French Revo-
lution which had begun with a set of major premises about the abstract
rights of man, and had then attempted "a decomposition of the whole
civil and political mass, for the purpose of originating a new civil order
out of the first elements of society."8 Hence reason, given its full deduc-
tive and speculative head, is not an emancipating but a destructive and
ultimately enslaving power in politics. Spiritual authority, at least, is
something to which we owe loyalty, and loyalty is not primarily rational;
hence society is held together by profounder forces than the reason can
express or reach.
In the second place, most temporal authority is vested in the ascendant
class: this class is faced with a strong revolutionary bid for power coming
from further down in society: the maintenance of the health of the social
organism, which means the maintenance of spiritual authority, is there-
fore bound up with preserving the existing rights and privileges of the
ascendant class. "We must suppose (society) to be in that state of ha-
bitual social discipline in which the wiser, the more expert, and the more
opulent conduct, and by conducting enlighten and protect, the weaker,
the less knowing, and the less provided with the goods of fortune."9
Burke goes on to say that "the state of civil society which necessarily
generates this aristocracy is a state of Nature"10—i.e., once again, the
genuine form of natural society. The ascendant class includes the church,
as for Burke the church is a continuous social institution, and its spir-
itual authority is inconceivable without that continuity. Hence Burke
says, in what from our present point of view is a key statement of his
thought:
Nothing is more certain, than that our manners, our civilization, and all the
good things which are connected with manners, and with civilization,
have, in this European world of ours, depended for ages upon two princi-
ples; and were indeed the result of both combined; I mean the spirit of a
gentleman, and the spirit of religion.11
tige remained for another century). The social function of the aristocracy
has always included the art of putting on a show, of dramatizing a way
of life. It is natural that America, with no hereditary aristocracy as such,
should have invented an ad hoc aristocracy out of its entertainers, who
attract much the same kind of identification that royal figures do in
British countries. In the thought of Carlyle, who has no interest in spir-
itual authority distinct from temporal authority, and wants only to iden-
tify the two, the reactivating of aristocracy naturally occupies a central
place. For Carlyle the "holiness" or radiance of the indwelling divinity in
man, which is perceptible in the hero, is the source of an undifferentiated
authority which is spiritual and temporal at once.
Yet even Carlyle distinguished the de jure authority of the aristocracy
from the de facto authority of captains of industry and self-made heroes
of the Napoleon and Cromwell category. The basis of the distinction
seems to be that as de facto or temporal authority is essentially active, so
de jure or spiritual authority has something about it associated with the
contemplative. In his chapter on symbolism in Sartor Resartus Carlyle
sees the heroic personality as an "intrinsic" symbol (i.e., one that has
value in itself, as distinct from the flag or the cross which are extrinsic
and have value only as indicators).12 As a symbol, the hero is the focus of
a community, and the de jure figure seems to be the most vivid one.
Crowds gather to see the Queen in order to see their own unity as a
society reflected in her. Here again there is a link between the recognition
of spiritual authority and the dramatic function of an ascendant class.
Samuel Butler also associates spiritual authority with the aristocracy,
in a more speculative and paradoxical way. He is, of course, particularly
fascinated by the working of the evolutionary process in human society,
and his conception of education, traditional as it is in itself, reflects this
interest. He points out in Life and Habit that no skill is learned thoroughly
until it passes through consciousness into the unconscious.13 It follows
that the most profoundly educated people are those who have been born
to wealth, leisure, and privilege, and have never been troubled by a
conscious idea, which includes a good many of the aristocracy. Thus in
The Way of All Flesh the hero, Ernest Pontifex, at that time engaged in
social work in East London, meets an old classmate named Towneley
who is large, handsome, simple-minded, well-to-do, and altogether ad-
mirable. Ernest asks Towneley effusively if he doesn't love the poor:
Towneley says no, and gets away as quickly as possible. It could hardly
be a briefer encounter, but it is an epiphany for Ernest: spiritual authority
278 On the Nineteenth Century
I see it all now. The people like Towneley are the only ones who know
anything that is worth knowing, and like that of course I can never be. But
to make Towneleys possible there must be hewers of wood and drawers of
water—men in fact through whom conscious knowledge must pass before
it can reach those who can apply it gracefully and instinctively like the
Towneleys can.14
II
But the university turns out to be a function of the church, and the
education it gives confronts the student with a dilemma: he must either
attach himself along with his education to the church or keep his educa-
tion as a private possession. Recurrently we have come to this crucial
point of having to define the community of spiritual authority. The
individual can readily be seen to be capable of understanding more than
society in general, and hence of possessing standards and values, with an
authority superior in kind if not in power. But the conception "gentle-
man," however interpreted, defines the superior individual rather than
the superior group, even granted that one may recognize the individual
as one of a group. For Newman only the church provides this commu-
nity, and of the gentlemen who cannot commit themselves to it he says:
"When they do wrong, they feel, not contrition, of which God is the
object, but remorse, and a sense of degradation They are victims of an
intense self-contemplation."24
In Newman's view of the church there is no place, as there would have
to be in Protestant thought, including Milton's, for a dialogue between
scripture and church. The church for Newman is the definitive teacher of
doctrine, hence it encloses scripture, and operates on ordinary society
very much as the British constitution does in Burke. For Burke the con-
flict of classes and their interests, in a free society, is settled by a legal
compromise which preserves the rights of both parties, and these com-
promises then form a series of precedents diffusing freedom through
society, as the quarrels of king and barons produced Magna Carta and
the quarrels of king and Parliament the Bill of Rights. Newman sees
church doctrine as developing in a somewhat similar way, being evolved
out of the crises of history, defining a dogma here, marking off a heresy
there, in an endless pilgrimage toward the City of God. Thus spiritual
authority in Newman is, as in Milton, a revelation, but a revelation that
has no place for metamorphosis, for the revolutionary and apocalyptic
transformation of society.
In Arnold, the conception "culture" is the basis from which we have to
start. In using the phrase spiritual authority to describe a pervasive prob-
lem of nineteenth-century thought, I have been putting unfamiliar con-
ceptions into the minds of some of my writers. For Mill, the problem is
not exactly one of spiritual authority, and for Butler, it is not exactly a
problem of authority. But Arnold is quite explicit about the authoritative
nature of culture:
The Problem of Spiritual Authority 283
Arnold's "culture" unites these qualities of the datum and the continu-
ous creation, being a human construct which, so far as it is rooted in the
past, possesses an objective authority. This authority, we should note, is
not exclusively intellectual, for "many things are not seen in their true
nature and as they really are, unless they are seen as beautiful,"29 and the
imagination as well as the reason may recognize a monument of its own
magnificence.
Wherever we turn in nineteenth-century thought we meet some ver-
sion of a "drunken boat" construct, where the values of humanity, intelli-
gence, or cultural and social tradition keep tossing precariously in a sort
of Noah's ark on top of a menacing and potentially destructive force.
This is the relation of the world as idea to the world as will in
Schopenhauer, of ethics to evolution in Darwin and Huxley, of the as-
cendant class to the proletariat in Marx, and, later, of ego to libido and id
in Freud. There are also many variants of a "saving remnant" theory,
The Problem of Spiritual Authority 285
only be the world revealed to us through the study of the arts and
sciences, the total body of human achievement out of which the forces
come that change ordinary society so rapidly. Of this world the universi-
ties are the social embodiment, and they represent what seems to me
today the only visible direction in which our higher loyalties and obliga-
tions can go.
25
Dickens and the Comedy of Humours
1967
A refinement of the same view sees the real story in Dickens's novels
as a rather simple set of movements within a large group of characters.
To this a mechanical plot seems to have been attached like an outboard
motor to a rowboat, just to get things moving faster and more noisily.
Thus our main interest, in reading Little Dorrit, is in the straightforward
and quite touching story of Clennam's love for the heroine, of their
separation through her suddenly acquired wealth, and of their eventual
reunion through her loss of it. Along with this goes a preposterous
melodrama about forged wills, identical twins, a mother who is not a
mother, skulking foreigners, and dark mysteries of death and birth which
seems almost detachable from the central story. Similarly, we finish Our
Mutual Friend with a clear memory of a vast panoramic pageant of
Victorian society, from the nouveau-riche Veneerings to Hexham living
on the refuse of the Thames. But the creaky Griselda plot, in which John
Harmon pretends to be dead in order to test the stability of his future
wife, is something that we can hardly take in even when reading the
book, much less remember afterwards.
Some works of fiction present a clearly designed or projected plot,
where each episode seems to us to be logically the sequel to the previous
episode. In others we feel that the episode that comes next does so only
because the author has decided that it will come next. In stories with a
projected plot we explain the episode from its context in the plot; in
stories lacking such a plot, we are often thrown back on some other
explanation, often one that originates in the author's wish to tell us
something besides the story. This last is particularly true of thematic
sequences like the "Dream Play" of Strindberg, where the succession of
episodes is not like that of a projected plot, nor particularly like a dream
either, but has to be accounted for in different terms. In Dickens we often
notice that when he is most actively pursuing his plot he is careless, to the
verge of being contemptuous, of the inner logic of the story. In Little
Dorrit, the mysterious rumblings and creakings in the Clennam house,
referred to at intervals throughout, mean that it is about to fall down.
What this in turn means is that Dickens is going to push it over at a
moment when the villain is inside and the hero outside. Similarly,
Clennam, after a good deal of detective work, manages to discover
where Miss Wade is living on the Continent. She did not expect him to
ferret out her address, nor had she anything to say to him when he
arrived; but, just in case he did come, she had written out the story of her
life and had kept it in a drawer ready to hand to him. The outrage on
Dickens and the Comedy of Humours 289
stored to his original status at the end. In drama such a theme involves
expounding a complicated antecedent action, and however skilfully done
not all audiences have the patience to follow the unravelling, as Ben
Jonson discovered to his cost at the opening of his New Inn. But in
narrative forms, of course, it can have room to expand. Shakespeare gets
away with it in The Winter's Tale by adopting a narrative-paced form of
drama, where sixteen years are encompassed by the action.
Dickens is, throughout his career, very conventional in his handling of
the New Comedy plot structure. All the stock devices, listed in Greek
times as laws, oaths, compacts, witnesses, and ordeals,3 can be found in
him. Oliver Twist and Edwin Drood are full of oaths, vows, councils of
war, and conspiracies, on both benevolent and sinister sides. Witnesses
include eavesdroppers like the Newman Noggs of Nicholas Nickleby or
Morfin the cello player in Dombey and Son. Ordeals are of various kinds:
near-fatal illnesses are common, and we may compare the way that
information is extracted from Rob the Grinder by Mrs. Brown in Dombey
and Son with the maltreating of the tricky slave in Menander and Plautus.
Many thrillers (perhaps a majority) use a stock episode of having the
hero entrapped by the villain, who instead of killing him at once imparts
an essential piece of information about the plot to him, after which the
hero escapes, gaining his wisdom at the price of an ordeal of facing
death. This type of episode occurs in Great Expectations in the encounter
with Orlick.
Every novel of Dickens is a comedy (N.B.: such words as "comedy" are
not essence words but context words; hence this means: "for every novel
of Dickens the obvious context is comedy"). The death of a central
character does not make a story tragic, any more than a similar device
does in The King and I or The Yeomen of the Guard. Sydney Carton is a man
without a social function who achieves that function by sacrificing him-
self for the congenial society; Little Nell's death is so emotionally luxuri-
ous that it provides a kind of muted festivity for the conclusion, or what
Finnegans Wake calls a "funferall."4 The emphasis at the end of a comedy
is sometimes thrown, not on the forming of a new society around the
marriage of hero and heroine, but on the maturing or enlightening of the
hero, a process which may detach him from marriage or full participa-
tion in the congenial group. We find this type of conclusion in Shaw's
Candida: Dickens's contribution to it is Great Expectations. Again, there is
usually a mystery in Dickens's stories, and this mystery is nearly always
Dickens and the Comedy of Humours 291
"The name of those fabulous animals (pagan, I regret to say) who used to
sing in the water, has quite escaped me."
Mr. George Chuzzlewit suggested "Swans."
"No," said Mr. Pecksniff. "Not swans. Very like swans, too. Thank you."
The nephew with the outline of a countenance, speaking for the first and
last time on that occasion, propounded "Oysters."
"No," said Mr. Pecksniff, with his own peculiar urbanity, "nor oysters.
But by no means unlike oysters: a very excellent idea; thank you, my dear
sir, very much. Wait! Sirens. Dear me! sirens, of course."10
or through those structures. Naturally there are limits to this: the same
social functions have to continue; but the sense that social institutions
have to reverse their relationship to human beings before society really
becomes congenial is very strong.
The law, for instance, as represented by the Chancery suit in Bleak
House and the Circumlocution Office in Little Dorrit, is a kind of social
vampire, sucking out family secrets or draining off money through end-
less shifts and evasions. It is explicitly said in both novels that the legal
establishment is not designed to be an instrument of society, but to be a
self-perpetuating social parasite. Education, again, is usually presented
in Dickens as a racket, a brutal and malignant racket with Squeers and
Creakle, a force-feeding racket in the "fact" school of Hard Times and the
Classical cram school of Dr. Blimber in Dombey and Son. Dickens's view
of the liberalizing quality of the Victorian Classical training is perhaps
symbolized in the grotesque scenes of Silas Wegg stumbling through
Gibbon's Decline and Fall to the admiration of the illiterate Boffins: an
unskillful performance which nobody understands. As for religion, even
the respectable churches have little to do except marry the hero and
heroine, and the spokesmen of the chapel, Chadband and Stiggins, are
the same type of greasy lout as their ancestor in Ben Jonson, Zeal-of-the-
Land Busy. Politics, from the Eatanswill election in Pickwick to the
Parliamentary career of Veneering in Our Mutual Friend, is a farce, only
tolerable when an amusing one. Industry is equally repulsive whether its
spokesman is Bounderby or the labour organizer Slackbridge. The amass-
ing of a fortune in the City, by Dombey, Ralph Nickleby, or Merdle in
Little Dorrit, is an extension of miserliness: it is closely associated with
usury; the debtors' prison is clearly the inseparable other side of it, and it
usually blows up a bubble of credit speculation with no secured assets,
ending in an appalling financial crash and endless misery. Martin
Chuzzlezuit carefully balances the swindling of American real-estate specu-
lators with the precisely similar activities of Montague's Anglo-Bengalee
Company in London. In several of the novels there are two obstructing
societies, one a social establishment and the other a criminal anti-estab-
lishment. When this occurs there is little if anything morally to choose
between them. We find the Artful Dodger no worse than the respectable
Bumble in his beadle's uniform, and Pip discovers a human companion-
ship with the hunted convict on the marshes that the Wopsles and
Pumblechooks of his Christmas dinner exclude him from.
It is perhaps in Little Dorrit that we get the most complete view of the
298 On the Nineteenth Century
are mysterious and emerge at the end, sometimes as bare names unre-
lated to the story, like Oliver Twist's father or the parents of Little Nell.
The father of Sissy Jupe in Hard Times deserts her without ever appearing
in the novel; the first things we see in Great Expectations are the tomb-
stones of Pip's parents. Pip himself is brought up by a sister who is
twenty years older and (as we learn on practically the last page of the
book) has the same name as his mother. Next come the parental figures
of the obstructing society, generally cruel or foolish, and often descended
from the harsh step-parents of folk tale. Murdstone and his sister, Pip's
sister, the pseudo-mothers of Esther Summerson and Clennam, belong to
this group. One very frequent device which combines these two types of
relationship is that of the preternaturally loving and hard-working daugh-
ter who is the sole support of a weak or foolish father. We have, among
others, Little Dorrit, Little Nell, whose grandfather is a compulsive gam-
bler, Jenny Wren in Our Mutual Friend with her drunken "child," Madeline
Bray in Nicholas Nickleby, and, in a different way, Florence Dombey.
Naturally the marriage of such a heroine, following on the death of the
parent, transfers her to the more congenial society. Finally we have the
parental or avuncular figures of the congenial society itself, those who
take on a protective relation to the central characters as the story ap-
proaches its conclusion. Brownlow in Oliver Twist, who adopts the hero,
Jarndyce in Bleak House, Abel Magwitch in Great Expectations, the Cheeryble
brothers in Nicholas Nickleby, the Boffins in Our Mutual Friend, are exam-
ples. Abel Magwitch, besides being the ultimate father of Pip, is also the
actual father of Estella, which makes Estella in a sense Pip's sister: this
was doubtless one reason why Dickens so resisted the conventional
ending of marriage for these two. The more realistic developments of
New Comedy tend to eliminate this genealogical apparatus. When one
of the girls in Les Precieuses ridicules announces that being so interesting a
girl she is quite sure that her real parents are much more interesting
people than the ones she appears to have [sc. 5], we do not take her very
seriously. But Dickens is always ready to cooperate with the lonely
child's fantasies about lost congenial parents, and this marks his affinity
with the romantic side of the tradition, the side related to Classical
romance.
I have used the word "anarchistic" in connection with Dickens's view
of society, but it is clear that, so far as his comic structure leads to any sort
of vision of a social ideal, that ideal would have to be an intensely
paternalistic society, an expanded family. We get a somewhat naive
Dickens and the Comedy of Humours 301
A realistic writer in the New Comedy tradition tends to work out his
action on one plane: young and old, hero and humour, struggle for
power within the same social group. The more romantic the writer, the
more he tends to set over against his humorous world another kind of
world, with which the romantic side of his story is associated. In a paper
written twenty years ago, I spoke of the action of romantic Shakespear-
ean comedy as divided between a foreground world of humours and a
background "green world," associated with magic, sleep and dreams,
and enchanted forests or houses, from which the comic resolution comes.20
Dickens has no green world, except for a glint or two here and there (e.g.,
the pastoral retreats in which Smike and Little Nell end their days, Jenny
Wren's paradisal dreams, the "beanstalk" abode of Tartar in Edwin Drood,
and the like), but he does have his own way of dividing his action. I have
spoken of the nineteenth-century emphasis on the presentable, on the
world of public appearance to which the nineteenth-century novelist is
almost entirely confined. Behind this world lies a vast secret world, the
world of privacy, where there is little or no communication. For Dickens
this world is associated mainly with dreams, memories, and death. He
describes it very eloquently at the opening of the third "Quarter" of The
Chimes, and again in the first paragraph of the third chapter of A Tale of
Two Cities, besides referring frequently to it throughout his work.
Few can read Dickens without catching the infection of his intense
curiosity about the life that lies in the dark houses behind the lights of his
loved and hated London. We recognize it even at second hand: when
Dylan Thomas's Under Milk Wood opens on a night of private dreams we
can see an unmistakably Dickensian influence. For most of the ironic
fiction of the twentieth century, this secret world is essentially the bed-
room and bathroom world of ordinary privacy, as well as the world of
sexual drives, perversions, repressions, and infantile fixations that not
only complements the public world but conditions one's behaviour in it
at every point. Characters in twentieth-century fiction have no privacy:
there is no distinction between dressing-room and stage. Dickens is by no
means unaware of the importance of this aspect of the hidden world, but
it is of little use to him as a novelist, and he shows no restiveness about
being obliged to exclude it. This is because he is not primarily an ironic
writer, like Joyce or Flaubert. What he is really curious about is a hidden
world of romantic interest, not a world even more squalid and common-
place than the visible one. His detective interest in hidden life is compa-
rable to other aspects of Victorian culture: one thinks of the pre-Raphaelite
paintings where we are challenged to guess what kind of story is being
304 On the Nineteenth Century
told by the picture and its enigmatic title, or of all the poems of Browning
that appeal to us to deduce the reality hidden behind what is presented.
In following the main action of a Dickens novel we are frequently
aware of a second form of experience being held up to it like a mirror.
Sometimes this is explicitly the world of the stage. The kind of entertain-
ment afforded by the Vincent Crummies troop in Nicholas Nickleby paral-
lels the uninhibited melodrama of the main story: the dance of the savage
and the Infant Phenomenon, in particular, mirrors the Dickensian theme
of the girl-child in the monster-world. In Hard Times, where the relation
is one of contrast, a circus company symbolizes an approach to experi-
ence that Gradgrind has missed out on. The Punch and Judy show in The
Old Curiosity Shop, one of several popular dramatic entertainments in
that book, has been mentioned, and in Great Expectations Pip, haunted by
the ghost of a father, goes to see Mr. Wopsle in Hamlet. Then again,
Dickens makes considerable use of the curious convention in New Com-
edy of the doubled character, who is often literally a twin. In The Comedy
of Errors the foreground Ephesus and the background Syracuse, in Twelfth
Night the melancholy courts of Orsino and Olivia, are brought into
alignment by twins. Similarly, the foreground action of Little Dorrit is
related to the background action partly through the concealed twin
brother of Flintwinch. In A Tale of Two Cities, where the twin theme is at
its most complicated, the resemblance of Darnay and Carton brings the
two cities themselves into alignment. In Dombey and Son the purse-proud
world of Dombey and the other social world that it tries to ignore are
aligned by the parallel, explicitly alluded to, between Edith Dombey and
Alice Brown. There are many other forms of doubling, both of characters
and of action, that I have no space here to examine. The role of Orlick in
Great Expectations, as a kind of demonic double of Pip, is an example.
The basis for such a dividing of the action might be generalized as
follows. There is a hidden and private world of dream and death, out of
which all the energy of human life comes. The primary manifestation of
this world, in experience, is in acts of destructive violence and passion. It
is the source of war, cruelty, arrogance, lust, and grinding the faces of the
poor. It produces the haughty lady with her guilty secret, like Lady
Dedlock or Edith Dombey or Mrs. Clennam, the lynching mobs that hunt
Bill Sikes to death or proclaim the charity of the Protestant religion in
Barnaby Rudge, the flogging schoolmasters and the hanging judges. It
also produces the courage to fight against these things, and the instinc-
tive virtue that repudiates them. In short, the hidden world expresses
Dickens and the Comedy of Humours 305
and headed for the right beds. It dissolves all hardening social institu-
tions and reconstitutes society on its sexual basis of the family, the
shadowy old fathers and mothers being replaced by new and livelier
successors. When a sympathetic character dies, a strongly religious pro-
jection of this power often appears: the "Judgment" expected shortly by
Miss Flite in Bleak House, for instance, stands in apocalyptic contrast to
the Chancery Court. Dickens's Eros world is, above all, a designing and
manipulating power. The obstructing humour can do only what his
humour makes him do, and toward the end of the story he becomes the
helpless pawn of a chess game in which black can never ultimately win.
The victorious hidden world is not the world of nature in the
Rousseauistic context of that word. The people who talk about this kind
of nature in Dickens are such people as Mrs. Merdle in Little Dorrit, Mrs.
Chick in Dombey and Son, and Wackford Squeers—not an encouraging
lot. Like most romancers, Dickens gives a prominent place to the fool or
"natural"—Smike, Mr. Dick, Barnaby Rudge—whose instincts make up
for retarded intelligence. But such people are privileged: elsewhere na-
ture and social education, or human experience, are always associated.
To say that Dora Copperfield is an unspoiled child of nature is also to say
that she is a spoiled child. Dickens's nature is a human nature which is
the same kind of thing as the power that creates art, a designing and
shaping power. This is also true of Shakespeare's green world, but Dick-
ens's Eros world is not the conserving force that the green world is,
which revitalizes a society without altering its structure. At the end of a
Shakespeare comedy there is usually a figure of authority, like Prospero
or the various dukes, who represents this social conservation. We have
nothing in Dickens to correspond to such figures: the nearest to them are
the empty Santa Claus masks of the Cheerybles, Boffin, and the reformed
Scrooge. For all its domestic and sentimental Victorian setting, there is a
revolutionary and subversive, almost a nihilistic, quality in Dickens's
melodrama that is post-Romantic, has inherited the experience of the
French Revolution, and looks forward to the world of Freud, Marx, and
the existential thriller.
I used the word "absurd" earlier about Dickens's melodramatic plots,
suggesting that they were creatively and not incompetently absurd. In
our day the word "absurd" usually refers to the absence of purpose of
meaning in life and experience, the so-called metaphysical absurd. But
for literary criticism the formulating of the theory of the absurd should
not be left entirely to disillusioned theologians. In literature it is design,
308 On the Nineteenth Century
the forming and shaping power, that is absurd. Real life does not start or
stop; it never ties up loose ends; it never manifests meaning or purpose
except by blind accident; it is never comic or tragic, ironic or romantic, or
anything else that has a shape. Whatever gives form and pattern to
fiction, whatever technical skill keeps us turning the pages to get to the
end, is absurd, and contradicts our sense of reality. The great Victorian
realists subordinate their story-telling skill to their representational skill.
Theirs is a dignified, leisurely vehicle that gives us time to look at the
scenery. They have formed our stock responses to fiction, so that even
when travelling at the much higher speed of drama, romance, or epic we
still keep trying to focus our eyes on the incidental and transient. Most of
us feel that there is something else in Dickens, something elemental, yet
unconnected with either realistic clarity or philosophical profundity.
What it is connected with is a kind of story that fully gratifies the hope
expressed, according to Lewis Carroll, by the original of Alice, that
"there will be nonsense in it."23 The silliest character in Nicholas Nickleby
is the hero's mother, a romancer who keeps dreaming of impossible
happy endings for her children. But the story itself follows her specifica-
tions and not those of the sensible people. The obstructing humours in
Dickens are absurd because they have overdesigned their lives. But the
kind of design that they parody is produced by another kind of energy,
and one which insists, absurdly and yet irresistibly, that what is must
never take final precedence over what ought to be.
26
The Meeting of Past and Future
in William Morris
1982
and the remarkable masque Love is Enough. Third, his epic and romance
translations, which include the Volsunga Saga, the Aeneid, the Odyssey,
Beowulf, and various Northern and Old French romances, an activity that
spread over all his later life. Fourth, essays and lectures on socialism,
more particularly on its relation to the place of the so-called "lesser arts"
in society. Fifth, a period of long prose romance and fantasy: The Wood
beyond the World, The Well at the World's End, The Story of the Glittering
Plain, The Sundering Flood, and others. There is also a genre in this period
which combines romance with his political vision: News from Nowhere,
probably his best-known book, The Dream of John Ball, The King's Lesson,
and the narrative poem Pilgrims of Hope.
All this work has had a very mixed reception. In Mackail's biography
of Morris there is, for all his imagination and sympathy, a tendency to
dismiss the whole socialist side of Morris as a perversion of his talents, a
typical example of a creative person becoming ensnared in the siren's
toils of a political movement he never understood. For the final romances
Mackail has a very limited admiration: one would have expected, for
example, some mention of The Sundering Flood, if only because it was
Morris's last work. Those of Morris's contemporaries who better under-
stood and shared his political sympathies had even less use for the prose
romances. Bernard Shaw spoke of them as the resuscitation of Don
Quixote's library.1 A hasty reader of some criticism on Morris might
easily get an impression of a dithering kook, too overcome by his own
restless versatility to focus his mind properly in any one direction.
With the hindsight of another century, we may perhaps still say that
Morris's political sympathies were naive, but we can hardly say that they
were peripheral, or showed any unawareness of where history was
going in his time. History has vindicated his interest in Marxism, not by
showing that any of it was right—certainly anything in it connected with
predicting the future has turned out to be rather grotesquely wrong—but
by showing that it was profoundly relevant to the concerns of England in
the i88os. And yet, what of these dreamy romances, with their archaic
language, hazy characterization, and meandering plots? Are they at least
not a retreat from Morris's extroverted world of business and design and
political activity into some kind of childhood fixation: the eight-year-old
dressed in a toy suit of armour whom Mackail speaks of,2 and whom so
many of Morris's critics invoke?
Here again the cycles of history have qualified our certainties. Marx-
ism was a minority movement in England in Morris's day, but it has
expanded now to the point where Morris's interest in it shows a good
The Meeting of Past and Future in William Morris 311
deal of prescience. Similarly, the late romances fell stillborn from his
press and were destined apparently to remain so indefinitely. But within
the last quarter-century or so there has been a quite unexpected develop-
ment in the area often (and very inaccurately) called "science fiction."
Some of the best-selling works in this area are Frank Herbert's Dune
trilogy, Ursula LeGuin's Earthsea trilogy, Zelazny's Amber trilogy,
Asimov's Foundation trilogy. The frequency of the trilogy form is doubt-
less due to the sensational success of Tolkien's Lord of the Rings, and these
works are routinely compared to Tolkien in the blurbs, although Eddison's
trilogy of Memison books was in the field earlier than Tolkien. Morris
wrote no romance that was formally a trilogy, but some of them are long
enough to have been arranged in that form. In any case the genre itself
seems clearly to have begun with Morris, apart from the fact that Morris
was at least one significant influence on Tolkien.
What is noticeable about the contemporary books is that they are
romances that deliberately revert from science fiction hardware, how-
ever much of it they incidentally incorporate, back to hand-to-hand
duelling with the equivalents of swords, back to plots and intrigues of a
kind that would hardly be out of place in a Jacobean drama. The political
situations are regularly drawn from models of the past: corrupt empires
holding on to power but being threatened by revolts, younger sons of
aristocratic families forging reputations for themselves through heroic
achievements like destroying monsters. Bernard Shaw's comment is not
far off the mark, either for Morris himself or for his successors. Works in
this genre are historical romances in which both the history and the
geography have been invented, and the settings are as arbitrary as those
indicated in Morris's "world's end" titles. In this same so-called science
fiction area are other romances that are retellings of traditional tales and
myths, like the Mabinogion stories in Evangeline Walton, which remind
us of Morris's other interest in collecting and retelling so many of the
great stories of the past. Once again Morris has proved to be profoundly
prescient, whatever our opinion of the books themselves. Many com-
mentators on Morris assume that his preoccupation with romance and
his socialist interests formed a schizophrenic contradiction in his mind.
But when both have turned out to be so central in our own cultural
environment we cannot help wondering about this assumption, even if
we draw the inference that our world is schizophrenic too.
Morris himself has left very few comments on his late romances,
beyond a letter to a paper explaining that a review of his Wood beyond the
World was mistaken in thinking that the story was an allegory of capital
312 On the Nineteenth Century
something quite different from the syntactical sense. There is also the
better-known distinction between "running" rhythm and the more syn-
copated "sprung" rhythm, with its greater variety of stresses and beats
against the established metre.7 There is the distinction between the
"Parnassian" level of writing which any genuine poet may achieve by
habit and practice, and the totally unpredictable flashes that occasionally
sweep across it.8 The general pattern is that of a middle level, and
something else that may be called metaphorically either above and higher,
or below and deeper.
It is clear that Morris devoted himself to a "Parnassian" level of writ-
ing, as in The Earthly Paradise, where the writing is invariably competent
but seldom startling or haunting. He also devotes himself to the "transi-
tional" kind of mental energy that emphasizes movement and continu-
ity. He is lost without some kind of story to tell, and is the least
contemplative of poets: the level of meaning is fairly uniform, and the
kind of romances read in 77 Penseroso, "Where more is meant than meets
the ear" [1.120], are on the whole not his kind, even though we may find
many phrases with a surprisingly complex resonance. Again, he sticks
closely to the "running" forms of metre and rhyme and stanza that
English imported from French and Italian sources, and (apart from his
translation of Beowulf) he shows little interest in the native accentual and
alliterative rhythms that Hopkins explored so powerfully. In terms of the
value judgments that half a century ago were practically unquestioned,
all this suggests that Morris is the worst example in English literature of
what Eliot meant by the dissociation of sensibility. But even these value
judgments are no more immortal than any others, and it may be signifi-
cant that the greater part of critical theory today gives its main attention
to narrative and "transitional" poetic techniques. Without trying to cre-
ate a new set of value judgments, it might be rewarding to inquire into
Morris's motives for his obviously deliberate choice of what seems, or
has seemed, the more commonplace path.
II
The real context of social planning, then, is a society in which work has
been defined as creative act, and thereby becomes the energy by which
an intelligent being expresses his intelligence. Work in this sense cannot
be separated from leisure, and can exist only in a society in which there is
no longer a "leisure class" with another class of exploited workers sup-
porting them, but in which the working class is the leisure class, and vice
versa. Such a society would reconstitute the word "manufacture" by
bringing it back to its original meaning of something made by a brain-
directed hand. The natural emotional response to producing anything
attractive by one's own hands is pleasure, and what Morris emphasizes
more than anything else is the continuous happiness of the people in his
Utopia.
If we say of News from Nowhere, "but this system would never work,"
we are expressing the kind of panic that Morris was attempting to
counteract. A society is not a "system": human beings have no business
trying to identify their community with a machine of any kind. And of
course "it" would never work: it is only people who work. Morris often
says that he is not opposed to machinery as such (though the inhabitants
of his future England seem to get along with astonishingly little of it), but
that the purpose of machinery is to absorb slavery. When exploitation
and alienation are removed from people their natural energies are set
free. The real question Morris is asking is rather, "I have given you a
picture of a happy and healthy community: do you like the picture? If
not, what's wrong with it, as a picture?" On that basis, objections to it
would soon start taking the form of expressions of distrust in human
freedom itself.
Morris's examples of unconscious intelligence, in "The Lesser Arts,"
are the Palaeolithic artefacts that were beginning to be discovered in his
day. Such an unconscious intelligence, as he clearly recognized, is very
close to consciousness. Similarly, we admire, for example, Shaker furni-
ture, but if the Shakers themselves had applied the kind of self-conscious
aesthetic canons to their work that we do, they could probably not have
produced it at all. It would be a surprising inference that the people who
produced such work were less intelligent than the people who collect it:
the Shaker craftsmen merely possessed a kind of intelligence that did not
get in the way of their "unconscious" skill. Morris's poetry, in particular,
is similarly an attempt to let an acquired skill flow through the con-
sciousness without being disturbed by that consciousness. Morris says
that anyone should be able to compose poetry while his mind is partly on
The Meeting of Past and Future in William Morris 317
Ill
Morris was all his life a pure anarchist, with a lowercase "a." His News
from Nowhere was written partly as a protest against Bellamy's socialist
Utopia Looking Backward, a vision of Boston in the year 2000 where
everyone is drafted to serve in an "industrial army," and where recrea-
tion consists largely of listening to government propaganda over the
"telephone," or what we now call the radio.15 Communist movements
since Morris's time have followed Bellamy and not Morris, and have also
followed the course that Morris most hated: economic centralization,
concentrating on mass production and distribution, setting up a rigid
chain of command throughout the whole of society. Even the curious
Janus-faced attitude to violence that gives anarchism both a terrorist side
and a peaceful side recurs in Morris: he says he has a religious hatred of
war and violence, yet News from Nowhere predicts the rise of the counter-
ideology of fascism much more clearly than most socialist writing of his
day did.
What the later Morris was, perhaps, was that very rare bird, a Marxist
uncorrupted by Leninism. Marx thought of Communism as a natural
evolution out of capitalism: when capitalism had reached a certain stage
of deadlock through its inherent contradictions, a guided revolutionary
movement could shift the control of production from a few exploiters to
the workers. This evolutionary development did not occur: Communism
was established in an essentially pre-industrial country, and became
simply the adversary of capitalism, not its successor. What attracted
Morris to Marx were such things as the comments on the impoverishing
of the rural by the urban parts of society in the Manifesto, the vision of
capitalism as a dehumanizing relationship, in contrast to earlier social
connections which, though still based on exploitation, were at least per-
sonal ones, and, above all, the anarchist ultimate goal that Marx envi-
sioned, when all states have withered away and imposed controls are no
longer needed.
And so, the informant of the narrator in News from Nowhere says, "we
discourage centralisation all we can."16 Not only has the British empire
vanished in Morris's ideal world, but England itself has broken down
into small local units and local councils. The House of Parliament has
been turned from a verbal dungheap into a literal one, and in its place
has come a decentralizing of control that the most extreme Jeffersonian
might consider chimerical. It was later than his remark about the impos-
sibility of Anarchism that Morris said, "it will be necessary for the unit of
administration to be small enough for every citizen to feel himself re-
The Meeting of Past and Future in William Morris 319
sponsible for its details."17 He also says that the goal of state socialism is
one that sickens him. When he goes on to say that "variety of life is as
much an aim of true Communism as equality of condition/'18 we realize
that Morris is talking about something quite different from what left-wing
movements of his time—and since—have been primarily concerned with.
That concern has been, of course, with political control and economic
development, both of which are normally centralizing movements. Most
of the effective social entities today are the huge continental powers
which, whether capitalist or socialist in organization, keep expanding
from that basis through various forms of political and economic imperi-
alism. Morris is interested in cultural development, and cultural tenden-
cies seem to go in the reverse direction. The more mature a culture is, the
more it tends to circumscribe itself in smaller units. If we wish to study
"American literature," for example, and discover what the creative liter-
ary imagination tells us about America, we find that "American litera-
ture" is mainly an aggregate of Mississippi authors, New England authors,
middle-Western authors, California authors, expatriate authors, and so
on over the whole area. Canadian literature has followed the same ten-
dency more recently, and even the much smaller area of Great Britain
shows us a Hardy confined to "Wessex," a Lawrence from the Midland
region, a Dylan Thomas from south Wales, and the like.
When the reading population of Great Britain was so much smaller,
before Wordsworth's time, English literature was essentially a London
literature, but with the Industrial Revolution and the rise of the great
Midland cities the picture quickly changed. We have Shelley remarking,
in the preface to Prometheus Unbound, that a great cultural advance
would result from breaking England up into many smaller units like
those of Renaissance Italy.19 It was abundantly clear in Morris's day that
cultural developments had to be distinguished from political and eco-
nomic ones if the total social picture were to be a healthy one. To attach
culture to the centralizing movements of politics and economics pro-
duces a cultural totalitarianism, an empty, pompous, officially certified
pseudo-art. To attach a political or economic movement to a decentraliz-
ing cultural one produces a kind of neo-fascist separatism. Nothing
could be more remote from anything Morris wanted than totalitarianism
or fascism, and it is understandable that so many political and economic
questions are simply waved away in News from Nowhere. The book in fact
often reads as though it were being deliberately confined to the cultural
aspect of social vision.
32O On the Nineteenth Century
IV
history takes the form of a series of "cultures" which behave like organ-
isms, starting in a "spring" of heroic aristocracy, organized priesthood,
and a peasantry bound to the land. Thence it develops towards a "sum-
mer" of city-states like those of the Renaissance, then an "autumn"
when, as in the eighteenth century, the potentialities of the culture are
exhausted, then a "winter" of annihilation wars, dictatorships, technol-
ogy in place of the creative arts, and rootless masses of people crowding
into huge and bloated cities. This has been the shape of Western culture:
it was preceded by a Classical one which had its spring in the time of
Homer, its summer and autumn in the city-states of Greece, and its
winter with Macedonian and Roman imperialism. Morris betrays no
awareness of any such view of history, but News from Nowhere does
present a somewhat childlike society with a strong temperamental affin-
ity for the medieval, as though a future and a past childhood spoke to
each other. There is an implied contrast with, say, the senile second
childhood of the complex gadgetry of the 1851 Exhibition. In such ro-
mances as The House of the Wolfings, again, there seems to be something of
a contrast in Morris's mind between a young and healthy, if barbaric,
civilization, and an older and crueller one in his account of the struggle
between a northern tribe and the Romans.
In our day every society must go through some kind of revolutionary
upheaval because of the technological changes taking place over the
world. The revolutions do not all have to be Marxist or anarchist, and
even if they were there would still be many different varieties of them;
but the revolutionary element is built into contemporary society every-
where. A technological revolution makes the world more uniform: one
cannot take off in a jet plane and expect a radically different way of life in
the place where the plane lands. The uniformity in its turn is enforced by
the new class that comes to power with the social change, because they
invariably discover that their own prerogatives are bound up with resist-
ance to any further change.
What was defined by Julien Benda, much later than Morris, as the
trahison des clercs may be seen from this point of view as the nervous itch
on the part of intellectuals to try to help turn the wheel of history into the
future, to prove to themselves and others that they are of some historical
use after all. But when the wheel of history turns it is precisely they who
seem most expendable. This process is dramatized, for example, in Plato,
who concentrates on the figure of Socrates, martyred for being a gadfly
in the Athens of his time. But then, being after all a revolutionary thinker,
324 On the Nineteenth Century
Plato goes on to the Laws, which preaches the absolute control by society
of its teachers, a vision of society where Socrates does not appear and
where he certainly could not function. It is dramatized too in the devel-
opment of early Christianity, when the generation of martyrs is suc-
ceeded by a generation of persecutors. It is dramatized also, in different
ways, in the careers of Milton, of Victor Hugo, of Gorky, and countless
others.
It looks as though it were the distinctive social function of the creative
mind to move in the opposite direction from the politico-economic one.
This means that he may have to face the charge of being a reactionary,
but cultural developments in time, as in space, seem to go in opposition
to the political and economic currents. The creative tendency is toward
the prerevolutionary, back to a time when, so to speak, Socrates and
Jesus are still alive, when ideas are still disturbing and unpredictable and
when society is less vainglorious about the solidity of its structure and
the permanence of its historical situation. Morris's "medievalism" has
precisely this quality about it of moving backward from the present to a
vantage point at which the real future can be more clearly seen. I have
noticed from my study of the Bible how these backward-moving pastoral
myths seem to be the other side of a genuinely prophetic vision, looking
beyond the captivities of Egypt and Babylon to a recovery of long lost
innocence. The fact that innocence may not have been lost but simply
never possessed does not impair the validity of the vision, in fact it
strengthens it.
Thus what seems the self-pitying nostalgia of the "Apology" to The
Earthly Paradise, where "the idle singer of an empty day" calls himself a
"dreamer of dreams, born out of my due time,"24 can also be read in
another light. Perhaps the singer is idle only because the day is empty.
The reference cannot be a self-identifying one, "idle" being the last
epithet that anyone, even Morris himself, could apply to the author of
The Earthly Paradise. It is rather an expression of something in nineteenth-
century culture that has become helpless and powerless, something now
crooked which perhaps only a dreamer of dreams can set straight.
Yeats, with his usual readiness to take off in helicopters that Morris is
not sure have been invented yet, remarks in his essay in The Celtic
Twilight called "Enchanted Woods":
They {the fairies of the Irish countryside} live out their passionate lives not
far off, as I think, and we shall be among them when we die if we but keep
The Meeting of Past and Future in William Morris 325
our natures simple and passionate. May it not even be that death shall unite
us to all romance, and that some day we shall fight dragons among blue
hills, or come to that whereof all romance is but
as the old men thought in The Earthly Paradise when they were in good
spirits?25
The quotation is from the epilogue to the story of Acrisius, the Classical
tale told for the month of April.26 Morris does not think in categories like
living after death in fairyland, and the total scheme set up in The Earthly
Paradise, though a deeply haunting one, has a different reference. The
"Wanderers" of the Prologue are old men, half from the Mediterranean
and the other half from the North, who after their wanderings, in the
course of which they have been welcomed as kings and worshipped as
gods, have met together on a lonely island to interchange their tradi-
tional stories. Nothing happens except that they tell them.
Yet these impotent old men are clearly being identified with the stories
they tell; and the stories themselves, it seems to me, are conceived as
latent powers, imaginative projections of life that humanity at present
can see no use for, and yet are the sources of all the styles of living, past,
present, and future, that it has set up. They are myths that form a
mythology, and a mythology is the world man builds as distinct from the
world that surrounds him, so far as the former world can be presented in
words. In his curious mania, as it sometimes seems, for telling and
translating all the world's great stories he can get his hands on, Morris
seems to be collecting the swords and spears of traditional heroism, of
chivalry and romance and warfare and magic and mystery, so that they
can be beaten into the plowshares and pruning-hooks of a new world
where man has made his peace with himself and with nature.
27
The World as Music and Idea
in Wagner's Parsifal
27 October 1982
dragons and other ambulatory fauna, has always been of minor interest
to me. In fact I have reservations about the genre itself. I once saw a work
of Monteverdi in which the singers performed offstage while the action
on the stage—an episode from Tasso—was mimed, and I have never
quite lost the feeling that that was the direction in which opera should
have developed.
Considering the time and place of my youth, it was inevitable that
there should be a long interval between my first music lessons and my
first opera (which was Lohengrin). Hence my early musical experiences
crystallized around the great keyboard composers, who produced the
music I feel I really possess. Then I went through a period, during the
Second World War, when I loathed Wagner's music to the point of
physical nausea. That meant, of course, that I was accepting the Nazi
identification with Wagner, and such paranoid elements in Wagner's
character as his anti-Semitism seemed to me at that time very central. So
I can understand even Nietzsche's hysteria on the subject of Wagner in
general and of Parsifal in particular,1 although the source of my own
hysteria was anti-Nazi and not anti-Christian. I learned from this nega-
tive experience not to trust value judgments too much, even when they
come from the pit of the stomach, which is where the sixteenth-century
alchemist van Helmont located the soul. Nevertheless it is sometimes an
advantage to have come to such a controversial figure as Wagner the
hard way, so that the stock prejudices against him have already been
made conscious.
One of the most extraordinary features of Wagner's mind, which is
familiar but still needs emphasizing, is the way in which all his mytho-
logical themes seemed to be present to him at once, aspects of a single
colossal vision that he turned to one at a time. If the operas were all alike
this would not be remarkable: it is their individuality that makes it so.
We remember that Lohengrin was Parsifal's son, that the central and
obvious source for the Parsifal story was the Parzival of the medieval
poet Wolfram von Eschenbach,2 who appears in his own right as a
character in Tannhauser, and that Wagner had originally thought of intro-
ducing Parsifal as a minor character into the later part of Tristan. So we
are not surprised to find that he had been reading Wolfram and ponder-
ing an opera on his hero quite early in his career, around 1845. But by the
time he was able to give his full time and energy to the subject he was
aware that it would probably be his last opera, and in a letter to King
Ludwig, after making his regulation plea that this time he must have
328 On the Nineteenth Century
complete freedom, he adds that, like William Tell, if his arrow fails he
has no other to send after it.3 A touch of genuine pathos here is given by
the fact that "Parsifal" was Wagner's private name for King Ludwig,
and that Wagner was dead within a few months of Parsifal's first
performance.
The story of Parsifal comes from one of the Grail romances. There are
so many Grail romances, and they interlock in such curious ways, that
one feels at first that there must have been some archetypal poem which
contained all the essential Grail themes, of which the poet we happen to
be reading has picked up only bits and pieces. But we soon realize that
criticism needs another conception when dealing with legends like this,
something closer to "total tradition" than to "lost first poem." A great
myth like that of the Grail means everything essential that it has ever
been made to mean in the history of its development, and the complete
story is the one that emerges gradually in the course of time, which in
English literature takes us down through Malory to Tennyson, Swinburne,
Charles Williams, and many others still to come.
Wagner will always be slightly peripheral to the total Grail story, I
think, because in Parsifal, as in Tristan, he obliterates the Arthurian con-
text of the cycle. To adapt a phrase of Vinaver about Malory, he has no
Camelot to balance his Corbenic (Malory's name for the Grail castle), and
so we have no contrasting base of social operations and no roots in a
specific body of legend. The Ring is solidly entrenched in the Siegfried
story, but a Grail story without an Arthurian court is as disembodied as
an Odyssey without Ithaca. A work of art derives its identity from its
context within the art, including the context of its tradition, and anything
that has to be called a Buhneniveihfestspiel clearly has problems with
identity.4 I am not speaking of anything that Wagner should have done
and did not do: I am trying to indicate the context of what he did. Parsifal
belongs to a genre of drama that I have elsewhere called the auto (taking
the word from Calderon):5 a musical and spectacular drama that is
neither tragic nor comic, but presents an audience with a central myth in
its cultural tradition, like the Biblical plays of the Middle Ages. The latter
were associated with the Feast of Corpus Christi, and the symbol of
communion so prominent in Parsifal is appropriate to its tradition.
For most of us the Holy Grail is a part of a Christian legend. It was,
according to tradition, the cup used by Jesus at the Last Supper, when he
identified the wine in it with his own blood. It was later used to catch the
actual blood and water that flowed from his side when it was pierced, on
The World as Music and Idea in Wagner's ParsifalI 329
"Whom does the Grail serve?" a much more profound question, but a
superfluous one for Wagner, for whom the Grail obviously serves the
knights of the Grail. Wagner has redistributed the traditional themes of his
sources in a most ingenious way. The theme of sexual impotence is trans-
ferred to Klingsor, who has castrated himself in order to achieve purity
through an act of self-will. Klingsor therefore really is the life-denying
spirit that Nietzsche thought he saw in the whole opera. The equivalent of
Parzival's failure to ask the crucial question comes when Gurnemanz
decides that, prophecy or no prophecy, Parsifal is nothing but a fool.
This happens at the end of the first act, in symmetrical contrast to
Parsifal's succession to Amfortas as leader of the Grail knights at the end
of the third. It is a rejection by a father figure, more or less: at least
Gurnemanz has previously addressed Parsifal as "my son." In the sec-
ond act Parsifal descends into a world of illusion which Wagner obvi-
ously associated, as we should do, with Parsifal's own unconscious.
Naturally he meets in that world the ghost of his mother Herzeleide,
whom he has, unknown to himself, violated, that is, killed, as he has
broken her heart by leaving her. Herzeleide is personated by Kundry, the
one female figure of the opera, who represents all the ambivalence of
traditional Christianity to female figures. In the Bible the symbolic male-
ness of God seems to represent the fact that nature, which is usually
female in mythology, is morally alien to man and keeps him imprisoned
in an endless round of death and rebirth. The flower maidens Parsifal
meets are spirits of nature: they are not evil, but they are creatures of a
morally irresponsible and nonhuman world. The redeeming God has to
be male, but man, who is to be redeemed, is in that context symbolically
woman, the forgiven harlot who appears in Old Testament prophecy
and as the Magdalen figure of the Gospels.
Kundry is neither wholly a siren of nature nor a Magdalen, but is torn
between the two, an Ariel who desperately longs to be a Caliban, the
servant of a human society, but cannot live in that world either. In
Klingsor's world she feels that Parsifal could be her saviour if she could
get into sexual contact with him, and Parsifal has to explain to her that
she cannot be redeemed by her own desire. In the Grail world she
becomes, in the third act, a forgiven and released Magdalen figure.
Wagner is said to have been annoyed by those who pointed to the
Kundry-Magdalen parallels, but he could hardly have put her through
the routine of washing Parsifal's feet and wiping them with her hair
without feeling that there was an echo in the room somewhere.
334 On the Nineteenth Century
alive, has already taken place, and reversed the direction of the cult of
heroic warfare.
The theme of the renunciation of a heroic quest, which runs all through
Parsifal, had already appeared in the Ring, because the whole titanic
struggle started by Alberich's theft can only end when the stolen gold is
put back where it was. The effectiveness of this theme for romance was
demonstrated in the next century by the sensational success of Tolkien,
who retells the story of a ring that must not be won but lost, the Nibelung
story interpenetrated with the spirit of redeeming simplicity in Parsifal,
symbolized by his "hobbits." Parsifal is much more explicitly the drama
of a renounced quest, to the point of being something of an anti-drama.
This is because the central theme of the spiritual growth of Parsifal
himself is so closely connected with the theme of temptation.
When Milton wanted to show the nature of genuine Christian heroism
in Paradise Regained, he chose the theme of the temptation of Christ in the
wilderness by Satan. That meant an epic of four books in which Satan
thinks up one enticing illusion after another, while Christ merely stands
in the centre and rejects them. An epic based on the central episode of
Buddha's life, his enlightenment under the Bo tree, rejecting one after
another of the illusions of Mara, would not be very different. In this kind
of theme the dramatic situation is the reverse of the moral one: our
sympathies are dramatically with Satan, with Mara, with Klingsor, be-
cause they do the dramatic work. To make heroes of Jesus and Buddha
and Parsifal because they refuse to do it makes moral sense, but a
dramatic paradox. One feels that while there is a lot going on in Parsifal,
what is not going on, to any great extent, is the kind of dramatic action
that would be needed (at least up to Wagner's time) to keep a purely
verbal play on the stage.
And yet in all major drama a neutralizing balancing power, which the
Greeks called nemesis in its tragic aspect, can be seen at work. In Shake-
speare's romances, while the surface action moves towards the marriage
of young and happy people, the major action is a setting right of some-
thing wrong in the past. The theme of The Tempest looks as though it were
going to be Prospero's revenge on his enemies by his power of magic. But
Prospero renounces both his revenge and his magic, and regains his
dukedom, as W.H. Auden makes him say, at the moment when he no
longer wants it.9 The "rarer action," as Prospero calls it [5.1.27], is a
neutralizing of the expected revenge action. Wagner remarked that the
Grail was the spiritualized version of the Nibelung hoard. But Parsifal
336 On the Nineteenth Century
does not acquire the Grail by a dragon-killing quest: he merely gets his
head clear of the kind of illusion that such dragons represent, and the
Grail thereby acquires him.
Going by the text alone, the characters of Parsifal do seem to be a life-
denying lot, crippled or half dead, and resembling characters in a play of
Beckett more closely than they do those in any earlier work of Wagner's.
Amfortas is in mortal agony, longing for death, until almost the last
moment of the drama; Titurel speaks from a tomb in the first act and is
buried in the third; Kundry, who practically has to be dug out of the
ground at the beginning of the third act, also longs for the death she
finally gets; Gurnemanz seems old and tired even at the beginning, and
proportionately more so at the end. Parsifal himself makes his entrance
as a stupid oaf shooting a swan, an oafs idea of fun, and then proves to
be unable even to answer any questions, much less ask them. He finally,
as we saw, becomes such an encumbrance to what action there is that
Gurnemanz pushes him irritably off the stage. Whatever one thinks of
the phrase "music of the future" applied to Wagner, Parsifal at least is the
drama of the future, pointing the way to the kind of dramatic struggle
with, and within, stagnation that we have later in Strindberg, Chekhov,
Beckett, and Sartre.
All through Wagner's work runs the theme of the comitatus, the broth-
erhood united by some form of distinctive heroism or skill—even the
Meistersinger make up such a group. But the knights of the Grail move
toward exhaustion in the third act, where much of the dominant music is
very like a funeral march. In the course of the action Gurnemanz remarks
that in the world of the Grail castle time has given place to space. I don't
know what this means altogether, but certainly the atmosphere is one of
suspended time, like the life-in-death of the Ancient Mariner, or the
world between incarnations in a Japanese Noh play. Another parallel
would be Ezekiel's vision of a valley of dry bones, transformed into "an
exceeding great army" [Ezekiel 37:10] by a power that Christian readers
of Ezekiel would identify with the Resurrection, the ultimate transform-
ing power that immediately follows Good Friday.
It seems to me significant, however, that Wagner kept the traditional
Good Friday as the setting for his third act, instead of changing it to
Easter Sunday. For the main action of the opera is less a resurrection than
a harrowing of hell. There are, as always, two levels of hell. The deeper
level, the world of the self-castrated Klingsor in which Kundry is unable
to die, is the real hell: it will always be there as long as man insists on
The World as Music and Idea in Wagner's Parsifall• 337
tached arias like Senta's ballad in The Flying Dutchman or Wolfram's song
to the evening star in Tannhauser. Some Wagner criticism gives the im-
pression that Wagner wrote a libretto, then composed a number of
leitmotifs, each one with an allegorical relationship to some character or
image in the story, then mixed these up in a musical pastiche where they
appear at appropriate moments. How anything resembling a structure
could emerge from such a procedure is an unanswered question. The
opposite extreme is represented by Lorenz's four-volume study attempt-
ing to demonstrate, not simply that the music has a structure, but that the
musical structure in fact is the structure of the opera.12 This tends to
suggest that Wagner's music dramas are simply overgrown symphonies
with vocal obbligato. But even the longest symphony has to have some
basis in symphonic form, and the structural principles of Wagner's mu-
sic seem to be quite different from those of symphonic form.
This statement, however, is less true of Parsifal than of any other
Wagner opera. Parsifal begins and ends in the same key (A-flat major),
and the second act also begins and ends in the same key (B minor). We
may call this pure accident, but accidents in Wagner are seldom if ever
pure. It looks as though tonality has a function for this opera which is
unusual for operas in general, even for Wagner's. All through the work,
again, there is a contrast of diatonic and chromatic textures. The diatonic
ones are associated with the Grail and the ideals and virtues it inspires.
The chromatic passages predominate in the world of Klingsor in the
second act, and are also associated with the agony of Amfortas and with
the more screaming and scampering aspects of Kundry.
The overture presents the three main Grail themes: we may follow
tradition, for the most part, and associate them respectively with the
Christian virtues of love, hope, and faith. We begin with what is called
the "Love Feast" motif, an eerie, plaintive, isolated melody followed by
arpeggios on the chord of A-flat. We are not, of course, in the world of
preconscious innocence represented by the open E-flat chords at the
beginning of Rheingold: the function of these arpeggios is to establish the
underlying rhythm of the very syncopated first theme. The second theme
is a well-known liturgical cadence called the "Dresden Amen," which
would have been familiar to many in Wagner's audience. A third theme,
with four descending notes prominent in it, follows and provides a
rhythmical contrast to the gentle and wavering opening. A quite sudden
modulation of this theme from A-flat to D major was associated by
Wagner, apparently, with the spreading of the Grail faith throughout the
The World as Music and Idea in Wagner's ParsifalI 339
world. The opening theme recurs, wistful and elusive as ever, and the
overture ends on a dominant seventh of almost intolerable insistence,
lingering even in the first recitatives after the curtain rises.
All three themes are strongly diatonic, and seem to set the pattern for
three modes of feeling. The "Love Feast" theme, in spite of its gentle
subsidence at its close, is mainly a rising melody with a dotted rhythm in
its rise that recurs, in different forms, through various moods of aspira-
tion and yearning, including even the central theme of the Good Friday
music. All three acts of Parsifal begin with a summons to wake up, the
second and third being both addressed, for different reasons, to the
harassed Kundry, and Klingsor has a demonic parody of rising rhythm
associated with him as the curtain goes up on the second act.
The "Dresden Amen" is one of a group of themes that seem to express
a mood of waiting, with calmness and patience, for some kind of deliver-
ance from the prison paradise of the Grail world. The most important of
these themes of hope, as we might call them, is the hymn that prophesies
the coming of the compassionate fool. The more vigorous theme called
"Faith" reminds us that the Grail knighthood is still a band of heroes,
even though their heroism has outgrown the fighting stage, and it is
linked with the marching rhythm of the procession in the first act, which
moves with a somewhat plodding stateliness towards the unveiling of
the Grail. The march in the third act, where the burial of Titurel is
involved, has a slightly different rhythm, closer, as said, to a funeral
march, in contrast to the more spirited martial theme that accompanies
the entrances of Parsifal. In the chromatic tumult of Klingsor's world in
the second act we hear two themes in particular associated with tempta-
tion and illusion. One is the waltzing rhythm of the flower maidens'
chatter, the other the pastoral six-eight (later nine-eight) rhythm of
Kundry's account to Parsifal of his childhood with his mother. Both have
curious recalls of the formulas of popular nineteenth-century music: they
are equal in attractiveness and technical skill to anything else in the
opera, but manage to suggest something a bit bogus, or at least common-
place, at the same time.
The opening of the third act, depicting the exhaustion and low morale
of the Grail knights and Parsifal's inability to find them, wanders uncer-
tainly around the key of B-flat minor: so uncertainly that one critic has
suggested that the real tonic chord is a diminished seventh rather than
the chord of B-flat minor. Wagner is never atonal, and when he seems to
move away from tonality it generally means that chaos is coming again.
34O On the Nineteenth Century
The third act then alternates between hope and fear, rising to a dissonant
climax when the knights insist that the suffering Amf ortas, who is at the
end of his endurance, uncover the Grail once more, and we wonder if a
demonic parody of the sacrifice of Christ is about to be enacted on this
Good Friday. However, Parsifal is present this time with his healing
spear, and the opera ends with the motif of "Faith" having it all its own
way, in a limpidly diatonic conclusion.
Even an amateur with no training in musical analysis, like myself,
could follow the evolving, intertwining, metamorphosing play of the
various themes throughout the opera for a long time; but we do not have
a long time (changed to space, like the Grail world, in the context of an
essay), and I wish to make one point only about the music. The verbal
framework of Parsifal, we suggested, was derived from Schopenhauer's
construct of the world as will and as idea, or representation of the world
in a conscious mind. This construct, though it has a popular reputation
for pessimism, is nevertheless one within which the redemptive efforts
of Christianity and Buddhism become at least intelligible. But the music
expands from here into a much larger vision of humanity led by its own
inner nature to rise toward some infinite power which is both itself and
the opposite of itself, an effort neither quixotic nor hopeless because the
infinite power has already descended to meet it. I hear this perhaps most
clearly at the moment of Parsifal's prayer before the spear, but its over-
tones and resonances are on every page of the opera, and make me
wonder whether music, which defines nothing and expresses every-
thing, may not be the primary language of the spirit, and not merely, as
Schopenhauer said, of the suffering and enduring will.
28
Some Reflections on Life and Habit
17 February 1988
pages or so are a brilliant and witty piece of writing, and if the entire
book were on that level it would be one of my favourite books. Two,
those hundred pages are essentially a theory of education, which natu-
rally concerns me as a teacher. Butler's theory was not new, but the
formulation and context of it were new in his day. The context was
Butler's intense interest in Darwinian evolution: he was a contemporary
of Darwin, and realized that the issue raised in the Origin of Species in
1859 was the central scientific issue of his time. Darwin's account of the
evolutionary process, in which variations are thrown out by a species at
random until one proves to have better survival value for its environ-
ment and becomes the channel for a new development, fascinated Butler
but dissatisfied him too. He felt that the degree of precision and skill
shown by even the simplest organisms, along with their immense vari-
ety, pointed to a directing will within them. The title of another book of
his, Luck or Cunning? indicates his attitude. Here he was reverting to an
earlier view, proposed by the botanist Lamarck in France and by Dar-
win's own grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, in England.
Biologists oppose this view on the ground that it appears to depend on
the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and that there is no evidence,
or not enough evidence, for this. As Butler went on, he became increas-
ingly hostile to Darwin, and more and more insistent on introducing
elements of will, design, and purpose into evolution. The consensus of
biologists was that the Darwinian explanation described the process, the
how of evolution, and that that was the whole business of biological
science. The other elements, they said, belonged to speculative philoso-
phy or theology, and could not be experimentally studied.
So Butler fell out of fashion, and became known as an amateur who
blundered into a scientific controversy on the wrong side without really
knowing what he was talking about. His reputation was further affected
by the fact that his chief disciple was Bernard Shaw, whose doctrine of
"creative evolution" in my opinion rather vulgarizes Butler's views. This
is particularly true of his interminably gabby play, or series of plays,
called Back to Methusaleh, in which the human race evolves from Adam
and Eve to a whirlpool of pure thought in something like twenty hours.
More recently, there was the attempt of the pseudoscientific politician
Lysenko, in Stalin's Russia, to set up Russian biology on a Lamarckian
basis, which proved an abysmal failure.
Well, as it happens, I am rather interested in people who are out of
fashion, because they often indicate the limitations of the age that consid-
ers them so. If I knew more biology, or more accurately, if I knew some
Some Reflections on Life and Habit 343
meaning. Also, we see an egg where there was no egg before, and that
gratifies our impatience to get something tangible without having to wait
too long for it. So when the Bible begins by saying that everything started
with a revolutionary act of God in suddenly making the world out of
nothing, we feel that that is the proper and inevitable way to begin the
story of nature. In Genesis the cackle and egg are perhaps below the
dignity of Holy Writ, although there are eggs in Hindu and Greek crea-
tion myths. But even in Genesis there is a spoken utterance and what
seems like a brooding bird. However, God's ways are not our ways, and
human creation is much more a matter of eggs trying to be hens in the
hope of producing future eggs.
The real paradox in Butler comes from the fact that words are instru-
ments of the conscious mind: they mean exploration, discovery, experi-
ment, and consequently imperfect knowledge. The unconscious
knowledge he is talking about is wordless. We do not feel complete
confidence in the skill of a craftsman until he can no longer say how he
does what he does. When we turn from human beings to plants and
animals, this paradox increases enormously. A snail builds its shell and a
warbler its nest with an unerring precision, exactly as though they knew
what they were doing. Why, then, do we deny the term "know" to them?
A good deal of Butler's wit comes from his applying terms of knowledge
and consciousness to organisms that simply behave with the appearance
of knowledge and consciousness. He says, for example, that the lichen
could not grow on the rock unless it thought it could, and could not think
it could unless it could, yet it does very well for itself in spite of arguing
in a circle.4
An organism- struggles to achieve some kind of equilibrium with its
environment, and so develops some patented skills to enable it to keep
on absorbing nutriment and reproducing its kind. In a human being this
is largely accomplished within a few days after birth. Butler says that a
baby a day old sucks, which involves a profound practical knowledge of
the laws of pneumatics and hydrostatics; it digests; it oxygenizes its
blood millions of years before oxygen was discovered; it sees and it
hears—all most difficult and complicated operations, involving a similar
knowledge of optics and acoustics. Before that, it was an embryo con-
structing eyes and limbs and performing other fantastically complex
feats of engineering.5
If we say "nature" does this, we are using a superfluous metaphor:
there is no such thing as nature, no mother-goddess who does things for
346 On the Nineteenth Century
us. The metaphor means that behind what the embryo does is a long
evolutionary process through which it has learned how it does it. Why,
says Butler, should we say of a man that he has never amounted to
anything? He got himself born, and that is about ninety-seven percent of
everything he can ever hope to do.6 Society confirms this view of uncon-
scious knowledge: we admire healthy, handsome, and fortunate people;
athletes get far more news coverage than specialists in semiotics; people
with conventional views, or people able to get along with conventions,
are the sensible, the nice people, the people it is comfortable to be with.
We also cherish an intense if sometimes grudging admiration for billion-
aires and dictators, because we spring from an environment in which the
predators are the aristocracy.
One of Butler's inferences, that there must have been a time when
there was something like intelligence and a learning process in the or-
ganism, takes him into biological speculations where it is hard to follow
him and where at present we do not need to follow him. It is the analogy
with human education that I am concerned with here.
II
only a metaphor for most of them, and very probably for all of them. In
Butler's day the German philosopher Nietzsche preached the gospel of
the evolving of man into a "superman," who sounds like a remarkably
unpleasant human being, however admirable as a god. Then there was
the doctrine of progress, a doctrine much older than Darwin.
Some people who wanted to believe in progress thought that evolution
had furnished a scientific proof of it. But of course evolution is a principle
in biology, and cannot be directly applied to human history except as an
analogy. Whether we believe in progress depends entirely on what fac-
tors we select as evidence for it. Thus the processes known in some areas
as pollution and in others as development, such as destroying a commu-
nity by building a highway through the middle of it, are often rational-
ized by some such phrase as "you can't stop progress." "Progress" here
is clearly an idol of some sort, and in totalitarian states, where thousands
of people can be shot or starved to get a more efficient system of agricul-
ture or industry in the future, we get some notion of how horrible such
idolatry can be. Whatever ideals we may frame, in education or any-
where else, will take time to reach, and so will relate to the future, but a
real future has to be built on what is available at present. To sacrifice the
present, which exists, to a future which does not exist, and certainly will
never exist in any presently recognizable form, is as perverse a notion as
any in history.
In my student days, during the Depression, it was widely believed that
capitalism would evolve into socialism, with or without a revolution,
socialism being assumed to be both more efficient and morally superior.
A secondary assumption was that evolution never made a mistake, but
always tended towards improvement. On the other side was the move-
ment sometimes called social Darwinism, which was really a rationaliz-
ing of imperialism, taking on the white man's burden in Africa and south
Asia. It asserted that there were developed and primitive societies, and
that the developed ones were following the evolutionary laws of a com-
petitive nature in enslaving or exterminating the primitive ones. "Devel-
oped" in this context meant that their military technology was deadlier.
In our day there has been an invasion of teachers of yoga, Zen, kundalini,
and other techniques of meditation, which often carry ideologies of
evolution along with them, promising developments of consciousness
that will usher in a new phase of human existence. Nobody can object to
the teaching of these techniques, but the evolutionary metaphors seem,
once again, to be merely analogies.
348 On the Nineteenth Century
values, and didn't realize how clearly they were expressing them. Much
of their alleged activism consisted of dodging everything academic that
looked difficult and repetitious. There were complaints about learning
by rote, "regurgitating" lecture notes, plodding through memorization,
and the like. They wanted every lecture to be an exciting existential
event; they organized "teach-ins" with imported speakers who were
usually left-wing political leaders giving one of their standard harangues;
and they greatly resented the suggestion that these activities were enter-
tainment and not education. Student representation, for them, did not
mean sitting on committees but organizing sit-ins and demonstrations
and disrupting meetings. Some of them were very agile in working out
rationalizations for all this, and I am far from denying the good faith of
the many idealistic students who believed passionately in what they
were doing, and had no idea how or by whom they were being manipu-
lated. But the movement was essentially one more outbreak of American
anti-intellectualism, and it was discouraging to find it in the very place
where it ought least to be.
Butler's theory of education follows the normal pattern in being based
on the traditional emphasis on habit and practice. If we take piano-
playing as a typical educational activity, it requires endless patient rep-
etition until conscious learning is finally digested into unconscious skill.
The unconscious cannot be hurried or forced or consciously invaded;
some learn more easily and quickly than others, but everyone learns in
essentially the same way. Obviously, a good deal of this sounds like the
emphasis on discipline and routine which in the past has given so penal a
quality to education, reinforced as it so often was by savage beatings and
the like. If the "unrest" of the '6os had been a reaction against this, it
would have been quite normal; but, while there had to be a good deal of
pretence that such elements still existed, they had in fact disappeared at
least fifty years earlier.
Of course a dull or plodding teacher can envisage only a dull educa-
tional process, and can make education a dreary enough operation. I
have had teachers myself who took a squalid pleasure in making drill-
sergeant noises about the moral benefits of plugging and slugging as
ends in themselves. That was in the '205 of this century, and of course
such teachers didn't realize that they were speaking for the capitalist
work ethic and setting up the automatism of the Ford assembly plant as
the model for it. Neither did I: I felt only that they were talking about
their own mental processes and not about mine, and it was some time
350 On the Nineteenth Century
before I realized that the emphasis on routine was only the flip side of
something very different.
Notice that we speak of "playing" the piano, just as we speak about
playing tennis or chess, and just as we call dramas, even the most terrible
tragedies, "plays." In ordinary speech we distinguish work and play,
work being energy expended for a further end in view, play being energy
expended for its own sake. Doing any kind of playing well, whether on
the stage or at a piano or chessboard, takes an immense amount of work,
but when the work has its end in play we can see the point in it much
more clearly. Nothing gives greater pleasure than spontaneous activity,
but the spontaneous comes at the end of a long discipline of practice. It
never comes early except when it is something we have inherited as part
of our previous evolutionary development—something our ancestors
have practised before us.
Education, then, is a movement toward the spontaneous, not a move-
ment away from it. We speak of liberal education, which means essen-
tially that something in us is getting liberated or set free. When we
practise the piano, we are setting ourselves free to play the piano. The
half-educated may follow rules or dodge around rules; it is only the
thoroughly educated who can take liberties with rules. If we want to
write, it is nothing very wonderful if we can produce acceptable or even
remarkable poetry in early years: poetry at that age ought to be a natural
secretion, like a pearl in an oyster. It is the writers that keep on writing
who matter in the history of literature; and what their incessant practice
aims at is a steadily purer and more direct simplicity. The simple, which
is the opposite of the commonplace, is normally one of the last secrets of
art to be mastered.
We often feel, ploughing through the gobbledygook and bumble of
political speeches and the like, Why can't they say what they mean?
Often, of course, they have excellent reasons for concealing what they
mean, but the real answer is usually that lucidity is difficult. We may
even be impressed by the kind of polysyllabic blather that merely throws
words at the ideas instead of expressing them; we may feel that anything
so hard to read must have been even harder to think out. But eventually
we realize that it is very easy to write this way: in fact it is the normal
way to write when we are not thinking about what we are doing. It is the
same with a kind of scholarly writing that we in the academic world are
reluctantly familiar with, and which infallibly indicates a lack of under-
standing of one's material.
Some Reflections on Life and Habit 351
III
It should be clear from what we have said that two kinds of memory are
involved in education, and that their roles are often confused. There is
Butler's unconscious memory, a continuing of the evolutionary process
we hooked into at the beginning of our lives, which is fostered by habit
and practice, and there is conscious memory, the recall of an event in the
past into the present. Conscious memory is certainly essential, as we
soon realize if we talk to someone who has lost it. It supplies the continu-
ity without which no learning is possible, hence the strong emphasis on
the use of the conscious memory in education. But conscious memory is
primarily an adjunct to unconscious memory, a means of getting hold of
it and supplying the energy of the conscious will for continuing it.
Practice or habit memory means the control of time, not the mere aware-
ness of it. Only when conscious memory is treated as an end in itself does
education become a treadmill of repetition.
Certainly there have been societies that approached education in this
way, handing on traditions from the past without change, and demand-
ing from the student only the acceptance of them through rote learning
and repetition, no criticism or recreation of them being tolerated. There
can be nothing here of the progressive developing of a skill or the setting
free of undeveloped abilities, only of stagnation. The contrast between
this and real education is not unlike the contrast between superstition
and faith. The root meaning of superstition is vestigial survival. When
we keep on doing something without understanding why we are doing
it, but have only a vague feeling that something awful will happen if we
stop doing it, we are in a state of superstition. Superstition of this kind is
frozen ideology, a pathological social condition that obstructs the devel-
opments in the arts and sciences, and so frustrates the central aim of
education. Its usual cause is a fear that something in these developments
will conflict with something else thought to be beyond the scope of
argument. Evolution itself, as we all know, had to contend with supersti-
tions attached to false readings of the Biblical creation myths.
The wise man who wrote the book in the Bible called Ecclesiastes
made two remarks that are very important for the theory of education.
One is "there is nothing new under the sun" [1.9], the other "to every-
thing there is a season" [3.1]. He was speaking of two areas of the
learning process, knowledge and experience. Knowledge may be new to
us or to the entire human race, but new knowledge is not yet knowledge:
352 On the Nineteenth Century
we do not know anything until we have recognized it, that is, placed it in
a context of what we already know, rearranging the familiar until the
unfamiliar is fitted into it. It follows that we cannot know the unique as
such. When we come to the phrase "to everything there is a season" and
its corollary, "there is a time for all things," we are in the realm of
experience, where everything is new and unique. The function of knowl-
edge is to set free the capacity to experience. The repetition and constant
practice that underlies the acquiring of a skill, then, is, or certainly ought
to be, a process of continuous discovery: the knowledge is not new, but
the experience of getting it is. Knowledge that tries to do without experi-
ence becomes paranoid; experience that tries to do without knowledge
becomes schizophrenic.
The anti-intellectual trend which is so deeply rooted in American life is
linked to a tendency in American education to emphasize experience at
the expense of knowledge. I say American because the same tendencies
have extended to Canada, perhaps as much here in the West as further
east. The tendency is often associated with the name of John Dewey,
although it seems hardly fair to blame him for all the imbecilities of his
disciples. But certainly such slogans as "learning by doing" can do a
great deal of damage when they ignore the fact that thinking is also a
doing, and one as totally dependent on habit and practice as any other
skill. There is a semantic difficulty here: we often speak, with Thurber's
Walter Mitty, of daydreaming or woolgathering as thinking, and when
we repeat prejudices acquired from our friends or the morning paper we
often imagine that we are thinking for ourselves. But thinking, again, is
like piano-playing: how well we do it depends primarily on how much of
it we have progressively and systematically done already, and at all
times the content of thinking is knowledge. The age of hysteria in the '6os
I spoke of developed the emphasis on experience over knowledge to
great lengths. Drug cults, for example, were pursued as novel modes of
experience, although they totally failed to link up with any genuine
knowledge or creativity. Today the pendulum has swung the other way,
and political leaders at least are required to have as narrow and conven-
tional a background of experience as possible. Unfortunately, a lack of
knowledge seems to be as highly prized as ever.
Samuel Butler was a humanist trying to relate, as a humanist should,
what he observed in his reading to the quality of human life, actual or
potential. His satire Ereivhon depicts a society that has destroyed all its
machinery. They had been persuaded to do this by a writer who told
Some Reflections on Life and Habit 353
them that machines were not simply becoming more efficient, but were
actually evolving as a new species, and evolving far too fast. They were,
he said, just on the point of overcoming the last obstacle in the way of
their taking over and enslaving humanity. That obstacle was their inabil-
ity to reproduce their own kind, but they were now beginning to use
human beings for that, as flowers use bees. So unless we destroy our
machines we shall have no future except to become their genital organs.8
Today we are faced with machines of a complexity that Butler himself,
to say nothing of his imaginary pamphleteer, never dreamed of. Butler
was writing satire, and knew that to say that machines are evolving was
a false analogy. (The satire was directed against Darwin, because Butler
believed that it would not be a false analogy on strictly Darwinian
premises.) Nevertheless, technological developments have certainly
dragged us through several major social revolutions in this century, and
many more are awaiting us. Hence they still illustrate the central ques-
tion that Butler's view of education raises: the question whether we are
to keep on transforming our natural environment for genuine human
ends, or mechanically go on exploiting both it and one another until we
arrive at total chaos, a cultural black hole from which no light can any
longer emerge. So the need is greater than it ever was for humanist
writers and scholars to keep fighting in the front line of the constant
struggle of humanity to stay in control of its own lives and habits.
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Notes
Introduction
1 Details of the ogdoad and the Great Doodle are set out by Michael Dolzani
in his introduction to TEN and in "The Book of the Dead: A Skeleton Key to
Northrop Frye's Notebooks," in Rereading Frye: The Published and Unpub-
lished Works, ed. David Boyd and Imre Salusinszky (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1999), 19-38.
2 The Secular Scripture is included in vol. 18 of the Collected Works, The Secular
Scripture and Other Writings on Critical Theory, 1976-1991, ed. Joseph Adam-
son and Jean Wilson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).
3 See "The Book of the Dead," 28, and LS, xvi.
4 "Novels and History and Northrop Frye," Eighteenth-Century Studies, 24
(1990-91), 227. In his 1955 Diary, NF notes that "Towards Defining an Age
of Sensibility" was commissioned by Earl Wasserman of Johns Hopkins
University as "a key paper revising all our ideas about that period," i.e.,
1750-1800 (see D, 610).
5 In the introduction to FI—the book in which "Towards Defining an Age of
Sensibility" and the Byron and Dickinson essays included here were first
collected—NF explains the focus of the volume in terms that are a barely
coded reversal of the priorities Eliot sets out in For Lancelot Andrewes: "a
tradition in which the major and prevailing tendencies are Romantic,
revolutionary, and Protestant" (i).
6 "Response," Eighteenth-Century Studies, 24 (1990-91): 246.
7 See "Response," 244.
8 "Northrop Frye as a Cultural Theorist," in Rereading Frye, 119.
9 For a full treatment of this subject, which the present essay to some extent
qualifies, see my "Frye and Romanticism," in Visionary Poetics: Essays on
Northrop Frye's Criticism, ed. Robert D. Denham and Thomas Willard (New
York: Peter Lang, 1991), 57-74.
356 Notes to pages xxvi-4
1 The Ghost, in The Poetical Works of Charles Churchill, ed. Douglas Grant
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 97 (bk. 2,1. 653).
2 E.g., in his A Vision, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1937), 73.
Notes to pages 5-11 357
3 Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 309.
4 Nicomachean Ethics, 4.7.14-15.
5 See "Croker's Edition of Boswell's Life of Johnson," in The Works of Lord
Macaulay, ed. Lady Trevelyan (London: Longmans, 1866), 5:498-538.
3. Nature Methodized
i The Poetical Works of Sir John Denham, ed. Theodore Howard Banks (New
Haven: Archon Books, 1969), 77 (11.191-2).
Notes to pages 25-30 359
19 Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution (1902). The book argued,
against the social Darwinists, that those who support each other are more
likely to survive than the competitive.
20 The full title of the 1714 edition of Mandeville's work was The Fable of the
Bees; or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits.
21 Robert Browning's Parleying with Bernard de Mandeville, in Parleyings with
Certain People of Importance in Their Day (1887).
22 Daniel Defoe, Captain Singleton (London: Oxford University Press, 1973),
199.
23 Borrow, Lavengro, 195 (chap. 31).
24 Borrow, Lavengro, 423 (chap. 77).
25 Robert Bage, The Fair Syrian (New York: Garland, 1979), 2:81.
26 Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), 169. Marx
says: "Of [Crusoe's] prayers and the like, we take no account here, since our
friend takes pleasure in them and sees them as recreation."
27 See Swift, Gulliver's Travels, pt. 4, chaps. 4-10.
28 "An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs," in The Writings and Speeches of
the Right Honourable Edmund Burke (Toronto: George N. Morang, 1901), 4:176.
29 See Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932).
30 Sterne, Tristram Shandy, 180 (vol. 3, chap. 36).
31 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences
(New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 308.
1 G.K. Chesterton, George Bernard Shaw (London: Bodley Head, 1909), 1-2.
2 The exact phrase has not been found, but cf. Franz Kafka, Letters to Felice,
ed. Erich Heller and Jiirgen Born, trans. James Stern and Elisabeth
Duckworth (New York: Schocken, 1973), 389.
3 In "Bentham" (1938), J.S. Mill refers to Bentham and Coleridge as "the two
great seminal minds of England in their age." Essays on Ethics, Religion and
Society, ed. J.M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 77.
Notes to pages 45-57 361
4 The aphorism reads simply, "A Word a Focal Point" (Inquiring Spirit, 101).
5 Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (London: Penguin, 1966),
302 (chap. 33).
6 The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Kathleen Coburn (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), 1:174.
7 Selected Poetry and Prose of Coleridge, 168-70.
8 "Psilanthropy" means "the doctrine that Jesus Christ was a mere man"; on
p. 381 Coburn quotes Coleridge's Table Talk (1835), which applies this term
to Unitarians.
9 "Captured one time by sharp desire, Apollo / Made him gifts of skills that
were the god's—/ Augury and the lyre and speeding arrows. / lapyx,
however, to postpone the death / Of a father desperately ill, preferred / To
learn the powers of herbs, a healer's ways, / And practise without glory
silent arts." Virgil, The Aeneid, trans. Robert Fitzgerald (London: Penguin,
1985), 382 (bk. 12,11. 537-43)-
10 Arnold's quotation is from an article on Marx by John Macdonell: "Karl
Marx and German Socialism," The Fortnightly Review, i March 1875, 391.
11 "If there be joy in the world, truly the man of pure heart possesses it."
Thomas a Kempis, Of the Imitation of Christ, trans. Abbot Justin McCann
(New York: New American Library, 1957), 56 (chap. 4).
7. Lord Byron
10 Religio Medici, in The Works of Sir Thomas Browne, ed. Geoffrey Keynes
(London: Faber & Faber, 1964), 1:26 (pt. i, sec. 16).
11 I am not assuming that man was not responsible for his civilization in pre-
Romantic times, but it makes a good deal of psychological difference
whether man is regarded as the continuous creator of his civilization or
merely as the trustee of an original form given him by God. [NF]
12 Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 2:2546.
13 Sonnet ("When I have fears that I may cease to be"), 1. 6.
14 As did T.S. Eliot in "The Metaphysical Poets," in Selected Essays, 288.
15 The Letters of John Keats, ed. Hyder Edward Rollins (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1958), 1:232 (19 February 1818).
16 Selected Poetry and Prose of Coleridge, 237 (chap. 12).
17 On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History, ed. Michael K. Goldberg,
Joel J. Brattin, and Mark Engel (Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1993), 207 (Lecture 6).
18 See "The Correspondent Breeze," reprinted in M.H. Abrams, ed., English
Romantic Poets: Modern Essays in Criticism ([New York: Oxford University
Press,] 1960) [37-54]. [NF]
19 Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 1:921.
20 Blake uses "Giant Forms" in the Preface to Jerusalem, "To the Public" (pi. 3);
then again in pi. 53,1. 8 (K62O, 684/Ei45, 202). For Wordsworth's "huge and
mighty forms" see The Prelude, bk. i, 1. 398 (1850) or 1. 425 (1805).
21 [Edward Bostetter,] The Romantic Ventriloquists ([Seattle: University of
Washington Press,] 1963). [NF]
22 Letters of John Keats, 2:67 (19 February 1819).
23 Percy Bysshe Shelley, Speculations on Metaphysics, in Complete Works, ed
Roger Ingpen and Walter E. Peck (New York: Gordian Press, 1965), 6:64.
24 The allusions to Blake are to the Introduction to the Songs of Experience, the
"And did those feet" lyric from Milton, and the poem from the Rossetti MS
beginning "The Caverns of the Grave I've seen." [NF]
25 Milton, pi. 15,1. 39 (K497/Eno).
26 Thomas De Quincey, Confessions of an English Opium-Eater and Other Writ-
ings, ed. Grevel Lindop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 158.
27 D.H. Lawrence, Selected Poems, ed. Mara Kalnins (London: J.M. Dent, 1992),
75-
28 Of particular interest is the Yeatsian identification of chance and choice in
the passage quoted. [NF] In StS, NF then refers the reader to his discussion
of Yeats's Thirteenth Cone, where chance and choice are one, in the essay
"The Top of the Tower" (StS, 259).
29 Cf. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, In Memoriam, pt. 56: "Nature, red in tooth and
claw / With ravine, shriek'd against his creed."
30 As NF's next remark indicates, he has in mind here W.H. Auden's Atlantis
(1941), which describes a trip to Atlantis in a "ship of fools."
Notes to pages 90-9 365
1 In Shaw's one-act play of 1913, The Music Cure, the following exchange
occurs:
REGINALD [exhausted but calm]: Why does valerian soothe me when it excites
cats? There's a question to reflect on! You know, they ought to have made
me a philosopher.
THE DOCTOR: Philosophers are born, not made.
REGINALD: Fine old chestnut, that. Everybody's born, not made.
THE DOCTOR: You're getting almost clever.
From The Complete Plays of Bernard Shaw (London: Oldham Press, 1931),
1126. The original remark is not from Horace but is a proverbial tag.
2 The Garden of Cyrus, in Works of Sir Thomas Browne, 1:226 (chap. 5).
3 See Margaret Murray, The Witch-Cult in Western Europe ([Oxford: Clarendon
Press,] 1921). [NF]
4 Besides Blackmore's The Creation, quoted at p. 20, above, NF is thinking of
such poems as the Hymn to Science by Mark Akenside (1721-70), An Essay on
the Universe in Four Books by Moses Browne (1704-87), and the Ode to the
Memory of Sir Isaac Newton: Inscribed to the Royal Society by Allan Ramsay
(1686-1758).
5 Thomas Hardy, The Dynasts: An Epic-Drama (London: Macmillan, 1925), 522.
366 Notes to pages 99-106
6 See "On Poesy or Art/' in Biographia Literaria, ed. [J.] Shawcross [London:
Oxford University Press, 1954], 2:257-8. [NF] The terms natura naturata and
natura naturans have medieval roots, but their modern usage in Schelling,
Coleridge, and others descends from Spinoza.
7 Parenthetical references to Death's Jest-Book and Beddoes's other plays are to
The Works of Thomas Lovell Beddoes, ed. H.W. Donner (London: Oxford
University Press, 1935).
8 Blake, Europe, pi. 15,1. 2 (K245/E66).
9 The title of the pamphlet for which Shelley was expelled from Oxford.
10 Shelley: Poetical Works, ed. Thomas Hutchinson (London: Oxford University
Press, 1971), 801.
11 Ibid., 812.
12 This term in this book means the whole period from the beginning of the
Christian era down to the latter part of the eighteenth century. [NF]
13 Cf. Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, trans. Mary Morris
([London: Faber & Gwyer,] 1928), chap. i. [NF]
14 For De Quincey's enthusiasm for Ricardo, see "Dialogues of Three
Templars on Political Economy, Chiefly in Relation to the Principles of Mr.
Ricardo" (1824), in The Works of Thomas De Quincey (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1859), 10:195-287. See also "The Services of Mr. Ricardo to the
Science of Political Economy, Briefly and Plainly Stated" (1824), in Thomas
De Quincey: The Uncollected Writings (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1890),
1:154-9. The most convenient English source for Goethe's scientific writing
is probably Scientific Studies, ed. and trans. Douglas Miller (New York:
Surkhamp, 1988). This volume includes the first part of Goethe's Theory of
Colour (German, 1810) as well as excerpts from his scientific journal On
Morphology, which contains an "Outline for a General Introduction to
Comparative Anatomy, Commencing With Osteology" (1820).
15 See his Hymne de I'Univers (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1961).
16 T.S. Eliot's "unreal city" is in The Waste Land, 1. 60; Charles Baudelaire's
"fourmillante cite" is from the preface to Les Fleurs du Mai; Belgian poet
EmileVerhaeren (1855-1916) wrote Les Villes Tentaculaires in 1895.
17 The Prelude, bk. i, 1. 398 (1850) or 1. 425 (1805).
18 The Keats Circle: Letters and Papers, 1816-1879, £d. H.E. Rollins (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1965), 2:144.
19 Religio Medici, in Works of Sir Thomas Browne, 1:26 (pt. i, sec. 16).
20 The concept of a "speaking picture" derives from Horace's Ut pictura poesis,
or "As is painting, so is poetry" (Ars Poetica, \. 361). The idea that painting
and poetry, as mimetic arts, are similar was widely repeated in Renaissance
and later criticism, but began to be attacked in the eighteenth century by
G.E. Lessing in his essay Laokoon (1766).
21 I take this term from Robert Schumann's piano music; cf. the
Notes to pages 106-25 367
41 I am not suggesting that it was Beddoes's fault that his play was not pub-
lished earlier, only that it is always unfortunate for literature not to have
important works published in their primary chronological place. I think this
principle applies also to the poetry of Hopkins. [NF]
42 Life and Habit, vol. 4 of The Works of Samuel Butler (New York: AMS Press,
1968), 109.
43 These lines are spoken by Orlando.
44 Works of Thomas Lovell Beddoes, 614-15.
45 Bosola is a main character in John Webster's The Duchess ofMalfi (written
1612/13, published 1623); Vendice is the misguided revenger of The Reveng-
er's Tragedy (1607) by Thomas Middleton.
46 Edward E. Bostetter's The Romantic Ventriloquists[: Wordsworth, Coleridge,
Keats, Shelley, Byron (Seattle: University of Washington Press,] 1963) deals
with this feature of Romantic poetry, though it is not concerned with
Beddoes. [NF]
47 Works of Thomas Lovell Beddoes, 595.
48 T.S. Eliot, "Christopher Marlowe," in Selected Essays, 123.
49 Death Sweet, in Works of Thomas Lovell Beddoes, 243.
50 "Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning; or Pure, Ornate, and Grotesque
Art in English Poetry" (1864). [NF] See The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot
(London: The Economist, 1965), 2:321-66.
51 "The Works of Edgar Allan Poe," Essays and Reviews. [NF] See The Works of
Robert Louis Stevenson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), 24:107-17.
52 Yeats does not refer specifically to the bardo in his poems or letters, but
"The Gates of Pluto" (the final section of A Vision, 1926) includes some
discussion of reincarnation. Yeats describes the "coming to self-knowledge"
of the spirit after death, and the various states that the soul undergoes
before its "return."
53 The Phases of the Moon, 1.118.
54 I owe this view of Goethe to Barker Fairley, Goethe's Faust: Six Essays ([Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press,] 1953). [NF]
55 In a letter to Thomas Forbes Kelsall (i April 1826), Beddoes wrote: "Thank
you for the box to day—because it has come. You're right, the Cenci is best,
because truest. [...] Why did you send me the Cenci? I open my own page,
& see at once what damned trash it all is. No truth or feeling" (Works of
Thomas Lovell Beddoes, 619).
56 Cf. Eliot's comment on the "tomorrow" speech in "The Three Voices of
Poetry," in On Poetry and Poets (London: Faber & Faber, 1957), 100.
57 "The plot then is the first principle and, as it were, the soul of a tragedy:
character comes second" (Poetics, 6.14).
58 The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, pi. 7,1.18 (Ki5i/E36).
59 From Gosse: the Donner Variorum edition has another and much more
verbose reading. [NF] See Works of Thomas Lovell Beddoes, 328-9.
Notes to pages 140-55 369
For the universal human mind in On Life, see Shelley's Poetry and Prose,
478.
96 NF is here equating creation and fall in Blakean manner. What Augustine
actually says is that time came into existence with the creation. See Saint
Augstine, Confessions, trans, with introduction and notes Henry Chad wick
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 229 ff. (bk. 11, sec. 13 ff.).
97 Milton, pi. 15,11.39, 46 (K497/Eno).
98 Letters of Percy Bysshe Shelley, ed. Frederick L. Jones (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1964), 154 (16 November 1819).
99 Prometheus Unbound, 3.4.1.
100 T.S. Eliot, The Cocktail Party (London: Faber & Faber, 1974), 174 (act 3,11.
423-31)-
101 T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land, 1. 317.
102 "There may be heaven; there must be hell; / Meantime, there is our earth
here—well!" Time's Revenges (1845), 11. 65-6.
103 Shelley: Poetical Works, 448.
104 "Note on Prometheus Unbound," in Shelley: Poetical Works, 271.
105 James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: Random House, 1934), 35.
106 "The Four Ages of Poetry," rpt. in Critical Theory Since Plato, ed. Hazard
Adams (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 509-14.
107 Shelley's Poetry and Prose, 482, 493.
108 Ibid., 505.
109 Ibid., 506.
no T.S. Eliot, Burnt Norton, 1. 89 (end of pt. 2).
111 Letters of John Keats, 2:102 (21 April 1819).
112 Ibid., 1:243 ( X 3 March 1818).
113 The Fall of Hyperion, canto i, 1.199.
114 Letters of John Keats, 1:185 (22 November 1817).
115 Ibid., 1:139 (10 May 1817).
116 Ibid., 1:170 (8 October 1817).
117 Ibid., 1:281 (3 May 1818).
118 Ode on Indolence, \. 54.
119 Parenthetic references are to canto and line of Endymion.
120 See Leslie Marchand, Byron: A Biography ([London: Murray,] 1957), 2:886.
[NF] Marchand points out that in a letter to John Murray (4 November
1820), Byron wote: "The Edinburgh praises Jack Keats or Ketch, or whatever
his names are: why his is the Onanism of Poetry." In a later letter to Murray
(9 November 1820), Byron added, "such writing is a sort of mental mastur-
bation—he is always f—gg—g his Imagination. I don't mean he is indecent,
but viciously soliciting his own ideas into such a state, which is neither
poetry nor any thing else but a Bedlam vision produced by raw pork and
opium."
372 Notes to pages 181-202
121 Point Counter Point (Penguin: London, 1955), 124 (chap. 10). Rampion calls
Shelley "a mixture between a fairy and a white slug."
122 Edmund Spenser, Mutabilitie, in The Fairie Queen, ed. Thomas P. Roche
(London: Penguin, 1978), 1055 (canto 8, st. 2).
123 Letter to Ellen Delp, 27 October 1925. [NF]
124 The Crystal Cabinet, 1. 21 [K429/E488].
125 Sonnet 5, Those hours that with gentle work did frame, 1.10.
126 Ode to a Nightingale, 1. 24 (st. 3).
127 Keats: Poetical Works, 351.
128 In a letter to Richard Woodhouse of 27 October 1818 Keats remarks that the
poet has no identity; in a letter to George and Thomas Keats of 21 Decem-
ber 1817 he comments on the poet's "negative capability" of remaining in
uncertainties. See Letters of John Keats, 1:387,193.
129 Letters of John Keats, 1:387 (27 October 1818).
130 Ibid., 1:207 (23 January 1818).
131 In Edgar Allan Poe's story "Ligeia," the narrator's second wife comes back
from the dead and appears to take possession of him in the persona of his
loved first wife Ligeia.
132 Letters of John Keats, 1:277 (3 May 1818).
133 Martin Heidegger, Erlaiiterungen zu Holderlins Dichtung (1951). Two of
Heidegger's Holderlin essays are translated in Existence and Being, ed.
Werner Brock ([London: Vision,] 1949). [NF]
134 Letters of John Keats, 1:185 (22 November 1817).
135 See T.S. Eliot, "The Metaphysical Poets," in Selected Essays, 287-8.
136 Cf. Andrew Marvell, Thoughts in a Garden, 11. 47-8: "Annihilating all that's
made, / To a green thought in a green shade."
137 Letters of John Keats, 2:323 (16 August 1820).
138 Ibid., 1:186 (22 November 1817).
139 Ibid., 1:143 (n May 1817).
140 Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey, 1.100.
141 Letters of John Keats, 1:231 (19 February 1818).
142 So-and-So Reclining on Her Couch, in Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), 296 (11. 23-4).
143 Letters of John Keats, 1:243 (^3 March 1818).
144 Ibid., 2:208 (21 September 1819).
145 Ibid., 1:232 (19 February 1818).
146 Ode on a Grecian Urn, st. 2,1. 4.
147 Wordsworth, The Prelude, bk. 6,1. 639.
148 Blake, Auguries of Innocence, 11.1-2 (K431/E49O).
149 Shelley, A Defence of Poetry, 504.
150 Letters of John Keats, 2:146 (24 August 1819).
151 Milton, Paradise Lost, bk. 12,1. 587.
Notes to pages 202-14 373
152 The reference is to the optimistic tutor in Voltaire's Candide (1759), who
taught that this was the best of all possible worlds.
153 Letters of John Keats, 2:101 (21 April 1819).
154 Ibid., 1:185 (22 November 1817).
155 Ibid., 2:102 (21 April 1819).
156 Ibid., 2:5 (16 December 1818).
157 Ibid., 1:218 (30 January 1818).
158 T.S. Eliot, "Poetry and Drama," in On Poetry and Poets (1957), 87. [NF]
159 "The primary Imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of
all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal
act of creation in the infinite I AM." Biographia Literaria, 1:202 (chap. 13).
160 See no. 6, n. 7.
deserves a much better name than lust/ which, when compared with the
integrity of heat in true passion, is toad-cold." Memoirs and Correspondence of
Coventry Patmore, ed. Basil Champneys (London: George Bell, 1900), 2:271.
Matthew Arnold, after quoting one of Keats's letters to Fanny, says that "It
is the sort of love-letter of a surgeon's apprentice which one might hear
read out in a breach of promise case, or in the Divorce Court. The sensuous
man speaks in it, and the sensuous man of a badly-bred and badly trained
sort." "John Keats," in Matthew Arnold's Essays in Criticism, ist and 2nd ser.
(London: Everyman, 1964), 283.
18 The Keats Circle, 1:69.
1 Selected Writings of Hans Denck, ed. and trans. Edward J. Furcha (Pittsburgh:
Pickwick Press, 1975), 135.
2 Gouffre du neant may be translated "abyss of nothingness." The two poems
by Baudelaire are Le Gouffre (1862) and Le Gout du neant (1859).
3 "Your Sailing to Byzantium, magnificent as the first three stanzas are, lets me
down in the fourth, as such a goldsmith's bird is as much nature as man's
body, especially if it only sings like Homer and Shakespeare of what is past
or passing or to come to Lords and Ladies." Letter of Moore to Yeats, 16
April 1930, in W.B. Yeats and T. Sturge Moore: Their Correspondence, 1901-
1937, ed. Ursula Bridge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953), 162.
4 W.B. Yeats, Blood and the Moon, pt. 2,1.14, and The Circus Animals' Desertion,
final line.
5 Jean-Jaques Rousseau, Reveries of the Solitary Walker, trans. Peter France
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), 88.
music from Durham University (1910), Oxford (1926), and Manchester (1930),
and an LL.D. from St. Andrews in 1928, is most admired for her Mass in D
(1891) and for her opera The Wreckers (1902-4). American composer, conduc-
tor, and critic Reginald de Koven (1859-1920) helped to establish the style of
American light opera with musicals such as Robin Hood (1900) and The
Highwayman (1897).
3 In NF's second year, "the drama group, Vic Dramatics, fell apart organiza-
tionally and Frye helped to pick up the pieces and organize the year" (Ayre,
66).
i Gate House, where NF had a single room from his second year on, was the
"house" that linked the newer to the older section of the men's residence,
Burwash Hall.
1 Peter Quennell, John Ruskin: The Portrait of a Prophet (1949); Derrick Leon,
Ruskin, the Great Victorian (1949); Reginald Howard Wilenski, John Ruskin:
An Introduction to Further Study of His Life and Work (1933).
2 Ruskin married Euphemia ("Effie") Gray in 1848. The marriage was an-
nulled in 1854 for non-consummation, and in 1855 Gray married the painter
John Everett Millais. In Evans's words, Ruskin "set his heart upon the child
Rosa La Touche" (251) when they first met in 1859; she was ten years old, he
was forty. On her seventeenth birthday he asked her to marry him, but her
increasing mental instability and her parents' opposition precluded this.
She died "wholly mad" (353) in 1875. Also in 1859, Ruskin met Margaret
Alexis Bell, the headmistress of a private girls' school at Winnington,
Cheshire. He paid frequent extended visits to the school until he quarrelled
with Bell in 1865, enjoying chiefly, Evans suggests, the presence of the
young female students "who fluttered everywhere and smiled at him as he
passed" (256). The St. George's Company or Guild had its origin in the May
1871 number of Fors Clavigera, when Ruskin began soliciting funds for a
scheme to buy land which was to be cultivated without the benefits of
steam power, ready-made goods, and individual freedom (341). The Guild's
376 Notes to pages 243-66
minded feminist and socialist. In his Autobiography Mill praised her extrava-
gantly as his intellectual superior and the inspirer, reviser, and virtual co-
author of many of his works.
21 John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University, ed. Frank M. Turner (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 78 (discourse 5, sec. 2).
22 Ibid., 78 (discourse 5, sec. 2).
23 Ibid., 85 (discourse 5, sec. 6).
24 Ibid., 135 (discourse 7, sec. 6).
25 Culture and Anarchy, in The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, ed.
R.H. Super (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980), 5:190-1
(chap. 5).
26 Ibid., 147 (chap. 3).
27 Ibid., 113 (chap. i).
28 Theses on Feuerbach, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works (New
York: International Publishers, 1975), 5:3.
29 Culture and Anarchy, 184 (chap. 5).
30 T.H. Huxley and Julian Huxley, Evolution and Ethics (London: Pilot Press,
1947), loin. 20.
1 "Morris as I Knew Him," in Bernard Shaw: The Complete Prefaces, ed. Dan H.
Laurence and Daniel J. Leary (London: Penguin, 1993-97), 3:2&4-
2 J.W. Mackail, The Life of William Morris (London: Oxford University Press,
1950), 1:10.
3 Mackail, Life of William Morris, 332.
4 The Collected Letters of William Morris, ed. Norman Kelvin (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1987), 1:162 (22 June 1872).
5 Collected Letters of William Morris, 2:807 (9 August 1882).
6 The Note-Books and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. Humphry House
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937), 96.
7 "Author's Preface," in The Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. W.H.
Gardner and N.H. Mackenzie (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 45.
8 Note-Books and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins, 29.
9 William Morris, News from Nowhere, 33 (chap. 5).
10 "The Lesser Arts," in The Political Writings of William Morris, ed. A.L. Merton
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1979), 40.
11 Carryle, Sartor Resartus, 210.
12 "The Nature of Gothic," in The Complete Works of John Ruskin, ed. E.T. Cook
and Alexander Wedderburn (London: George Allen, 1904), 10:197.
13 Life of William Morris, 2:210.
380 Notes to pages 317-31
1 Nietzsche said of Wagner and Schopenhauer that "they negate life, they
slander it." Of Parsifal he remarked, "For Parsifal is a work of perfidy, of
vindictiveness, of a secret attempt to poison the presuppositions of life—a
bad work." Nietzsche Contra Wagner, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 670, 675.
2 NF's Notebook 143 has a lengthy book-by-book analysis of Wolfram's
poem: see Michael Dolzani's edition of Northrop Frye's Notebooks on Romance,
CW, 15 (NR, 167-81).
3 Wagner wrote to Ludwig: "Yes! I must have complete freedom with this
final work; for, like Tell, I am bound to say that if this too slips weakly from
my hands, I have no other work to send out into the world." See Selected
Letters of Richard Wagner, trans, and ed. Stewart Spencer and Barry
Millington (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1987), 896 (25 August 1879).
4 Buhnenweihfestspiel (a stage-consecrating festival drama) was Wagner's
subtitle for Parsifal.
5 AC, 282.
6 See esp. Selected Letters of Richard Wagner, 458-9.
7 Chretien de Troyes left his Perceval; ou le Roman graal unfinished at his death
ca. 1185; there were at least three early medieval continuations. Chretien de
Troyes's Arthurian Romances, trans. W.W. Comfort (Dent, 1967), is an anno-
tated volume in NF's library in Victoria University Library.
8 "To have Chr. sung by a tenor—what a disgusting idea!" Cosima Wagner's
Notes to pages 335-53 381
Diaries, ed. Martin Gregor-Dellin and Dietrich Mack, trans. Geoffrey Skelton
(London: Collins, 1978-80), 2:935.
9 W.H. Auden, The Sea and the Mirror, in Collected Poems, ed. Edward
Mendelson (London: Faber & Faber, 1991), 404.
10 See sec. 52, bk. 3, of The World as Will and Representation (New York: Dover,
1966), 1:255-67.
11 For the abuse, see n. i above. Nietzsche praised the overture as, among
other things, "a sublime and extraordinary feeling, experience, happen-
ing of the soul at the basis of the music, which does Wagner the highest
credit.... Has any painter ever painted such a melancholy gaze of love as
Wagner did with the last accents of his prelude?" Selected Letters ofFriedrich
Nietzsche, ed. Christopher Middleton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1969), 259-60 (21 January 1887).
12 Alfred Lorenz, Das Geheimnis der Form bei Richard Wagner (The Secret of Form
in Richard Wagner), 4 vols. (Berlin: Hesses Verlag, 1924-33), an analysis of
the later operas.
page/line
2
5/6-7 story or plot for study or plot (as in TSS)
26/35 religion for relation (as in TSS)
27/39 limitation or for limitation of
28/11 For we that live to please for And they that live to please
31/20 Blessed Mary Flanders for the Blessed Mary of Flanders
32/5 "I prefer death a thousand times" for "I had rather death a thousand
times"
32/6 "And I prefer a thousand times - to death" for "I had rather a
thousand times than death"
36/7 the cultural the fairly new for the cultural to the fairly new
49/9 Arnold's reading for Arnold reading
66/4 as popular for at popular
67/19 Lake Poets for Lake poets (as earlier in the essay)
70/20 "vagabond libertine" for "libertine vagabond"
72/15 are all the more significant for is all the more significant
76/21 "I object even to the best of the Romantics" for "I object to even the
best of the Romantics"
89/2 hedgehog in for hedgehog. In (as in Romanticism Reconsidered)
99/7 Monsters for Mountains
106/17 Davidsbund for Davidsbundler
134/33-4 "Hunchback and Saint and Fool are the last crescents" for "Hunch-
back and Saint and Fool are the final crescents"
143/22 this world for the world
157/8 A Defence for The Defence (and elsewhere)
169/27 lone remarks for Panthea remarks
206/8 livery stable for livery stables
221/37 new kind of relationship for new relation
225/20-1 others on the redemptive for others the redemptive
384 Emendations
Abrams, M(eyer) H(oward) (Mike) Alienation, 124, 316; myth, 177; from
(b. 1912): "English Romanticism: nature, 103
The Spirit of the Age" (1963), 72, Allegory: life as, 85; in Morris, 312
73, 74; The Mirror and the Lamp Allston, Washington (1779-1843):
(1953), 11, 84; Natural Super- Coleridge on, 155
naturalism (1971), 222 America: discovery of, 35; geometry
Absurd, the, 156; in Beddoes, 150; in of, 153-4
Dickens, 289, 307-8; knowledge as, American Civil War, 248, 251, 270
133-4 Amory, Thomas (1691-1788): The Life
Achilles, 160 of John Bunde (1756), 25
Acta Victoriana: NF writes for, 234 Amphion, 190,193
Actaeon, 183 Anabasis: and rebirth, 190. See also
Action: in Beddoes, 139-40,143; and Ascent
consciousness, 166; heroic, 165, Analogy, 20, 97; as language of God,
334-5; in Milton, 164,166 107; "like" as sign of, 162
Adam, 80,163; Christ as new, 330; Anarchy, 125; in Dickens, 296, 300; in
dream of, 180; knowledge of, 87-8; Morris, 317-18
in Milton, 63, 83,104; traditional Anatomy form: in the eighteenth
and Romantic, 103 century, 25
Addison, Joseph (1672-1719): aphor- Anaximander (ca. 610-546 B.C.), 144
isms of, 19; on taste, 28; The Vision Andromeda, 305
ofMirza (1711), 60 Animals: in Dickens, 305; in poetry,
Adonis, Gardens of, 85,184,186 13
Aesthetics: and ideology, 220-1; of Annals of the Fine Arts, 210
Morris, 315 Anthropomorphism, 222
Agape, 162; and eros, 163; redemption Anti-intellectualism, 352
via, 105. See also Caritas; Love Aphorisms: of Coleridge, 43-5, 48.
Alchemy, 98. See also Magic See also Fragmentation
Aldrich, Thomas Bailey (1836-1907), Apocalypse, 222-3,282; in Keats, 201;
253 and liberty, 273; thinking of, 173
386 Index
Apollo: in Keats, 193; oracle of, 115 Asimov, Isaac (1920-92): Foundation
Apuleius, Lucius (b. ca. A.D. 125), trilogy (1951-53), 311
186 Astrology, 98
Aquinas, St. Thomas (ca. 1225-74): Astronomy, 98,100; in Chaucer,
Summa Theologica, 94 107-8
Arbuthnot, John (1667-1735): The Atlantic Monthly, 248
History of John Bull (1712), 20 Atlantis, 89,190; in Romantic myth,
Archetype(s), 73; from Beattie, 24-5; 86; in Shelley, 167
Beddoes's characters as, 138 Attis, 331
Architecture: Gothic, 322; Morris on, Auchinleck, Lord (1706-82), 6
315 Auden, W(ystan) H(ugh) (1907-73),
Ariel, 158,159 69, 90; For the Time Being (1944),
Aristocracy, 344; authority of, 276-9 89; The Sea and the Mirror (1944),
passim; barbarians as, 283; in 335
Dickens, 298; fraternity of, 320; Augustan Age, 7, 321-2; art in, 11;
Romantic view of, 109-10. See also characteristics of, 27; interpenetra-
Leisure class tion in, 29-30; metaphor in, 14
Aristophanes (ca. 448-ca. 388 B.C.): Augustine, St. (A.D. 354-430), 58; on
The Frogs, 134 the fall, 166
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), 6, 8,115; on Aurelius, Marcus (A.D. 121-80), 49
catharsis, 12; on plot, 137; proairesis Austen, Jane (1775-1817), 32,76;
in, 273 comedies of, 123; Love and Freind-
Arnold, Matthew (1822-88), 9, 271; as ship (pub. 1922), 82,111; Northanger
anti-Romantic, 90; on Byron, 57; on Abbey (1818), 59, 82; Pride and
culture, 282-4; on liberty, 320; on Prejudice (1813), 54; Sense and
Keats, 214; on the university, 285- Sensibility (1811), 82
6; Culture and Anarchy (1869), 283; Authority: of genius, 106; spiritual,
Empedodes on Etna (1852), 118; 271-86 passim; temporal, 274-7
Notebooks of Matthew Arnold, ed. passim
Lowry et al. (1950), 48-9 Autohypnosis, 90
Arthur, legend of, 328. See also Grail
Artist: responsibility of, 105-6 Babe, Murray W., 234
Art(s), 81; counter-environment of, Bach, Johann Sebastian (1685-1750),
106; democratization of, 317; 18
identity of, 328; moral force of, Bacon, Francis, Viscount St. Albans
176-7; and nature, 8,19; origin of, and Baron Verulam (1561-1626),
69; as play, 25; reality via, 286; 25,45,48, no
Romanticism in, 75-6; and society, Bage, Robert (1720-1801): The Fair
309 Syrian (1787), 32; Hermsprong
Ascent: of Christ, 114; failure of, 193; (1796), 32, 35
in Keats, 190-1. See also Anabasis; Bagehot, Walter (1826-77): on the
Quest grotesque, 133
Index 387
Buddhism: Wagner's interest in, 334, - works: Beppo (1818), 52, 55, 64; The
340 Bride ofAbydos (1813), 52; Cain
Bulwer-Lytton, Edward George, ist (1821), 55,63-4,87,109,113,115;
Baron Lytton (1803-73), 287; A Childe Harold's Pilgrimage (1812-17),
Strange Story (1862), 111 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58-9, 60, 61, 64,
Bunyan, John (1628-88): The Holy War 66,85,113,120,131,142; The
(1682), 112; The Pilgrim's Progress Corsair (1814), 52, 53, 59, 66, 70,142;
(1678-84), 87,118 The Curse of Minerva (1811), 52;
Burke, Edmund (1729-97), 284; as Darkness (1816), 54, 87; The Destruc-
conservative, no; doctrine in, 282; tion of Sennacherib (1815), 57; Don
identity in, 204; law in, 283; tempo- Juan (1819-24), 55, 58, 61, 64-6
ral authority in, 275; Appeal from the passim, 69,70,85,122,131,142; The
New to the Old Whigs (1792), 34, Dream (1816), 54; English Bards and
279; Reflections on the Revolution in Scotch Reviewers (1809), 51, 64; The
France (1790), 27 Giaour (1813), 52; Heaven and Earth,
Burns, Robert (1759-96): 10,209,258; 63-4,67-8; Hebrew Melodies (1815),
To a Mouse (1786), 13 57; Hours of Idleness (1807), 51; Lara
Burton, Robert (1577-1640): Anatomy (1814), 52, 53, 59, 60, 87-8,113;
of Melancholy (1621), 211 Lines to Mr. Hodgson (1830), 62;
Butler, Samuel (1612-80): Hudibras Manfred (1816), 54, 59, 63, 67, 69,79;
(1663), 65 Marino Faliero (1821), 55, 62; Ode to
Butler, Samuel (1835-1902), 25,282, Napoleon Buonaparte (1814), 53; Ode
284; Erewhon (1872), 182,278, 341, to Venice (1819), 55; The Prisoner of
352; Life and Habit (1877), 126,277, Chilian (1816), 54; Sardanapalus
341-53 passim; Luck or Cunning? (1821), 55,64,70; She Walks in
(1886), 342; The Way of All Flesh Beauty (1815), 57; Stanzas for Music,
(1903), 277 57; The Two Foscari (1821), 55;
Byron, Allegra (1817-22), 54 The Vision of Judgment (1822), 55,
Byron, Annabella, Lady (1792-1860), 64, 67-8, loo, 113; Werner (1822),
54 62
Byron, Augusta Ada (1815-52), 54 Byronic hero, 119,142; as natural
Byron, George Gordon, Baron Byron man, 112
of Rochdale (1788-1824), 76, 88,
125,126,198; brothers theme in, Cain, 80; and Abel, 112
113; burlesque in, 65; the exile in, Calderon de la Barca, Pedro (1600-
157; on history, 116; in Italy, 55; on 81), 328
Keats, 181; life of, 50-6; lyrics of, Camus, Albert (1913-60): L'Etranger
56-8; new sensibility of, 69; plays (1941), 122
of, 62-4; rhyme in, 132; satires of, Canada: literature of, 319
64-8; sister, 103; tales of, 59-62; Canada Council, 93
temperament of, 188; youth of, 70- Cannibal feast, 132
i; in the Victorian Age, 69 Capitalism: and Communism, 318;
390 Index
Deluge, 190; and fall, 167. See also 300-1; festivity in, 291; humours in,
Flood 287-308 passim; industry in, 297;
De Man, Paul (1919-83): Allegories of institutions in, 296-8; marriage in,
Reading (1979), 219, 225-6; Blindness 291, 300; mystery and murder in,
and Insight (1971), 219,220,225-6; 291; probability in, 288-9; radical
The Rhetoric of Romanticism (1984), vision of, 289; recognition scenes
219-26 in, 293; resurrection in, 306; stock
Democracy, 124-5; death represents, devices in, 290; twin theme in, 304;
141; and Keats, 205 violence in, 304-5
Demonic: in Keats, 195; interpenetra- - works: Barnaby Rudge (1841), 301,
tion, 204; lovers, 126; world, 108, 304; Bleak House (1852-53), 55,289,
114-15 291,292,293,294,295,297, 300,
Denck, Hans (ca. 1495-1527), 219 301, 304, 307; The Chimes (1845),
Denham, Sir John (1615-69), 28; 301, 303, 306; A Christmas Carol
Cooper's Hill (1642), 24 (1843), 3°6, 307; David Copperfield
Dennis, John (1657-1734), 19 (1850), 293,295,298,299, 301-2,
Depression, the, 347 305, 306, 307; Dombey and Son
De Quincey, Thomas (1785-1859), (1846-48), 290,292,293,294,296,
84-5,101; introversion in, 120; 297, 300, 302, 304, 305, 306, 307;
"The English Mail-Coach" (1849), Edwin Drood (1870), 289,290, 303,
154; Savannah-la-Mar (1845), 86 305; Great Expectations (1860-61),
De Regnier, Henri (1864-1936), 241 204,290,296,297,298, 300, 301;
Derrida, Jacques (1930-2004): on Hard Times (1852-56), 292,297,299,
Rousseau, 225 300, 304, 305; Little Dorrit (1855-57),
Descartes, Rene (1596-1650), 48,79 288,294,295,296,297-8, 301, 302,
Descent, 190; in Dickens, 302; of 304, 305, 306, 307; Martin
identity, 114-15; in Keats, 183. See Chuzzlewit (1844), 291,294,297,
also Ascent; Quest 305; Nicholas Nickleby (1839), 290,
Design: as absurd, 308; Morris on, 317 294, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304,
Desire, 156 305, 307; The Old Curiosity Shop
Detective fiction, 36 (1840-41), 133,290,291,296, 302,
Devil, the, 96 303, 304, 305; Oliver Twist (1837),
Dewey, John (1859-1952), 352 290, 294, 295, 297, 299, 300, 302,
Dialectic: Coleridge detests, 45 304, 306; Our Mutual Friend (1864-
Diana: as diva triformis, 183-4, *85; in 65), 288,291,294,295,297, 300, 303,
Keats, 183 305, 307; The Pickwick Papers (1836-
Dickens, Charles (1812-70): the 37), 292-3,295, 297; A Tale of Two
absurd in, 289, 307-8; braggart Cities (1859), 290, 301, 303, 304, 306
soldier in, 292; Christmas in, 291; Dickinson, Edward (1803-74), 245
description in, 305; the double in, Dickinson, Emily Elizabeth (1830-
304; dystopia in, 299; as fairy tale, 86): awe in, 262-3,269; body and
287,299, 302; family in, 296,299, soul in, 265-6; circumference in,
394 Index
251, 261-2, 264, 269; on death, 264- Poem 1615,256; Poem 1620,262;
5,268-70; diction of, 256; on her Poem 1658,255-6; Poem 1679,266;
father, 246; first published, 249; Poem 1701,262; Poem 1732,266;
friendships of, 246-9; and God, Poem 1733,262; Poems by Emily
259-65 passim; genius of, 270; Dickinson (1890), 253; Struck, was I,
grammar in, 255; on the Holy nor yet by Lightning, 268; Success is
Spirit, 263-4; hymn form of, 246, counted sweetest, 249; Wild Nights!
257; innocence and experience in, 251
266; life of, 245-70 passim; as Dickinson, Lavinia (1833-99), 246;
Moses, 270; Paradise in, 264,267, publishes sister Emily, 252-3
268, 270; perceptions of, 250; Diderot, Denis (1713-84), 37
popularity of, 254; prose in, 258; Dionysus, 96, 97,102,104; green
riddles in, 255, 259; style of, 254-8 world of, 159
- works: Doubt Me! My Dim Compan- Disraeli, Benjamin (1804-81), 287
ion! 268; I like to see it lap the miles, Divinity: and poetry, 199
255; I never told the buried gold, 269; DNA, 343
It sifts from leaden sieves, 255; Love Dobree, Bonamy (1891-1974): English
selects its own society, 168; Poem 48, Literature in the Early Eighteenth
263; Poem 49,260; Poem 59,261; Century (1959), 16-23 passim
Poem 109, 252; Poem 123, 251; Poem Doctrine: and scripture, 282
193,260-1; Poem 214,265; Poem 248, Dolphin: as salvation, 190
268; Poem 256,268; Poem 354,256; Donne, John (1572-1631), 136
Poem 357,260; Poem 400,266; Poem Dostoevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich
419,266; Poem 441,251; Poem 4.4.2, (1821-81), 68,239; Notes from
267; Poem 516, 255; Poem 623, 258; Underground (1864), 74
Poem 641, 256; Poem 677, 250; Poem Dragon: of death, 165; guards iden-
679,265; Poem 709,255; Poem 711, tity, 144; as illusion, 336; symbol-
255; Poem 721,269; Poem 722,249; ism of, 330, 331
Poem 733,263; Poem 745,254; Poem Drama: Jacobean, 311
756, 267; Poem 764, 254; Poem 810, Drayton, Michael (1563-1631):
259; Poem 822,265; Poem 949,259; Endimion and Phoebe (1595), 186
Poem 1037,256; Poem 1052,256; Dream: and creation, 146-7,189; and
Poem 1068,267; Poem 1129,255; death, 171; in Dickens, 303, 306; in
Poem 1182,269; Poem 1205,260; Keats, 178; and poetry, 11, 204
Poem 1207,257; Poem 1260,263; Drugs, 352
Poem 1283,268; Poem 1319, 262; "Drunken boat" construct, 284:
Poem 1395,254; Poem 1421,270; consciousness as, 89; in Beddoes,
Poem 1434,268; Poem 1439,263; 145; in Freud, 89,113-14. See also
Poem 1445,257; Poem 1454,257; Rimbaud
Poem 1462,264; Poem 1463,254,255; Dryden, John (1631-1700): prose of,
Poem 1569,264; Poem 1576,266; 28; on Shakespeare, 17; Of Dramatic
Poem 1599,260; Poem 1601,266; Poesy (1668), 29; Fables Ancient and
Index 395
Incarnation, 89; Coleridge on, 48; and James I of England (1566-1625), 116
discarnation, 176; imagination as, Jefferson, Thomas (1743-1826), 37
162; threat of, 100 Jehovah, 159. See also God
Incest: in Byron, 60; Shelley on, 168-9 Jesus, 100,159, 324; and the Grail,
Indicator, The, 212 328; as hero, 335. See also Christ
Individual, 124; as microcosm, 144; Johnson, Samuel (1709-84): 8, 27,46;
and nature, 117; and the sublime, on being, 30; Boswell on, 3-4;
no criticism of, 29; on Dryden, 28, 76;
Industrial Revolution, 319 as father-figure, 6; on Gray's Bard,
Inertia: Jupiter as, 157 14; on the Ossian poems, n, 12;
Innocence: and creation, 324; in Lives of the Most Eminent English
Dickinson, 266; and experience, Poets (1779-81), 9,29; Prologue
177-8,183,190; and illusion, 332; Spoken by Mr. Garrick, at the Open-
in Keats, 198; vision of, 180,181, ing of the Theatre in Drury-Lane,
202-3 1747, 28; Rasselas, Prince of Abys-
Intelligence: conscious and uncon- sinia (1759), 25, 60
scious, 316, 343-6 passim; and Johnson, Thomas H. (1902-85): The
energy, 316 Poems of Emily Dickinson (1955),
Interpenetration: in the Augustan 253, 255; The Letters of Emily
Age, 29-30; in Beddoes, 133,142; Dickinson (1958), 253
and poetry, 203; types of, 201; in John the Baptist, 329
Wordsworth, 80 Jolliffe, Charles D. (Charlie), 237
lonesco, Eugene (1909-94), 22,134 Jolliffe, Dick, 234,238
Irony, 82, 303; in Eliot, 137; in Keats, Jonah, Book of, 190
198; in Romance, 115,118,121-3 Jonson, Ben (1572-1637), 17, 296; The
Isaac: and Ishmael, 112 Alchemist (1610), 291; Bartholomew
Isaiah, Book of, 26 Fair (1614), 297; The New Inn (1629),
Ishmael, 157: as Byronic hero, 112 289; Epicene, or The Silent Woman
Israel, 103 (1616), 291; Volpone (1605), 291, 301
Joseph of Arimathea (ist c. A.D.), 329
Jackson, Helen Hunt (1830-85): Joyce, James Augustine Aloysius
Ramona (1884), 249; Mercy (1882-1941), 18,94,101, 303;
Philbrick's Choice (1876), 249 Dickens influences, 296; Finnegans
Jacob: Dickinson as, 261; and Esau, Wake (1939), 290; Portrait of the
112; his ladder, 35 Artist as a Young Man (1916), 13,
Jacobean drama, 119; and Beddoes, 174; Stephen Hero (1944), 200
134-5,136 Judaism, 95
James, Henry (1843-1916): "The Jolly Jung, Carl Gustav (1875-1961), 25,
Corner" (1908), 269; What Maisie 187
Knew (1897), 24° Kairos, 166
James, Mary Frances (1903-88), 41 Kali, in
Index 401
Middle class: and liberty, 320 ridicules (1659), 300; Tartuffe (1664),
Miles gloriosus: death as, 129 301
Mill, Harriet Taylor (1807-58), 281 Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de
Mill, John Stuart (1806-73), 7&/ 271, (1533-92), 46; as Ydgrunite, 278;
282, 314; on Coleridge, 45; educa- "Of Cannibals" (1580), 35
tion in, 281; on spiritual authority, Monteverdi, Claudio (1567-1643), 327
279-81; On Liberty (1859), 280 Moon, 109
Milne, A(lan) A(lexander) (1882- Moore, John (1729-1802): Zeluco
1956), 231 (1789), 59
Milnes, Richard Monckton, ist Baron Moore, Thomas (1779-1852), 64
Houghton (1809-85): ed., Life, Moore, T(homas) Sturge (1870-1944),
Letters, and Literary Remains of John 223
Keats (1848), 213 Morality: in literature, 106
Milton, John (1608-74), 29, 69, 76, 80, Morley, Christopher, 3
83, 88,94,197,271, 324; Coleridge Morris, William (1834-96), 136, 279;
on, 46; education in, 281; on gen- on the arts, 321-5; on centraliza-
ius, 106; on liberty, 101; his muse, tion, 318-19, 321; five phases of his
78; on poets, 106; on the Restora- writing, 309-10; on fraternity, 320;
tion, 16-17; spiritual authority in, on manufacture, 316; medievalism
273-4; on temporal power, 283; in, 116-17, 3!5/ 324; as Parnassian,
universe of, 77-8,193; L'Allegro 313; politics of, 310, 317-20; schizo-
(1645), 160,196-7; Arcades (1632), phrenia in, 311; on social planning,
186; Areopagitica (1644), 273,281; 315-16; on work, 313-17
Comus (1637), 83,85,162; Lycidas - works: trans. The Aeneid (1875),
(1638), 186,190; Nativity Ode (1645), 310; trans. Beowulf (1898), 310, 313;
26, 78, 99,174; Paradise Lost (1667), trans. The Odyssey (1887), 310;
33/ 59/ 63, 78,115,122,160-1,164, trans. Volsunga Saga (1870), 310;
179,182; Paradise Regained (1671), "Art and Socialism" (1884), 240;
165, 335; II Penseroso (1631), 160, The Defence of Guenevere (poem)
196-7; Samson Agonistes (1671), 274; (1858), 309; A Dream of John Ball
Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1888), 310; The Earthly Paradise
(1649), 274 (1868/9-70), 309, 313, 324, 325;
Minos, King, 190 Gertha's Lovers (1899), 312; House of
Mirrors: in Beddoes, 145; in Dickens, the Wolfings (1890), 323; "A King's
304 Lesson" (1886), 310; "The Lesser
Mistress, cruel, 121. See also Courtly Arts" (1878), 314, 316; The Life and
love Death of Jason (1867), 309; Love Is
Modern Library (Random House), Enough (1873), 310; News from
240 Nowhere (1891), 278-9, 310, 313,
Modern mind: two poles of, 80-1 316, 317-20 passim, 323; The
Moliere (Jean-Baptiste Poquelin) Pilgrims of Hope (1885), 310; The
(1622-73), 289; Les Precieuses Roots of the Mountains (1889), 312;
Index 405
The Story of the Glittering Plain art, 8,19; in Dickens, 307; in the
(1891), 310; The Story of the Sunder- eighteenth century, 27; as female,
ing Flood (1897), 310/ 312/ "Svend 333; hero as, 119; identity with,
and His Brethren" (1856), 312; The 104,115,124,125,138,177-8;
Well at the World's End (1896), 310; innocence in, 202; as mechanical,
The Wood beyond the World (1894), 79; as mother, 95,126,169; natura
310, 311 naturans, 99,138,155,221, 222;
Mosely, Sir Oswald (1896-1980), 240 poetry of renewed, 20; pre-Roman-
Mother: in romantic tragedy, 120,121 tic, 81; as process, 99,107; Roman-
Mountain, Elizabeth (Bessie), 230, 234 tic view of, 102,103-4,111-12;
Mount Holyoke College, 246 scientific and poetic visions of,
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus (1756- 150-1; in Shelley, 166,170; spirit of,
91), 18; Don Giovanni (1787), 66 161-2; spiritual authority from,
Murray, John (1745-93)7 53/ 55 284; two levels of, 13, 22, 33, 34-5,
Music: in Parsifal, 337-40; 77,78,80, 95-7,104,108,109,123,
Schopenhauer on,337 126,158-9, 222, 224, 331; unity
Music of the spheres, 96,158,169,199 with, 103-4. $ee also Creation, four
Mysticism, 264 levels of
Myth(s), 84, 93-4; characters as, 82; of Nazism, 83. See also Fascism
concern, 102; and deconstruction, Necessity, 152-3; in Blake, 78-9; and
226; man creates, 100-1,150-1,177; freedom, 272
meaning of, 328; and mythology, Negative capability, 188,199
325; poetic origin of, 98 Nemesis, 335
Mythology: decline of, 26; and Neptune, 190
ideology, 226; matriarchal, 96; and Nero (Nero Claudius Caesar) (A.D.
myth, 325; open, 177; Romanticism 37-68): silver age of, 322
as new, 102-3; two structures Nerval, Gerard de (Gerard Labrunie)
descend from, 94 (1808-55), 15
Mythopoeic poetry: plotless, 167; New Comedy, 299; Dickens as, 289-
Romantic poetry as, 84-5 94, 300, 301; festivity in, 291;
nineteenth-century, 302-3
Napoleon I (Napoleon Bonaparte) New Criticism: and Byron, 56
(1769-1821), 68,115,119; Byron Newman, Cardinal John Henry
on, 53; Keats on, 189; as Romantic, (1801-90), 47, 271; doctrine in, 283;
83-4. on spiritual authority, 281-2; the
Napoleonic wars, 93 university in, 285
Narcissus, 145; poetry of, 198 New society: in comedy, 122
Narrative: plotless, 167 New Testament: and tyranny, 160.
Nash, Ogden (1902-71), 65 See also Bible; Gospel; Scripture
Natural society, 34-7 passim, 103, Newton, Sir Isaac (1642-1727), 28,
no, 122 98,100; in Blake, 79; excitement
Nature, 345-6; ambivalent, 88-9; and over, 19; world picture of, 78;
406 Index
Prophecy: poetry as, 174; and the liberty, 272-5; and tyranny, 276
pastoral, 324 Rebirth, 147. See also Resurrection
Prose: aphorisms and, 44; continuous Recognition, 352
and discontinuous, 258 Redemption: myths of, 105; in
Proserpine, 193 Parsifal, 331, 333, 335, 337; tradi-
Proust, Marcel (1871-1922) 101; tional and Romantic, 103
Romantic tragedy of, 121 Red Sea, 145; habit as, 165
Pseudepigrapha, 13 Reformation, no, 321-2
Psyche, 184 Refrain: in lyric, 10
Pulci, Luigi (1432-84): Morgante Regeneration, 152,163,169
maggiore (1481), 65 Reincarnation, 147
Puppet characters, 296 Religion: eighteenth-century, 26; and
Purgatory: space as, 202-3 poetry, 177,195
Pushkin, Alexander (1799-1837), 68 Rembrandt (Rembrandt Harmensz
Pygmalion, 168 van Rijn) (1606-69): nature in, 155
Renaissance, 321-2; ascent in, 80
Quarterly Review: Endymion reviewed Repetition, 351; and education,
in, 209 349; in literature as product and
Quennell, Peter (1905-94): Ruskin: process, 10-11;
The Portrait of a Prophet (1949), 242 Response, community of, 194,204-5.
Quest: imaginative, 200; mental, 118; See also Saving remnant; Spontane-
and question, 332-3; renunciation ity
of, 335; in Shelley, 165; of the soul, Revelation, 194,222-3; Book of, 259;
114,118,178. See also Ascent; mythopoeic, 107; and spiritual
Descent authority, 273-4,282
Revolution, no, 147,165-6; as apoca-
Rabelais, Francois (1493-1553), 46 lypse, 73; and culture, 283-4; m
Radcliffe, Anne, nee Ward (1764- Dickens, 307; and Eros, 176; and
1823), 59,111 fraternity, 320; hope of, 163; in-
Reading: authentic, 176 ward, 83; and Morris, 317; in poetic
Realism, 155; and imagination, 299; imagery, 74; and revelation, 282; of
and romance, 118, 287; and Ro- Romanticism, 78-83 passim, 101,
manticism, 82,116-17 102,108-10,114; and Shelley, 167,
Reality, 80,166,182; via the arts and 172; and spiritual authority, 274-6;
sciences, 286; in Beddoes, 143-4; technological, 323
cemetery of, 134; death as, 149; to Richardson, Samuel (1689-1761), 36;
Keats, 178; and literature, 308; new, storytelling of, 9; Clarissa (1747-48),
27; spatial projection of, 78-83 11, 31; Pamela (1740-41), 9, 31
passim; two kinds of, 176-7; Rilke, Rainer Maria (1875-1926), 102;
underworld of, 162; verbal, 38 on the poet, 183
Reason, 105; Age of, 22; belief in, 25; Rimbaud, Jean Nicolas Arthur (1854-
inferior to consciousness, 99; and 91), 15; dereglement de tons les sens,
Index 409
(1820), 172; Song to the Men of Soul: Keats on, 202; quest of the, 114,
England (1839), 173; Speculations on 118,178
Metaphysics (1840), 85; To a Skylark Sound patterns: in literature as
(1820), 218; The Triumph of Life product and process, 10-11; of
(1824), 174,226; Witch of Atlas poetry, 257
(1824), 154 Southey, Robert (1774-1843), 11, 51,
- Prometheus Unbound (1820), 85,86, 70; Byron ridicules, 61; Vision of
87,90,92,100,117,123,125,150-76 Judgment (1820), 67, 68
passim, 319; Jupiter in, 79,152, Space: as purgatory, 202-3
156-7,159,161,163-4,167,172-3 Sparagmos, 190. See also Fragmenta-
Sheridan, Richard Brinsley (1751- tion
1816), 64; The School for Scandal Spectator, The, 19, 29
(1777), 26 Spengler, Oswald (1880-1936), 322
Sidney, Sir Philip (1554-86), 25 Spenser, Edmund (ca. 1552-99), 195;
Siegfried: legend of, 328 stanzaic form in, 11; The Faerie
Silence: poetry of, 201 Queene (1590-96), 80, 83,85,108,
Simile, 97 112,179-80,182,186,201;
Simrock, Karl Joseph (1802-76), 329 Mutabilitie Cantos (1599), 179,182;
Sinclair, Lister (b. 1921), 42 The Shepheardes Calender (1579), 182
Sky-gods, romantic, 79 Spheres, music of. See Music of the
Smart, Christopher (1722-71): Jubilate Spheres
Agno (1758/9-63; pub. 1939), 12,13, Spirit: of God, 273; music as language
14; Song to David (1763), 10,12, 36 of, 340; of Nature, 161-2
Smith, Adam (1723-90), 33 Spirits: elemental, 158,192-3; in
Smith, Aubrey C. (1863-1948), 234 Shelley,i58
Smith, Mrs. Spencer, 51-2 Spontaneity: education towards, 350.
Smollett, Tobias George (1721-71): See also Response, community of
The Adventures of Ferdinand Count St. Michael's College, 341
Fathom (1753), 32 Stars: as mechanical, 109; as original
Smyth, Dame Ethel (1858-1944), 230 creation, 96, 98
Social contract: in Burke, 34; in the Stendhal (Marie-Henri Beyle) (1783-
eighteenth century, 33-4 1842), 68
Socialism, 320; Morris on, 319 Sterne, Laurence (1713-68), 25;
Social science, 101 animals in, 13; Tristram Shandy
Society: and art, 309; and identity, (1759-65), 5, 8, 37, 65
204; natural, 275, 276; obstructing Stevens, Wallace (1879-1955), 200
and congenial, 289,291, 292,294, Stevenson, Robert Louis (1850-94):
296,298-9, 300; original, 83; the on Poe, 133; on Whitman, 256
poet in, 116; transformation of, 282 Stock response: humour of, 295
Socrates (469-399 B.C.), 324 Storytelling: as power, 325. See also
Soler, Antonio (1729-83), 18 Fiction; Narrative; Plot
Song of Songs: bride in, 95 Stream of consciousness, 8
412 Index
- The Prelude (1805,1850), 104,105, 30; image and emblem in, 223-4;
117,118,131,192, 200; mighty on Shelley, 160; spirits in, 80; on
forms of, 80, 84,104; mother- the writer's mask, 4; Among School
goddess in, 88; the soldier in, 82 Children (1927), 223; Byzantium
Work: and leisure, 316; Morris on, (1932), 223,224; The Celtic Twilight
314, 317; and play, 350 (1893), 324-5; Responsibilities (1914),
Working class, 317; and equality, 320; 223; Sailing to Byzantium (1925),
Morris on, 316. See also Class 223, 224; The Statues (1939), 224; The
conflict Tower (1928), 171; Vacillation (1932),
Writer: Boswell as, 5-6; in history, 20; 224
serious, 106 Yoga, 347
Writing: lucid, 350; process of, 8-13 Young, Edward (1683-1765): Night
passim Thoughts (1741), 28
Youth: Byron as, 70-1; education of,
Yale University, 3, 220 317
Yeats, William Butler (1865-1939), 70,
101,102,104,109,136, 220; Byzan- Zelazny, Roger (Rodzher Zheliazny)
tium in, 224; as conservative, no; (b. 1937): Amber trilogy, 311
double gyre, 134; on the Grail, 329- Zen Buddhism, 201, 347
Zeus, 160