Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Third Division of this
Court dated March 7, 2005.
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision dated December 14,
2004 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69626, upholding the Order dated August
24, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch 90, which found no merit in
petitioner's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, along with the
Order dated January 10, 2002, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On July 16, 1973, private respondent Jose Mari Chan (Chan) entered into a contract
with petitioner Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. (Bayanihan), whereunder the former
assigned to the latter all his rights, interests and participation over his musical
composition "Can We Just Stop and Talk A While ". On March 11, 1976, the parties entered
into a similar contract over Chan's other musical composition entitled " Afraid For Love To
Fade".
On the strength of the abovementioned contracts, Bayanihan applied for and was
granted by the National Library a Certi cate of Copyright Registration for each of the two
musical compositions, thus: November 19, 1973, for the song "Can We Just Stop and Talk
A While" and on May 21, 1980, for the song "Afraid for Love To Fade."
Apparently, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner Bayanihan, Chan
authorized his co-respondent BMG Records (Pilipinas) [BMG] to record and distribute the
aforementioned musical compositions in a then recently released album of singer Lea
Salonga.
In separate letters both dated December 7, 1999, petitioner Bayanihan informed
respondents Chan and BMG of its existing copyrights over the subject musical
compositions and the alleged violation of such right by the two. Demands were made on
both to settle the matter with Bayanihan. However no settlement was reached by the
parties.
Hence, on August 8, 2000, Bayanihan led with the Regional Trial Court at Quezon
City a complaint against Chan and BMG for violation of Section 216 of Republic Act No.
8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, with a prayer
for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, enjoining respondent BMG from further recording and distributing the subject
musical compositions in whatever form of musical products, and Chan from further
granting any authority to record and distribute the same musical compositions.
In its answer, BMG contended, among others, that: (1) the acts of recording and
publication sought to be enjoined had already been consummated, thereby rendering moot
Bayanihan's prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction; and (2) there is no clear showing
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that petitioner Bayanihan would be greatly damaged by the refusal of the prayed for TRO
and/or preliminary injunction. BMG also pleaded a cross-claim against its co-respondent
Chan for violation of his warranty that his musical compositions are free from claims of
third persons, and a counterclaim for damages against petitioner Bayanihan.
Chan, for his part, led his own answer to the complaint, thereunder alleging that: (1)
it was never his intention to divest himself of all his rights and interest over the musical
compositions in question; (2) the contracts he entered into with Bayanihan are mere music
publication agreements giving Bayanihan, as assignee, the power to administer his
copyright over his two songs and to act as the exclusive publisher thereof; (3) he was not
cognizant of the application made by and the subsequent grant of copyrights to
Bayanihan; and (4) Bayanihan was remissed in its obligations under the contracts because
it failed to effectively advertise his musical compositions for almost twenty (20) years,
hence, he caused the rescission of said contracts in 1997. Chan also included in his
answer a counterclaim for damages against Bayanihan.
After hearing the parties, the lower court came out with an order denying
Bayanihan's prayer for TRO, saying, thus:
After carefully considering the arguments and evaluating the evidence
presented by counsels, this Court nds that the plaintiff has not been able to
show its entitlement to the relief of TRO as prayed for in its veri ed complaint
(see Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended), hence,
this Court is of the considered and humble view that the ends of justice shall be
served better if the aforecited application is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, the same court, in its subsequent Order dated August 24, 2001 , 2
likewise denied Bayanihan's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to wit:
After carefully going over the pleadings and the pertinent portions of the
records insofar as they are pertinent to the issue under consideration, this Court
nds that the plaintiff has not been able to show its entitlement to the relief of
preliminary injunction as prayed for in its veri ed complaint ( see Section 4, Rule
58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended), hence, this Court is of the
considered and humble view that the ends of justice shall be served better if the
aforecited application is denied. (see also Order dated July 16, 2001).
SO ORDERED.
Its motion for a reconsideration of the same order having been likewise denied by
the trial court in its next Order of January 10, 2002 , 3 petitioner Bayanihan then went to the
Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69626 ,
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the Orders of
August 24, 2001 and January 10, 2001, denying its prayers for a writ of preliminary
injunction and motion for reconsideration, respectively.
In the herein assailed Decision dated December 14, 2004 , the Court of Appeals
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upheld the challenged orders of the trial court and accordingly dismissed Bayanihan
petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding neither flaw of jurisdiction nor taint of grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of the assailed Orders of the respondent court dated
August 24, 2001 and January 10, 2002, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
It would thus appear that the two (2) contracts expired on October 1, 1975 and
March 11, 1978, respectively, there being neither an allegation, much less proof, that
petitioner Bayanihan ever made use of the compositions within the two-year period agreed
upon by the parties.
Anent the copyrights obtained by petitioner on the basis of the selfsame two (2)
contracts, su ce it to say that such purported copyrights are not presumed to subsist in
accordance with Section 218[a] and [b], of the Intellectual Property Code, 1 0 because
respondent Chan had put in issue the existence thereof.
It is noted that Chan revoked and terminated said contracts, along with others, on
July 30, 1997, or almost two years before petitioner Bayanihan wrote its sort of
complaint/demand letter dated December 7, 1999 regarding the recent "use/recording of
the songs 'Can We Just Stop and Talk A While ' and 'Afraid for Love to Fade,"' or almost
three (3) years before petitioner led its complaint on August 8, 2000, therein praying, inter
alia, for injunctive relief. By then, it would appear that petitioner had no more right that is
protectable by injunction.
Lastly, petitioner's insinuation that the trial court indulged in generalizations and was
rather skimpy in dishing out its reasons for denying its prayer for provisional injunctive
relief, the same deserves scant consideration. For sure, the manner by which the trial court
crafted its challenged orders is quite understandable, lest it be subjected to a plausible
suspicion of having prejudged the merits of the main case.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
2. Rollo, p. 148.
3. Rollo, p. 162.
7. Developers Group of Companies, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 715, March 8, 1993.
8. Ibid.
(a) Copyright shall be presumed to subsist in the work or other subject matter to which the
action relates if the defendant does not put in issue the question whether copyright
subsist in the work or subject matter; and
(b) Where the subsistence of the copyright is established, the plaintiff shall be presumed to be
the owner of the copyright if he claims to be the owner of the copyright and the
defendant does not put in issue the question of his ownership;