A.C. No.
12025, June 20, 2018
EDMUND BALMACEDA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROMEO Z.
USON, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, JR., J.:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
Edmund Balmaceda (complainant) against respondent Atty.
Romeo Z. Uson (respondent) for violating Rules 16 and 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The complainant alleged that sometime in April 2012, he and a
certain Carlos Agapito (Agapito) went to the office of the
respondent to seek legal advice, concerning the supposed
intrusion or illegal occupation of his brother, Antonio Balmaceda
(Antonio), over a property he owned, which he subsequently
sold to Agapito. At the conclusion of their meeting, complainant
and Agapito were convinced that the filing of an ejectment
case is the most appropriate legal measure to take and
engaged the services of the respondent as counsel for a fee of
P75,000.00.1 The said attorney's fees were paid in full to the
respondent as evidenced by a receipt2 signed by the latter.
Despite the full payment of the attorney's fees, the respondent
did not file an ejectment case against Antonio. The complainant
visited the respondent several times to follow up on his case but
the latter would always tell him he was already working on the
same. Two years had lapsed, however, but no ejectment case
was ever filed by the respondent. Thus, in February 2014, he sent
the respondent a demand letter3 for the return of the attorney's
fees of P75,000.00 which he paid him but the latter refused to
receive the same. He sent him another demand letter4 to refund
him the amount but still the respondent refused to heed. The
unjustified refusal of the respondent to return the amount paid as
attorney's fees culminated in the filing of the instant disbarment
complaint against him.5
In his Verified Answer with Positive and Affirmative Defenses,6 the
respondent denied the pertinent allegations in the complaint. He
alleged that upon receipt of the attorney's fees, he immediately
sent a demand letter to Antonio, asking him to vacate the
subject property. Forthwith, Antonio confronted him about the
veracity of the claims stated in the demand letter. Respondent
then presented to Antonio the deed of extrajudicial settlement
and waiver of rights in favor of the complainant, as well the
latter's certificate of title over the property, and the deed of
absolute sale in favor of Agapito and his wife. Antonio was taken
aback upon learning of the documents and told the respondent
that they are going to take legal action as they were co-owners
of the property and that it is better for him not to meddle into the
feud. He immediately informed the complainant of the incident
as well as the threat hurled by Antonio to take matters to court
He then offered to return the amount of P75,000.00 given to him
as attorney's fees but the complainant refused to accept the
amount and insisted on the filing of the ejectment case. For
several times, the complainant went to his office to insist on the
filing of the case but he repeatedly told him he can no longer
proceed with the same especially that the supposed co-owners
of the property expressed the intention to file an action for the
annulment of title, deed of extrajudicial settlement and deed of
sale against the complainant and Agapito. He offered to return
the money paid to him as attorney's fees but the complainant
refused and threatened to file an administrative case against
him. Not long thereafter, the complainant filed the instant
disbarment case. Respondent, however, maintained that he did
not violate his oath as a lawyer nor the Code of Professional
Responsibility and prayed that the complaint be dismissed.7
During the preliminary mandatory conference, the attorney-in-
fact of the complainant, Emily Bendero (Bendero) and the
respondent manifested that the latter offered to return a portion
of the attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00 and that the
former accepted the same as full settlement of the claim. They
likewise expressed in writing their mutual desire to terminate the
case. Considering, however, that mere settlement among the
parties does not automatically result in the dismissal of the
complaint, the parties were still ordered to submit their
respective verified position papers. 8 Notwithstanding this order, it
was only the respondent who submitted his position paper.9
The IBP's Findings
In his Report and Recommendation10 dated June 28, 2015, IBP
Investigating Commissioner Oscar Leo S. Billena of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
found that no substantial evidence was presented to prove the
allegations in the complaint and thus recommended the
dismissal of the disbarment complaint. The dispositive portion of
the report reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended
that the herein complaint for disbarment be dismissed.11
On October 28, 2015, the Board of Goven1ors of the IBP issued
Resolution No. XXII-2015-65,12reversing the recommendation of
the investigating commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to REVERSE the findings of facts and the
recommended dismissal by the investigating Commissioner,
adopting the recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline imposing a penalty of 6 months suspension against
Atty. Romeo Z. Uson pursuant to previous Supreme Court
decisions in similar cases.13
On March 3, 2016, the respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration14 but the Board of Governors denied the same in
its Resolution No. XXII-2017-1146,15 disposing as follows:
RESOLVED to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration there being
no new reason and/or new' argument adduced to reverse the
previous findings and decision of the Board of Governors.16
Ruling of this Court
The Court sustains the recommendation of the Board of
Governors of the IBP.
It needless to emphasize that at the very moment a lawyer
agrees to be engaged as a counsel, he is obliged to handle the
same with utmost diligence and competence until the
conclusion of the case. He is expected to exert his time and best
efforts in order to assist his client in his legal predicament.
Neglecting a legal cause renders him accountable under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, under Rule 18.03
thereof, which states:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03- A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Further, in Spouses Jonathan and Ester Lopez vs. Atty. Stnamar E.
Limos Lopez vs. Limos,17 it was stressed, thus:
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound
to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such
client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence
for which he must be held administratively liable.18
In the instant case, the respondent reneged on his duty when he
failed to file the ejectment case on behalf of the complainant
despite full payment of his attorney's fees. His negligence caused
his client to lose his cause of action since the prescriptive period
of one year to file the ejectment case had already lapsed
without him filing the necessary complaint in court.
Respondent, however, claimed that it was an exercise of good
judgment on his part not to file the case considering the
circumstances surrounding the ownership of the disputed
property. He averred that when he sent a demand letter to
Antonio and the other occupants of the property, he was
informed that the complainant acquired the title through
fraudulent means and that they plan to institute a civil action
against the complainant.
The respondent's excuse fails to convince.
Before respondent was engaged as counsel, he had a discussion
with the complainant about his legal concern and had a good
opportunity to examine the documents presented to him by his
prospective client. When he agreed to be the counsel of the
complainant, it only means that, based on the discussion and
documents, he believed that complainant had a cause of
action to file an ejectment case. He signified his approval to the
filing of the ejectment case when he accepted the case and
the corresponding fees thereto as in fact the acknowledgment
receipt19 for the said payment states that it is in full satisfaction of
his attorney's fees for the filing of the ejectment case. To state
the pertinent portion, viz.:
RECEIVED the amount of SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P75,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, from EDMUND AUSTRIA
[BALMACEDA], as and for full payment of Attorney's Fees in
Ejectment Case, Re: SPS. CARLOS J. AGAPITO and DOLORES
CARIÑO AGAPITO VS. ANTONIO AUSTRIA BALMACEDA of Sitio
Lecor, Barangay Poblacion Norte, Paniqui, Tarlac.
Paniqui, Tarlac, April 16, 2012. (Emphasis ours)
That the occupants of the property claimed that they also have
a right to possess the same and that they intend to bring the
matter to court are not compelling reasons to prevent the
respondent from filing the ejectment case. After all, they are free
to pursue legal remedies to protect their own interest. What
should have merited respondent's greater consideration is the
fact that the complainant is his client and his earlier assessment
that he has a cause of action for ejectment. In any case,
whoever may have the better title or right to possess the
property will depend on the appreciation of the trial court.
Respondent cannot sway this Court by alleging that the
occupants, in fact, filed an action for annulment of the
complainant's title to the property, even submitting a photocopy
of the said complaint to be part of the records of the case. He
may have thought this would pass as a convenient excuse to
validate his claim that there was a good reason for not filing the
case but the circumstances and evidence he submitted only
highlighted his negligence. Based on the records, he agreed to
the filing of the ejectment case in April 16, 2012, which was the
date stated in the receipt of the full payment of his attorney's
fees. On the other hand, the complaint for annulment of title was
filed by Antonio and his supposed co-heirs only on November 5,
2013, as stamped in the photocopy of the same. At that time,
one year had already lapsed and therefore the complainant
had already lost his cause of action for ejectment due to the
respondent's failure to file the necessary complaint. Had
respondent been prompt, the complainant could have
established his case in court. Plainly speaking, the respondent
cannot justify his negligence by claiming that the occupants
pursued their threat to file a case in court. There is simply no
connection between his duty as counsel to the complainant
with the supposed defendants' threat to retaliate with a
separate legal action. This should have even prompted him to
be more vigilant in protecting his client's case but, as it was, he
slacked and let his client lose his case without the merits thereof
being submitted to the fair deliberation and disposal of the
court.
In Nebreja vs. Reonal,20 the Court reiterated the strict command
for lawyers to diligently and competently protect their client's
causes, thus:
This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the
mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the
client is considered per se a violation. Thus, a lawyer was held to
be negligent when he failed to do anything to protect his client's
interest after receiving his acceptance fee. In another case, this
Court has penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of the
status of the case, among other matters. In another instance, for
failure to take the appropriate actions in connection with his
client's case, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law
for a period of six months and was required to render
accounting of all the sums he received from his client.21
Further, in Reyes vs. Vitan,22 it was held that "the act of receiving
money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling
complainant's case and subsequently failing to render such
services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility."23
That the respondent eventually returned a portion of the money
to the complainant and both have signified consent to the
termination of the case do not automatically exonerate him
from administrative liability. Restitution may have earned him the
condonation of his client but, being a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, he is also answerable to the legal
profession. Membership in the bar, being imbued with public
interest, holds him accountable not only to his client but also to
the court, the legal profession and the society at large. He is thus
expected to conduct himself according to the stringent
standards of morality and competence imposed upon all
members of the legal profession. After all, membership in the bar
is merely a privilege which may be withdrawn, temporarily or
perpetually, from a lawyer who fails to live by the tenets of
professional responsibility.
Moreover, in Bautista vs. Bernabe,24 it was held that the
"complainant's desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does
not exonerate respondent or put an end to the administrative
proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant." The
reason stems from the fact that "disbarment cases are sui
generis."25 In Bautista, the Court elucidated, thus:
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is
a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is
in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.26
It is also well to remember that in Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, it is provided that a lawyer only holds
in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession. "The relationship between a lawyer and his client is
highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and
good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes
upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client."27
In the present case, it was established that the respondent
collected his attorney's fees and thereafter neglected the
complainant's case. While he offered an excuse for his non-filing
of the complaint for ejectment, the same was not an
acceptable reason for failing to perform the agreed legal
services. Moreover, he failed to promptly return the money he
received as acceptance fees as it took him more than two (2)
years, or after the filing of the instant administrative case, to
refund the complainant of the amount paid for services not
rendered.
To be clear, the mere forgiveness, desistance or acquiescence
of the client to the dismissal of the administrative proceedings
will not ipso facto absolve the lawyer from liability but by
establishing that no misconduct or negligence was committed.
In this case where the respondent admitted to receiving
attorney's fees and failing to file a complaint for ejectment even
after the lapse of two (2) years, the imposition of an
administrative sanction is only proper.
In Solidon vs. Macalalad,28 the respondent lawyer was imposed
with the penalty of six (6) months suspension for failing to file a
petition for registration of title over a certain property after
receipt of the acceptance fee of P80,000.00. He also failed to
promptly return the money he received even after failing to
render legal services. Similarly, in Pariñas vs. Paguinto,29 the Court
imposed the same penalty upon the respondent lawyer for
violating Rule 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when
he failed to file an annulment case despite receipt of
acceptance fee and filing fees. Also, in Vda. De Enriquez vs. San
Jose,30 the erring lawyer was meted the penalty of six (6) months
of suspension for failing to file the appropriate civil case after
sending a demand letter. Here, the Court declared that "the
failure to file a pleading is by itself inexcusable negligence on
the part of respondent."'31

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds the imposition

of the six (6) months of suspension on the respondent warranted
under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romeo Z. Uson GUILTY of violating

Rules 18.03 and 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He is hereby SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS from the practice
of law effective upon receipt of this decision, and is sternly
warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Public
Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts. Likewise, a Notice of Suspension shall be
prominently posted in the Supreme Court website as a notice to
the general public.

The respondent, upon receipt of this resolution shall forthwith be

suspended from the practice of law and shall formally manifest
to this Court that his suspension has started. He shall furnish all
courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his
appearance a copy of this manifestation.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 12012, July 02, 2018
GERONIMO J. JIMENO, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. FLORDELIZA M.
JIMENO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This case stemmed from a Complaint1 dated July 10, 2012 filed
by complainant Geronimo J. Jimeno, Jr. (complainant) before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), seeking the suspension/disbarment of
respondent Arty. Flordeliza M. Jimeno (respondent) for alleged:
(a) unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct,
specifically, by falsifying a public document, in violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR);
and (b) violation of her duty to preserve her client's confidences
in violation of Rule 21.01, Canon 21 of the CPR.
The Facts
Complainant claimed to have discovered that respondent, who
is his cousin, sold the property of his parents, the late Spouses
Geronimo P. Jimeno, Sr. (Geronimo Sr.) and Perla de Jesus
Jimeno (Perla; collectively, Spouses Jimeno) located at Brgy.
Gintong Silahis, San Jose, Quezon City (Malindang property)
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-
52411,2 through a Deed of Absolute Sale3dated September 8,
2005 (subject deed) executed by respondent as attorney-in-fact
of Geronimo Sr.4 He claimed that the subject deed was falsified
considering that: (a) the same bore the signature of Perla who
had already passed away on May 19, 2004,5 or more than a year
prior to the execution thereof; (b) Geronimo Sr. was erroneously
described as married to Perla, when he was already a widower
at the time; (c) Geronimo Sr. was made to appear as the
absolute and registered owner in fee simple of the property
when the same is co-owned by him and his ten (10) children
(Jimeno children); and (d) Geronimo Sr.'s residence and postal
address was stated as "421 (formerly 137) Mayon Street, Quezon
City," when the same should have been "10451 Bridgeport Road,
Richmond, British Columbia" as indicated in the Special Power of
Attorney6 dated July 9, 2004 (subject SPA) he executed,
authorizing respondent to administer and sell his real properties in
the Philippines.7 Complainant likewise alleged that respondent
mentioned "so many unnecessary and un-called for matters like
[his] father having allegedly (sic) illegitimate children" when his
lawyer requested for copies of the titles and other documents
respecting the properties covered by the SPA, in violation of her
duty to keep in confidence whatever informations were
revealed to her by the late Geronimo Sr. in the course of their
professional relationship (lawyer-client privilege).8
In her defense,9 respondent claimed that: (a) she was not the
one who prepared or caused the preparation of the subject
deed and that all the necessary documents for the sale of the
Malindang property, including the subject SPA and the Deed of
Waiver of Rights and Interests10 dated July 4, 2005 executed by
the Jimeno children in their parents' favor (collectively,
documents of sale), were merely transmitted by her cousin and
respondent's sister, Lourdes Jimeno-Yaptinchay (Lourdes), from
Canada; (b) the sale of the Malindang property was with the
consent of all the Jimeno children, including complainant; and
(c) she merely signed the subject deed in good faith before
endorsing the same to the buyer, Melencio G. Aquino, Jr.
(Aquino), for disposition.11 Respondent further claimed that the
contents of her email dated April 24, 2012 to complainant's
lawyer are "privileged communication" which are relevant to the
subject of inquiry, and they did not arise from the confidences
and secrets of the late Geronimo Sr. She challenged
complainant's invocation of Canon 21, contending that the
matter is personal to a client, and is intransmissible in character.12
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD
In a Report and Recommendation13 dated June 14, 2013, the
IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed that while the sale
of the Malindang property appeared to be a unanimous
decision of the Jimeno children, and the documents of sale
which were all prepared in Canada were merely sent to
respondent in the Philippines, she allowed herself to become a
party to a document which contained falsehood and/or
inaccuracies in violation of her duties as a lawyer, namely: (a) to
refrain from doing or consenting to any falsehood; (b) to employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client; and (c) to refrain from allowing his client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case.14Accordingly, he
recommended that respondent be reprimanded for her
acts,15 which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors (Board) in Resolution No. XXI-2014-67816 dated
September 28, 2014.
Dissatisfied, complainant filed a motion for
reconsideration17 dated May 1, 2015. The motion was granted by
the Board in Resolution No. XXII-2016-27818 dated April 29, 2016,
increasing the imposed penalty to suspension from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months. The same Resolution likewise
directed IBP-CBD Director Ramon S. Esguerra (Director Esguerra)
to prepare an extended resolution to explain the Board's
action.19
Director Esguerra thereafter submitted an Extended
Resolution20 holding that respondent's dishonest acts in relation
to the subject SPA and the subject deed constitute blatant
transgressions of her duties as a lawyer under Rule 1.01 of the
CPR. He noted that respondent never denied knowledge of
Perla's demise and her own description of her close relationship
with the complainant's family bolsters such knowledge. However,
instead of advising Geronimo Sr. and the Jimeno children to
execute an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Perla to
enable the proper registration of the Malindang property in their
names preliminary to the sale to Aquino, she voluntarily signed
the subject deed despite the patent irregularities in its execution.
He also rejected her reliance on the purported assurances made
by complainant's siblings, holding that her oath as a lawyer
mandates her to be cautious of the consequences of her action
and enjoins her to refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.21
Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration,22 which was
denied by the Board in Resolution No. XXII-2017-113523 dated
May 27, 2017.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the records of the
case were transmitted to this Court.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the
same were duly substantiated by the records.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and
with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued
with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high
and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of
every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full
expression in the Lawyer's Oath that every lawyer of this country
has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law
Profession,24 thus:
I,_________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose
of evasion. So help me God.25 (Emphasis supplied)
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws
of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out
of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to
conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his
clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe
and maintain the rule of law, as well as be an exemplar worthy
of emulation by others.26
In line with the letter and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath, the Court
has adopted and instituted the Code of Professional
Responsibility27 (CPR) to govern every lawyer's relationship with
his profession, the courts, the society, and his clients.28
Pertinent to this case are Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 15.07 of justifications to excuse her from discharging her obligation to be
Canon 15, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19, which provide: truthful and honest in her professional actions since her duty and
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws responsibility in that regard are clear and unambiguous.38
of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Thus, despite complainant's admission that he "agreed in
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, principle for the sale of the properties of their parents in the
immoral or deceitful conduct. Philippines to generate funds for their support and medical
attention x x x,"39 the Court cannot turn a blind eye on
xxxx respondent's act of permitting untruthful statements to be
embodied in public documents which she herself signed. To
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty allow this highly irregular practice for the specious reason that
in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. lawyers are constrained to obey their clients' wishes, even if for
laudable purposes, would effectively sanction wrongdoing and
xxxx falsity which would undermine the role of lawyers as officers of
the court.
Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance
with the laws and the principles of fairness. Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their
support for the cause of their clients should never be attained at
xxxx the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute
fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
CANON 19 - A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
bounds of the law. rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he
must do so only within the bounds of the law. It is worthy to
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to emphasize that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be
attain the lawful objectives of his client x x x. (Italics supplied) pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and must be held
within the bounds of reason and common sense.40Respondent's
After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds itself
responsibility to protect and advance the interests of her client
in complete agreement with Director Esguerra's finding that
does not warrant a course of action not in accordance with the
respondent's acts in relation to the subject SPA and the subject
pertinent laws and legal processeses.
deed constitute blatant transgressions of her duties as a lawyer,
as ordained by Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR, which engraves
All told, respondent is found guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath,
an overriding prohibition against any form of
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 15.07 of Canon 15, and Rule 19.01 of
misconduct.29 Additionally, the Court finds that respondent fell
Canon 19 of the CPR by allowing herself to become a party to
short of her duty to impress upon her client compliance with the
the subject deed which contained falsehood and/or
pertinent laws in relation to the subject transaction. In this case,
inaccuracies.
while seemingly aware of the demise of Perla that rendered the
Malindang property a co-owned property of Geronimo Sr. and
On the other hand, the Court finds no merit in the charge of
the Jimeno children, instead of advising the latter to settle the
violation of the rule41 on lawyer-client privilege42 for lack of
estate of Perla to enable the proper registration of the property
proper substantiation.
in their names preliminary to the sale to Aquino, she voluntarily
signed the subject deed, as attorney-in-fact of Geronimo Sr.,
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of
despite the patent irregularities in its execution. These
the Bar may be disbarred or suspended for any of the following
irregularities are: (a) the fact that it bore the signature of Perla,
grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in
who was already deceased; (b) the erroneous description of
office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime
Geronimo Sr. as married to Perla despite the latter's demise and
involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the Lawyer's Oath; (6)
as being the absolute owner in fee simple of the Malindang
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
property which is a co-owned property; and (c) the erroneous
(7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without
statement of Geronimo Sr.'s residence and postal address.
authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
That respondent had no hand in the preparation of the
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
documents of sale is of no moment because as a lawyer, she is
probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an
expected to respect and abide by the laws and the legal
officer of the court.43
processes.30 To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and
respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can
Verily, the act of respondent in affixing her signature on a deed
never be overemphasized. Considering that, of all classes and
of sale containing falsehood and/or inaccuracies constitutes
professions, lawyers are most sacredly bound to uphold the
malpractice and gross misconduct in her office as attorney.
law, it is imperative that they live by the law.31
Case law provides that in similar instances where lawyers
committed falsehood or knowingly allowed the commission of
As a lawyer, respondent is fully aware of the requisites for the
falsehood by their clients, the Court imposed upon them the
legality of a voluntary conveyance of property, particularly, the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Jimenez v.
scope of the rights, interests, and participation of the
Francisco,44 a lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for
parties/signatories to the deed of sale, and the consequent
six (6) months for permitting untruthful statements to be
transfer of title to the properties involved, yet, she chose to
embodied in public documents. Similarly, in Bongalonta v.
disregard the patent irregularities in the subject deed and
Castillo45 the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer who
voluntarily affixed her signature thereon. Notably, respondent did
committed falsehood in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and of
not specifically admit nor deny knowledge of the demise of
the CPR. In view of the antecedents in this case, the Court finds it
Perla, but her claim of such strong ties to complainant's family
appropriate to sustain the recommended suspension from the
bolsters knowledge thereof.32 Besides, her awareness of Perla's
practice of law for six (6) months.
demise even prior to the affixture of her signature on the subject
deed may be sufficiently inferred from her averments, among
As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation
others, that: (a) when Perla got sickly sometime in the early part
in Samonte v. Abellana:46
of 2004, Lourdes began giving her a series of phone
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure
calls regarding the disposition of Spouses Jimeno's real
that whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this
properties;33 and (b) she was never remiss in her duty to inform
country should remain faithful to the Lawyer's Oath. Only thereby
the Jimeno children, through Lourdes and Teresita Jimeno-Roan,
can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the
about the legal repercussions and legal complications of
Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception x x x
pushing through and continuing with the negotiations with the
evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to
prospective buyers of the Malindang property,34which
practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of
admittedly continued even after the demise of Perla.35 However,
the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern
despite being aware that something was amiss with the
disciplinary sanctions.47 (Emphasis supplied)
documents of sale, respondent allowed herself to become a
party to the subject deed which contained falsehood and/or WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Flordeliza M. Jimeno (respondent)
inaccuracies in violation of her duties as a lawyer. is found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Rule 15.07 of Canon 15, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of
Respondent's claims that she acted in good faith,36 and that she the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she
relied on the assurance of full responsibility from the ten (10) is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, with
Jimeno children37 cannot relieve her of administrative liability. As a STERN WARNING that any repetition of the same or similar acts
a lawyer, she cannot invoke good faith and good intentions as will be punished more severely.
Respondent's suspension from the practice of law shall take
effect immediately upon her receipt of this Decision. She
is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that
her suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-
judicial bodies where she has entered her appearance as
counsel.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar

Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as
an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
information and guidance; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 July 31, 2017
A.C. No. 11663
NANETTE B. SISON, represented by DELIA B.
SARABIA, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. SHERDALE M. VALDEZ, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint for
Permanent Disbarment1 (disbarment complaint) dated
September 13, 2013 filed by complainant Nanette B. Sison
(complainant), represented by her mother, Delia B. Sarabia
(Sarabia),2 against respondent Atty. Sherdale M. Valdez
(respondent) for violating his professional duties under the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Sometime in September 2012, complainant, an overseas Filipino
worker in Australia, engaged respondent's legal services to file
an action against Engr. Eddie S. Pua of E.S. Pua Construction (old
contractor) and the project manager, Engr. Dario Antonio
(project manager), for failing to construct complainant's house in
Nuvali, Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna in due time.3 Although no
written agreement was executed between the parties specifying
the scope of legal services, respondent received the total
amount of ₱215,000.00 from complainant, through Sarabia, on
three (3) separate dates.4 Respondent acknowledged receipt of
the first two (2) installments in a handwritten note, stating that the
amount of ₱165,000.00 was for litigation expenses, i.e., attorney's
fees, filing fees, bond, and other expenses.5 The last payment
was deposited online to the bank account of respondent's wife,
Ma. Analyn M. Valdez.6
On January 8, 2013, complainant terminated respondent's legal
services via e-mail and text messages7 with a demand to return
the amount given, which was not heeded notwithstanding
several demands; Hence, complainant, through Sarabia, filed
the instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
alleging that despite receipt of her payments: (a) respondent
failed to render his legal services and update her regarding the
status of the case; (b) commingled her money with that of
respondent's wife; (c) misappropriated her money by failing to
issue a receipt for the last installment of the payment received;
and (d) fabricated documents to justify retention of her money.8
For his part,9 respondent claimed that he reported the status of
the case to complainant through phone and e-mail.10After
studying the case, he informed complainant of his evaluation via
e-mail.11 On November 1, 2012, respondent went to his
hometown in Ilagan, Isabela with one "Atty. Joselyn V. Valeros"
to personally serve the demand letter to the old contractor.
However, when they went to the house of the old contractor on
November 4, 2012, the person present thereat refused to receive
the letter.12 Respondent supposedly spent ₱15,000.00 for his
travel to Ilagan, Isabela.13
Respondent further averred that he was supposed to personally
meet complainant for the first time upon the latter's arrival in the
Philippines in the second week of November 2012. During the
meeting, he intended to personally report the status of the case,
have the pleadings signed, and explain how her payments
would be applied. However, no phone call or e-mail was made
by complainant to confirm the meeting.14 Respondent later
learned from complainant's new contractor that she did not
want to meet with him for fear that he would only ask for more
money.15
On the same day his legal services were terminated, respondent
sent the demand letters to the old contractor and the project
manager via courier service,16 allegedly before he found out
about the termination.17 In a letter18 dated January 10, 2013,
respondent, through complainant's sister, Elisea Sison, asked
complainant to reconsider the termination and outlined the
services he already rendered, as follows: (a) he sent a demand
letter dated November 4, 2012 to the old contractor; (b) he
drafted a complaint for breach of contract and damages with
prayer for preliminary attachment; (c) he sent a final demand
letter dated January 8, 2013 to the old contractor; and (d) while
waiting for a response, he proceeded to investigate the old
contractor's real and personal properties to ascertain what can
be the subject of preliminary attachment.19 Respondent
admitted that he opted not to immediately mail the demand
letter to the old contractor so that the latter could not dispose of
or hide his properties.20 Alternatively, respondent offered to
return the amount of ₱l50,000.00 to complainant, explaining that
he already studied the case, prepared the complaint, and
incurred expenses.21However, complainant refused and
proceeded to file the present case.
Instead of filing their respective position papers before the IBP-
CBD, the parties filed a Joint Manifestation22 on February 20,
2014, agreeing to settle the matter amicably and
acknowledging that the disbarment complaint was filed
because of "misapprehension of facts due to pure error in
accounting and honest mistakes by respondent."23Complainant's
counsel acknowledged receipt of ₱200,000.00 representing
partial ·payment of respondent's obligation, while the balance
of ₱l18,352.00 will be paid subsequently.24 In turn, complainant
undertook not to pursue nor testify against respondent in this
administrative case, as well as in the Estafa case.25
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the Report and Recommendation26 dated June 7, 2014, the
IBPCBD Investigating Commissioner (IC) recommended that
respondent be reprimanded for violating his obligations under
the CPR with a stem warning never to commit the same mistakes
again.27
At the outset, the IC disapproved the Joint Manifestation, noting
that a compromise agreement would not operate to exonerate
a lawyer from a disciplinary case.1âwphi1 As to respondent's
liability, the IC observed that he committed several violations of
the CPR during the period of his engagement with complainant
from September 2012 up to January 8, 2013. First, he failed to
inform his client about the status of the case.28 The IC
acknowledged that respondent rendered some legal services to
complainant, but only came up with the list of services after his
termination, thus, supporting the conclusion that he indeed
failed to update his client about the developments of the
case.29 Second, he asked for payment of fees from complainant
even before he prepared the draft complaint. The IC explained
that a prudent lawyer would first wait for the computation of
court fees before seeking payment of filing and bond
fees.30Third, respondent failed to issue the proper receipt for the
full amount he received from complainant.31 Fourth, respondent
commingled the funds of his client with that of his wife when he
asked that the ₱50,000.00 be deposited to his wife's bank
account.32
As to the compensation for legal services, the IC opined that
₱30,000.00 was reasonable based on quantum meruit, in view of
the limited services respondent rendered during the initiatory
stage of the case - i.e., review of the case and drafting of
demand letters, complaint, and special power of
attomey.33 However, citing Nebreja v. Reonal,34 the IC declined
to recommend restitution of the amount received by
respondent, noting the Court's alleged policy that the collection
of money should be made through an independent action.35 The
IC also refused to grant reimbursement to respondent of the
amount of ₱l5,000.00 he incurred for his trip to Isabela for his
failure to render an accounting of his expenses.36
Although respondent was found to have violated his duties to his
client, herein complainant, the IC considered his active
membership in the IBP-Laguna Chapter from 2007 to 2009 and
his continuous service as a law professor in Adamson University
since 2009 as mitigating factors to reduce his recommended
penalty to reprimand.37
In a Resolution38 dated January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the IC's Report and
Recommendation, but modified the penalty to suspension from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,39 but was denied in a
Resolution40 dated September 23, 2016.
 The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.
The Court's Ruling
After a judicious review of the records, the Court concurs with
the IBP's finding of administrative liability with some modifications.
Records show that in September 2012, complainant engaged
respondent's services to file a money claim, and pursuant to such
engagement, complainant paid respondent a total of
₱215,000.00. After a little more than three (3) months,
complainant terminated respondent's legal services due to the
latter's failure to render legal services. While it was
acknowledged that respondent did render some legal services
to complainant albeit only in the initiatory stage, it was also
established that respondent failed to duly update his client on
the developments of the case. As correctly pointed out by the
IBP, respondent's lapses constitute a violation of Rule 18.04,
Canon 18 of the CPR, which reads:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status
of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, a lawyer is duty-
bound to serve the latter with competence and to attend to
such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion. He owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed upon him.41 In this relation, a lawyer
has the duty to apprise his client of the status and developments
of the case and all other relevant information.42
In this case, respondent alleged that he waited for
complainant's arrival in the Philippines in November 2012 to
personally report on his accomplishments, to have the necessary
pleadings signed, and to explain how the money given will be
applied. However, the meeting did not push through.
amounts intended as filing and bond fees, as these were
obviously unutilized.
In fact, respondent admitted that, based on his belief, he was
entitled to only ₱65,000.00 as compensation for his legal
services.46 As such, he should have returned the excess amount
of ₱150,000.00 out of the ₱215,000.00 he received from
complainant. Notably, Rule 16.03 of the CPR allows a lawyer to
retain the amount necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements.47 Hence, respondent's persistent refusal to return
the money to complainant despite several demands renders him
administratively liable.
Although the IBP correctly found that respondent is entitled to
reasonable compensation for the limited services he rendered,
the Court notes that respondent appears to have waived his
claim for compensation when he agreed to return the amount
of ₱200,000.00 in cash and pay an additional ₱l18,352.00 in
exchange for complainant's desistance in the Estafa and
disbarment cases filed against him.48 Thus, the matter of
restitution should no longer be an issue. However, it should be
stressed that his administrative liability herein should remain,
considering the rule that a disbarment case is not subject to any
compromise.49
Anent the penalty, the Court has the plenary power to discipline
erring lawyers,50 and thus, in the exercise of its judicial discretion,
may impose a penalty less than the IBP's recommendation if
such penalty would achieve the desired end of reforming the
errant lawyer.51 Considering the surrounding circumstances of
this case, such as the short duration of the engagement,
respondent's return of the money, his expression of humility and
remorse, and the fact that this is his first administrative case, the
Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
a period of three (3) months sufficient and commensurate to
respondent's violations.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sherdale M. Valdez is
found GUILTY of violating Rule 18.04, Canon 18, as well as Rules
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) months effective from the finality of
this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar

Indeed, respondent cannot justify his non-compliance by shifting
the blame to complainant for failing to meet with him, especially
so that he failed to inform his client of the pleadings she needed
to sign.
The Court likewise finds that respondent violated Rules 16.01 and
16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR, which respectively read:
Confidant to be entered in the personal record of respondent as
a member of the Philippine Bar; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts throughout the
country.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property

collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien
over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. x x x.

The highly fiduciary nature of an attorney-client relationship

imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client.43 Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the filing
and processing of a case, if not utilized, must be returned
immediately upon demand.44 His failure to return gives rise to a
presumption that he has appropriated it for his own use, and the
conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes a gross violation
of his professional obligation under Canon 16 of the CPR.45

In this case, respondent failed to account for the money

received from complainant when he only acknowledged
receipt of ₱165,000.00 for litigation expenses despite admittedly
receiving ₱215,000.00. When complainant terminated his legal
services, the fact that no case has been filed in court should
have prompted him to immediately return to complainant the
 A.C. No. 9832, September 04, 2017
LOLITA R. MARTIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. JESUS M. DELA
CRUZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a letter-complaint1 dated
February 10, 2013 filed by complainant Lolita R. Martin
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Jesus M. Dela Cruz
(respondent) for the latter's failure to return the acceptance fee
in the amount of P60,000.00 he received from complainant,
despite several demands.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that sometime in 2012, she engaged
respondent's legal services in relation to several pending cases
she filed before the following agencies: (a) the Professional
Regulation Commission; (b) the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City (OCP-QC); and (c) the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board.2 After giving photocopies of the cases' files,
complainant paid respondent P60,000.00 as acceptance fee,
evidenced by the Official Receipt3 dated August 23, 2012.4
From December 21, 2012 to February 6, 2013, complainant
repeatedly went to respondent's office to inquire on the status of
the cases, but respondent was not there.5 Thus, complainant
wrote several letters6 to him requesting the return of the money
she paid as acceptance fee due to respondent's failure to take
any action on her cases. He even failed to appear in the hearing
for preliminary investigation before the OCP-QC on January 16,
2013, causing it to be reset on February 20, 2013.7 Respondent
also refused to answer any of her calls.8
After several months, respondent finally contacted complainant,
and told her not to worry as he would still handle the other cases,
particularly the Estafa case pending before the OCP-QC.
However, respondent still failed to attend the scheduled
preliminary investigation. Aggrieved, complainant went to
respondent's office, but the latter only answered "[k]asi alam ko
alas dose ng hapon ang hearing."9Angered by his response,
complainant reiterated her demand for the return of the
acceptance fee, but the latter refused.10 Thus, she wrote letter-
complaints for respondent's disbarment to the Office of the
Ombudsman, as well as to the Presidential Action Center of the
Office of the President, which were indorsed to the Court.11
On June 17, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution 12 requiring
respondent to comment on the letter-complaint, but he failed to
comply.13
On January 13, 2014, the Court dispensed with respondent's
comment and, instead, referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.14
On June 2, 2014, the IBP conducted a mandatory conference,
but only complainant appeared. On even date, it issued an
Order15 directing the parties to file their position papers within ten
(10) days, to which only complainant complied.16
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the Report and Recommendation17 dated August 18, 2014,
the Investigating Commissioner (IC) recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year and ordered to return to complainant the
amount of P60,000.00 he received as acceptance fee with
twelve percent (12%) interest per annum.18
The IC held that respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Rule
16.01, Canon 16, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) due to his failure to: (a)
render any legal service despite his engagement and receipt of
P60,000.00 as acceptance fee; (b) appear in two (2) preliminary
investigation hearings before the OCP-QC; and (c) return the
money complainant paid him despite written and verbal
demands.19 The IC also found respondent liable for willful
disobedience to the Court's lawful orders for his failure to file his
comment to the letter-complaint, as well as to the IBP's processes
when he failed to file a mandatory conference brief, to appear
during the mandatory conference hearing, and to file his
position paper.20
In a Resolution21 dated February 20, 2015, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the IC's Report and
Recommendation.
On October 29, 2015, respondent filed his motion for
reconsideration,22 explaining that he was not aware of the
administrative case against him, as he was out of the country for
most of the period from 2013 to 2015,23 and that the notices of
the IBP proceedings were sent to the IBP-QC, rather than to his
office address in Scout Borromeo, QC, and that the staff in the
former office did not apprise him about the notices.24
Respondent averred that, during their first meeting, he and
complainant only discussed six (6) administrative cases, which
did not include the pending criminal investigation case before
the OCP-QC.25Nevertheless, respondent admitted that
complainant had asked him to attend an on-going investigation
in the prosecutor's office, for which he requested for the case
documents, which were, however, not given to him.26 He insisted
that complainant informed him that the hearing was at two
o'clock in the afternoon, which was the reason why he instructed
complainant to give him the documents before noon on that
date so he can go over them during lunch break.27
While he opined that the acceptance fee is not refundable
since he already prepared pleadings for complainant, he also
manifested that he will nonetheless comply with the order to
return the money to complainant but requested that he be
allowed to pay in installments within three (3) months.28
The IBP denied his motion in a Resolution29 dated September 23,
2016.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP's findings insofar as it found
respondent administratively liable for violating Rules 18.03 and
18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR.
A judicious review of the records shows that complainant
secured respondent's legal services for several cases and paid
P60,000.00 as acceptance fee. However, respondent failed to
perform legal services on any of these cases, and upon
demand, refused to return the acceptance fee paid by
complainant. He also failed to respond to complainant's letters
and calls inquiring on the status of said cases. These acts
indubitably constitute violations of Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon
18 of the CPR, which respectively read:
CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status
of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information.
Under these provisions, a lawyer is duty-bound to competently
and diligently serve his client once the former takes up the
latter's cause. The lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon
him. Hence, his neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him
amounts to inexcusable negligence for which he must be
administratively liable,30 as in this case. The Court finds no
credence to respondent's defense that he prepared pleadings
for complainant given that he failed to provide any proof to
substantiate his claim.
The Court, however, does not find respondent liable for violating
Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates lawyers to
"account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client." Consistent with this duty, respondent accounted
for his receipt of P60,000.00 as acceptance fee from
complainant when he issued the Official Receipt dated August
23, 2012.31 He also cannot be held liable for failure to account
complainant's alleged payment of P2,500.00 as research fee for
lack of proof that such amount was paid to respondent.
Anent the penalty, in similar cases wherein lawyers were found to
have neglected their clients' causes, the Court imposed upon
them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months.32 Consistent with these cases,
respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months.

As regards restitution, the Court has, in several cases, allowed the

return of acceptance fees when a lawyer completely fails to
render legal service.33 As applied to this case, the order for
respondent to return the P60,000.00 is, therefore, proper. Indeed,
an acceptance fee is generally non-refundable,34 but such rule
presupposes that the lawyer has rendered legal service to his
client.35 In the absence of such service, the lawyer has no basis
for retaining complainant's payment, as in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jesus M. Dela Cruz (respondent) is

found GUILTY of violating Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective from the finality of this Resolution, and
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.

The suspension in the practice of law shall take effect

immediately upon receipt by respondent. Respondent
is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that
his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-
judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as
counsel.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant to be entered in respondent's personal record as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 8903, August 30, 2017
EDIGARDO V. BONDOC, Complainant, v. ATTY. OLIMPIO R.
DATU, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
The Case
On February 22, 2011, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
received a Sinumpaang Salaysay1 signed by complainant
Edigardo V. Bondoc, (Bondoc) seeking the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Olimpio R. Datu (Datu) for alleged violations of
the Code of Professional Conduct. Acting on this matter, this
Court required Datu to file his comment.2 After this, the parties
were required to attend a series of mandatory conferences
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on
Bar Discipline. Upon filing of their position papers at the end of
the mandatory conference, the Commission on Bar Discipline
rendered its report and recommendation. The IBP adopted the
recommendation with modification and forwarded the
resolution to this Court.
The Facts
Bondoc claims that sometime in November 2006, he consulted
Datu regarding a civil case for damages that he intended to file
against a certain John Paul Metcado (Mercado). Bondoc
disclosed to Datu that he figured in a vehicular accident caused
by Mercado. Because of his injuries, Bondoc had to be
hospitalized and was forced to spend P100,000 in medical
expenses. Mercado attempted to settle the matter with him but
he was paid the small sum of P30,000. Bondoc thus sought to hire
Datu to file a civil case for damages. Datu assured Bondoc that
given the facts, he had a strong case. Bondoc and Datu then
agreed that Datu will handle the filing of the case. In return,
Bondoc undertook to pay Datu P25,000 in attorney's fees.
Bondoc complied with his obligation by paying Datu in two
installments. He paid P15,000 on February 6, 2007 and P10,000 on
August 6, 2007. The checks covering these payments were
received by a certain Tess Pano, a staff in Datu's office. Bondoc
also turned over to Datu all the documents pertinent to the civil
damages case. He then regularly followed up on the progress of
the case. However, Datu persistently told him to give the court
more time.3
Meanwhile, on February 12, 2008, Bondoc consulted Datu about
a complaint for estafa and illegal recruitment which he intended
to file against Ronald De Auzen (Auzen) and Nor-ain M. Blah
(Blah). He relayed to Datu that he had already sent demand
letters with the assistance of a certain SPO2 Jose Alamin Ho of
the Pampanga Police and that he only needed help in drafting
affidavits. Datu offered his services in drafting the affidavits for
Bondoc and two other persons also intending to file cases
against Auzen and Blah. For this service, Datu charged the total
amount of P1,200.4
More than a year later, Datu still made no reports to Bondoc
regarding the civil case for damages. When Bondoc inquired
with the trial court in San Fernando City, he was informed that no
civil suit for damages was filed against Mercado in his behalf.
Bondoc then asked Datu about the status of the case without
disclosing that he had already inquired with the court. Datu
requested Bondoc to return the next day. When he returned,
Datu showed him a letter5 dated May 5, 2008 which Datu
supposedly sent to Mercado inviting the latter to a meeting to
discuss a possible settlement of the case. On the date set for the
conference, only Bondoc attended. Datu related to Bondoc
that he had talked to Mercado's lawyer who informed him that
Mercado had already paid Bondoc P500,000 in settlement.
Bondoc denied this and presented to Datu the
acknowledgment receipt showing that he was only paid
P30,000. Bondoc further claims that he requested Datu to pursue
the case and the latter acceded. However, notwithstanding the
several months that had passed, Datu still took no steps to file the
civil case. Because of this, Bondoc demanded the return of the
P25,000 which he paid. Datu, however, refused.6
In his comment,7 Datu vehemently denied Bondoc's allegations.
He claims that sometime in November 2006, Bondoc went to his
office to hire him as a lawyer in connection with the case for civil
damages which Bondoc intended to file against Mercado. Datu
states that Bondoc told him he only received a measly sum of
P30,000 from Mercado because of the accident. Believing that
Bondoc had a meritorious cause of action, Datu agreed to
represent him. Bondoc returned to his office in February 2007 to
deliver two checks, worth P15,000, to cover his attorney's
fees.8 Datu alleges that he sent a letter to Mercado inviting him
to a conference with Bondoc before the case was filed in court.
To prove this, he attached as Annex 1 of his comment a
letter9 dated May 5, 2008. He then claims that Mercado's
counsel called him and told him that Mercado had already
settled the matter and paid Bondoc P500,000.10 As proof of this,
Datu attached to his comment an unsigned document
purporting to be the affidavit11 of a certain Hector Mercado
claiming to be the father of Mercado and asserting that he
settled his son's liability to Bondoc through the payment of
P500,000. Datu states that he confronted Bondoc about this
matter who eventually admitted that he did, in fact, receive
P500,000. Because of this, Datu no longer filed the complaint.12
Datu further claims that Bondoc also employed his legal services
for the filing of an estafa and illegal recruitment case. He alleges
that he drafted the complaint-affidavit for Bondoc and two
other complainants. They purportedly agreed that Bondoc will
give Datu a personal computer as payment for his attorney's
fees. Datu also said that Bondoc also obtained his services in
drafting demand letters. However, due to an unexpected tum of
events, their lawyer-client relationship was terminated.
According to Datu, he was surprised when Bondoc started
demanding the refund of P15,000. He explained that while it is
true that Bondoc gave him two checks in the amount of P8,000,
Bondoc had supposedly intended this as payment of Datu's
attorney's fees for his legal services to certain Spouses Gonzales.
Bondoc had allegedly owed the Spouses Gonzales a sum of
money.13
IBP Commissioner Jaime G. Oracion (Commissioner Oracion)
recommended that Datu be found liable for violating Rule 16.03
of Canon 16, Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, suspended from the practice of law
for three months, and ordered to pay Bondoc P25,000 with legal
interest.14 The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner
Oracion's recommendation with modification. It increased the
amount from P25,000 to P30,000 and decreased the period of
suspension from three months to one month.15
The Ruling of the Court
We agree with the IBP's findings that Datu breached his
obligation under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Bondoc's allegation is clear and simple. He obtained Datu's
services to file a civil case for damages. Datu agreed and
received P25,000 as attorney's fees. This amount was paid in two
installments - P15,000 on February 6, 2007 and P10,000 on August
6, 2007. However, instead of filing the civil case for damages,
Datu did nothing. He only acted more than a year later when
Bondoc demanded for an update as to the progress of the
case. Further, even when Datu finally decided to render the
legal service he promised, all he did was to draft a letter inviting
Mercado to a meeting. This meeting never took place. After this,
Datu chose to no longer act on the matter. Datu admitted these
in his pleadings.16
While Datu insists that he properly performed his obligation as
Bondoc's lawyer in the case for civil damages, the evidence
clearly shows that the only effort that Datu made was to write a
letter to Mercado 18 months from the time that Bondoc
obtained his services. This letter purportedly invited Mercado to
a meeting. This meeting, however, did not push through as Datu
claims that Mercado's counsel had informed him that Mercado
had already settled the matter by paying Bondoc P500,000.
While Bondoc asserts that he denied Mercado's version and
even presented to Datu the acknowledgment receipt showing
that he received a mere P30,000, Datu, instead of endeavoring
to ascertain the truth of Mercado's claim, merely decided to
believe Mercado's story hook, line and sinker. Datu attempts to
prove his claim by presenting an affidavit allegedly signed by a
certain Hector Mercado stating that Bondoc had already been
paid P500,000. The document, however, is both unsigned and
undated. Datu claims that this document was lifted from his
computer files. Elementary rules of evidence prevent us from
giving weight to this affidavit. Neither has its due execution or
authenticity been established.17
While Datu claims that he has no obligation to return Bondoc's
payment because he purportedly rendered other legal services,
no proof exists in the record to show that he legally represented
Bondoc in any case for which the latter owes him payment. Datu
points to a complaint-affidavit which he allegedly assisted
Bondoc in drafting. The document attached to prove this does
not in any way show that Datu indeed provided such assistance.
He also asserts that he drafted demand letters for Bondoc. We
note that there are two sets of demand letters presented to
establish this allegation. None of these letters prove Datu's story.
One set of demand letters themselves clearly state that they
were drafted with the assistance of a certain SPO2 Jose Alamin
Ho.18 Meanwhile, the other set shows Datu as counsel but these
letters are unsigned and show no indication that they were duly
sent out to, and received by, the proper parties.19
Finally, Datu also claims that in addition to the P15,000 that he
received from Bondoc, he also received P8,000. According to
him, this was not intended as payment for the services he
rendered to Bondoc. Datu alleges that this was payment for his
legal services to the Spouses Gonzalez, to whom Bondoc owed
a sum of money. There is, however, nothing in the record to
prove that Datu represented the Spouses Gonzalez in any
proceeding.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we AFFIRM WITH
MODIFICATION Resolution No. XX-2013-374 of the IBP Board of
Governors. We impose upon Atty. Olimpio R. Datu the penalty
of SIX MONTHS SUSPENSION from the practice of law for violation
of Rule 16.03, Rule 18.03, and Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, effective upon finality of this Decision.
He is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Olimpio R. Datu is also ORDERED to RETURN to Edigardo V.
Bondoc the amount of P25,000 with legal interest from the date
of finality of this Decision until the full amount is returned.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant and noted in Atty. Olimpio R. Datu's record as a
member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.

Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reminds

lawyers that they owe fidelity to the cause of their client.
Inextricably linked to this duty is Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 which
impresses upon lawyers not to neglect a legal matter entrusted
to them. In Camara v. Reyes20 (Camara), we reiterated that the
duty of fidelity and the obligation not to neglect a legal matter
entrusted by the client mean nothing short of entire devotion to
the client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the defense of his
or her rights. Lawyers must exert their best efforts to preserve their
clients' cause. Unwavering loyalty displayed to a client also
serves the ends of justice. Hence, in Camara, where the
respondent Atty. Reyes, after receiving his attorney's fees, took
no steps to protect his client's interest, we found him liable under
Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 and suspended him for a period of six
months.21

This case also bears semblance to the case Sencio v.

Calvadores22 (Sencio). In Sencio, Atty. Calvadores received the
amount of P12,000 as attorney's fees. He undertook to prosecute
the civil aspect of his client's case which involved the death of
the latter's son in a vehicular accident. While the client
persistently asked for updates and Atty. Calvadores continuously
reassured her, she eventually found out that no case was ever
filed.23 We found Atty. Calvadores liable under Canon 17 and
Rule 18.03 of Canon 18. In this case, we reminded members of
the legal profession that "[o]nce a lawyer agrees to handle a
case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care;
less than that, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer."24 For his
violation, we suspended Atty. Calvadores for six months.25

This court has consistently penalized lawyers who fall short of their
obligation to manifest devotion and diligence to protect the
interest of the client by failing to file his or her client's initiatory
action after receiving attorney's fees. This is the import of our
ruling in the cases Camara, Sencio, as well as in Reyes v.
Vitan 26 and Solidon v. Macalalad.27 In all these cases, we
imposed a penalty of suspension for a period of six months.

Applying these rulings to the present case, this court finds that
Datu fell short of the fidelity and diligence that he owed his client
Bondoc. Datu failed to protect Bondoc's interest by: (1) not
acting on the complaint he promised to file on behalf of
Bondoc; (2) acting on the matter only after 18 months and after
Bondoc's persistent inquiries; and (3) by believing Mercado's
alleged payment to Bondoc without as much as demanding
any proof of this payment. Rather than securing Bondoc's
interest, Datu chose to side with Mercado. This is not the kind of
unwavering loyalty and diligence that is expected of members
of the legal profession.

Further, having failed to render legal services, Datu has the legal
and moral obligation to return the P25,000 which he received.
Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 mandates that "[a] lawyer shall deliver
the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand x
x x." Failure to do so merits the imposition of disciplinary action. In
addition to the imposition of disciplinary action, this Court, in a
number of cases,28 has also ordered the return of the attorney's
fees received with legal interest.

Thus, in accordance with our consistent ruling, the proper

penalty that should be imposed in this case is suspension from
the practice of law for a period of six months. Further, Datu must
also return the P25,000 he received from Bondoc with legal
interest.
 October 3, 2017
A.C. No. 11754
JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B. BRAGAS,
Respondents
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified Affidavit-
Complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
by complainant Joaquin G. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) against
respondents Atty. Edgardo O. Era (Atty. Era) and Atty. Diane
Karen B. Bragas (Atty. Bragas) for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against
Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation
entitled Gil Abucejo, Edgar Besmano, Efren Sager, Darlito Sosa,
Gerardo G. Talosa, and Salvador Villanueva v. Solid Engine
Rebuilders Corporation and/or Joaquin G. Bonifacio, docketed
as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05- 05953-03. Complainants therein
(Abucejon Group) were represented by Era and Associates Law
Office through Atty. Era.2
On June 15, 2004, the Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the
corporation liable for illegal dismissal and, consequently, ordered
them to pay Abucejo Group their separation pay, full
backwages and pro-rated 13th month pay. More specifically,
Bonifacio and his corporation were ordered to pay a partially
computed amount of ₱674,128 for the separation pay and full
backwages, and ₱16,050.65 for the 13th month pay.3 Bonifacio
and the corporation brought their case up to the Supreme Court
but they suffered the same fate as their appeals and motions
were decided against them.4
Thus, on January 26, 2006, a Writ of Execution5 was issued to
implement the June 15, 2004 Decision. A Notice of Garnishment
dated February 6, 2006 was likewise issued.6 Two alias writs dated
May 8, 20087 and April 16, 20138were later on issued, directing
the sheriff to collect the sum of ₱4,012,166.43, representing the
judgment award plus interest and attorney's fees.
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty.
Era for representing conflicting interests entitled Ferdinand A.
Samson v. Atty. Edgardo 0. Era, docketed as A.C. No. 6664.9 In a
July 16, 2013 Decision, this Court found Atty. Era guilty of the
charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for two years, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO
O. ERA guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17
of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt
of this decision, with a warning that his commission of a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of
Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA and entered m [sic] his file in the Office
of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by
the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.10
On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public auction over
Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's properties in the business
establishment was conducted to implement the alias writ. Atty.
Era actively participated therein. He attended the public
auction and tendered a bid for his clients who were declared
the highest bidders. On the same day, a certificate of sale was
issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's officers
and employees who were there at that time. Armed with such
documents, Atty. Era led the pulling out of the subject properties
but eventually stopped to negotiate with Bonifacio's children for
the payment of the judgment award instead of pulling out the
auctioned properties. Atty. Era summoned Bonifacio's children to
continue with the negotiation in his law office. On behalf of his
clients, their counter-offer for the satisfaction of the judgment
award went from ₱6 Million to ₱9 Million.11
As the parties were not able to settle, on December 3, 2013,
Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's business
establishment together with their clients and several men, and
forced open the establishment to pull out the auctioned
properties. This was evidenced by the videos presented by
Bonifacio in the instant administrative complaint.12
This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious
mischief, robbery, and trespassing with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Pasay City. In its Resolution13 dated March 31, 2014,
the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict
Attys. Era and Bragas for grave coercion.14
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed
before the NLRC and this Court sometime in February and April,
2014 with regard to the subject labor case.15
On August 8, 2014, Bonifacio filed the instant administrative
complaint.16
In their Answer,17 Attys. Era and Bragas alleged that Bonifacio
has no personal knowledge as to what transpired on November
28, 2013 and December 3, 2013 as the latter was not present
therein at that time.18 Hence, his allegations of force, threat, and
intimidation in the execution of the judgment is without basis.19 In
his defense, Atty. Era further argued that he did not violate the
Court's order of suspension from the practice of law as he merely
acted as his clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special Power
of Attomey20 (SPA) dated May 3, 2006. It is Atty. Era's theory that
with such SP A, he was not engaged in the practice of law in
representing his clients in the implementation of the alias writ. He
added that he never signed any document or pleading on
behalf of his clients during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, being
an associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, she was merely
representing the Abucejo Group as said law firm's clients. Anent
the Php 6 Million to 9 Million counter-offer that they made, Attys.
Era and Bragas explained that the parties were still on
negotiation, hence, both parties are free to have their own
computations, which they could respectively accept or
otherwise.21
In his Report and Recommendation22 dated March 17, 2015,
Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera
recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative
complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The Investigating Commissioner found nothing wrong with the
indication of a suspended lawyer's name in a pleading
considering that the same was not signed by the latter. There
was also no proof that a pleading was prepared by Atty. Era. On
the other hand, there was no impediment against Atty. Bragas to
sign the pleadings. There was also no proof that in doing so, Atty.
Bragas was assisting suspended Atty. Era in filing a pleading.
Neither the presence of Atty. Era during the public auction and
the negotiations was an implication or proof that Atty. Era was
engaging in the practice of law during his suspension. According
to the Investigating Commissioner, anybody, not exclusively
lawyers, can be present at an auction sale or negotiation.
As to whether Attys. Era and Bragas violated any rules/laws in the
implementation of the judgment by using force, threat, and
intimidation, the Investigating Commissioner noted that
complainant contradicted such imputations by filing the
following pleadings, to wit: (1) a Motion to Close and Terminate
Case23 dated December 18, 2013, acknowledging the full
satisfaction of the judgment award and even prayed for Attys.
Era and Bragas' clients to take possession of the remaining
machines in his business establishment; (2) a
Manifestation24 dated March 12, 2014, wherein complainant
stated that he has surrendered the vehicles listed in the
certificate of sale; (3) an Omnibus Motion with Entry of
Appearance (Motion to Withdraw and Motion to Reiterate
Motion to Close and Terminate Case and release of TRO
Bond25 dated February 4, 2014; (4) A Motion for Consignation
with Motion to Lift Levy26 dated October 29, 2014; and (5) a
Motion to Withdraw Complaint27 dated December 10, 2013 on
the criminal case for Malicious Mischief, Robbery, and
Trespassing against Attys. Era and Bragas. In fine, the
Investigating Commissioner ratiocinated that in acknowledging
the satisfaction of the judgment in the labor case and
withdrawing the criminal case that he filed against Attys. Era and
Bragas with regard to the implementation of the said judgment,
complainant contradicted and demolished his own allegation
that the satisfaction of the judgment was improperly and
unlawfully implemented.28
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the
administrative charges against Attys. Era and Bragas be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.29
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), in its Resolution No. XXI- 2015-
27030 dated April 18, 2015 reversed and set aside the
Investigating Commissioner's findings and conclusions:
RESOLUTION No. XXI-2015-270 CBD Case No. 14-4300 Joaquin G.
Bonifacio vs. Atty. Edgardo O. Era and Atty. Diane Karen B.
Bragas
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and considering Atty. Era's continuedengagement in
the practice of law during the period of his suspension by
admittedly participating in the negotiation for the payment of
money judgment including pegging of interest he acted as his
clients advocate instead as an agent in view of the presence
also of his client in the negotiation, for holding office and
admittedly summoned the complainant's children to determine
the money judgment. Hence, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.
RESOLVED FURTHER, for her assistance in the unauthorized
practice of law of Atty. Edgardo O. Era, Atty. Diane Karen B.
Bragas is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
month.
In its Extended Resolution31 dated October 17, 2016, the IBP
Board of Governors found Atty. Era's argument that he merely
acted pursuant to an SP A given to him untenable. The Board
explained that the invoked SP A gave Atty. Era the authority to
appear and represent the Abucejo Group only on the May 4,
2006 auction and did not include the November 28, 2013
auction. Also, while he was authorized to receive payment on
behalf of his clients, the SP A specifically stated that said
payments should be made in the form of checks and not
machinery or property. Thus, Atty. Era had no authority under the
SP A to represent his clients during the November 28, 2013
auction and to pull out and receive the corporation's machines
as payment of the judgment award. At any rate, according to
the Board, Atty. Era's clients relied on his legal knowledge in
having the judgment award satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era violated
Section 28,32 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.33
Corollary to this, the Board also found Atty. Bragas liable for
allowing and assisting Atty. Era to engage in an unauthorized
practice of law. The Board concluded that Atty. Bragas ought to
know that Atty. Era's acts during the satisfaction of the alias writ
could be performed only by a member of the bar in good
standing.34
Pursuant to Section 12(b),35 Rule 139-B of the Rules, the records of
the instant case were transmitted to this Court.
No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by
either party as of June 29, 2017.
Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give its final action on
the instant administrative case, the issues being: (1) Did Atty. Era
engage in the practice of law during his suspension therefrom
that would warrant another disciplinary action against him?; and
(2) In the affirmative, is Atty. Bragas guilty of directly or indirectly
assisting Atty. Era in his illegal practice of law that would likewise
warrant this Court's exercise of its disciplining authority against
her?
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of
Governors.
Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".
On this matter, Our pronouncement in the landmark case
of Renato L. Cayetano v. Christian Monsod, et. al. 36 is on point.
Thus, We quote herein the relevant portions of the said
Decision, viz.:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing
in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office
where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by
his associate." (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St.
23, 193 N .E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
"xxx for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as
an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. CS. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d
895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.
Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. pp. 262, 263).
xxxx
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting
orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge
of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or
more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney
at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr v. Cardell,
155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.1âwphi1 "To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)37 (Emphasis
supplied)
penalty to be imposed upon Atty. Era, i.e., three years
suspension from the practice of law, taking into account that this
is his second infraction.
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his unauthorized
practice of law and, thus, must likewise be reproved.

In Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F.

Bustamante,38We succinctly ruled that the term practice of law
implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public
as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
consideration of services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may
be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying
oneself as an attorney, appearing in court in representation of a
client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the
general practice of law.39
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the
following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning clients in
the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered
bid in the auction for his clients; (3) secured the certificate of sale
and presented the said document to the corporation's officers
and employees present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted
that his clients are now the new owners of the subject properties,
hence, should be allowed entry in the premises; (5) initiated the
pull out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's
children in his law office as regards the payment of the judgment
award with interest instead of pulling out the properties.40
There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty.
Era's suspension from the practice of law and yet, she allowed
herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice. Clearly,
Atty. Bragas violated the CPR, specifically:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to
assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such duty is founded
upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice
be limited only to individuals found duly qualified in
education and character.49
As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know
that Atty. Era's acts constitutive of law practice could be
performed only by a member of the Bar in good standing, which
Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence, she should have not
participated to such transgression.

Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to

It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating
matters relating to the same may not be exclusively for lawyers,
as opined by the Investigating Commissioner. However, in this
case, as aptly put by the Board in its Resolution, Atty. Era's acts
clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the
legal effects and consequences of each course of action in the
satisfaction of the judgment award.41 Precisely, this is why his
clients chose Atty. Era to represent them in the public auction
and in any negotiation/settlement with the corporation arising
from the labor case as stated in the SPA being invoked by Atty.
Era.42 Such trained legal mind is what his clients were relying
upon in seeking redress for their claims. This is evident from the
fact that they agreed not to enter into any amicable settlement
without the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the latter being
their lawyer.43 It could readily be seen that the said SPA was
executed by reason of Atty. Era being their legal counsel. Thus,
We are one with the Board's submission that the said SPA cannot
be invoked to support Atty. Era's claim that he was not engaged
in the practice of law in performing the acts above-cited as such
SP A cunningly undermines the suspension ordered by this Court
against Atty. Era, which We cannot countenance.
Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during
his suspension
As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law
for a period of two years in this Court's Decision dated July 16,
2013. He performed the above-cited acts on the same year,
specifically November to December 2013. Indubitably, Atty. Era
was engaged in an unauthorized law practice.
circumvent the suspension order. The factual circumstances of
the case clearly shows that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace
Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or the law firm's clients during the
latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who
admittedly was the one actively performing all acts pertaining to
the labor case he was handling.
Considering the foregoing, We also adopt the Board's
recommendation as regards Atty. Bragas' guilt in the violation of
the CPR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is
found GUILTY of willfully disobeying this Court's lawful order and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) years, while Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is likewise
found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) month, effective immediately from receipt of this
Decision. Also, both Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense, or a commission of
another offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of
respondents as members of the Bar, and copies furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order

of this Court, which under Section 27,44 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Further,
Atty. Era's intentional maneuver to circumvent the suspension
order not only reflects his insubordination to authority but also his
disrespect to this Court's lawful order which warrants reproach.
Members of the bar, above anyone else, are called upon to
obey court orders and processes.45 Graver responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of
the courts and to show respect to their processes.46

This case is not novel. We had previously disciplined erring

lawyers who continue in their practice despite being suspended
by the Court. In Rodrigo A. Molina v. Atty. Ceferino R.
Magat,47this Court suspended Atty. Magat from the practice of
law for practicing his profession despite this Court's previous
order of suspension. Likewise in another case, We suspended a
lawyer for continuing in her practice despite the clear language
of this Court's suspension order.48

In view of the foregoing, We agree with the Board of Governors'

Resolution, finding Atty. Era guilty of willfully disobeying the lawful
order of this Court warranting the exercise of Our disciplining
authority. We also adopt the Board's recommendation as to the