VERCELES, JR. VS COA BRION, J.

:
We resolve the petition for certiorari[1] filed by Leandro B. Verceles, Jr., to assail the October
28, 2010 decision[2] and December 6, 2013 resolution[3] of the Commission on Audit (COA) in
Case No. 2008-016.

Antecedents

The Provincial Government of Catanduanes (the province), represented by then Governor

Leandro B. Verceles, Jr. (Verceles), engaged the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) to carry out the province's tree seedlings production project (the project).[4] The
province and PENRO entered into several Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) to implement the
project.[5]

On June 11, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP), through Resolution No. 067-2001, gave
blanket authority to the governor to enter into contracts on behalf of the province.[6] The SP
reaffirmed the authority given to the governor through Resolution Nos. 068-2001 and 069-
2001.[7] On the same date, the SP also resolved to give the governor the power to realign, revise,
or modify items in the provincial budget.[8]

The cost of the project was allegedly paid out of the Economic Development Fund (EDF)
allocation in the provincial budget for calendar years (CY) 2001 and 2002.[9] The EDF is the
20% portion of the province's internal revenue allotment (IRA) required by law to be spent on
development projects.[10]

The province and PENRO subsequently executed the following MOA:[11]

Amount Supposed
MOA Date Funding Source
(in pesos) Authority
SP Resolution No.
67-2001; affirmed EDF allocation in
First MOA 27 September 2001 1.5 Million in SP Resolution the CY 2001
Nos. 68-2001 and Budget
69-2001.
Savings from the
EDF (CY 2001)
transferred to
Second MOA 30 October 2001 1.5 Million the same
the Environment
Management
Program
EDF allocation in
Third MOA 6 May 2002 3 Million the same the CY 2002
Budget
Savings from the
EDF (CY 2002)
Fourth MOA 22 August 2002 3 Million the same
transferred
to Trees Seedling
 Production of
Environmental
Safeguard
Savings from the
EDF (CY 2002)
transferred
Fifth MOA 26 September 2002 1 Million the same to Trees Seedling
Production of
Environmental
Safeguard
[12]
On October 12, 2001, the SP issued Resolution No. 104-A-2001, which effectively revoked
the blanket authority given to the governor to enter into contracts on behalf of the Province.[13]

On February 4, 2003, the COA Audit Team Leader issued an Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM), finding that Verceles should have sought prior authority from the SP
pursuant to Sections 22 (c)[14] and 465 (b) (1) (vi)[15] of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code (LGC) before executing any MOA after the issuance of Resolution No. 104-
A-2001.[16]

Verceles filed his comments. The Audit Team Leader forwarded the AOM to the COA Regional
Office.[17] The Regional Office affirmed the AOM and issued Notices of Disallowance in the
total amount of P7,528,175.46.[18]

Verceles moved but failed to obtain reconsideration of the Notices of Disallowance. The Legal
and Adjudication Office also denied his appeal and motion for reconsideration. Verceles elevated
the case to the COA proper (national office) to challenge the disallowed payments.[19]

In his petition[20] before the COA, Verceles mainly argued that the payments for the project were
covered by appropriations under the EDF allocation of the provincial budget for CYs 2001 and
2002.[21] Verceles argued that the local chief executive need not secure express or specific
authorization from the SP as long as a budget for a contract is already appropriated. He claimed
that the first and third MOAs were funded by the EDF allocation in the CYs 2001 and 2002
budgets, and that, the second, fourth, and fifth MOAs were funded by valid augmentations from
other items also under the EDF allocation.

The COA Decision

The COA denied Verceles' petition for lack of merit.[22]

The COA held that the augmentations or realignments made by Verceles to fund
the second, fourth, and fifth MOAs[23] were contrary to Section 336[24] of the LGC.[25] The COA
ruled that the disbursements also violated Section 85 (1)[26], of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1445 or the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and Section 305 (1)[27] of the
LGC.[28] These provisions underscore the need for an appropriation before contracts involving
the expenditure of public funds may be entered into.
The COA further ruled that at the time Verceles made the augmentations to fund
the second, fourth, and fifth MOAs, he was not authorized by the SP, and that the CY 2003
appropriation ordinance could not ratify the MOAs entered into in CYs 2001 and 2002.[29]

The COA also explained that Resolution Nos. 067-2001, 068-2001, and 069-2001 authorized
Verceles' predecessor only (former Governor Hector Sanchez) and that the grant of authority did
not extend to Verceles.[30] The COA reasoned that a resolution does not have the attribute of
permanence.[31] Consequently, the public funds spent to pay for the project had no legal
basis.[32] Thus, the first and thirdMOAs were still unauthorized even assuming they were funded
by the EDF allocation in CYs 2001 and 2002.

The dispositive portion of the COA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, LAO-Local Resolution No. 2007-002 dated January 16, 2007 affirming the Notices
of Disallowance in the aggregate amount of P7,528,175.46 is hereby AFFIRMED.[33]
Verceles moved but failed to obtain reconsideration of the COA decision.[34] He came to this
Court for relief through the present petition for certiorari. On August 12, 2014, the Court granted
Verceles' prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation
of the assailed COA decision.[35]

The Petition

Verceles anchors his petition on the following grounds:

First, the COA disregarded Section 465 (b) (1) (vi) of the LGC, an exception to Section 22 (c) of
the same code.[36]

According to Verceles, while prior authorization to enter into a contract is the general rule, the
LGC identifies an exception, i.e., when the contract entered into is pursuant to a law or
ordinance. He points out that the funding for the first and third MOAs were approved and
included in the budget of the province for CYs 2001 and 2002.[37]

Verceles posits that even granting that Resolution No. 104-A-2001 had revoked the governor's
blanket authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the province, the MOAs merely
implemented the items already identified in the appropriation ordinances for CYs 2001 and 2002.
Thus, he could (as he did) enter into the MOAs to implement the approved items in the
budget.[38]

Second, he vetoed ResoluUtion No. 104-A-2001.[39]

Third, Resolution Nos. 67-2001, 68-2001, and 69-2001 had the force and effect of an ordinance
and, thus, were effective during his term.[40] He argues that these resolutions carried the
legislative intent to authorize the provincial governor to negotiate and contract loans on behalf of
the province.[41] These resolutions were not time-bound.[42]

Fourth, all the MOAs had proper funding authorizations.

Verceles claims that the first and third MOAs were covered by appropriations under the EDF of
the Province's CY 2001 and CY 2002 budgets.[43]

The second, fourth and fifth MOAs, on the other hand, were funded from augmentation of funds
from savings, which augmentations were ratified in the CY 2003 appropriation ordinance.
Augmentation is allowed under Section 336 of the LGC and Article 454 (b) of the LGC
implementing rules and regulations.[44] Verceles underscores that the appropriation ordinance for
CY 2003[45] ratified the second, fourth, and fifth MOAs.[46]

Finally, Verceles submits that the COA violated his constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases when it took it more than ten (10) years to resolve the case.[47]

The COA's Comment

The COA, through the Office of the Solicitor General, denies that it gravely abused its discretion
when it affirmed the Notices of Disallowance.

The COA maintains that it correctly disallowed the cost of the project based on the grounds
discussed in the assailed decision.[48] The COA emphasizes that when the local chief executive
enters into contracts, the law requires prior authority from the SP.[49] The COA insists that
Verceles executed the MOAs without the prior authorization from the SP. The appropriation
ordinances for CYs 2001 and 2002 did not specifically authorize Verceles to enter into MOAs
with the PENRO.[50]

Having affirmed the Notices of Disallowance on legal grounds, the COA insists that it did not
abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion. The abuse of discretion that warrants the issuance
of the writ of certiorari must be grave, which means that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner, or that the respondent tribunal refused to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.[51]

Finally, the COA submits that the right to the speedy disposition of cases is a flexible concept
such that a mere mathematical counting of the time involved is not sufficient; the right is deemed
violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays.[52]

The Issue

The issue is whether the COA gravely abused its discretion when it disallowed the payments for
the questioned MOAs and held Verceles[53] liable for the amount disallowed.
 Our Ruling

We partly grant the petition.

Notwithstanding the number of arguments raised by the parties, the Court focuses its attention on
two concepts decisive in the resolution of the present case: (1) the authority of the governor as
the local chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the province; and (2) the power of
the governor to augment items in the provincial budget.

The authority of the governor to enter into contracts on behalf of the province

Section 16 of the LGC, also known as the general welfare clause, empowers the local
government units (LGUs) to act for the benefit of their constituents. The LGUs exercise powers
that are: (1) expressly granted; (2) necessarily implied from the power that is expressly granted;
(3) necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and (4)
essential to the promotion of the general welfare of the inhabitants.[54]

As the chief executive of the province, the governor exercises powers and performs duties and
functions that the LGC and other pertinent laws provide.[55] These include the power to enter into
contracts on behalf of the province.

In support of their competing claims, it is notable that both Verceles and the COA invoke the
same provisions of the LGC: Section 22 (c)and Section 465 (b) (1) (vi).

Section 22 (c) of the LGC provides that "[u]nless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract
may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without
prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned."

Section 465 (b) (1) (vi) of the LGC, on the other hand, states that ". . . the Chief Executive . . .
[shall] [r]epresent the province in all its business transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds,
contracts, and obligations, and such other documents upon authority of the sangguniang
panlalawigan or pursuant to law or ordinance."

Verceles insists that the subject MOAs were duly authorized because they were covered by the
provincial annual budget for CYs 2001 and 2002. The COA refutes this claim on the grounds
that: (1) the ordinances did not specifically authorize Verceles to execute the MOAs with the
PENRO; and (2) the CY 2003 appropriation ordinance, which supposedly ratified the
augmentations made by Verceles in 2001 and 2002, could not have retroactive application.

We partly agree with Verceles.

The prior authorization for the local chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the local
government unit may be in the form of an appropriation ordinance passed for the year
which specifically covers the project, cost, or contract to be entered into by the local government
unit.[56]

The case of Quisumbing v. Garcia[57] on this point is instructive.

In 2004, then Governor Gwendolyn F. Garcia entered into infrastructure contracts on behalf of
the Province of Cebu. After audit, the COA reported that Garcia had entered into several
contracts on behalf of the Province of Cebu without authority from the SP as required under
Section 22 (c) of the LGC.[58]

Garcia, alleging that the infrastructure contracts were entered into pursuant to the general and
supplemental appropriation ordinances passed by the SP, argued that a separate authority to enter
into such contracts was no longer necessary.[59] She admitted that the appropriation ordinances
pertained to the CY 2003 budget which was merely reenacted in CY 2004.[60]

The Court found that Garcia failed to point out the specific provisions in the general and
supplemental appropriation ordinances in 2003 that supposedly authorized her to enter into the
questioned contracts in 2004.[61]

Highlighting the need to closely examine the ordinances that supposedly funded the contracts
entered into by Garcia, we explained in Quisumbing that

[r]esort to the appropriation ordinance is necessary in order to determine if there is a provision

therein which specifically coversthe expense to be incurred or the contract to be entered
into. Should the appropriation ordinance, for instance, already contain in sufficient detail
the project and cost of a capital outlay such that all that the local chief executive needs to
do after undergoing the requisite public bidding is to execute the contract, no further
authorization is required, the appropriation ordinance already being sufficient.

On the other hand, should the appropriation ordinance describe the projects in generic
terms such as "infrastructure projects," "inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage,
flood control, and irrigation systems projects," "reclamation projects" or "roads and
bridges," there is an obvious need for a covering contract for every specific project that in
turn requires approval by the sanggunian. Specific sanggunian approval may also be required
for the purchase of goods and services which are neither specified in the appropriation ordinance
nor encompassed within the regular personal services and maintenance operating
expenses.[62] [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Explained simply, the LGC requires the local chief executive to secure prior authorization from
the sanggunian before he can enter into contracts on behalf of the LGU.[63] A separate prior
authorization is no longer required if the specific projects are covered by appropriations[64] in the
annual budget[65] of the LGU. The appropriation ordinance passed by the sanggunian is the local
chief executive's authority to enter into a contract implementing the project.

As required in Quisumbing, the local chief executive must inquire if the provisions in the
appropriation ordinance specifically cover the expense to be incurred or the contract to be
entered into.
If the project or program is identified in the appropriation ordinance in sufficient detail, then
there is no more need to obtain a separate or additional authority from the sanggunian. In such
case, the project and the cost are already identified and approved by the sanggunianthrough the
appropriation ordinance. To require the local chief executive to secure another authorization for a
project that has been specifically identified and approved by the sanggunian is antithetical to a
responsive local government envisioned in the Constitution[66]and in the LGC.[67]

On the other hand, the need for a covering contract arises when the project is identified
in generic terms. The covering contract must also be approved by the sanggunian. We will
discuss this requirement below.

In summary and to harmonize the two provisions: Section 22 (c) of the LGC requires the local
chief executive to obtain prior authorization from the sanggunian before he can enter into
contracts in behalf of the LGU. Section 465 (b) (1) (vi), on the other hand, allows the local chief
executive to implement specific or specified projects with corresponding appropriations without
securing a separate authority from the sanggunian. In the latter provision, the appropriation
ordinance is the authority from the sanggunian required in the former provision.

We now apply these parameters to the present case.

Verceles claims that the first and third MOAs were funded by the EDF allocation of the province
in CYs 2001 and 2002. We agree but only with respect to the third MOA.

First MOA (2001 EDF)

The appropriation ordinance of the province for CY 2001 indeed contained a provision on the
EDF. Section 6 of Appropriations Ordinance No. 1-2001 provides:

SECTION 6. The Lump-Sum Appropriation for the 20% Economic Development Fund (EDF) is
Forty-Five Million Four Hundred Five Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-Three and 0.20/100 Pesos
(P45,405,633.20).

Special Provision:

1. USE AND RELEASE OF FUNDS - The amount herein appropriated shall strictly adhere to
the policies and guidelines provided under DILG Memorandum Circular No. 95-216, dated
December 14, 1995, in conjunction with Section 106 of RA 7160 and the CY 1999 Multi-
Sectoral Development Plan of the Province as may be approved by the Catanduanes
Development Council, PROVIDED, that appropriations under the 20% EDF shall be
approved by the Sanggunian Panlalawigan. [emphasis and underscoring ours]
Notably, Section 6 did not list the specific projects that would be funded by the EDF. In other
words, the SP has not yet determined how the lump-sum EDF (in the amount of P45,405,633.20)
would be spent at the time it approved the annual budget. The SP, however, required that
appropriations under the 20% EDF shall need its approval.

Otherwise stated, while there was an available fund for the economic development projects of
the province, the specific projects had not yet been identified. The corresponding costs for the
projects had also not been set aside. Contrary to Verceles' assertion, the CY 2001 appropriation
ordinance did not specifically authorize him to enter into the first MOA to implement the tree
seedlings production project.

Thus as held in Quisumbing, we need to determine whether there was a specific prior approval
from the SP before Verceles could enter into the first MOA.

There was none.

Verceles claims that SP Resolution No. 67-2001 (affirmed in SP Resolution Nos. 68-2001 and
69-2001) all dated June 11, 2001 authorized him to enter into the first MOA dated September 27,
2001. We do not find this position persuasive.

The relevant portions of these resolutions were similarly worded, thus:

BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby-resolved, to authorize, as it is hereby authorized, the

Provincial Governor to enter into, for and in behalf of Catanduanes, and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan approving herein, all memoranda of agreement, contracts or other undertakings
with national government agencies, other local government units and other public and private
entities, as may be allowable by law, granting them the authority to undertake for and on behalf
of the provincial government of Catanduanes activities, such as, but not limited to, bidding and
implementation of projects and programs, acquisition of supplies and other undertakings.[69]
Undeniably, these SP resolutions gave the provincial governor the blanket authority to enter into
contracts on behalf of the Province. The question is whether a blanket authority is a sufficient
authority for the governor to implement projects that have no definite appropriations.

We answer in the negative.

While a blanket authority is not per se ineffective, it does not suffice for purposes of
implementing projects funded by lump-sum appropriations. The nature of lump-sum
appropriations vis-a-vis the power of the purse of the SP (as the legislative organ of the LGU)
requires the local chief executive to obtain definite and specific authorizations before he can
enter into contracts funded by lump-sum appropriations. The exception is when the appropriation
ordinance already identifies the specific projects and the costs of the projects to be funded by
lump-sum appropriations.

We elaborate on these points below.

First, the nature of a lump-sum appropriation requires specific authorization from the SP before
projects funded by it can be implemented.

The LGC defines appropriation as the authorization made by ordinance, directing the payment
of goods and services from local government funds under specified conditions or for specific
purposes.[70] The power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law (in the case of
LGUs, by ordinance) of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified
purpose.[71] Lump-sum, on the other hand, means 'consisting of a single sum of
money.'[72] Lump-sum appropriation is thus a single sum of money set aside by the legislature for
a specified purpose.

Relevant in the present case is the EDF, a lump-sum fund intended for the economic
development projects of the Province. The description 'economic development,' by itself, is a
generic term as it does not readily specify the projects that may be covered by the lump-sum
appropriation. To stress, the CY 2001 appropriation ordinance did not at all identify the projects
to be funded by the EDF. On this basis, Verceles should have clearly obtained prior approval
from the SP before he entered into the first MOA.

Quisumbing instructs us that should the appropriation ordinance describe the projects in generic
terms, there is a need for a covering contract for every specific project that in turn requires
approval by the sanggunian. Thus, the blanket authority, even granting that Verceles vetoed its
revocation, was not a sufficient authority for him to enter into the first MOA as he was not
specifically authorized to do so.

Second, the power of the purse of the SP requires the governor to obtain prior authority before he
can implement projects funded by lump-sum appropriations.

The SP, as the legislative organ of the province, exercises the power of the purse in much the
same way as the Congress does at the national level.

The SP decides how the provincial budget will be spent; what projects, activities and programs to
fund; and the amounts of money to be spent for each project, activity or program. On the other
hand, the governor, as the local chief executive tasked to enforce ordinances, is expected to
faithfully execute the appropriation ordinance and to spend the budget in accordance with its
provisions.[73]

In the landmark case of Belgica v. Secretary Ochoa,[74] the Court had the opportunity to discuss
the characteristics of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as a lump-sum amount
of money given to individual legislators. We held that -

[w]hat beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular
lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such
appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the
multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a "specific appropriation of money"and hence, without a proper line-item which the
President may veto.[75] [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Using this as parameter, we note that the CY 2001 EDF is akin to the PDAF as they are both
singular lump-sum amounts to be tapped as a funding source for multiple purposes. They are
both described in generic terms ("economic development fund" and "priority development
assistance fund"), which requires the further determination of the actual amount to be spent and
the actual purpose of the appropriation.
We employ the above analogy to emphasize that the 2001 EDF was not a specific appropriation
of money as Verceles would want the Court to believe in his attempt to justify the first MOA. At
the time the SP enacted the 2001 appropriation ordinance, it had not yet set apart certain sums of
money from the EDF for specified purposes. In other words, the SP had not yet completely
exercised its power of the pursesuch that all the governor had to do was to implement the
projects identified in the appropriation ordinance. On the contrary, the 2001 EDF did not specify
the projects to be funded.

Further, Section 6 of the 2001 appropriation ordinance stated that "appropriations under the 20%
EDF shall be approved by the Sanggunian Panlalawigan." Obviously, the SP wanted to ensure
that the projects to be funded by the EDF still go through the deliberations of the SP members
precisely because these projects had not been previously identified and approved by the SP.

Since the 2001 EDF was a lump-sum amount not yet apportioned to specified development
projects, Verceles needed to secure prior authority from the SP. Having failed to secure prior
authority, the first MOA was unauthorized and properly disallowed.

Third MOA (2002 EDF)

Applying the standards discussed above, we find that the third MOA was duly funded and
authorized by the CY 2002 appropriation ordinance of the province.

Section 3 of Appropriation Ordinance No. 2002-001[76] provides

Section 3. The Lump-Sum Appropriation for the 20% Economic Development Fund (EDF) is
Forty Five Million One Hundred Twelve Thousand One Hundred Eighty Six Pesos & 80/100
(P45,112,186.80)

Special Provision:

1. Use and release of fund - The amount herein appropriated shall strictly adhere to the policies
and guidelines provided under DILG Memo Circular No. 95-216 dated December 14, 1995 in
conjunction with Section 106 of RA 7160 and the CY 2002 Multi-Sectoral Development Plan of
the Province as initiated by the Catanduanes Development Council (CDC) and approved by the
Sanggunian Panlalawigan and hereto incorporated in this Ordinance, to wit:

xxxx

ENVIRONMENTAL SECTOR

1. Tree Seedlings Production for Environmental Safeguard - Amount: P3,000,000.00

xxxx [emphasis ours]

In stark contrast to the previous year's EDF, the CY 2002 appropriation ordinance clearly,
specifically and expressly set aside P3,000,000.00 to fund the tree seedlings production project
of the Province. This served as sufficient authority for Verceles to execute the third MOA.
Thus, the COA gravely abused its discretion when it disallowed the third MOA and insisted that
Verceles should have secured a separate and additional authority from the SP. The COA
ignored Section 3 of the CY 2002 appropriation ordinance, which specifically identified the tree
seedlings production project with a P3,000,000.00 allocation.

The power of the governor to augment items or realign funds in the approved annual budget
of the province

Verceles maintains that the second, fourth, and fifth MOAs were funded by augmentations from
the other items under the EDF for CY 2001 and 2002. He points to Section 8 of the appropriation
ordinance for CY 2003, which ratified all augmentations made in the previous budgets. The
COA rejects Verceles' claim on the ground that an appropriation ordinance for a given year
cannot retroactively approve realignments made in previous years.

We sustain, with qualifications, the argument of the COA.

The relevant provision is Section 336 of the LGC:

Section 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. - Funds shall be

available exclusively for the specific purpose for which they have been appropriated. No
ordinance shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations from one item to
another. However, the local chief executive or the presiding officer of
the sanggunian concerned may, by ordinance, be authorized to augment any item in
the approved annual budget for their respective offices from savings in other items within
the same expense class of their respective appropriations. [emphasis and underscoring ours]
Under Section 336, the general rule is that funds shall be available exclusively for the specific
purpose for which they have been appropriated. The exception is when the local chief executive
is authorized by ordinance to augment any item in the approved annual budget from savings in
other items within the same expense class.

Article 454[77] of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC[78] states that augmentation
implies the existence in the budget of an item, project, activity, or purpose with an appropriation
which upon implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources is determined to be
deficient.

The question is whether the grant of authority to the local chief executive to augment items in the
annual budget can be belatedly granted. To answer this, we review the case of Araullo v. Sec.
Aquino III.[79]

Construing Section 25(5),[80] Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the Court laid down the
requisites for a valid transfer of appropriated funds at the national level, namely:

(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective
offices; and

(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.[81]

The crucial requisite as far as the fourth and fifth MOAs are concerned is the first requisite, i.e.,
the existence of a law (in this case, ordinance) authorizing the governor to augment items in
approved budget. As to the second MOA, the crucial requisite is the third requisite, i.e., the
existence of an actual item to be augmented.

Second MOA (2001 EDF)

There was no valid augmentation made in CY 2001 that could have covered the cost of
the second MOA.

As discussed above, the CY 2001 appropriation ordinance did not identify the specific projects
or items[82] to be funded by the EDF. How could Verceles transfer savings from nonexistent
items (in the EDF) to augment the tree seedlings propagation project? The project that was
supposed to be augmented was also not identified in the CY 2001 appropriation ordinance.

The augmentation was legally impossible as there were no items from which savings could have
been generated from and there was no item to which such savings could have been
transferred.[83] The second MOA was thus correctly disallowed.

Fourth and Fifth MOAs (2002 EDF)

Still in Araullo, we ruled that Section 25(5) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, not being a self-
executing provision of the Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be operative.
That law, generally, is the general appropriation act (GAA) of a given fiscal year. To comply
with the first requisite, the GAA should expressly authorize the transfer of funds.[84]

Araullo suggests that for augmentations to be valid, the GAA of a given fiscal year must
expressly authorize the transfer of funds in the same year. At the very least, a law must first be
passed authorizing the transfer of savings in the year that realignments are to be made.

On the local level, Section 336 of the LGC requires an implementing ordinance so that the local
chief executive can augment items in the annual budget of the LGU. Applying Araullo, the
appropriation ordinance of a given fiscal year must expressly authorize the local chief executive
before he can make augmentations in that particular year, or at the very least, he must be
authorized by ordinance before he can make augmentations.

Verceles posits that the authority to augment items in the approved annual budget may be given
retroactively, that is, after the augmentations have been made. He cites Section 8 of the CY 2003
appropriation ordinance of the province, which states,

Section 8. Authority to Augment Items and Figures in the Budget and Ratification of Previous
Acts of the Provincial Governor. — The Provincial Governor is hereby authorized to
effect and is hereby considered to have been authorized, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
hereby approves and ratifies all augmentations of items and figures in the CY 2003 Budget
that includes the 20% Economic Development Fund (EDF) for CY 2003, and previous
budgets and 20% [EDFs], and all modifications, revisions, thereof that may be considered as
augmentations, all which may be or have been warranted due to, but not limited to, actual or
possible shortfall in the revenue collections of the province and the IRA due it xxx.[85] [emphasis
and underscoring supplied]
Verceles also cites Ocampo v. People,[86] where the Court held that a loan agreement entered into
by the provincial governor without prior authorization from the SP is unenforceable. The Court
ruled in that case that the SP's failure to impugn the contract's validity despite knowledge of its
infirmity is an implied ratification that validates the contract.

In essence, Verceles argues that if jurisprudence has allowed the implied ratification of a contract
entered into without prior authority, then there is no reason why express ratification through
& post facto authorization would not be valid.

Before we rule on this issue, we note that the COA disallowed the fourth and fifth MOAs on the
sole ground that the CY 2003 appropriation ordinance could not ratify the augmentations made
in CY 2002. The COA did not comment on whether there were actual savings generated from the
other items under the 2002 EDF that could be realigned to the tree seedlings production project.
We thus limit our discussion on whether the ratification by the SP of the augmentations made by
Verceles was effective.

We affirm the COA's disallowance of the fourth and fifth MOAs on the following grounds:

First, the power of the local chief executive to augment items under Section 336 of the LGC is a
mere exception to the general rale that funds shall be available exclusively for the specific
purpose for which they have been appropriated.

Exceptions are strictly construed and apply only so far as their language fairly warrants, with all
doubts being resolved in favor of the general proviso rather than the exception.[87] As an
exception to the general rule, all the requirements for a valid augmentation must be strictly
complied with. One such requirement is that the local chief executive must be authorized by an
ordinance.

Consistent with the strict construction approach, we rale that the requisite "authorized by
ordinance" does not necessarily and automatically include "ratified by ordinance."

The exception clause of Section 336 states: "the local chief executive . . . may, by ordinance, be
authorized to augment any item in the approved annual budget . . . ."[88] The key phrase is "by
ordinance, be authorized to augment." We must therefore interpret this phrase in a manner that
does not easily erode the basic principle that funds shall be available exclusively for the specific
purpose for which they have been appropriated.

To "authorize" means "to empower; to give a right or authority to act." It means "to endow with
authority or effective legal power, warrant or right; to permit a thing to be done in the future."[89]

Thus, strictly speaking, the governor must be duly authorized before he can make augmentations.
We highlight the words "to augment" suggesting that what is being authorized is an act that has
yet to happen.

Nevertheless, our ruling in the present case should not be taken to mean that the LGC prohibits
the ratification of previously unauthorized augmentations. We only want to underscore the
necessity of an existing authority before the local chief executive can make augmentations. The
Court recognizes that there may be narrow instances where past augmentations can be shown to
have fully complied with all the requisites (except for the authority by ordinance requisite) for a
valid augmentation, in which cases, ratification is allowed. Such is not the case here as will be
explained next.

Second, the all-encompassing nature of the blanket ratification by the SP of all the augmentations
made in the past budgets rendered such ratification ineffective.

We note the very broad wording of Section 8 of CY 2003 appropriation ordinance. Without
qualification, it approved all past augmentations regardless of whether such augmentations could
have been legally permissible. By the expedient passing of the CY 2003 appropriation ordinance,
the SP presumed that all requisites for augmentation were complied with, effectively bypassing
the said requisites. This cannot be allowed as there are strict requirements before augmentations
can be made; the existence of actual savings[90]is just one example.

To cite a case in point, the 2001 augmentation of the EDF that purportedly funded
the second MOA could not have been validly ratified by the SP because there were no identified
items under the 2001 EDF from which savings could have been generated; there were also no
items to which such savings could have been realigned.

Third, Section 26 of the CY 2002 appropriation ordinance of the province provides that "[a]ll
realignments of fund shall be approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan."[91]

In contrast to the CYs 2001[92] and 2003[93] appropriation ordinances, which expressly authorized
the governor to realign, revise, modify, or change items in the annual budget, Section 26 of the
CY 2002 appropriation ordinance is couched in a markedly different language. The SP
effectively withheld from Verceles the authority to make augmentations by requiring its approval
for all realignments of funds.

Finally, the Ocampo case does not squarely apply here.

What was impliedly ratified in Ocampo was the MOA entered into by the governor without prior
authority. The issue here is more nuanced. The present case involves unauthorized
augmentations, which became the bases for unauthorized MOAs. Verceles not only entered into
unauthorized MOAs, he was able to enter into these MOAs because he made augmentations that
had no prior authorizations.

Further, Ocampo was decided under the old LGC where the counterpart provision on
appropriation of funds did not contain the authority of the local chief executive to make
augmentations.[94]

The personal liability of Verceles, et al., for the disallowed amount

Section 103 of the Government Auditing Code declares that expenditures of government funds
or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of
the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.

The public official's personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds was
made in violation of law. In this case, Verceles' acts of: (1) making augmentations without prior
authority and (2) entering into a contract on behalf of the province without requisite authority
were in violation of the LGC.[95]

In one case, we held that while the public official may have relied on the opinion of the City
Legal Officer, such reliance only serves to buttress his good faith. It does not, however,
exculpate him from his personal liability under the Government Auditing Code, as the ordinance
in question was clear and precise and left no room for interpretation.[96]

The same is true in the present case where Verceles' reliance on, among others, the opinion of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, does not exculpate him from his personal
liability. Section 336 of the LGC and Section 26 of the Province's appropriation ordinance in CY
2002, in clear and precise language, required the authority from the SP before the governor can
make augmentations or realignments of funds.

In summary, and except for the incorrectly disallowed third MOA, we find that the COA's
assailed decision was made in faithful compliance with its mandate and in judicious exercise of
its general audit power as conferred on it by the Constitution.[97] The COA was merely fulfilling
its mandate in observing the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected
and conserved; and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of
such funds and property should be prevented. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed
to the COA.[98]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we PARTLY GRANT the petition and

accordingly MODIFY the October 28, 2010 decision and December 6, 2013 resolution of the
Commission on Audit (COA) in Case No. 2008-016, such that the Notices of Disallowance
which covered the third Memorandum of Agreement, dated May 6, 2002, between the Province
of Catanduanes and the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office,
are ANNULLED.

The temporary restraining order issued is hereby lifted.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154200 July 24, 2007

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION and its BOARD OF

ADMINISTRATORS, Petitioners,
vs.
DANILO MORALES, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J>:

The sole issue for resolution in the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 before us is whether the
Court of Appeals (CA) committed an error of law in its July 4, 2002 Decision2 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 62919 in ordering the implementation of a writ of execution against the funds of the
National Electrification Administration (NEA).

There being no dispute as to the facts,3 the following findings of the CA are adopted:4

Danilo Morales and 105 other employees5 (Morales, et al.) of the NEA filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 88, Quezon City, a class suit6 against their employer for payment of
rice allowance, meal allowance, medical/dental/optical allowance, children’s allowance and
longevity pay purportedly authorized under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.7 In its December 16,
1999 Decision,8 the RTC ordered NEA, thus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED directing the respondent
NEA, its Board of Administrators to forthwith settle the claims of the petitioners and other
employees similarly situated and extend to them the benefits and allowances to which they are
entitled but which until now they have been deprived of as enumerated under Section 5 of DBM
CCC No. 10 and their inclusion in the Provident Funds Membership, retroactive from the date of
their appointments up to the present or until their separation from the service.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.9

Upon motion of Morales, et al., the RTC issued a Writ of Execution dated February 22,
2000,10 which reads:

NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby directed to cause respondents National Electrification
Administration (NEA) and its Board of Administrators with principal office address at 1050
CDC Bldg., Quezon Avenue, Quezon City to forthwith settle the claims of the petitioners and
other employees similarly situated and extend to them the benefits and allowances to which they
are entitled but which until now they have been deprived of as enumerated under Sec. 5 of DBM
CCC No. 10 and you are further directed to cause their inclusion in the Provident Fund
Membership, retroactive from the date of their appointments up to the present or until their
separation from the service.11

Thereafter, a Notice of Garnishment12 was issued against the funds of NEA with Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to the extent of ₱16,581,429.00.

NEA filed a Motion to Quash Writs of Execution/Garnishment,13 claiming that the garnished
public funds are exempt from execution under Section 414 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1445,15 but manifesting that it is willing to pay the claims of Morales, et al.,16 only that it has no
funds to cover the same, although it already requested the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) for a supplemental budget.17

In its Order of May 17, 2000, the RTC denied the Motion to Quash but, at the same time, held in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Execution, thus:

WHEREFORE, the motion to quash writs of execution/ garnishment is DENIED but the
implementation of the judgment is placed on hold for ninety (90) days reckoned from this
day. The respondents are directed to formally inform this Court and the petitioners of the
prospect of obtaining funds from Department of Budget and Management within 30 days from
receipt and every 30 days thereafter, until the 90 day period has lapsed.

The motion to direct DBP to release to the petitioners the NEA funds garnished earlier
amounting to ₱16,591.429 is also DENIED.

SO ORDERED.18 (Emphasis ours)

Morales, et al. filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration19 but the RTC denied it.20

Meanwhile, in a letter dated June 28, 2000, former DBM Secretary Benjamin E. Diokno
informed NEA Administrator Conrado M. Estrella III of the denial of the NEA request for a
supplemental budget on the ground that the claims under R.A. No. 6758 which the RTC had
ordered to be settled cannot be paid because Morales, et al. are not "incumbents of positions as
of July 1, 1989 who are actually receiving and enjoying such benefits."21

Moreover, in an Indorsement dated March 23, 2000, the Commission on Audit (COA) advised
NEA against making further payments in settlement of the claims of Morales, et al.. Apparently,
COA had already passed upon claims similar to those of Morales, et al. in its earlier "Decision
No. 95-074" dated January 25, 1995. Portions of the Indorsement read as follows:

This Office concurs with the above view. The court may have exceeded its jurisdiction when it
entertained the petition for the entitlement of the after-hired employees which had already
been passed upon by this Commission in COA Decision No. 95-074 dated January 25,
1995. There, it was held that: "the adverse action of this Commission sustaining the disallowance
made by the Auditor, NEA, on the payment of fringe benefits granted to NEA employees hired
from July 1, 1989 to October 31, 1989 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, subject
disallowance is lifted."

Thus, employees hired after the extended date of October 31, 1989, pursuant to the above COA
decision cannot defy that decision by filing a petition for mandamus in the lower court.
Presidential Decree No. 1445 and the 1987 Constitution prescribe that the only mode for
appeal from decisions of this Commission is on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the manner
provided by law and the Rules of Court. Clearly, the lower court had no jurisdiction when it
entertained the subject case of mandamus. And void decisions of the lower court can never
attain finality, much less be executed. Moreover, COA was not made a party thereto, hence, it
cannot be compelled to allow the payment of claims on the basis of the questioned decision.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the auditor of NEA should post-audit the disbursement vouchers on
the bases of this Commission's decision particularly the above-cited COA Decision No. 94-074
[sic] and existing rules and regulations, as if there is no decision of the court in the subject
special civil action for mandamus. At the same time, management should be informed of the
intention of this Office to question the validity of the court decision before the Supreme Court
through the Office of the Solicitor General.22 (Emphasis ours)

Parenthetically, the records at hand do not indicate when Morales, et al. were appointed. Even
the December 16, 1999 RTC Decision is vague for it merely states that they were appointed after
June 30, 1989, which could mean that they were appointed either before the cut-off date of
October 31, 1989 or after.23 Thus, there is not enough basis for this Court to determine that the
foregoing COA Decision No. 95-074 adversely affects Morales, et al..Moreover, the records do
not show whether COA actually questioned the December 16, 1999 RTC Decision before this
Court.

On July 18, 2000, Morales, et al. filed a Motion for an Order to Implement Writ of Execution,
pointing out that the reason cited in the May 17, 2000 RTC Order for suspension of the
implementation of the writ of execution no longer exists given that DBM already denied NEA’s
request for funding.24 They also filed a Petition to Cite NEA Board of Administrators Mario
Tiaoqui, Victoria Batungbacal, Federico Puno and Remedios Macalingcag in Contempt of
Court25 for allegedly withholding appropriations to cover their claims.

Acting first on the petition for contempt, the RTC issued a Resolution dated December 11, 2000,
to wit:

The court is aware of its order dated May 17, 2000, particularly the directive upon respondents to
inform this court and the petitioners of the prospect of obtaining funds from the Department of
Budget and Management within the period specified. From the comments of the respondents, it
appears they did or are doing their best to secure the needed funds to satisfy the judgment
sought to be enforced. In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 of the Supreme
Court provides:

"In order to prevent possible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the Commission on
Audit, judges are hereby enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the
issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies and local
government units.

Judges should bear in mind that in Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego (31 SCRA
617, 625 [1970], this Court explicitly stated:

"The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's action only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution and the power of the court ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgment, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required
by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects
as appropriated by law."

Moreover, it is settled jurisprudence that upon determination of State liability, the prosecution,
enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and
procedures laid down in P.D. No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines (Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, 701-02 [1993]
citing Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84 [1973]). All money claims against the Government must
"first be filed with the Commission on Audit which must act upon it within sixty days. Rejection
of the claim will authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari
and in effect sue the State thereby (P.D. 1445, Sections 49-50)."

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, petition to cite respondents in contempt of court is

premature, hence the same is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.26 (Emphasis ours)

Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order dated January 8, 2001, denying the Motion for an Order
to Implement Writ of Execution, citing the same SC Administrative Circular No. 10-2000.

Upon a Petition for Certiorari27 filed by Morales, et al., the CA rendered the July 4, 2002
Decision assailed herein, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order dated January 8, 2001 and the
Resolution of December 11, 2000 of the public respondent Judge are declared NULL and VOID.

Accordingly, the respondent judge is directed to implement the Writ of Execution relative
thereto.

SO ORDERED..28

The CA held that NEA can no longer take shelter under the provisions of P.D. No. 1445 and SC
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 because it is a government-owned or controlled corporation
(GOCC) created under P.D. No. 269, effective August 6, 1973.29 Citing Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations,30 the CA held that, as such GOCC, petitioner NEA may be
subjected to court processes just like any other corporation; specifically, its properties may be
proceeded against by way of garnishment or levy.31

NEA and its Board of Directors (petitioners) immediately filed herein petition for review. It is
their contention that the CA erred in directing implementation of the writ of execution on two
grounds: first, execution is premature as Morales, et al. (respondents) have yet to file their
judgment claim with the COA in accordance with P.D. No. 1445 and SC Administrative Circular
No. 10-2000;32 and second, execution is not feasible without DBM as an indispensable party to
the petition for certiorari for it is said department which can certify that funds are available to
cover the judgment claim.33

The petition is meritorious.

Indeed, respondents cannot proceed against the funds of petitioners because the December 16,
1999 RTC Decision sought to be satisfied is not a judgment for a specific sum of money
susceptible of execution by garnishment; it is a special judgment requiring petitioners to settle
the claims of respondents in accordance with existing regulations of the COA.

In its plain text, the December 16, 1999 RTC Decision merely directs petitioners to "settle the
claims of [respondents] and other employees similarly situated."34 It does not require petitioners
to pay a certain sum of money to respondents. The judgment is only for the performance of an
act other than the payment of money, implementation of which is governed by Section 11, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 11. Execution of special judgments. - When a judgment requires the performance of any
act other than those mentioned in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of the judgment
shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against
whom the same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the
same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.

Garnishment cannot be employed to implement such form of judgment. Under Section 9 of Rule
39, to wit:

Section 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. -

xxxx

(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. - The officer may levy on debts due the judgment obligor
and other credits, including bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and other
personal property not capable of manual delivery in the possession or control of third parties.
Levy shall be made by serving notice upon the person owing such debts or having in his
possession or control such credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment
shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees.
Garnishment is proper only when the judgment to be enforced is one for payment of a sum of
money.

The RTC exceeded the scope of its judgment when, in its February 22, 2000 Writ of Execution,
it directed petitioners to "extend to [respondents] the benefits and allowances to which they are
entitled but which until now they have been deprived of as enumerated under Sec. 5 of DBM
CCC No. 10 and x x x to cause their inclusion in the Provident Fund Membership."35 Worse, it
countenanced the issuance of a notice of garnishment against the funds of petitioners with DBP
to the extent of ₱16,581,429.00 even when no such amount was awarded in its December 16,
1999 Decision.

However, in its subsequent Orders dated May 17, 2000 and January 8, 2001, the RTC attempted
to set matters right by directing the parties to now await the outcome of the legal processes for
the settlement of respondents’ claims.

That is only right.

Without question, petitioner NEA is a GOCC36 -- a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the government, with capacity to sue and be sued.37 As such GOCC, petitioner NEA cannot
evade execution; its funds may be garnished or levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment
rendered against it.38 However, before execution may proceed against it, a claim for payment of
the judgment award must first be filed with the COA.39

Under Commonwealth Act No. 327,40 as amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA
which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims of any sort" due
from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.41 With respect to
money claims arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758, their allowance or
disallowance is for COA to decide, subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition
for certiorari to this Court.42

All told, the RTC acted prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow the
parties recourse to the processes of the COA. It may be that the tenor of the March 23, 2000
Indorsement issued by COA already spells doom for respondents’ claims; but it is not for this
Court to preempt the action of the COA on the post-audit to be conducted by it per its
Indorsement dated March 23, 2000.1avvphi1

In fine, it was grave error for the CA to reverse the RTC and direct immediate implementation of
the writ of execution through garnishment of the funds of petitioners,

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 4, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The Resolution dated December 11, 2000 and Order dated
January 8, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Quezon City in Special Civil Action No.
Q-99-38275 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 98355 March 2, 1994

HON. TOMAS R, OSMEÑA, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND HONORABLE EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO, respondents.

Office of the City Attorney for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

NOCON, J.:

Sometime in 1985 the City of Cebu decided to construct a modern abattoir. For this project, the
City Treasurer, Ricardo Pestano, issued a certificate of availability of funds dated April 30, 1985,
in the amount of FIVE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED NINETEEN THOUSAND AND ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY (P5,419,180.00) PESOS, specifically "for the construction of Cebu City
Abbatoir (sic)." 1 After a public bidding, H. Franco Construction Company, Inc. (HFCCI) was
awarded to do the construction of the abattoir. Thus, the City of Cebu, through its Mayor, Ronald
R. Duterte, entered into a contract with HFCCI, the terms of which are as follows:

WHEREAS, the contract cost for this project is EIGHT MILLION THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
TWENTY(P8,368,920.00) PESOS;

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, the City treasurer of Cebu City certified the availability of funds for
the first installment due to the CONTRACTOR in the amount of TWO MILLION
NINETY TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED THIRTY (P2,092,230.00)
PESOS, which is to be due and payable upon certification of the City Engineer,
concurred in by the Project Management Staff that the project substantially
completed;

WHEREAS, the CITY OF CEBU shall include the Budget for calendar year
1986, the amount of SIX MILLION TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY (P6,276,690.00) PESOS which
represents the second, third and final installment payments due to the
CONTRACTOR. 2

On March 13, 1986, Sen. John H. Osmeña, then Officer-In-Charge of the City of Cebu, ordered
the suspension of the project and review of the contract by the COA. He also wrote HFCCI
asking them to account for the value of their progress. On April 24, 1986, HFCCI claimed the
amount of TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED FORTY TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY FOUR AND 29/100 (P2,142,964.29) PESOS as the value of the work accomplished.

Unable to collect the said amount after so many demands, HFCCI instituted a civil action, 3 dated
May 21, 1987 against the City of Cebu, for recovery of investment and damages.

In its answer dated June 5, 1987, the City of Cebu, while admitting having entered into a contract
with HFCCI, alleged that the contract it entered into was null and void as declared by the
Commission on Audit in its 2nd Indorsement dated September 4, 1986. Therefore whatever
amount is due to HFCCI is to the sole liability of the officer or officers who entered into the said
contract.4

Nevertheless, on December 15, 1988, the City of Cebu, through its Mayor, Tomas R. Osmeña,
entered into a compromise agreement, approved by the court, to the effect that as a full and final
settlement to the claim of HFCCI, the City of Cebu shall pay the amount of ONE MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P1,500,000.00) PESOS.

On the strength of the Court's Order dated March 3, 1989 the Provincial Deputy Sheriff, RTC,
Branch 5, Cebu City was ordered on March 8, 1989, to serve a writ of execution against the City
of Cebu through its Mayor, Tomas R. Osmeña. Thus, the amount of P1,500,000.00 and
P15,052.00, as lawful fees, were garnished from the City's funds deposited in the Philippine
National
Bank. 5

The trial court's judgment based on the compromise agreement was referred to the COA's
Regional Director, who in turn indorsed the same to the Chairman of the COA. In its 3rd
Indorsement dated May 2, 1989, the COA ruled that:

It may not be disputed that the contract for the construction of the Cebu City
Abattoir was declared void in a 2nd Indorsement dated September 4, 1986, of this
Commission. And since no appeal appears to have been taken thereon, said
decision became final.

Consequently, "if a compromise is based upon an antecedent claim which is

undisputedly and undoubtedly illegal, the compromise may be considered invalid
on the ground of illegality as well as lack of consideration." (Sec. 29, 15 Am. Jur
2d) Besides the compromise agreement entered into by the City of Cebu with H.
Franco Construction Co., Inc., after the contract by and between them had been
declared void by this Commission, is a circumvention of the constitutional
provision that the party aggrieved by any decision, order or ruling of the
Commission may within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof appeal
on certiorari to the Supreme Court (Sec. 2-2, Art. XII-D,1973 Constitution; Sec.
7, Art, IX-A, 1987 Constitution).
 Under the circumstances, this Commission concurs in the view expressed by that
Office that the expenditure involved would be the personal liability of the officer
directly responsible for its incurrence (Sec. 103, P.D. No. 1445).6

Petitioner's request for reconsideration of the above ruling was denied in COA's 5th Indorsement
dated January 23, 1991,7 hence this petition, with the following arguments:

1) the decision of the Public Respondent as contained in the 2nd Indorsement

dated September 4, 1986 is null and void for having been made without, in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion;

2) that Public Respondent's decision has never become final because it was made
without, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.8

Petitioner argues that the decision of COA invalidating the contract between the City of Cebu
and HFCCI was void since it was already executed and fulfilled. Petitioner further stresses that
COA has no authority to declare a contract already executed void. And since the 2nd
Indorsement is a nullity, it never attained finality.

The petition is devoid of merit.

The Commission on Audit has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all
accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of and expenditures or uses of funds and property,
owned of held in trust by, or pertaining to, the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies
or instrumentalities.9

The Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1445) further provides that no contract involving the
expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor 10 and
the proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering
into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and the amount
necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current year is available for expenditure on
account thereof. 11 (Emphasis supplied) Any contract entered into contrary to the foregoing
requirements shall be VOID. 12

Clearly then, the contract entered into by the former Mayor Duterte was void from the very
beginning since the agreed cost for the project (P8,368,920.00) was way beyond the appropriated
amount (P5,419,180.00) as certified by the City Treasurer. Hence, the contract was properly
declared void and unenforceable in COA's 2nd Indorsement, dated September 4, 1986. The COA
declared and we agree, that:

The prohibition contained in Sec. 85 of PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code) is

explicit and mandatory. Fund availability is, as it has always been, an
indispensable prerequisite to the execution of any government contract involving
the expenditure of public funds by all government agencies at all levels. Such
contracts are not to be considered as final or binding unless such certification as to
funds availability is issued (Letter of Instruction No. 767, s. 1978). Antecedent of
 advance appropriation is thus essential to government liability on contracts (Zobel
v. City of Manila, 47 Phil. 169). This contract being violative of the legal
requirements aforequoted, the same contravenes Sec. 85 of PD 1445 and is null
and void by virtue of Sec. 87. 13

As a matter of fact, the City of Cebu relied on the above pronouncement and interposed the same
as its affirmative defense, 14 so much so that petitioner cannot now assert that it was void having
been issued in excess of COA's jurisdiction. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court or
an administrative body to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. It is not right for a party
who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny the same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.15

Besides, neither the petitioner nor HFCCI questioned the ruling of COA declaring the invalidity
of the abattoir contract, thereby resulting in its finality even before the civil case was instituted.
Petitioner could have brought the case to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari within
thirty days from receipt of a copy of the COA decision in the manner provided by law and the
Rules of Court. 16 A decision of the Commission or of any of its Auditor not appealed within the
period provided by law, shall be final and executory.17

Petitioner cannot hide behind the argument that the payment was made in compliance with the
trial court's judgment. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General:

Since petitioner and HFCCI knew of the absolute invalidity of said Abattoir
Contract, the Compromise Agreement relative to the petitioner's obligation
resulting from said Abattoir contract is also void and in existent and the decision
based on said Compromise Agreement is unenforceable against the City of Cebu.
(Art. 1422, Civil Code of the Philippines). 18

The trial court's decision based on the compromise agreement could not have ratified a contract
which is void ab initio. Consequently the settlement of the supposed obligation of the City of
Cebu arising out of a void contract becomes a personal liability of petitioner who is directly
responsible therefor.19

Neither can petitioner rely on the principle of Quantum Meruit. Quantum Meruit is based on
justice and equity, to compensate a property or benefit received if restitution is equitable and if
such action involves no violation, frustration or opposition to public policy. In the present case,
however, the payment due to HFCCI was due to the compromise agreement which in turn was
made in pursuance to a supposed abattoir contract, which is a void contract. Furthermore, there
was no evidence presented as to the extent of work accomplished by HFCCI as to substantiate
the amount stipulated in the compromise agreement. Finally, as observed by the Solicitor
General:

In any event, it is respectfully submitted that since petitioner's act in entering into
said Compromise Agreement . . . came after public respondent had voided
petitioner's abattoir contract (he) may not be allowed to evade the legal sanctions
 resulting from his failure to comply with the law's safeguards against undue
expenditures of public funds.20

Premises considered, the Compromise Agreement entered into between the City of Cebu,
through its Mayor, Tomas Osmeña is void being merely a derivative of a previously void
Abattoir Contract, and thus becomes a personal liability of the officer who entered into it
pursuant to Sec. 87 & 103 of P.D. 1445.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC CHAIRMAN ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,

COMELEC COMMISSIONERS RESURRECCION Z. BORRA and FLORENTINO A.
TUASON, JR., petitioners, vs. JUDGE MA. LUISA QUIJANO-PADILLA, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 215 and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORP.,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; In the discharge of its task, the primordial concern of the OSG is to see
to it that the best interest of the government is upheld; This is regardless of the fact that what it
perceived as the “best interest of the government” runs counter to its client agency’s position.—
PHOTOKINA alleges that the OSG has no standing to file the present petition since its legal
position is contrary to that espoused by the majority of the COMELEC Commissioners. This is a
leap to a non-sequitur conclusion. The OSG is an independent office. Its hands are not shackled
to the cause of its client agency. In the discharge of its task, the primordial concern of the OSG is
to see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld. This is regardless of the fact that
what it perceived as the “best interest of the government” runs counter to its client agency’s
position. Endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interest of virtually the entire
government officialdom, the OSG may transcend the parochial concerns of a particular client
agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal.

Same; Same; In the final analysis, the client of the OSG is not the agency but no less than the
Republic of the Philippines in whom the plenum of sovereignty resides.—Hence, while
petitioners’ stand is contrary to that of the majority of the Commissioners, still, the OSG may
represent the COMELEC as long as in its assessment, such would be for the best interest of the
government. For, indeed, in the final analysis, the client of the OSG is not the agency but no less
than the Republic of the Philippines in whom the plenum of sovereignty resides.

Same; Same; The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad dictum.—Anent the alleged
breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that it is not an iron-clad dictum.
On several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of national interest and of
serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial
determination of the case. The case at bar is of similar import. It is in the interest of the State that
questions relating to government contracts be settled without delay. This is more so when the
contract, as in this case, involves the disbursement of public funds and the modernization of our
country’s election process, a project that has long been overdue.

Same; Mandamus; Mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual
obligations.—No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce the
performance of contractual obligations.

Same; Same; Mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s right is founded clearly in
law and not when it is doubtful; Legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights
are well-defined, clear and certain.—Moreover, worth stressing is the judicial caution that
mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s right is founded clearly in law and not
when it is doubtful. In varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights
may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain. Here, the
alleged contract, relied upon by PHOTOKINA as source of its rights which it seeks to be
protected, is being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected but also because it is
illegal and against public policy.

Same; Same; PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to
formalize the contract; The proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is
considered void; In issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory
injunction and in not dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion.—In fine, we rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder,
cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINA’s bid is beyond
the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not binding
upon the COMELEC and is considered void; and that in issuing the questioned preliminary writs
of mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-
45405, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners cannot be compelled
by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion,
especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br.
215.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Castillo, Laman, Tan, Pantaleon & San Jose for respondent Photokina Marketing Corp.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The contracting prerogative of public officers is circumscribed with a heavy burden of

responsibility. They must exercise utmost caution and observe the law in order to protect the
public from unjust and inequitable government contracts.
The case at bar provides us with another occasion to stress that with respect to government
contracts, statutes take precedence over the public officers’ freedom to contract. Here, the
primordial question to be resolved is—may a successful bidder compel a government agency to
formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by
Congress for the project?

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, alleging that respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 215, Quezon City, committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the (a) Resolution1
dated December 19, 2001 granting private respondent’s application for a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction in Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405;2 and (b) Resolution3 dated
February 7, 2002 denying petitioners’ Omnibus Motion to dismiss the petition and their motion
for reconsideration of the same Resolution and granting private respondent’s application for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

The facts are undisputed.

In 1996, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the
“Voter’s Registration Act of 1996,” providing for the modernization and computerization of the
voters’ registration list and the appropriation of funds therefor “in order to establish a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters.”4

Pursuant thereto, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution No. 00-
03155 approving in principle the Voters’ Registration and Identification System Project (VRIS
Project for brevity). The VRIS Project envisions a computerized database system for the May
2004 Elections. The idea is to have a national registration of voters whereby each registrant’s
fingerprints will be digitally entered into the system and upon completion of registration,
compared and matched with other entries to eliminate double entries. A tamper-proof and
counterfeit-resistant voter’s identification card will then be issued to each registrant as a visual
record of the registration.

On September 9, 1999, the COMELEC issued invitations to prequalify and bid for the supply
and installation of information technology equipment and ancillary services for its VRIS
Project.6 Private respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and
was allowed to participate as one of the bidders.
After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA’s bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion
Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score and was declared the winning bidder. Thus, on
September 28, 2000, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 32527 approving the Notice of
Award to PHOTOKINA, which, in turn, immediately accepted the same. The parties then
proceeded to formalize the contract, with Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain and Atty. Rodrigo D.
Sta. Ana, acting as negotiators for the COMELEC and PHOTOKINA, respectively.

However, under Republic Act No. 87608 the budget appropriated by Congress for the
COMELEC’s modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual available
funds under the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the
COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos.
In December 2000, then COMELEC Chairman Harriet O. Demetriou issued a memorandum to
the COMELEC en banc expressing her objections to the contract. Commissioner Sadain, for his
part, submitted a draft of the contract9 providing a price that would not exceed the certified
available appropriation but covering only Phase I of the VRIS Project, i.e., issuance of
registration cards for 1,000,000 voters in certain areas only.10 Under the draft, the “subsequent
completion of the whole project shall be agreed upon in accordance with the Bid Documents and
the annual funds available for it.”11

On February 2, 2001, the term of former Chairman Demetriou and those of Commissioners Julio
F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores expired. Appointed as their successors were Alfredo
L. Benipayo as Chairman and Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentine A. Tuason, Jr. as
Commissioners.

Meanwhile, PHOTOKINA, as the winning bidder, wrote several letters to the COMELEC
requesting the formal execution of the contract, but to no avail.12

Then Chairman Benipayo, through various press releases and public statements, announced that
the VRIS Project has been “scrapped, dropped, junked, or set aside.” He further announced his
plan to “re-engineer” the entire modernization program of the COMELEC, emphasizing his
intention to replace the VRIS Project with his own version, the “Triple E Vision”.13

On October 2, 2001, Senator Edgardo J. Angara directed the creation of a technical working
group to “assist the COMELEC in evaluating all programs for the modernization of the
COMELEC which will also consider the PHOTOKINA contract as an alternative program and
various competing programs for the purpose.”

Unsatisfied with the adverse turn of events, PHOTOKINA filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 215, Quezon City a petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages (with prayer for
temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction) against the COMELEC and all its Commissioners,14 docketed as Special Civil
Action No. Q-01-45405. PHOTOKINA alleged three causes of action: first, the deliberate refusal
of the COMELEC and its Commissioners to formalize the contract rendered nugatory the
perfected contract between them; second, in announcing that the VRIS Project has been junked
and that he has plans to re-engineer the COMELEC’s entire modernization program, Chairman
Benipayo committed grave abuse of discretion; and third, the COMELEC’s failure to perform its
duty under the contract has caused PHOTOKINA to incur damages since it has spent substantial
time and resources in the preparation of the bid and the draft contract.
In support of its application for writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction,
PHOTOKINA adopted the evidence it adduced during the hearing of its application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order.

On December 19, 2001, respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla issued the first assailed
Resolution granting PHOTOKINA’s application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction,
thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to: (1) grant the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction; and (2) deny the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issue enjoining respondents, their
agents, successors and assigns from replacing the VRIS Project upon petitioner’s posting of a
bond in the amount of P20,000,000.00, which bond shall answer for whatever damages which
may be sustained by reason of the issuance of the said writ, if it turns out that the plaintiffs are
not entitled thereto.

SO ORDERED.”15

Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. PHOTOKINA reiterated its plea
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.16 For their part, the COMELEC and its
Commissioners, through the Solicitor General, prayed that the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction be set aside and that the petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages be
dismissed.17

On February 8, 2002, respondent judge issued the second assailed Resolution denying the
COMELEC’s Omnibus Motion and, this time, granting PHOTOKINA’s application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, thus:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to: (1) deny Respondents’ Omnibus
Motion for the dismissal of this case and for the reconsideration of this Court’s Resolution
granting the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction; (2) grant Petitioner’s Motion dated
January 2, 2002 insofar as it prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction;
(3) Grant the prayer for the reduction of the preliminary prohibitory injunction bond from
P20,000,000.00 to P10,000,000.00; (4) Clarify its Resolution dated December 19, 2001 to the
extent that the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction will also enjoin Respondents, their
agents, successors and assigns from disregarding the contract for the VRIS Project between
Petitioner and Respondent COMELEC; (5) deny Petitioner’s motion to declare Respondents in
default.

“Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issue directing all respondent
Commissioners to immediately resume negotiations to formalize the execution of the contract
with Petitioner for the VRIS Project upon petitioner’s posting of a bond, separate from the above
bond for the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, in the amount of P20,000,000.00, which
bond shall answer for whatever damages that may be sustained by reason of the issuance of the
said writ, if it turns out that Petitioner is not entitled thereto.

“SO ORDERED.”18

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in
behalf of then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Resurreccion Z.
Borra and Florentine A. Tuason, Jr.
Petitioners contend that: (1) a petition for mandamus and prohibition does not lie to enforce
contractual obligations, hence, PHOTOKINA’s proper recourse before the Regional Trial Court
should have been an action for specific performance; (2) respondent judge, by issuing the
injunctive writs, already assumed that the VRIS Project was lawfully awarded by the COMELEC
to PHOTOKINA, and that there is a valid perfected contract between them, thus, manifesting her
prejudgment; and (3) injunctive writs should not be issued when an action for damages can
adequately compensate for the injuries. Petitioners pray that the two assailed Resolutions be
nullified and Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 be dismissed outright.19

On February 21, 2002, the majority of the COMELEC Commissioners—Luzviminda G.

Tancangco, Rufmo S.B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion and Mehol K. Sadain—filed with this Court a
Manifestation20 that “the Chairman and the two Commissioners who filed the instant Petition
acted without authority from the COMELEC en banc to take such action.”

PHOTOKINA filed a Comment with Motion to Dismiss,21 the present petition, on two
procedural grounds. First, the petition violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. And second,
the OSG has no authority and/or standing to file the petition considering that the petitioners have
not been authorized by the COMELEC en banc to take such action. Without the concurrence of
at least a majority of the members of the COMELEC, neither petitioners nor the OSG could file
the petition in behalf of the COMELEC.

In refutation of petitioners’ arguments, PHOTOKINA contends that mandamus is an appropriate

remedy since what is involved in Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 is the performance of a
ministerial duty. Citing Isada vs. Bocar,22 PHOTOKINA maintains that mandamus may be
availed of by private parties to compel public officers to act on a contract entered into pursuant
to law. In its Supplemental Comment,23 PHOTOKINA invites the Court’s attention to
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Jancom Environmental Corporation24 whereby
the winning bidder was afforded every right to seek enforcement of its perfected contract with
the government.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Initially, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.

PHOTOKINA alleges that the OSG has no standing to file the present petition since its legal
position is contrary to that espoused by the majority of the COMELEC Commissioners. This is a
leap to a non-sequitur conclusion. The OSG is an independent office. Its hands are not shackled
to the cause of its client agency. In the discharge of its task, the primordial concern of the OSG is
to see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld.25 This is regardless of the fact that
what it perceived as the “best interest of the government” runs counter to its client agency’s
position.26 Endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interest of virtually the entire
government officialdom, the OSG may transcend the parochial concerns of a particular client
agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal.27 Our ruling in Orbos vs. Civil Service
Commission,28 is relevant, thus:
“x x x It is incumbent upon him (Solicitor General) to present to the court what he considers
would legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client’s
position. x x x

“In the present case, it appears that after the Solicitor General studied the issues he found merit
in the cause of the petitioner based on the applicable law and jurisprudence. Thus, it is his duty to
represent the petitioner as he did by filing this petition. He cannot be disqualified from appearing
for the petitioner even if in so doing his representation runs against the interests of the CSC.

“This is not the first time that the Office of the Solicitor General has taken a position adverse to
his clients like the CSC, the National Labor Relations Commission, among others, and even the
People of the Philippines. x x x” (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, while petitioners’ stand is contrary to that of the majority of the Commissioners, still, the
OSG may represent the COMELEC as long as in its assessment, such would be for the best
interest of the government. For, indeed, in the final analysis, the client of the OSG is not the
agency but no less than the Republic of the Philippines in whom the plenum of sovereignty
resides.29

Moreover, it must be emphasized that petitioners are also public officials entitled to be
represented by the OSG. Under Executive Order No. 29230 and Presidential Decree No. 478,31
the OSG is the lawyer of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or
agents. Surely, this mandate includes the three petitioners32 who have been impleaded as public
respondents in Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405.

Anent the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that it is not an
iron-clad dictum. On several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of national
interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the
judicial determination of the case.33 The case at bar is of similar import. It is in the interest of
the State that questions relating to government contracts be settled without delay. This is more so
when the contract, as in this case, involves the disbursement of public funds and the
modernization of our country’s election process, a project that has long been overdue.

We now resolve the following substantive issues:

1) Is a petition for mandamus the appropriate remedy to enforce contractual obligations? and 2)
May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it notwith-
standing that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project?

I
No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of
contractual obligations.34 As early as 1924, Justice Street, in Quiogue vs. Romualdez,35 already
set forth the justification of this rule, thus:

“Upon the facts above stated we are of the opinion that the writ of mandamus is not the
appropriate, or even an admissible remedy. It is manifest that whatever rights the petitioner may
have, upon the facts stated, are derived from her contract with the city; and no rule of law is
better settled than that mandamus never lies to enforce the performance of private contracts, x x
x The petitioner’s remedy, if any she has, is by an original action in the Court of First Instance to
compel the city to pay the agreed price or to pay damages for the breach of contract.

“x x x. As said in Lowe vs. Phelps (14 Bush, 642):

‘It must, therefore, appear upon every application for a mandamus that it is the legal duty of the
respondent to do that which it is sought to compel him to do, and that he has upon proper
application refused to perform that duty.’ (Citing numerous authorities).

“It was not intended to aid a plaintiff in the enforcement of a mere contract right, or to take the
place of the other remedies provided by law for the adjudication of disputed claims. Looking at
the case from the standpoint of appellant, it involves nothing more than an ordinary breach of
contract. If, as contended, the appellant had a valid contract with the school board, it also had an
adequate remedy at law to recover damages for its breach; and to permit the writ of mandamus to
be used for the purpose of enforcing a mere contract right would be a wide departure from the
settled practice in respect to the character of cases in which relief by mandamus may be
obtained.

“In Parrott vs. City of Bridgeport (44 Conn., 180), the writ was refused where the petitioner
sought to compel a city to construct a public

_______________

34 Quiogue vs. Romualdez, 46 Phil. 337 (1924) citing Florida Central & Peninsular R. Co. vs.
State ex rel Tavares, 20 L.R.A., 419; Tabigue vs. Duvall, 16 Phil. 324 (1910).

35 Ibid., pp. 339-341.

365

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 18, 2002

365

Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla

street in a certain manner agreeably to the terms of a special agreement between the petitioner
and the city. In the course of the opinion the court said:

“* * * The duty, therefore, if any, which rests upon the city in this regard, is one which it owes to
the petitioner as an individual, not to the public, and the special contract is the foundation upon
which it rests. But the writ of mandamus has never been considered as an appropriate remedy for
the enforcement of contract rights of a private and personal nature and obligations which rest
wholly upon contract and which involve no questions of public trusts or official duty. Indeed,
strictly speaking, it never lies where the party aggrieved has adequate remedy at law, and its aid
is only to be invoked to prevent an absolute failure of justice in cases where ordinary legal
processes furnish no relief.” (Emphasis supplied)

The passage of time has not eroded the wisdom of the foregoing rule. Its invocation by this Court
in Province of Pangasinan vs. Reparation Commission,36 Aprueba vs. Ganzon,37 City of Manila
vs. Posadas,38 Jacinto vs. Director of Lands,39 National Marketing Corporation vs. Cloribel,40
Astudillo vs. The Board of Directors of People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation,41 and
Sharp International Marketing vs. Court of Appeals42 virtually reinforces the rule.

The present case is our latest addition to the above catena of jurisprudence. We carefully read the
pleadings filed in Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 and we are convinced that what
PHOTOKINA sought to enforce therein are its rights under the accepted bid proposal. Its
petition alleged that notwithstanding the COMELECs issuance of a Notice of Award and its
(PHOTOKINA’s) subsequent acceptance thereof, the COMELEC still refused to formalize the
contract. As a relief, PHOTOKINA prayed that after trial, petitioners be directed “to review and
finalize the formal contract” and to “implement the VRIS Project.43 Petitioners, on their part,
specifically denied the existence of a perfected contract and asserted that even if there was one,
the same is null and void for lack of proper appropriation. Petitioners labeled the contract as
illegal and against public policy.

Akin to our rulings cited above, we hold that mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce the
COMELEC’s alleged contractual obligations with PHOTOKINA. It has other adequate remedy
in law. Moreover, worth stressing is the judicial caution that mandamus applies as a remedy only
where petitioner’s right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful.44 In varying
language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus
only if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain.45 Here, the alleged contract, relied upon
by PHOTOKINA as source of its rights which it seeks to be protected, is being disputed, not
only on the ground that it was not perfected but also because it is illegal and against public
policy.

Of course, there are cases in which the writ of mandamus has been used to compel public
officers to perform certain acts, but it will be generally observed that in such cases, the contracts
have been completely performed by the petitioner, and nothing remained to be done except for
the government to make compensation. These exceptional cases are cited in Isada vs. Bocar46
where the act of the respondent public officer has the effect of setting aside contracts already in
the process of consummation. In contrast with Isada, the alleged contract here has not yet been
fully performed by PHOTOKINA; and though it avers readiness to perform, petitioners raised
serious questions as to its validity. Their posture is tenable.
II
To spare PHOTOKINA the drudgery of a fruitless pursuit, we deem it appropriate to lay down
the principles governing government contracts and to apply them to the instant case. Meanwhile,
as PHOTOKINA will later on deduce from the discussion, the contract subject of this
controversy is one that can be slain in sight for being patently void and unenforceable.
Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that “no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”47 Thus, in the execution of
government contracts, the precise import of this constitutional restriction is to require the various
agencies to limit their expenditures within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal year.

Complementary to the foregoing constitutional injunction are pertinent provisions of law and
administrative issuances that are designed to effectuate the above mandate in a detailed
manner.48 Sections 46 and 47, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as “Administrative Code of 1987,” provide:

“SEC. 46. Appropriation Before Entering into Contract.—(1) No contract involving the
expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor, the
unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover the proposed
expenditure; and x x x

“SEC. 47. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract.—Except in the case of a contract
for personal service, for supplies for current consumption or to be carried in stock not exceeding
the estimated consumption for three (3) months, or banking transactions of government-owned
or controlled banks, no contract involving the expenditure of public funds by any government
agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official of the agency
concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been
duly appropriated for the purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract
for the current calendar year is available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to
verification by the auditor concerned. The certificate signed by the proper accounting official and
the auditor who verified it, shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed
contract, and the sum so certified shall not thereafter be available for expenditure for any other
purpose until the obligation of the government agency concerned under the contract is fully
extinguished.

It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of appropriations
and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the
execution of government contracts. The obvious intent is to impose such conditions as a priori
requisites to the validity of the proposed contract.49 Using this as our premise, we cannot accede
to PHOTOKINA’s contention that there is already a perfected contract. While we held in
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Jancom Environmental Corporation50 that “the
effect of an unqualified acceptance of the offer or proposal of the bidder is to perfect a contract,
upon notice of the award to the bidder,” however, such statement would be inconsequential in a
government where the acceptance referred to is yet to meet certain conditions. To hold otherwise
is to allow a public officer to execute a binding contract that would obligate the government in
an amount in excess of the appropriations for the purpose for which the contract was attempted
to be made.51 This is a dangerous precedent.

In the case at bar, there seems to be an oversight of the legal requirements as early as the bidding
stage. The first step of a Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) is to determine whether the bids
comply with the requirements. The BAC shall rate a bid “passed” only if it complies with all the
requirements and the submitted price does not exceed the approved budget for the contract.”52
Extant on the record is the fact that the VRIS Project was awarded to PHOTOKINA on account
of its bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos. However, under Republic Act No. 8760,53 the
only fund appropriated for the project was PI Billion Pesos and under the Certification of
Available Funds54 (CAP) only P1.2 Billion Pesos was available. Clearly, the amount
appropriated is insufficient to cover the cost of the entire VRIS Project. There is no way that the
COMELEC could enter into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was way beyond
the amount appropriated by law for the project. This being the case, the BAG should have
rejected the bid for being excessive55 or should have withdrawn the Notice of Award on the
ground that in the eyes of the law, the same is null and void.56

The objections of then Chairman Demetriou to the implementation of the VRIS Project, ardently
carried on by her successor Chairman Benipayo, are therefore in order.

Even the draft contract submitted by Commissioner Sadain, that provides for a contract price in
the amount of P1.2 Billion Pesos is unacceptable. Indeed, we share the observation of former
Chairman Demetriou that it circumvents the statutory requirements on government contracts.
While the contract price under the draft contract57 is only P1.2 Billion and, thus, within the
certified available funds, the same covers only Phase I of the VRIS Project, i.e., the issuance of
identification cards for only 1,000,000 voters in specified areas.58 In effect, the implementation
of the VRIS Project will be “segmented” or “chopped” into several phases. Not only is such
arrangement disallowed by our budgetary laws and practices, it is also disadvantageous to the
COMELEC because of the uncertainty that will loom over its modernization project for an
indefinite period of time. Should Congress fail to appropriate the amount necessary for the
completion of the entire project, what good will the accomplished Phase I serve? As expected,
the project failed “to sell” with the Department of Budget and Management. Thus, Secretary
Benjamin Diokno, per his letter of December 1, 2000, declined the COMELEC’s request for the
issuance of the Notice of Cash Availability (NCA) and a multi-year obligational authority to
assume payment of the total VRIS Project for lack of legal basis.59 Corollarily, under Section 33
of R.A. No. 8760, no agency shall enter into a multi-year contract without a multi-year
obligational authority, thus:

“SECTION 33. Contracting Multi-Year Projects.—In the implementation of multi-year projects,

no agency shall enter into a multi-year contract without a multi-year Obligational Authority
issued by the Department of Budget and Management for the purpose. Notwithstanding the
issuance of the multi-year Obligational Authority, the obligation to be incurred in any given
calendar year, shall in no case exceed the amount programmed for implementation during said
calendar year.”

Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence
dictated them not to enter into a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and available
funds. Definitely, to act otherwise would be a futile exercise for the contract would inevitably
suffer the vice of nullity. In Osmeña vs. Commission on Audit,60 this Court held:

“The Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1445) further provides that no contract involving
the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor and
the proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering
into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and the amount
necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current fiscal year is available for expenditure
on account thereof. Any contract entered into contrary to the foregoing requirements shall be
VOID.

“Clearly then, the contract entered into by the former Mayor Duterte was void from the very
beginning since the agreed cost for the project (P8,368,920.00) was way beyond the appropriated
amount (P5,419,180.00) as certified by the City Treasurer. Hence, the contract was properly
declared void and unenforceable in COA’s 2nd Indorsement, dated September 4, 1986. The COA
declared and we agree, that:

‘The prohibition contained in Sec. 85 of PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code) is explicit and
mandatory. Fund availability is, as it has always been, an indispensable prerequisite to the
execution of any government contract involving the expenditure of public funds by all
government agencies at all levels. Such contracts are not to be considered as final or binding
unless such a certification as to funds availability is issued (Letter of Instruction No. 767, s.
1978). Antecedent of advance appropriation is thus essential to government liability on contracts
(Zobel vs. City of Manila, 47 Phil. 169). This contract being violative of the legal requirements
aforequoted, the same contravenes Sec. 85 of PD 1445 and is null and void by virtue of Sec. 87.’
”

Verily, the contract, as expressly declared by law, is inexistent and void ab initio.61 This is to
say that the proposed contract is without force and effect from the very beginning or from its
incipiency, as if it had never been entered into, and hence, cannot be validated either by lapse of
time or ratification.62

Of course, we are not saying that the party who contracts with the government has no other
recourse in law. The law itself affords him the remedy. Section 48 of E.O. No. 292 explicitly
provides that any contract entered into contrary to the above-mentioned requirements shall be
void, and “the officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or other
contracting party for any consequent damage to the same as if the transaction had been wholly
between private parties.” So when the contracting officer transcends his lawful and legitimate
powers by acting in excess of or beyond the limits of his contracting authority, the Government
is not bound under the contract. It would be as if the contract in such case were a private one,
whereupon, he binds only himself, and thus, assumes personal liability thereunder.63 Otherwise
stated, the proposed contract is unenforceable as to the Government.

While this is not the proceeding to determine where the culpability lies, however, the
constitutional mandate cited above constrains us to remind all public officers that public office is
a public trust and all public officers must at all times be accountable to the people. The authority
of public officers to enter into government contracts is circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility. In the exercise of their contracting prerogative, they should be the first judges of
the legality, propriety and wisdom of the contract they entered into. They must exercise a high
degree of caution so that the Government may not be the victim of ill-advised or improvident
action.64
In fine, we rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to
formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINA’s bid is beyond the amount appropriated by
Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is
considered void; and that in issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and
prohibitory injunction and in not dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405, respondent
judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners cannot be compelled by a writ of
mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially
where disbursement of public funds is concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 19, 2001 and
February 7, 2002 issued by respondent Judge Padilla are SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action No.
Q-01-45405 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Petition granted, resolutions set aside.

Note.—Generally, the performance of an official act or duty which necessarily involves the
exercise of discretion or judgment cannot be compelled by mandamus. However this rule does
not apply in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess
of authority. (Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 307 SCRA 104 [1999]) Commission on
Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla, 389 SCRA 353, G.R. No. 151992 September 18, 2002

G.R. No. 175457 July 6, 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 175482

ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ruperto A.
Ambil, Jr.1 and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr.2 assailing the Decision3 promulgated on
September 16, 2005 and Resolution4dated November 8, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 25892.

The present controversy arose from a letter5 of Atty. David B. Loste, President of the Eastern
Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman,
praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an
accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the
residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report6 dated January 4, 1999,
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of criminal charges against
petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. On September 22, 1999, the
new President of the IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is no
longer interested in pursuing the case against petitioners. Thus, he recommended the dismissal of
the complaint against petitioners.8

Nonetheless, in an Information9 dated January 31, 2000, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino
R. Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together with
SPO3 Felipe A. Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
Memorandum10 dated August 4, 2000, recommending the dismissal of the complaint as regards
Balano and the amendment of the Information to include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from
Jail under Article 15611 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining
accused. The Amended Information12 reads:

That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, and for sometime prior [or] subsequent thereto,
[in] the Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [the] above-named accused, Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.[,] being
then the Provincial Governor of Eastern Samar, and Alexandrino R. Apelado, being then the
Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar, both having been public officers, duly elected, appointed
and qualified as such, committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping x x x each other, with deliberate intent, manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally order and cause the
release from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim, accused in
Criminal Case No. 10963, for Murder, by virtue of a warrant of Arrest issued by Honorable
Arnulfo P. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar, and thereafter
placed said detention prisoner (Mayor Francisco Adalim) under accused RUPERTO A. AMBIL,
JR.’s custody, by allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused Ambil’s residence for a period
of Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which act was done without any court order, thus accused
in the performance of official functions had given unwarranted benefits and advantage to
detainee Mayor Francisco Adalim to the prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

BAIL BOND RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each.13

On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.

At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason, however,
that Adalim’s transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the
dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalim’s sister,
Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor
Adalim was to be held.

Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence and rested its case after the
admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to
Evidence with Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial14 but the same was denied.

At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-
White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.

Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998 to 2001.
According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalim’s lawyers that he directed the transfer of
Adalim’s detention to his home. He cites poor security in the provincial jail as the primary
reason for taking personal custody of Adalim considering that the latter would be in the company
of inmates who were put away by his sister and guards identified with his political opponents.15

For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of Eastern Samar and the
sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how Mayor Adalim was arrested while they were
attending a wedding in Sulat, Eastern Samar, on September 6, 1998. According to Atty. White,
she sought the alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after Provincial Warden and herein
petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to guarantee the mayor’s safety.16

Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar. He
confirmed his arrest on September 6, 1998 in connection with a murder case filed against him in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. White’s
account that he spotted inmates who served as bodyguards for, or who are associated with, his
political rivals at the provincial jail. He also noticed a prisoner, Roman Akyatan, gesture to him
with a raised clenched fist. Sensing danger, he called on his sister for help. Adalim admitted
staying at Ambil, Jr.’s residence for almost three months before he posted bail after the charge
against him was downgraded to homicide.17

Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar. He
recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano fetched him at home to assist in the arrest
of Mayor Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting the legality of Mayor Adalim’s arrest
and arguing with the jail guards against booking him for detention. At the provincial jail,
petitioner was confronted by Atty. White who informed him that he was under the governor, in
the latter’s capacity as a provincial jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he
submitted to the governor’s order to relinquish custody of Adalim.18

Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail to be dilapidated and
undermanned. According to him, only two guards were incharge of looking after 50 inmates.
There were two cells in the jail, each housing 25 inmates, while an isolation cell of 10 square
meters was unserviceable at the time. Also, there were several nipa huts within the perimeter for
use during conjugal visits.19

On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the assailed
Decision20 finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled
that in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him
unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable quarters with access to television and
other privileges that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person
under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or
when he is admitted to bail.21

The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners’ defense that Adalim’s transfer was made to ensure
his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally verify any actual threat on
Adalim’s life but relied simply on the advice of Adalim’s lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also
pointed out the availability of an isolation cell and nipa huts within the 10-meter-high perimeter
fence of the jail which could have been used to separate Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it
cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s failure to turn over Adalim despite advice from Assistant Secretary
Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of Interior and Local Government.

Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an indeterminate penalty of

imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four
(4) months. In favor of petitioner Apelado, Sr., the court appreciated the incomplete justifying
circumstance of obedience to a superior order and sentenced him to imprisonment for six (6)
years and one (1) month to nine (9) years and eight (8) months.

Hence, the present petitions.

Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues for our consideration:

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3(e) REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED,

APPLIES TO PETITIONER’S CASE BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN.

II

WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER SUCH AS PETITIONER IS A PRIVATE

PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 3(e), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS
AMENDED.

III

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ACTED WITH DELIBERATE INTENT,

MANIFEST PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR GROSS INEXCUSABLE
NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SAID SECTION 3(e).
 IV

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR AND JAILER

UNDER SECTIONS 1730 AND 1733, ARTICLE III, CHAPTER 45 OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917 AND SECTION 61, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC
ACT 6975 HAS THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE CUSTODY OF A DETENTION
PRISONER.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR THE LAWFUL EXERCISE
OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE.

VI

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED BECAUSE

THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.22

For his part, petitioner Apelado, Sr. imputes the following errors on the Sandiganbayan:

THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND/OR MISAPPLICATION OF

THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN CONVICTING ACCUSED APELADO,
EITHER AS PRINCIPAL OR IN CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED AMBIL.

II

IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF

CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER, THE
LATTER SHOULD BE ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER PARAGRAPH 6, ARTICLE 11 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE.

III

THE COURT A QUO’S BASIS IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AMBIL AND

HEREIN PETITIONER OF HAVING GIVEN MAYOR ADALIM "UNWARRANTED
BENEFITS AND ADVANTAGE TO THE PREJUDICE x x x OF THE
GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE MOST, SPECULATIVE.23

The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed up into three: (1) Whether he is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; (2) Whether a provincial
governor has authority to take personal custody of a detention prisoner; and (3) Whether he is
entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 11(5)24 of the RPC.

Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s assignment of errors can be condensed into two: (1)
Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; and (2)
Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose under Article 11(6)25 of the RPC.

Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does not apply to
his case because the provision contemplates only transactions of a pecuniary nature. Since the
law punishes a public officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a private person, petitioner
avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor to Mayor Adalim, a public officer.
Further, he claims good faith in taking custody of the mayor pursuant to his duty as a "Provincial
Jailer" under the Administrative Code of 1917. Considering this, petitioner believes himself
entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of duty.

Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies allegations of conspiracy between him and
petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he was merely following the orders of a
superior when he transferred the detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes immunity from
criminal liability.

For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) points out the absence of jurisprudence
that restricts the application of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 to transactions of a pecuniary nature.
The OSP explains that it is enough to show that in performing their functions, petitioners have
accorded undue preference to Adalim for liability to attach under the provision. Further, the OSP
maintains that Adalim is deemed a private party for purposes of applying Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019 because the unwarranted benefit redounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to his person
as a detention prisoner accused of murder. It suggests further that petitioners were motivated by
bad faith as evidenced by their refusal to turn over Adalim despite instruction from Asst. Sec.
Ingeniero. The OSP also reiterates petitioners’ lack of authority to take custody of a detention
prisoner without a court order. Hence, it concludes that petitioners are not entitled to the benefit
of any justifying circumstance.

After a careful review of this case, the Court finds the present petitions bereft of merit.

Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Actwhich provides:

Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must concur: (1) the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(3) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.26

As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers discharging official
functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over public officers charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,27 as amended by R.A. No. 8249.28 The
pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read as follows:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all

cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads[;]

xxxx

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.

xxxx

Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The
same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a Certification29 from the Provincial
Government Department Head of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is
classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the
lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil,
Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried
jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over
them – the Sandiganbayan.

The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by which a violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 may be committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.

In Sison v. People,30 we defined "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" as follows:

"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature
of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other
persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless
men never fail to take on their own property." x x x31

In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in
transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. There is no merit to
petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by
virtue of his power as the "Provincial Jailer" of Eastern Samar.

Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the extent of the power of local chief
executives over the units of the Philippine National Police within their jurisdiction:

SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National Police.—
The extent of operational supervision and control of local chief executives over the police force,
fire protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall
be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A.
No. 6975), otherwise known as "The Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of
1990," and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.

In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 697532 on the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology provides:

Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The Jail Bureau shall exercise supervision and control over all
city and municipal jails. The provincial jails shall be supervised and controlled by the
provincial government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall be subsidized by the
National Government for not more than three (3) years after the effectivity of this Act.
The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.33 An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may
even decide to do it himself.34

On the other hand, the power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to
see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties."35 If the subordinate officers fail or
neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties. Essentially, the power of supervision means no more than the
power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the
law.36 The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does
not lay down the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or replace them.37

Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor alone which has authority to
exercise control and supervision over provincial jails. In any case, neither of said powers
authorizes the doing of acts beyond the parameters set by law. On the contrary, subordinates
must be enjoined to act within the bounds of law. In the event that the subordinate performs an
act ultra vires, rules may be laid down on how the act should be done, but always in conformity
with the law.

In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner Ambil, Jr. cites Section 1731,
Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917 on Provincial jails in support. Section 1731
provides:

SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.—The governor of the province shall be
charged with the keeping of the provincial jail, and it shall be his duty to administer the
same in accordance with law and the regulations prescribed for the government of
provincial prisons. The immediate custody and supervision of the jail may be committed to the
care of a jailer to be appointed by the provincial governor. The position of jailer shall be
regarded as within the unclassified civil service but may be filled in the manner in which
classified positions are filled, and if so filled, the appointee shall be entitled to all the benefits
and privileges of classified employees, except that he shall hold office only during the term of
office of the appointing governor and until a successor in the office of the jailer is appointed and
qualified, unless sooner separated. The provincial governor shall, under the direction of the
provincial board and at the expense of the province, supply proper food and clothing for
the prisoners; though the provincial board may, in its discretion, let the contract for the feeding
of the prisoners to some other person. (Emphasis supplied.)

This provision survived the advent of the Administrative Code of 1987. But again, nowhere did
said provision designate the provincial governor as the "provincial jailer," or even slightly
suggest that he is empowered to take personal custody of prisoners. What is clear from the cited
provision is that the provincial governor’s duty as a jail keeper is confined to the administration
of the jail and the procurement of food and clothing for the prisoners. After all, administrative
acts pertain only to those acts which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and
purposes already declared by the legislative body or such as are devolved upon it38 by the
Constitution. Therefore, in the exercise of his administrative powers, the governor can only
enforce the law but not supplant it.

Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found in Section
173739 under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the neighboring province in case
the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to accommodate all provincial prisoners. However,
this provision has been superseded by Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule 114 provides:

SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No person under detention by legal
process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to
bail.

Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal
process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor. This
was amply clarified by Asst. Sec. Ingeniero in his communication40 dated October 6, 1998
addressed to petitioner Ambil, Jr. Asst. Sec. Ingeniero wrote:

06 October 1996

GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL

Provincial Capitol
Borongan, Eastern Samar

Dear Sir:

This has reference to the letter of Atty. Edwin B. Docena, and the reports earlier received by this
Department, relative to your alleged action in taking into custody Mayor Francisco "Aising"
Adalim of Taft, that province, who has been previously arrested by virtue by a warrant of arrest
issued in Criminal Case No. 10963.

If the report is true, it appears that your actuation is not in accord with the provision of Section 3,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that an arrested person be delivered to the
nearest police station or jail.

Moreover, invoking Section 61 of RA 6975 as legal basis in taking custody of the accused
municipal mayor is misplaced. Said section merely speaks of the power of supervision vested
unto the provincial governor over provincial jails. It does not, definitely, include the power to
take in custody any person in detention.

In view of the foregoing, you are hereby enjoined to conduct yourself within the bounds of law
and to immediately deliver Mayor Adalim to the provincial jail in order to avoid legal
complications.

Please be guided accordingly.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.)
JESUS I. INGENIERO
Assistant Secretary

Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a "provincial jailer." Said
petitioner’s usurpation of the court's authority, not to mention his open and willful defiance to
official advice in order to accommodate a former political party mate,41 betray his unmistakable
bias and the evident bad faith that attended his actions.

Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element of the crime. As
mentioned above, in order to hold a person liable for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, it
is required that the act constituting the offense consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any
party, including the government, or (2) giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge by the accused of his official, administrative or judicial
functions.

In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of giving unwarranted
benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with murder, by causing his
release from prison and detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner
Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case on two points.
First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly because the last sentence thereof provides
that the "provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses, permits or other concessions" and he is not such government
officer or employee. Second, the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private
party but to a public officer.

However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has obviously lost
sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan42 where we
held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of
whether or not the accused public officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions." Following is an excerpt of what we said in Mejorada,

Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public
officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or
qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the
Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the
inclusion of officers and employees of officers (sic) or government corporations which, under the
ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction
of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of
granting licenses or permits or other concessions.43 (Italics supplied.)

In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,44 we affirmed that a prosecution for violation
of said provision will lie regardless of whether the accused public officer is charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.45
Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s second contention, Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 3019
defines a "public officer" to include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent
or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal from the government. Evidently, Mayor Adalim is one. But
considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes the giving by a public officer of
unwarranted benefits to a private party, does the fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of
such benefits take petitioners’ case beyond the ambit of said law?

We believe not.

In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than "private
person" to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a
reason. The term "party" is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance46 as
distinguished from "person" which, in general usage, refers to a human being.47 Thus, a private
person simply pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a private party is more
comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private
capacity to protect his personal interest.

In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and
detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in
his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of
applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.

Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has
given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative or
judicial functions.48 The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more
favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from
some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice
or estimation above another.49

Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other than the
provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable quarters, provided better
nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch television. Petitioners readily
extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers that the mayor’s life
would be put in danger inside the provincial jail.

As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to establish the existence of any
risk on Adalim’s safety. To be sure, the latter would not be alone in having unfriendly company
in lockup. Yet, even if we treat Akyatan’s gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim as a threat of
aggression, the same would still not constitute a special and compelling reason to warrant
Adalim’s detention outside the provincial jail. For one, there were nipa huts within the perimeter
fence of the jail which could have been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the prisoners
while the isolation cell was undergoing repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have exceeded the
85 days that Adalim stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. More importantly, even if Adalim
could have proven the presence of an imminent peril on his person to petitioners, a court order
was still indispensable for his transfer.

The foregoing, indeed, negates the application of the justifying circumstances claimed by
petitioners.

Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or
lawful exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts
in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any
criminal liability. In order for this justifying circumstance to apply, two requisites must be
satisfied: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office; and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.50 Both requisites are
lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s case.

As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority when he ordered the
transfer and detention of Adalim at his house. Needless to state, the resulting violation of the
Anti-Graft Law did not proceed from the due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of his
office.

In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of obedience to an
order issued for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who
acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose does not incur any
criminal liability. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following requisites must be
present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must be for some lawful
purpose; and (3) the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.51 Only the
first requisite is present in this case.

While the order for Adalim’s transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then
Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr. to carry it out
was lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado,
Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order, transported him
to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him liable as a principal by direct participation
under Article 17(1)52 of the RPC.

An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part of and another performing another so as to complete it with a view to the
attainment of the same object, and their acts although apparently independent were in fact
concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments.53

Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s willful cooperation in

executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s order to move Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court
order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the
law. The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person under detention by legal process is
elementary. Truth be told, even petitioner governor who is unschooled in the intricacies of the
law expressed reservations on his power to transfer Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of
petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the violation charged, makes them equally
responsible as conspirators.

As regards the penalty imposed upon petitioners, Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes a
public officer or a private person who violates Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 with imprisonment for
not less than six (6) years and one (1) month to not more than fifteen (15) years and perpetual
disqualification from public office. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act
No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, if the offense is punished by a special law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same.1avvphi1

Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan upon petitioner Ambil, Jr. of imprisonment for
nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months is in
accord with law. As a co-principal without the benefit of an incomplete justifying circumstance
to his credit, petitioner Apelado, Sr. shall suffer the same penalty.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We find petitioners
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. is, likewise,
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months.

With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191219 July 31, 2013

SPO1 RAMON LIHAYLIHAY1 AND C/INSP. VIRGILIO V. VINLUAN, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari2 are the Decision3 dated August 8, 2008 and
Resolution4 dated February 12, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 22098 which
found petitioners Virgilio V. Vinluan (Vii1luan) and Ramon Lihaylihay (Lihaylihay) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."

The Facts
Acting on the special audit report5 submitted by the Commission on Audit, the Philippine
National Police (PNP) conducted an internal investigation6 on the purported "ghost" purchases of
combat, clothing, and individual equipment (CCIE) worth ₱133,000,000.00 which were
allegedly purchased from the PNP Service Store System (SSS) and delivered to the PNP General
Services Command (GSC). As a result of the internal investigation, an Information7 was filed
before the Sandiganbayan, charging 10 PNP officers, including, among others, Vinluan and
Lihaylihay, for the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the accusatory portion of
which reads:

That on January 3, 6, 8, 9 and 10, 1992, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused public
officers namely: Gen. Cesar P. Nazareno, being then the Director General of the Philippine
National Police (PNP); Gen. Guillermo T. Domondon, Director for Comptrollership, PNP; Sr.
Supt. Bernardo Alejandro, Administrator, PNP Service Store System; Sr. Supt. Arnulfo Obillos,
Director, PNP, General Services Command (GSC); C/Insp. Virgilio Vinluan, Chairman,
Inspection and Acceptance Committee, PNP, GSC; C/Insp. Pablito Magnaye, Member,
Inspection and Acceptance Committee, PNP, GSC; Sr. Insp. Amado Guiriba, Jr., Member,
Inspection and Acceptance Committee, PNP, GSC; SPO1 Ramon Lihay-Lihay, Inspector, Office
of the Directorate for Comptrollership, PNP; Chief Supt. Jose M. Aquino, Director, Finance
Service, PNP; and Sr. Supt. Marcelo Castillo III, Chief, Gen. Materials Office/Technical
Inspector, PNP, while in the performance of their respective official and administrative functions
as such, taking advantage of their positions, committing the offense in relation to their office and
conspiring, confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, through evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the government in the following
manner:

Accused Gen. Nazareno in his capacity as Chief, PNP and concurrently Board Chairman of the
PNP Service Store System, surreptitiously channeled PNP funds to the PNP SSS through
"Funded RIVs" valued at ₱8 [M]illion and Director Domondon released ASA No. 000-200-004-
92 (SN-1353) without proper authority from the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)
and Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and caused it to appear that there were
purchases and deliveries of combat clothing and individual equipment (CCIE) to the General
Service Command (GSC), PNP, by deliberately and maliciously using funds for personal
services and divided the invoices of not more than ₱500,000.00 each, pursuant to which the
following invoices were made and payments were effected therefor through the corresponding
checks, to wit:

Invoice No. Check No. Amount

30368 880932 P 500,000.00
30359 880934 500,000.00
30324 880935 500,000.00
30325 8080936 500,000.00
 30322 8080937 500,000.00
30356 8080938 500,000.00
30364 8080939 500,000.00
30360 8080940 500,000.00
30365 8080941 500,000.00
30323 880943 500,000.00
30358 880942 500,000.00
30362 880943 500,000.00
30366 880943 500,000.00
30357 880946 500,000.00
30361 880947 500,000.00
30363 880948 500,000.00
P 8,000,000.00
=============

thereafter, accused members of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee together with
respondents Marcelo Castillo III and Ramon Lihay-Lihay certified or caused to be certified that
the CCIE items covered by the aforementioned invoices were delivered, properly inspected and
accepted, and subsequently distributed to the end-users, when in truth and in fact, as accused
well knew, no such purchases of CCIE items were made and no items were delivered, inspected,
accepted and distributed to the respective end-users; that despite the fact that no deliveries were
made, respondent Alejandro claimed payment therefor, and respondent Obillos approved the
disbursement vouchers therefor as well as the checks authorizing payment which was
countersigned by respondent Aquino; and as a result, the government, having been caused to pay
for the inexistent purchases and deliveries, suffered undue injury in the amount of EIGHT
MILLION PESOS (₱8,000,000.00), more or less.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

Four of the above-named accused died during the pendency of the case, while Chief Supt. Jose
M. Aquino was dropped from the Information for lack of probable cause.9 As such, only Director
Guillermo Domondon, Sr. (Domondon), Supt. Arnulfo Obillos (Obillos), C/Inspector Vinluan,
Sr. Inspector Amado Guiriba, Jr. (Guiriba), and SPO1 Lihaylihay remained as accused in the
subject case. During their arraignment, Domondon, Obillos, Vinluan, and Lihaylihay all pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged,10 while Guiriba remained at large.11

The Sandiganbayan Ruling

On August 8, 2008, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed Decision,12 exonerating Domondon
but finding Obillos, Vinluan, and Lihaylihay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.13 It found that all the essential elements of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 were present in the case, in particular that: (a) Obillos, Vinluan, and Lihaylihay are public
officers discharging administrative functions; (b) they have acted with evident bad faith in the
discharge of their respective functions considering that: (1) seven of the sixteen Requisition and
Invoice Vouchers (RIVs) bore erasures and/or superimposition to make it appear that the
transactions were entered into in 1992 instead of 1991;14 (2) the details of the supplies
purportedly received and inspected were not reflected in the Reports of Public Property
Purchased, thus, indicating that no actual inspection of the items were made;15 and (3) there was
a "splitting" of the subject transactions into ₱500,000.00 each to avoid the review of a higher
authority as well as to make it fall within the signing authority of Obillos; and (c) they failed to
refute the prosecution’s claim that the subject CCIE items were never received by Supply
Accountable Officer of the GSC (GSC SAO), Dante Mateo (Mateo), nor delivered to its end-
users,17 hence, leading to the conclusion that the subject transactions were indeed "ghost"
purchases which resulted to an ₱8,000,000.00 loss to the government. In view of their
conviction, Obillos, Vinluan, and Lihaylihay were sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a term of
six years and one month, as minimum, to nine years and one day, as maximum, including the
penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. They were likewise ordered to jointly
and severally indemnify the government the amount of ₱8,000,000.00.18 Aggrieved, Obillos,
Vinluan, and Lihaylihay filed their separate motions for reconsideration which were all denied in
a Resolution19 dated February 12, 2010. Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not petitioners’ conviction for the crime of violation
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 was proper.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

At the outset, it bears pointing out that in appeals from the Sandiganbayan, as in this case, only
questions of law and not questions of fact may be raised. Issues brought to the Court on whether
the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whether the
presumption of innocence was sufficiently debunked, whether or not conspiracy was
satisfactorily established, or whether or not good faith was properly appreciated, are all,
invariably, questions of fact.20 Hence, absent any of the recognized exceptions to the above-
mentioned rule,21the Sandiganbayan’s findings on the foregoing matters should be deemed as
conclusive.

Petitioners were charged with the crime of violation of Section 3(e)22 of RA 3019 which has the
following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including
the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.23 As observed by the Sandiganbayan, all these elements are extant in
this case:

As to the first element, it is undisputed that both petitioners were public officers discharging
administrative functions at the time material to this case.

As to the second element, records show that Vinluan, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Inspection and Acceptance Committee, signed the 16 certificates of acceptance, inventory, and
delivery of articles from the PNP SSS despite its incompleteness or lack of material dates, while
Lihaylihay certified to the correctness of the Inspection Report Forms even if no such deliveries
were made.24 Petitioners’ claim that the subject CCIE items were received by GSC SAO
Mateo25 is belied by the absence of any proof as to when the said deliveries were made.
Moreover, the supposed deliveries to the Narcotics Command26 were properly rejected by the
Sandiganbayan considering that the said transactions pertained to a different set of end-users
other than the PNP GSC. Hence, having affixed their signatures on the disputed documents
despite the glaring defects found therein, petitioners were properly found to have acted with
evident bad faith in approving the "ghost" purchases in the amount of ₱8,000,000.00.27 To note,
their concerted actions, when taken together, demonstrate a common design28 which altogether
justifies the finding of conspiracy.1âwphi1

Lastly, as to the third element, petitioners’ participation in facilitating the payment of non-
existent CCIE items resulted to an ₱8,000,000.00 loss on the part of the government.1âwphi1

Thus, considering the presence of all its elements, the Court sustains the conviction of petitioners
for the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

In this relation, it must be clarified that the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan29 (Arias) cannot be
applied to exculpate petitioners in view of the peculiar circumstances in this case which should
have prompted them to exercise a higher degree of circumspection, and consequently, go beyond
what their subordinates had prepared. In particular, the tampered dates on some of the RIVs, the
incomplete certification by GSC SAO Mateo on the date of receipt of the CCIE items, the
missing details on the Reports of Public Property Purchased and the fact that sixteen checks all
dated January 15, 1992 were payable to PNP SSS should have aroused a reasonable sense of
suspicion or curiosity on their part if only to determine that they were not approving a fraudulent
transaction. In a similar case where the documents in question bore irregularities too evident to
ignore, the Court in Cruz v. Sandiganbayan30carved out an exception to the Arias doctrine and as
such, held:

Unlike in Arias, however, there exists in the present case an exceptional circumstance which
should have prodded petitioner, if he were out to protect the interest of the municipality he swore
to serve, to be curious and go beyond what his subordinates prepared or recommended. In fine,
the added reason contemplated in Arias which would have put petitioner on his guard and
examine the check/s and vouchers with some degree of circumspection before signing the same
was obtaining in this case.
We refer to the unusual fact that the checks issued as payment for construction materials
purchased by the municipality were not made payable to the supplier, Kelly Lumber, but to
petitioner himself even as the disbursement vouchers attached thereto were in the name of Kelly
Lumber. The discrepancy between the names indicated in the checks, on one hand, and those in
the disbursement vouchers, on the other, should have alerted petitioner - if he were conscientious
of his duties as he purports to be - that something was definitely amiss. The fact that the checks
for the municipality’s purchases were made payable upon his order should, without more, have
prompted petitioner to examine the same further together with the supporting documents
attached to them, and not rely heavily on the recommendations of his subordinates.31 (Emphasis
supplied)

Equally compelling is the nature of petitioners’ responsibilities and their role in the purchasing of
the CCIE items in this case which should have led them to examine with greater detail the
documents which they were made to approve. As held in the recent case of Bacasmas v.

Sandiganbayan,32 when there are reasons for the heads of offices to further examine the
documents in question, they cannot seek refuge by invoking the Arias doctrine:

Petitioners cannot hide behind our declaration in Arias v. Sandiganbayan charge just because
they did not personally examine every single detail before they, as the final approving
authorities, affixed their signatures to certain documents. The Court explained in that case that
conspiracy was not adequately proven, contrary to the case at bar in which petitioners’ unity of
purpose and unity in the execution of an unlawful objective were sufficiently established. Also,
unlike in Arias, where there were no reasons for the heads of offices to further examine each
voucher in detail, petitioners herein, by virtue of the duty given to them by law as well as by
rules and regulations, had the responsibility to examine each voucher to ascertain whether it was
proper to sign it in order to approve and disburse the cash advance.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, on the matter of the admissibility of the prosecution’s evidence, suffice it to state that,
except as to the checks,34 the parties had already stipulated on the subject documents’ existence
and authenticity and accordingly, waived any objections thereon.35 In this respect, petitioners
must bear the consequences of their admission and cannot now be heard to complain against the
admissibility of the evidence against them by harking on the best evidence rule. In any event,
what is sought to be established is the mere general appearance of forgery which may be readily
observed through the marked alterations and superimpositions on the subject documents, even
without conducting a comparison with any original document as in the case of forged signatures
where the signature on the document in question must always be compared to the signature on
the original document to ascertain if there was indeed a forgery.

WHEREFORE, the petition is OENIED. The Decision dated August 8, 2008 and Resolution
dated February 12, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 22098 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

G.R. Nos. 153952-71 August 23, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (4th Div.) and HENRY BARRERA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision1 dated May
6, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan granting the Demurrer to Evidence of Mayor Henry E. Barrera
(Mayor Barrera) and dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 25035-25037, 25039-25041, 25043, 25045-
25047, 25049-25050, and 25053-25054, on the ground that the elements of the offense under
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended, were not established beyond reasonable doubt.

Mayor Barrera, together with Rufina Escala (Escala) and Santos Edquiban (Edquiban), were
charged with 14 counts of violation of Sections 3(e) and 9 of Republic Act No. 3019 in separate
Informations, which alleged essentially similar set of facts, save for the names of the
complainants, to wit:

That on or about 30 June 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Candelaria, province
of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Henry E.
Barrera, Santos Edquiban and Rufina E. Escala, all public officers, then being the Municipal
Mayor, Market Collector, and District Supervisor, respectively, all of Candelaria, Province of
Zambales, committing the penal offense herein charged against them while in the performance
of, in relation to, and taking advantage of their official functions and duties as such, thru
manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally, in conspiracy with one another, prevent [Ermelinda Abella (Criminal Case No.
25035), Lourdes Jaquias (C.C. No. 25036), John Espinosa (C.C. No. 25037), Jean Basa (C.C.
No. 25038), Lerma Espinosa (C.C. No. 25039), Eduardo Sison (C.C No. 25040), Lina Hebron
(C. C. No. 25041), Nora Elamparo (C.C. No. 25042), Luz Aspiras (C.C . No. 25043), Oscar
Lopez (C.C. No. 25044), Corazon Cansas (C.C. No. 25045), Michelle Palma (C.C. No. 25046),
Mila Saberon (C.C. No.25047), Merlina Miraflor (C.C. No. 25048), Edna Bagasina (C.C. No.
25049), Jocelyn Educalane (C.C. No. 25050), Alvin Gatdula (C.C. No. 25051), Helen Egenias
(C.C. No. 25052), Luz Eclarino (C.C. No. 25053) and Josephine Elamparo (C.C. No. 25054)], a
legitimate lessee-stallholder from exercising his/her contractual and/or proprietary rights to
transfer to, occupy and/or operate his/her assigned stall at the public market of Candelaria,
Province of Zambales, under the subsisting lease contract dated 25 June 1998, without any valid
or justifiable reason whatsoever, by means of the issuance and implementation of the patently
unlawful Memorandum No. 1 dated 30 June 1998, thereby causing undue injury to (private
complainants).2

During the Pre-Trial Conference on February 22, 2000, the People and Mayor Barrera marked
their respective documentary exhibits and entered into the following stipulation of facts:

1. That at the time material to this case as alleged in all of the Informations, accused
Henry E. Barrera was a public officer being then the municipal mayor of Candelaria,
Zambales;

2. That private complainants were awarded individual contract of lease for a market stall
in the new Candelaria Public Market by the former Mayor Fidel Elamparo before the oath
taking of the accused on June 30, 1998;

3. That the awardees are the following:

1. Ermelina Abella 11. Corazon Cansas

 2. Lourdes Jaquias 12. Michelle Palma

3. John Espinosa 13. Mila Saberon

4. Jean Basa 14. Merlinda Miraflor

5. Lerma Espinosa 15. Edna Bagasina

6. Eduardo Sison 16. Jocelyn Educalane

7. Lina Hebron 17. Alvin Gatdula

8. Nora Elamparo 18. Helen Egenias

9. Luz Aspiras 19. Luz Eclarino

10. Oscar Lopez 20. Josephine Elamparo

4. That on June 30, 1998 accused Henry E. Barrera after taking his oath as the new
Mayor of Candelaria, Zambales went to the public market and pleaded with the
complainants herein not to occupy the new market stalls;

5. That there was a public hearing conducted on the issue of the public market on July 8,
1998 by the Sangguniang Bayan with the new elected mayor as presiding officer;

6. That accused Henry E. Barrera was the Vice-Mayor of Candelaria, Zambales from
1986 to 1992;

7. That the accused was a stall holder or lessee of one of the stalls at the Candelaria
Public Market;

8. That on March 11, 1995 during the time of Mayor Fidel Elamparo, the public market
of Candelaria, Zambales was razed to the ground;

9. That the incident displaced about 60 market vendors;

10. That Ex-Mayor Elamparo assured the market vendors who were displaced together
with Congressman Antonio Diaz that they will enjoy priority/preference over the new
stalls once the public market is re-built; and

11. That the displaced market vendors were temporarily sheltered along Perla St. and
Ruby St., adjacent to the burned public market.

The parties agreed, that the only issue to be resolved is: whether or not accused Henry E. Barrera
is liable for violation of Section 3(e) and 9 of Republic Act No. 3019.3
While the Pre-Trial Order, reflecting the foregoing stipulation of facts, was not signed by the
members of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, the issuance, authenticity, and contents
thereof were never disputed nor put in issue by any of the parties.

When arraigned, accused Mayor Barrera, Escala, and Edquiban separately pleaded not guilty.

On August 2, 2000, Escala and Edquiban filed an Omnibus Motion: 1) For the Issuance of an
Order Dropping Dr. Rufina Escala and Mr. Santos Edquiban from the Information; 2) To
Withdraw Bond; and 3) To Lift Hold Departure Orders on the ground that the Ombudsman
approved the recommendation of the Special Prosecutor to drop said two accused from the
Informations.

In an Order dated August 8, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted the Omnibus Motion and
accordingly ordered Escala and Edquiban dropped from the Informations.

Complainants Abella, Jaquias, John Espinosa, Lerma Espinosa, Sison, Hebron, Cansas, Palma,
Saberon, Bagasina, Educalane, Eclarino, and Josephine Elamparo testified for the People. Upon
motion of the People, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order dated August 14, 2001, dismissing the
complaints of Basa, Norma Elamparo, Lopez, Miraflor, Gatdula, and Egenias, on the ground that
said charges cannot be prosecuted successfully without the testimony of these six complainants.
The People, however, proceeded with the prosecution of the complaints of Abella and the 13
other complainants (Abella, et al.). Subsequently, the People formally offered its documentary
exhibits, which were admitted in evidence.

Mayor Barrera filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence on October 23, 2001,
which the Sandiganbayan granted in an Order dated October 29, 2001.

Mayor Barrera filed his Demurrer to Evidence on November 8, 2001, avowing that there was no
bad faith in his issuance of Memorandum No. 1, which prevented Abella, et al., from occupying
the new stalls at the Candelaria Public Market. He explained that he needed to issue
Memorandum No. 1 since the previous Municipal Mayor, Fidel Elamparo, awarded the Lease
Contracts over the new public market stalls less than a week before the end of the latter’s term
and without regard to the requirement of pertinent laws. Mayor Barrera also claimed that he did
not act with manifest partiality in issuing Memorandum No. 1 considering that said issuance
applies not only to Abella, et al., but also to all awardees of the questionable Lease Contracts.
Mayor Barrera further pointed out that Abella, et al., did not suffer any undue injury even when
they were unable to occupy the new public market stalls as they were able to continue working
and earning as market vendors at the temporary public market site. Hence, Mayor Barrera argued
that any purported damage sustained by Abella, et al., by reason of the issuance and
implementation of Memorandum No. 1 should be solely borne by them, being damnum absque
injuria.

In its Comment/Opposition to Mayor Barrera’s Demurrer to Evidence, the People asserted that
the pieces of evidence it adduced and presented were more than sufficient to sustain the accused
Mayor’s conviction. The People maintained that it would be in Mayor Barrera’s best interest to
explain during trial why on June 30, 1998, said Mayor, assisted by the police, forcibly evicted
Abella, et al., from the new public market and padlocked the market stalls without the benefit of
any court order. According to the People, Mayor Barrera’s actuations displayed a wanton
disregard of the constitutional rights to life and property, as well as to due process of law, which
resulted to business losses on the part of Abella, et al., from the time their market stalls were
closed.

On May 6, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision granting Mayor Barrera’s Demurrer
to Evidence and dismissing the criminal cases against said Mayor. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Demurrer to Evidence filed by accused HENRY E. BARRERA, through

counsel, is hereby GRANTED and Criminal Cases Nos. 25035-37; 25039-41; 25043; 25045-47;
25049-50 and 25053-54 are hereby DISMISSED on the ground that the elements of the offense
under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, were not established beyond reasonable doubt.4

Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan judgment, the People filed the
present Petition, faulting the graft court for the following:

THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

PROMULGATING THE ASSAILED DECISION AS IT NEVER EXPRESSED
CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE ON WHICH IT
IS BASED, IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF SEC. 14, ARTICLE VIII OF
THE CONSTITUTION.

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE AND QUANTIFY
ACTUAL INJURY AND DAMAGE SUFFERED BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANTS.

III

THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE EVIDENT BAD FAITH
ON THE PART OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

The Petition has no merit.

At the outset, we note that this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was
filed without a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated May 6, 2002 having been filed
before the Sandiganbayan. This fact alone would have warranted the dismissal of the instant
Petition given the general rule that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non
before the filing of a petition for certiorari. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,5 we held:
As a rule, the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, lies only when the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct
the error imputed to it through a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution.
The rationale of the rule rests upon the presumption that the court or administrative body which
issued the assailed order or resolution may amend the same, if given the chance to correct its
mistake or error. The motion for reconsideration, therefore, is a condition sine qua non before
filing a petition for certiorari.

Here, petitioners filed the instant petitions for certiorari without interposing a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan. Section 1 of the same Rule 65
requires that petitioners must not only show that the trial court, in issuing the questioned
Resolution, "acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," but that "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." We have held that the "plain," "speedy," and
"adequate remedy" referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the
questioned Order or Resolution. It bears stressing that the strict application of this rule will also
prevent unnecessary and premature resort to appellate proceedings. We thus cannot countenance
petitioners’ disregard of this procedural norm and frustrate its purpose of attaining speedy,
inexpensive, and orderly judicial proceedings.

In justifying their failure to file the required motion for reconsideration, petitioners vehemently
assert that they were "deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief, and that
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless."

We are not persuaded.

Petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for
reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for
reconsideration, petitioners must show concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so. They
must demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan, in issuing the assailed Resolution, acted capriciously,
whimsically and arbitrarily by reason of passion and personal hostility. Such capricious,
whimsical and arbitrary acts must be apparent on the face of the assailed Resolution. These, they
failed to do.

The People in the instant case absolutely failed to provide any explanation as to why it did not
first move for reconsideration of the challenged Sandiganbayan judgment before seeking a writ
of certiorari from this Court. We therefore cannot find any "concrete, compelling, and valid
reason" to except the People from the aforementioned general rule of procedure.

The Petition at bar must also be dismissed on substantive grounds.

Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "[n]o decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based." The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is to inform the person
reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after
consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe
that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the
court for review by a higher tribunal. Thus, a decision is adequate if a party desiring to appeal
therefrom can assign errors against it.6

Our review of the Sandiganbayan Decision dated May 6, 2006 reveals that said judgment
actually contained a summary of the antecedent facts and proceedings; as well as a discussion on
the relevant statutory provisions, the elements of the offense charged, and the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by the People. The factual and legal bases of the assailed
Sandiganbayan Decision, granting Mayor Barrera’s Demurrer to Evidence, are readily evident in
the following excerpts therefrom:

The instant "Demurrer to Evidence" is impressed with merit.

Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. 3019, provides that:

Section 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful;

xxxx

e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. x x x

To be liable for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, four essential elements (as
stated in the Information filed in the present cases) must be present:

1) That the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
public officers;

2) That said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his
official duties or in relation to his public position;

3) That he causes undue injury to any party, whether government or private individuals;
and

4) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.

The first two above-stated elements are clearly present in the instance cases. However, the third
and fourth elements appear to be absent, or at best remain doubtful.
The undue injury mentioned as the third essential element in the commission of the crime
requires proof of actual injury and damage. Clarifying, the Supreme Court, in Llorente v.
Sandiganbayan, stated:

"x x x Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot be presumed even after a
wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the
elements of a crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury or the giving of any unwarranted
advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue
injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty."

In the instant cases, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to prove actual injury and
damage suffered by the private complainants, as one of the elements of the crime herein charged,
in that it failed to specify, quantify and prove to the point of moral certainty the purported
"undue injury". The complainants in their testimonies, admitted that they have been working and
earning, either as market vendors or in pursuit of their profession from the time of the closure of
their respective market stalls up to now. Also, their claims of business losses, at the time material
to the cases at bar, leave much to be desired vis-à-vis the moral certitude exacted by law to prove
the alleged undue injury. Pathetically, said evidence, are either contradictory or incredible.

Likewise, the prosecution’s evidence failed to prove manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith
on the part of the accused, as the fourth of the above-stated requisites for the commission of the
crime herein charged.

For an act to be considered as exhibiting "manifest partiality," there must be a showing of a clear,
notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other. "Partiality" is
synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished
for rather than as they are." "Evident bad faith," on the other hand, is something which does not
simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent
or ill will; It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design, or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purpose.
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest and deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do
wrong or cause damage.

The evidence presented by the prosecution falls short of that quantum of proof necessary to
establish the fact that the accused acted with manifest partiality or with evident bad faith. On the
contrary, what is clear from the evidence adduced, was that herein accused simply exercised his
legitimate powers under the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) which provides that a
municipal mayor has the power to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers" and, for this purpose, he shall have the
power to "issue such executive order as are necessary for the proper enforcement and execution
of the laws and ordinances." Ex-Mayor Elamparo’s acts of entering into lease contracts, when his
term was about to expire and herein accused-movant’s term was about to commence, being the
mayor-elect, was not only in violation of the Local Government Code provision that "no contract
may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without
prior authorization by the sangguniang concerned," but also of the other requirements of law
such as, a verified application from the complainants, payment of application fees, drawing of
lots and the opening of bids, since not all the displaced vendors can be accommodated in the
thirty-two stalls in the new public market. The intent of such a maneuvering was obviously to tie
the hands of the incoming administration.

The undue haste of awarding stalls in the new public market by Ex-Mayor Elamparo was
flagrant, because from 26 June to 30 June, 1998, former stall holders of the old market that
burned down, held a rally to denounce the allegedly unfair awarding of contracts of lease over
the new stalls, complaints ranging from awards to new comers, to instances of two stalls, being
awarded to one lessee.

It was precisely in this state of affair that prompted herein accused-movant Barrera to cause the
issuance of Memorandum No. 1, Series of 1998, after he had taken his oath as mayor of
Candelaria, Zambales, to wit:

"You are hereby advised that effective 1:00 PM, June 30, 1998, the transferring to and
occupancy of stalls inside the Public Market shall be temporarily suspended.

For your strict implementation and compliance."

Lastly, of significance is the fact that Memorandum No. 1 applied to all stallholders at the new
public market, be they supporters or not of Mayor Barrera during the 1998 mayoralty elections
just past. These admissions of the complaining witnesses in open court, thus, refute their
allegations in their affidavits that the purpose of the memorandum was to award the new stalls to
Mayor Barrera’s supporters.

In the light of all the foregoing, We find that herein accused-movant Henry E. Barrera cannot in
fairness be held liable under the indictment. In this connection, it has been held that the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense; the burden of proof is never on the accused to disprove the facts necessary to establish
the crime charged. "It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence" says the Supreme Court, "that
unless the prosecution discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.7

In fact, based on the foregoing, the People was able to identify and discuss with particularity in
its present Petition the grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the graft court in
granting Mayor Barrera’s Demurrer to Evidence. Thus, contrary to the People’s contention, the
aforequoted Sandiganbayan judgment did not violate the mandate of Article VIII, Section 14 of
the 1987 Constitution.

We further disagree with the People’s assertion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Sandiganbayan in ruling that several elements for the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 30198 are lacking, or at best, doubtful, in this case.
In order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the provision itself
explicitly requires that the accused caused undue injury for having acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or with gross inexcusable negligence, in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial function. The People’s evidence failed to support the existence of these
two elements.

The issuance by Mayor Barrera of Memorandum No. 1 is rooted in Section 444, in relation to
Section 22, of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
which provide:

Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. – (a) The
municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the municipal government, shall exercise such powers
and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal
mayor shall:

xxxx

(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the municipality and the
exercise of its corporate powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code, implement all
approved policies, programs, projects, services and activities of the municipality and, in addition
to the foregoing, shall:

xxxx

(iii) Issue such executive orders as are necessary for the proper enforcement and execution of
laws and ordinances.

Section 22. Corporate Powers. – x x x

xxxx

(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief
executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian
concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the
provincial capitol or the city, municipality or barangay hall.

The award of Lease Contracts over the new public market stalls were marred by several
irregularities, among which, was it being made by the former Mayor with only one week before
the expiration of his term and the lack of prior authorization by the sanggunian as required by
Section 22(c) of Republic Act No. 7160. Also, there were 60 market vendors displaced by the
fire at the old public market, but only 32 stalls were available for occupancy at the new public
market. A rally was held by the stall holders displaced by the fire from the old public market to
denounce the allegedly unfair awarding of the Lease Contracts over the new public market stalls
to new comers, and even in some instances, the awarding of two stalls to only one lessee. These
circumstances prompted Mayor Barrera, the newly elected Municipal Mayor, to issue
Memorandum No. 1 pursuant to his duty of enforcing and implementing laws and ordinances for
the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants. It bears to stress that Memorandum
No. 1 applies equitably to all awardees of the Lease Contracts over the new public market stalls,
not just Abella, et al., and did not give any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to any
particular private party. Consequently, we find that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when it declared that Mayor Barrera did not issue Memorandum No. 1 with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or with gross inexcusable negligence.

Moreover, in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan,9 we explained that the undue injury caused to any party,
including the government, under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, could only mean actual
injury or damage which must be established by evidence. Abella, et al., alleged undue
damage/injury by reason of Memorandum No. 1 because they had been unable to occupy the
new public market stalls and were thus deprived of their daily income of varying amounts.
However, Abella, et al., in their own testimonies,10 admitted that that they have continued
working and earning – either as market vendors at the temporary public market site, or in pursuit
of their profession – from the time their market stalls were closed until present time. Hence, there
was no sufficient evidence to establish actual injury or damage suffered by Abella, et al., by
reason of Memorandum No. 1.

In People v. Sandiganbayan,11 we defined grave abuse of discretion as follows:

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. x
x x.

xxxx

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution
had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."
Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for
to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the
case ends there.

The sole office of an extraordinary writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. For as long as the court acted within its jurisdiction, an error of judgment that it may
commit in the exercise thereof is not correctible through the special civil action of certiorari. To
reiterate, the Sandiganbayan, in rendering the challenged Decision, acted with jurisdiction and
did not gravely abuse its discretion.
There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting Mayor
Barrera’s Demurrer to Evidence as to deprive the graft court of jurisdiction, the issuance of a
writ of certiorari is not warranted in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 197567 November 19, 2014

GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, LEONARDO B. ROMAN, ROMEO L. MENDIOLA,
PASTOR P. VICHUACO, AURORA J. TIAMBENG, and NUMERIANO G.
MEDINA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the Resolution2 dated May 30, 2006 and the
Order3 dated October 9, 2009 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-L-C-05-
0084-A, which dismissed the criminal complaint against herein respondents for lack of probable
cause.

The Facts

The present case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit4 filed by herein petitioner Enrique T.
Garcia, Jr. (Garcia), incumbent Provincial Governor of the Province of Bataan (Province), before
the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-L-C-05-0084-A, against respondents former Provincial
Governor Leonardo B. Roman (Roman), former Executive Assistant Romeo L. Mendiola
(Mendiola), former Provincial Treasurer Pastor P. Vichuaco (Vichuaco), former Budget Officer
Aurora J. Tiambeng (Tiambeng), and incumbent5 Provincial Accountant Numeriano G. Medina
(Medina), all of the Provincial Capitol of Bataan, charging them with Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification of Public Documents under Article 217 in relation to Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act
No. (RA) 3019, or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," inter alia.

Also charged were incumbent6 Provincial Engineer Amelia R. De Pano (De Pano), Assistant
Provincial Engineer Angelito A. Rodriguez (Rodriguez), Engineer Noel G. Jimenez (Jimenez),
and Architect Bernardo T. Capistrano (Capistrano), as well as Noel Valdecañas7 (Valdecañas),
the owner and manager of V.F. Construction of Balanga City.
The essential allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit are as follows:

On November 3, 2003, Roman, being the Provincial Governor at that time, entered into a
contract8 with V.F. Construction, as represented by Valdecañas, for the construction of a mini-
theater at the Bataan State College - Abucay Campus, Abucay, Bataan (project) for the contract
price of ₱3,660,000.00.9

Thereafter, or on February 23, 2004, Roman signed and issued a Certificate of

Acceptance,10 stating that the project was "100% completed in accordance with plans and
specification[s]" per the Accomplishment Report11 and Certification,12 both dated February 20,
2004, prepared and signed by Capistrano, Jimenez, Rodriguez, and De Pano. Valdecañas also
affixed his signature on the said Accomplishment Report and later executed an Affidavit13dated
May 26, 2004 stating that the project was 100% completed.

In view of the project’s purported completion, two (2) Land Bank of the Philippines
checks14 (Land Bank checks) – each in the amount of ₱1,655,318.18 (or ₱3,310,636.36 in total)
– were respectively issued by Roman and Vichuaco on April 30 and June 2, 2004 in favor of
V.F. Construction. The issuances were made pursuant to two (2) separate Disbursement
Vouchers15 prepared and issued by De Pano, Medina, and Vichuaco, and approved for payment
by Roman. In addition, an Allotment and Obligation Slip16 (ALOBS) was issued, prepared, and
signed by De Pano, Tiambeng, and Medina to reimburse V.F. Construction for the cost of the
labor and materials utilized for the construction of the project. Tiambeng also certified in the
ALOBS the "existence of [an] appropriation" for the said project.17 Meanwhile, Mendiola
prepared all the supporting documents for the approval and release of the funds therefor, and
submitted the same to Roman for his signature.18

The receipts issued by V.F. Construction dated May 5, 200419 and June 3, 200420 show that it
received the payments for the project.

Notwithstanding the various documents attesting to the project’s supposed completion, as well as
the disbursement of funds in payment therefor, Garcia – Roman’s successor as Provincial
Governor – authorized the inspection of the project sometimein August 2004 and discovered that
while its construction was indeed commenced, it remained unfinished as reflected in a
Memorandum Report21 dated August 24, 2004.

Hence, Garcia filed the above-mentioned Complaint-Affidavit against, among others,

respondents, who, in response, proffered their individual defenses.22

For his part, Roman cited political enmity between him and Garcia as the reason for the filing of
the complaint.23 He defended the genuineness of the project, averring that it was not a "ghost
project" as, in fact, substantial work had been done thereon.24 He ascribed the falsehood in this
case to the Accomplishment Report and Certification dated February 20, 2004, as well as
Valdecañas’s Affidavit, which all stated that the project was 100% completed, claiming that he
had no participation in their preparation and execution25 and that he only signed the
Disbursement Vouchers after finding no irregularities on the said documents.26
Similarly, Mendiola denied any participation in the preparation and execution of any of the
documents involved in the project.27

On the other hand, Vichuaco admitted having signed the Disbursement Vouchers and Land Bank
checks, from which the project was funded, but denied having any knowledge that the
construction thereof was not yet completed.28 He claimed to have signed the Disbursement
Vouchers only after having ascertained that De Pano and Medina, in their official capacities, had
already signed the same, and ventured that he would not have done so had he known that the
project was not yet complete.29

Medina also admitted having signed the Disbursement Vouchers and ALOBS, but claimed that
he did so after a thorough examination of the supporting documents, i.e., the Accomplishment
Report and Certification. He stated that he was not informed that the project was not yet
completed when he signed the Disbursement Vouchers and the ALOBS, adding that the project
was already substantially completed when Garcia prevented further work on the same.30 He
further insisted that the project was covered by a corresponding appropriation.31

Meanwhile, Tiambeng claimed that, as the Budget Officer of Bataan at the time, she verified that
there was a corresponding appropriation for the project. Thus, she signed the ALOBS, which she
claimed was a ministerial duty on her part.32 In this regard, she posited that she would not have
signed the same had she known that there was no appropriation for the project.33

As for the other officials charged, namely, De Pano, Rodriguez, Jimenez, and Capistrano, they
collectively admitted having signed the Accomplishment Report and Certification, but
maintained that they did so only after the same had been reviewed by the other provincial
engineers.34 Valdecañas, for his part, denied35 the allegations against him and claimed that
Medina borrowed his contractor’s accreditation in order to participate in the bidding for the
project. He pointed out that it was Medina who actually participated in the bidding process and
that his signature appearing on the documents pertaining to the project was falsified.36 He added
that he was out of the country when payments for the project were made.37

The Ombudsman Ruling

In a Resolution38 dated May 30, 2006, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict De Pano,
Rodriguez, Jimenez, and Capistrano for the crime of Falsification of Public Documents by
making it appear through the aforesaid Certification and Accomplishment Report that the project
had already been completed when the same was only partially constructed. The Ombudsman
held that their report was necessary for the issuance of a certification for the disbursement of
funds therefor.39

On the other hand, the Ombudsman cleared respondents from liability on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence, reasoning that "mere signature on a voucher or certification is not
enough" to establish any conspiracy among them which would warrant their
conviction.40 Relying on the doctrine enunciated in the case of Arias v. Sandiganbayan41(Arias)
which states that "[a]ll heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates
and on the good faith ofthose who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations,"42 the Ombudsman held that there was "no direct and strong evidence that [Roman]
participated in the fraudulent act/transaction"43 and that his act, together with that of the other
respondents, was protected by the "legal presumption of good faith and regularity,"44 which
Garcia failed to overcome.

Oddly, no pronouncement was made with regard to the criminal charges against Valdecañas.45

Dissatisfied, Garcia moved for reconsideration,46 citing the Commission on Audit’s (CoA) Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-004-100 (2004)47 dated April 21, 2005 (CoA
Memo), which stated that the project had no source of funds, thus rendering the contract therefor
void and the payments made therefor illegal.48Moreover, by approving and effecting the payment
of the project despite its non-completion and the absence of an allotment therefor, Garcia
claimed that respondents, who acted in conspiracy with each other, should beheld liable this time
for the crime of Technical Malversation under Article 22049 of the RPC.50

In an Order51 dated October 9, 2009, the Ombudsman denied Garcia’s motion for
reconsideration, hence, this certiorari petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The central issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing all the criminal charges against respondents for lack of probable cause.
In his certiorari petition, Garcia maintains that the findings in the CoA Memo are sufficient to
establish probable cause and to hold respondents for trial for the crimes of Technical
Malversation, Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents, and for
Violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.52 As it appears, the other criminal and administrative
charges contained in his complaint-affidavit53 were not anymore discussed in the said
petition.Thus, the Court is constrained to confine its analysis only to what has been alleged
therein.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

I.

The present Constitution and RA 6770,54 otherwise known as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989,"
have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise ofits
investigatory and prosecutorial powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public
officials and employees.55 Hence, as a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the
Ombudsman’s findings and respects the initiative and independence inherent in its office, which
"beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the
public service."56

The foregoing principle does not, however, apply when the Ombudsman’s ruling is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, subjecting the same to certiorari correction. Among other instances,
the Ombudsman may be deemed to have gravely abused its discretion when it unjustifiably fails
to take essential facts and evidence into consideration in the determination of probable cause.57 It
may also be committed when the Ombudsman patently violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence. Indeed, any decision, order or resolution of a tribunal tantamount to
overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably grave abuse of
discretion.58

Legally classified, such misdeeds fall squarely within the concept of grave abuse of discretion
which is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public
officer concerned, which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
poweris exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.59

Applying these principles to thiscase, the Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its
discretion when it disregarded the CoA Memo and patently misapplied existing jurisprudence –
particularly, the Ariascase – in ruling that there was no probable cause for the crime of Violation
of Section 3 (e),60 RA 3019. Accordingly, respondents should be indicted for such. However, the
same does not hold true for the other crimes of Technical Malversation and Malversation of
PublicFunds through Falsification of Public Documents for reasons that will be hereinafter
discussed.

II.

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof. To engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and to determine if the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the
crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that
every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no criminal
offense.61

The elements of the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e),62 RA 3019 are as follows: (a) the
offender must be a public officer discharging administrative,judicial, or official functions; (b) he
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.63

Considering the findings contained in the CoA Memo, which the Ombudsman, however,
disregarded, it is quite clear that all the foregoing elements are, in all reasonable likelihood,
present with respect to respondents’ participation in this case.

Respondents, who were all public officers at the time of the alleged commission of the crime –
particularly, as provincial officials of Bataan discharging administrative functions (first element)
– apparently acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith – or, at the very least, gross
inexcusable negligence – when they issued the pertinent documents and certifications that led to
the diversion of public funds to a project that had no proper allotment, i.e., the mini-theater
project (second element). The absence of such allotment not only renders invalid the release of
funds therefor but also taints the legality of the project’s appropriation64 as well as the Province’s
contract with V.F. Construction. As the CoA Memo pertinently explains:

Four contracted infrastructure projects and a financial assistance extended to [the] barangay by
your administration amounting to ₱5,404,000 and ₱100,000, respectively, were found devoid of
valid appropriations. Of the amounts, ₱4,992,750 was already paid while the remaining balance
of ₱511,250 was lodged to Accounts Payable. The non-existence of valid appropriations
rendered the contracts void and the payments illegal.

The said projects were among the 19 provided with appropriations totalling ₱14,005,000 in the
[P]rovince’s 2003 Closing Budgets embodied under Ordinance No. A-6 and approved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in its Resolution No. 54 on February 23, 2004.

The validity of the appropriations and the subsequent transactions were not considered in audit
due tolack of legal basis, to wit:

a. No sources of funds for the ₱14.005M appropriation rendering it invalid

The ₱43,487,527.16 computed source/available balance for the ₱14,005,000 appropriation was
already used as the beginning available balance in the computation of the Estimated Revenues
and Receipts considered in the earlier approved CY 2004 Annual General Fund Budget
contained in Appropriation Ordinance No. 2 and passed under S.P. Resolution No. 6 on January
12, 2004 (Please see Annex A [with the heading "Supplemental Appropriations of ₱14,005,000.
CY 2003 Closing Budget]). Sec. 321 of RA 7160 provides, among others, that:

"No ordinance providing for a supplemental budget shall be enacted, except when supported by
funds actually available as certified by the local treasurer or by new revenue sources."

b. Non-release of allotments for the ₱14.005 M appropriation

Allotment is the authorizationissued by the Local Chief Executive (LCE) to a department/office

of the LGU, which allows it to incur obligations, for specified amounts, within the appropriation
ordinance. (Sec. 08, Manual on the NGAS for LGUs, Volume I).

As verified from the Accounting and Budget offices, no allotments were released for the
projects, hence the incurrence of the obligations were not authorized. In spite of this, the amount
of ₱14,005,000 was taken up among the continuing appropriations/allotments in CY 2004. Also,
Allotment and Obligation Slips (ALOBS) which serve as the LGU commitments to pay were
certified for eight of the projects in the amount of ₱7,816,000.65 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

To be clear, the nineteen (19) projects mentioned in the CoA Memo were listed under "Annex
B"66 thereof entitled "Schedule of Contracted Projects and Financial Assistance Out ofInvalid
Appropriations, CY 2004," all of which had no allotments issued. First and foremost on the list is
the construction of the mini-theater project. A similar CoA memorandum, AOM No. 2004-
2667 dated September 6, 2004, which was also ignored by the Ombudsman, contains the same
audit results with regard to the lack of a valid allotment for the project. Thus, absent compliance
with this basic requirement, the authorizations made by respondents in relation to the project
were therefore prima facie tainted with illegality, amounting to either manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or, at the very least, to gross inexcusable negligence. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect
that respondents – being the Province’s accountable officers at that time – had knowledge of the
procedure on allotments and appropriations. Knowledge of basic procedure is part and parcel of
respondents’ shared fiscal responsibility under Section 305 (l) of RA 7160, viz.:

Section 305. Fundamental Principles.- The financial affairs, transactions, and operations of local
government units shall be governed by the following fundamental principles:

xxxx

(l) Fiscal responsibility shall beshared by all those exercising authority over the financial affairs,
transactions, and operations of the local government units; x x x.

Hence, unless the CoA’s findings are substantially rebutted, the allotment’s absence should have
roused respondents’ suspicions, as regards the project’s legality, and, in consequence, prevented
them from approving the disbursements therefor. This is especially true for Roman, who, as the
Local Chief Executive of the Province at that time, was primarily charged with the issuance of
allotments.68 As such, he was in the position to know if the allotment requirement had, in the first
place, been complied with, given that it was a pre-requisite before the project could have been
contracted.

In addition, the Court observes the same degree of negligence on the part of respondents in
seemingly attesting to the project’s 100% completion when such was not the case. The erroneous
certification rendered the disbursements made by the Province suspect as V.F. Construction had
still to fulfill its contractual obligations to the Province and yet were able to receive full payment.

Considering that the illegal diversion of public funds for the mini theafter project would
undermine the execution of other projects legitimately supported by proper allotments, it is quite
obvious that undue injury on the part of the Province and its residents would be caused.
Likewise, considering that V.F. Construction had already received full payment for a project that
had yet to be completed,it also appears that a private party was given unwarranted benefits by
respondents inthe discharge of their functions (third element).

Thus, with the elements of the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 herein ostensibly
present, the Court hereby holds that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion whenit
dismissed said charge against respondents.

That the Ombudsman had not, in any manner, mentioned the two (2) CoA AOMs, i.e., AOM
Nos. 2005-004-100 (2004) (i.e., the CoA Memo) and 2004-26, in its ruling leads the Court to
believe that it deliberately failed to consider the same. As the Court sees it, these are significant
pieces of evidence which should not have been casually ignored. This stems from a becoming
respect which all government agencies should accord to the CoA’s findings. Verily, being the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government, the CoA is vested with broad powers
over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public
funds and property.69 As held in the case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.:70

[I]t is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially onewhich is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also
finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that
this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.71

With the weight accorded to the CoA’s findings, the Ombudsman should have, at the very least,
explained its reasons as to why the two (2) CoA AOMs had no bearing in this case. However, no
such explanation was herein made. As such, the Court holds that the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion in this respect.

Palpable too is the Ombudsman’s grave abuse of discretion by its misplaced reliance on the
Arias doctrine.1âwphi1

The factual circumstances which led to the Court’s ruling in Arias were such that there was
nothing else in the documents presented before the head of office therein that would
haverequired the detailed examination of each paper or document, viz.:

We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents,
received procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly-sized office
could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would
be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor isnot ordinarily
expected to call the restaurant aboutthe amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was
present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise
personally look into the reimbursement voucher’s accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has
to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive
head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume ofpapers that
must be signed. x x x.72 (Emphasis supplied)

Simply put, when a matter is irregular on the document’s face, so much so that a detailed
examination becomes warranted, the Arias doctrine is unavailing.

Here, it cannot be denied that the absence of an allotment for the project already rendered all
related documents/transactions irregular on their face. By this fact alone, respondents ought to
have known that something was amiss. To echo the CoA Memo, Section 321 of RA 7160
provides, among others, that "[n]o ordinance providing for a supplemental budget shall be
enacted, except when supported by funds actually availableas certified by the local treasurer or
by new revenue sources." Section 8, Chapter 3 of the Manual on the NGAS for LGUs, Volume I
further defines an "[a]llotment [as] the authorizationissued by the Local Chief Executive (LCE)
to a department/office of the LGU, which allows it to incur obligations, for specified amounts,
within the appropriation ordinance." Since the mini-theater project was an appropriation made in
a supplemental budget, then there should have been funds certified to be actually available for
such appropriation to even be made. However, as the CoA found, no such funds were certified as
available. Likewise, the project had no supporting allotment, which means thatthere was
basically no authority for the provincial officials, i.e., respondents, to even incur the obligations
under the V.F. Construction contract, much morefor them to disburse the funds in connection
therewith. Section 344 of RA 7160 provides:

Section 344. Certification on, and Approval of, Vouchers.- No money shall be disbursed unless
the local budget officer certifies to the existence of appropriation that has been legally made for
the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer
certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. x x x.

xxxx

With these apparent irregularities, it is quite perplexing how the Ombudsman could have applied
the Arias doctrine in support of its ruling, especially with respect to the charge of Violation of
Section 3 (e), RA 3019. Thus, by patently misapplying existing jurisprudence, the Court finds
that the Ombudsman also committed a grave abuse of discretion on this score and its ruling, in
these aspects, must bereversed and set aside. In fine, the Ombudsman is ordered to file in the
proper court the necessary Information against respondents for violating Section 3 (e), RA 3019.

That being said, the Court proceeds to discuss the other charges contained in Garcia’s petition.
III.

As earlier stated, Garcia, in his petition, also seeks that respondents be indicted for the crimes of
Technical Malversation, and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents. However, unlike the charge for the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019, the
Court is unable to render the same disposition.

First, while Garcia insists upon the sufficiency of his evidence to indict respondents for
Technical Malversation, the Court cannot pass upon this issue, considering that the Complaint-
Affidavit filed before the Ombudsman originally charged respondents not with Technical
Malversation under Article 22073 of the RPC, but with Malversation of Public Funds through
Falsification of Public Documents, defined and penalized under Article 217,74 in relation to
Article 17175 of the RPC, a complex crime.76 It bears stressing that the elements of Malversation
of Public Funds are distinctly different from those of Technical Malversation. In the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal
useor allows any other person to take such public funds for the latter’s personal use. On the other
hand, in Technical Malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration
not for his or another’s personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was
appropriated by law or ordinance.77 Technical Malversation does not include, or is not
necessarily included in the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.78

Since the acts supposedly committed by respondents constituting the crime of Technical
Malversation were not alleged in the Complaint Affidavit and the crime for which respondents
raised their respective defenses was not Technical Malversation, the petition must perforce be
denied on this score. Otherwise, the Court would be sanctioning a violation of respondents’
constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them, so as to deny them a reasonable opportunity to suitably prepare their defense.79

Finally, with respect to the chargeof Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of
Public Documents, the Court observes that there lies no evidence which would give a prima
facieindication that the funds disbursed for the project were misappropriated for any personal
use. The CoA Memo shows that the Province’s funds were used for a public purpose, i.e., the
mini-theater project, albeit without any allotment issued therefor. Garcia also fails to convince
the Court that the Province’s funds were diverted to some personal purpose. Failing in which, the
Court cannot pronounce that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing such charge.

As it stands, Garcia’s petition is granted only in part as respondents should be indicted for the
lone crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 for the reasons above-discussed. It must,
however, be clarified that the dismissal of the charge of Technical Malversation is without
prejudice to its proper re-filing unless barred by prescription, considering that such dismissal was
based merely on procedural grounds and is not, in any way, tantamount to an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolution dated May 30, 2006 and
the Order dated October 9, 2009 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-C-05-0084-A,
insofar as they dismissed the criminal charge against respondents Leonardo B. Roman, Romeo L.
Mendiola, Pastor P. Vichuaco, Aurora J. Tiambeng, and Numeriano G. Medina (respondents),
for Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents, are AFFIRMED.
However, the said Resolution and Order, insofar as they dismissed the criminal charge against
respondents for violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act" are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is ORDERED to file
in the proper court the necessary Information for violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 against
respondents. Finally, for reasons herein discussed, the criminal charge against respondents for
Technical Malversation is DISMISSED, without prejudice to its proper re-filing.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. 188066 October 22, 2014

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision2 dated
November 21, 2008 and Resolution3 dated May 14, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 03498, which reversed and set aside the Consolidated Decision4 dated June 30,
2005 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman) and absolved respondent Cynthia
E. Caberoy (Caberoy) of any administrative liability.

Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Avanceña National High School (RANHS) in Arevalo, Iloilo
City. She was charged with Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e) and (f) ofRepublic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"by Angeles O. Tuares (Tuares) for
allegedly withholding her salary for the month of June 2002. The case was docketed as OMB-V-
A-03-0239-E. Saidcase was consolidated with OMB-V-A-03-0572-I, which was a complaint
filed by Tuares against Ida B. Endonila, Erlinda G. Gencaya, Clarissa G. Zamora and Victoria T.
Calunsod.

Caberoy denied the charge against her, alleging, among others, that the payrolls of June 1 to15,
2002 and June16 to 30, 2002 show that Tuares received her salary as shown by her signatures on
lines no. 11 of the payrolls.5

In the Consolidated Decision dated June 30, 2005 rendered by the Ombudsman, Caberoy was
found guilty of Oppression and was meted out the penalty of dismissal from service. The
dispositive portion of the consolidated decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Principal II, Ramon

Avanceña National High School, (RANHS), Arevalo, Iloilo City, is hereby found GUILTY of
OPPRESSION and is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH
CANCELLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBILITY, FORFEITURE OFEARNED
LEAVECREDITS AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS, AND DISQUALIFICATION FROM
REEMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE. On the other hand, respondents IDA
B. ENDONILA, Schools Division Superintendent, ERLINDA G. GENCAYA, Asst. Schools
Division Superintendent, CLARISSA G. ZAMORA, Administrative Officer III, all three of the
Division of Iloilo City, DepEd Region VI, Iloilo City, and VICTORIA T. CALUNSOD, Officer-
In-Charge/Secondary School Head Teacher III, Ramon Avanceña National High School,
(RANHS) Arevalo, Iloilo City, are found NOT GUILTYof the same offense and/or violating
Sec. 3 (f) of R.A. 3019 and thus these cases are considered DISMISSED as far as they are
concerned. Furthermore, on the administrative aspect of the counter-allegation of Perjury against
herein complainant ANGELES O. TUARES, Ramon Avanceña National High School, Arevalo,
Iloilo City, the same is likewise DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
SO DECIDED.6

Caberoy filed a joint motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Ombudsman in its
Order dated September 19, 2006.7

The Ombudsman found that Tuares was not paid any amount in June 2002 because of her failure
to submit her clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers (PAST), while the other
teachers received their salaries for the same month.8 The Ombudsman concluded that Tuares was
"singled out by respondent Caberoy as the only one who did not receive any amount from the
school on June 2002 because, as established earlier, the former failed to submit her clearance and
PAST."9 The Ombudsman also took into consideration several infractions previously committed
by Caberoy, which allegedly displayed her "notoriousundesirability as a government officer for
withholding teachers’ salaries without authority."10 According to the Ombudsman, Caberoy
could not honestly claim that she had not been forewarned by the Ombudsman of the grave
consequences of her repeated illegal act.11Caberoy filed a petition for certiorariwith the CA,
seeking the reversal of her dismissal from service, and in the assailed Decision dated November
21, 2008, the CA granted Caberoy’s petition. The dispositive portion of the CA decision states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The consolidated decision dated June 30, 2005, of
the respondent Ombudsman is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is
hereby rendered ABSOLVING the petitioner of any liability, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.12

The Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in the assailed
Resolution dated May 14, 2009.

In clearing Caberoy from the charge against her, the CA found that no undue injury was caused
to Tuares since she received her June 2002 salary. According to the CA, since Caberoy was
charged with Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the element of undue injury is
absent in this case, Caberoy cannot be held liable for the offense.13 The CA also ruled that
Caberoy’s "refusal" to release Tuares’ salary was justified and the element of "failure to so act x
x x for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter
some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interestedparty, or
[discrimination] against another" under Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019, is likewise
absent.14 Finally, the CA found that the acts of Caberoy are not constitutive of oppression.15

Lastly, the CA ruled that the Ombudsman’s findings and conclusions are not supported by
substantial evidencesince Caberoy’s act of withholding Tuares’ salaries was clearly
justified.16 Hence, the present petition, based on the ground that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ REVERSAL OF THE PETITIONER OFFICE OF

THE OMBUDSMAN’S DECISION FINDING [CABEROY] ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE
FOR OPPRESSION IS AN ERROR OF LAW CONSIDERING THAT ITS FINDINGS IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTAN[T]IAL EVIDENCE.17
The Ombudsman argues that it was error for the CA to exonerate Caberoy on the reasons that the
withholding of Tuares’ salary was justified and that there was no undue injury onher part as she
later received her salary. The Ombudsman contends that Caberoy was found guilty of
Oppression, which is an administrative offense under the Civil Service law, and is distinct from
the crime of Violation of R.A. No. 3019, from which she was absolved. According to the
Ombudsman, the quantum of proof in these two offenses (Oppression and Violation ofR.A. No.
3019) is distinct and the records of the case disclose that there is substantial evidence to support
its decision. The Ombudsman also contests the factual findings of the CA that Tuares actually
received her salary, stating that in the summary of payrolls and the checks, Tuares’ name does
not appear. Moreover, no evidence was presented by Caberoy to prove that Tuares actually
received her salary, other than her bare allegation. Finally, the Ombudsman states that Caberoy
has already been penalized several times for previous misconduct, which displays her propensity
to commit the misdemeanor.18

Ruling of the Court

Initially, it must be stated thatin a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the Court is limited only to a review of errors of law committed by the CA, and the Court is not
required to review all over again the evidence presented before the Ombudsman.19 The rule,
nevertheless, admits of exceptions, such as when the findings of the CA and the Ombudsman are
conflicting,20 which is what occurred in the present case. Hence, the Court must now look into
the matter of whether the CA committed a reversible error when it reversed the findings and
conclusions of the Ombudsman.

Tuares charged Caberoy in OMB-V-A-03-0239-E with both Oppression and Violation of Section
3(e)(f) of R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman, however, found Caberoy guilty only of Oppression.

Oppression is an administrative offense21 penalized under the Uniform Rules on Administrative

Cases in the Civil Service,22 which provides:

Section 52. Classification of Offenses.—Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties

are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects
on the government service.

A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:

xxxx

14. Oppression.

1st Offense – Suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year;

2nd Offense – Dismissal.

xxxx
Oppression is also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a misdemeanor committed by a
public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily
harm, imprisonment or other injury. It is an act ofcruelty, severity, or excessive use of
authority.23 To be held administratively liable for Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority, there
must be substantial evidence presented proving the complainant’s allegations.24 Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept asadequate
to support a conclusion.25 In this case, the CA correctly overturned the Ombudsman’s findings
and conclusions, and explained the reasonsfor exculpating Caberoy, as follows:

Evidently, from the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Ombudsman contradicted itself when it
found and held thatpetitioner was guilty of "oppression" for not paying the private respondent
her June 2002 salary, because as a matter of fact she has been paidalbeit delayed. Such payment
is clearly and indubitably established from the table where it was shown that private respondent
received on July 17 and 25, 2002, her June 2002 salary in the amounts of ₱4,613.80 and
₱4,612.00, respectively.

xxxx

The above narration of facts do not show that petitioner committed acts constitutive of
"oppression." Assuming petitioner’s action is erroneous or overly zealous, this certainly does not
merit the most severe penalty of dismissal from government service. Apparently, the petitioner is
only protecting herself from any future, adverse consequences if she allows the disbursement of
public funds without the appropriate supporting documents. "It is a well-known fact that in the
government service an employee must submit his daily time record duly accomplished and
approved before one cancollect his salary."

xxxx

Finally, on the contention that the findings and conclusions of the respondent Ombudsman is
considered conclusive and deserve respect and finality is true only when the same is based on
substantial evidence. As discussed above, the action taken by petitioner in withholding the
salaries of private respondent was clearly justified. It was a measure taken by a superior against a
subordinate who ignored the basic tenets of law by not submitting the required documents to
support payment of her salary and proportional vacation pay for the aforesaid period. x x x.

x x x [I]n this case before us, the records is bereft of substantial evidence to support respondent
Ombudsman’s findings and conclusion that petitioner committed oppressive acts against private
respondent and violated Sections 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019. On the contrary and as earlier
discussed, respondent Ombudsman found and concluded that private respondent was paid her
June salaryalbeit late. Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that the act of respondent Ombudsman in
concluding that petitioner is guilty as charged despite absence of substantial evidence to support
the same is totally unfounded and is therefore, tantamount to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack or excess of discretion. x x x.26 (Citations omitted)

The complaint filed by Tuares against Caberoy charged the latter with "manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence for having ordered the payroll clerk of
 [RANHS] to cause the exclusion of [her] name in the payroll of June 2002 x x x and [in spite of]
the fact that [she has already] rendered full service during said days x x x without any justifiable
reason and without due process and without any authority under the law."27 A perusal of Tuares’
allegations shows that her claim pertains to the alleged withholding of her salary for the month of
June 2002. Records show, however, that Tuares was actually paid her salary for the month of
June 2002. Thus, the vouchers for the payroll period of June 1 to 15, 200228 and June 16 to 30,
200229 showed Tuares’ name on line 11 and her signature acknowledging receipt of her salary
for such period. This was, in fact, confirmed in the 2002 salary payrolls submitted by the
RANHS Office of the Auditor and summarized by the Ombudsman,30 to wit:

Tuares’ No. in the Amount

Period Voucher No. Date of Check
Payroll Received
June (Proportional pay & 101-02-6- June 25, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
salary) 161
June (Proportional pay) 101-02-6- June 28, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
164
June (Proportional pay) PS-02-7-182 July 4, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June (Proportional pay & PS-02-7-195 July 17, 2002 11 ₱4,613.80
salary)
June (Proportional pay) PS-02-7-196 July 19, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June PS-02-7-200 July 25, 2002 11 ₱4,612.00
July 101-02-8- August 19, 16 ₱4,694.72
231 2002
1âwphi1

The amounts received and signed for by Tuares correspond essentially to the other amounts she
received as salary for the other periods in 2002. On this score, entries in the payroll, being entries
in the course of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity under Section 43, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court,31 and absent any evidence presented by Tuares showing the contrary, good faith
must be presumed in the preparation and signing of such payrolls.32

Even assuming, as the Ombudsman asserted, that Tuares received her June 2002 salary only on
July 2002, the same does not constitute Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority. The delay in
the release of Tuares’ salary hardly qualifies as an "act of crueltyor severity or excessive use of
authority," especially when she contributed to the cause of the delay, that is, she submitted her
Form 48 (Daily Time Record) for June 2002 only on July 11, 2002.33

Neither can the Court subscribe to the Ombudsman’s conclusion that Tuares was singled out by
Caberoy.According to the Ombudsman:
In other words, as far as these fortunate teachers are concerned, checks dated June 25 and 28,
2002 and July 04 and 19, 2002 actually and in paper covered their June 2002 salary; checks
dated July 17 and 19, 2002 actually and in paper covered their July 2002 salary; x x x.

Whereas on the part of complainant Tuares, this is what really happened: The checks dated July
17 and 25, 2002 were technically for services rendered in June 2002 ascorrected by COA but the
amounts corresponding to complainant’s salaryfor the whole month of June 2002 was actually
received by her only in July 2002 and that in effect means that she did not really receive any
amount from the school in June 2002; x x x.

Viewed from the discussion above, it is therefore crystal clear that complainant was singled out
by respondent Caberoy as the only one who did not receive any amount from the school on June
2002 because, as established earlier, the former failed to submit her clearance and PAST.34

It must be stressed that like other grave offenses classified under the Civil Service laws, bad faith
must attend the act complained of. Bad faith connotes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent
or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.35 There must be evidence, independent of the fact of
such delay, which will lead to the inevitable conclusion that it was for the purpose of singling out
Tuares. The Court has consistently upheld the principle that in administrative cases, to be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any grave offense, the evidence against the respondent
should be competent and must be derived from direct knowledge.36 "Reliance on mere
allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an administrative complaint with no leg to
stand on."37 Except for the Ombudsman’s deduction based on the dates of issuance of the
vouchers and the checks as shown in the payroll, the records of thiscase are bereft of evidence
that will support its view that the delay in the release of Tuares’ salary indicated that she was
singled out. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the CA, "[t]he certifications issued by Acting
Book keeper Hayde S. Momblan will show that it was not only [Tuares] who was not included in
the June 2002 payrolls; there were other teachers who were not included because they failed to
submit the required year-end clearance. x x x Evidently, [Tuares] was not singled out or
discriminated against as insisted by her and respondent Ombudsman."38

All told, the Court finds that the CA did not commit a reversible error in exonerating Caberoy
from the charge against her.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third
Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed
against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A.
3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by
the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to
Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among
those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for
having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in
entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause
to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there
was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted
because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.

Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as
follows:

On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO
ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy
with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air
Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter
into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to
Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft
Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957,
as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility
Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event
of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the
Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.4

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.

On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:

The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why
this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged
co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case.5

The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a
motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has
exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was
alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6

On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on the
ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that,
independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to
have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official
authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019.

The prosecution filed its Opposition.8

On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:

Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it
appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-
conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the
Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A

QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND
IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
 II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A

QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE
HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE

DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT
QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.

The elements of the above provision are:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.11

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses
under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this
Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent.13

The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a
private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the
public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
Information.

Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer
who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not
prosper.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with
whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the
allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is
already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal
liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile
does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019.
In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary
Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he
should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with
a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be
indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no
longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the
private person may be indicted alone.

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If
two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the
agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible
therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in
execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written
by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or
insane at the time of trial.17 The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the
conviction of the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:

x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime
depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one
person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator
does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the
offense.19

The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he
(respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-
conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative
intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or
corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution
of a private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.

In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of
and the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is
instructive, to wit:

x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except
when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The
crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An
agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long
as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the
sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.

However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or

more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination
of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this
Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that

While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a
crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a
conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered
together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated
crime and its commission by the conspirators.

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the
commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound
principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through
the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose
evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other
than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy."
The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where
this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator)
without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the
criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime
must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x
accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible x x x

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as
to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the
enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the
rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.

In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the
crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light
that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for
collectivizing criminal liability.

xxxx

x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved,
all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals.
This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The
concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display
of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held
solidarily liable.22

This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with
Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better
left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove
or disprove its presence.

Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to
Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the
late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into
another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject
of the present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a
Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has
no jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution
before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no
reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on January 11,
2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied
in the instant case.

The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in
G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a
Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's
contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation
vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused
in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.27

Thus, it has been held that:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant
of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court
he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the
merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs.
Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

xxxx

As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:

"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed
to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."

Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said
jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction
over the person."

Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined
to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which
called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny
said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28

In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction
of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In
fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB
issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction over his person.

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract
entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a
special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations
of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by
R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under
the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly
by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done.
Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of
its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise
would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law
defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.

Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the
main case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of
the case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main case and it
would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2,
2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of
Criminal Case No. 28090.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Criminal Case No. 26558

Plaintiff, For: PLUNDER

- versus –

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, PRESENT:

Former President of the
Republic of the Philippines, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PJ,
JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA, Chairperson
CHARLIE "ATONG" TIU HAY SY ANG,
EDWARD S. SERAPIO, VILLARUZ, JR., and
YOLANDA T. RICAFORTE, PERALTA, JJ.
ALMA ALFARO,
JOHN DOE also known as
ELEUTERIO RAMOS TAN or MR. UY,
JANE DOE also known as PROMULGATED:
DELIA RAJAS,
JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, Accused. September 12, 2007

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------x

DECISION

Republic Act (RA) No. 7080 as amended was approved on July 12, 1991, creating and
introducing into our criminal legal system the crime of "plunder". This law penalizes public
officers who would amass immense wealth through a series or combination of overt or criminal
acts described in the statute in violation of the public trust. RA No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder
Law was a consolidation of Senate Bill no. 733 and House Bill No. 22752. The Explanatory
Note of Senate Bill No. 733, quoted in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965,
February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 555), explains the reason behind the law as follows:

Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and
economic treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed
thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of
time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states
and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve
simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but
constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus,
the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of
the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination
to succumb to the corrupting influence of power.

The majority opinion in the above-cited case, penned by Honorable Justice Josue N. Bellosillo,
further explained the rationale behind the Anti-Plunder Law in this manner:

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials
in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and
corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to milk the coffers of the
government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the
national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those
ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a
malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation.
The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately
eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in
public office.
 These are times that try men’s souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of
national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by
petitioner’s ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and
trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension
among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion
call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge
triumphant in the midst of ferment. [Emphasis Supplied]

The present case is the first of its kind to be filed charging the highest official of the land, a
former President, among others, of the offense of plunder. Needless to state, the resolution of this
case shall set significant historical and legal precedents.

Throughout the six years over which the court proceedings in this case unfolded, this Court
confronted numerous novel and complicated legal issues (including the constitutionality of the
plunder law, propriety of house arrest, among others), heard lengthy testimonies from several
dozens of witnesses from both sides and perused voluminous documentary evidence and
pleadings from the parties. Considering the personalities involved and the nature of the crime
charged, the present case aroused particularly intense interest from the public. Speculations on
the probable outcome of the case received unparalleled attention from the media and other
sectors of society. Indeed, the factual and legal complexities of the case are further compounded
by attempts to sensationalize the proceedings for various ends.

However, this Court is ever mindful of its imperative duty to act as an impartial arbiter: (a) to
serve the interest of the State and the public in punishing those who would so severely abuse
their public office and those private individuals would aid them or conspire with them and (b) to
protect the right of the accused to be only convicted upon guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, the decision of this Court follows, upon no other consideration other than the law and a
review of the evidence on record.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

AND THE PROCEEDINGS
__________________________

This case for plunder commenced with the filing on April 4, 2001 of the Information which is
quoted hereunder:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the

Ombudsman, hereby accuses former Joseph Ejercito Estrada, together with Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas,
and John & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No.
7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
by himself and in conspiracy with his co-accused, business associates and persons
heretofore named, by taking advantage of his official position, authority,
connection or influence as President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire ill-
gotten wealth, and unjustly enrich himself in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, through a combination and series of overt and
criminal acts, described as follows:

(a) by receiving, collecting, directly or indirectly, on many instances, so-

called "jueteng money" from gambling operators in connivance with co-accused
Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and Edward Serapio, as witnessed
by Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, among other witnesses, in the aggregate amount
of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), more
or less, in consideration of their protection from arrest or interference by law
enforcers in their illegal "jueteng" activities; and

(b) by misappropriating, converting and miusing for his gain and benefit
public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the One Hundred
Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, in conspiracy with co-accused
Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, as witnessed by Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’
Singson, among other witnesses; and

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling the Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase and
buy a combined total of 681,733,000 shares of stock of the Belle Corporatiion in
the aggregate gross value of One Billion Eight Hundred Forty-Seven Million Five
Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Fifty Seven Pesos and Fifty Centavos
(P1,847,578,057.50), for the purpose of collecting for his personal gain and
benefit, as in fact he did collect and receive the sum of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P
189,700,000.00), as commission from said stock purchase; and

(d) by unjustly enriching himself in the amount of THREE BILLION

TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P 3,233,104,173.17) comprising his unexplained wealth acquired,
accumulated and amassed by him under his account name "Jose Velarde" with
Equitable PCI Bank;

to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.

Various motions were filed by accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (FPres.
Estrada), Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada (Jinggoy Estrada), and Edward S. Serapio (Serapio). Accused
Serapio filed his Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) to Hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of
arrest and further Proceedings; (b) to conduct a determination of probable cause; (c) for leave to
file accused’s motion for reconsideration and /or reinvestigation; and (d) to direct the
Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges against accused Serapio dated April 6,
2001. While accused FPres. Estrada filed three (3) motions; (1) Urgent Motion to Defer
Proceedings, dated April 9, 2001, (2) Position Paper Re: Probable Cause (ex abundante ad
cautelam) dated April 9, 2001 which was joined by accused Jinggoy Estrada, and (3) Motion to
(a) remand the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation consistent with the
Honorable Supreme Court’s Resolution in G.R. No. 147512-19 (Joseph E. Estrada v. Hon.
Aniano Desierto, et al.); and (b) hold in abeyance judicial action in the case particularly the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and steps leading thereto until after the conduct of a proper
preliminary investigation, dated April 11, 2001.

In a Resolution promulgated on April 16, 2001, the Court directed the prosecution to submit to
the Court not later than April 18, 2001 the required affidavits, counter-affidavits, and supporting
evidence as well as other supporting documents accompanying the Information, which were
needed to determine the existence of probable cause for the issuance or non-issuance of a
warrant of arrest. As directed, the prosecution filed on April 18, 2001 its Manifestation and
Compliance.

On April 19, 2001, the prosecution filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to admit Amended
Information, which is quoted hereunder:

AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the

Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. "ASIONG SALONGA" AND a.k.a. "JOSE VELARDE", together
with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO
ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO
THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as
follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL

INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE,
PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT,
BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’
ANG, JOSE ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,

converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a
portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00] tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang,
Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES;

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN

AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO
PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the
Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR
LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND
FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A
TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY
SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY
 SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE
VELARDE";

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,

SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND AND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT
NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On April 20, 2001, the Court in its Minute Resolution granted and admitted the prosecution’s
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information dated April 18, 2001.

On April 25, 2001, the Court promulgated its Resolution which stated:

xxx xxx xxx the Court finds and so hold that probable cause for the offense of
PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants for the arrest of accused Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas.

No bail is fixed for the provisional liberty of the accused for the reason that the penalty
imposable for the offense of plunder under RA No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of RA
No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death.

Director General Leandro R. Mendoza, Chief of the Philippine National Police, shall
implement the warrant of arrest upon service to him by Mr. Edgardo A. Urieta, Chief of
the Sheriff and Security Services Division of the Sandiganbayan. Once arrested, all the
accused shall undergo the required processes and be detained at the PNP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City subject to, and until, further orders from this Court.

On the 25th day of April 2001, on the basis of the said resolution, the Court issued an Order of
Arrest and Hold Departure Order for all the named accused in the present information. The
Philippine National Police (PNP) submittd its Report of Compliance dated April 25, 2001 which
stated:

1. That in compliance with the Order of Arrest issued by the Honorable Court in
the above captioned criminal case, accused Joseph E. Estrada and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada,
both residence of no. 1 Polk Street, North Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila voluntarily
surrendered to the undersigned on 25 April 2001 at about 3:00 o’clock PM at said
residence in the presence of their counsels.

2. That right after their surrender, they were brought inside Camp Crame, Quezon City
for the required processes and pending further orders from this Honorable Court they
shall be kept in Camp Crame;

A Compliance/Return of Warrant of Arrest was also filed on April 26, 2001 by P/Chief
Superintendent Nestor B. Gualberto.

As to accused Serapio, the PNP’s Report of Compliance reads in part:

2. That one of the accused named therein, Atty. Edward S. Serapio, surrendered to the
Chief, Philippine National Police, through the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City on April 25, 2001 at about 9:45 PM where
the required processes were administered to him and pending further orders from this
Honorable Court he shall be kept in Camp Crame;

The Court, in its Minute Resolution dated April 26, 2001, set the arraignment of the detained
accused on May 3, 2001 which was cancelled due to the different motions filed by the accused.
Accused Jinggoy Estrada filed his Motion to Quash or Suspend dated April 24, 2001 and a Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2001. Among other motions, accused FPres. Estrada
filed his Motion to Quash dated June 7, 2001 and accused Serapio filed his Motion to Quash (Re:
Amended Information dated April 18, 2001) dated June 26, 2001. In its Resolution dated July 9,
2001, the Court denied all the aforesaid motions to quash and accused Jinggoy Estrada’s Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2001. The Court’s Resolution dated July 9, 2001 was
sustained by the Honorable Supreme Court in the Decisions rendered in Joseph Ejercito Estrada
vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001) and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002).

On July 10, 2001, the Court denied the motion to defer filed by accused FPres. Estrada and
Jinggoy Estrada and proceeded with the arraignment of accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada,
and Serapio under the Amended Information. The accused having refused to enter a plea, the
Court entered a plea of not guilty for all the three (3) accused.

Petitions for Bail / House Arrest

With the detention of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in Camp Crame on April 25,
2001, both accused filed on the same day an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Place on House Arrest.
The Court on June 9, 2001, issued a Resolution denying accused FPres. Estrada’s Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest and issued an Order for the confinement of accused
FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada at Fort Sto. Domingo, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, subject to the need
for their continued confinement at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC) where they
were then confined. In view of the said resolution, accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada,
on June 13, 2001, filed an Omnibus Motion (Re: Resolution promulgated on June 9, 2001)
pressing in the alternative a Motion for Detention in Tanay, Rizal.

On March 17, 2004, FPres. Estrada filed a Motion to Modify Custodial Arrangement dated
March 17, 2004 and, on March 30, 2004, the counsel de officio of accused FPres. Estrada filed a
Manifestation dated March 29, 2004 informing the Court, among others, that the said accused
was willing to have his property in Tanay, Rizal placed under the control and supervision of the
Court and the Philippine National Police for the duration of his detention.

On July 12, 2004, the Court issued a joint resolution granting FPres. Estrada’s motion to modify
Custodial Arrangement dated March 29, 2004 subject to the conditions imposed by the Court.
Accused FPres. Estrada filed a Compliance and Acceptance of Conditions on July 13, 2004.
Since then, accused FPres. Estrada has been detained in his property at Tanay, Rizal.

When the Court ordered the arrest and detention of the accused in these cases, accused Serapio
filed his petition for bail on April 27, 2001. Accused Jinggoy Estrada’s petition for bail was
included in his Very Urgent Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2001.

Accused Serapio’s Petition for Bail was deferred indefinitely as prayed for by the said accused
while, on August 14, 2001, accused Jinggoy Estrada filed an Urgent Second Motion for Bail for
Medical Reasons dated August 16, 2001 which the prosecution opposed. On December 20, 2001,
the Court issued its Resolution denying accused Jinggoy Estrada’s Urgent Second Motion for
Bail for Medical Reasons.

Considering the denial of the said motion for bail for medical reasons, accused Jinggoy Estrada,
on April 17, 2002, filed an Omnibus Application for Bail dated April 16, 2002. After hearing, the
Court issued a Resolution on March 6, 2003 which granted accused Jinggoy Estrada’s Omnibus
Application for Bail. The prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration dated March 13, 2003 was
denied in this Court’s Resolution dated April 30, 2003. The aforesaid Resolutions granting bail
to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada were upheld by the Honorable Supreme Court in a Decision
promulgated in G.R. No. 158754, People vs. Sandiganbayan (Special Division) and Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada (August 10, 2007).

As to accused Serapio, the Court’s Resolution dated September 12, 2003 also granted accused-
movant Serapio’s Urgent Petition for Bail dated April 27, 2001. The Court fixed the amount of
bail of accused Serapio and Jinggoy Estrada at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
each which was to paid in cash.

While the case was already in the trial stage, on January 4, 2002 the counsels for the accused
Estradas wrote a letter to the Acting Presiding Justice requesting for a re-raffle of the cases
against the accused, citing as grounds the continuing uncertain composition of the justices
handling the cases against the accused Former President, et al., at that time. The prosecution filed
its Opposition to Request for Re-Raffle On January 9, 2002 and its Comment/Suggestion on
January 10, 2002 that a Special Third Division be constituted to be composed of the present
Presiding Justice, the only remaining member of the Third Division to which the case was
raffled, and two other Sandiganbayan Justices who are not retirables within the next three (3)
years. Justice Anacleto Badoy, the Chairman of the Third Division, was due to retire on October
2002, while Justice Ilarde, the other member, retired on November 27, 2001. On January 11,
2002, the Sandiganbayan En Banc issued its Resolution 01-2002 recommending to the Supreme
Court that the cases against accused FPres. Estrada, et al., be referred to a Special Division. The
Supreme Court on January 21, 2002 promulgated its Resolution Creating the Special Division of
the Sandiganbayan which shall hear, try and decide with dispatch the Plunder Case and all
related cases filed or may hereafter be filed against accused FPres. Estrada, and those accused
with him, until they are resolved, decided and terminated. In the Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court retained, as Junior Member, the present Presiding Justice
who was then the only remaining member of the Third Division to which the Plunder Case was
raffled, and designated the then Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, as Chairperson, and
Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval as Senior Member. This was not the first time that a
Special Division of the Sandiganbayan was constituted to try a case. A Special Division was
previously constituted to try and decide the Aquino-Galman cases in that composition of the said
Division was also maintained until the case was decided notwithstanding the subsequent changes
in the composition of the Division due to promotions and/or retirement of its members.

During the same year, the counsel de parte of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada all
withdrew their appearances. The Court on March 1, 2002, in order to protect the rights and
interest of the accused, appointed the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) and those who have been
recommended by the Board of Governor of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to represent
accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada as counsel de oficio, namely, Former Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan Manuel Pamaran, Atty. Prospero Crescini, Atty. Irene Jurado and
Atty. Manuel Malaya. The PAO lawyers mentioned their duration as counsel de oficio, hence,
(Ret.) Presiding Justice Pamaran and the private practitioners represented accused FPres. Estrada
and Jinggoy Estrada up to the time the prosecution rested its case and submitted to the Court its
Formal Offer of Evidence. However, before the presentation of the evidence for the defense,
accused FPres. Estrada, in a Letter dated September 1, 2004, informed the Court that he have
decided to re-engage the services of the members of his original de parte panel of lawyers.

Upon conclusion of the presentation of prosecution evidence and after the Court have ruled on
the offer of evidence of the prosecution, accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio
filed their respective motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence. In a Joint Resolution
dated March 10, 2004, the Court granted accused FPres. Estrada’s Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case Nos. 26905 and 26565 while it denied the same motion
of all the accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 for lack of merit. Subsequently, the Demurrer to
Evidence of accused FPres. Estrada was filed. In its Joint Resolution dated July 12, 2004, the
Court resolved to deny FPres. Estrada’s Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 26905 but
granted the Demurrer to Evidence of FPres. Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26565.
After the presentation of the evidence for accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada, accused
Serapio manifested that he opted not to present his own evidence but adopted the evidence
presented by FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada. The said accused then formally offered their
evidence. The Court issued its resolution on the formal offer of evidence for accused FPres.
Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio. On the other hand, the prosecution manifested that it was
not presenting any rebuttal evidence but formally offered additional evidence and tendered
excluded evidence in its Supplemental Formal Offer of Exhibits [Re: Exhibits Identified,
Presented, and Marked during the Cross Examination of Defense Witnesses] with Tender of
Excluded Evidence dated March 29, 2007. The Court issued its Minute Resolution dated April
19, 2007 on the said additional offer of evidence of the prosecution.

In an Order dated May 9, 2007, the Court gave the parties a period of time to file their respective
memoranda and scheduled the Oral Summation requested by accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy
Estrada on June 15, 2007. After the Oral Summation, the case was submitted for decision.

Incidentally, on November 10, 2006, the National Bureau of Investigation filed its Return of
"Alias" Order of Arrest, informing the Court that one of the accused in this case, Atong Ang was
extradited from the United States of America and was already under the custody of the said
agency. At his arraignment, accused Atong Ang refused to enter a plea and the Court entered a
plea of not guilty for the said accused.

On January 24, 2007, when the case was scheduled for Pre-Trial only for accused Atong Ang,
the prosecution and the said accused, assisted by his counsel, manifested in open court that they
had executed a Plea Bargaining Agreement. The Court’s Resolution dated March 14, 2007
approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the parties.

On March 19, 2007, during accused Atong Ang’s re-arraignment, the said accused pleaded guilty
to a lesser offense of Corruption of Public Officials under Article 212 in relation to Article 211
of the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, the Court rendered its decision against accused
Atong Ang sentencing said accused to "two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional
minimum, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as maximum, and to
pay the amount of P25,000,000.00 to the Government as his civil liability". Accused Atong Ang
immediately filed a Petition for Probation (with Motion to Deduct Period of Preventive
Imprisonment from the Term of Imprisonment and to Post Bail Pending Resolution thereof)
which the Court granted in a Resolution dated May 25, 2007. Accused Atong Ang is now under
probation.

STATEMENT OF THE STIPULATIONS

OF THE PARTIES AT PRE-TRIAL
________________________________

After the arraignment of the accused, the pre-trial was conducted which led to the issuance of the
Amended Pre-Trial Order dated June 14, 2001, quoted in part hereunder:

When this case was called for pre-trial on September 3, 2001, accused JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, JOSE "Jinggoy" P. ESTRADA appeared, assisted by counsels,
Atty. Jose B. Flaminiano, Atty. Cleofe Villar-Verzola, Atty. Rene A. V. Saguisag and
Atty. Raymond Parsifal A. Fortun. Accused Edward S. Serapio likewise appeared,
assisted by his counsels, Atty. Sabino Acut, Jr. and Atty. Martin Israel L. Pison. The
People was represented by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, Deputy Ombudsman
Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos, Ombudsman
Prosecutor III Antonio T. Manzano and Humphrey T. Monteroso.

The accused Estradas and Edward S. Serapio submitted their WAIVER OF

APPEARANCE dated September 3, 2001 stating as follows:

Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Edward S. Serapio hereby waive
their appearance during the pre-trial and the trial of this case subject to the conditions
that:

a. whenever his/her/their name/s/are mentioned at any stage of the

proceedings of this/ these case/s whether in testimonial or documentary
evidence, such name/s refer/s to his/her/them; and
b. whenever his/her/their appearance shall be require by the Court at any
time, they will appear, otherwise warrant/s shall issue for their arrest.

The aforementioned three (3) accused verbally manifested in open Court that they fully
understand and agree with their conditions contained in their Waiver of Appearance.

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution, the accused Estradas and accused Serapio agreed to stipulate on the
following facts, as proposed by the prosecution to wit:

1. That accused Joseph Estrada (“Estrada” for short) took his oath of office
as President of the Republic of the Philippines on 30th June 1998, [cf.
Proposal No. 1(For all specifications) of accused Estrada’s Proposed
Stipulation of Facts of the defense dated 01 August 2001];
2. That accused Joseph Estrada is married to Dra. (now Senator) Luisa P.
Ejercito; [cf. Proposal No. 2 (For all Specifications) of accused Estrada’s
Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the defense dated 01 August 2001];
3. That accused Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, Jr. (“Jinggoy” for short) is the son of
accused Joseph Estrada; [cf. Proposal No. 3 (For all Specifications) of
accused Estrada’s Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the defense dated 01
August 2001;
4. Edward S. Serapio is a lawyer and a former professor of law at the Ateneo
de Manila University School of Law; [cf. Proposal No. 1 of accused Atty.
Edward Serapio’s Request for Stipulation of Facts and Admission of
Documents dated 01 August 2001;
5. On April 29 1999, Atty. Serapio was appointed by President Joseph
Estrada as Presidential Assistant for Political Affairs with the rank of
Undersecretary. [cf. Proposal No. 2 of accused Atty. Edward Serapio’s
 Request for Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Documents dated 01
August 2001;
6. He accepted such appointment. [cf. Proposal No. 2. 1 of specification of
accused Atty. Edward Serapio’s Request for Stipulation of Facts and
Admission of documents dated 01 August 2001.

The other stipulations of facts proposed by the accused Estradas and admitted by the
prosecution were:

1. That From 1998-2001, Mr. Luis "Chavit" Singson was elected Governor
of the province of Ilocos Sur; [cf. Proposal No. 6 (For all Specifications)
of accused Estrada’s Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the defense dated 01
August 2001];
2. That the amount of P40 Million was withdrawn by a person representing
herself to be accused Alma Alfaro from Land Bank of the Philippines-
Shaw Branch on 28th August 1998; [cf. Proposal No. 5 of specification (b)
of accused Joseph E. Estrada and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada’s Stipulation of
Facts and Admission of Documents dated 01 August 2001.

The accused Estradas proposed and the prosecution admitted the following stipulation of
facts:

1. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Rodolfo "Bong"

Pineda; [cf. Paragraph 13 of the Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of
Facts dated 01 August 2001];
2. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows "Atong" Ang; [cf.
Paragraph 17 of the Prosecution’s Additional stipulation of Facts dated 01
August 2001];
3. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Lucio Co; [cf.
Paragraph 23 of the Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01
August 2001];
4. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Jaime Dichaves; [cf.
Paragraph 24 of the Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01
August 2001];
5. That accused President Estrada is a close and childhood friend of Carlos
A. Arellano; [cf. Paragraph 1 Re: Belle case of the Prosecution’s
Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
6. That accused President Estrada appointed Carlos A. Arellano as Chairman
of the Social Security System on July 1, 1998; [cf. Paragraph 2 re: Belle
case of the Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August
2001];
7. That Carlos A. Arellano was appointed by accused President Estrada as
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Social Security System; [cf.
Paragraph 3 re: Belle case of the Prosecution’s Additional Stipulation of
Facts dated 01 August 2001];
 8. That accused President Estrada knew of the existence of Belle
Corporation; [cf. Paragraph 7 re: Belle case of the Prosecution’s
Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];

Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the prosecution admitted by accused Serapio:

1. That Erap Muslim Youth Foundation (hereinafter the

"Foundation") has a huge fund of more than P211 Million.

The only issue that was raised by the parties for resolution is whether or not accused
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, JOSE "Jinggoy" P. ESTRADA and ATTY. EDWARD
S. SERAPIO are guilty of the offense charged in the Amended Information.

The accused Estradas raise also the issue of whether or not the allegations in the
information would constitute the crime of plunder as defined by R.A. No. 7080.
(COMMENT ON, AND MOTION TO CORRECT PRE-TRIAL ORDER DATED
SEPTEMBER 13, 2001, filed by accused Estrada’s on September 21, 2001)

The evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense in support of, or in denial, of the
speculations of the predicate acts adverted to in each of the paragraphs are discussed hereunder
in seriatim:

EVIDENCE PRESENTED:

RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH A OF THE

AMENDED INFORMATION
____________________________

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL

INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE,
PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT,
BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’
ANG, JOSE ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

The alleged co-conspirators of accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada named in this
paragraph (a) are: Charlie "Atong" Tiu Hay Sy Ang (Atong Ang), Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte (Ricaforte) and Edward S. Serapio. The paragraph also refers to
unidentified co-conspirators by the usual "Jane Does" and "John Does".

I. EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

The principal witness of the prosecution in this first specification of the predicate acts of plunder
is Former Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" C. Singson. He testified extensively on the charge
that FPres. Estrada accumulated ill-gotten wealth in the above-mentioned amount through the
monthly remittance to him of seems of money collected from operations of illegal gambling,
commonly known as "jueteng", based in the different provinces of the country allegedly in
consideration of the prosecution or unimpeded operation of said illegal gambling.

The gist of the testimony of Singson relative to paragraph (a) of the Amended Information is set
forth hereunder:

GOVERNOR LUIS "CHAVIT" CRISOLOGO SINGSON (Gov. Singson) was 61 years old,
married, a businessman, and a resident of Mabini Street, Poblacion, Vigan, Province of Ilocos
Sur at the time he took the witness stand as prosecution witness. The examination of the witness
was done by Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo under the control and supervision of the
Ombudsman who was present. The counsel de oficio of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy
Estrada, (Ret.) Justice Manuel R. Pamaran, objected to the appearance of the Solicitor General,
which the Court noted. [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp. 166-167] The testimony of Gov. Singson
was presented to corroborate the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Maria Carmencita Itchon,
Emma B. Lim and the Equitable PCI Bank Branch Managers where Ricaforte opened accounts,
and to prove that accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, Atong Ang, Ricaforte, Serapio and
the other accused, in conspiracy with one another, amassed and accumulated ill-gotten wealth for
principal accused FPres. Estrada’s benefit while he was the 13th President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of Four Billion Ninety Seven Million Eight Hundred Four Thousand
One Hundred Seventy-Three Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P4,097,804,173.17), part of which
was derived from:

(1) the collection of jueteng protection money from November 1998 to August 2000, in
the amount of Five Hundred Forty Five Million Pesos (P545,000,000.00) more or less
and the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) also from the said
illegal gambling protection money; and

(2) misappropriation, diversion and conversion for his personal gain as benefit public
funds in the amount of One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) more or
less, representing a portion of the Two Hundred Million pesos (P200,000,000.00)
Tobacco Excise Share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under Republic Act No.
7171.

Gov. Singson was also presented by the prosecution to prove that Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio
conspired with and/or acted as co-principals by indispensable cooperation of FPres. Estrada in
the running of the illegal numbers game of jueteng and in the receipt by FPres. Estrada of jueteng
protection money; that accused Jinggoy Estrada regularly collected jueteng protection money
every month from January of 1999 to August 15, 2000, as an indispensable part of the amassing
and accumulating ill-gotten wealth by principal accused FPres. Estrada and as part of the series
and/or combination of overt or criminal acts constituting the crime of plunder; that Serapio
conspired with FPres. Estrada and the other accused in receiving the Two Hundred Million Pesos
(P200,000,000.00) which came from jueteng operations and in hiding and/or laundering the same
through the banking system and that Serapio was the personal lawyer of FPres. Estrada and that
in furtherance of the conspiracy he set up various juridical entities to mask and/or hide various
illegal proprietary and business interests of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson would also identify
certain documents, checks, pictures and other facts relevant to the foregoing, which tend to prove
the combination and/or series of overt and criminal acts, constitutive of the crime of plunder (and
to oppose the petition for bail of Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson’s testimony was also offered to
prove the illegal use of alias). [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp. 168-174]

Gov. Singson testified that he was called by FPres. Estrada at his house in Polk Street,
Greenhills, on August of 1998. Gov. Singson was then the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur.
Gov. Singson went to Polk Street in the evening. He was assisted by a security guard towards the
kitchen where he found Atong Ang and FPres. Estrada talking how to expand the operations of
jueteng, an illegal numbers game, in the provinces where there was yet no jueteng protection
money. Shortly, Bong Pineda arrived. Gov. Singson heard FPres. Estrada told Bong Pineda that
starting on that day not to bring money at his house because it was very obvious. Gov. Singson
did not know Bong Pineda very much but he saw Bong Pineda in Congress when he was
investigated regarding jueteng. The jueteng money would protect jueteng operator from being
arrested. FPres. Estrada then instructed Bong Pineda to give the money to Atong Ang or to Gov.
Singson because the latter was a Governor so it would not be obvious if he brought money to
FPres. Estrada. [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp. 178-187]

According to Gov. Singson, the day after the aforementioned meeting, Atong Ang started
meeting with the jueteng operators in his office near the municipal hall of San Juan. [Ibid, p.
188] Atong Ang and the operators were bargaining how much protection money from each
province will be given to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, p. 193] After the final talk, they started collecting
jueteng protection money, specifically from August of 1998. [Ibid, p. 203]

Gov. Singson knew FPres. Estrada for almost thirty (30) years before August of 1998. FPres.
Estrada was not yet a mayor but a movie actor as Gov. Singson’s mother was a producer. [Ibid,
p. 191] Gov. Singson first met Atong Ang at the cockpit and gambling places. He had known
Atong Ang for a long time even when FPres. Estrada was still the Vice President. According to
Gov. Singson, Bong Pineda was a close "compadre" of FPres. Estrada while his son, Jinggoy
Estrada, was Bong Pineda’s godson by marriage. [Ibid, p. 197]

Gov. Singson claimed that he was present in not all but several meetings of Atong Ang with the
jueteng collectors. He was present when there was an agreement on the three percent (3%) of
total collections in every province, as fixed by Atong Ang. [TSN dated July 22, 2002, pp. 12-13]
Jueteng money was delivered to FPres. Estrada initially every end of the month, starting
September of 1998 and later every 15th and at the end of the month. [Ibid, p.14]

On October of 1998, Gov. Singson and Atong Ang brought the jueteng protection money of
about Nine Million Pesos (P9,000,000.00) for the said month to FPres. Estrada at his house, in
No. 1 Polk Street in Greenhills, but FPres. Estrada and Atong Ang had a nasty quarrel about the
sugar allocation request of Atong Ang which was denied by FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson
brought home the said P9,000,000.00 but, the following day, FPres. Estrada called him up asking
him to pay F.P. Estrada’s obligations which went on until the said amount was consumed and
Gov. Singson was instructed by FPres. Estrada to continue the collection of the jueteng money.
[Ibid, pp. 26, 22-23]

Gov. Singson continued the collection as instructed by FPres. Estrada, still with the help of
Atong Ang, from November of 1998 until August of 2000. The amounts of money collected
from jueteng during the said period were listed in the ledger per month and per province. The
ledger also listed the expenses paid for using the jueteng protection money. [Ibid, pp. 24-27]

Every fifteen (15) days, Gov. Singson himself delivered protection money to FPres. Estrada in
the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) or a total of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) every month. Emma B. Lim delivered once the jueteng money to FPres.
Estrada in Malacañang. The protection money was delivered usually in cash but sometimes in
check. Chavit Singon presented to this court two (2) sets of ledger. The first set consisted of nine
(9) pages covering the month of November of 1998 up to July of 1999 (Exh. W7 to Exh. E8). The
September 1998 and October 1998 collections were not reflected in the said ledger since the
ledger was done only after FPres. Estrada and Atong Ang quarreled in October 1998. The second
set of ledger covered the months of August of 1999 to August of 2000 (Exh.A-4 to Exh. A-4-d).
[TSN dated July 22, 2002, p. 27-31]

Gov. Singson prepared the pages of the first set of ledger (Exh. W7 to E8) with the help of Emma
B. Lim and Ma. Carmencita Itchon and on the following year, Ricaforte joined them. [Ibid, pp.
35-36]

The pages of the second set of ledgers starting August of 1999 to August of 2000 [Exhibit A-4
and submarkings] were prepared by Ricaforte under the supervision of Gov. Singson who also
checked the said ledger. [Ibid, pp. 36-37]

Ricaforte was introduced to Gov. Singson by FPres. Estrada before his birthday on April 19,
1999. She was designated by FPres. Estrada as auditor because FPres. Estrada was strict with
money. Gov. Singson was thankful for Ricaforte’s designation because he did not want FPres.
Estrada to distrust him. [Ibid, p. 40] Gov. Singson considered Ricaforte as the employee of
FPres. Estrada with respect to the jueteng collections because not only was she introduced to
Singson by FPres. Estrada, the latter also told Singson to give her Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,
000.00) monthly salary.

Ricaforte held office at LCS Building owned by Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 42-43] Gov. Singson
did not know Yolanda Ricaforte or her husband Orestes Ricaforte before April of 1999. Gov.
Singson identified Ricaforte from a picture (Exh. A-6-b-1) where she was seated beside Menchu
Itchon, the assistant of Gov. Singson. The picture was taken during the wedding of Raquel, the
daughter of Gov. Singson where FPres. Estrada and his wife Senator Loi Ejercito stood as
wedding sponsors. [Ibid, p. 45-48]

According to Gov. Singson, the jueteng collections were placed in a scratch paper as they came
every fifteen (15) days, at the middle and the end of the month or five (5) days after the end of
the month. When all the collections had arrived, the list was finalized and then transferred to the
computer. The ledgers were prepared upon instructions of FPres. Estrada because the latter was
strict with money. [Ibid, pp. 37-40, 41-42]

Gov. Singson explained in detail the entries on the left hand portion of the ledger for November
of 1998 up to July of 1999. In the province of Ilocos Sur, the total collection for fifteen (15) days
was Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P750,000.00), in the province of La Union for 15
days, Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) total collection, while in Bulacan for 15
days, One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) total collection (Exh. W7) of protection money for
FPres. Estrada. The entries for the other provinces were similar. On the left side column were the
names of the provinces, the middle column pertained to the number of days, i.e., whether for 15
or 30 days and the right column, the total amount of collections of jueteng protection money, in
order that jueteng operators will not be "arrested" or apprehended. There was one (1) collector
for three (3) provinces. [Ibid, pp. 53-54]

In the second set of ledger (Exh. A-4 to A-4-d) Ricaforte gave a code name for every province
below the title "Theme". The number of days, either 15 or 30, under the title "days" and the total
amount of protection money for FPres. Estrada below the title "points" were indicated in the
ledger. [Ibid, pp. 55-56]

Gov. Singson narrated that when FPres. Estrada was still the Vice President, they were already
collecting jueteng money but not in all provinces. When FPres. Estrada assumed the presidency,
he called Gov. Singson and Atong Ang to start jueteng collections in provinces without
protection money. Atong Ang talked to certain persons in the said provinces so that the
collection of protection money could start. Every province had a collector but sometimes there
was one collector for three (3) provinces. The collections were submitted to Gov. Singson but
sometimes they would get the money from the house of the collectors. The jueteng collections
which FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to operate for FPres. Estrada’s own benefit was at the
national level, meaning nationwide. They did not interfere with jueteng operations at the lower
level. Before there were "Kangaroo" type of jueteng operations or "Guerilla Type". They did it
on their own and they did not pay protection money. When the jueteng operators gave protection
money to FPres. Estrada, they were not apprehended anymore although there were instructions to
the contrary which were for show or for record purposes only. [Ibid, pp. 59-64]

There were local officials who did not allow jueteng like Governor Lina in Laguna. He changed
the Provincial Commander several times but jueteng still continued. In the other places the
protection money for jueteng given to the local officials was different from that given to the
higher levels. [Ibid, pp. 65-66]

In Exhibit A-4, ULAC stands for Bulacan and the figure 1.00 means One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) for fifteen (15) days, as protection money for FPres. Estrada. If the number of
days was blank it meant 15 days, otherwise the number 30 was indicated.

In the ledger (Exh A-4-C up to A-4-I) covering the periods of January of 2000 up to August of
2000, the same figures appeared but the code names of the provinces were replaced by their
original names as instructed by FPres. Estrada who was confused with the code names. Under
the sub-title "amount", the total amount of protection money given to FPres. Estrada was
reflected. For instance, in Ilocos Sur, the amount of 500 meant Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 67-68]

The other entries were similar, except for the substitution of the code names with actual names of
the provinces. For instance, the amount of protection money given to FPres. Estrada
corresponding to Ilocos Sur entered as 500, was Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
For the province of Bulacan the number of days was blank and the figure 1,000 was entered.
This means that for Bulacan for 15 days the total protection money given to FPres. Estrada was
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). According to Gov. Singson, the collections were delivered
in exact amount so they removed the zeroes in the ledger so as not to lengthen the entries. [Ibid,
pp. 69-70]

The two boxes of entries at the right bottom of the ledger marked as Exhibits A-4 to A-4-l,
reflected the expenses to show where some of the money collected went. [Ibid, p. 70] The first
entry (Exh. W7-1) showed that Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) went to "Jimpol", which
referred to then Secretary Jimmy Policarpio. The latter confirmed to Gov. Singson this receipt of
the said amount from Bong Pineda which Secretary Policarpio, then a political liaison officer for
Congress, would use for the media. [Ibid, pp. 74-75] In the ledger for November of 1998, the
entry 300 Goma (Exh W7-2) means that Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) was given to the
Office of the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). [Ibid, pp.74-76] Gov. Singson
himself brought the money at first to General Lastimoso, the Chief of the PNP but he refused to
receive the money. Later Atong Ang identified the persons from PNP who will pick up the
money and help them in the operation. Gov. Singson called up FPres. Estrada to inform him that
Lastimoso refused to receive the money. Gov. Singson was worried Lastimoso may not
coordinate with them. One time, Gov. Singson was called to Malacanang and he met General
Lastimoso there and FPres. Estrada told the latter to coordinate with Gov. Singson about the
operation of jueteng. General Lastimoso expressed the need to coordinate with the Regional
Commanders to apprehend jueteng operations for show only ("kunwari"). [Ibid, pp. 77-80]

The entry "November 1998, 5.00, AS Sunday" (Exh W7-3) means that the amount for Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) protection money was given to FPres. Estrada, whose code name
was "Asiong Salonga" on a Sunday. Gov. Singson himself gave the money to FPres. Estrada.
The next entry "1.000 Jing" (Exh W7-4), would show that One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
was given to Jinggoy Estrada, whose code name was "Jing". According to Gov. Singson, Jinggoy
Estrada was the collector of protection money for the Province of Bulacan which should be
Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) for every month but Jinggoy Estrada kept the One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and remit to Gov. Singson only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) or
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for every 15 days. [Ibid, pp. 80-82]

Atong Ang told Gov. Singson that Jinggoy Estrada got One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and
Jinggoy Estrada confirmed it but when they told FPres. Estrada about it, he instructed them not
to give Jinggoy Estrada money and he will be the one to give money to Jinggoy Estrada. Gov.
Singson removed the name of Jinggoy Estrada from the list and they kept it a secret from FPres.
Estrada that Jinggoy Estrada was taking jueteng money because Jinggoy Estrada will get angry
too if he was not given a share. Jinggoy Estrada was then the Mayor of the Municipality of San
Juan. Jinggoy Estrada collected money from the Province of Bulacan at the later part of January
of 1999. [Ibid, p. 82-85]

The entry "500 JD" (Exh W7-5) means that Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) went to
Jude Estrada, a son of FPres. Estrada. Jude confirmed to Gov. Singson that he received the said
amount of jueteng protection money from Atong Ang who reported that to Gov. Singson. The
entry "1.800 ad check" (Exh W7-6) refers to One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,800,000.00) covered by a bad check, part of jueteng money, which bounced. This was PCI
Bank Check No. 0019063 (Exh. F8) given to Gov. Singson by one Celso De Los Angeles. The
entry "17.300 total expenses" (Exh. W7-7) represents the Seventeen Million Three Hundred
Pesos (P17,300,000.00) the amount of total expenses for the month of November of 1998. The
total expenses every month were entered in the ledger (Exh. X7 to E8, and Exh. A-4 to A-4-d.
[Ibid, pp. 85-92])

In the entry for December of 1998 (Exh. X7), the first entry "5.00, AS" (Exh. X7-1) shows the
Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) that was given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada from the
collection of jueteng protection money. The ledger for January 1999 bearing as first entry "6.00
cash January 2, AS" (Exh Y7-1), reflected the Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) cash from the
same source given personally by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada. The entry "3.00 check,
February 1, 1999, AS" (Exh. W7-2) shows that Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) in check
was given to FPres. Estrada on February 1, 1999 as part of protection money. [Ibid, pp. 93-95]
Another entry "5.00 check, February 1, 1999 AS" (Exh Y7-3), refers to the Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) Check given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada from jueteng protection money.
This check (Metrobank Check No.0000917, Exh G8-1) was deposited in the account of Paul
Boghart, who was mentioned during the impeachment trial at the Senate as a foreigner assisting
in the "PR" of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 93-97]

The entry "3.500 cash, January 19, AS" (Exh. Y7-4) pertains to Three Million Five Hundred
Pesos (P3,500,000.00) cash from the protection money given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada
on January 19 (1999). The entry "5.00, February 18, AS" (Exh. Z7-1) refers to the Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) given by Gov. Singson to FPres. on February 18, 1999 from the same
protection money. Gov. Singson explained that the entry "400 tax" (Exh Z7-2) at the right hand
portion of Exhibit Z7, refers to the Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) which he got
for reimbursement of the expenses that he paid or would pay but were not recorded in the ledger.
In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh. A8), April 1999 (Exh. B8), May 1999 (Exh. C8), June 1999
(Exh. D8), July 1999 (Exh. E8), and August 1999 (Exh A-4) there were similar entries of "tax"
which were also intended for the same purpose. Gov. Singson called them "butal". Gov. Singson
had the permission of FPres. Estrada that all amounts less than One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) were considered "butal" which Gov. Singson kept for reimbursement of
expenses which FPres. Estrada would ask Gov. Singson to pay. If the total amount collection was
Four Million Two Hundred Pesos (P4,200,000.00), Gov. Singson got Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00) of the said collection as "butal" and included the same in the ledger as
"tax". [Ibid, pp. 98-101]

In the ledger for February 1999 collection appears a handwritten entry "+ 4.00 capitol February
3, 1999". This entry pertains to the Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) "kickback" which FPres.
Estrada asked Gov. Singson to give him on February 3, 1999 out of the Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00) allotted for the repair of the capitol of Ilocos Sur. This P4 Million was added to
the "total to date" of the collection which consequently amounted to Thirty Eight Million Pesos
(P38,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 102-103]

In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh. A8), the first entry "5.00, 4/6/99, AS" (Exh. A8-1) shows that
Five Mllion Pesos (P5,000,000.00) that Gov. Singson gave FPres. Estrada on April 6, 1999. Gov.
Singson wrote on the ledger "AS", i.e. Asiong Salonga, the code name of FPres. Estrada [Ibid, p.
103]

Regarding the entry "500 3/23 c/0 Malou AS" (Exh A8-2), Gov. Singson explained that Malou
Florendo, the Secretary of FPres. Estrada, coordinated with Gov. Singson by telephone for the
delivery of the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada. Emma B. Lim
delivered the money as Gov. Singson was in the province when FPres. Estrada called up Gov.
Singson to tell him he needed money very badly. [Ibid, pp. 104-106]

On April 1, 1999, Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) were given by Gov. Singson to FPres.
Estrada from jueteng protection money as shown by the entry "5.00 4/1/99 AS" (Exh B8-1). The
next entry, "1.00, William Gatchalian" (Exh "B8-2), refers to the One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) given by Gov. Singson to William Gatchalian upon instruction of FPres.
Estrada. Gatchalian had a Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) check but FPres. Estrada won
only Nineteen Million Pesos (P19,000,000.00) in their mahjong game, so FPres. Estrada asked
Gov. Singson to give to Gatchalian the change of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) charged to
the jueteng protection money. Gov. Singson gave Gatchalian the said amount through a
Metrobank Check No. 0001066 (Exh H8 and H8-1). [Ibid, pp.106-109]

The entry in Exhibit B8 which reads "200 Jerry and Len" (Exh B8-3) reflects the One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) each given to then Secretary Lenny De Jesus and Secretary Jerry
Barican, or a total amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), as "balato" as
instructed by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 109-110]

Senator Tessie Oreta and Sonny Osmena were also given One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
each or a total of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in Cebu aboard the Presidential Yatch
"Ang Pangulo" as shown by the entry "2.00 Tessie and Sonny" (Exh. B8). Gov. Singson gave the
said sums of money to the Senators, which he funded through the jueteng protection money, in
the form of Metrobank Check No. 0001081 (Exhs. I8 and I8 -1 and Metrobank Check No.
0001082 (Exhs. J8 and J8-1) upon instruction of FPres. Estrada, as their "balato" for the winning
of the latter in "Mahjong". [Ibid, pp. 112-114]

The amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) was given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada
from the jueteng protection money on each of the following dates as shown by the entries in the
ledger: (1) May 1, 1999 ("5.00 5/1/99 AS" – Exh. C8-1); (2) May 18, 1999 ("5.00 5/18/99 AS" –
Exh. C8-2); (3) June 1, 1999 ("5.00 6/1/99 AS" – Exh. D8-1); (4) June 18, 1999 ("5.00 6/18/99
AS" – Exh. D8-2); (5) July 31, 1999 ("5.00 7/1/99 AS" – Exh. E8-1); and (6) July 19, 1999 ("5.00
7/19/99 AS" – Exh. E8-2). From May 1, 1999 to July 19, 1999, the total amount of money given
by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada would amount to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00)
based on the ledger. [Ibid, pp.115-118]

The entry reading "123,000 total to date" (Exh E8-3) represents the total amount of One Hundred
Twenty Three Million Pesos (P123,000,000.00) that remained as of July 1999. [Ibid, pp. 118-
119]

After July 1999, particularly on August 1999, FPres. Estrada called Gov. Singson, Ricaforte and
Serapio to a meeting at Mandaluyong. Gov. Singson was instructed by FPres. Estrada in the
presence of Ricaforte and Serapio to turn-over all the balance of the money from jueteng to the
account of Ricaforte. Gov. Singson was keeping most of the above-mentioned P123,000,000.00
in the bank and the others in cash in his office because FPres. Estrada would ask for money from
time to time. Gov. Singson turned-over the aforementioned balance of the jueteng money partly
in check and partly in cash in the office of FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte and Serapio were there with
the Former President. [Ibid, pp.119-123]

Part of the aforesaid P123,000,000.00 was covered by Metrobank Check No. 0001360 (Exh
K8 and K8-1) of Gov. Singson in the amount of Seventeen Million Two Hundred Ten Thousand
Pesos (P17,210,000.00) [Ibid, p. 123]. The second and third checks (Exhs A-2-b and A-7-c) were
PCI Bank checks in the account name of William Gatchalian each in the amount of Thirty-Five
Million Pesos (P35,000,000.00) or a total of Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). Gov.
Singson narrated that the amount of Sixty-Two Million Pesos (P62,000,000.00) from the jueteng
protection money was lent to William Gatchalian. Out of this transaction, FPres. Estrada earned
Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) such that William Gatchalian paid a total of Seventy
Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 124-125]

Gov. Singson presented Metrobank Check No. 0001332 with account name Governor Luis
"Chavit" Singson, in the amount of Forty-Six Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P46,350,000,00) payable to William Gatchalian (Exh L8 and L8-1). This check, according to
Gov. Singson was part of the jueteng protection money lent to William Gatchalian. The rest of
the P62,000,000.00 were in cash and covered by other checks. [Ibid, pp. 126-127]

The Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) earned from the loan by FPres. Estrada was taken as
advance by the latter before due date of the P70,000,000.00 of Gatchalian. For this reason, the
P8,000,000.00 was not anymore added to the balance of P123,000,000.00 of jueteng money.
[Ibid, pp. 127-130] The advance of P8,000,000.00 was covered by Metrobank Check No.
0001388 with the account name Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson (Exhs. M8 and M8-1). During
the impeachment trial at the Senate, it turned out that the P8,000,000.00 was deposited in the
account of Senator Loi Estrada [Ibid, pp. 130-131,139]

The fourth check which covered part of the total balance of P123,000,000.00 jueteng protection
money was a Far East bank Check in the amount of Thirty-Four Million Six Hundred Forty Two
Thousand Four Hundred Forty Two Pesos (P34,642,442.00) payable to the order of Fontain
Bleau, Inc. (Exh B6). [Ibid, p. 124] According to Gov. Singson, the Far East Bank check payable
to the order of Fontaine Bleau, Inc. was paid by Fontana to Fontaine Bleau, Inc. which was a
casino owned by FPres. Estrada and built with the use of jueteng protection money. The bulk of
the P123,000,000.00 were turned-over by Gov. Singson in the form of checks. The cash
amounted only to Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) only. [TSN dated July 24, 2002,
pp.8-9]

In the second set of ledger covering the months of August 1999 to August 2000 (Exh A-4) are
found the following entries: (1) "3.00 AS 9/6 8 o’clock a.m." (Exh A-4.1) and (2) "5.00 AS
8/16/99" (Exh A-4.2). The entries represent the two (2) Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00)
given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada on September 6 at 8 o’clock in the morning and on
August 16, 1999 or a total of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as part of jueteng collection.
[Ibid, pp. 10-13]

The other entries in the said ledger are: (1) "16.310 August 1-15" (A-4-3); (2) "13.150 August
16-31" (Exh. A-4-4); (3) "29.460 total for August" (Exh. A-4-5); (4) "15.200 expenses" (Exh. A-
4-6); (5) "14.260 subtotal" (Exh. A-4-7); (6) ".260 tax" (Exh. A-4-8); (7) "14.000 total to date"
(Exh. A-4-9). Gov. Singson explained that the entries mean (1) that the total collection for
August 1-15, 1999 amounted to Sixteen Million Three Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos
(P16,310,000.00); (2) that from August 16-31, 1999 the total collection was Thirteen Million
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P13,150,000.00); (3) that the total collection for the whole
month of August 1999 was Twenty Nine Million Four Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos
(P29,460,000.00) which all went to FPres. Estrada. The expenses for the said month reached
Fifteen Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P15,200,000.00). The said amount of expenses
was deducted from the total collection for the same month. The remainder, described as
"subtotal", amounted to Fourteen Million Two Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P14,260,000.00).
Of the latter sum of money, Two Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P260,000.00) was treated as
"butal" and taken by Gov. Singson to be used as reimbursement for expenses which Gov.
Singson was requested by FPres. Estrada to pay. The balance of Fourteen Million Pesos
(P14,000,000.00) was deposited in the bank for President Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 14-18]

The "tax" entries in the ledger, starting Exhibit Z to Z-7, covered the amounts less than One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) which were treated as "butal" that remained with Gov. Singson to
reimburse him for expenses which were not recorded in the ledger but should be deducted from
the money of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 19-21]

Gov. Singson mentioned that he personally gave or handed to FPres. Estrada even if Malou
Florendo, FPres. Estrada’s secretary, was around. Gov. Singson either left the money beside
FPres. Estrada or behind the latter’s chair. FPres. Estrada would count the money by the bundle
[Ibid, pp. 22-23]. The Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) delivered by Emma B. Lim to Malou
Florendo not to FPres. Estrada personally was confirmed by the latter to have been received by
him. Emma B. Lim delivered the money to the Malacañang Palace because of the changes in the
instructions given by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 23-24]

The net balance of Fourteen Million Pesos (P14,000,000.00) for August 1999 was deposited by
Ricaforte at Equitable PCI Bank. The same was done to the net monthly balances for September
1999, October 1999, November 1999, December 1999, January 2000, February 2000, March
2000, April 2000 and May 2000. [Ibid, pp. 25-27]
The other entries in the second set of ledger for September 1999 and October 1999 as follows:
(1) "AS 11:30 am/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-a-1); (2) "10/29 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-b-1"); (3)
10/14 AS/258 5.000 (Exh A-4-b-2), mean that Gov. Singson whose code name was "258" gave
FPres. Estrada, referred to as "AS", which stands for Asiong Salonga Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) on each of the following dates: (a) in September 1999 at 11:30 in the morning;
(b) on October 29, 1999; and (c) on October 14, 1999.

In the November 1999 ledger (Exh A-4-c), the following entries appear (1) "11/30 laptop
comp./print.105,850" (Exh. A-4-c-1) (2) "11/30 2 Starex 800 each/258 1.600" (Exh. A-4-C-2);
(3) "11:30 AS/258 12p.m PG5.000" (Exh. A-4-C-3); (4) "11/15 AS/258 at 4p.m 5.000" ( Exh. A-
4-C-4 ), and (5) "11/08 Jimpol 2.400".

Gov. Singson explained the foregoing entries in the November 1999 ledger as follows: On
November 30, 1999, the amount of P105,850.00 was used to buy the laptop computer with
printer of Ricaforte. On November 30, 1999, Gov. Singson purchased Two (2) units of Starex at
Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos each or a total amount of One Million Six Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P1,600,000.00). One unit of Starex went to Ricaforte and was registered in her name. The
other was left in their office. At 12:00 noon on November 30, 1999, Gov. Singson brought Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada in his house at P. Guevarra St. at Greenhills as
part of jueteng protection money. At that time, Guia Gomez, one of the most loved of FPres.
Estrada, resided at the said house. Gov. Singson also gave Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to
former FPres. Estrada on November 15, 1999 at 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. On November 8,
1999, the amount of Two Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,400,000.00) was given by
Bong Pineda to Secretary Jimmy Policarpio, as confirmed by both of them to Singson. During
the prior months, only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) per month were given to Policarpio,
as shown by the ledger, but this was increased by Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00)
because Policarpio told Gov. Singson that the Media was costly ("Magastos"). [Ibid, pp. 30-39]

The ledger for December 1999 (Exh. A-4-d), contains the following entries: (1) "12/30 AS/258
5.000" (Exh A-4-d-1) and (2) "12/04 AS/258 5.00" (Exh A-4-d-2). According to Gov. Singson
the aforesaid entries show that he gave to FPres. Estrada, as part of Jueteng protection, the
amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on December 30, 1999 and another Five Million
Pesos (P5 Million) on December 4, 1999. [Ibid, pp.39-41]

The ledger for January 2000 (Exh A-4-E) contains the following entries: (1) "1/31/00 AS at PR
5.000" (Exh A-4-E-1); and (2) "1/15/00 AS at Pr 5.000". According to Gov. Singson "PR" stands
for Presidential Residence and "AS" for Asiong Salonga, that he gave to FPres. Estrada the
amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) twice, one on January 31, 2000 and the other
January 14, 2000, at the Presidential Residence. [Ibid, pp.41-43]

According to Gov. Singson, he was ordered by FPres. Estrada to give to him Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) of the jueteng collection every fifteen (15) days of the month. All the jueteng
collections were for FPres. Estrada. The total amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00)
were given to him every month plus the expenses ("gastos") and the remainder or the rest of the
collection were deposited in the bank for FPres. Estrada in the name of Ricaforte. A total amount
of Two Hundred Sixteen Million Pesos (P216,000,000.00) were deposited in the bank for FPres.
Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 43-44]

Gov. Singson agreed at first that he would not earn anything from jueteng, provided that the
share of Ilocos Sur from the excise tax under R.A. No. 7171 amounting to billions of pesos
would be released to them for their projects. Gov. Singson testified that, after the One Hundred
Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) were taken from him, the release of the funds did not
continue. The Former President did not comply with the agreement. [Ibid, pp. 44-46]

In the ledger for February 2000 (Exh A-4-F), the following entries appear: (1) "AS/258 5.000"
(Exh A-4-F-1); and (2) "2/17/00 AS 258 5.000" (Exh A-4-F-2). Gov. Singson testified that these
entries mean that he gave to FPres. Estrada, Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) as part of
jueteng protection money in an unspecified day in February of 2000 and another Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) of the same money on February 17, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 48-49]

The ledger for March 2000 (Exh A-4-G), bears the following entries: (1) "3/16/00 AS/258 5.000"
(Exh A-4-g-1); and (2) "4/3/00 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-G-2). According to Gov. Singson the
entries mean that he gave Five Million Pesos (P5 Million) on March 16, 2000 and another Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on April 3,2000, both as part of jueteng protection money. [Ibid,
pp. 49-50] Gov. Singson explained that "258" was his code name which he had been using even
in their radio communication and that later, FPres. Estrada would kid him with his code name
when they played mahjong. [Ibid, p. 52]

In the April 2000 ledger (Exh A-4-H), the entry "4/14/00 AS/258 5.000" appeared twice, (Exh
A-4-H-1) because according to Gov. Singson he gave Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) twice,
one in the morning and another in the afternoon on the same day, April 14, 2000, or a total of
Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) from jueteng protection money collection, because FPres.
called him up twice on the said date as his birthday on April 19, 2000 was nearing. [Ibid, pp. 53-
54]

At the ledger for May 2000 (Exh A-4-i), the first entry also at the right hand portion was "5/31
AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-i-1) and next entry was "5/13 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-i-2). Gov.
Singson explained that the entries meant that he gave Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on
May 31, 2000 and another Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada on May 13,
2000, both part of the jueteng protection money. Gov. Singson also mentioned that the entries
sometimes were not in chronological order, but they were for the same month. [Ibid, pp. 55-56]

The June 2000 ledger (Exh A-4-j), the entry at the right hand portion reads: "6/30 AS/258
3.300", and the next entry is "6/15 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-j-2). According to Gov. Singson,
these means that he gave to FPres. Estrada Three Million Three Hundred Thousand
(P3,300,000.00) from jueteng protection money collection on June 30, 2000, and Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) from the same collection, on June 15, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 56-57]

The succeeding ledgers for July 2000 (Exh A-4-k) the following entries appear: (1) "7/14
AS/258 2.650" (Exh. "A-4-k-1) and (2) "8/12 AS/258 3.600" (Exh.A-4-k-2). Gov. Singson
explained that the entries mean respectively that he gave the amount of Two Million Six
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P2,650,000.00) on July 14,2000 and Three Million Six Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P3,600,000.00) to FPres. Estrada as part of jueteng protection money
collection. [Ibid, pp.57-58] To the question of why the amounts were less than P5,000,000.00 on
the said occasions, Gov. Singson replied that it so happened that those were the only cash in his
possession when the requests for money were made and that they stopped jueteng collection
because Atong Ang started with "Pick 2" and later "Bingo 2 Balls" which according to FPres.
Estrada would have a semblance of legality. [Ibid, pp. 59-60]

The ledger for the month of August 2000 (Exh.A-4-L) contains the entry "8/16 AS/258 3.050"
(Exh. A-4-L-1). Gov. Singson testified that he gave FPres. Estrada on August 16, 2000 the
amount of Three Million Fifty Thousand Pesos (P3,050,000.00) as part of protection money
collected from jueteng. [Ibid, pp. 62-63] According to Gov. Singson the President was very strict
with money and so they had an auditor and he checked the ledger monthly so that they could not
make any kickback ("Kupit") from the jueteng collection. [Ibid, pp. 63-64]

Gov. Singson testified that the jueteng collector for Bulacan on November and December 1998
was Jessie Viceo. In January 1999 the jueteng collector for Bulacan was Jinggoy Estrada as
shown by the ledger where he was identified as "Jing" who got One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) (Exh. W7). Viseo and Jinggoy Estrada were friends so the latter supervised the
jueteng collection in Bulacan, although he was residing in San Juan. When FPres. Estrada
instructed Gov. Singson not to give money to Jinggoy Estrada and so that the latter will not get
mad at him, Gov. Singson and Jinggoy Estrada agreed to keep it a secret from the FPres. that
Jinggoy Estrada managed the jueteng collection in Bulacan and that out of the total monthly
collection of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) from Bulacan, Jinggoy Estrada gave only Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to Gov. Singson and he retained One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00). The money was either picked-up from the office or house of Jinggoy or the
latter sent the money to Singson. The secret arrangement started in November 1999 and lasted
until the end of August 2000. [Ibid, pp. 69-70] However, the arrangement did not appear in the
ledger because they will be scolded by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, p. 71] When asked whether Jinggoy
Estrada personally collected the jueteng money, Gov. Singson replied that it was Jinggoy Estrada
and Jessie Viceo who talked with each other, sometimes they got the jueteng money from the
office of Jinggoy Estrada or sometimes the latter sent it to the office of Singson, but Gov.
Singson knew that Jinggoy was in charge of the jueteng collection. The secret arrangement came
about because jueteng collection in Bulacan was a problem from the start as there were delays or
sometimes the checks paid by Jessie Viceo bounced. Viceo agreed to the arrangement because he
was a close friend of Jinggoy Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 71-72] Gov. Singson knew Viceo personally
because he would see Viceo in the cockpits which the latter frequented. [Ibid, p. 74]

Gov. Singson considered the biggest among the expenses charged to the "Tax" the One Million
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00) given to Laarni Enriquez whom Gov. Singson
described as the most beloved or favorite of FPres. Estrada [Ibid, p. 75]. According to Gov.
Singson, he was assessed, like other persons who attended the birthday party of Laarni, the
aforesaid P1,200,000.00 as his share in the price of the necklace birthday gift amounting to
Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for Laarni. Jaime Dichaves collected the said amount
from Gov. Singson after the party. Gov. Singson paid by check which was deposited in the
account of Laarni at PSBank. [Ibid, pp. 76-81] It was Congressman Mark Jimenez who
pinpointed the guests who would share (P1,200,000.00) each for the gift for Laarni after they had
just finished playing mahjong with FPres. Estrada during the party. [Ibid, p. 84] Gov. Singson
charged the P1,200,000.00 as "tax" in the jueteng collection because it was "a big amount of
money". [Ibid, pp. 87-88]

In the early part of the year 2000, FPres. Estrada instructed Gov. Singson to transfer Two
Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) of jueteng money to Serapio. The instruction was
given by FPres. Estrada to Gov. Singson in Malacañang Palace in the presence of Ricaforte and
Serapio. According to Gov. Singson, Serapio said "Ako na ang bahalang magpa-ikot-ikot" which
Gov. Singson took it to mean that Serapio would see to it that the Two Huundred Million Pesos
(P200,000,000.00) jueteng money would not be traced before it reached him. FPres. Estrada
checked Gov. Singson in April 2000 when FPres. Estrada’s birthday was approaching, whether
the money was so transferred. The transfer of funds was confirmed to Gov. Singson by both
Ricaforte and Serapio. The jueteng money delivered to Serapio initially amounted to One
Hundred Twenty Three Million Pesos (P123,000,000.00) but it was increased later to Two
Hundred Sixteen Million Pesos (P216,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 88-94]

Gov. Singson testified that Serapio was the trusted lawyer of FPres. Estrada who formed fake
corporations for FPres. Estrada which Serapio would narrate to Gov. Singson when they often
see each other in Malacañang Palace. Serapio was introduced to Gov. Singson in 1999 after the
birthday of FPres. Estrada.

Gov. Singson delivered jueteng money to FPresident Estrada in a black bag, like an attaché case.
He delivered money at the houses of FPres. Estrada, particularly once at P. Guevarra Street,
twice or thrice or four times or five times at Polk Street. [Ibid, pp. 95-98]

Atty. Kenneth S. Tampal of the office of the Senate Legal Counsel brought the black bag
referred to by Gov. Singson which was marked as Exhibit "MMM" at the Senate Impeachment
Proceedings and the set of ledgers for the period beginning August 1999 to August 2000
(Exhibits A-4 to A-4-l). The bag was a leatherette attaché case with two (2) combination locks
numbered 000. [Ibid, pp. 103-105] According to Atty. Tampal, the exhibits are in the custody of
the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel. [Ibid, p. 110]

Gov. Singson testified that the abovementioned black bag (Exh. O8) was one of the black bags
which they used to deliver money to FPres. Estrada in Malacañang Palace. [Ibid, p. 113] The
said black bag can contain five or even six million pesos. [Ibid, pp. 115, 118] He would leave the
bag with money and brought with him the bag without money. The bag contained two (2)
combination locks. The combination of both was "000" although he change it to "419",
representing the birthdate of FPres. Estrada, April 19, at the time he delivered money in
Malacañang Palace to FPres. Estrada, but the latter asked him to revert to "000" combination
because FPres. Estrada could not open the lock. [Ibid, pp. 118-119] There were four (4) pieces of
this type of bag. [Ibid, pp. 115-116]

The bills placed in the bag were in One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) denomination. Many times
Singson himself delivered the jueteng money to FPres. Estrada in Malacañang Palace. To go to
the Presidential Residence (PR), he passed through the main gate where there were guards. At
first, the Secretary would call to give the guards instruction not to inspect the bag. Later on, the
guards came to know Gov. Singson and allowed him to enter without inspecting the bag. Jueteng
money was either delivered to Gov. Singson’s office or picked-up by Gov. Singson, or his driver
or his security or the people in his office. [Ibid, pp. 121-124]

The total amount of money Gov. Singson collected from jueteng operations for FPresident
Estrada starting November 1998 to August 2000 was Five Hundred Forty Million Pesos
(P540,000,000.00) more or less, according to Gov. Singson.

Gov. Singson personally delivered about Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to
FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, p. 124-125]

In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh AAAAAAAA), the entry "Bicol15 1.100" means in the
Province of Bicol for fifteen (15) days the protection money collection for FPres. Esrada was
One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,100,000.00). In the ledger for the month of
November 1998 (Exh. W7), there was an entry "1.500 Anton and 2.500 Anton". According to
Gov. Singson, the entry was made because Atong Ang told him the amounts of One Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) and Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P2,500,000.00), or a total of Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00), collected from Bicol were
recorded / listed in the name of Presidential Assistant Anton Prieto. Atong Ang informed Gov.
Singson that FPres. Estrada knew about it and the latter so confirmed to Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp.
125-127]

While jueteng protection money collection started in September 1998, the ledger started only in
November 1998 when Gov. Singson alone was asked to continue the jueteng collection. [Ibid,
pp. 128-129]

In the July 2000 ledger (Exh. A-4-k), the total amount of jueteng collection and the total amount
of expenses were the same so the balance at the end of the month was zero because "Pick 2"
replaced jueteng, as Gov. Singson, Dante Tan and FPres. Estrada discussed in Malacañang and in
his new home at New Manila called "Boracay". "Pick 2" was the brainchild of Dante Tan and
"Bingo 2 Ball" was the brainchild of Atong Ang. [Ibid, pp. 129-132] In "Boracay", Bong Pineda
told Dante Tan, Gov. Singson and FPres. Estrada that "Pick 2" may be hard to be understood by
the people because there will be 75 numbers. [Ibid, p. 134]

In August 2000, "Pick 2" started and, in September 2000, before his departure for the United
States, FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to hasten the start of "Bingo 2 Balls". Atong Ang
called Gov. Singson when he was in Malaysia in September 6, 2000 and told him that FPres.
Estrada would like to rush the start of "Bingo 2 Balls". Gov. Singson replied that was nice and
asked that Atong Ang reserve Ilocos Sur for him. However, the following day the son of Gov.
Singson informed him that the other half of the franchise was given to his political opponent,
Eric Singson, whom he defeated in the election. Eric Singson was his distant relative. [Ibid, pp.
138-141]

According to the son of Gov. Singson, Atong Ang told him that he had the provincial
commander transferred and the Chief of Police replaced. His father could not do anything to stop
"Bingo 2 Balls" as it was decided by FPres. Estrada and his political career was finish. Gov.
Singson talked with Atong Ang when he was in Malaysia and told him that they should wait for
FPres. Estrada to return. FPres. Estrada returned from the United States on September 13, 2000.
Gov. Singson also arrived from Malaysia the following day. The following day, Gov. Singson
asked FPres. Estrada over the phone why the franchise was given to his political enemy. Gov.
Singson told him that all the mayors will be embarrassed. FPres. Estrada replied that he had
nothing to do with it. Gov. Singson thought that FPres. Estrada was fooling him. He told FPres.
Estrada that it was a matter of pride, that all his mayors were getting embarrassed. FPres. Estrada
replied that he did not care, so Gov. Singson told him "Kung dahil lang dyan pagkatapos ng lahat
bibitawan mo ako, bibitaw na rin ako sa iyo". [Ibid, pp. 142-146]

Gov. Singson then asked his lawyers to prepare his affidavit because he knew that his life would
be in danger if he would part ways with FPres. Estrada, who was very powerful and Gov.
Singson had no evidence. Gov. Singson then called Ricaforte and asked her to fax to him the
ledger. Ricaforte asked if they were going to Malacañang. Gov. Singson knew that Ricaforte did
not know yet what was happening. After she faxed the ledger from her house to Gov. Singson,
the latter asked his lawyer to continue with the preparation of his affidavit. Gov. Singson said he
prepared the affidavit so that if anything happened to him it would be known who was
responsible. When asked if he was threatened, Gov. Singson replied that he knew FPres. Estrada
and the men around him so he knew that his life was in danger. [Ibid, pp. 146-150]

The first set of ledgers was faxed to Singson, while the second set (Exhs. A-4 to A-4-1) was in
the possession of Ricaforte which she produced during the impeachment proceedings. The
prosecution would have the latter subpoenaed fom the Senate. Everyone that Gov. Singson
consulted gave the same comment. Nobody will believe Gov. Singson because FPres. Estrada
was the most popular President elected. Gov. Singson talked with Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson
told Jinggoy Estrada that his family got One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00)
from him and that Jinggoy Estrada got part of the said money. Gov. Singson also told Jinggoy
Estrada that jueteng money all went to his father and that Jinggoy Estrada also had a part of it.
Jinggoy Estrada told Gov. Singson, they would fix it. [Ibid, pp. 147-155]

Nothing happened so Gov. Singson talked with JV Ejercito, another son of FPres. Estrada. JV
Ejercito asked Gov. Singson not to come out and that he will talk with his father. Again nothing
happened so Gov. Singson approached Secretary Ronnie Zamora and showed him the ledger.
The latter reacted that the ledger was a serious matter, "Delikado ito". Zamora asked Gov.
Singson not to come out and he told Gov. Singson that he would see FPres. Estrada. Gov.
Singson then went to see Former Secretary Edgardo Angara at the latter’s GMA Farm in
Batangas and showed to him the ledger. Secretary Angara asked Gov. Singson not to come out
publicly because the ledger was a serious matter and even they, the cabinet members may be
affected. After that first meeting in Batangas, Chavit Singon saw Secretary Angara at the
Philippine Plaza and he latter told Gov. Singson that it was alright as he was able to talk to
FPres. Estrada. Secretary Angara, according to Gov. Singson, told FPres. Estrada that Gov.
Singson was a big help to them in politics and that he was just asking for a small favor. Secretary
Angara also asked FPres. Estrada not to embarrass Gov. Singson’s mayors. This matter might be
known by the media. Secretary Angara informed Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada got mad and
replied "Sinong tinakot nya?" Before Secretary Angara left, he told FPres. Estrada that he saw
Gov. Singson’s jueteng ledger and he found it a ground for impeachment. FPres. Estrada
appeared surprised ("Nagulat") but did not say anything. Secretary Angara assured FPres.
Estrada, he will first talk with Gov. Singson and fix it. For the third time, Gov. Singson saw
Secretary Angara at New World Hotel. He asked Gov. Singson to give him until the end of
September 2000 because the FPres. was a "macho" and would not easily give in. However, Gov.
Singson replied that he was already decided because his mayors kept on calling him. Incidentally
according to Gov. Singson, these political enemies were operating the "Bingo 2 Balls". [Ibid, pp.
156-164]

After Secretary Angara, Gov. Singson also approached Congressman Mark Jimenez, who said
after he met with FPres. Estrada, General Lacson and Secretary Ronnie Zamora that "Bingo 2
Balls" will not stop in Ilocos Sur but that Gov. Singson should lie low first. Gov. Singson replied
that he had decided already to come out and he informed his mayors that he will expose the
anomalies involving FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson talked with Jimenez over the phone when he
was then at Holiday Inn on October 3, 2000. There was a conference of the Mayors League in
the Philippines. Gov. Singson left Holiday Inn together with twenty-two mayors. According to
Gov. Singson, armed men followed him at about 11:30 that evening at San Marcelino Street and
that his vehicle was blocked by three cars and one motorcycle, all passengers by which were
fully armed by armalite. Two of the cars were TMG cars and the other, a civilian red car. Gov.
Singson told the mayor with whom he was talking over the phone that they should all go to San
Marcelino, behind Jai-Alai because of an emergency. His driver was instructed by Gov. Singson
not to open the door of his vehicle. [TSN dated July 29, 2002, pp. 11-19]

PAOC men signaled Gov. Singson to get out of his vehicle, a bullet-proof Ford Super Van but he
refused. He went out of the van after the mayors arrived one after another. The PAOC team told
Gov. Singson that they received information that he had a blinker that, although he did not use it,
mere possession was already a violation and that they wanted to bring this to Crame and after he
suggested that he be given a ticket of the volation but he instead asked that they go to the police
precincts at the United Nations Avenue. Only the two TMG Officers went to the police precinct
with Gov. Singson who rode in his own van. There were media people at the police precinct.
When asked why he was being harassed although he was influencial to the FPres. Estrada, Gov.
Singson replied to the media that he will expose the anomalies of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 20-
26]

The following day the incident was published in the newspapers and shown on television. The
group of FPres. Esrada tried to settle with Singson. JV Ejercito was the first to call repeatedly
(every two minutes) to ask Gov. Singson to return the call of FPres. Estrada, Gov. Singson called
the latter who asked that they talk because he was confused with the problems of the Abu Sayyaf
and the First Lady. Gov. Singson replied he had already given his word. They talked for the
second time and then third time, it was FPres. Estrada himself who called. The next person to
call was Atong Ang who was pleading to Gov. Singson to fix the matter. Gov. Singson brought
up the P130 Million from the excise tax which Gov. Singson said was taken by Atong Ang and
FPres. Estrada. Atong Ang promised that the said amount will be returned to Gov. Singson and
that the "Bingo 2 Balls" will be given to Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson informed him that it was
too late. Atong Ang called Gov. Singson about twenty (20) times [Ibid, pp. 27-37]
After Atong Ang, Former Secretary Alfredo Lim called to convince Gov. Singson to settle and to
see FPres. Estrada. Alfredo Lim asked Gov. Singson to proceed with the press conference but he
should put the blame on Atong Ang and that they will take care of Atong Ang. Alfredo Lim
gestured with his right fist thumb down. Gov. Singson understood this to mean that Atong Ang
will be killed. Gov. Singson did not agree because he might be implicated. He asked them to
look for a good reason. [Ibid, pp. 38-42)

The next to call Gov. Singson was Jinggoy Estrada. The latter and Gov. Singson talked on
October 8, 2000. Jinggoy Estrada also sent many emissaries to talk with Gov. Singson. That
evening Gov. Singson went to Cardinal Sin at his San Miguel Residence. Gov. Singson
explained to Cardinal Sin the situation and left to him the evidences so that in case anything
happens to Gov. Singson, he would know who will be responsible. Gov. Singson saw the
Cardinal with his sisters. Cardinal Sin told Gov. Singson to go ahead that he will pray for Gov.
Singson and that God will be with them. [Ibid, pp. 42-26]

Gov. Singson returned to his house at 10:00 o’clock in the evening where Jinggoy Estrada called
him and sent emissaries again to Gov. Singson. At 12:00 midnight Jinggoy Estrada and some
friends of his arrived at Gov. Singson’s house in Blue Ridge, Quezon City. Jinggoy Estrada
pleaded to Gov. Singson until 3:00 o’clock the following morning. Gov. Singson told Jinggoy
Estrada that it was too late because his press conference will happen in a while and all that the
Estradas could do was to deny what Gov. Singson will reveal at the press conference. He further
said to Jinggoy Estrada that he will not mention the latter’s name. [Ibid, pp. 46-51]

Gov. Singson proceeded with his press conference on October 9, 2000 at Club Filipino. He gave
the two reasons: first, FPres. Estrada insulted him and wanted him killed so he was not a true
friend anymore; and second, he already had the evidence and they will kill him even if he did not
pursue his planned press conference. It was better for him to be killed with honor and to show
how corrupt the government was under the Estrada Administration. According to Gov. Singson,
FPres. Estrada wanted to replace jueteng with "Bingo-2-Balls" because he will earn more, about
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) a day. Gov. Singson explained how much FPres. Estrada
would receive from "Bingo 2 Balls". [Ibid, pp. 51-59]

Gov. Singson also mentioned that FPres. Estrada owned the "Boracay Mansion" in New Manila.
He identified this property through a computer generated picture (Exh. P8). [Ibid, pp. 60-67]
Gov. Singson also described the house of FPres. Estrada at Polk St., Greenhills which he had
visited frequently as well as the house of the FPres. in P. Guevarra Street which was just 2 to 3
kilometers away from Polk Street. [Ibid, pp. 68-72]

Gov. Singson testified as to the other properties of FPres. Estrada like Fontainbleau, Inc., a
casino. A check (Exh. V6) payable the order of Fonteinbleau, Inc. was among the checks turned
over to Ricaforte. Gov. Singson helped put up the said casino for FPres. Estrada. However, his
name does not appear as an incorporator of the said company in its Articles of Incorporation
(Exh. 22). According to Gov. Singson, the shares in the company were distributed as follows:
five percent (5%) to Butch Tenorio, the President of the casino; twenty-five percent (25%) for
Gov. Singson; seventy percent (70%) for FPres. Estrada which were placed in the names of
Jaime Dichaves and his classmate Susie Pineda. [Ibid, pp. 72-76]
To prove his close relationship with FPres. Estrada, Gov. Singson mentioned that Jacob, a son of
the FPres. Estrada by Laarni Enriquez, was his baptismal godson while FPres. Estrada stood as
sponsor (in the wedding with his two children, Racquel and Randy). [Ibid, pp.76-78]

On cross examination, Gov. Singson was confronted with his testimony during the Senate
impeachment trial, contained in the transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings held
on December 13, 2000 at pages 234 and 235 (Exh. 28-Serapio and submarkings). In the said
testimony, Gov. Singson did not mention that Serapio was present when he turned over to
Ricaforte the jueteng protection money, partly in cash and partly in check. [TSN dated July 29,
2002, pp. 147-150] Gov. Singson insisted that Serapio was present but he was being confused by
the Senators sympathetic to FPres. Estrada. It appears, however, that Singson was not asked
during impeachment proceedings who were present during the aforementioned turn-over of
jueteng protection money. [Ibid, pp. 150-151] Gov. Singson also testified that he did not know if
Ricaforte withdrew the amount in cash. Gov. Singson was only told by Ricaforte that she gave
the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to Serapio. [Ibid, pp. 153-156 Gov. Singson
also admitted that the P200,000,000.00 were transferred to the Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.
[Ibid, p. 156] and that he likewise testified before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on October
17, 2000, as shown by the transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing of that Committee
(Exh. 29 and submarkings). Ibid, pp. 158-159]. Gov. Singson acknowledged that he had came
across the Certificate of Incorporation and By-Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.
(Exh 1-Serapio and submarkings). The said foundation’s Certificate of Incorporation was dated
November 17, 2000, and that the Articles of Incorporation was dated February 15, 2000. [Ibid,
pp. 167-168] Gov. Singson saw for the first time during his cross-examination the certification of
the Branch Manager of Equitable-PCI Bank that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.
maintained an account in the total amount of Two Hundred Three Million One Hundred Thirty-
Six Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-One Pesos and Twenty Seven Centavos (P203,136,931.27)
(Exh 17; 17-a-Serapio). [Ibid, p. 169]

EMMA BARBON LIM (Emma Lim) worked for Gov. Singson since July 1987 as Liaison
Officer at the latter’s private office in LCS Building, San Andres corner Diamante Street, San
Andres Bukid, Metro Manila. LCS stood for Luis Chavit Singson. Emma Lim did personal
errands for Gov. Singson, like collecting jueteng money from different persons for FPres.
Estrada pursuant to the instructions of Gov. Singson.

As early as January 1999, Emma Lim was already receiving deliveries of jueteng money. Gov.
Singson told her to take care of the money that she was receiving because it was not the money
of Gov. Singson but of FPres. Estrada. She started collecting jueteng money sometime in April
1999. She personally went to the person from whom she collected the money. She knew that it
was jueteng money because Gov. Singson told her so and that it was also confirmed by
Ricaforte.

She also knew that it was jueteng money because there was an instance that Ricaforte scolded
her for opening an envelope. Ricaforte told her that it was strictly confidential and it was
intended for FPres. Estrada. Emma Lim also personally delivered jueteng money to Malacañang.
According to Emma Lim, Ricaforte was the accountant-auditor of FPres. Estrada. This was how
she was introduced by Gov. Singson to her and how she introduced herself when she reported at
the LCS Office. Ricaforte also held office in the same address. Emma Lim’s other co-employee
was Menchu Itchon. [TSN dated July 1, 2002, pp. 12-17]

Witness testified that she collected jueteng money from Undersecretary (USec) Anton Prieto,
Jinggoy Estrada and Bong Pineda.

USec Anton Prieto was the Presidential Assistant for Bicol Affairs. He was the one in charge of
jueteng collection in the Bicol Area. Witness met Prieto personally and he introduced himself to
the witness as such. Every time he called the office, he always said that he was an
Undersecretary in Malacañang.

Sometime on April 1999, Emma Lim met Prieto at the lobby of Dusit Hotel Nikko in Makati.
Usec Prieto handed to her a sealed mailing envelope which she brought to their office at LCS
Building. Emma Lim called Gov. Singson who asked her to open the envelope to know how
much she received. The envelope contained a post dated check (Exh F7, F7-1 to F7-5) in the
amount of P1,190,000.00. Emma Lim deposited the check (Exh G7, G7-1 to G7-4) in the account
of Gov. Singson at the Metrobank, Ayala Center Branch on April 7, 1999.

Three days after the check was deposited, the New Accounts Department of the Metrobank
Ayala branch informed Emma Lim that the check was dishonored because the signature was
different. The check was returned through Usec Prieto’s messenger.

Emma Lim usually deposited the PNB Naga Branch checks from Prieto in the Account No.
0963011682260 of Gov. Singson. The deposit slips (Exhibits I7 to Q7 and submarkings) listed the
deposits.

At one time, Ricaforte scolded her for opening the envelope because it was strictly confidential
and that it was for FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte took the check from the Emma Lim. [Ibid, pp. 17-
56]

Ricaforte first reported at the LCS building on April 16, 1999. She introduced herself as the
accountant-auditor of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson also introduced her as such.

Emma Lim collected jueteng money twice from Bong Pineda, who was in charge of the jueteng
collections in Pampanga because Gov. Singson told her so.

Sometime on January 2000, upon instruction of Gov. Singson, Emma Lim and Gov. Singson’s
driver Faustino Prudencio went to the house of Bong Pineda at No. 2 Albany Street, Northeast
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila to pick-up money. At Pineda’s house, Pineda’s secretary,
Marty, asked her to enter an office room to wait for Bong’s brother Romy Pineda. When Romy
Pineda arrived, he placed a shopping bag on top of the table and asked Emma Lim to count the
contents. The money was P5,000,000.00 in P1,000 denominations. After counting the money,
they returned the money inside the shopping bag and Mr. Pineda made her sign a half sheet of
bond paper evidencing that she received the money. Emma Lim then kept the money inside the
vault at the LCS office and informed Gov. Singson that she had picked up the money.

The second time Emma Lim collected money from Bong Pineda was sometime on February
2000. They were on their way home after collecting money from Jinggoy Estrada. Menchu
Itchon called her and told her that Gov. Singson wanted her to drop by the house of Mr. Bong
Pineda to pick-up money. Emma Lim proceeded and Marty again ushered her to the office room.
Romy Pineda arrived. He opened what appeared to be a bookshelf and came out with a red
Salvatore Ferragamo shopping bag (Exhibit R7) containing P5,000,000.00. The money was in
P1,000 bills and in 5 bundles containing P1,000,000.00 each. Romy Pineda asked her to sign a
paper that she received the amount. She kept the money in the vault assigned to her at the LCS
office. She informed Gov. Singson that she received the money from Bong Pineda, and Gov.
Singson told her that he will pass by for it. [Ibid, pp. 58-80]

She collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada three times. These were sometime in January,
February 2000 and March 17, 2000.

For the first collection, Gov. Singson called her up at the LCS office and told her to call the
office of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to inquire if she can pick up what was to be picked up. The staff
of Jinggoy Estrada who answered the phone told her to go there after lunch. Witness left the
office at 1:00 o’clock with the driver of Gov. Singson and proceeded to the office of Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada at the second floor of the Municipal Hall of San Juan, Metro Manila.

When she arrived at the office, the staff at the receiving section gave her a sheet of paper where
she wrote her name and office. The bodyguard of Jinggoy Estrada arrived and handed to her
something which was wrapped in a magazine and sealed with scotch tape. The bodyguard told
her not to count the money because there were many people around. She then brought the
package back to the LCS office and kept it in the vault. She called Gov. Singson and told him
that she already picked up the money from Jinggoy Estrada. When Gov. Singson arrived, witness
counted the money in his presence and it was P1,000,000.00 which she turned over to Gov.
Singson.

Sometime in February 2000, she again collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada. Gov.
Singson called her up and instructed her to call up the office of Jinggoy Estrada. She was able to
talk to Jinggoy Estrada’s secretary Josie and was told to go to their office after lunch.

Josie ushered her inside the office of Jinggoy Estrada. Jinggoy Estrada was there. Witness
greeted him a good afternoon and he smiled. Josie asked her to sit in front of her table which was
about 4 to 5 meters away from Jinggoy Estrada. Josie took up a paper bag from under her table
and placed it on top of the table. She asked the witness to count the contents. The witness
counted that there were ten (10) bundles of P1,000.00 bills. Each bundle had 100 pieces and the
total amount was P1,000,000.00. She then asked permission to leave. After coming from the
office of Jinggoy Estrada, they proceeded to the house of Bong Pineda.

She collected jueteng money for the third time from Jinggoy Estrada on March 17, 2000. She
again went to the office of Jinggoy Estrada after lunch after contacting Josie. When she arrived
there, she was ushered inside the office of Jinggoy Estrada. She can no longer remember the
number of staff inside the office. It was Josie who told her to sit down in front of the table of
Jinggoy Estrada. Jinggoy Estrada took out a check from his wallet and gave it to her saying,
"Sabihin mo kay Gob tseke na lang." Emma Lim then kept the check inside her bag. The amount
was P1,000,000.00 with United Overseas Bank Philippines, San Juan Branch as the drawee bank.
The witness deposited the check to the account of Gov. Singson at Metrobank, Ayala Center.
The deposit slip (Exhibit S7) was presented.

According to the witness, the check was personalized because it bore the picture of Jinggoy
Estrada at the background. Emma Lim had seen this kind of check of Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp.
82-111] Emma Lim maintained her testimony notwithstanding that she was shown a certification
dated December 11, 2000 issued by Isabelita M. Papa, Executive Vice President of United
Overseas Bank of the Philippines, stating that Mr. Jose P. Estrada, also known as Jinggoy
Ejercito Estrada, never had a current or checking account with the said bank. [TSN dated July
10, 2002]

She knew that the money she kept in the vault assigned to her were jueteng collections because
Governor Singson and Ricaforte told her so. [TSN dated July 1, 2002, p. 81]

On July 3, 2002, Emma B. Lim continued her direct examination and testified that she personally
met FPres. Estrada when she delivered jueteng money to Malacanang. As instructed by Gov.
Singson, she was fetched by Singson’s driver, personal aide and security guard at Singson’s
office at LCS. She boarded the Ford Expedition when they passed by the LCS office.Singson
called to ask Emma Lim to double check the money inside the car if it was Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00). Gov. Singson’s driver Faustino Prudencio, personal aide Jemis Singson and
security guard Frederico Artates were inside the car too when she bundle count the money. They
proceeded to the residence of FPres. Estrada at Polk Street, Greenhills. However, Artates and
Jamis Singson were informed by the security guards that Malou Florendo and FPres. Estrada
were not at home. They waited outside and decided to take their lunch in a restaurant in
Greenhills. They brought the black bag containing the money with them at the restaurant. Gov.
Singson’s personal aide was holding the bag. Driver Faustino Prudencio received instruction
from Singson for them to proceed to Malacanang. It was already 1:00 o’clock, after lunchtime in
1999 during the Maslog book scam in Malacanang. She recalled it because her companion
warned her not to open the bag because "Baka ma-maslog ka ". In that incident, Maslog was
caught bringing money inside Malacanang. Emma Lim was dropped-off at the circle inside
Malacanang. She carried the black bag containing P5,000,000.00. Emma Lim introduced herself
to the security guard as Emma from the office of Governor Gov. Singson and told him Malou
Florendo was expecting her. The amount of P5,000,000.00 was in One thousand (P 1,000.00)
peso bills. [TSN dated July 3, 2002, pp. 190-207] The security guard allowed her to enter,
without passing the bag through the x-ray. The guard was not strict and pointed to her the
Presidential Residence. There was another security guard in front of the house and Emma Lim
gave the same introduction and that Malou Florendo was expecting her. Emma was allowed to
enter. She was met by Malou inside the residence, Emma Lim saw FPres. Estrada, wearing a
cream polo. Emma Lim handed the black bag to Malou Florendo. Emma Lim and FPres. Estrada
were within each other’s view. Malou placed the black bag beside an office table. Emma Lim
heard Malou told Gov. Singson over the phone that she was already there. Emma Lim left for the
LCS office. [Ibid, pp. 242-261] Emma Lim described the black bag as rectangular with
numbered combination lock. The width was about 8 inches, the length, 18 inches and the height
was 12 inches. It was made of canvass or synthetic material. Emma demonstrated in court that
she could carry a bag of similar size with P 5,000,000.00 inside. Five bundles of bills weighed
four (4) kilos and eight (8) grams. [Ibid, pp. 263-279,280] The bag weighed 2 kilos and 6 grams.
The bag and its contents weighed 7 kilos and 4 grams. [Ibid, p. 288]

On cross-examination, Emma Lim testified that she worked for Gov. Singson since 1987. She
started living at LCS Office since 1989 until she got married in 1996. She did not pay rent just
like the other employees of Singson. She was not related to Singson. Her brother Roy Barbon
worked as driver for Singson between 1990 and 1992. She did not feel beholden to Gov. Singson
because she worked for her salary. She did not owe him a debt of gratitude but it should be the
other way around because she got embroiled in this trouble because of jueteng collections. [Ibid,
pp. 296-308]

Emma Lim attended a dinner at Malacañang Palace on February 16, 2001. [TSN dated July 17,
2002, pp. 75-77] She was appointed at John Hay Development Corporation during the term of
President Arroyo. She received Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) per board meeting. Emma
Lim also worked as liaison officer of Gov. Singson for overseas workers. [Ibid, pp.87-88] She
knew that she was collecting jueteng money because Gov. Singson said so and Ricaforte
comfirmed. Further the money delivered was bundled by millions and no money of that amount
arrived their office when Gov. Singson was not yet a collector. [Ibid, p. 99]

MARIA CARMENCITA ANCHETA ITCHON (Itchon), a Certified Public Accountant,

testified that she was hired by Gov. Singson to be an accountant of Fountain Bleau Incorporated
(later renamed Fontain Bleau Incorporated) on February 19, 1999. According to Itchon, the said
corporation, which was set-up to build a casino in Clark Air Base, Pampanga, was owned by
former President Estrada. Witness knew that this was owned by Estrada because Gov. Singson
said so and it was confirmed by Mrs. Ricaforte. [TSN, June 17, 2002, pp. 115-118]

She allegedly knew that Fontain Bleau Incorporated got its funding from the jueteng collections
of FPres. Estrada because Gov. Singson would always tell her to wait for the jueteng collection
of FPres. Estrada every time she asked for funds. [Ibid, pp. 119-122]

As Accountant, she was the one who made the listings of the pre-operation and expenses of
Fontain Bleau and during that time she was the Accountant, she already
received jueteng collections for FPres. Estrada.

Itchon further testified that she received jueteng collections, amounting to a total of around Six
Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) in cash and check, about six (6) times. She received
these jueteng collections from the messengers of Mr. Anton Prieto and former San Juan Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada or Jingle Bells. After receiving the collections, she would inform Gov. Singson
and then either Gov. Singson took the collection from her or they turned it over to Mrs. Yolanda
Ricaforte.
Itchon identified Fontain Bleu’s original Certificate of Incorporation (Exh. P6) and the Articles of
Incorporation and By Laws attached (Exh. P6-1), which were in her possession. These
incorporation documents showed the date of Fontain Bleau’s registration with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (April 5, 1999), the names of its incorporators, and its office address at
the 2nd Floor, LCS Building, San Andres Bukid, Manila. Itchon’s sketch of the office was
marked as Exh. Q6. [Ibid., pp. 123-124,132-137]

Itchon averred that before she personally met Yolanda Ricaforte at the office in LCS, Ricaforte
used to call their office and introduced herself as the Accountant – Auditor for FPres. Estrada. As
early as March 19, 1999, Singson told Itchon that she would be working with Yolanda Ricaforte,
the Accountant of FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte began to report for work in the same office as Itchon
on April 16, 1999. [Ibid, pp. 129-132, 138-141]

Singson and Ricaforte told Itchon that Ricaforte will be her [Itchon’s] immediate supervisor.
Ricaforte checked Itchon’s entries in her journal. Ricaforte signed the check that Itchon prepared
for payment for the supplier of Fontain Bleau and Ricaforte brought Itchon every time she went
to the Pampanga office.

Itchon proceeded to narrate how in the course of their work she and Ricaforte became close and
had many conversations including among others how FPres. Estrada came to appoint Ricaforte’s
husband Orestes Ricaforte as undersecretary of Tourism and how FPres. Estrada gifted Orestes
with the Black Lexus that Yolanda and Itchon usually used in traveling to the Pampanga office.
Itchon had photographs of gatherings she attended with Ricaforte (Exh. A-6-vvvvv). [Ibid, pp.
143-152]

Itchon knew Ricaforte to be the Accountant–Auditor of FPres. Estrada in Fontain Bleau

Incorporated and for juetengcollections because Ricaforte reported directly to FPres. Estrada.
Itchon then narrated how on June 15, 1999, she and Mrs. Regina Lim (one of the incorporators of
Fontain Bleau) brought Ricaforte to Malacañang at around 3:30 p.m. They brought her there
because Ricaforte said she would report to FPres. Estrada. Before going to Malacañang,
Ricaforte took their records of Fontain Bleau, got Itchon’s journal and the list of expenses and
then Itchon briefed her regarding their expenses. [Ibid, pp. 155-162]

Itchon also testified that Ricaforte also reported to FPres. Estrada by phone, sometimes using the
landline in the office and sometimes using her [Ricaforte’s] cell phone. Itchon knew that the calls
were made to FPres. Estrada because she was around when Ricaforte was making calls, and
Ricaforte would ask her to keep quiet because she was calling the President. The calls were made
inside the LCS office.

Itchon explained that she knew that the cell phone number of Ricaforte was 0918-9021847
because the number was originally issued in Itchon’s name. The cell phone was supposed to be
hers. When they were in Fontain Bleau, they bought cell phones and the application form for the
number was under Itchon’s name. Itchon was the one who assigned it to herself. But when the
cell phones came, Itchon testified that Ricaforte took the cell phone no. 0918-9021847 and the
number 0918-9021849 originally assigned to Ricaforte went to Itchon. Itchon also testified that
Ricaforte called up Estrada in her presence about five times.
Itchon prepared a summary of the calls (Exh. R6 with submarkings) made by Ricaforte. Itchon
explained that these were the summary of phone calls of Ricaforte to FPres. Estrada at the
presidential residence; to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or Jingle Bells, to Mr. Edward Serapio, to
Governor Singson and to Mr. Romy Pineda, the brother of Bong Pineda. She took the
information from the fifteen (15) Statements of Account of Ricaforte for her cell number 0918-
9021847. The phone billings of Ricaforte particularly with reference to cell phone no. 0918-
9021847 were with Itchon. [Ibid, pp. 163-175]

Itchon averred that she prepared or came up with a summary of calls made by Mrs. Ricaforte
upon the advice of her lawyer Atty. Pablito Sanidad because when she and Mrs. Ricaforte
testified in the Senate Blue Ribbon Hearing Committee, Mrs. Ricaforte testified that she seldom
or never called up President Joseph Estrada, Mr. Jinggoy Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio,
Governor Singson and Mr. Romy Pineda. Itchon also testified that when she prepared the
summary based on the entries on the particular phone billings, she found out several phone calls
to those persons mentioned. [TSN, June 19, 2002, pp. 8-12]

Fifteen (15) Statements of Account (Exhs. S6, S6-1 up to S6-14) issued by Smart communications
were also identified by Itchon purporting to be statements of account of Cell phone No. 0918-
9021847. The Statements of Account covered the billing period ending July 1999 and billing
period ending August 31, 2000. The billing statements of account were received by Itchon from
the company for her to pay. The cell phone bills were being paid by Fontain Bleau, but when
Fontain Bleau ceased to exist, the phone bills were paid by Ricaforte with money
from jueteng collections. [Ibid, pp. 15-18]

Itchon affirmed that she was present during Mrs. Ricaforte’s phone call to the presidential
residence in five instances. During these times, Mrs. Ricaforte was at the LCS office and Itchon
was either beside her or in front of Mrs. Ricaforte’s office table. Itchon pointed out in the sketch
(Exh. Q6) she prepared where she was during the five times when the calls were made in her
presence.

The number or numbers Ricaforte called up were 736-8855 and 736-8858. Itchon testified that
she knew that the numbers pertain to the numbers in the Presidential Residence because they had
office records and she also tried calling the number. When she dialed the numbers she asked if it
was the PMS. The answer was it was the Presidential Residence. When asked why Itchon
checked and called the numbers in the first place, she answered that when she checked Mrs.
Ricaforte’s cell phone bills, she found out that the numbers were there so she tried calling to
check whether it was the Presidential Residence.

When asked what was the nature or gist of the conversation from the end of Mrs. Ricaforte when
she called up the Presidential residence, Itchon answered that Mrs. Ricaforte said: "Malou, this is
Yolly. Is the President already calling for me? If he needed me, just call me on the cell phone."
According to Itchon, Malou was the secretary of FPres. Estrada and Itchon knew this because it
was Mrs. Ricaforte who told her. [Ibid., pp. 18-23]

According to Itchon, there were also calls made to former San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and,
in her summary, Ricaforte called up Mayor Jinggoy Estrada twenty-four (24) times. On at least
five occasions, Itchon testified that she was present when Ricaforte called up Jinggoy Estrada
while they [Itchon and Ricaforte] were both in the LCS office. Itchon distinctly remembered two
dates of Ricaforte’s phone calls to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada – (a) August 16, 1999 when Ricaforte
called up Jinggoy in his residence because that was the first call of Ricaforte when she started
concentrating as the accountant-auditor of former President Estrada in his "jueteng" collections;
and (b) November 15, 1999 because Ricaforte called up Mayor Jinggoy several times as they
were waiting for Mayor Jinggoy’s jueteng collection from which they would get their salaries.

The cell phone number of Jinggoy Estrada was 0917-526-0217 and his landline number was 724-
4736. Itchon knew that these numbers pertain to Jinggoy Estrada because she got the numbers
from Gov. Singson. She got the number because she wanted to check the cell phone bills of
Ricaforte because there were times that she remembered that Ricaforte had been calling the
number of Jinggoy Estrada which Itchon was not aware of. [Ibid, pp. 23-28]

Based on Itchon’s as well as the phone billings, Ricaforte called up Atty. Edward Serapio six (6)
times at cell phone No. 0918-9012071. Itchon also got the number of Atty. Serapio from Gov.
Singson. Based on the Smart Communications phone billings, Ricaforte called up Atty. Serapio
on March 23 and 24, 2000, and April 3, 12, 13, and 14, 2000. (Exh. S6 with submarkings) [Ibid.,
pp. 29-35]

According to Itchon’s summary, Mrs. Ricaforte called up Gov. Singson 209 times at cell phone
nos. 0917-8387171 and 0918-9002443. Itchon was present several times when Ricaforte called
up Gov. Singson. Itchon knew that these numbers pertained to Gov. Singson because she was
familiar with these cell phone numbers. [Ibid, pp. 37-38]

Itchon also testified to calls made by Ricaforte to a certain Romy Pineda, the brother Bong
Pineda, whom she knew was a jueteng lord. Itchon testified that Ricaforte called up Romy
Pineda in his landline number, 722-7366. Based on the Summary that Itchon prepared, Ricaforte
called up Romy Pineda twice. [Ibid, pp. 38-39]

Itchon further testified that Fontain Bleau, Inc. was not able to operate because Fontain Bleau
could not comply with PAGCOR’s requirement for a 200-room hotel accommodation so it was
not issued a license to operate.

After the non-issuance of the license to operate, Fontain Bleau entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with RN Development Corporation on July 19, 1999 (Exhs. T6, T6-1 to T6-2). The
Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") stipulated that RN Development Corporation will
reimburse all the pre-operations expenses of Fontain Bleau and that Fontain Bleau will have a
10% share from the casino that will be established by RN Development Corporation. Itchon was
present during the signing of the MOA. She identified the signatures of the witnesses to the
MOA; namely, a certain Pax who was introduced to Itchon as Atong Ang’s sister (Exh. T6-2-c)
and Yolanda Ricaforte (Exh. T6-2-d). Itchon testified that she came to know Atong Ang during
the negotiation of the MOA and that Atong Ang was present during the signing.

As far as Itchon knew, the pre-operational expenses of Fontain Bleau was around Sixty Five
Million Pesos (P65,000,000.00). This was reimbursed by RN Development Corporation to
Fontain Bleau pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. Itchon brought with her a copy of
RN's deposit slip and their first payment in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00)
(Exh. U6) and testified that the depositor’s signature therein was Emma Lim’s, one of the
secretaries in the LCS office. Itchon also had a photocopies of the second check that RN paid to
Fontain Bleau in the amount of Thirty Four Million Six Hundred Forty Thousand Four Hundred
and Forty Two Pesos (P34,640,442.00) (Exh. V6) and of the acknowledgement receipt (Exh. V6-
1) signed by Ricaforte and Atty. Manuel Singson, as Director and Corporate Secretary,
respectively of Fontain Bleau. Itchon further testified that Ricaforte got the originals of these
documents but Itchon had them photocopied for her record before Ricaforte took the originals.

Since Fontain Bleau was unable to operate, all the employees of Fontain Bleau in the Pampanga
office were terminated. It was only Itchon and Mrs. Ricaforte who were retained. [Ibid, pp. 39-
58]

In August 1999, Ricaforte already concentrated on being the accountant-auditor of FPres.

Estrada in his "jueteng" operation and then Itchon was told by Gov. Singson to help Ricaforte.
Nothing happened to Fontain Bleau anymore. Itchon allegedly knew that in August 1999,
Ricaforte concentrated in the jueteng collection because Itchon was there when Gov. Singson
briefed Ricaforte regarding the collection of the jueteng operation and she [Ricaforte] was given
the code name "Madam Auring" by Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 58-60]

Itchon’s testimony then detailed how she participated in the "jueteng" collections. She was
tasked to receive the "jueteng" collections that were brought to the office. There were also times
when Itchon or Emma Lim were called by Ricaforte to help compute and count the money turned
over to Ricaforte such as double checking through a calculator. Collections that Itchon received
were brought by messengers of Mr. Anton Prieto and sometimes by the messengers of Gov.
Singson who picked up the jueteng collections from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Itchon knew
Prieto’s messenger because when the messenger came, the checks were inside the white
envelope with markings "Menchu/Emma" and then the messenger introduced himself as
messenger of Anton Prieto. Itchon was also present when Gov. Singson was giving instructions
to his messengers to get jueteng collections from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson’s
messengers were Mr. Jamis Singson and Edward Iverra. Each collection was One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) per collection in cash. She remembers these collections from Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada on two (2) occasions because it was from there that they (Ricaforte, Lim, Itchon and
Iverra) took their salary.

According to Itchon, these jueteng collections came in around 15th and 30th of the month. From
the time that they started concentrating on the jueteng collection for the former President on
August 1999, Itchon received these collections about six (6) times, covering the period August
1999 to August 2000. The total collections she received after August 1999 was around Seven
Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00). With respect to the Seven Million Peso collections that she
received, there were times when Gov. Singson took the collection directly from her and there
were times when Gov. Singson instructed her to turn over the collection to Ricaforte. As
Accountant of Fontain Bleau, she also received six (6) collections, for the period February 1999
to July 1999. All in all Itchon averred she received twelve (12) collections. [Ibid, pp. 61-66]
Itchon also testified that Emma Lim was the secretary of Governor Singson and also a co-
employee at the LCS Office. Since Emma Lim was also helping in the jueteng collections, she
also received salary from Ricaforte. [Ibid, pp. 71-72]

On cross examination, Itchon explained that the name of the former President allegedly did not
appear in the Articles of Incorporation of Fontain Bleau because of his public position and
because the source of its funds was illegal [TSN, June 24, 2002, pp. 19-20]. Emma Lim, Jamis
Singson, Edward Iverra and sometimes Ricaforte collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada.
Jamis Singson turned over to Itchon the jueteng collection about once or twice in 2000 between
January to August 2000. Itchon testified that they helped Gov. Singson count Five Million pesos
(P5,000,000.00) from the jueteng collections sent through the messengers and some from the
collections of Gov. Singson himself and placed the said amount of money in a black bag to be
brought to FPres. Estrada but she admitted she did not see the delivery to President Estrada.
[Ibid, pp. 23-30, 101]

Itchon and the others at the office would allegedly wait for the call of Ricaforte to Jinggoy every
pay day because their salaries would come from Jinggoy’s jueteng collection. Itchon was only
present around five (5) times that Ricaforte called Jinggoy, although Ricaforte called Jinggoy 24
times. (Ibid, pp. 39-46) Itchon also mentioned during her cross-examination that Gov. Singson
was reimbursed for the jueteng money advanced to Fontain Bleau when the latter was acquired
by RN Development Corporation. RN Development Corporation’s partial payment in the amount
of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) was deposited in the account of Fontain Bleau by
Ricaforte and Ricaforte thereafter returned to Singson the said amount through a Metrobank
check payable to Singson. (Exhs. X6, X6-1, X6-2) [Ibid, pp. 125-127; TSN, June 26, 2002, pp.
25-26]

According to Itchon, the use by Ricaforte of the cell phone no. 0918-9021847 in the name of
Itchon was proven by the cell phone number declared by Ricaforte in the bank where she
deposited money (Ibid, p. 19). She admitted that she and Emma Lim were appointed by President
Arroyo as Director of John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation on September 2001. (Exh.
26, 26-a to 26-c-1) [TSN, June 26, 2002, pp. 51-56]

On redirect, Itchon referred to the acknowledgement receipt dated March 12, 1999 (Exh. Y-6)
for the advance rental of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000) as well as the landscape plan of said
company (Exhs. E7, E7-1 to E7-6) as proof that that original name of Fontain Bleau was spelled
Fountain Bleau Holding, Inc. [Ibid, p. 100]

Smart Communications billings identified by Itchon were marked as Exhs. X6, X6-1 to X6-2
[Ibid, pp. 101-105]. Itchon also brought to court the journal (Exhs. A7-1 to A7-5) and
computerized list (Exh. B7, B7-1 to B7-3) of the pre-operation expenses of Fountain Bleau
amounting to Sixty Five Million (P65,000,000.00) which were reimbursed by RN Development
Corporation. She also presented the computerized list of said expenses with specifics (Exh. C7,
C7-1 to C7-4) and some of the checks of Gov. Singson which were used to pay the expenses of
Fountain Bleau from March 3, 1999 to June 20, 1999 (Exh. D7, D7-1 to D7-95) The funds of
Fountain Bleau were taken by Gov. Singson from jueteng collections. The check covering part of
the reimbursement to Fountain Bleau in the amount of Thirty Four Million Six Hundred Forty
Thousand Four Hundred and Forty Two Pesos (P34,640,442.00) was marked as Exh. V6 (with
submarkings). [Ibid, pp. 106-117]

VICENTE RAGIL AMISTAD (Amistad) was a Philippine National Police (PNP) officer
stationed at Vigan City Police Station, assigned to former Gov. Singson since 1989 until the time
of his testimony. On three (3) occasions in 1999 and 2000, Amistad was instructed by Gov.
Singson to go to the house of Bong Pineda at Albany Street, Northeast Greenhills and received
from Romy Pineda, Bong Pineda’s brother, the followings sums of money: Seven Million Seven
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P7,750,000.00); Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) and Three
Million Two Hundred Fifty Pesos (P3,250,000.00). Amistad would bundle count, place the
money in a plastic bag and bring it to Gov. Singson at LCS building, after signing a receipt
prepared by Romy Pineda. [TSN, September 16, 2002, pp. 15-56]

Amistad also testified that upons instruction of Singson, he went to the office of then Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada at the second floor of the Municipal Hall of San Juan in 1999. After Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada called up someone, he [Jinggoy] asked Amistad to go down and get what
Jinggoy would give him in front of the Municipal Hall. At the ground floor, the security guard of
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada gave him a package wrapped in a newspaper with scotch tape, which he
brought to Gov. Singson at LCS Building. Amistad testified that he was was scolded by Gov.
Singson because the money inside the package was short. Gov. Singson called up Jinggoy and
informed the latter about the shortage. The following day Amistad was informed by Gov.
Singson that the shortage of Jinggoy was already given to him.

JAMIS BATULAN SINGSON (Jamis) was the personal aide of Gov. Singson, who was not
related to him. Jamis Singson knew FPres Estrada and Gov. Singson to be close friends who
played mahjong and drank together. Jamis Singson was constantly with Gov. Singson when he
delivered jueteng money to FPres Estrada. [TSN, September 18, 2002, pp. 25-31] Jamis Singson
saw Gov. Singson counting the jueteng money before he placed them in a black bag which he
would carry.

Jamis also testified that in March 1999, he, Artates and driver Prudencio went to the house of
Bong Pineda. Artates went inside the house and when he went out, he was carrying a shopping
bag full of money. Jamis then transferred the money to a black bag which Gov. Singson used to
deliver money to FPres. Estrada. Jamis described the black bag’s measurements and how it was
opened from the top with a combination (lock) ( Exh. "08"). The money totalled Five Million
Pesos (P 5,000,000.00 ) in five (5) bundles of One Million Pesos ( P1,000,000.00 ) each. They
proceed to LCS Building in San Andres to pick up Emma Lim as instructed by Gov. Singson.
Inside the vehicle, Emma Lim counted the money. [Ibid, pp. 68-81] They went to the Polk Street
house of FPres. Estrada but the latter was not home. While having lunch at a restaurant, Emma
Lim received a call from Gov. Singson instructing them to go to Malacañang. Emma Lim
alighted from the vehicle with the black bag and entered passing through the guard house in
going to the Presidential residence. They waited outside. Emma Lim asked to be fetched later
and she was no longer holding the black bag. [TSN, ibid, pp. 83-90]

Jamis also testified to one occasion in the middle of 1999 when he himself was instructed by
Gov. Singson to collect money from the house of Bong Pineda. That time Jamis received Seven
Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) in a shopping bag from Romeo "Romy" Pineda. Romy made
Jamis sign a blue book and then Jamis brought the money to Gov. Singson in the latter’s office.
[Ibid, pp. 91-101]

Jamis also testified he collected jueteng money from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada twice on Gov.
Singson’s instructions. For the first occasion, on or about October 1999 Jamis went to the office
of then Mayor Jinggoy Estrada at the second floor Municipal Hall of San Juan at around 4pm to
5 pm. Inside the said office, Jinggoy Estrada’s bodyguard Nestor showed a sando plastic bag to
Jinggoy Estrada and after that Jamis saw Jinggoy pointing to him [Jamis]. Jamis brought the
plastic bag, which Jamis subsequently saw contained an indeterminable amount of money, to
Singson at the latter’s office. [Ibid, pp. 105-121]

The second time Jamis collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada was immediately after the
first time, in the evening.Thus, Gov. Singson instructed Jamis to proceeed to the house of Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada in Greenhills. At Mayor Jinggoy’s house, Jamis again received a plastic sando
bag from "Nestor". Jamis brought the bag to Gov. Singson’s office and handed it to Menchu
(Ma. Carmencita) Itchon as Gov. Singson instructed. Jamis identified Menchu in Court. He said
she was the companion of Ricaforte in the office. [Ibid., pp. 121-132]

ATTY. DAVID JONATHAN YAP (Atty. Yap), the Senate Legal Counsel, testified that he
acted as the Deputy Clerk of the Senate Impeachment Court. Among others, his office was in
charge of receiving all documents and pleadings relating to the impeachment trial. He was in
charge of marking the Exhs. requested by the parties and keeping them in custody. He brought to
this Court in compliance with a subpoena a fifteen (15)-paged document marked in this case as
prosecution’s Exhs. "A-4" to "A-4-L" [TSN, September 25, 2002, p. 63] He identified his
signatures that he affixed on the Exhibits on December 7, 2002. He testified that he saw Yolanda
Ricaforte when she brought those documents to the Senate Impeachment Court in compliance
with a subpoena dated December 5, 2000 (Exh. E) issued by Chief Justice Davide. Atty. Yap was
present when Ricaforte took her oath on the witness stand on December 7, 2000 He identified
Ricaforte from a photograph (Exh. A6-V5-1). The Original documents were placed in a vault
inside his office, where they had been kept and deposited since they were turned to him during
the impeachment trial, except only when they were sent over to the Sandiganbayan as requested.
[Ibid., p. 77]

Atty. Yap was at the back of Yolanda Ricaforte at the Senate Impeachment Trial when she gave
her testimony that the ledger she brought is an ordinary "listahan." [TSN, Senate Impeachment
Trial, p. 144; see also TSN of these cases,September 25, 2002, pp. 78-79]

EDELQUINN DE GUZMAN NANTES (Nantes) was the Branch Manager of Equitable-PCI

Bank, Scout Tobias-Timog Branch on September 1, 1999. Nantes knew Yolanda Ricaforte
because the latter was a client of the bank. Ricaforte told Nantes that she [Ricaforte] was in the
real estate and fish pond business.

Nantes personally attended to Ricaforte when the latter opened checking and savings account
with the branch on September 1, 1999. She asked Ricaforte to fill up all the required documents
for opening current and savings accounts such as the signature cards for Current Account No.
0107-00638-9 and Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0. (Exhs. A-6, A-6-a and A-6-b) [TSN,
May 22, 2002, pp. 67-72]

Ricaforte opened one checking account, one savings account, seven special savings accounts and
a PCI Emerald Fund. The initial amount of deposit in the savings account was Seventeen Million
Two hundred Five Thousand Pesos (P17,205,000.00) as shown by the deposit slip for Savings
Account No. 0517-042227 (Exh. A-6-aa). The Seventeen Million Two Hundred Ten Thousand
Pesos (P17,210,000.00) was in check payable to cash. The Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) was
deposited in the checking account No. 0107-001638-9 (Exh. A-6-bb) and the balance of
Seventeen Million Two Hundred Five Thousand Pesos (P17,205,000) was deposited in the
savings account. [Ibid, pp. 80-85]

There were deposits made on the savings account of Ricaforte after the initial deposit. Nantes
presented and identified the deposit slips and the statement of accounts of Ricaforte (Exh. A-6
and submarkings) which were: Deposit Slip dated September 1, 1999 (Exh. A-6-aa) with the
amount of Seventeen Million Two Hundred Five Thousand Pesos (P17,205,000.00); Deposit Slip
dated September 7, 1999 (Exh. A-6-cc) with the amount of Three Million Seven Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P3,700,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 29, 1999 (Exh. A-6-dd) with the
amount of One Million Six Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Pesos (P1,697,000.00); Deposit
Slip dated September 7, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ee) with the amount of Ten Million Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P10,400,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 15, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ff) with the
amount of Five Million Seven Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P5,775,000.00); Deposit
Slip dated September 17, 1999 (Exh. A-6-gg) with the amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P750,000.00); Deposit Slip dated October 4, 1999 (Exh. A-6-hh) with the amount of Nine
Million Fifty Thousand Pesos (P9,050,000.00); Deposit Slip dated October 19, 1999 (Exh. A-6-
ii) with the amount of Six Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P6,650,000.00); Deposit
Slip dated November 4, 1999 (Exh. A-6-jj) with the amount of Six Million Nine Hundred Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P6,930,000.00); Deposit Slip dated November 16, 1999 (Exh. A-6-kk) with the
amount of Four Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P4,600,000.00); Deposit Slip dated
November 19, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ll) with the amount of One Million Seven Hundred Eleven
Thousand Pesos (P1,711,000.00); Deposit Slip dated December 7, 1999 (Exh. A-6-mm) with the
amount of Nine Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P989,150.00);
Deposit Slip dated January 10, 2000 (Exh. A-6-2) with the amount of Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00); and a deposit slip (Exh. A-6-3) with the amount of Two Million Four Hundred
Sixty Thousand Pesos (P2,460,000.00).

Bank statements reflected withdrawals (Exhs. A-6-nn to A-6-zz) from the savings account for the
period September 30, 1999 to October 31, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 87-97]

With respect to the Current Account No. 0107-00638-9, witness identified the specimen
signature card (Exh. A-6-a and A-6) to show that the initial deposit slip was Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) (Exh. A-6-bb). [Ibid, p. 98]

Ricaforte signed in the presence of Nantes the Authority to Debit and Transfer Funds (Exh. A-6-
G) which allowed funds to be automatically transferred from savings to current account to cover
checks issued. [TSN dated May 27, 2002, pp. 11-16]
The initial deposit for the First Special Savings Account No. 0157-90392-6 was Seventy Million
Pesos (P70,000,000.00) as shown by the Special Savings Passbook (Exh. A-6-S3) of Ricaforte
dated December 2, 1999. The account was closed on April 13, 2000. It had a balance of Seventy
One Million Three Hundred Ninety Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Five and Eight Centavos
(P71,390,875.08) which was transferred to Ricaforte’s regular Savings Account. [Ibid, pp. 22-24,
43]

In the Second Special Savings Account covered by Special Savings Passbook No. 392093 dated
February 7, 2000 (Exh. A-6-X3) showed the initial deposit of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) was taken from the regular savings account. A withdrawal of the whole
amount of Ten Million One Hundred Thirteen Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and
Fifty Seven Centavos (P10,113,836.57) was made on April 13, 2000 reflected in the Credit
Advice dated April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-ZZZ). [Ibid, pp. 49-60]

The Third Special Savings Account was opened on March 29, 2000 for Two Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00). The money was taken from her regular Savings
Account No. 0157-04427-0. The amount of Two Million Five Hundred One Thousand Six
Hundred Sixty Six Pesos and Sixty Six Centavos (P2,501,666.66) was withdrawn from the
special savings account as shown by the certified true copy of the Credit Advice dated April 13,
2000 (Exh. A-6-C4). [Ibid, pp. 84, 93-95]

The Fourth Special Savings Account No. 3157-00073-9 covered by the Special Savings
Passbook No. 392178 (Exh A-6-E4) had an initial deposit of Nine Million Seven Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P9,700,000.00) as found in the deposit receipt dated April 5, 2000 (Exh A-6-
D4). On April 13, 2000, the Special Savings was cancelled and preterminated. The amount of
Nine Million Seven Hundred Three Thousand (P9,703,000) was credited to Savings Account No.
0157-04227-0. [Ibid, pp. 115-124]

The Fifth Special Savings Account (Exh. A-6-G4) which was opened on May 29, 2000 under the
name of Yolanda T. Ricaforte had an initial deposit of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P2,500,000.00). The initial deposit was withdrawn from her regular Savings Account.
The Special Savings was closed on September 4, 2000 and the amount of Two Million Five
Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Four Hundred Eleven Pesos and Twenty Centavos
(P2,559,411.20) was credited to her Regular Savings Account 0157-04227-0. [Ibid, pp. 128-129,
135, 138]

The Sixth Special Savings Account (Exh. A-6-L4), under the name of Yolanda T. Ricaforte, was
opened on May 4, 2000 for One Million Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,900,000.00). The
account was closed on September 4, 2000 as per Debit Advice dated September 4, 2000 (Exh. A-
6-P4) for the matured Special Savings Account worth Two Million Twenty Two Thousand Four
Hundred Twenty Nine Pesos and Eighteen Centavos (P2,022,429.18). [Ibid, pp. 147–153]

The Seventh Special Savings Account No. 3157-00088-7 dated June 1, 2000 (Exh. A-6-Q4) was
worth Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in cash. The account was closed on September 4,
2000 and the proceeds were credited to the Regular Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0. The
balance (Exh. A-6-T4) then was Two Million Thirty Five Thousand Thirty Five Pesos and Ninety
One Centavos (P2,035,035.91). [Ibid, pp. 156, 166]

The PCI Emerald Fund was in the amount of Six Million Six Hundred Sixteen Thousand Six
Hundred Seventy Six Pesos and Nineteen Centavos (P6,616,676.19) (Exh. A-6-U4 and Exh. A-6-
V4). The fund was then rolled-over monthly as evidenced by the Confirmation letter (Exh. A-6-
Z4) dated December 6, 2000. It was again rolled-over several times until it was redeemed on June
5, 2002. [Ibid, p. 168, 176 -193]

The first four Special Savings Accounts were all debited on April 13, 2000 and Ricaforte
purchased a Cashier’s Check payable to Cash for Ninety One Million Pesos (P91,000,000). The
Application for Cashier’s check (Exh. "A-6- R5") was signed by Ricaforte as purchaser. The
Cashier’s check (Exh. A-6- S5 and Exh. A-6-U5) was cleared and accepted by Equitable PCI
Bank, Makati Pacific Star Branch, based on the dorsal portion of the check.

The last three Special Savings Accounts (Special Savings Account Nos. 3157-00077-1, 3157-
00080-1, and 3157-00088-7) were closed on September 4, 2000 and all the proceeds were
credited to the regular savings account, and then invested in the PCI Emerald Fund for Six
Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P6,600,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 168, 206-207]

Nantes met Ricaforte more than twenty times and identified the latter through a picture shown by
the prosecution. (Exh. A-6-V5) [TSN, May 29, 2002, pp. 16-20]

The current account balance is at Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) (Exh. A-6-W5) and that of
the Savings Account is One Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six and
Sixty Nine Centavos (P197,736.69) (Exh. A-6-X5). The last withdrawal from the savings account
was made on October 5, 2000 for automatic transfer to the current account in the amount of
Seventy Nine Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Four and Eighty Centavos (P79,664.80). The last
deposit was on October 4, 2000, through a credit memorandum of Thirty Seven Thousand
Twenty Nine Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P37,029.17) which represented the interest of the
PCI Emerald Fund. After October 5, 2000 there were no more counter transactions, only the
entry of interest earned and withholding tax. [Ibid, pp. 23-27]

ROSARIO SALUDO BAUTISTA (Bautista) is the Senior Branch Manager of the Equitable,
PCI Bank, Diliman, Matalino Branch. Bautista personally attended to Yolanda Ricaforte who
was a walk-in client of the branch on November 19, 1999. Ricaforte opened a savings account
and used her California driver’s license and passport for identification.

The duly accomplished specimen signature card (Exh. A-7-z) was presented to show the
existence of the savings account. It was personally accomplished by Mrs. Ricaforte in the
presence of Bautista. The initial deposit of Mrs. Ricaforte was Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) in cash. [TSN, May 29, 2000, pp. 93-96]

Ricaforte returned to the branch on November 22, 1999. She opened a combo account and closed
the savings account she opened on November 19, 1999. The combo account was Savings
Account Number 0288-02037-0 and Current Account Number 0238-00853-0. As a new account,
Bautista required Mrs. Ricaforte to accomplish signature cards (Exh. A-7 and A-7-a). When the
combo account was already opened, Ricaforte presented for deposit two (2) checks totaling
Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). Each check (Exh. A-7-B and A-7-C) was payable to
cash for Thirty Five Million Pesos (P35,000,000.00). The drawer was William T. Gatchalian and
the drawee bank was PCI Bank, main office in Makati City.

Ricaforte told Bautista that the money came from the proceeds of the sale of a prime property
sold to Mr. Gatchalian. As precautionary measure, the branch of Bautista checked with the
drawee bank PCI Makati and they learned that Gatchalian’s account was a good account.

There were additional deposits made to the account. One deposit made on November 23, 1999
was a check (Exh. A-7-h) issued by Governor Luis Gov. Singson dated November 22, 1999 for
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) payable to cash. The drawee bank was Metro Bank, Ayala.
The second check deposit made was on December 16, 1999 payable to cash with PNB, Naga
Branch as drawee bank. The check (Exh. A-7-i) was dated December 9, 1999. The check was
deposited and subsequently cleared.

On December 2, 1999, Ricaforte deposited Three Million Fifty Thousand Pesos (P3,050,000.00)
in cash (Exh. A-7-d). The cash was in big bills, P1,000 and P500 denominations. Ricaforte
explained to Bautista that the amount came from other accounts in other banks because she
planned to transfer all her other accounts to Equitable, Diliman, Matalino Branch. Another cash
deposit (Exh. A-7-f and Exh. A-7-aa) was made on January 28, 2000 for One Million Pesos.
[Ibid, pp. 100-130]

Ricaforte also opened a special saving account number 3288-00079-3 in the amount of Seventy
Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). The initial deposit was taken from Ricaforte’s savings account
(Exh. A-7-j). The account was opened with passbook number 394979 (Exh. A-7-bb) and the
specimen signature card (Exh. A-7-cc). The account has already been closed. [Ibid, pp. 132-135]

On February 24, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte again transferred Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000) from
her ordinary savings account to a special savings account deposit (Exh. A-7-w) with Account
Number 3288-00087-4. Ricaforte also accomplished a specimen signature card (Exh. A-7-dd) for
the Special Savings Account.

On April 13, 2000 Mrs. Ricaforte applied for a Sevety Seven Million Peso (P77,000,000)
cashier’s check against her special savings deposit account. She accomplished an application
form (Exh. A-7-l) for the transaction. Ricaforte had to accomplish a deed of undertaking (Exh.
A-7-n) because the cashier’s check was payable to cash. The cashier’s check (Exh. A-7-ee) was
deposited on April 25, 2000 at the Pacific Star Branch of Equitable PCI Bank in Makati. The
name and account number were not indicated on the check. [Ibid, pp. 148 -159]

Mrs. Ricaforte always dealt with Bautista as the Bank Manager for her transactions. Bautista
identified Ricaforte as the one wearing red (Exh. A-6-vvvvv-1) when shown a group picture.
Bautista also identified the girl beside Mrs. Ricaforte as Mrs. Itchon, one of the witnesses in the
impeachment proceedings. Aside from the personal visits of Mrs. Ricaforte, Bautista also called
her on cell phone no. 0918-9021847 or home landline 9518854 whenever there was a maturity or
an updating of interest. [Ibid, pp. 162-168]

At the time of Bautista’s testimony, the balance in the account of Ricaforte was around Two
Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,200,000.00). It is still earning interest.

SHAKIRA CASTRILLO YU (Yu) was the Manager of Equitable PCI Bank, Pedro Gil-
Robinson’s Branch since it opened on August 1999. Yu knew Yolanda T. Ricaforte as she was
one of their depositors. Ricaforte told Yu that she was connected with Fil-East Travel and Tours
which is located at the second floor of the Manila Midtown Hotel. Ricaforte first opened a
Regular Savings Account, participated in the Reverse Repurchase Agreement and subsequently
opened a Special Savings Account.

Ricaforte opened the Regular Savings Account on January 6, 2000. It was Ms. Evelyn Ponce, the
Cash Operations Officer who attended to her as Yu was not around. Yu brought with her the
specimen signature card (Exh. A-8-P) for Savings Account No. 027602029-3 and the New
Accounts Record (Exh. A-8-Q) which were filled out by Ricaforte. [TSN, June 3, 2002, pp. 85-
92]

The initial deposit (Exh. A-8-Q-3) of the Regular Savings Account was Six Million Pesos
(P6,000,000.00) in cash (Exh. A-8-R). When witness asked Ricaforte where the initial deposit
came from, Ricaforte said it was proceeds of a sale of a property. [Ibid, pp. 97-100]

Other deposits made to the Regular Savings Account were the following: a check deposit
amounting to Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty-Five Thousand (P2,965,000) with Governor Luis
Chavit Singson as drawer; a cash deposit of One Million Five Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos
(P1,540,000) deposited on January 25, 2000 and a One Million Three Hundred Forty Thousand
Pesos (P1,340,000) check deposit (Exh. A-8-D) with Governor Singson as drawer (Exh. A-8-D-
1). [Ibid, pp. 101-112]

On January 31, 2000, Ricaforte told Yu that she wanted to earn higher interest so witness advised
her to participate in the Reverse Repurchase. Ricaforte asked Yu to debit her Regular Savings
Account for about Eight Million Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos (P8,900,000.00) (Exh. "A-8-P").
On February 29, 2000 Ricaforte informed Yu that she did not want the Reverse Repurchase and
she wanted a bank product that earned a higher interest with passbook as documentation. The
Certificate of Participation without Recourse (Exh. A-8-F) was then paid on February 29, 2000
in the amount of Eight Million Nine Hundred Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos
and Eighty Two Centavos (P8,940,752.82).

Yu then advised Ricaforte to open a Special Savings Account. They took out her participation in
the Reverse Repurchase for P8,900,000.00 plus interest and Ricaforte asked them to debit more
or less One Million Fifty-One Thousand Pesos (P1,051,000.00) from her Regular Savings
Account because she wanted her Special Savings Account to be in the amount of Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00). The specimen signature card of the Special Savings Account and the
Credit Memo (Exh. A-8-G) under the account name Yolanda Ricaforte for the Account No. 276-
90238-5 dated 2/29/2000 were shown as evidence of the existence of the account. The three
signatures appearing in the card belonged to Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte signed in front of Yu.

Subsequently, Ricaforte withdrew her Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) plus interest from the
Special Savings Account and transferred the amount to her Regular Savings Account. The
Special Savings passbook of Mrs. Ricaforte (Exh. A-8-H) contained the entry Out of
Return P10,019,555,55. [Ibid, 113-120]

On April 13, 2000, Ricaforte applied for a cashier’s check in the amount of Eleven Million Pesos
(P11,000,000) debited to her Regular Savings Account. The application for Cashier’s check
(Exh. A-8-I), the receiving copy of the Cashier’s check, the Letter of Undertaking and Cashier’s
check (Exh. A-8-T) were all presented. The Application for Cashier’s Check stated that the
Cashier’s Check is allowed to be payable to cash except that the bank will not be held
responsible for the loss thereof or a demand for a refund or replacement. It is no longer allowed
starting around July or August 2000.

Ricaforte instructed Yu to transfer Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) from her
Regular Savings Account on May 23, 2000 to her Special Savings Account to earn higher
interest. A Special Savings Account Passbook (Exh. A-8-L) was issued to Mrs. Ricaforte which
credited the Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) to the Special Savings Account. [Ibid,
pp.120-127]

At present, the outstanding balance of the Special Savings Account is more or less Six Hundred
Thirty Four Thousand Pesos (P634,000.00). The regular Savings Account has an outstanding
balance of more or less Sixty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P69,800.00).

After being shown a photograph, Yu identified Yolanda Ricaforte as the person wearing maroon
or red in the picture (Exh. A-6-Z5). Yu was able to talk to Mrs. Ricaforte over the phone around
six (6) times. She used the cell phone number indicated in the records. [Ibid, pp. 128-132]

VERGEL LEJARDE PABILLON (Pabillon) knew a person by the name of Yolanda Ricaforte
because Ricaforte opened regular Savings Account No. 0193-61496-8 and Special Savings
Account No. 02193-15050-3 with Equitable PCI Bank T.M. Kalaw Branch on February 8, 2000
while Pabillon was still manager of the branch.

Ricaforte mentioned to Pabillon that she was connected with a certain company under the name
of Phil. East Travel and Tours located at Ramada Hotel, Mabini. She handed her California
Driver’s license as identification card and signed the specimen signature cards about one foot
away from the witness.

Pabillon brought the Individual Account Record (Exh. A-9-C) and the signature cards signed by
Mrs. Ricaforte as evidence of the Account. The initial deposit made were in the form of a PNB
Manager’s Check (Exh. A-9-A) in the amount of Ten Million Seven Thousand Seven Hundred
Seventy Seven Pesos and Seventy-Eight Centavos (P10,007,777.78) and One Million Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,400,000.00) in cold cash. Eleven Million Pesos (P11,000,000.00)
of that amount was placed in the Special Savings Account and Four Hundred Seven Thousand
Seven Hundred Seventy Seven Pesos and Seventy Eight Centavos (P407,777.78) was placed
under the Regular Savings Account. [TSN, June 5, 2002, pp. 98-109]

On April 13, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte went to the bank and informed the witness that she needed
Eleven Million Pesos (P11,000,000.00) in the form of manager’s check, payable to cash, to be
taken out from the existing Special Savings Account No. 02193-6-15050-3. The manager’s
check dated April 13, 2000 payable to cash was presented (Exh. A-9-B). Ricaforte had to sign a
Purchaser’s Undertaking bearing her name as purchaser. (Exh. A-9-F) [Ibid, pp. 113-127]

Mrs. Ricaforte opened a third account, Special Savings Accounts No. 02-193-15177-1, in the
amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). A debit memo (Exh. A-9-G) showed
the transfer of the P500,000 from the regular Savings Account 0193-64196-8 to the special
savings account.

On August 31, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte went to the bank and requested for another Two Hundred
Fifty Thousand Peso (P250,000.00) manager’s check payable to her to be deducted from Special
Savings Account No. 02193-15177-1. A bank document which served as a registered copy of the
issuance of the manager’s check was presented. (Exh. A-9-H) [Ibid, pp. 128-129]

Pabillon identified Ricaforte from a group photograph (Exh. A-6-B5) [Ibid, pp. 133-134]

The witness availed of the early retirement offered by Equitable PCI. He testified in the
impeachment trial even if he was already supposed to go on early retirement because he just
wanted to tell the truth regarding what transpired to the opening of the account of Mrs. Ricaforte.
[TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 54-56]

EDGARDO LIM ALCARAZ (Alcaraz) was the branch manager of Equitable PCIBank, Scout
Albano branch for almost three years. He met Yolanda Ricaforte because she was one of their
clients. She opened three accounts with the bank on March 2, 2000 and he was the one who
personally attended to her. These were savings account and current account under the automatic
transfer facility and a special savings account.

Alcaraz testified on documents to show that Yolanda Ricaforte opened these three accounts, such
as the individual account record which showed information about Ricaforte, her special
instructions and the summary of the accounts that she opened. The other documents pertained to
the specimen signature cards signed by Ricaforte for Checking Account No. 5732-01-975-7,
Savings Account No. 5733-15154-3 and Special Savings Account No. 5733-00721-0. Ricaforte
submitted her local driver’s license and her California driver’s license for identification. She told
witness that she was engaged in the prawn business in Iloilo. Alcaraz contacted Ricaforte two or
three times using the numbers she wrote in the account record. He also had a calling card from
Ricaforte (Exh. A-10-F). [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 79-84]

The initial deposit in cash for the savings account opened by Ricaforte was One Million Nine
Hundred Ninety Five Thousand (P1,995,000.00). The initial deposit for Checking Account 5732-
01-975-7 was Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). The initial deposit for Special Savings Account
No. 5733-0721-0 was Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000). Copies of the deposit slips (Exhs. A-10-
G, A-10-H, A-10-I) [Ibid. pp. 97-99]

On April 12, 2000, Ricaforte pre-terminated the special savings account. This is shown by its
passbook (Exh. A-10-J). A credit memo (Exh. A-10-L) showed that Ricaforte requested that the
proceeds of the special savings account be credited under the Savings Account No. 5733-15154-
3.

On the same day, Mrs. Ricaforte applied for a manager’s check in the amount of Three Million
Pesos (P3,000,000.00) payable to bearer. The application form for manager’s check (Exh. A-10-
C), the proof sheet copy of the manager’s check (Exh. A-10-K) and the copy of the check were
presented (Exh. A-10-M). [Ibid, pp.102-108]

As of the time of Alcaraz’ testimony, the regular savings account still existed with an
outstanding balance of One Hundred Three Thousand Pesos (P103,000.00). The checking
account was still active with an outstanding balance of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). With
respect to the checking account, Ricaforte issued a check in the amount of P500,000.00 on
March 12, 2000. Since the accounts are automatic transfer accounts, the funds from the savings
account were automatically transferred to the checking account. [Ibid, pp. 100-101]

EMMA AVILA GONZALES (Gonzales) had been the Branch Manager of Equitable Savings
Bank, Isidora Hills Branch for more than three years up to time she testified in this Court.
Gonzales knew a person by the name of Yolanda Ricaforte who was one of the clients of the
bank.

She first met Ricaforte on March 15, 2000 when she opened a special savings account with the
branch. She walked into the bank, approached the witness and told her that she wanted to open
an account and that she was a valued client of other branches of Equitable Savings Bank. The
specimen signature card (Exh. A-11) and deposit slip (Exh. A-11-A) were shown to prove the
opening of the special savings account. The initial deposit was Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) cash, in ten bundles of five hundred (500) peso bills. Ricaforte said she was a
businesswoman but did not specify the kind of business she was engaged in. With respect to the
initial deposit of Ricaforte, the account is still outstanding. The original copy of the Equitable
Special Savings Passbook No. 123727 (Exh. A-11-I) shows the outstanding balance to be Five
Hundred Ninety Three Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos and Thirty Two Centavos
(P593,496.32) as of June 10, 2002. The difference in the amount was the interest earned from the
time it was opened. There was no movement of the fund except for the interest. [TSN, June 10,
2002, pp. 162-169, June 17, 2002, p. 10]

Ricaforte also opened Special Savings Account No. 077090498-6 (Exh. A-11-H and Exh. A-11-
D) amounting to Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00). The initial deposit was an MBTC
(Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.) Ayala Branch Check No. 1070. It was payable in cash and
the drawer was Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson. It was cleared after three days. The account
was pre-terminated on April 14, 2000. The withdrawal slip (Exh. A-11-E) showed that the
amount withdrawn was Seven Million Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and
Eleven Centavos (P7,019,736.11). Ricaforte received the payment in the form of a Cashier’s
check (Exh. A-11-F) payable to cash in the amount of Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) and
cash in the amount of Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos
(P19,736.11). The dorsal portion of the Cashier’s check showed that it was deposited in
Equitable Banking Corporation, Makati Pacific Star. On the other hand, the amount of Nineteen
Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11) cash was used to
open regular Savings Account No. 0770009375 (Exh. A-11-I). The latest bank statement (Exh.
A-11-J) showed that the account still existed but the balance was no longer Nineteen Thousand
Seven Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11). [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp.
172-189]

Witness was able to verify the phone number given by Mrs. Ricaforte because when she called
the number, Mrs. Ricaforte answered the phone. [TSN, June 17, 2002, pp. 11-13]

ANTONIO MARTIN SAGRITALO FORTUNO (Fortuno) was the Bank Operations Officer
of Equitable PCI Bank, Pacific Star Branch since January 28, 2002. The witness averred that he
handled the opening of accounts; supervised the investment section; the foreign telegraphic
transfer as well as the domestic telegraphic transfer and the safekeeping of the records of
deposits; and other transactions which transpired in their branch.

Fortuno brought with him documents relating to the deposit of six (6) cashier’s/manager’s
checks in the total amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to the Pacific Star
Branch and the transfer of these funds from cashier’s checks to the account of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation in the 100 Strata Branch of Equitable PCI Bank. [TSN dated September 27,
2002, p. 127]

He identified an Acknowledgement Letter [Exh. I9, with sub markings; Exh. 16-a (Serapio)]
dated April 25, 2000 addressed to Atty. Edward Serapio from Beatriz L. Bagsit, who was then
Division Head of the Makati Area. The letter acknowledged receipt of six (6) checks for deposit
on a staggered basis and on various different dates to the account of Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation maintained at the Ortigas Strata Branch. The checks were as follows:

(1) PCIBank Manager’s Check NO. 573-000035822 dated April 12, 2000 for P3
Million (Exh. A-10-m);

(2) PCIBank Manager’s Check No. 019L-000061146 dated April 13, 2000 for P11
Million (Exh. A-9-b);

(3) Equitable Bank Cashier’s Check No. 0226-00949 dated April 13, 2000 for P11
Million (Exh. A-8-t);

(4) Equitable Bank Cashier’s Check No. 0238-000941 dated April 13, 2000 for P77
Million (Exh. A-7-ee);

(5) Equitable Bank Cashier’s Check No.107-013064 dated April 13, 2000 for P91
Million; (Exh. A-6-r5)
 (6) Equitable Bank Cashier’s Check No.6720-00042 dated April 14, 2000 for P7
Million; (Exh. A-11-g)

Fortuno also identified the passbook for Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5 (Exh. J9, with sub
markings) which was opened on April 25, 2000. A bearer account is an account wherein there is
no name mentioned in the account. According to Fortuno, the six (6) manager’s checks were the
manager’s checks that were deposited on April 25, 2000 in the bearer account for the total
amount of Two Hundred Million (P200,000,000.00).

According the witness, the instruction in the letter was to deposit the funds on a staggered basis
and they can do so if they first deposit all the checks simultaneously for the three-day clearing.

On the basis of debit memos, manager’s check applications, detailed report transaction and
deposit slips or receipts, the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) was gradually
withdrawn from the bearer account and transferred to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation from
April 27, 2000 to May 11, 2000.

The six (6) checks were deposited in Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5 of which fourteen (14)
withdrawals in Manager’s Checks (Exh. K9 to X9, with sub markings) were made in various
amounts and these withdrawals were further divided into twenty-eight (28) deposits into the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation. Each withdrawal was divided into two deposits, as shown by the
Account Information Slips, Deposit Receipts and Detailed Report for Transfers and Debit/Credit
Memos (DRTM) (See Exhs. K9 to X9, with sub markings) brought by the witness. [Ibid, pp. 32-
96]

The bearer account was closed on November 14, 2000 as evidenced by the Fund Transfer Memo
(Exh. Z9), and contained the interest for Ninety Seven Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Two
Pesos (P97,392) which was transferred to the account of the Foundation. [Ibid, pp. 97-98]

AIDA TUAZON BASALISO (Basaliso) was the operations officer of Equitable PCIBank,
Ortigas-Strata 100 Branch since July 1997. She brought with her bank documents on the
accounts of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation maintained at the Equitable PCIBank, Strata-
Ortigas Branch including the inter-branch deposits from the Equitable PCIBank, Pacific Star
Branch for the total amount of P200 million to the Account No. 0192-85835-6 in the name of
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.

The signature card for Savings Account No. 0192-85702-3 (Exh. A10) of the Treasurer-in trust
has the signature of Mr. George Go, the former Chairman of the Board of the bank. The list of
Contribution (Exh. B10) also had the signature of the treasurer, Mr. George Go. The two
documents were given to Basaliso by Catherine Mercado, someone who usually transacted
business at the branch.

Witness also identified the Signature Cards of the Savings and Checking Accounts of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation. On the signature cards (Exh. C10) pertaining to the Savings Account
No. 0192-85835-6, the signatures of Mr. Raul De Guzman, Mr. George Go, Mr. Edward Serapio
and Mr. Danilo Reyes, Ms. Mila Reforma appear. Two signature cards were needed for the same
account because the corporation consisted of five (5) signatories.

The signature cards (Exh. D10 and Exh. D10-1) for current Account No. 0142-62890-2 showed
the signatures of the same five persons.

She identified the Secretary’s Certificate (Exh. E10) showing that the Corporate Secretary was
Edward S. Serapio, the Certificate of Incorporation with SEC Registration No. 2000002526
(Exh. F10) and the Articles of Incorporation (Exh. G10) and the by-laws (Exh. H10).

Witness also testified on a debit memo (Exh. I10) dated April 20,2000 in Savings Account No.
019285702-3 amounting to One Hundred Thousand Two Hundred One Pesos and Ten Centavos
(P100,201.10) and credited (Exh. I10-2) to 014262890-2 the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) for the opening of the checking account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation and
a Credit Advice (Exh. I10-1) to Savings Account No. 019285835-6 amounting to Ninety
Thousand Two Hundred One Pesos and Ten Centavos (P90,201.10) to open the savings account
of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.

Basaliso also testified on "no book cash deposits" made to the savings account of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation. No book meant that the deposit was made by the depositor without
bringing his savings passbook. DRTM (Detailed Report of Transfer Debit and Credit memos)
(Exhs. J10 to R10) were presented to show the transactions. The following deposits were made:
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) total deposit on April 27, 2000, Six Million Seven Hundred
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P6,725,000.00) and Eight Million Two Hundred Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (P8,275,000.00) on April 28, 2000, Five Million One Hundred Eight Thousand
Pesos (P5,108,000.00) and Nine Million Eight Hundred Ninety Two Thousand Pesos
(P9,892,000.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) on May 2, 2000, Three Million
Ninety One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Pesos (P3,091,450.00) and Six Million Nine Hundred
Eight Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P6,908,550.00) totaling Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) on May 3, 2000, Six Million One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred
Twenty Five Pesos (P6,118,225.00) and Eight Million Eight Hundred Eighty One Thousand
Seven Hundred Seventy Five Pesos (P8,881,775.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00) on May 4, 2000, Five Million Nine Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Pesos
(P5,936,000.00) and Nine Million Sixty Four Thousand Pesos (P9,064,000.00) totaling Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) on May 8, 2000, Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) and Eight
Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos on May 9, 2000, Seven Million
Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P7,250,000.00), Seven Million Three Hundred Ninety Nine
Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P7,399,800.00), Nine Million Three Hundred Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (P9,375,000.00), Nine Million Four Hundred Forty Nine Thousand Four
Hundred Pesos (P9,449,400.00), Nine Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P9,600,000.00) and
Eleven Million Nine Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P11,925,800.00)
totaling to Fifty Five Million (P55,000,000.00) on May 10, 2000, Six Hundred Thirty Four
Thousand Pesos (P634,000.00), Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00),
Three Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,800,000.00), Five Million Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P5,200,000.00), Nine Million One Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand Two
Hundred Eighty Pesos (P9,139,280.00), Nine Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P9,500,000.00), Nine Million Eight Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P9,836,500.00) and Nine Million Eight Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty
Pesos (P9,889,720.00) totaling about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) on May 11, 2000.
There was also a credit memo made on November 14, 2000 amounting to Ninety Seven
Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Two Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P97,392.50) (Exh. S10). Bank
statements pertaining to the periods April 1-28, 2000 up to December 2000, except statements
for July, August and October were presented.

At the time of Basaliso’s testimony, the current account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation
with a balance of Eight Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P8,600.00) (Exh. T10) was dormant. The
Savings Account No. 0192-85835-6 was inactive with a balance of Two Hundred Seven Million
One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P207,001,883.53)
(Exh. U10).

Witness also testified that any two persons out of the five signatories of the Foundation were
authorized to transact regarding the accounts. Based on record, the amount of Two Hundred
Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) was deposited into the account without a single centavo being
lost. The passbook [See Exh. U10,36(Serapio)] had a balance of Two Hundred Seven Million
One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P207,001,888.53)
because it already earned interest. There were no withdrawals from the Savings and Current
Account from the time they were opened. [TSN dated October 2, 2002 and October 7, 2002]

ATTY. CECILIO ALEJANDRO VILLANUEVA (Villanueva) is the assistant Corporate

Secretary of PAGCOR. Witness brought with him the Minutes No. 36 of PAGCOR’s Regular
Board Meeting dated September 5, 2000, under Agenda Item No. 002646 of the Best World
Gaming and Entertainment Corporation Cancellation of Quick Pick bingo and conduct of
PAGCOR’s Two Balls Bingo Games (Exh. S15). Witness brought with him pp. 28-30 with
referred to Item Agenda No. 002646. Villanueva’s testimony was offered corroborate the
testimony of Gov. Singson that the consultancy firm of Atong Ang will receive 6% of the gross
income from Bingo Two Balls.

On cross examination, witness testified that he has no personal knowledge whether the Bingo 2
Balls was actually implemented. [TSN dated December 2, 2002 and TSN dated December 4,
2002]

MARIANITO MANIGBAS DIMAANDAL (Dimaandal) was the Assistant Director of the

Malacañang Records Department since 1993. Dimaandal identified the appointment papers of
Atty. Serapio as Presidential Assistant for Political affairs, Office of the Presidential Adviser for
Political Affairs (Exh. V10) and Mr. Orestes Ricaforte as Undersecretary, Department of Tourism
(Exh. W10) and the assumption into office by Ms. Yolanda Ricaforte to the PCGG representing
the San Miguel Campo Creo Group (Exh. X10).

Witness also brought a Certification (Exh. Y10) issued by the Office of the President that the
phone numbers 736-8856 and 736-8858 were in fact the telephones assigned to and connected to
the presidential residence during the incumbency of FPres. Estrada.
On December 16, 2002, Dimaandal was recalled to the witness stand. He further presented and
identified the Appointment of Edward S. Serapio as Member Ad Interim of the Judicial and Bar
Council representing the Private Sector dated July 1, 2000 (Exh. I17) issued by FPres. Estrada; a
Memorandum to All Heads of Office and Units signed by Former Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora (Exh. J17); and a Memorandum to All Heads of Office and Units from the Office of the
President dated April 29, 1999 (Exh. K17 with submarkings) with the subject title "Special
Instructions to the Presidential Assistant for Political Affairs" and with the contents read as
follows: "Be informed that I have given special instructions to Atty. Edward S. Serapio,
Presidential Assistant I for Political Affairs, to undertake, in addition to his regular duties and
responsibilities, the following functions: 1) provide prompt objective and independent advice on
any legal question, matter, or issue which may be of special concern to the President; 2) update
the President on recent developments in law or jurisprudence on such subjects, areas, or issues
which the President may so specify; 3) study and review documents, deeds, contracts,
memoranda or other papers which the President may opt to refer to him for study and review; 4)
coordinate with various units of the Office of the President, Departments, and other agencies and
instrumentalities of the government on any legal matter which the President may refer to him;
and 5) perform other duties and responsibilities as may be directed by the President. Atty.
Serapio will be directly reporting to the President on any of the foregoing matters. For your
information and guidance."

On March 31, 2003, witness Dimaandal was again recalled to the witness stand. He presented
and identified copies of Proclamation No. 145 dated July 17, 1999 (Exh. X19), Proclamation No.
194 dated October 11, 1999 (Exh. Y19), Proclamation No. 202 dated October 21, 1999 (Exh. Z19),
Proclamation No. 205 dated October 25, 1999 (Exh. A20), Proclamation No. 225 dated January
30, 2000 (Exh. B20), Proclamation No. 234 dated January 28, 2000 (Exh. C20), Proclamation No.
273 dated April 23, 2000 (Exh. D20), Proclamation No. 355 (Exh. E20), Administrative Order
Nos. 28, 29, 32, 50, 59, 69, 73, 87, 89 (Exhs. F20 – N20), Memorandum Order Nos. 82, 88, 89
(Exhs. O20-Q20) and memorandum Circular No. 45 (R20) . These documents were signed by
FPres. Estrada and his signatures were marked accordingly. [TSN dated October 7, 2002;
December 16, 2002; and March 31, 2003]

SALVADOR ROSAL SERRANO (Serrano) was the Vice-President of Security Bank

Corporation and the head of its Centralized Operation and Control Division. [TSN dated
November 25, 2002] He was responsible for the day to day operations of one hundred nineteen
(119) branches of the Security Bank Corporation; supervised the record keeping and accounting
of the branch transactions; ensured the compliance of their branches to bank policies and
procedures; supervised the safekeeping of all documents of all branch transactions; and issued
certified true copies of documents in relation to the original documents kept by the bank.

Serrano was called by the prosecution to corroborate the testimony of prosecution witness Gov.
Singson that he issued a check payable to cash from funds of jueteng protection money to
accused FPres. Estrada and that the said accused, in turn, delivered the check to Mr. Paul Bograd
who subsequently deposited the check to his account at the Security Bank Corporation; and to
identify and authenticate the documents he was subpoenaed to bring.
Serrano identified a microfilm copy of Metro Bank Check No. 0000917 for the amount of Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) that was deposited through Security Bank Corporation on
February 2, 1999. The maker of this check was Gov. Singson and which check was deposited to
Account No. 061-0-14636-7 whose account holder was Paul Gary Bograd as evidenced by a
deposit slip of Security Bank Corporation (Exhs. N14; N14-1; N14-2; N14-3; O14; O14-1; O14-2; and
O14-3).

Also presented was a statement of account showing that an amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000) was credited on February 2, 1999 to the account of Paul Gary Bograd (Exhs.
P14 and P14-1). Serrano also identified the specimen signature card of Paul Gary Bograd showing
that the latter was a depositor in their bank and that he [Bograd] held the Account No. 061-0-
14636-7 of Security Bank Corporation (Exhs, Q14; Q14-1; and Q14-2).

PATRICK DEE CHENG (Cheng), an employee of CITIBANK for 12 years, became the
Branch Banking Head of CITIBANK on November 2001. [TSN dated October 7, 2002 and TSN
dated October 9, 2002] As banking head, he had overall supervision and responsibility for all the
branch banking operations of CITIBANK in all of its six (6) branches.

Cheng presented and identified the following:

(1) deposit slip (Exh. Z10, with sub markings) dated October 4, 1999 for the account of
Luisa P. Ejercito ("Mrs. Ejercito") under Account No. 166820 covering the deposit of
Metrobank Check No. 00138 (See Exh. M8 as original and Exh. A11 as micro film copy)
dated September 29, 1999 by Gov. Singson in the amount of Eight Million Pesos
(P8,000,000) and another check in the amount of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P400,000);

(2) Account Opening Form (Exh. B11) for Account No. 166820 of Mrs. Ejercito;

(3) Hold-all-Mail Agreement (Exh. C11, with sub markings) dated March 9, 2000 of Mrs.
Ejercito which designated Ms. Lucena Baby Ortaliza to be her authorized representative;

(4) deposit slip (Exh. D11, with sub markings) of William T. Gatchalian dated August 20,
1999 with Account No. 8131201377 for Forty Six Million Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P46,350.000.00) which covered the deposit of Metrobank Check No.
000132 dated August 21, 1999 of Gov. Singson in the amount of P46,350,000.00;

(5) certified copy of the microfilm of the Metrobank Ayala Center Branch Check NO.
000132 (See Exh. E11, with sub markings) dated August 21, 1999 drawn by Gov.
Singson, payable to William Gatchalian in the amount of P46,350,000;

(6) Relationship Opening Form – Personal (Exh. F11, with sub markings) of Mr. William
T. Gatchalian; and

(7) Signature Card (Exh. G11, with sub markings) of Mr. William T. Gatchalian for a
Peso Checking Account with Account No. 8131201377 opened on March 13, 1996.
MELCHOR SUAREZ LATINA (Latina) is head of Remedial Management, Globe
Telecommunication in charge of terminated accounts. [TSN dated October 9, 2002]

He brought with him a certification (Exh. H11) October 4, 2002 issued by Atty. Melchor S.
Latina, and subscribed before Atty. Gilbert Escolo that Globe Cellular Phone No. 0917-5260217
was registered in the name of Jinggoy Estrada. The certification was supported with the Service
Agreement for Cellular Mobile Phone Service (See Exh. H11-1, with sub markings) executed by
the applicant Jinggoy Estrada and the supporting documents required in connection with the
subscription of cell phone; specifically, a photocopy of Jinggoy Estrada’s driver’s license (Exh.
H11-2) and statement of his Philippine National Bank Visa (Exh. H11-3) as proof of billing. The
cellular phone issued to Jinggoy Estrada has already been cut-off since December 15, 2000 based
on Globe Telecom records (Exh. H11-4).

ATTY. OSWALDO CHONG SANTOS (Atty. Santos) was a partner of the De Borja Santos
Law Firm during the time of the impeachment proceedings against the accused Former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada. [TSN dated January 6, 2003 and TSN dated January 8, 2003]

In a letter dated December 22, 2000, the De Borja Santos Law Firm was requested by the
Prosecution Panel of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation regarding the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exhibit A-12-a)

Atty. Santos testified that the commissioned law firm of which he was a member started
conducting research and investigation on the alleged foundation on December 28, 2000. They
gathered available documents pertaining to the Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. from the Records
Division of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On January 5, 2001, witness Santos
then went to the corporate address of the subject foundation indicated in the SEC documents
(Exh. V17) that the investigating team gathered which was at 15th Floor, Strata 100 Building,
Emerald Avenue, City of Pasig. He found out from his inquiries that the said office address was
occupied by the law firm of De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Jerodias. Atty. Santos
clarified that his partner named De Borja was not the same person indicated in the
aforementioned law firm and that the witness had no idea if they were related. Thereafter, the
witness contacted the phone number of the subject foundation indicated in the SEC documents
that the investigating team had but got the response that the phone number belonged to the
aforesaid law firm and not to the subject foundation.

The witness then presented and identified a copy of the Report (Exh. A12) of the investigating
team on the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. He said that the original copy was submitted to
the Prosecution Panel of the House of Representatives and he attested as to the truth of the
contents of the report. Atty. Santos mentioned that the said report stated that the law firm
occupying the supposed corporate office of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. "used to be
the law firm of the Acting Corporate Secretary Atty. Edward S. Serapio".

Atty. Santos also identified the SEC documents that the investigating team had gathered which
were previously produced and identified by prosecution witness Atty. David Jonathan Villegas
Yap. These SEC documents were as follows: a Certificate of Corporate Filing / Information
dated December 28, 2000 pertaining to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; a Certificate of
Incorporation of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. dated February 17, 2000 with SEC
Reg. No. A20002526; a Covering Sheet of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; the Articles
of Incorporation of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; a Certificate of Filing of the
Amended By-Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. dated April 3, 2000; another
Covering Sheet of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; and the Amended By-Laws of the
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exhs. T17, U17 V17, W17 with submarkings, X17, Y17 and
Z17 with submarkings)

The witness testified on cross examination that the Erap Muslim Foundation, Inc. was duly
organized and obtained a juridical personality in accordance to law. The Amended By-Laws of
the subject corporation, which was approved by the SEC, allegedly provided that the members of
the Board of Trustees were not entitled to receive allowances or honoraria in the performance of
their duties. Atty. Santos was not, however, familiar to the Minutes of the Organizational
Meeting of the Board of Trustees held on March 22, 2000 (Exh. 4-Serapio); the Community Tax
Certificate (Exh. 5-Serapio) of the foundation; and the Mayor’s Permit (Exh. 6-Serapio) as well
as the Business Permit (Exh. 9-Serapio) of the foundation. He qualified that he verified from the
Office of the Bureau of Permit of Pasig City that the foundation had registered its Business
License though he did not see the Mayor’s Permit of the foundation and mentioned the same in
the report. Atty. Santos likewise admitted that he did not come across documents relating to the
operations of the foundation but testified consistently on matters pertained the report. (Exhs. 7-
Serapio, 8-Serapio, 10-Serapio to 15-Serapio, and 21-Serapio to 27-Serapio, inclusive of
submarkings)

CAROLINA SANTIAGO GUERRERO (Guerrero) is the Branch Manager of PS Bank

Murphy Branch, Quezon City. She brought with her a deposit slip (Exh. A13) processed on
December 23, 1999. The deposit involved a Metrobank Ayala Center Check No. 001547 (Exh.
N8) issued by Luis Chavit Singson in the amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,200,000). The check was deposited to the account of Laarni Enriquez with Account No.
0180409000-3. The account statement for the month of December 1999 (Exh. C13, with sub
markings) of Laarni Enriquez showed that the amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P1,200,000) was credited to her account on December 24, 1999.

The signature card (Exh. B13) showed that the account was opened on July 18, 1996. The card
contained Enriquez’s address as 95 8th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and her description as
Filipino, 5’5", 34 years old, brown, medium built and tiny mole on the right cheek.

Guerrero further testified that the biggest single check deposit of Ms. Enriquez in the particular
savings account was made on August 4, 1998 for P40 Million. This was shown through a bank
statement of account (Exh. D13) brought by the witness. The subject account was already closed
as shown by the December 27, 2000 bank statement. The address given in the statement had
changed to 771 Harvard Street, Wac-wac Subdivision, Mandaluyong. (TSN dated October 30,
2002, pp. 6-28)

DR. ROGELIO V. QUEVEDO (Dr. Quevedo) was, at the time of his testimony, the Head of
the Legal and Carrier Business of Smart Communications, Incorporated. The prosecution offered
his testimony to corroborate the Itchon’s testimony regarding the Smart cellular phone numbers
used by Atty. Serapio and Ricaforte.

Dr. Quevedo identified a Certification signed by him that Smart Cellular Phone Nos. 0918-
9012071 and 0918-9021847 were registered in the names of Atty. Edward Serapio and Fontain
Bleu, Inc., respectively. (Exh. G12) [TSN dated October 28, 2002, p. 74]

With respect to Smart Cellular Phone No. 0918-9012071, witness identified the application form
accomplished by an Edward S. Serapio of the De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra Serapio Law
Office (Exh. H12), Certification regarding mobile phone number, phone model, INEI and ICCID
(Exh. I12), Official Receipt No. 82116771 (Exh. J12), Sales Invoice No. A0161625 (Exh. K12),
Account Summary dated March 6, 1999 (Exh. L12), photocopy of Statement for Atty. Serapio’s
Philippine National Bank Visa Card (Exh. M12), photocopy of Atty. Serapio’s Citibank card
(Exh. N12), Customer Inquiry Menu (Exh. O12), Customer Address Inquiry (Exh. P12), On Line
Aging Information (Exh. Q12), Service Disconnection document showing termination of the
account upon request of the customer on December 20, 2000 (Exh. R12) and Certification
Account Memo Inquiry (Exh. S12). [Ibid., pp. 75-90]

With respect to Smart Cellular Phone No. 0918-9021847, Dr. Quevedo presented and identified
the application form of Fontain Bleau, Inc. for two (2) cellular phones for Yolanda Ricaforte and
Maria Carmencita Itchon showing that the number 0918-9021847 was issued to Itchon while the
number 0918-9021849 was issued to Ricaforte (Exh. T12), Customer Inquiry Menu (Exh. U12),
Customer Address Inquiry (Exh. V12), Account Maintenance Inquiry (Exh. W12), On Line Aging
Information (Exh. X12) and audio recording for the voice mail of 0918-9021847 by a certain
"Yolly" (portion of TSN marked as Exh. Y12). [Ibid., pp. 91-115] Dr. Quevedo further testified
that the account for 0918-9021847 had already been disconnected.

II. EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

The following are the witnesses for the defense under paragraph (a):

FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA (FPres. Estrada) took the witness
stand on March 22, 2006, March 29, 2006, April 5, 2006, April 19, 2006, April 26, 2006, May
24, 2006, May 31, 2006, June 7, 2006, June 14, 2006, June 21, 2006 and June 28, 2006. At the
outset, FPres. Estrada denied that Gov. Singson was his close friend because he had only one
close friend, the late actor Fernando Poe, Jr. Gov. Singson was just an ordinary friend and a
political ally to him. He seldom saw Gov. Singson when he was a Mayor of San Juan. Although
he admitted that they sometimes went out, as they had common friends.

FPres. Estrada stated that all allegations in specification (a) of the Amended Information were
lies, as he did not receive a single centavo from any form of illegal gamling, even when he was
still a mayor and he never conspired with jueteng lords. As mayor of San Juan, his policy ws to
make San Juan jueteng free so he directed the Chief of Police of San Juan to go all out against all
forms of gambling. He even personally raided all gamling dens and had all indulging in jueteng
and other forms of gamling arrested and jailed. However, their wives and children came to him
and explained that their husbands could not find other jobs. He promised to put up a livelihood
program for them. (TSN, April 5, 2006, morning session, pp.20-26)

FPres. Estrada also cited national artist Nick Joaquin’s book "Joseph Estrada and other Sketches"
(Exh. 457), particularly the article in the said book "Erap In a New Role" (Exh. 457-a), which
narrated an incident when he padlocked a gambling den when he was still mayor. (Exhs.457-a-1;
and 457-a-2) [TSN, April 5, 2006, pp.35-36]

FPres. Estrada asserted that his policy against gambling had not changed, even when he was a
senator, Vice President and President. However, he realized when he was a mayor that jueteng
which was a gambling for the poor was illegal and its collectors were harassed while the casino
for the rich was legal. He delivered his first privilege speech at the senate on November 25, 1987
(Exh. 458) where he advocated the legalization of jueteng in order that the government through
PAGCOR could earn Twelve Million Pesos (P 12, 000,000.00) everyday or Three Hundred Sixty
Million Pesos (P 360, 000,000.00) a month which could be used to provide essential services for
the poor instead of the enrichment of the police and illegal operators. Although when he was
Vice-President and appointed by President Fidel V. Ramos as Chairman of the Presidential Anti-
Crime Commission, jueteng was not part of his mandate but he was to go against kidnapping,
carnapping and illegal drugs. As President, he appointed Justice Cecilia Munoz-Palma as
Chairperson of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and asked her to study how to
legalize jueteng. She retired only after less than two (2) months to take care of her sick husband.
Later it was assigned to her successor Rosario Lopez, who begged off as she was new on the job.
Chairperson Alice Reyes of PAGCOR took over and finished the study.

Chairperson Reyes reported to former FPres. Estrada that the answer to jueteng was Bingo-2-
Balls and that if jueteng was to be legalized the government could earn no less than Five Billon
Pesos (P5,000,000,000.00). The study of jueteng showed that from Regions I to V only the
collectors, cabos and runners numbering one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) benefit from
jueteng whereas if jueteng is legalized, the jueteng cobradors will became members of the SSS or
GSIS, they would have decent jobs, ceased to be harassed and victims of extortion. First Lady
Loi Ejercito woud have funds to provide dialysis machines for the poor. The legalization of
jueteng will minimize if not totally eradicate corruption among police officials and local
government officials (Ibid, pp.43-48) According to Alice Reyes, the Presidential social funds
could be augmented if jueteng was to be legalized. However, FPres. Estrada told Reyes that
instead the Mayors and governors social fund should be created because these local officials are
besieged with requests for medicines, funerals, bills, bills for tuition fees etc. [Ibid, pp.47-50]

FPres. Estrada instructed Chairperson Reyes to implement right away the Bingo-2-Balls. There
was a dry-run in Bulacan and it was very successful. It earned Twenty Four Million Pesos (P24,
000,000.00) in less than three (3) weeks in a few towns in Bulacan. Unfortunately, the jueteng
lords who were against it caused trouble and it was stopped. There were allegations that FPres.
Estrada was receiving jueteng money. [Ibid, pp.53-54]

FPres. Estrada denied that in August 1998 he had a meeting with Atong Ang at the kitchen of his
residence at Polk Street, Greenhills, which was allegedly witnessed by Gov. Singson who arrived
later, followed by Bong Pineda. From the start, FPres. Estrada had told Ang to distance himself
from the former President, Ang never stepped into his house nor in Malacañang except during
the wedding of his daughter where he did not even see Ang. Bong Pineda too had never stepped
into his house. Gov. Singson only fabricated the alleged meeting. His testimony in the
impeachment that he saw Bong Pineda when he arrived at Estrada’s house and the testimony in
this trial that Pineda arrived later were conflicting. [Ibid, pp.55-62] FPres. Estrada also belied the
testimony of Singson that he told Bong Pineda that he should not be the one to bring the jueteng
money because it would be very obvious. FPres. Estrada denied that he entered into any
transaction regarding any illegal form of gambling specially jueteng. [Ibid, pp.57-70] He
admitted that Bong Pineda was his "kumpadre". The father of the wife of his son Jinggoy, Precy,
was a friend of Bong Pineda. They were from Pampanga. The family of Precy, not the Estradas,
got Mrs. Pineda, the wife of Bong, as principal sponsor at the wedding of Jinggoy and Precy. He
wondered why Bong Pineda was not presented by the prosecution as witness when Singson kept
on referring to him. [Ibid, pp.70-74]

On the delivery to him of jueteng money, FPres. Estrada denied Singson delivered jueteng
protection money to him at his house at Polk Street, the Presidential Residence in Malacañang
and at P. Guevara Street. He also denied that Emma Lim delivered jueteng money to his
Secretary Malou Florendo at Malcañang and that contrary to the testimony of Emma Lim, it was
hard for anybody, including his dentist, to enter the Presidential Residence in Malacañang
without passing through the strict security check. He never heard of Emma Lim except during
the impeachment trial. He never asked Singson to pay his obligations, as he did not have any
debt, nor did he ask Singson to buy any appliance for him. He refused gifts like appliances which
he would just raffle off during Christmas. He had never seen Carmencita Itchon, who he learned
was a relative of Singson. Emma Lim and Carmencita Itchon were rewarded for testifying
against him at the trial with their appointment as member of the Board of Directors of Camp
John Hay [Poro Point Development Corporation, now Poro Point Management Corporation]
(Exh. 459-A-2, 459-A-3) He emphatetically stated that he did not receive a single centavo of
jueteng money. [TSN, April 5, 2006, afternoon session, pp.3-19]

FPres. Estrada denied any knowledge of the ledgers of jueteng money testified to by Singson. He
stated he had not seen said ledgers, he had nothing to do with them and he could not understand
them. He first saw the ledgers on television during the impeachment trial. Acording to him,
Singson only fabricated the ledgers; like the documents pertaining to the excise tax. [Ibid., pp.24-
35, 46, 49, 52-55]

FPres. Estrada also called a lie the testimony of Singson that he instructed Singson to pay Mr.
Paul Bograd Five Million Pesos (P 5, 000,000.00) from the jueteng money. He did not ask
Singson to keep money from him, so he could not order Singson to pay Paul Bograd and he did
not owe the latter anything. [TSN, April 19, 2006, p.14] He explained that the check for
P1,200,000.00 (Exh. N8) which Singson allegedly gave as birthday gift for Laarni Enriquez was
actually intended for his son Jacob and his two siblings, specifically, P1,000,000.00 for Jacob,
the godson of Singson and P100, 000.00 each for Jacob’s two (2) siblings, as Christmas gift. The
check was dated December 22, 1999 whereas the birthday of Laarni was September 22, 1999,
Former President Estrada was surprised at the big amount and he thought that Singson was trying
to ingratiate himself to him. [TSN, April 19, 2006, pp.15-16]
FPres. Estrada also belied the claim of Singson that he advanced the Eight Million Pesos
(P8,000,000.00) interest from the Sixty-Two Million Pesos (P62, 000,000.00) of jueteng money
lent to Wlliam Gatchalian. He denied too that he ordered Singson to lend the said amount of
money to Gatchalian because he did not ask Singson to keep any money for him. [Ibid., pp.23-
25]

Regarding Yolanda Ricaforte, former President Estrada admitted he knows Yolanda, who is the
wife of the Former Tourism Attache in Tokyo, Orestes Ricaforte. Orestes met him when he
arrived at the airport for a speaking engagement for Overseas Filipino Workers in Tokyo. He met
Orestes again after four (4) or five (5) years when he, then already the Vice-President, had a
speaking engagement with the Filipino community in Los Angeles. There Orestes introduced his
wife Yolanda to FPres. Estrada. He met Yolanda again during the oath-taking of Orestes as
Undersecretary of Tourism. He appointed him Undersecretary as he promised if he would
become President when they were in Los Angeles. He also appointed Yolanda as director of
Campo Carne as requested by Orestes because their income was not enough as they had two (2)
children studying in Los Angeles. [Ibid., pp.27-30]

FPres. Estrada however denied that Yolanda at any time was his employee. He seldom saw
Yolanda after the oath-taking of her husband. He did not approve her auditor for jueteng as
claimed by Singson. He had nothing to do with the money deposited by Yolanda, as he did not
have in his possession any bank documents. [Ibid., pp.30-33]

Regarding the testimony of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Former President Estrada
testified that even before he became mayor and when he was a mayor, he was giving
scholarships to poor deserving students, since he believed that education would give them the
opportunity to rise above poverty. His number one program as mayor was to put up the first
municipal high school, which as cited by national artist Nick Joaquin in his book (Exhs. 457 and
457-A-3), was the project closest to his heart as it will offer free education to the needy young.
He said that 60% of elementary graduates could not afford to go to high school and thereby they
could become a potential trouble group. This is the root cause of criminality and he would rather
spend money on free high school than spend it to enlarge the municipal jail. [Ibid., pp.33-35]

Former President Estrada also established the Movie Workers welfare Foundation
(MOWELFUND) when he was still an actor (Exh. 460). The MOWELFUND sent to the United
States to study film making seven (7) scholars who were shown in The Evening Post, June 1,
1981 edition (Exh. 461). He also put up the ERAP Foundation in 1988 to give scholarship to
poor but deserving students. ERAP is the acronym of Education Research and Assistance
Program. It was registered with the SEC as shown by its Articles of Incorporation (Exh. 462)
The incorporators of the Foundation were: former Senate President Joverto Salonga; former
President Estrada’s brother-in-law, Raul P. de Guzman, former Vice-President of the University
of the Philippines and member of its Board of Regent’s; Mr. Anthony Dee, former owner of
China Banking; Mr. Dee K Chong, member of the Board of Directors of China Banking; Mr.
Manuel Zamora, a businessman and bar topnotcher; Mr. Antonio Abacan, now President of
Metrobank; Mr. Ronald Allan Poe, also known by his screen name Fernando Poe, Jr.; Mr. Iñigo
Zobel of Makati; Mr. Carlos Tuason, a former Chairman of the Philippine Sports Commission
and a cousin of Mr. Jose Mike Arroyo; Mr. Danny Dolor, a businessman; Mr. Hermogenes
Tantoco, a big fishpond owner in Malolos, Bulacan; and Mdme. Maria Clara Lobregat former
City Mayor of Zamboanga (Exh. 462-B). According to the memorandum of Executive Director
of the ERAP Foundation, Jing Ancheta (Exh. 463), for school year 1988-1989 to 2005-2006, a
total of 6,574 availed of the scholarship of the said Foundation, of which 2,512 graduated, 2,251
discontinued and 811 then currently enrolled. There were scholars from Cordillera
Administrative Region. (Exh. 464); National Capital Region (Exh. 464-A); Regions I to XIIb
(Exhs. 464-B, 464-C, 464-D, 464-E, 464-F, 464-G, 464-H, 464-I, 464-J, 464-K, 464-L, and 464-
M); ARMM (Exh. 464-N); CARAGA Region (Exh. 464-O). The list of schools attended by the
scholars and the attachment to the memorandum of Mr. Ancheta which was a Report of the e-
Cares Program of Fr. Larry Faraon, dated March 19, 2006 re: Students and Profile were marked
as Exhs. 463-C and 465 (with submarkings) respectively. [TSN, ibid, pp.43-58]. According to
Former President Estrada, the seed money for the foundations came from his salary as mayor. He
said that from the time that he was a mayor, then Senator, Vice-President and President, he never
received a single centavo from his salary. They all went to the Foundations. [Ibid, p.60]

FPres. Estrada testified that he devoted his salaries as public official to scholarship for the poor
because without them, there would be no Erap. The poor patronized his movies and supported
him in his political career. He solicited donations for his scholarship programs but donors wanted
to remain anonymous. He put up the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation because it was his
campaign promise for the people of Mindanao. In the Mindanao State Colleges, in Marawi City,
he promised to send one hundred (100) Muslim Youth yearly to Australia and America. When he
was elected President, he spoke on January 25, 1999 of his project Muslim Youth Foundation in
Smokey Mountains (Exh. 466) and in Angelicum College in Sto. Domingo Church at Quezon
City during the launching of the Educational Reentry, Agenda for the President to the Poor (Exh.
467 and 467-a). To comply with this promise, he asked his brother-in-law, Dr. Raul de Guzman
to put up the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, whose articles of Incorporation was duly
registered with the SEC (Exh. 252 [also Exhs. G10, W17 to W17-6 of Prosecution]) [TSN, April
26, 2006, pp.11-24]

Aside from Dr. de Guzman, the other incorporators of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation were
Professor Danilo Reyes of the University of the Philippines (UP) who had a Masteral and
Doctorate Degree in Pulic Administration at UP, another UP Professor, Mila Reforma, Mr.
George Go, one of the owners PCI-Equitable Bank, and Atty. Edward Serapio, a valedictorian of
the Ateneo de Manila College of Law and a bar topnotcher. The latter was introduced to him in
1999 by then Secretary Lito Banayo of the Philippine Tourism Authority. He appointed Serapio
as Presidential Assistant on Political Affairs because he was impressed by his bio-data. Serapio
is not that close to him as he dealt with Serapio on an official and professional level. He denied
that Serapio established a fictitious ("kalokohan") corporation for him. He described Serapio as
an ex-seminarian, a scholar, a very respectable person, very conservative, very professional, a
family man and of unquestionable integrity [Ibid., pp.24-28]. Former President Estrada was
automatically the Chairman Emeritus of the foundations that he established. He was the number
one fund-raiser but he is not a signatory to the checks of the foundation. The seed money of the
foundation came from his salary. He sponsored an Erap Golf Tournament which raised
P27,000,000.00, some part of which went to MOWELFUND and most of it to the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation. Funds were also raised from Valentines Ball at Manila Hotel and from
solicitations from his businessman friends and classmates. [Ibid., p.29]
Regarding the meeting allegedly attended by him, Singson, Ricaforte and Serapio where he
instructed Singson to give to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, through Serapio, jueteng
money in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200, 000,000.00. former President
Estrada claimed that no such meeting took place. He only learned from Atty. Serapio that
Singson gave P200,000,000.00 to the foundation which he said came from an anonymous donor.
He ordered Atty. Serapio to return the money to Singson because his immediate reaction was that
it was jueteng money. The Former President Estrada emphatically stated: "I’m sure it’s from
jueteng." [Ibid., p.34] He knew because Singson had been offering this to him a long time ago.
According to Serapio he did not know it was jueteng money and that he received the money in
good faith. When the former President told Serapio to take all possible means to return the
money, Serapio replied that he would consult the Board of Trustees first. Former President
Estrada did not know what happened after that because rallies and the impeachment started.
(Ibid, pp.34-36). He learned later that the money was intact at the Equiatble-PCI Bank and that it
earned interest, per bank certification (Exh. 257-C) and passbook (Exh. 257, 257-A and 257-B).
At the time of the testimony, the money based on the aforesaid documents amounted to P 213,
000,000.00. (Exh. 257-B) [TSN, ibid, pp.41-45] Dr. Raul d Guzman informed him that the
scholarship was continuing but the foundation could not send scholars to the US but only to the
universities in the Philippines. One of the scholars, Janice Halim Negrosa was in the courtroom,
at the time of this testimony of the former President [Ibid., p.46]. He was happy with the
continuation of the scholarship because it was his vow to help the poor who supported him in his
election as Mayor, Senator, Vice-President and President. [Ibid, pp.47-48] He established two (2)
foundations, the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation and the Erap Para sa Mahirap Foundation to
emphasize the assistance to our Muslim brothers, the true pure-blooded Filipinos who defended
us from foreign invaders. It was impossible to use the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation for money
laundering because he was not a signatory to the checks of the foundation. Its treasurer was the
Chairman of the bank who would not allow his name to be used in money laundering. If the
Foundation would be dissolved, all its assets would go to the government. [Ibid., pp.50-55; and
Exh. 252-C]

In support of his policy to go after illegal gambling, former President Estrada cited the
memorandum and verbal directives that he issued to the PNP to implement this policy. In a
memorandum dated August 3, 1998 (Exh. 132) of Acting PNP Chief Roberto Lastimoso
pertaining to the aforesaid directives, he reported that he conducted 1,600 operations resulting in
the arrest of 807 suspects, confiscation of P320,039.70 in cash and jueteng paraphernalia, the
filing of 253 cases in court with 13 cases still under investigation. The report gave the statistics
of illegal gambling for the semester 1998 and informed the former President that he [Lastimoso]
gave an ultimatum to all PRO Directors to pursue the anti-illegal gambling campaign without
end, until finally stopped and eradicated. Another report of the PNP Acting chief stated in part:

"Dear President Estrada: This pertains to our compliance with the presidential directive
dated August 14, 1998, regarding the resurgence of illegal gambling operations in the
country. Please be informed that the directive was sent to all PNP Regional Directors to
identify, find, arrest and file charges appropriate in Court against individuals who are
using the name of President Estrada, or supposed connection with his office to promote
these illegal activities, and to come up with rigid measures and tangible results and
 immediately stop all forms of illegal gambling, particularly jueteng and masiao." (Exh.
134) [TSN, April 26, 2006]

On October 7, 2000, Former President Estrada issued a Memorandum to the Secretary of Inetrior
and Local Government, the Director General of PNP that pending review of PAGCOR’s Bingo-
Two-Ball which was in the meantime suspended, they were directed to intensify anti-jueteng
operations to prevent unscrupulous individuals from taking advantage of the situation. (Exh. 468)
He also issued another memorandum to the incoming Director General Panfilo Lacson reiterating
his directive against illegal gambling and requiring periodic and timely reports on all actions
relative thereto. (Exh. 469) [TSN, ibid., pp.56-64]

On the testimony of Gov. Singson that he was used and humiliated by the former President and
ordered killed by the latter, the former President testified that on the contrary, it was Singson
who used his name specifically in jueteng collections and Singson made it appear that he could
influence him, that Singson was close to him, and that Singson joined his state visits even if he
was not invited. Singson was accosted by the Traffic Management Group (TMG) because he was
illegally using sirens and blinkers, as testified to by TMG’s General Paredes. [Ibid, pp.65-66]

According to Former President Estrada, Singson leveled the serious accusations against him
because of his mounting problems. Singson had only two (2) sources of income, the tobacco
excise tax under R.A. No. 7171 and jueteng. Singson could not liquidate his cash advance from
the tobacco excise tax share of Ilocos Sur. He told Singson that he could not help him because
COA was an independent constitutional body. Singson was also against Bingo-2-Ball which was
already conceptualized because he would lose his source of income. [TSN, April 26, 2006,
pp.64-69] Former President Estrada was informed that Singson talked to then Secretary Alfredo
Lim seeking his intercession to seek a meeting with Former President Estrada so that jueteng
would not be legalized or that if legalized (through Bingo-2-Ball) the franchise be given to him,
otherwise it would mean his [Singson’s] political death. Former President Estrada refused to talk
with Singson and told Secretary Lim to talk to Chairperson Alice Reyes. Singson approached
also other persons aside from Secretary Lim and Senator Edgardo Angara. Senator Angara told
FPRes. Estrada that Singson went to see him on a Sunday asking help about jueteng and Bingo-
2-Ball. He told Senator Angara to tell Singson not to talk to him but to Chairperson Alice Reyes.
Angara mentioned that Singson threatened to expose him but he said he had nothing to hide and
if Singson wanted so, to let him do it. Former President Estrada then immediately had the
accusations investigated as he had confirmed that for a long time, Singson had already been
using his name, specifically in jueteng collection. He was hurt by the accusations of Singson as
he was turned from being a President, with the biggest mandate in a clean election, into a
prisoner because of a big lie started by one person, Governor Singson. Moreover his son Jinggoy
and Atty. Serapio were also detained for two (2) years when they knew nothing about jueteng
[TSN, April 26, 2006, pp.69-77.]

JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA was elected Vice Mayor of San Juan in 1988 and Mayor of
San Juan in 1992. [ TSN, November 17, 2004, pp. 15-16.]

Mayor Jinggoy stated that he first got to know Gov. Singson, whom he considered as an
acquaintance, during the presidential campaign of his father, FPres. Estrada, in the 1998
elections. At that time, Gov. Singson supported FPres. Estrada and hosted a lunch for FPres.
Estrada’s entourage when they campaigned in Ilocos Sur. After the presidential campaign, he
said he met Gov. Singson only occasionally. [Ibid., pp. 16-17]

Mayor Jinggoy denied the testimony of Gov. Singson that he was the collector for jueteng
protection money in the province of Bulacan starting January 1999 to August 2000. Witness also
stated that he has never been called "Jingle Bell" nor had he received or heard communication
where he was called "Jingle Bell". Witness also denied the statement of Gov. Singson that a
certain Jessie Viceo was the collector of jueteng protection money in the province of Bulacan
from January 1999 to August 2000, because witness had never been a collector or protector of
jueteng. However, Mayor Jinggoy admitted that he came to know Jessie Viceo when the latter
was running for congressman since Viceo was also aligned with their political party during the
time witness was assigned to campaign for his father in the province of Bulacan. After that,
witness stated that he met Viceo three times in social functions. Again, witness considered Viceo
as an acquaintance. [Ibid., 18-22]

Mayor Jinggoy also denounced for being untrue the allegation that as collector of jueteng
protection money in Bulacan, he collected Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) monthly of
which One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was retained by him and the other Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) was sent to Gov. Singson’s office or was picked up by Gov. Singson’s aides
from witness’ office in the municipal hall of San Juan or from witness’ residence. [Ibid., p. 22]

He further added that he had never used a personalized check with his picture printed on the
check as testified to by Emma Lim who allegedly deposited such check drawn against the United
Overseas Bank of the Philippines, San Juan Branch to Gov. Singson’s account with Metro Bank
Ayala Branch. Mayor Jinggoy presented a certification to prove that he does not maintain a
current account with the said bank. [Ibid., pp. 25-26]

Witness also denied the testimony of prosecution witnesses Vicente Amistad and Jamis Singson
who both claimed to have collected/received jueteng protection money from the witness. With
respect to the statements of Jamis Singson, Mayor Jinggoy asserted they were untrue since he did
not have a security aide named Nestor. Further, the testimony of Jamie Singson that on other
occasion, the latter got protection money from witness’ residence at Polk St., Greenhills is also
not true because he does not live in Polk St. but in 97 Kennedy St., North Greenhills. [Ibid., pp.
26-28]

As regards the rest of the testimony of Gov. Singson, Mayor Jinggoy also stated that following
were totally untrue: that in his conversation with Gov. Singson, witness confirmed that he
received a part (or Fifteen Million Pesos) of the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos that came
from the tobacco excise funds because witness was never involved nor did he know anything
about it; that before the press conference held on October 9, 2000 at the Club Filipino, witness
tried to dissuade Singson from making the expose because at that time witness was in Australia
watching the Sydney Olympics. [Ibid., pp. 29-32] Witness, however, admitted that three weeks
before he left for Australia, Singson called him up before meeting him at the Kamayan, EDSA
where witness was having dinner with his basketball team to ask if witness can convince his
father or Atong Ang to give Singson the franchise of Bingo 2 Ball and not to his (Singson)
political enemies, to which Mayor Jingoy replied that he will try to talk to Atong Ang. Witness
also denied the allegation that he called up Gov. Singson at midnight of October 8, 2000, on the
eve of the press conference where according to Gov. Singson, witness told Gov. Singson that
"baka naman isama mo pa ako dito, Governor", because witness was then shooting a movie with
Judy Ann Santos. [Ibid., pp. 34-39, 102]

Bong Pineda was an acquaintance of Jinggoy Estrada. He denied having known Orestes Rusty
Ricaforte and Yolly Ricaforte, while he admitted having known Bonito Singson whom he met
once or twice. [Ibid., 65-68]

Jinggoy Estrada testified that the Municipality of San Juan maintained a current account with the
Philippine National bank and Land Bank and not with the United Overseas Bank. He, himself
maintained a personal account with United Coconut Planters Bank. [Ibid., pp. 86-88]

Mayor Jinngoy knew Atong Ang personally, whose real name was Charlie and he first come to
know him even before the 1998 presidential elections. He testified that he did not know Alma
Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan, Victor Tan Uy, or a Jojo Uy, and a yatch by the name of Escalera. [Ibid.,
99-104]

ALICIA PEREZ LLAMADO REYES (Reyes) was the Chairperson and Chief Executive
Officer of PAGCOR since January 2, 1987. She was appointed by Former President Corazon C.
Aquino, reappointed by Former President Fidel V. Ramos, and again reappointed by Former
President Joseph E. Estrada. [TSN, March 7, 2005]

The witness testified that Atong Ang proposed to her the operation of Bingo Two Balls
sometime in the year of 2000. She welcomed the idea since Atong Ang successfully handled the
Jai-Alai operations of PAGCOR. Witness Reyes then suggested for a written proposal from
Atong Ang. In a Letter dated September 1, 2000 addressed to the Director of PAGCOR Jose
Rodriguez III (Exh. 286), Atong Ang proposed the feasibility of the Bingo Two Balls. The
proposal was duly approved for negotiation by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR in a
Memorandum dated September 5, 2000 (Exh. 287 with submarkings). Witness Reyes added that
the proposal had the confirmation of FPres. Estrada who even told her to "study the proposal and
if it will displace Jueteng then he [was] all for it". For the purpose of implementing the initial
operation of Bingo Two Balls, the officers of PAGCOR called a meeting in Parañaque Casino
and invited several personalities knowledgeable in number gaming operations in the Philippines.
Gov. Singson did not attend the meeting since the latter was not interested according to Atong
Ang. The operation of Bingo Two Balls in Ilocos Sur was nonetheless offered to three relatives
of Gov. Singson.

Among the conditions for the operation of Bingo Two Balls was the drawing of winning
numbers in public and that no payments will be made "under the table". It was agreed that 23%
of the total revenue will be remitted to PAGCOR and 77% of the total revenue will inure to the
benefit of the operators. The Bingo Two Balls nationwide operation was estimated to gain P50 to
65 Million of sales a day. Atong Ang was supposed to be given a management fee of 8% but was
reduced to 7% and then to 5%. The management fee was finally recommended to be reduced at
2% by the head of the Bingo Department of PAGCOR in a Recommendation Letter dated
November 30, 2000 (Exh. 290).

The dry-run operation of Bingo Two Balls lasted for 20 days particularly in the Province of
Bulacan. According to witness Reyes, PAGCOR got P24 Million from the initial operation of
Bingo Two Balls from the Province of Bulacan alone. FPres. Estrada then ordered for the
suspension of the operation of Bingo Two Balls allegedly because of adverse publicity and
criticisms from the press.

On cross examination, witness Reyes clarified that there was no written agreement for the dry-
run operation of the Bingo Two Balls and that the conditions set forth in the initial operation was
not final. She also stated that the P24 Million that was remitted to PAGCOR represented the 23%
share that was agreed upon and that part of this share was remitted to the Social Fund of the
Office of the President. The 77% share of the income was returned to the operators.

On re-direct examination, the witness testified that the Social Fund of the Office of the President
was created during the term of Former President Aquino. During her administration, this fund
was utilized mostly for building school houses which policy was also adopted during the
administration of Former Presidents Ramos and Estrada.

ATTY. EMILIA SAMONTE PADUA (Padua) was the Managing Head of the Entertainment
and Bingo Department of PAGCOR since July of 1996 to June of 2001. She managed,
supervised, and controlled the nationwide commercial bingo operations and bingo derivatives,
such as Quick-Pick Games and Bingo Two Balls. [TSN, March 9, 2005]

The witness testified that her department reviewed and evaluated the Bingo Two Ball Project
Proposal of Atong Ang to PAGCOR. The said project proposal was approved for an initial
operation and that the Officer-In Charge for the project was Jose Rodriguez III while the
Consultant of the project was the Prominent Marketing Consultancy Group, Inc. of which Atong
Ang was the General Manager. Atong Ang also served as the Marketing Agent of PAGCOR for
the project and, as such, he identified the operational areas and the pre-qualified applicants. The
Bingo Two Ball Project was partially implemented from September 18, 2000 to October 7, 2000
in the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, CAR, Cordillera Administrative Region, Albay, Bicol,
Cavite, Marinduque, Lucena, Batangas, Northern and Southern Luzon, and in Visayas.
PAGCOR allegedly attained its financial goals and objectives in the organizational stage of the
project. Witness Padua presented and identified PAGCOR’s Share Based on Reported Sales
Quota (Exh. 288) prepared by the consultancy group of Atong Ang to corroborate the success of
the initial operation of the Bingo Two Balls Project.

Based on a Memorandum dated November 14, 2000 (Exh. 290) approved by the Board of
Directors of PAGCOR, the 20-day operation of the Bingo Two Ball Project aggregated a gross
sale of P106,206,661.00 and that P24,427,532.00 was collected by PAGCOR which represented
its 23% share. The consultancy group of Atong Ang gained 2% from the 23% share of
PAGCOR. Though there was no written agreement between PAGCOR and the consultancy
group of Atong Ang as regards the payment of the latter’s 2% share, the Board of Directors of
PAGCOR decided that the consultancy group of Atong Ang was entitled to such share.
Witness Padua also testified that among the objectives of the Bingo Two Ball Project were to
eradicate the illegal number games such as Jueteng and to create employment opportunities.
However, the said project was ordered suspended by the Office of the President because of
adverse criticisms and questions of legality from the public.

On cross examination, witness Padua admitted that there was no bidding conducted by PAGCOR
in awarding the operation of the Bingo Two Ball Project to Prominent Marketing Consultancy
Group, Inc. She explained that since Atong Ang also headed the Power Management
Corporation which successfully handled the Jai-Alai Operations of PAGCOR, the Board of
Directors of PAGCOR decided to engage the services of the Prominent Marketing Consultancy
Group, Inc. of Atong Ang to handle the Bingo Two Ball Project. The witness further testified
that some of the appointed operators of the Bingo Two Ball Project were reputed as Jueteng
Operators but qualified that she only knew them as such after the initial operation of the said
project.

On re-direct examination, witness Padua testified that assuming the Bingo Two Ball Project was
not suspended and a contract was perfected between PAGCOR and the operator the contract
would nonetheless pass the review and approval of the Office of the Government Corporate
Council (OGCC) and the Office of the President.

SENATOR ALFREDO SIOJO LIM (Sen. Lim) was appointed as the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) on January 8, 2000. [TSN, March 14,
2005]

On October 7, 2000, Sen. Lim read in the newspaper the alleged attempted ambush on the life of
Gov. Singson and discussed the issue with Congressman Luis "Baby" Asistio during their
breakfast meeting at the Manila Yacht Club. Thereafter, Sen. Lim and Baby Asistio visited Gov.
Singson at his residence in Blue Ridge, Quezon City. Governor Casimiro Ynares, Jr. later arrived
and joined their conversation. According to Lim, Gov. Singson related to them the details of the
attempted plot against the life of Gov. Singson on the late evening of October 3, 2000. On said
date, members of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) armed with long rilfes and not wearing
proper uniforms, accosted the vehicle occupied by Gov. Singson along San Marcelino Street, for
beating a red light and having a blinker on top of his vehicle. Gov. Singson initially refused to
alight from his vehicle and got down only when the mayors that he just had a meeting with
arrived on the scene. Singson argued with the TMG Officers and refused to be brought to Camp
Crame. The dispute ended when the TMG Officers finally agreed that they will no longer force
Gov. Singson to be brought to Camp Crame since the blinker of the vehicle of Gov. Singson was
surrendered to them.

Gov. Singson allegedly said that Atong Ang and Ping Lacson were the persons responsible for
the attempted ambush on his life, and that both conspired to have him killed because Gov.
Singson was against the Bingo Two Balls gaming proposal of Atong Ang and that there was an
arrangement for the raising of campaign funds for the presidential candidacy of Ping Lacson.
Sen. Lim further related that Gov. Singson also implicated FPres. Estrada on the alleged
attempted ambush on his life on the theory that Atong Ang and Ping Lacson will not have the
courage to have him killed without the approval of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson also grumbled
about the awarded franchises for the operation of the Bingo Two Balls in Ilocos by Atong Ang to
the political opponents of Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson also mentioned that FPres. Estrada did not
help him sort out his problems with the Commission on Audit (COA).

Sen. Lim further testified that on the following day, October 8, 2000, he and Congressman Baby
Asistio went to the Malacañang Palace and met FPres. Estrada. The witness relayed to FPres.
Estrada the sentiments and allegations of Gov. Singson. FPres. Estrada denied Gov. Singson’s
accusations that he had something to do with the attempted ambush and that he would initiate an
investigation on the matter. FPres. Estrada said that Gov. Singson was his good friend and that
he was with Lim in Cebu City and Cagayon de Oro during the alleged incident. As to the issue
regarding the Bingo Two Ball Project of Atong Ang, FPres. Estrada said that he was convinced
by PAGCOR that it could triple its proceeds as compared to the operations of Jai-Alai. FPres.
Estrada would also trigger an investigation regarding Gov. Singson’s allegation that Atong Ang
had planned to divert the proceeds of the Bingo Two Ball Project of PAGCOR. Witness Lim
added that FPres. Estrada admitted that he left Gov. Singson to explain to COA because he had
no control and supervision over the said constitutional body.

The witness also refuted the testimony of Gov. Singson that he conveyed the impression to Gov.
Singson that FPres. Estrada gave the signal to kill Atong Ang. Witness Lim claimed that his
thumbs down gesture to Gov. Singson meant that FPres. Estrada would have Atong Ang ordered
investigated and not to have the latter killed.

On cross examination, witness Lim testified that he had no personal knowledge as to the
purchase of shares from Bell Corporation by GSIS and SSS; as to the matters regarding the
Ilocos Sur Excise Taxes; and as to the Jueteng collection ledger of Yolanda Ricaforte.

VIOLETA SUAREZ DAMITAN (Damitan) was the Executive Assistant of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation employed by Raul P. De Guzman on January 1, 2004 (Exh. 278). [TSN,
March 16, 2005] She was responsible, among others, for the safekeeping of the records of the
said corporation such as the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, and the records of applicants
to the scholarship program of the foundation.

Damitan testified that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation provided scholarship education
programs to the less privileged Muslim youth Filipinos. The applications and recommendations
filed were reviewed by the Screening Committee and approved by the Board of Trustees of the
foundation.

Damitan presented and identified the credentials and pertinent records of Sittie Shahani
Laminero who was one of the applicants granted a scholarship program by the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation (Exhs. 295, 296, 297 and submarkings). She likewise presented and identified
several documents enumerating and showing other grantees of the said scholarship program,
namely, Salvador Ongay Domona, Sohayle Hadji Abdul Rachman, Janice Halim Negrosa,
Roque Santos Morales, and Ahmad Robert (Exhs. 279, 280, 298, 299 and submarkings). The
witness further presented and identified a Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation on July 21, 2000 to show the appointment of the other
employees of the foundation and the accounts of the scholarship program (Exh. 274 and
submarkings).

SALVADOR ONGAY DOMONA [TSN, March 16, 2005], JANICE HALIM

NEGROSA [TSN, March 30, 2005], ROQUE SANTOS MORALES [TSN, March 30,
2005] and H. SOLAYHE A.A. MARANGIT [TSN, March 28, 2007], all similarly testified that
they were granted scholarships by the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Witness Domona applied
and was admitted for the scholarship program on the year 2003; witness Negrosa applied and
was admitted to the said program on the year 2004; witness Morales applied and was admitted to
the same program on the year 2004 and witness Marangit applied and was admitted to the same
program in 2004. These witnesses also presented and identified their respective credentials and
pertinent documentary evidence. (see also Exhs. 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309,
310, and submarkings)

ATTY. CARINA JAVIER DEMAISIP (Demaisip) was appointed Assistant Corporate

Secretary of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. on January 1, 2004 (Exh. 277). She
assisted the release of funds and prepared the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Trustees of
the foundation. [TSN dated March 30, 2005 and TSN dated April 4, 2005]

Demaisip testified that Raul P. De Guzman solicited her services for the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation sometime on July of 2003 which was after the incarceration of Atty. Edward S.
Serapio, the Corporate Secretary. The foundation was located at the 4th Floor of VAG Building
in Greenhills, Ortigas Avenue. The witness then identified several minutes of the meetings
approved by the Board of Trustees of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation (Exhs. 279, 281, 312,
and submarkings) and corroborated the testimony of witness Violeta S. Damitan regarding the
approved and awarded scholarship programs by the foundation (Exh. 313 and submarkings). She
also testified that among the reasons why the foundation had no scholars for the years 2000,
2001, 2002, and 2003, except for Salvador O. Domona, were because of (a) the ineffectiveness
of the Board of Trustees brought by the charges against FPres. Estrada, (b) the lack of funds to
operate the foundation due to the freeze orders, and (c) the failure of the institutions to comply
with the requirements of the scholarship program. The funds of the foundation became available
on November 11, 2003. Hence, the foundation started releasing checks only thereafter although
some of the applications for the scholarship program were already reviewed and approved before
the availability of the funds.

MARIA LOURDES LOVERO FLORENDO (Florendo) was an Executive Assistant in the

Office of the Vice President and the Confidential Secretary of accused FPres. Estrada. [TSN,
April 20, 2005 and April 25, 2005]

Florendo testified that she did not know and had never met on any occasion Emma Lim. The
witness said that she was shocked when she read from the newspaper that Emma Lim allegedly
gave her a black bag containing P5,000,000.00 at the Presidential Residence. She refuted the
statements that Emma Lim gave during the Impeachment Trial on December 11, 2000 that the
latter went straight to her and handed a black bag which contained P5,000,000.00; that Emma
Lim was not required at the guardhouse of the Presidential Residence to have her black bag
examined in the X-Ray Machine; that there were no furniture or sala sets at the right side of the
entrance of the Presidential Residence; that witness Florendo received the black bag and placed it
near a table and that she talked to Gov. Singson and told him that "they already arrived"; and that
Emma Lim went out running towards her vehicle after giving the black bag to witness Florendo
(Exh. 320-C and submarkings).

NORMAN DELOS SANTOS BORDADORA (Bordadora) was a reporter of the Philippine

Daily Inquirer since July of 1996. He testified that he was the author of an article in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer Newspaper entitled "Chavit, I Have Never Been Into Jueteng" which
was published on May 21, 2005 (Exh. 335). The source of the contents of his article was
allegedly Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson whom witness Bordadora had interviewed through a
cellular phone which was not recorded. The witness clarified that he interviewed Gov. Singson
on the alleged jueteng involvement of Archbishop Cruz and not on the jueteng expose in the year
2000. [TSN, June 22, 2005]

ATTY. JOSEPH QUION ORSOS (Orsos), P/SUPT. ARTURO LACSINA

PAGLINAWAN (Paglinawan), P/SUPT. RODOLFO SANTOS AZURIN,
JR. (Azurin), POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR NOEL BIACA VALLO (Vallo), P/SUPT.
ELISEO DECENA DE LA PAZ (Dela Paz), JONIRO FORMILLEZA
FRADEJAS (Fradejas) and RENATO MENDOZA PAREDES (Paredes), all testified to
matters related to the October 3, 2000 traffic incident involving Gov. Singson and the Traffic
Management Group ("TMG").

Orsos, a Police Officer and the Chief of the Legal Services of the TMG, presented and identified
a Roster of Troops dated October 3, 2000; a Disposition of Personnel as of August 28, 2000
dated October 31, 2000; a Memorandum dated October 4, 2000 regarding the apprehended motor
vehicle of Gov. Singson; and another Memorandum dated October 4, 2000 (Exh. 360) regarding
the traffic violation of the driver of Gov. Singson. He admitted he had no personal knowledge of
the incident. [TSN, July 13, 2005, Exhs. 358-61 with submarkings] Paredes, Director of the
TMG, identified a Memorandum dated October 4, 2000 signed by him and previously marked as
Exh. 360. [TSN dated August 17, 2003] Paglinawan, Chief of the General Assignment Section of
the Western Police District, testified that there were no records in the WPD that Gov. Singson
filed a case in relation to the October 3, 2000 incident. [TSN, July 18, 2005] Azurin, Chief of the
Special Operations Division of the TMG, testified that, on October 3, 2000, he was called by
Vallo for assistance in some misunderstanding with Gov. Singson. He also testified to what
happened after they proceeded to the WPD headquarters in UN Avenue and related that the
agents of the TMG Group were wearing proper uniform but admitted that he himself was not in
proper uniform. Azurin testified that the blinker and siren found in the vehicle of Gov. Singson
were confiscated for violation of a Memorandum dated July 14, 1998 issued by the Office of the
President. [TSN, July 18, 2005, and Exh. 362 with submarkings] Vallo, Chief of the Operation
Task Force Limbas of the TMG, testified to the TMG’s spotting of an accelerating vehicle (Gov.
Singson’s), the chase and the accosting of the vehicle for a traffic violation. Dela Paz, Police
Chief Superintendent of the Philippine National Police, identified his signature in a
Memorandum sent to relevant offices pertaining to the use of blinkers [TSN, August 8, 2005,
Exh. 364] Fradejas, Executive Assistant II of the Traffic Engineering Center of the Metro Manila
Development Authority, identified a Certification pertaining to the DPWH Phase I installation of
traffic lights in Metro Manila. [TSN dated August 8, 2005, Exh. 384]
DR. GEMMA BAULA DAVID (David) had been the dentist of FPres. Estrada since the latter
was still a Senator. David testified that she provided dental treatments to FPres. Estrada at the
latter’s residence in No. 1 Polk Street, Greenhills, and at the Presidential Residence in
Malacañang. The witness related that, every time she visited FPres. Estrada at his residence in
Greenhills as well as in the Presidential Residence in Malacañang for the scheduled dental
appointment, she had to pass the strict security protocols conducted at the entrance of both
locations. She further related that at there was a walk-through metal detector at the Presidential
Residence in Malacañang. [TSN, May 30, 2005]

MARICHU ANDUEZA VILLANUEVA (Villanueva) was a Journalist of the Philippine Star

Newspaper and a member of the Malacanang Press Group. She authored the article entitled
"Palace Backs Ping on Anti-Jueteng Drive" in the June 17, 2000 issue of the said newspaper
which was based on a press conference she attended in Malacañang Palace on June 16, 2000.
[TSN, September 26, 2005; Exh. 415 and submarkings]

ATTY. RICARDO VILLANUEVA PUNO, JR., a practicing lawyer, testified that he joined
the government as Press Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson on or about March 16, 2000
and stayed in that position until January 20, 2001. In such position, he would only speak of
information that he was authorized to disseminate to the public or the media at that particular
time. His position gave him the privilege of being present at discussions on policies, which
included Presidential meetings. [TSN, October 3, 2005]

To the best of his recollection, the policy of the FPres. Estrada then was always to fight illegal
gambling. That has been the declared policy even during the tenure of the witness as Press
Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson. He had a general recollection of this policy, but he had
no specific recollection of the times it was actually mentioned.

He could not recall specifically a press conference held on June 16, 2000, although he saw the
June 17, 2000 issue of the Philippine Star attached to the subpoena [Exh. 415], but there was a
time when he held a series of briefings for media at 2:00 p.m., and it was probably during one of
those briefings that the points in the article were raised. The article referred to a drive by the then
Director General of the Philippine National Police against jueteng. The question asked of the
witness at the time was probably, whether FPres. Estrada in fact prescribed jueteng reduction. It
was very clear that it was in fact the policy at that time, based on their previous conversations.
The article, however, referred to the drive allegedly initiated by then PNP Director Panfilo
Lacson. Up to the time that the witness left in January 2001, he could not remember any reversal
of that policy. He would not know, however, if jueteng continued despite the campaign against
it, because his office as Press Secretary was not monitoring the situation.

ATTY. HILARIO PAUL HAVOC RAGUNJAN, JR. was a commissioned Notary Public who
notarized the Letter dated May 28, 2005 of Rodolfo Q. Pineda (Exh. 331) addressed to the
Chairman of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the House of the House of
Representatives, Hon. Mario Z. Almario. Witness Ragunjan, Jr. testified that he personally knew
the affiant of the letter but had no personal knowledge as to the contents of the said letter. [TSN,
June 6, 2005]
MARIBETH ANG ESCOBAR, Officer-in-Charge of the United Overseas Bank (UOB) San
Juan Branch, testified on a Certification dated June 28, 2002 addressed to Atty, Irene Jurado
issued by Ms. Elma Gutierrez, who was no longer connected with UOB. Witness had been the
OIC of UOB San Juan since Ms. Gutierrez’ resignation. (TSN, November 22, 2004, p. 48)

The said Certification stated: "This is to certify that based on our records from 1999 up to the
present, we have no current account listed under the name of the client Mayor Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada." She verified the facts stated in the Certification by personally checking the records on
file in their system and there was no reading of an account under the name of Senator Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, upon receipt of the subpoena. (Ibid., p. 54)

Escobar also testified that she was not aware and has not seen any check with photo of the client
on the face of the check. She has never processed a customized check but has seen one with the
logo of a company like Sunlife. Witness stated that the Certification was issued based on the
letter dated June 28, 2002 of Atty. Irene D. Jurado to the Manager of UOB San Juan. (Ibid., pp.
54-58)

Witness testified that although the certification stated only that Jose Jinggoy Estrada had no
current account, her verification of their their records showed that there was no Jose Jinggoy
Estrada on the list of active accounts of UOB San Juan, as well as in the dormant accounts.
Similarly, the Municipality of San Juan had no account with the UOB San Juan, more so the
Municipality of Marikina. (Ibid., pp. 94-98)

ROSEMARIE J. SAN GREGORIO, Community Affairs Officer II of the Municipal

Government of San Juan, testified that she didn’t know personally a lady by the name of Emma
Lim, but has seen her testify before the Impeachment Court on television. She remembered
particularly the testimony of Emma Lim because Emma Lim mentioned the name of her
officemate, Josie, who was with the witness when they were watching the proceedings in the
television along with Lauro Quirino, who was their receptionist in the Mayor’s Office. Witness
remembered that among the testimony of Emma Lim was that she went to the Municipal Office
to collect money. Witness stated that she and Josie Ramos were surprised and amazed with
Emma Lim’s testimony since she [Emma Lim] did not go to the Mayor’s Office. Josie Ramos
was the one handling papers for the signature of the Mayor. [TSN, November 24, 2004, pp. 26-
42]

JOSEFINA QUIAZON RAMOS worked as one of the secretaries in the Office of the Mayor,
Municipality of San Juan for 1998 to 2001, preparing documents for signature of then Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada. Witness Ramos corroborated the testimony of Rosemarie San Gregorio that
Emma Lim did not go to the Office of then Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada in January, February
and March 2000 to pick up allegedly jueteng money from the Office of the Mayor.

Ramos described as untrue the testimony of Emma Lim that Emma Lim talked to Ramos and
was asked to sit in front of Ramos’ table in the Office of the Mayor on February and March
2000. Witness stated that Emma Lim never went to the Office of the Mayor in San Juan. Witness
was surprised when Emma Lim mentioned her name during the impeachment trial, and that she
told this to Mayor Estrada who called her up after Emma Lim testified. Mayor Estrada was also
surprised and told her that "what is that woman saying, that woman is a liar". [TSN, December 6,
2004]

SUSAN MACALLA AVILES was the Social Secretary of Ms. Guia Gomez and a resident of
No. 1 Ibuna Street corner P. Guevarra Street, San Juan, Metro Manila. She testified that, as social
secretary, she was the one who received guests, entertained them and was the one who would
call to serve the visitors coffee or juice at the house of Guia Gomez at No. 1 Ibuna Street corner
P. Guevarra Street, San Juan. Aviles asserted that Gov. Singson never went to the house at P.
Guevarra. [TSN, December 1, 2004, p.16-17] She clarified that the house on P. Guevarra and
Ibuna were one and the same because their address was No. 1 Ibuna Street corner P. Guevarra
Street, San Juan. (Ibid., p.44)

NOEL ISRAEL BUENDIA was previously a security guard assigned at the residence of Guia
Gomez at No. 1 Ibuna corner P. Guevarra Streets, San Juan, from February 26, 1998 up to 2002,
and as such, was stationed at the gate along Ibuna St. from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and the one
assigned in the front and in-charge of asking visitors. During his assignment at Guia Gomez’s
residence, Buendia testified that he did not see Gov. Singson go there. [TSN, December 1, 2004]

CONGRESSMAN LUIS A. ASISTIO (Cong. Asistio) testified that he was at San Francisco,
California on July 24, 2000 as part of the official Philippine Delegation accompanying then
President Joseph E. Estrada in his state visit to the United States of America, and that it was there
that he saw Gov. Singson, at the lobby of the Fairmont Hotel where they stayed, telling him of
the latter’s problem that FPres. Estrada did not want to see him. Cong. Asistio, together with
Gov. Singson, went to the room of FPres. Estrada, and Gov. Singson asked FPres. Estrada to call
the Chairman of the COA for the relief of the Auditor assigned in his province to which FPres.
Estrada replied that he might get into trouble as the Chairman of the COA is a constitutional
appointee and suggested that Gov. Singson instead talk to then Executive Sectary Ronaldo
Zamora to resolve his problem.

Witness also testified that after returning from the U.S. and prior to the expose or press
conference made by Gov. Singson in October 2000, he received a call from the latter asking him
if they could meet it Manila Peninsula, and, at the same time, Gov. Singson told him of his
problem and his grievances (sama ng loob) against FPres. Estrada, including placing his political
opponents in positions of power in his province, such as, the relief of the Provincial Commander
and conferring on his brother, Bonito, who is his mortal enemy, a position regarding jueteng.

Cong. Asistio clarified that in the many meetings he had with Gov. Singson during the period
late August to September 2000, they mainly talked about the state of the Ilocos Sur provincial
leadership and occasionally Gov. Singson’s suspicions regarding Atong Ang’s designs to corner
bingo two balls and ease him out. According to Cong. Asistio, Gov. Singson is worried that his
continued provincial leadership will be affected by the developments. Cong. Asistio also testified
they never talked about jueteng, or receipt of jueteng monies or the alleged receipt of money
from R.A. 7171 since according to him, he knew of these issues only during the Impeachment
Trial and he thinks that these are mere figments of Gov. Singson’s imagination.
Cong. Asistio also testified that he, together with Mayor Lim, went to the house of Gov. Singson
to persuade the latter not to push through with the press conference.

Cong. Asistio also testified that in his visits to Malacañang during the time of FPres. Estrada, at
least three times a week, he never saw Atong Ang there because Atong Ang was banned by the
FPres. Estrada from entering Malacañang. [TSN, October 11, 2004 and October 13, 2004]

ATTY. ESTELITA D. CORDERO (Cordero) testified that she was a close friend Mrs. Lydia
"Honey Girl" Singson, sister of Gov. Singson, and worked as a legal consultant for Mrs. Honey
Girl Singson when the latter was appointed as Director General of the Technology and
Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC) until October 12, 2000. [TSN, November 8, 2004, pp. 9,
11-12, 14]

Cordero testified that in October 2001, members of the Save Ilocos Sur Alliance (SISA) visited
her in her office and requested her to go over several audit reports (1999 to 2000, SAO Special
Report 1999) of the province and to find out if there is any basis for filing any action against
responsible public officials of the province. [Ibid., p. 38] After going through the documents,
witness Cordero, together with members of SISA and other concerned citizens, decided to file
criminal complaints against Gov. Singson and other responsible officers of the province who did
some anomalous transactions to the detriment of the province. [Ibid., pp. 44-45]

Witness thought that the testimony of Emma Lim in the impeachment trial were all lies because
from the statement of Gov. Singson, he did not have anything to do with jueteng and the delivery
of the money. Thus, witness claimed that all of these were fabricated statements on the part of
Emma Lim. [TSN, November 10, 2004, pp. 26-28]

Witness Cordero also testified that Gov. Singson was the jueteng lord in their province and
neighboring provinces, and all matters relating to jueteng, such as, employment, people,
operations were under the control of Gov. Singson. [Ibid., pp. 29-30]

BRIG. GEN. RODOLFO DOCTOR DIAZ, a retired military officer, was assigned as the
Commanding Officer of the Presidential escorts, one of the major units of the Presidential
Security Group, in 1998 when FPres. Estrada assumed office. He testified that he was familiar
with the private residence of FPres. Estrada in No. 1 Polk Street. Quezon City. According to
Gen. Diaz, only the First Family’s vehicles were allowed to park in the garage. Only five
vehicles could be accommodated there and usually the cars parked there were the President’s
primary and secondary car, as well as an SUV and two more cars. Witness also detailed the
security measures followed in Polk Street. In Polk Street, visitors were never allowed to park
their cars inside the garage. [TSN, June 1, 2005, pp. 50-56]

The witness did not see Atong Ang either at No. 1 Polk Street or in Malacanang since the
President has been elected. He had seen Mr. Jaime Dichaves twice; Mr. Baby Asistio, once or
twice. He did not see Governor Singson in No. 1 Polk Street [Ibid., pp. 81-83]

RICARDO GREY GOLPEO, General Manager of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) from February 2000 to February 2001, testified that he and then PSCO Chairman
Rosario Lopez were summoned by FPres. Estrada to Malacañang in March 2000. On that
occasion, FPres. Estrada informed them that jueteng had become a big problem to him and
wanted to know if the PCSO can do something to fight jueteng. The witness replied that they will
study the instruction of the President. Chairman Lopez instructed witness to personally handle
the matter. At the time the witness left PCSO, he testified that the PCSO had not come up with a
suggestion to the President on how to eradicate jueteng. [TSN, April 11, 2005, pp. 11-17, 19,
30)]

DANILO DELA ROSA REYES was a Member of the Board of Trustees of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation, Inc. and the Acting Treasurer of the said foundation. He was also an
Associate Professor at the National College of Public Administration and Governance in the
University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman and the Vice President for Educational Services for
the "Erap Para sa Mahirap" Foundation

Reyes testified that the "Erap Para sa Mahirap" Foundation was duly established in 1988 and had
14,000 recipients of scholarships as of the year 2000. Among the Incorporators of the said
foundation was FPres. Estrada. The "Erap Para sa Mahirap" Foundation, however, encountered
financial constraints so the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. came into existence.

Reyes related that Raul P. De Guzman, a brother-in-law of FPres. Estrada, invited him to join in
establishing a foundation for the poor and deserving Muslim students in line with the vision of
FPres. Estrada of developing a new generation of Muslim leaders. He then identified the
documents related to the registration of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exhs. 251 to
255, 262 to 271, inclusive of submarkings) with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). The Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. was duly organized in accordance with law and
had conducted its business upon incorporation for bona fide purposes as stated in its Articles of
Incorporation (Exh. 252) and Amended By-Laws (Exh. 255). The original Members of the Board
of Trustees were: Prof. Mila Reformina, Dr. Raul P. De Guzman, Atty. Edward S. Serapio, Dr.
Danilo Reyes, and Mr. George L. Go, who later resigned.

The word ERAP affixed to the name "Muslim Youth Foundation" was allegedly an acronym for
"Education, Research, and Assistance Program". The funding of the said foundation was
provided by the Erap Golf Cup, which donated the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00); the contributions of the Board of Trustees in the amount of P20,000.00 each;
and a Two Hundred Million Peso (P200,000,000.00) donation from a donor which, according to
Serapio, would like to remain anonymous. The amount of Ten Million One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P10,100,000.00) was deposited with the UCPB and eventually transferred to Metrobank
while the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) was deposited with Equitable PCI
Bank. The Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) was the source of the foundation’s operating
expenses and for minimal scholarship program during the time material in this case.

According to Reyes, the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. had (four (4) scholars for MA in
Islamic Studies in the University of the Philippines for school year 2004-2005. For the second
semester of that school year, the foundation added four (4) more scholars for Masters Degree,
two in the University of the Philippines and the other two in the Philippine Normal University.
The scholars were only given Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) per semester. Reyes explained
that the foundation was in hiatus for three (3) years because its funds were frozen by a court
order and that they conducted meetings after the recuperation of Dr. De Guzman who got sick,
and after the release on bail of Atty. Serapio.

Reyes also testified as to the appointment papers of the employer of the foundation, such as the
Executive Assistant, the Assistant Corporate Secretary and the Utility Messenger. The office
address of the foundation was transferred from Pasig to the VAG Building in San Juan. [TSN,
February 21, 2005; February 23, 2005; and March 2, 2005]

EUGENE MACAMASBAD, a Police Senior Inspector with the Philippine National

Police, brought with him the documents required in the subpoena addressed to Gen. Arturo
Lomibao of the PNP or his authorized representative. He produced a certified true copy of a
Memorandum Circular 2000-003, certified by Celia Redison (Exh. 365). As to the memorandum
dated July 19, 2000 which was subpoenaed, the same could not be located as shown by a
certification dated 29 July 2005 issued by the Deputy Chief of the PACER. (Exh. 380) [TSN,
August 1, 2005, pp. 60-69] The witness came to Court and produced the above documents only
upon verbal instruction from his officers. He was not the records custodian and he did not have
any knowledge about records being maintained by their office. [Ibid., pp. 70-72, id.]

SEN. EDGARDO ANGARA, a lawyer and a senator when he testified in Court, knew Gov.
Singson. They were compadres, being godfathers at the wedding of Singson’s niece. In
September 2000, Gov. Singson made an unexpected visit at Senator Angara’s farm to request
that the witness talk to President Estrada about the 2-balls game. Gov. Singson told the witness
that the franchise for the said game in Ilocos Sur was given to his political opponent and he was
losing face with his supporters. Gov. Singson wanted the franchise to go to him or if it cannot be
granted, that the game of 2-balls not be allowed altogether in Ilocos. The witness replied that he
would go down to Manila and call the President to relay Gov. Singson’s message. [TSN, June 1,
2005, pp. 13-15]

Sen. Angara remembered Gov. Singson saying that the franchise was given to Eric Singson.
Gov. Singson even mentioned a list of of jueteng payoffs and that one of the beneficiaries was
the President. When Sen. Angara mentioned to FPres. Estrada Gov. Singson’s request regarding
2-balls and statements regarding jueteng, the President denied that he was a recipient of any
payoff, saying he had nothing to do with it [2-balls] but that it was Atong Ang’s jurisdiction
[Ibid., pp.16 and 24]

After Sen. Angara relayed the answer of the President, Gov. Singson asked the witness to talk to
Atong Ang and the witness said he will try. When the witness was able to talk to Atong Ang and
repeated Gov. Singson’s request, Atong Ang replied he will study it or that he will have to
consult PAGCOR. The witness denied having told Gov. Singson "Grabe ‘to. Huwag kang
lumabas at akong bahala kay Presidente dahil baka pati kaming mga Cabinet
members maaapektuhan nito." [Ibid., pp. 17-18, 24-25] Witness saw the list of payoffs shown by
Singson, but he did not read it. [Ibid., pp. 30, 43]

FINDINGS OF FACT
Re: Sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information

With respect to the alleged acts of receiving or collection of sums of money from illegal
gambling, commonly known as "jueteng", in the form of share or percentage, the Court finds
credible material portions of Gov. Chavit Singson’s testimony insofar as they are corroborated
by independent and competent evidence.

The Court concedes that Gov. Chavit Singson did not have the purest of motives in exposing the
jueteng collections which he testified were done for the benefit of FPres. Estrada. Undoubtedly
and by his own admission, he resented not being given the franchise for the Bingo Two Balls, the
government sanctioned numbers game, in his home province of Ilocos Sur. He feared the demise
of his political career as the said franchise was given to his political opponents, Eric Singson and
his brother Bonito Singson, to the embarrassment of the mayors who were affiliated to him. Gov.
Chavit Singson was disappointed to say the least that Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, JV Ejercito, the
other son of FPres. Estrada, Secretary Edgardo Angara, Secretary Alfredo Lim, friends like Luis
Asistio and Mark Jimenez, whom Gov. Chavit Singson approached to intercede to FPres. Estrada
to help him secure the franchise, were unsuccessful. Gov. Chavit Singson was also displeased
that FPres. Estrada would not use the Office of the Presidency to help him with his trouble with
the Commission on Audit which was demanding his liquidation of the Two Hundred Million
Pesos (P200,000,000.00) share of Ilocos Sur in the excise taxes collected under RA No. 7171.
The Court will not cite the alleged attempt on the life of Gov. Chavit Singson in the evening of
October 3, 2000 considering the contradictory evidence on this matter consisting of the
testimony of the enforcement officers on the incident.

The acts of collection of jueteng protection money for FPres. Estrada from various provinces
nationwide per month as well as the payments to him and to various persons from such sums of
money with his approval or acquiescence were methodically detailed in two sets of ledgers: the
first set covering the period beginning November 1998 to July 1999 (Exh. W7 to E8), and the
second set for the period starting August 1999 to August 2000 (Exh. A-4 to A-4-l). The first set
of ledgers were personally prepared by Gov. Chavit Singson, aided by Emma Lim and
Carmencita Itchon, while the second set of ledgers were prepared by Yolanda Ricaforte, under
the supervision of Gov. Chavit Singson and also with the help of Lim and Itchon. Insofar as the
collection of jueteng money is concerned, Emma Lim and Carmencita Itchon, by their own
admission performed similar roles as Yolanda Ricaforte except that the latter received double the
amount of the monthly salary of Lim and Itchon by virtue of her "supervisory" status.

The accused would have this Court dismiss the ledgers as hearsay and/or mere fabrications.
However, there are circumstances which lend credibility to the said ledgers. The first set of
ledgers (Exh. W7 to E8) was faxed by Ricaforte to Singson just before Gov. Chavit Singson made
his expose while the second set of ledgers (Exh. A-4 to A-4-l) was in the possession of Ricaforte,
which she produced during the Senate Impeachment proceedings, as testified to by Atty. David
Jonathan Yap, the Senate Legal Counsel.

Yolanda Ricaforte was closely associated to FPres. Estrada, being the wife of Orestes Ricaforte,
who was appointed by FPres. Estrada as Undersecretary of Tourism. Ricaforte opened several
accounts in the different branches of Equitable PCI Bank with unusually huge deposits and
investments in multiple of millions of pesos during the period covered by the second set of
ledgers.

Per testimony of Nantes, in Scout Tobias-Timog Branch, Ricaforte opened a savings account, a
current account, seven special savings account and a PCI Emerald account. In the Savings
Account No. 0157-04227-0 alone, after the initial deposit of P17,205,000.00 on September 1,
1999, she deposited from September 7, 1999 to January 10, 2000, a staggering total amount of
P57,712,150.00. The initial deposits for each of the seven (7) Special Savings Accounts were:
P70,000,000.00 (December 2, 1999); P10,000,000.00 (February 7, 2000); P2,500,000.00 (March
29, 2000); P9,700,000.00 (April 5, 2000); 2,500,000.00 (May 29, 2000) P1,900,000.00 (May 4,
2000); and P2,000,000.00 (June 1, 2000). The deposit in the PCI Emerald Fund was
P6,616,676.19 (December 6, 2000).

According to Rosario S. Bautista, in Diliman-Matalino Branch, Ricaforte opened on November

19, 1999 a combo account: Savings Account No. 0288-02037-0 and Current Account No. 0238-
00853-0 with an initial deposit of P70,000,000.00 covered by two (2) PCI Bank Checks payable
to cash each in the amount of P35,000,000.00, drawn by William T. Gatchalian. Additional
deposits were: a check (Exh. A-7-h) issued by Gov. Chavit Singson on November 22, 1999 for
P1,000,000.00; another check dated December 9, 1999 with PNB Naga as drawee bank (Exh. A-
7-j); cash deposit of P3,050,000.00 (Exh. A-7-d) on December 2, 1999; and cash deposit of
P1,000,000.00 on January 28, 2000.

In the Pedro Gil-Robinsons Branch, according to Shakira C. Yu, Ricaforte opened on January 6,
2000, a Regular Savings Account with an initial deposit of P6,000,000.00. Other deposits
consisted of: (1) check drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson for P2,965,000.00; (2) cash deposit of
P1,540,000.00 on January 25, 2000; and check drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson in the amount of
P1,340,000.00.

In the T.M. Kalaw Branch, Pabillon testified that Ricaforte opened Regular Savings Account No.
0193-61496-8 and Special Savings Account No. 02193-15050-3 on February 8, 2000, with the
initial deposits in PNB Managers Check (Exh. A-9-A) in the amount of P10,007,777.78 and cash
of P1,400,000.00.

In the Scout Albano Branch, Alcaraz testified that Ricaforte opened on March 2, 2000 three
accounts with initial deposits as follows: Savings Account No. 5733-15154-3, P1,995,000.00;
Special Savings Account No. 5733-0721-0, P2,000,000.00; and Checking Account No. 5732-01-
975-7, P5,000.00.

In Isidora Hills Branch, Gonzales testified that Ricaforte opened on March 15, 2000, among
others, Special Savings Account No. 077090498-6 with the initial deposit of P7,000,000.00 in
the form of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. Check drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson payable to
cash.

Bank officials, such as Salvador R. Serrano, Patrick Dee Cheng, and Carolina S. Guerrero,
testified to the existence of checks paid by Chavit Singson which landed in the accounts of
persons associated with FPres. Estrada: (1) Metrobank Check No. 0000917 of Gov. Chavit
Singson for P5,000,000.00 which was deposited on February 2, 1999 in Account No. 061-0-
14636-7 of Paul Gary Bogard at Security Bank; (2) Metrobank Check No. 00138 drawn by
Chavit Singson on September 29, 1999 in the amount of P8,000,000.00 deposited in the account
of Mrs. Luisa P. Ejercito; (3) Metrobank Ayala Center Check No. 000132 drawn by Gov. Chavit
Singson payable to William Gatchalian in the amount of P46,350,000.00; (4) Metrobank Check
No. 001547 issued by Gov. Chavit Singson in the amount of P1,200,000.00 which was deposited
in the Account No. 0180409000-3 of Laarni Enriquez on December 23, 1999.

The Erap Muslim Youth Foundation

The paper trail of the P200,000,000.00 deposited for the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.
incontrovertibly established that the said sum of money came from jueteng collections through
the cashier’s / managers checks purchased by Ricaforte using the deposits in the accounts that
she opened in the different branches of Equitable PCI Bank described above, as follows:
Cashier’s Check for P91,000,000.00, Scout Tobias-Timog Branch, April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-S);
Cashier’s Check for P77,000,000.00, Diliman-Matalino Branch, April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-7-ee);
Cashier’s Check for P11,000,000.00, Pedro Gil-Robinsons Branch, April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-9-B);
Manager’s Check for P3,000,000.00, Scout Albano Branch, April 12, 2000 (Exh. A-10-K); and
Cashier’s Check for P7,000,000.00, Isidora Hills Branch, April 14, 2000.

Antonio Fortuno, Bank Operations Officer of Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star Branch, testified
that the aforementioned six (6) checks were deposited in Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5.
From the said bearer account, fourteen (14) withdrawals in Manager’s Checks (Exh. K9 to
X9 with submarkings) were made in various amounts. Each withdrawal was divided into two
deposits or a total of twenty eight (28) deposits of various amounts into the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation, as shown by the Account Information Slips, Deposit Receipts, and Detailed Report
for Transfers and Debit / Credit Memos (DRTM) (Exh. K9 to X9 with submarkings).

Fortuno identified the Acknowledgement Letter (Exh. I9) dated April 25, 2000 addressed to Atty.
Serapio from Beatriz Bagsit, Division Head of Makati Area, acknowledging receipt of the said
six (6) checks for deposit on staggered basis and on different dates to the account of Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. at Ortigas-Strata Branch.

Aida T. Basaliso corroborated the testimony of bank officer Fortuno as to the inter-branch
deposits at Equitable PCI Bank Strata Ortigas Branch in Savings Account No. 0192-85835-6 of
the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. from the Pacific Star Branch of the same bank in the
amount of P200,000,000.00 on staggered basis.

The slew of bank documents, involving mind-boggling amounts of money and authenticated by
competent and credible bank officers, convinces the Court that collection of jueteng money for
FPres. Estrada indeed took place and the entries in the ledger were not manufactured by Gov.
Chavit Singson.

Payments or disbursements of the jueteng protection money to persons related to or closely

associated with FPres. Estrada belie his denial that the funds accounted for in the ledgers belong
to him. Indeed, the Court cannot see why Gov. Chavit Singson would make such large and
substantial payments in the form of checks drawn from his Metrobank account, to personalities
such as William Gatchalian, Laarni Enriquez, Loi Estrada, or other intimate associates of FPres.
Estrada unless the money belonged to FPres. Estrada and the funds were being disbursed
according to his instructions. The evidence does not show why Gov. Chavit Singson would
choose Ricaforte to take over the supervision of the jueteng collection and let her deposit
millions of pesos into Ricaforte’s accounts in the different branches of the Equitable PCI Bank
when Ricaforte had no prior association nor relation to Gov. Singson and that the latter had his
own trusted associates. As admitted by the accused, it was FPres. Estrada who had a long
standing and close relationship with Ricaforte and her husband. This fact would explain
Ricaforte’s vital participation in the preparation of the second set of ledgers. The said ledgers
were prepared and later produced before the Senate by Ricaforte and not by Gov. Singson.

The first set of ledgers show that P72,500,000.00 of jueteng money were handed to FPres.
Estrada, alias "Asiong Salonga" from November 1998 to July 1999. Based on the second set of
ledgers, the total amount of jueteng money that FPres. Estrada received was P112,800,000.00
from August 1999 to August 2000. For the entire duration or period covered by the 2 sets of
ledgers of the total amount of P185,300,000.00. was handed by Gov. Chavit Singson to FPres.
Estrada bi-monthly. The balance, after these amounts were given to FPres. Estrada and the
deduction of expenses, were deposited by Ricaforte in her bank accounts. Based on the two (2)
sets of ledgers the total jueteng collections for FPres. Estrada from November 1998 to August
2000 amounted to P545,291,000.00. The P200,000,000.00 of these sums of money found their
way into the account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.

With respect to Jinggoy Estrada, according to Gov. Singson, he was the "Jing" listed as an
expense in the ledger for P1,000,000.00. It was Gov. Singson’s testimony that FPres. Estrada
(after discovering that entry) forbade Gov. Chavit Singson from giving any further share in the
jueteng protection money to Jinggoy Estrada and that it will be up to FPres. Estrada to give
Jinggoy Estrada a share. For this reason, Gov. Chavit Singson and Jinggoy Estrada hid the fact
that Jinggoy Estrada was the collector for the Province of Bulacan and that the latter was
receiving P1,000,000.00. To begin with, the prosecution’s theory that Jinggoy Estrada had to
keep his participation in the jueteng collection a secret from his own father belied the allegation
that Jinggoy Estrada’s participation in the jueteng scheme was that of a principal or a
conspirator. The grant of bail to Jinggoy Estrada was anchored on this fact advanced by Gov.
Singson in his very own testimony. Although prosecution witness Gov. Singson, and the other
witnesses who were under his employ, testified that there were instances that they collected or
received money from Jinggoy Estrada, there was no testimony to the effect that they saw Jinggoy
Estrada subtracted his share from jueteng collections or in any other way received a share from
the jueteng collections. This Court further found it difficult to believe that Jinggoy Estrada, who
was not even a resident of Bulacan, was the collector for Bulacan. Gov. Singson associates
Jinggoy Estrada with Viceo allegedly from Bulacan. Who is Viceo? Why was Viceo not charged
if it was true that jueteng collections from Bulacan came from him before they passed the hands
of Jinggoy? There was no evidence at all that the money Jinggoy Estrada turned over to Gov.
Singson or the latter’s representatives was part of the jueteng protection money collected from
Bulacan or that he received funds from a certain Viceo.
The prosecution did not also rebut the bank certification presented by the defense that Jinggoy
Estrada did not have an account with the United Overseas Bank. The certification disproved the
testimony of Emma Lim that the deposit slip in the amount of P1,000,000.00 said to be part of
jueteng money was turned over to her by Jinggoy Estrada in the form of a personalized check
with his photograph, from his account at the United Overseas Bank. The gaps in the
prosecution’s evidence as to Jinggoy Estrada create uncertainty in the mind of the Court as to the
participation of Jinggoy Estrada in the collection and receipt of jueteng money. This Court had
already brushed aside prosecution’s reliance on the telephone calls and billing statements for
such calls between Ricaforte and Jinggoy Estrada to prove that he was a jueteng collector for
Bulacan, for being highly speculative. The Court’s ruling remains firm to this day.

With respect to Serapio, neither Gov. Chavit Singson’s testimony nor the ledger entries proved
that Serapio was involved in any way in the collection or disbursement of jueteng protection
money. Certainly, Serapio’s involvement appears to have begun and was limited to the funds of
the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Serapio is being charged with "laundering" or concealing a
portion of the jueteng protection money in the amount of approximately P200,000,000.00 which
was deposited in the account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.

To this Court’s mind, while the P200,000,000.00 was clearly illegally amassed wealth, the
evidence on record is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Serapio was aware that
the questioned funds were in fact amassed from jueteng protection money collections and that
the fact of the unusually large amount of the deposits into the foundation’s account was with
criminal intent on the part of Serapio to "launder" or conceal the illegal nature of the funds to
serve the purpose of the acquisition or amassing of ill-gotten wealth by FPres. Estrada. The only
evidence presented on this point is the uncorroborated testimony of Gov. Chavit Singson that
Serapio was present during the meeting wherein FPres. Estrada instructed the transfer of the
amount of P200,000,000.00 to the foundation. The Court has reservations as to the credibility of
Gov. Singson’s assertion in this regard because Gov. Singson failed to mention Serapio’s
presence on that occasion during his testimony at the Senate Impeachment trial. Neither can the
Court consider from the single fact alone that he arranged the staggered deposit of the said sum
of money to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation that he had a criminal intent to conceal ill-
gotten wealth in furtherance of the accumulation of such wealth by the principal accused. More
so, this Court is not prepared to conclusively rule that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation is not
a legitimate foundation or that it was set up purely to hide his illegally amassed wealth. The
incorporation papers and business permits of the Foundation are authentic and regular. The
personalities behind the said foundation appear to be well-respected academicians. Fortunately or
unfortunately, the public revelation of the nature of the P200,000,000.00 as part of jueteng
protection money collected for FPres. Estrada came too soon after the organization of the
Foundation. The Court is not in a position to ascertain with moral certainty if this controversy
preempted any legitimate charitable activities it could have undertaken soon after its
incorporation as it was explained by defense witnesses or whether it was as the prosecution
asserted a money laundering entity. Premises considered, it is difficult to presume any criminal
intent on the part of Serapio to conceal or launder jueteng protection money in order to
contribute to the amassing and accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by FPres. Estrada in connection
with the transfer of the P200,000,000.00 to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, notwithstanding
that the evidence on record demonstrate indisputably that the said sum of money form part of ill-
gotten wealth obtained though the predicate acts charged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information.

RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH B OF THE

AMENDED INFORMATION
_____________________________

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,

converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a
portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00] tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang,
Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES;

I. EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

GOVERNOR LUIS "CHAVIT" CRISOLOGO SINGSON also testified to prove the second
charge in the amended Information involving the diversion of excise taxes under Republic Act
(RA) No. 7171. [TSN dated July 29, 2002, pp. 78-80] According to Gov. Singson, Ilocos Sur
was not getting its rightful share as a beneficiary of the excise tax. He reminded FPres. Estrada
of his campaign promise that he would release all the funds to Ilocos Sur in advance, amounting
more or less to Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) including interest. FPres. Estrada promised
to comply but he said that because of the huge election expenses he hoped that Gov. Singson
would help. Since, Gov. Singson was afraid not to get the funds, he said: "Why not?" when
FPres. Estrada asked: "How much?" Gov. Singson replied "Maybe Ten Percent (10%) of what
you can release." FPres. Estrada instructed Gov. Singson to prepare his request and he will
approve it. Gov. Singson brought the request addressed to Secretary Diokno of the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM). FPres. Estrada wrote a marginal note on the request
addressed to the DBM with instruction to approve it. The original of the letter was submitted to
Secretary Diokno. Gov. Singson produced in court a Xerox copy with the original stamp mark of
receipt dated 8/7. The marginal note reads: "Aug. 3, ’98. To Secretary Ben Diokno, Please see if
you can accommodate the request of Governor Singson" (Exh. Q8 and submarkings). [Ibid, pp.
81-96]

According to Gov. Singson, Jinggoy Estrada and Atong Ang kept on following up the release of
the money from DBM. A notice of funding check issued (Fund 103 dated August 25, 1998)
(Exh. R8) was received by Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson immediately informed Jinggoy Estrada
and Atong Ang. The latter told Gov. Singson that the President needed One Hundred Thirty
Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00). Gov. Singson was surprised because their agreement was only
ten percent (10%). Atong told him there will be billions of pesos, so they should be the first one
to deliver to FPres. Estrada and thus be the strongest and more influential (to the Former
President). Gov. Singson then caused the preparation of a Provincial Board resolution
appropriating the sum of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00). The Board approved
the appropriation of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170 Million) for the flue curing barn
and Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) for infrastructure. Atong Ang gave Gov. Singson
three (3) names to whom the money would be sent, which they did. Landbank Vigan transferred
One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) to Landbank Mandaluyong which credited
the accounts of the three (3) persons named by Atong Ang as follows: Account No. 0561043-38,
Alma Alfaro, August 27, 1998, P40,000,000.00; Account No. 0561-0445-97, Delia Rojas,
August 28, 1998, P50,000,000.00; and Account No. 0561-0446-00, Eleuterio Tan, August 28,
1998, P40,000,000.00. The total amounted to P130,000,000.00.

The above data were contained in a certification of Landbank Branch Head Ma. Elizabeth
Balagot (Exh. S8). [Ibid, pp. 96-108] Gov. Singson did not personally know Delia Rajas, Alma
Alfaro or Eleuterio Tan. In a photograph (Exh. V8), Gov. Singson identified Jojo Uy as the
Eleuterio Tan who showed up at the bank to withdraw the money. Jojo Uy, according to Gov.
Singson was very close to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 109-110]

Gov. Singson narrated that Atong Ang called him up from his mother’s house and asked Gov.
Singson to go there where they will wait for the money. Gov. Singson went to the house of
Atong Ang’s mother at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and waited there until 3:00 to 4:00 o’clock
in the afternoon. When the money arrived, Gov. Singson noticed that Atong Ang left some
money in the house. Atong Ang and Gov. Singson boarded Atong Ang’s vehicle, and Gov.
Singson’s vehicle with the security and driver followed them. At the corner near the house of
FPres. Estrada at Polk St., Atong Ang asked Gov. Singson to alight from his vehicle so that it
would not be obvious to the people in the vicinity. Gov. Singson alighted from the vehicle and
saw Atong Ang’s car entered inside the house of FPres. Estrada. Atong Ang was the one driving
the car. After 15 to 20 minutes, Gov. Singson followed Atong Ang to the house of FPres.
Estrada. Gov. Singson then met the First Lady, Dr. Loi Estrada who thanked Gov. Singson,
saying "Chavit, thank you very much we really needed it." Gov. Singson took the money which
he and Atong Ang brought. [Ibid, pp. 111-114] When FPres. Estrada came out, Gov. Singson
asked him how much Atong Ang gave him. FPres. Estrada answered Seventy Million Pesos
(P70,000,000.00). Gov. Singson informed him that the total amount was One Hundred Thirty
Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00). FPres Estrada got mad at Atong Ang who explained that he
gave Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) to Dr. Loi Estrada, and Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00) to Jinggoy Estrada. Atong Ang found it hard to explain the remaining Twenty
Five Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 114-116]

Gov. Singson frequented the house of FPres. Estrada. At one time, the latter asked him again to
make a request for the excise tax allocation which he will approve. Gov. Singson explained that
the release of the money must be continued in big amount so that they could cover up the One
Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00). FPres. Estrada agreed but he did not give the
billions promised. Hence, Gov. Singson could not cover up the (P130,000,000.00). When told by
Gov. Singson that the Commission on Audit (COA) was "pestering" them, FPres. Estrada asked
Gov. Singson to cover it up in the meanwhile. The amount of Forty Million Pesos
(P40,000,000.00) out of the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) was paid to
the supplier of the flue curing barn which were delivered by the supplier and inaugurated by
FPres. Estrada as shown by the pictures taken on that occasion (Exhs.T8 and U8). The flue curing
barn was needed by the tobacco farmers to save time and money. [Ibid,pp. 116-121]

Gov. Singson referred to the inaugural speech of FPres. Estrada where the latter stated "walang
kama-kamaganak, walang kai-kaibigan, walang kumpa-kumpadre". Gov. Singson said after what
happened that it would mean even friends should pay to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 122-124]

Gov. Singson demonstrated in Court, from the witness stand up to the door of the courtroom and
back in more or less twenty (20) seconds, that he, who had smaller built than Atong Ang, could
carry a box containing Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) in demonetized bills from the
Central Bank in One Thousand Pesos (P1, 000.00) denomination each. There were twenty
bundles of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) per bundle inside the box. The distance between
the witness stand and the door of the courtroom was thirteen (13) meters. [Ibid, pp. 124-135] The
box carried by Gov. Singson weighed more than ten (10) kilos and five bundles of cash
amounting to P5,000,000.00 weighed 4.8 kilos. [Ibid, pp. 172-173]

JAMIS BATULAN SINGSON (Jamis) further testified that he, Gov. Singson, his escort
Federico Artates, and Driver Faustino Prudence, left the office of Gov. Singson on August 31,
1998 to fetch Atong Ang in his office at Pinaglabanan. They all proceeded to the house of the
mother of Atong Ang. Gov. Singson and Atong Ang went inside the house while the rest waited
outside. Later, Atong Ang, Gov. Singson and William Ang, the brother of Atong Ang, went out.
Gov. Singson instructed them to accompany William to Westmont Bank, Shaw Boulevard.
Jamis, Artates, William Ang and the driver of Atong Ang rode the Mitsubishi Van owned by
Atong Ang. William Ang went inside the bank and after 3 hours came out with Jojo Uy and two
security guards carrying two boxes each or a total of four (4) boxes. Jojo Uy was a family friend
of Atong Ang, whom Jamis often saw in the office of Atong Ang. Jamis identified Jojo Uy in a
photograph (Exh. V8). Each of the boxes were brown in color, with a length of more than ten
(10) inches, height of twelve (12) inches and thickness of eight (8) to ten (10) inches. [TSN dated
September 18, 2002, pp. 38-55] Jamis and Artates each brought two (2) boxes inside the vehicle
and went back to the house of the mother of Atong Ang, with an armored van following them.
The four boxes were brought inside the house where Gov. Singson and Atong Ang were seated
on a sofa. After lunch, Jamis saw the men of Atong Ang loading something in the vehicle of
Atong Ang.

Gov. Singson boarded the car of Atong Ang and instructed Jamis to just follow them to FPres.
Estrada’s house at Polk Street in Greenhills, but they were instructed by Gov. Singson to wait at
the corner. William Ang earlier informed them that the boxes contained money for FPres.
Estrada. Jamis did not actually see the money. After an hour, Gov. Singson asked to be fetched
from FPres. Estrada’s house. [Ibid, pp. 59-68]

MARIA ELIZABETH GOZO BALAGOT testified that she was the Manager of Land Bank
Vigan Branch from August 3, 1998 to December 31, 2000 and had over-all supervision and
control of the accounts of said Branch.

According to witness Balagot, on August 27, 1998, Land Bank Vigan Branch received a
Facsimile of Inter-Office Debit Advice (Exh. L18 and submarkings) dated August 27, 1998 from
Land Bank Malacañang Branch with instruction to credit Current Account No. 04021045-70 of
the Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos
(P200,000,000.00). Land Bank Vigan Branch complied with the instruction and correspondingly
sent an Inter-Office Credit Advice (Exh. M18 and submarkings). Later in the afternoon of August
27, 1998, authorized (Exh. N18) representatives from the Office of the Provincial Governor of
Ilocos Sur, namely, Maricar Paz and Marina Atendido, presented Check No. 0000097650 (Exhs.
O18 and P18 and submarkings) dated August 27, 1998 in the amount of One Hundred Seventy
Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) issued to the order of Luis "Chavit" Singson accompanied by
an Accountant’s Advice for Local Check Disbursement (Exh. Q18 and submarkings) dated
August 27, 1998.

Witness Balagot confirmed that on August 27, 1998, the Provincial Administrator of Ilocos Sur
called up Land Bank Vigan Branch requesting for encashment of the One Hundred Seventy
Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) that had been credited to the account of the province. She asked
for three (3) days for encashment as a matter of bank policy but since the Provincial
Administrator told her the money is immediately needed, she suggested for them to apply for a
demand draft payable and encashable in Land Bank Makati Branch. Maricar Paz advised witness
Balagot that the demand drafts should be payable to Delia Rajas, Alma Alfaro, Nuccio Saverio,
and Eleuterio Tan, although she was not given the reason why the drafts had to be issued in their
names. She never received any call from FPres. Estrada instructing her as to the said names.

On August 28, 1998, witness Balagot called up Gov. Singson to inform him that Delia Rajas and
Eleuterio Tan were trying to deposit their demand drafts in Westmont Bank and the governor
responded that it was okay with him. She made a second call to the governor in the afternoon to
inform him of the presence of Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan in Land Bank Shaw Branch and
they were insisting that the checks be encashed there. Witness Balagot informed the governor
that she could not accept the encashment at the said branch, but Gov. Singson told her to do what
they wanted. She testified that she called the governor instead of Maricar Paz because she knew
for a fact that the one giving instructions to Maricar Paz was the governor himself.

Witness Balagot then advised Land Bank Shaw Branch to cancel the demand drafts and the
amounts covered will just be coursed through the individual accounts by inter-branch
transaction. Witness Balagot then prepared an Inter-Branch Transaction Advice for Eleuterio Tan
(Exh. Z18) and Delia Rajas (Exh. Y18) and credited the amount of Forty Million Pesos
(P40,000,000,00) and Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) to their respective accounts. The
cancelled demand drafts were returned to Land Bank Vigan Branch with a Memorandum (Exh.
A19) dated August 31, 1998. The demand draft issued to Nuccio Saverio, on the other hand, was
encashed in Land Bank Makati Branch.

Witness Balagot also identified and affirmed her Sworn Affidavit (Exhibit B19 and submarkings)
dated November 6, 2000 relative to the foregoing facts. [TSN dated January 20, 2003 and TSN
dated January 22, 2003]

MARIA CARIDAD MANAHAN RODENAS was the cashier at Land Bank Shaw Branch. She
testified that she knew a person by the name of Alma Alfaro as the authorized representative of
valued clients, Mrs. Catalina Ang and Yolanda Uy, and as an account holder of the branch.
[TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 13-16] According to witness Rodenas, Alfaro claimed to be an
employee of Power Express and that Power Express was owned by Catalina Ang. [TSN,
November 11, 2002, pp. 21-25]

Witness Rodenas testified that on August 27, 1998, she assisted Alma Alfaro open her own
savings account with the branch with an initial deposit of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) (Exh.
H13). Alfaro presented her school ID (Exh. F13-2) and SSS card (Exh. F13-1) as valid IDs and
personally accomplished the signature card (Exh. G13). Alfaro indicated her business address to
be c/o Power Express and residence address as Capt. Savy Street, Zone IV-A, Talisay, Negros
Occidental. After complying with requirements, Alfaro told witness Rodenas that Forty Million
Pesos (P40,000,000.00) coming from Land Bank Vigan Branch will soon be credited to her
account. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 16-27] True enough, Forty Million Pesos
(P40,000,000.00) from Land Bank Vigan Branch was credited online to Alfaro’s newly created
account. When Alfaro told witness Rodenas that she wanted to withdraw the money right away,
the latter told Alfaro to just come back the following day as she will still have to prepare the
money. Witness Rodenas then requested from Land Bank’s Greenhills Cash Center the amount
of Forty Six Million Pesos (P46,000,000.00) to cover the amount needed by Alfaro as well as to
cover other withdrawals for the day as shown by the Fund Transfer Request (Exh. I13).

When Alma Alfaro returned to the bank on the following day, she proceeded to withdraw Forty
Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) (Exh. J13) in cash from her account. [TSN, November 4, 2002,
pp. 27- 43] In that same afternoon, Alma Alfaro asked witness Rodenas to help her two friends,
whom she introduced as Eleuterio Tan and Delia Rajas, with their demand drafts. Delia Rajas
brought two demand drafts, Demand Draft No. 099435 in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00) (Exh. L13) and Demand Draft No. 09936 in the amount of Twenty Million
Pesos (P20,000,000.00) (Exh. K13). Eleuterio Tan’s Demand Draft, on the other hand, was in the
amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) (Exh. M13).

Witness Rodenas testified that Tan and Rajas asked that they be accommodated in Land Bank
Shaw Branch because they considered it too risky to encash their demand drafts in the cash
department in Buendia, Makati and thereafter to bring it back to Mandaluyong since they were
from Mandaluyong. [TSN, November 11, 2002, p. 136] After examining the demand drafts
presented, witness Rodenas advised Rajas and Tan that she could not accommodate their request
because Land Bank Shaw Branch was not the paying unit of the drafts and that she did not have
the amount with her at that time. Due to their insistence, however, witness Rodenas conferred
with Elizabeth Balagot and Lawrence Lopez, the Branch Manager and Branch Accountant of
Land Bank Vigan Branch, who told her to just cancel the demand drafts and let Rajas and Tan
open accounts with their branch so that they could credit the amounts online. [TSN, November 4,
2002, pp. 44-51]

Eleuterio Tan presented two IDs (Exh. N13) and accomplished a specimen signature card (Exh.
O13) and cash deposit slip (Exh. P13) for One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00). Witness Rodenas
identified Eleuterio Tan in a picture (Exh. F9). Delia Rajas also presented two IDs (Exh. Q13) and
accomplished a specimen signature card (Exh. R13) and deposit slip (Exh. S13) for One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00).
Witness Rodenas sent the cancelled demand drafts by facsimile to Land Bank Vigan Branch and
after sometime the Vigan Branch credited online the proceeds of the demand drafts to the newly
created accounts of Tan and Rajas. The original of the demand drafts were later returned to the
Vigan Branch. [TSN, November 11, 2002, p. 133] Tan and Rajas then accomplished withdrawal
slips (Exh. T13 & Exh. U13) to withdraw Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) and Fifty Million
Pesos (P50,000,000.00), respectively. Thereafter, Eleuterio Tan filed three (3) applications for
cashier’s check (Exhs. W13, V13 & X13) causing Land Bank Shaw Branch to issue THREE (3)
cashier’s checks (Exhs. W13-1, V13-1 & X13-1) in his name in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00) each. The three (3) cashier’s checks were later deposited at Westmont Bank,
Mandaluyong Branch to Savings Account No. 2011-00772-7. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 52-
91]

SPO2 FREDERICO APENES ARTATES was a policeman since 1988. At the time of his
testimony, he was assigned at the Vigan City Police Station but detailed to Gov. Singson as
security escort.

Witness Artates testified that on August 31, 1998, he was in the office of Gov. Singson at the
LCS Building in San Andres Bukid, Manila, together with Gov. Singson, Jamis Singson and
driver Faustino Prudencio. According to him, Gov. Singson instructed them to go to the
apartment of Atong Ang’s mother and while there they accompanied William Ang, Atong’s
brother to Westmont Bank at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City where they got four (4) boxes
of cash from the said bank and returned back to the house of Atong Ang’s mother and later on
proceeded to FPres. Estrada’s house at Polk Street. He described each of the boxes to be 10
inches in length, 12 inches in height 15 inches in width [TSN, September 25, 2002, pp.90-107].
[TSN dated September 25, 2002]

ILONOR ANDRES MADRID testified that she was the Chief of License Section, Operations
Division, Land Transportation Office. Madrid presented and identified certifications dated
January 2, 2001 (Exh. I11) and December 6, 2000 (Exh. D9) pertaining to the data in the driver’s
license of Victor Jose Tan Uy, and identified computer generated photographs of Victor Jose Tan
Uy (Exhs. J11 & D9-1). [TSN, October 9, 2002, pp. 127-148]

GWEN MARIE JUDY DUMOL SAMONTINA was the Assistant Vice-President and Head of
Records and Information Management Center of the Social Security System (SSS) since January
1998. She was the official records custodian of the SSS and in-charge of ensuring that all records
received by the branches were archived.

Witness Samontina brought with her the Social Security Form E-1 (Exh. V11-1 and sub
markings) filed by Delia Ilan Rajas. This form showed that her address was No. 48 Calbayog
Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and SSS number was 33-2365508-7. Witness also brought
several SSS Form R-1 and R1-A filed by the employers of Rajas with SSS namely (1) Admate
Company, Inc., (2) Energetic Security and Specialists, Inc. (3) Jetro Construction and
Development Inc., (4) Power Management and Consultancy Inc. The forms (Exhs. W11, X11, &
Y11, and sub markings) filed by Admate Company, Inc. showed the company address to be No.
46 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The first R1-A Form filed on December 8,
1994 showed Rajas as the only employee. The R1-A Form filed on May 6, 1998 showed that
Rajas as listed as one of the employees. The forms were accomplished by the employer’s
representative and treasurer, Yolanda A. Uy. The forms submitted by Energetic Security and
Specialists, Inc. (Exhs. Z11 and A12, with sub markings) showed the business address to be No.
46 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The forms showed that Charlie T. Ang and
Delia Rajas appeared as employees. The forms were accomplished by Ma. Rosanie U. Ang. The
Form R-1 (Exh. B12, with sub markings) of Jetro Construction and Development, Inc. filed on
October 9, 1990 showed that it had two employees. This document was accomplished by
Yolanda Ang. Its Form R1-A (Exh. C12, with sub markings) filed on March 15, 1995 showed that
it had 18 employees, including Delia Rajas. The address is still No. 46 Calbayog Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and it was prepared by Yolanda A. Uy. The forms (Exhs. D12,
E12 & F12, with sub markings) of Power Management and Consultancy Incorporation were
received by SSS on June 8, 2000. It had an office address at 188 Captain Manzano Street, Corner
N. Domingo, San Juan, Metro Manila. Among the officers listed were Charlie T. Ang, Nerissa S.
Ang, and William T. Ang. Delia Rajas appeared as one of its employees. [TSN, October 23,
2002, pp. 25-60]

II. EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

During his testimony, accused FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO

ESTRADA vehemently denied that he asked Gov. Singson to give him part of Ilocos Sur’s share
on the tobacco excise tax imposed by Republic Act No. 7171; that when he was approached by
Gov. Singson regarding the said share of his province, he told Singson to make a formal request,
and that Singson already had a prepared request (Exh. Q) to which FPres. Estrada wrote his
marginal note addressed to then Budget Secretary Diokno, stating: "Please see if you can
accommodate".

FPres. Estrada explained that he could not have alluded to his election expenses because
contributions to his 1998 Presidential Campaign were overflowing; that he rejected many
contributions which kept pouring in as it was the case with a very popular candidate like him;
that he even asked his party treasurers to distribute campaign funds to their candidates for
Mayor, Congressman and Governor, that Gov. Singson got a big share of the campaign funds,
that Gov. Singson’s testimony on the percentage he allegedly asked for was a lie as he would not
take away funds intended for farmers and that in fact during his term as President he rejected an
offer of Fourteen Million Dollars (US $14,000,000) for him to sign a sovereign guaranty; that he
did not know Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan or Mr. Uy, and Delia Rajas, that being the President,
he could not have conspired with Delia Rajas whom he heard was a cook; that he met Charlie
"Atong" Ang sometime in 1993 or 1994, when the latter was introduced to him by his friend,
Jojo Antonio; that he was not that close to Ang; that Atong Ang never went to his house at Polk
Street, Greenhills, San Juan to deliver money from the excise tax as testified to by Gov. Singson;
that the garage in his house could not accommodate Atong Ang’s vehicle since the Presidential
Car was parked there and there were security arrangements if he was at home and that Gov.
Singson was merely passing the blame to him because he would not help Gov. Singson with his
problem with the Commission on Audit. [TSN, March 22, 2006, pp. 63-113]

On March 29, 2006, FPres. Estrada testified that Atong Ang did not go to his residence at Polk
Street, Greenhills nor at Malacañang except when Atong Ang attended the wedding of his
daughter; that in the reenactment at the Bangko Sentral, it was shown that One Thirty Million
Pesos (P130,000,000.00) in bills could not fit into four (4) boxes contrary to the testimony of
Gov. Singson, and that the weight of the said sum of money was equivalent to two and one half
sacks of rice which could not be carried by one person.

FPres. Estrada disclaimed any knowledge of Prosecution’s Exhibits "A19", "X18" and "Y18" and
also Landbank check dated August 27, 1998 for Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) and Gov.
Singson’s September 3, 1998 letter to Elizabeth Balagot, Landbank Manager of Vigan Branch in
Ilocos Sur. He also testified that the Notice of Funding Check Issued, Fund 103 dated August 25,
1998 signed by DBM Secretary Benjamin Diokno addressed to the Provincial Governor of Ilocos
Sur, [Exh. R8] did not reach the Office of the President.

According to FPres. Estrada, he did not know, nor have seen, Alma Alfaro, the person mentioned
in the certification that inter-branch deposits made by the provincial government of Ilocos Sur
from August 27 to 28, 1998, particularly on August 27, 1998 to Account No. 0561-0445-38 in
the name of said Alma Alfaro in the amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00). He said
that he saw her for the first time only during the Impeachment Trial. [TSN, March 29, 2006,
pp.42-49] He also did not know, nor have seen, Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan, the owners of the
bank accounts at Land Bank Shaw Branch who were recipients of the online credit from Land
Bank Vigan Branch on August 28, 1998 in the amounts of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00)
and Forty MiIlion Pesos (P40,000,000.00) respectively [TSN, ibid, pp.50-51]. The persons
shown in the photographs marked as prosecutions Exhibits "F", "G9", and "T8" were not known
to him. He was able to identify the photograph marked as Exhibit "U8" which was the
inauguration of the flue-curing plant in Ilocos Sur, which he later on learned was a mere show-
off ("pakitang tao") because the project did not push through.

FPres. Estrada likewise denied any knowledge of prosecution’s exhibits presented to identify
Victor Jose Uy (a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan) (Exhs. "N9", "N13", "T11" & "J"); Delia Rajas (Exhs. "V",
"W", "H", "H13", "Y", "Y-3", "Z11", "A12", "B12-4", "C12", "D12" & "Q13") and Alma Alfaro
(Exhs. "F12" & "F13"). [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp.59-68,79,80]

FPres. Estrada likewise disclaimed any knowledge of prosecution’s exhibits regarding the
P130,000,000.00 excise tax share of Ilocos Sur [Exhs. H13, I13, J13, K13, M13, L13, O13, P13-1, R13,
S13, E13, U13, V13, V13-1, W13, W13-1, X13, X13-1, Y13, Z13, M17, N17, O17, P17, Q17, R17, S17, L18,
M18, N18, O18, P18, Q18, R18, S18, T18, B19, Z18. [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp.76-95]

FPres. Estrada also belied Gov. Singson’s testimony of that he ordered Gov. Singson to cover up
his unliquidated cash advances by countering that Gov. Singson tried to cover up his own cash
advances as the Commission on Audit was already going after him and he wanted to pass the
blame to FPres. Estrada. [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp. 98-100] When he learned about the Two
Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) excise tax share of Ilocos Sur, he instructed then
Justice Secretary Artemio G. Toquero to investigate the matter. Secretary Toquero, in turn,
referred the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). After one week, NBI Regional
Director Carlos Saunar submitted a report through a Memorandum dated October 20, 2000 (Exh.
199) to Secretary Toquero. Director Saunar also submitted to FPres. Estrada a December 12,
2000 letter (Exh. 201); another document (Exh. 204) addressed to Secretary Toquero on the
subject – Governor Luis Chavit Singson, et al. for malversation of public funds – Twenty Million
Pesos (P20, 000,000.00) and for violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019; an affidavit
of Agustin D. Chan, Jr. (Exh. 202) and to which is an attached letter dated December 3, 2000 of
Agustin T. Chan, Jr. (Exh. 202-D) with attached certification (Exh. 206-C) demanding that Gov.
Singson settle his outstanding cash advance in the amount of One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000.00) and Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) under Check Nos. 98397 and
42364 dated December 29, 1999 and March 19, 1999, pursuant to paragraph 9.1 and 9.3.3.3 of
COA Circular No. 97-002 and Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445; an affidavit of Elizabeth Arabello
dated January 12, 2001 (Exh. 205); a document entitled "WP, item Singson cash advances" (Exh.
208), which details the unliquidated cash advances of Gov. Singson at year end 1999 amounting
to One Hundred Thirty Five Million Five Hundred Eighty Four Thousand Eight Hundred
Eighteen Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P135,584,818.17); and NBI Disposition Form, Subject
Results of Evaluation and Evidence in Support of COA Reports on the provincial government of
Ilocos Sur for the years 1997 and 1998 (Exh. 198), stating that the amount of Four Hundred
Thirty Five Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Eight Pesos
(P435,190,298.00) was spent by Gov. Singson on the Tomato Paste Plant which COA found to
be a non-functioning and non-operational project and to have incurred the loss of more than
Twenty Million Six Hundred Fifty-five Thousand and Seventy-four Pesos (P20, 655, 074.00) as
of June 30, 1998 [TSN, March 29, pp.106-131] and that there were ELEVEN (11) other cases of
unsettled, unliquidated or dissolved cash advances of Gov. Singson which included the One
Hundred Seventy Million (P170,000,000) unliquidated cash advances for the purchase of
equipment for the Tobacco Flue Curing Plant involved in this case. [TSN, ibid, pp.143-144]

FPres. Estrada narrated that Director Saunar informed him that the case against Gov. Singson
was clear and should be filed right away with the Office of the Ombudsman. Director Saunar
gave him a copy of the complaint–affidavit of the NBI (Exh. 200, 200-N, 200-0, 200-P, 200-Q)
recommending the filing of the appropriate charges against Gov. Singson and other Ilocos Sur
provincial officials among others for the non-delivery of the supplier NS International, Inc. of the
equipment for the flue curing barn and re-drying plant in the amount of One Hundred Seventy
Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) (Exh. 200-R). [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp. 7-18] However, Gov.
Singson was granted immunity from criminal prosecution and Gov. Singson was able to pass on
the case against FPres. Estrada by implicating the latter as the one who ordered him and
testifying against him. [TSN, ibid, pp.19-25]

The last time FPres. Estrada talked to Gov. Singson was when he stopped over at San Francisco
USA for a speaking engagement on his way to an official visit to Washington he was surprised
that Gov. Singson who was not a member of his delegation fetched him at the airport. After his
speaking engagement, he went up to his room where Congressman Asistio and Gov. Singson had
a big problem with the COA in Ilocos Sur because the provincial auditor did not want to
cooperate with him. Gov. Singson asked FPres. Estrada to help transfer the said auditor, which
request he refused because COA is an independent constitutional body. Gov. Singson insisted
that FPres. Estrada call the COA Chairman to interfere in his behalf. He reminded Gov. Singson
that he should not look after himself but he should protect the name of the Office of the
President. Gov. Singson then abruptly stood up and grudgingly left. FPres. Estrada came to know
of the name of the COA provincial auditor during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing
and he was Atty. Agustin Chan who testified at the hearing and demanded that Gov. Singson
liquidate his cash advances. Later, FPres. Estrada read from the newspaper that Chan was
ambushed and killed in a town in Ilocos Sur. [TSN, ibid, pp.31-44]

ATTY. AGATON S. DACAYANAN was the State Auditor of the Commission on Audit
(COA) assigned at the Province of Ilocos Sur for the years 1995 to 1999. He examined, audited
and settled all accounts of the Province of Ilocos Sur based on the documents submitted by, and
gathered from the Provincial Accountant, Provincial Treasurer, Budget Officer and other
officials who have access to the financial transactions of the provincial government. He
submitted Annual Audit Reports at the end of every year.

Witness Dacayanan then presented and identified the Annual Audit Reports for the years ended
December 31, 1995 (Exh. 187 and submarkings); December 31, 1996 (Exh. 188 and
submarkings); December 31, 1997 (Exh. 189 and submarkings); and, December 31, 1998 (Exh.
190 and submarkings). [TSN dated September 20, 2004, TSN dated Septebmer 22, 2004 and
TSN dated September 29, 2004]

BONIFACIO M. ONA was Director III of COA and the Officer-In-Charge of its Special Audit
Office. Witness Ona testified that one of his duties as OIC of the Special Audit Office was to
transmit the Report prepared by their audit teams to the different auditing units and as such he
had the chance to review as to its form the Special Audit Report for the Province of Ilocos Sur
for the period 1999 (SAO Report No. 99-31) (Exh. 191 and submarkings), which he presented to
the Court by virtue of a subpoena duces tecum, and after which he transmitted the same to the
Governor of Ilocos Sur. [TSN dated October 4, 2004]

ELVIRA JAVIER FELIX was State Auditor IV of the COA. Witness testified that she was the
Officer-in-Charge of the Provincial Auditor’s Office from October 5, 2001 to July 31, 2002, and
she presented and identified Annual Audit Reports for the Province of Ilocos Sur for the years
ended December 31, 2001 (Exh. 192 and submarkings), and December 31, 2002 (Exh. 193 and
submarkings).

Witness Felix also presented and identified copies of the Annual Audit Reports of the Province
of Ilocos Sur for the years ended December 31, 1999 (Exh. 194 and submarkings) and December
31, 2000 (Exh. 195 and submarkings) which she secured from the Provincial Auditor’s Office,
and which were prepared during the term of then Provincial Auditor Atty. Agustin Chan who
was killed in an ambush on October 4, 2001. [TSN dated October 4, 2004 and TSN dated
October 6, 2004]

ELIZABETH M. SAVELLA was an Auditor of the Corporate Government Sector of the COA.
Savella testified that she was assigned previously with the Special Audit Office of the
Commission of Audit and was designated in 1999 as the Team Leader of a Special Audit Team
that conducted a special audit of the Province of Ilocos Sur for the period from 1996 to 1999.
Being the Team Leader, witness Savella was the one assigned to consolidate all the audit
findings submitted by the team members to come up with the audit report. The said audit report
was SOA Report No. 99-31 (Exh. 191 and submarkings).
Witness stated that the scope of the audit was the financial transaction and operation of the
Province of Ilocos Sur for the period 1996 to 1999. They looked, particularly, into the utilization
of R.A. 7171 funds and the utilization of the PNB loan specifically the implementation of the
Tomato Flue Curing Plant Project, stating that the audit aims to evaluate the regularity of the
implementation of the province’s projects. [TSN dated October 6, 2004 and TSN dated October
11, 2004]

CONGRESSMAN LUIS A. ASISTIO testified that he knows Gov. Singson and met him
several times. He said that on July 24, 2000, he accompanied Gov. Singson to see FPres. Estrada
at his room at the Fairmont Hotel at San Francisco, California where Gov. Singson requested
FPres. Estrada to call the Chairman of the Commission on Audit to ask for the relief of the
Auditor assigned to his province to which FPres. Estrada declined.

Asistio clarified that in the many meetings he had with Gov. Singson during the period late
August to September 2000, they never talked about alleged receipt of monies from R.A. 7171
and he knew of these issues only during the Impeachment Trial. He thinks that these are mere
figments of Gov. Singson’s imagination since they never talked of anything except the provincial
leadership.

Gov. Singson also did not mention the name of accused Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. He added that
Gov. Singson at one time went to his house when there was an ongoing rally at Makati prior to
the press conference and told him that he (Gov. Singson) does not consider FPres. Estrada as his
friend anymore.

Asistio added that he watched the Impeachment Trial against FPres. Estrada and thinks that it is
a farce because in all their conversations, Gov. Singson never mentioned about R.A. 7171 nor
talked about jueteng, except probably when he said "kunin na nilang lahat huwag lang yung
liderato".

Asistio stated that in his visits to Malacañang during the time of FPres. Estrada, at least three
times a week, he never saw Atong Ang there because Atong Ang was banned by FPres. Estrada
from entering Malacañang. [TSN dated October 11, 2004 and TSN dated October 13, 2004]

CARLOS P. SAUNAR was Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. In

October 2000, he was the Chief of the Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, assuming the position
from 1997 or 1998 up to July 2001, and as such was tasked to investigate the public disclosures
made by then Gov. Singson as per instructions of then NBI Director Federico Opinion, who was,
in turn, directed by then Justice Secretary Artemio G. Tuquero in a Memorandum dated October
10, 2000 (Exh. 199 and submarkings).

In the conduct of their investigation, Saunar and his team of investigators secured documents
from the COA, such as, the Audit Reports of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur and the
Schedule of Unliquidated Cash Advances, and subpoenaed the concerned public officials and
employees of the Province of Ilocos Sur. [TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 67-69]
After evaluating the reports and evidence, witness submitted an Evaluation Disposition Form
(Exh. 198 and submarkings) dated 16 October 2000 which made mention of 11 cases (Annex A
of Disposition Form) (Exh. 198-B) of irregularities that were assigned to different teams for
investigation. [TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 80, 84]

The result of Saunar’s investigation on the P170,000,000.00 alleged unliquidated cash advances
of Governor Singson and some other cash advances was contained in a Revised Report of
Investigation which became the subject of a Complaint-Affidavit (Exh. 200 and submarkings)
dated 10 January 2001 signed by Carlos S. Caabay, then acting Director, NBI, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman. Witness explained that the Revised Report of Investigation traced the
P170,000,000.00 from its source up to its liquidation. [TSN, October 13, 2004, p. 96]

Saunar testified that they made a record check and searched, as requested by the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee, for the whereabouts of accused Alma Alfaro, accused Eleuterio Tan and
accused Delia Rajas but failed to locate them. [TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 107-110] The NBI
filed two (2) other cases involving cash advances of the Gov. Singson with the Office of the
Secretary of Justice, one of which is contained in a case transmittal (Exh. 201 and submarkings)
dated 12 December 2000 addressed to Honorable Artemio G. Tuquero relating to the
P100,000,000.00 cash advance of Gov. Singson and supported by a Report of Investigation dated
12 December 2000 (Exh. 201-B). The other case transmittal (Exh. 204 and submarkings) they
filed with the Department of Justice on December 14, 2000 was in connection with the cash
advance of Gov. Singson in the amount of P20,000,000.00, and supported by another Report of
Investigation dated 14 December 2000 (Exh. 204-B). In all the investigations conducted by the
NBI on the cash advances of Gov. Singson, Saunar said that they prepared an analysis, "WP-
Singson Cash Advance" (Exh. 208 and submarkings) (WP stands for working paper), and that
based on the working paper, Gov. Singson had accumulated cash advances of Three Hundred
Five Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P305,600,000.00) between the period January 1997
to January 2000. From this total, the amount of P170,015,181.83 appears to have been settled,
leaving a balance of unliquidated cash advances of Gov. Singson of P135,584,818.70 as of
January 2000. [TSN, October 25, 2004, pp. 53-54]

The amount of P163,663,636.27 as appearing in the working paper, which was also the subject
matter of the complaint-affidavit filed with the Ombudsman (Exh. 200), is supposed to be the
amount that was the settlement of the cash advance of P170,000,000.00 less 30% withholding
tax supposed to be remitted to the BIR. The P170,000,000.00 pesos came from the
P200,000,000.00 representing the share of the Province of Ilocos Sur from the excise taxes
collected pursuant to R.A. 7171 that was released by the DBM. The P170,000,000.00 was then
cash advanced by Gov. Singson from the account of the Province of Ilocos Sur in LBP Vigan
Branch, wherein a certain Marina Atendido deposited the amount of P40,000,000.00 in favor of
the account of Alma Alfaro at the LBP Shaw Boulevard Branch through an inter-branch
accommodation. The same was withdrawn in cash by Alma Alfaro. [TSN, October 25, 2004, pp.
57-63]

As to the remaining P130,000,000.00, four (4) demand drafts were applied for by Maricar Paz,
one of which was issued in favor of Luccio Saberrio in the amount of P40,000,000.00 which was
withdrawn in LBP Makati, where the amount of P35,000,000.00 was deposited to another
savings account (the account number is indicated in the demand draft) in the same LBP Makati
while the P5,000,000.00 was cashed. The second demand draft pertains to another
P40,000,000.00 pesos in favor of Eleuterio Tan which was negotiated at the LBP Shaw
Boulevard Branch but was cancelled, and in lieu of this, the corresponding amount was wire
transferred from LBP Vigan to LBP Shaw Boulevard. The two remaining demand drafts pertain
to Delia Rajas, one in the amount of P20,000,000.00 and the other in the amount of
P30,000,000.00, and were negotiated in LBP Shaw Boulevard but were also cancelled, the
corresponding total amount of P50,000,000.00 was then wire transferred and deposited to the
account of Delia Rajas in LBP Shaw Boulevard. [TSN, October 25, 2004,, pp. 64-70]

Saunar reiterated that they conducted an in-depth investigation of the expose’ made by Gov.
Singson, which includes alleged violations on the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices, malversation
of public funds and violation of R.A. 4200, pursuant to the memorandum issued by the Secretary
of Justice. However, their investigation so far has not reached the point of illegal jueteng or
illegal gambling. They did not conduct an in-depth investigation on the activities of Mr. Atong
Ang and FPres. Estrada because they have not reached that point where the evidence would show
that they have participated. [TSN, October 25, 2004, pp. 102-104]

However, they already filed a complaint-affidavit dated January 10, 2007 which referred to the
One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) that was cash advanced by Gov. Singson
based on the evidence they gathered so far in their investigation.

Saunar further testified that on November 2000, Director Opinion directed him to accommodate
interviews on the result of their investigation in connection with the P170,000,000.00 alleged
cash advance of Gov. Singson which was done in his office when he was still the Chief of the
NBI Anti-Graft Division, and the result of which appeared in a VCD. [TSN, November 3, 2004,
pp. 18, 26-27]

[TSN dated October 13, 2004, TSN dated October 25, 2004, TSN dated October 27, 2004 and
TSN dated November 3, 2004]

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP) OCULAR INSPECTION

On May 25, 2005, the Court conducted another ocular inspection at the Money Museum of the
BSP upon the request of the accused Estradas. The Court observed that if the P130,000,000.00
were all in P1000.00 denominations and divided into 130 bundles with each bundle consisting of
1000 pieces of P1000.00 peso bills amounting to P1 Million pesos, only a maximum of 20
bundles amounting to P20 Million pesos would fit in a box (Exh. X-Ocular Inspection), with an
inner or interior dimensions of 12 inches width, 10 inches height and 15 inches length which
measurement was given by prosecution witnesses Artatez and a certain OJ Singson during their
testimony. Thus, the P130 Million pesos would fit in 6 and ½ boxes.

If the P130,000,000.00 were in P500.00 denominations and divided into 260 bundles with each
bundle consisting of 1000 pieces of P500.00 bills amounting to P500,000.00, the
P130,000,000.00 pesos would fit in 13 boxes.
A Certification issued by the BSP that the P1,000,000.00 pesos in P1000.00 bills would weigh
about just under a kilo has already been submitted by the accused in the previous hearing. [TSN
dated May 25, 2002, pp. 10-11]

FINDINGS OF FACT

Re: Sub-paragraph (b) of the Amended Information

With respect to the predicate act of divesting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur, this Court finds that indeed an
amount of P130,000,000.00 out of the P200,000,000.00 share in tobacco excise taxes of the
Province of Ilocos Sur was withdrawn from the provincial coffers and misappropriated and
misused to the damage and prejudice of the said province.

The evidence presented before this Court establish beyond doubt that Gov. Singson initiated the
process that eventually led to the allocation and release of funds by the national government to
the Province of Ilocos Sur of the amount of P200,000,000.00 from the excise tax imposed
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7171. As chief executive of the Province of Ilocos Sur, Gov.
Singson personally handed a letter to FPres. Estrada requesting the release of Ilocos Sur’s share
in the tobacco excise taxes [Exh. Q8] to pin him on his campaign promise to the people of Ilocos
Sur during the 1998 Presidential Elections. FPres. Estrada, through a marginal note on Gov.
Singson’s letter, endorsed the request to then Sec. Benjamin Diokno of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) [Exh. Q8-1]. The DBM released the amount of P200,000,000 to
the Province of Ilocos Sur as its share in tobacco excise taxes as shown in the Notice of Funding
Check Issued, Fund 103 dated August 25, 1998 signed by DBM Sec. Benjamin Diokno and
addressed to the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur [Exh. R8]. Gov. Singson forthwith caused the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur to enact a Resolution appropriating the sum of
P200,000,000.00, of which P170,000,000.00 was intended for flue-curing barns and
P30,000,000.00 for infrastructure. Gov. Singson caused the release of P170,000,000.00 from the
said fund as shown by the Authorization he issued to Maricar Paz and Marina Atendido,
employees of his office to officially transact with Land Bank Vigan Branch, in behalf of the
Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur dated August 27, 1998 [Exh "N18"], Check No.
0000097650 dated August 27, 1998 issued to the order of Luis "Chavit" Singson in the amount
of P170,000,000.00 [Exhs. O18 and P18], and an Accountant’s Advice for Local Check
Disbursement dated August 27, 1998 [Exh. Q18]. This amount, however, was broken down into
smaller amounts and deposited/transferred to the accounts of individuals identified with or
known associates of Atong Ang, namely Alma Alfaro, Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan, as shown
by a certification of Land Bank Vigan Branch Manager Ma. Elizabeth Balagot [Exh. S8],
Demand Draft Application Nos. 656 and 712 in the name of Delia Rajas [Exhs. R18 and S18],
Demand Draft Application No. 734 in the name of Eleuterio Tan [Exh. T18], and Demand Draft
Application No. 722 in the name of Nuccio Saverio [Exh. U18], and the four demand drafts
issued pursuant thereto [Exhs. V18, K13, L13 and M13]. A fifth demand draft in the name of Gov.
Singson was inexplicably cancelled albeit the amount covered by it was deposited in the account
of Alma Alfaro through an Inter-Branch Deposit Accomodation Slip [Exh. X18] as instructed by
Maricar Paz to Land Bank. The demand drafts issued to Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan were
similarly cancelled and the amounts of P40,000,000.00 and P50,000,000.00 covered by the
demand drafts were deposited in the accounts of Eleuterio Tan and Delia Rajas, respectively, at
Land Bank Shaw Branch. Alma Alfaro’s P40,000,000.00 was withdrawn by her in cash a day
after it was deposited in her account at Land Bank Shaw Branch on August 27, 1998 [TSN,
November 4, 2003, pp. 27-43]. On the other hand, Tan and Rajas withdrew on the same day
P40,000,000 and P50,000,000, respectively, from their accounts and Tan used the proceeds to
buy Three (3) cashier’s check in the amount of P30,000,000 each or a total of P90,000,000
[Exhs. W13-1, V13-1 & X13-1]. The Three (3) cashier’s check were deposited in Savings Account
No. 2011-00772-7 at Westmont Bank, Mandaluyong Branch [Ibid, pp. 52-91]. The
P40,000,000.00 originally covered by the demand draft in the name of Gov. Singson which was
cancelled and subsequently withdrawn by Alma Alfaro was not shown to have been deposited at
Westmont Bank. Who profited from this sum of money? The Court can only surmise given the
dearth of even the prosecution’s evidence on what happened to the money after it was received
by Alma Alfaro. Significantly, it appears that of the P170,000,000.00 appropriated by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur for flue-curing barns only the amount of P40,000,000.0
went to the supplier of the flue-curing barn, Nuccio Saverio who encashed his demand draft at
Land Bank Makati Branch. Saverio could collect only the said amount in view of the testimony
of Gov. Singson that he delivered only one module of flue curing barns costing P40,000,000.00.

According to Jamis Singson and Artates, they accompanied William Ang, the brother of Atong
Ang, to Westmont Bank to withdraw money but they just waited outside the bank. They helped
carry the four (4) boxes to the vehicle when William and the security guards brought the said
boxes outside the bank. Thereafter, they joined William transport the boxes to the home of
Catalina Ang, and later to the residence of FPres. Estrada at Polk Street. Jamis and Artates were
told by William Ang that the boxes contained money for FPres. Estrada.

The prosecution’s evidence that only the amount of P90,000,000.00 was deposited in Westmont
Bank created a loophole in the impression given by the testimony of Gov. Singson that he and
Atong Ang were supposed to bring the P130,000,000.00 withdrawn from Westmontbank to the
residence of FPres. Estrada. The Court can only speculate that this could have been the reason
why during the Ocular Inspection at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) the amount of
P130,000,000.00 could not fit the four (4) boxes described by Gov. Singson and the other
prosecution witnesses.

There are also gaps in the prosecution’s evidence on the alleged delivery to FPres. Estrada of the
diverted funds or a portion thereof. It was not established how much cash was allegedly stashed
in the boxes that came from Westmont Bank and which were unloaded/reloaded at the house of
Catalina Ang or how much cash was in the boxes allegedly brought to FPres. Estrada’s house.
No one testified that he saw cash being handed to FPres. Estrada, Sen. Loi Estrada or Jinggoy
Estrada. Serious doubts are engendered by the bare testimony of Gov. Singson, the prosecution’s
star witness, who, by his own account, did not even touch the boxes of money, nor count the
money inside the boxes that arrived at the home of Catalina Ang and allegedly reloaded for
delivery to Polk Street. Gov. Singson did not also see the alleged turnover of the money by Ang
to FPres. Estrada, Dr. Loi Estrada or Mayor Jinggoy as he stayed at the corner of Polk Street, so
many meters away from the highly fenced and gated house of FPres. Estrada. The Court finds it
queer that Gov. Singson would stay only at the corner of the street where FPres. Estrada’s
residence is located instead of accompanying Ang to witness the delivery of money that,
according to him, was important to him and his constituents in Ilocos Sur. Only Atong Ang could
have credibly testified on the alleged delivery of money but the prosecution did not present him
as a witness, despite his plea of guilt to a lower offense and his admission that he partook of
P25,000,000.00 of the P130,000,000.00 of the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur. This Court could
not admit without corroborating evidence Gov. Singson’s bare testimony that FPres. Estrada
purportedly got mad that Atong Ang gave him only P70,000,000.00 and that Atong Ang had
given P20,000,000.00 and P15,000,000.00 to Dr. Loi Estrada and Mayor Jinggoy respectively. In
this Court’s view, certain details of Gov. Singson’s testimony on this point are rather incredible
and far-fetched. Gov. Singson had not offered any explanation why and how Atong Ang had the
temerity or the guts to divide the money among FPres. Estrada and the members of the First
Family and decide by himself the amount of their respective shares without prior clearance of
FPres. Estrada, then the highest executive official of the land.

Furthermore, the record is bereft of evidence to confirm Gov. Singson’s testimony that FPres.
Estrada was interested in the diversion of tobacco excise taxes or that there was an agreement
between Gov. Singson and FPres. Estrada that 10% of any amount released to the Province of
Ilocos Sur would be turned over by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson’s statements
that Atong Ang and Mayor Jinggoy kept following up the release of the money and that Atong
Ang informed Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada wanted not just 10% but P130,000,000.00 of the
P200,000,000.00 are likewise uncorroborated. Regarding the testimony of Gov. Singson
implicating Jinggoy Estrada in the commission of the predicate act mentioned in sub-paragraph
(b), the Honorable Supreme Court early enough had clarified the import of the charge against
accused Jinggoy Estrada under the Amended Information in this manner:

xxx xxx xxx Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or
misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of
Ilocos Sur, which Act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1
(d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner (Jinggoy Estrada) but
instead names other conspirators of the Former President. [Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, supra, p. 553]

The recent decision in People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (Special Division) and Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada (G.R. No. 158754, promulgated August 10, 2007) which upheld this Court’s
Resolution granting bail to Jinggoy Estrada, has explained the essence and import of the above-
quoted ruling:

Obviously hoping to maneuver around the above ruling so as to implicate individual

respondent for predicate acts described in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the Amended
Information, petitioner now argues:

It should be emphasized that in the course of the proceedings in the instant case,
respondent Jinggoy Estrada waived the benefit of the said ruling and opted,
instead, to participate, as he did participate and later proceeded to cross examine
witnesses whose testimonies were clearly offered to prove the other constitutive
acts of Plunder alleged in the Amended Information under sub-paragraphs "b",
"c", and "d".
 We disagree.

At bottom, the petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded "benefits" to respondent
Jinggoy that were inexistent at the start of that case. But no such benefits were extended,
as the Court did not read into the Amended Information, as couched, something not there
in the first place. Respondent Jinggoy’s participation, if that be the case, in the
proceedings involving sub-paragraphs "b", "c", and "d", did not change the legal situation
set forth in the aforequoted portion of the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 148965. For when it
passed, in G.R. NO. 148965, upon the inculpatory acts envisaged and ascribed in the
Amended Information against Jinggoy, the Court merely defined what he was indicted
and can be penalized for. In legal jargon, the Court informed him of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, right guaranteed an accused under the Constitution. In fine,
all that the Court contextually did in G.R. No. 148965 was no more than to implement his
right to be informed of the nature of the accusation in the light of the filing of the
Amended Information as worded. If at all, the Court’s holding in G.R. No. 148965 freed
individual respondent from the ill effects of a wrong interpretation that might be given to
the Amended Information.

The mere fact that FPres. Estrada endorsed Gov. Singson’s request for release of funds to the
then DBM Secretary for review does not indicate any undue interest on the part of FPres. Estrada
in the grant of Gov. Singson’s request. The tenor of the marginal note itself was simply for the
DBM Secretary to "see if [he] can accommodate the request of Governor Singson." Finally, not a
scintilla of evidence links FPres. Estrada to any of the obscure personalities who withdrew the
P130,000,000.00, namely, Delia Rajas, Alma Alfaro, and Eleuterio Tan and to any of the official
bank documents that made possible the diversion and misappropriation of the aforesaid public
funds.

In sum, the paper trail in relation to the P130,000,000.00 diverted tobacco excise taxes began
with Gov. Singson and ended with Atong Ang. This Court does not find the evidence sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt that FPres. Estrada or any member of his family had
instigated and/or benefited from the diversion of said funds.

RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH C OF THE

AMENDED INFORMATION
_____________________________

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE,
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY
FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A
 TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY
SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE

Under paragraph (c) of the Amended Information, accused FPres. Estrada was charged with the
crime of plunder, for having willfully, unlawfully and criminally acquired, amassed or
accumulated and acquired ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P189,700,000.00 representing
commissions or percentages by reason of the purchase of shares of stock of Belle Corporation by
SSS and GSIS.

The gravamen of this specific charge is whether FPres. Estrada, unjustly enriched himself at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic by receiving a
commission of P187 Million as consideration for the purchase by SSS and GSIS of Belle Shares.
Even if the Prosecution is able to establish that FPres. Estrada used his official position,
authority, relationship and influence and directed, ordered and compelled Carlos A. Arellano
(then President of the SSS) and Federico C. Pascual (then President of GSIS) for SSS and GSIS
to buy Belle shares with money of the GSIS and SSS which are held in trust by the said
institutions for the millions of employees of the government and the private sector, such fact
alone does not constitute an overt or criminal act, the commission of which would warrant a
conviction for plunder. Prosecution must establish that, in consideration of the purchase by GSIS
and SSS of the Belle Shares, FPres. Estrada received the amount of P189,700,000.00 as
commission.

In discharging its burden of proof that FPres. Estrada directed, ordered and compelled, for his
personal gain and benefit, the GSIS to purchase 351,878,000 shares of stock more or less, and
the SSS to purchase 329,855,000 shares of stock more or less, of the Belle Corporation in the
amount of more or less One Billion One Hundred Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty Five
Thousand Six Hundred Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,102,965,607.50) and more or less
Seven Hundred Forty Four Million Six Hundred Twelve Thousand And Four Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P744,612,450.00), respectively, or a total of more or less One Billion Eight Hundred
Forty Seven Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty
Centavos (P1,847,578,057.50), the prosecution presented its principal witnesses in the persons of
Arellano, Pascual, Ocier and Capulong.

EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

WILLY NG OCIER (Ocier) was the Vice Chairman and Director of Belle Corporation on June
24, 1999. He testified that SSI Management, a company created by Roberto Ongpin was the
Selling stockholder of Belle shares totaling 650,000,000. [TSN January 9, 2002, p.94] Roberto
Ongpin, in his personal capacity, originally gave an option to Mark Jimenez to purchase these
650,000,000 shares of Belle [Ibid., pp. 67- 68] because Roberto Ongpin at that time granted (sic)
to transform Belle Corporation into the foremost gaming company in the Philippines, and he
wanted somebody to help him "acquiring (sic) licenses to do Jai-Alai and to do Super Sabong,
Bingo, Casino, etc., etc." [Ibid. pp. 71 and 72] and Mr. Roberto Ongpin whom he held in high
regard, told him that Mark Jimenez was a very close friend of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 84] The
option was given as an incentive for Mark Jimenez as a favor to Roberto Ongpin. [Ibid. p. 88]
Mark Jimenez was not able to exercise the option because Ongpin was ousted from the Board of
Belle on June 15, 1999. [Ibid. p. 90]

After a meeting of the Board of Directors of Belle Corporation on July 20, 1999 (Exh. P), when
Dichaves asked Ocier about the option given by Ongpin to Mark Jimenez and if the option can
be given to him, Ocier told Dichaves that the option cannot be given anymore because of the fact
that the shares are intended to be sold in light of a recent call for unpaid subscription. [TSN,
January 7, 2002, p. 17] The Board of Director of Belle Corporation decided to make a call for
payment of unpaid subscriptions to raise money to address the debt problem of the Corporation.
[TSN, October 1, 2001, p. 79] When asked what can be done in relation to the Belle shares,
Ocier explained to Dichaves that he needs the latter’s help in selling the Belle shares to cover for
the 75 per cent unpaid subscription and the two of them basically agreed to divide the work
wherein Ocier would contact his foreign brokers to sell the shares and Dichaves will contact his
local counterparts or contacts if he can sell the shares locally. [TSN, January 7, 2002, p.18]

Ocier further testified that overtime (sic) the market was not very strong, so the foreign brokers
took quite a while to make decisions about their action of buying Belle shares. [Id.] In a
subsequent meeting with Dichaves, Ocier testified that Dichaves confirmed to him that there was
a good chance that GSIS and SSS may be willing to buy the Belle shares and when he asked
when the shares can be transacted he was assured by Dichaves that the latter had taken up the
matter already with FPres. Estrada and that Dichaves told him that the Former President had
already spoken to Carlos Arellano of SSS and Ding Pascual of GSIS about the said matter. [Ibid.
p. 19]

After a few weeks, Dichaves called Ocier and told the latter that the transaction may be pushing
through but that Dichaves wanted to take up a matter of condition that was proposed for the
transaction to push through which was to the effect that Ocier will have to give a commission for
the transaction to push through. [Ibid .pp. 20-21] Ocier testified that since the shares involved
was approximately 600,000,000 to 650,000,000 and the price of Belle at that time at about P3.00
per share, the total expected proceeds of the sale was almost Two Billion Pesos
(P2,000,000,000.00) and the commission that Jaime was asking for amounted to Two Hundred
Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00). [Ibid. p. 23]

When asked to whom the commission should be given, Ocier answered that according to
Dichaves, the condition was being imposed by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 26] When asked for his
reaction to the information conveyed by Dichaves that it was FPres. Estrada that imposed the
condition, Ocier testified that his reaction was that he felt that it was quite a big amount of
commission to be paid and that normally, in real estate and stock transactions, commissions
range between three (3) to five (5) percent only and he told Dichaves that he finds that quite high
[Ibid. p. 34], to which Dichaves answered that "that was the condition." [Ibid. p. 36] When asked
what his answer was to the answer of Dichaves that that was the condition, Ocier answered that
he was constrained to agree because Dichaves told him that "that was the only way for the
transaction to push through." [Id.] Ocier further testified that on October 21, 1999, Belle shares
totaling 447,650,000 were sold by SSI Management to GSIS and SSS through Eastern Securities
Development Corporation [Ibid. p. 39; Exh. Q; Q-1; Exh. T] while other Belle Shares were sold
through other brokers. [TSN dated January 14, 2002, p. 20]

CARLOS ALMARIO ARELLANO (Arellano) was appointed Chairman and President of SSS
on July 1, 1998 by FPres. Estrada. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 49] The transaction with Belle
was initiated on October 6, 1999. He got a call from FPres. Estrada and was told: "Gusto ko kayo
ni Ding Pascual ay tignan ninyo ang pagbili ng Belle Corporation sa stock market. [Ibid. pp. 75-
77] He thought that the words "tignan ninyo" was an instruction for him. [Ibid. p. 80] After the
instruction, he asked the people in the Investment Department of SSS to take a look and review
the shares of Belle as an investment item in the portfolio of SSS and also to find out to what
extent the SSS can further increase the SSS position in the said stock. [Ibid. p. 82]

As far as the Investment Committee was concerned, they agreed that Belle is still possible
investment for the SSS. [Ibid. p. 94] In answer to the instruction of the President he said "Opo,
opo." [Id.] He got a call from FPres. Estrada the week after and he was asked to see the President
at Malacanang. [Ibid. p. 95] At Malacañang, he saw FPres. Estrada with Jaime Dichaves. While
he was there he approached the FPres. who stood up and took him aside and asked whether this
time, he had followed FPres. instructions to buy Belle shares. He replied: "Tinitignan pa po ng
Investment committee namin." [Ibid. pp. 97, 104] He did not immediately buy the Belle shares
because he felt that it was not the proper timing and the volume that was being considered was
too much and not yet the proper time. [Ibid. p. 102] When he answered this to the Former
President, he recalled that the reaction of the Former President was to tell him "Bilisan ninyo na,
bilisan." [Ibid. p. 107] Upon receiving these instructions, he still did not do anything for a few
days after. [Ibid. p. 115] After several days, he received another call from FPres. Estrada and he
repeated "Bilisan mo, bilisan ninyo na. [Ibid. p. 124] As far as he was concerned, it was more
serious than previous orders given to him. [Id.] On October 21, the SSS implemented the
transaction. [TSN dated November 7, 2001, p. 110]

FEDERICO CALIMBAS PASCUAL (Pascual) was the President of GSIS in 1999, testified
that he had a meeting with FPres. Estrada on September 6, 1999 and in that meeting, he was
instructed by the FPres. Estrada to buy Belle Shares. It was only in October 9, 1999 when he
ordered his people to buy Belle Shares because First: he was hoping that the President was not
serious in his September 6, 1999 instruction and he was hoping the President would forget his
instruction. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 20] Second, because he was not very comfortable with
Belle because some people are of the opinion that Belle Shares, because the corporation is
involved in jai-alai and gambling, is "speculative flavor." [Id.]

In another telephone conversation with FPres. Estrada on October 9, 1999, he felt that the
President was more serious in his instructions in the sense that, he was away and there was this
telephone call and he felt that FPres. Estrada was already agitated. [Ibid. p. 24] In the telephone
call, he was asked by FPres. Estrada "bakit hindi ka pa bumibili ng Belle" to which he replied
"tatawag ho ako sa head office at papa-aralan ko." [Ibid. pp. 56-57]

When he returned to the Philippines on October 21, 1999, he learned that GSIS had purchased
351,000,000 Belle Share worth P1,100,000,000.00 as shown by the investment committee
confirmation report.

On cross-examination, he testified that his purpose in executing his affidavit was to remove from
the minds of the doubting public that he benefited from the Belle Shares. [Ibid. p. 48; Exh. O to
O-4] The alleged money making that intervened or supervened in the purchase of Belle Shares
was not included in his affidavit because the purpose was to show how GSIS purchased shares of
Belle on the instruction of the Former President. [Ibid. p. 54] The purchases of Belle Shares were
made when he was abroad. FPres. Estrada gave him the instructions to buy and he also made
instructions to his people to buy, that was the chain of events. [Ibid. pp. 68; 74] He authorized
the purchase of Belle Shares only if Belle was a qualified share. [Ibid. p. 69] If he did not make
that call to the people in GSIS about the Former President’s instruction, there was probably no
possibility of GSIS acquiring Belle Shares during that period of time beginning October 13 to
October 21. [Ibid. p. 77] Except for the instruction, there was nothing irregular, illegal or
anomalous about the transaction and he does not know whether somebody benefited from the
purchase of Belle Shares that took place between October 13 to 21. [Ibid, p. 83]

RIZALDY TADEO CAPULONG (Capulong) was the Deputy Chief Actuary and Assistant
Vice-President of the Securities Trading and Management Department of the Social Security
System (SSS). He headed the Actuary Department which was responsible in making long term
and short term projections of the revenues and expenditures of SSS. As AVP of the Securities
Trading and Management Department, Capulong was in charge of providing research and
operational support to top SSS offices with regard to equities and investment.

Capulong testified that he made the recommendation which cost the SSS P1,300,000,000.00
because per his research, evaluation and verification, it was a profitable transaction. He had gone
into the validity and legality of the acquisition of the Belle Shares and he was convinced that
they were all proper, legal and beyond reproach. He signed the recommendation and submitted it
for approval of the Executive Management Committee and then for the approval of the Social
Security Commission. Capulong clarified that it was an approval for allocation not for funding.
For SSS to be able to acquire shares of their corporation, it was necessary that there was an
approval for an allocation. SSS had the amount of money but it was not reserved for Belle
transactions even with the approval of the recommendation. The money will only be identified
and allocated at the time of transaction. [TSN dated February 6, 11, 13, and 18, 2002]

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

REYNALDO PASTORFIDE PALMIERY (Palmiery) was the Senior Executive Vice-

President and the Chief Operating Officer and Member of the Board of Trustees of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Palmiery was the Chairman of the Investment
Committee of the GSIS in 1998 to 2000. The Investment Committee discusses the new proposals
for investment which were elevated by the Corporate Finance Group of the GSIS. The process is
that the Finance Corporate Group first studies and evaluates stocks which are not yet qualified
and accredited to be purchased and elevates this to the Investment Committee for discussion, and
if it is approved by the Investment Committee then it is elevated to the board for approval.

Palmiery testified that the GSIS had been trading all Belle Shares in 1993. The first acquisition
of GSIS then was about 18 million shares, or 5% of the outstanding stocks of Belle Corporation,
and that the GSIS booked an aggregate trading gain of P145,859,195.95 on the purchase of Belle
Shares alone (Exh. 236 and submarkings).

Palmiery then presented and identified a Joint Counter-Affidavit which the members of the
Investment Committee filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. He confirmed the statement
contained in the last paragraph of the joint affidavit that the Investment in Belle Shares was made
solely on the basis of the compliance with the law and GSIS internal guidelines. Palmiery was
not aware of any phone call made by FPres. Estrada to Pascual. He further explained that the
acquisition of the Belles Shares was pursuant to the directive of General Manager Pascual.
Palmiery related that he received a call from Pascual and instructed him to review and study the
prospects of Belle Corporation with the end objective to purchase shares of stock of the said
corporation up to the limit allowed under the existing guidelines of GSIS. The evaluation was
pursued and approved.

On cross-examination, Palmiery admitted that under GSIS Resolution No. 284 series of 1992,
General Manager Pascual was given the sole authority to trade in stocks listed or traded in the
two (2) major stocks exchange, and under GSIS Resolution No. 273, he was granted the
continuing authority to buy Belle Shares. Resolution No. 273 was then amended in 1998 by the
GSIS providing for the continuing authority for the President and General Manager as well as the
Executive Vice President and the Senior Vice President for Corporate Finance to purchase and
sell stocks traded in the Stocks Exchange at prevailing prices.

On re-direct examination, Palmiery testified that when General Manager Pascual called and
instructed him to purchase Belle Shares the number of shares to be purchased was specified to be
within the limits of the GSIS Guidelines which was the number of shares equivalent to one board
seat or 10% of the outstanding shares whichever is higher. [TSN dated December 13, 2004 and
TSN dated January 24, 2005]

HON. HERMOGENES DIAZ CONCEPCION (Conception) was a Retired Associate Justice

of the Supreme Court and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS).

Concepcion testified that he was familiar with the Belle Resources and Shares of Stocks, and
confirmed the veracity and accuracy of the statement in paragraph 10 of his Affidavit. With
respect to the acquisition that took place on October 13 to 21, 1999, witness Concepcion
explained that the President/General Manager of the GSIS has full authority to buy and sell
shares listed in the stock exchange of the amounts within the boundary set forth by the Board of
Trustees. So, the President buys and sells these securities without the Board knowing what he did
because decisions have to be made sometimes on the spot in order to get a better margin.
Paragraph 16 (2) of the Counter-Affidavit was checked with the records of the GSIS, the
Committee in charge of the investment, and the amounts made by the GSIS on these shares,
P145,859,195.94, was furnished to them. Witness Concepcion explained that during the period
from 1993 to 2000, the GSIS would buy shares then sell them, buy shares then sell them, and by
that process, the GSIS made P145 Million as profit or actual gain. Witness also stated that
paragraph 16 (9) which refers to the purchase of 351,878,000 shares was based on the records of
the GSIS.

Concepcion also testified that then President and General Manager Federico Pascual never told
them that FPres. talked to him nor discussed to the witness the alleged directive or pressure
brought upon him by FPres. Estrada. There was no need to ask Federico Pascual why he bought
shares because there is the presumption that our functions are regularly performed. [TSN dated
December 8, 2004]

MERCEDITAS GARCIA GACULITAN (Gaculitan) was the Corporate Secretary of the

Social Security Commission (SSS). Gaculitan testified that before these investments in Belle
Resources Corporation were made prior approval of the investment by the Commission en banc
were obtained since all purchases and all investments are required to be approved or passed upon
by the Social Security Commission. [TSN dated December 13, 2004]

Accused FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA testified on his own

defense. The relevant portions of his testimony are set forth below.

The purchase of Belle Shares according to accused FPres. Estrada

In the Memorandum for FPres. Estrada, the defense stated that under this indictment, the
Prosecution incur the bounden duty to prove:

1. accused Estrada’s acts constitutive of directing, ordering and compelling the GSIS
and SSS to buy Belle Shares;
2. the purchase were made solely due to the said acts of compulsion by accused
Estrada;
3. the extent and parameter of Estrada’s acts relative to the questioned purchases;
4. the alleged profit commission is government fund or money; and
5. damages to the government or People of the Philippines.

The Defense claims that the prosecution’s evidence itself shows that (1) the transaction
complained of was perfectly valid, since accused FPres. Estrada did not direct, order or compel
SSS and GSIS to buy Belle Shares and (2) there is no proof that any commission was paid to the
accused. [Defense Memorandum, p. 192]

To bolster its claim that the purchase of Belle Shares was a perfectly valid transaction, the
Defense pointed to the following portions of Arellano’s testimony:

1. That the purchase of Belle Shares was a routine transaction in the regular course
of business, for SSS had previously purchased Belle Shares at profit;
 2. What was told by FPres. Estrada to Arellano was simply to initiate the acquisition
of Belle Shares. How many shares he was ordered to buy and at how much price
per share, was never dealt with in the phone conversation;
3. The above notwithstanding, Arellano proceeded on his own volition with the
acquisition of the 249 Million Belle Shares.
4. The Decision to purchase was exclusively his and the policy making body of SSS.
[Ibid. pp. 193-194, citing TSN, November 8, 2001, pp. 63, 73-74, 75-76]

The Defense argues that the reason why Arellano testified in the manner he did and executed an
affidavit implicating FPres. Estrada in the instant plunder case notwithstanding that there was
nothing irregular, illegal or anomalous in the October 21, 1999 acquisition of Belle Shares was
because his testimonies and affidavit are his last ditch effort to exculpate himself from possible
plunder charges where he may be detained without bail considering that plunder is a capital
offense. [Ibid. p. 197]

Likewise, the Defense cited the testimony of Capulong who testified that he examined and
audited all the acquisition papers and the various confirmation slips and official receipts covering
the acquisition and found them to be in order. Hence he had no objection to, but on the contrary,
approved the payment of the said acquisition. Said witness also testified that as far as he was
concerned, there was nothing illegal or irregular or anomalous in the SSS purchase of Belle
Shares in October 21, 1999 and that it was a legal investment and a valid investment that is in the
list of investment of SSS. That it is not an irregular investment and it is said that it might be
somewhat not ordinary in the sense that in this case there was a call. [Ibid. p. 198, citing TSN,
November 14, 2001, p. 53]

Insofar as the acquisition by GSIS of Belle Shares, the Defense argued that the purchase by GSIS
was in accordance with investment policy and rules.

The Defense sought to establish that the Belle Shares were qualified under GSIS policy and
charter and GSIS may by itself and in accordance with its rules, purchase Belle Shares without
the need of any order or compulsion from anybody as shown by the testimony of Pascual, the
President of GSIS when he admitted that even way back in 1993, GSIS had been purchasing or
dealing with Belle Shares and had already made profits at the extent of around P145,000,000.00
since 1993 up to the present prior to his coming in as the new General Manager of GSIS. [TSN,
November 22, 2001, pp. 61 to 62] That the purchase was in accordance with the GSIS policy was
established by Pascual’s testimony that the trading department under the Corporate Finance
Group investigated and made further inquiries in connection with the shares and concluded that
there would be no violation that could have been committed by GSIS in the purchase of the
shares. [TSN, December 3, 2001, pp. 14 and 15] Pascual further testified that the price of P3.13
per share was the worth of the shares around the time it was purchased and it was reported to him
by his people that the reason why they bought so much was because there was a history of
profitability and that they already had a P1,000,000,000.00 turnover plus and he felt that it was
"a good buying afterwards." (sic) [Defense Memorandum, p. 204] Pascual also testified that he
had no information if anybody benefited from the purchase of Belle Shares that took place on
October 13 to 21 and admitted that GSIS was suffering a paper loss because of the purchase.
[Ibid. p. 204-205, citing TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 83-84]
Defense argued that assuming arguendo that there was an instruction from FPres. Estrada for
such purchase, such instruction was not too compelling or irresistible to directly cause the
execution of the purchase suggestion and that such instruction was immaterial because the GSIS
Board which approved the transaction did not receive the alleged instruction of the Former
President and that in the same vein, the GSIS decided on the purchase independently, free from
any compulsion by an outsider as the instruction given by Pascual was to the effect that a study
be conducted and if the Belle Shares are qualified, to buy within the range of their authority.
[Defense Memorandum, pp. 205-206, citing TSN, December 3, 2001, p. 93]

As to Pascual’s testimony that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him for the purchase of a
(sic) particular shares, the Defense pointed out that as per admission of Pascual, what he meant
by unusual was that FPres. Estrada called him when he was out of the country. Defense pointed
out however, that as testified by FPres. Estrada, the latter did not know that Pascual was out of
the country when he called. [Ibid. p. 209] Defense pointed out that, by Pascual’s admission, the
GSIS Board was not pressured into finding that the Belle Shares were okay, above board, and
that they were not pressured by anybody into concluding the purchase. [Ibid. p. 214, citing TSN,
December 3, 2001, p. 93]

FPres. Estrada testified that he appointed Arellano and Pascual and he knows that Belle
Resources is the developer of Tagaytay Highlands because sometimes, he spends his weekend in
Tagaytay Highlands. [TSN, April 26, 2006 (pm), p. 10-11] He denied that he instructed or
ordered Pascual to buy Belle Shares on September 6, 1999 during a meeting with him. What he
told Pascual was to study and make due diligence if Belle Shares will be beneficial to the GSIS.
To which Pascual answered "Yes" and that he has this Corporate Finance Group to make the
study. As to the testimony of Pascual regarding his telephone conversation with FPres. Estrada,
the latter testified that he did not know that Pacual was abroad and he talked to him not about
Belle Shares but about delayed benefits of GSIS members. [Ibid. pp. 17, 24] He denied ordering
Pascual to buy Belle Shares. [Ibid. pp. 15-17] He claimed there was nothing irregular about his
instruction to Pascual when he only told him to make a serious study and due diligence. [Ibid. p.
22]

As regards Arellano’s testimony, FPres. Estrada denied that he ever called Arellano nor did he
order him to buy Belle Shares. He remembers that Mr. Jaime Dichaves told him, that being one
of the members of the Board of Directors, the latter informed him that Belle Resources are
offering their stocks to GSIS and SSS and that Dichaves was looking for investors, local and
foreign and he told Dichaves that it will be upon the study of SSS and GSIS who will decide
whether they are buying or not. [Ibid. p. 25] As regards the telephone conversation with
Arellano, FPres. Estrada testified that they talked in Tagalog and he said to Arellano to study the
offer of Belle Resources and if it will be beneficial to the government then why not. To which
Arellano answered "Yes, sir," that he would refer the matter to the Investment Committeee to
give due diligence. [Ibid. pp. 26-27] FPres. Estrada denied that he pressured Arellano and said
that he noticed that the testimony of Pascual and Arellano are the same as if they are of the same
script. [Ibid. p. 29] FPres. Estrada stated that Pascual or Arellano, admitted buying Belle Shares
and they were the ones who decided the amount and how much to buy and they did not inform
him anymore. [Ibid. p. 32] As regards the testimonies of Pascual and Arellano, FPres. Estrada
testified that it seems they have only one lawyer. He learned that Pascual and Arellano were
called by then DOJ Secretary Perez and it was the latter who pressured them to testify against
him and they were threatened to be charged with plunder. He also learned that Secretary Perez
gave them a lady lawyer but he does not know the relation of Perez to that lady lawyer. [Ibid. p.
37] FPres. Estrada testified that after Arellano testified in Court, the latter called him and
apologized because according to him, he could not do anything since he was threatened by
Secretary Perez with the words that if they can send the President to jail, what more of him?
[Ibid. p. 41]

FPres. Estrada also denied knowledge of the alleged conversation and transaction between Ocier
and Dichaves. He testified that Mr. Dichaves was, at that time, one of the members of the Board
of Directors of Belle Resources and a business man. [Ibid. p. 42] FPres. Estrada cited instances
when he was offered commissions but he rejected them such as the IMPSA and SGS deals. [Ibid.
pp. 45-48] His reaction to Arellano’s statement to him that the latter was threatened was to say
that he understood because the same thing happened to him when he was offered by Secretary
Nani Perez that he could go to any country of his choice but he refused. [Ibid. pp. 49-50]

FINDINGS OF FACT

Re: Sub-paragraph (c) of the Amended Information

We find that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that FPres. Estrada
directed and instructed Arellano and Pascual for SSS and GSIS respectively to buy Belle Shares.

As can be culled from the testimonial and documentary evidence of the Prosecution, the
following circumstances surround the purchase of the Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.

On July 20, 1999, Ocier and Dichaves discussed the matter of the sale of the 650,000,000 shares
of Belle, in the light of a recent call for payment of unpaid subscription which the Board of
Directors of Belle Corporation decided to address its debt problems. Ocier explained to Dichaves
that he needs the latter’s help in selling the Belle Shares to cover for the 75 per cent unpaid
subscription. They agreed to divide the task of looking for buyers of these Belle Shares with
Ocier looking for foreign buyers and Dichaves to look for local buyers. [ TSN, January 7, 2002,
p.18]

In a subsequent meeting with Dichaves, the latter confirmed to Ocier that there was a good
chance that GSIS and SSS may be willing to buy the Belle shares as Dichaves had taken up the
matter already with FPres. Estrada and that Dichaves told him that the Former President had
already spoken to Carlos Arellano of SSS and Ding Pascual of GSIS about the said matter. [Ibid,
p. 19]

After a few weeks, Dichaves called Ocier and told the latter that the transaction may be pushing
through but that a commission will have to be paid as a condition for the purchase to push
through. [Ibid. p. 21] As per Ocier’s testimony, Dichaves told him that it was FPres. Estrada who
imposed the condition. [Ibid. p. 26] Since the shares involved was approximately 600,000,000 to
650,000,000 and the price of Belle at that time was about P3.00 per share, the total expected
proceeds of the sale was almost Two Billion Pesos and the commission involved would amount
to Two Hundred Million Pesos. [Ibid. p. 23]

Since the payment of the commission was the only way for the transaction to push through, he
was constrained to agree to the payment of the commission. [Ibid. p. 36]

On September 6, 1999, at a meeting with FPres. Estrada, Federico Pascual, President of GSIS
was instructed by the President to buy Belle Shares. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 20]

On October 6 1999, Carlos Arellano got a call from FPres. Estrada and was told: "Gusto ko kayo
ni Ding Pascual ay tignan ninyo ang pagbili ng Belle Corporation sa stock market. [TSN,
November 7, 2001, p. 77] He thought that the words "tignan ninyo" was an instruction for him.
[Ibid. p. 80] After the instruction he asked the people in the Investment Department of SSS to
take a look and review the shares of Belle as an investment item in the portfolio of SSS and also
to find out to what extent the SSS can further increase the SSS position in the said stock. [Ibid. p.
82]

He got a call from FPres. Estrada the week after and he was asked to see the President at
Malacanang. [Ibid. p. 95] At Malacañang he saw FPres. Estrada with Jaime Dichaves. While he
was there he approached the President who stood up and took him aside and asked whether this
time, he had followed FPres. Estrada’s instructions to buy Belle shares. He replied: "Tinitignan
pa po ng Investment committee namin"; [Ibid. p. 97-104] When he answered this to the
President, he recalled that the reaction of the President was to tell him "Bilisan ninyo na,
bilisan." [Ibid. p. 107] Upon receiving these instructions, he still did not do anything for a few
days after. [Ibid. p. 115]

After several days, he received another call from FPres. Estrada and the latter repeated "Bilisan
mo, bilisan ninyo na." As far as he was concerned, it was more serious than previous orders
given to him. [Ibid. p. 124]

October 9, 1999 while Pascual was abroad, he talked by phone to FPres. Estrada who asked him
"bakit hindi ka pa bumibili ng Belle" to which he replied "tatawag ho ako sa head office at papa-
aralan ko." [TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 56-57] He felt that the President was more serious in
his instructions in the sense that, he was away and there was this telephone call and he felt that
FPres. Estrada was already agitated. [Ibid. p. 24] He ordered the purchase of the Belle Shares on
the same day. The President gave him the instructions to buy and he also made instructions to his
people to buy, that was the chain of events. [Ibid. pp. 68; 74]

For the period October 13-21, 1999, GSIS bought 351,878,000 Belle Shares and paid
P1,102,965,607.50 (Exh. N), and the Social Security System (SSS) bought 329,855,000 Belle
Shares for P744,612,450.00 on October 21, 1999. [TSN, February 14, 2005, p.78]

That the purchase of Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS was the result of the instructions of the
FPres. Estrada is borne out by the following circumstances:
 1. The sequence of events beginning from the time Ocier agreed to the payment of
commission, to the instructions transmitted personally and by telephone calls
from FPres. Estrada to Pascual and Arellano, to the actual purchase of Belle
Shares by GSIS and SSS.
2. The haste with which GSIS and SSS bought Belle Shares. In the case of GSIS,
from October 9, 1999 (when the "agitated instructions" were given) to October
13, 1999 (the date when the first purchases were made) or a period of 4 days. In
the case of SSS, a few days after October 13, 1999, ( the date when the "more
serious" order was given by FPres. Estrada to Arellano) to October 21, 1999 (the
date when the purchases were made) or a period of no more than 8 days. The
instructions to buy originated from FPres. Estrada and cascaded to Pascual and
Arellano then to GSIS and SSS respectively.
3. The obedience to FPres. Estrada’s instructions despite Arellano’s reluctance to do
so because he believed that it was not the proper timing and the volume that was
being considered was too much and not yet the proper time. [TSN, November 7,
2001, p. 102] And in the case of Pascual, his reluctance to buy because he was not
very comfortable with Belle because some people are of the opinion that Belle
Shares, because the corporation is involved in jai-alai and gambling, has
speculative flavor. [TSN, November 22, 2001, Ibid. p. 20]
4. The relationship of Pascual and Arellano to FPres. Estrada, who, being the
appointees and subordinates of FPres. Estrada, cannot refuse the instruction of
their superior.
5. The manner in which the instructions were given. In the case of Arellano, he felt
that the third order was more serious than previous orders given to him. [TSN,
November 7, 2001, p. 124] And, in the case of Pascual, because he felt that FPres.
Estrada was already agitated. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 24]

We find no merit to the claim of the Defense that the prosecution’s evidence itself shows that:
(1) The transaction complained of was perfectly valid, since accused FPres. Estrada did not
direct, order or compel SSS and GSIS to buy Belle Shares and (2) There is no proof that any
commission was paid to the accused. [Defense Memorandum, p. 192]

The denial of FPres. Estrada that he instructed Pascual and Arellano to buy Belle Shares cannot
overcome the straightforward and direct testimony of Pascual and Arellano attesting to the
persistent instructions given by FPres. Estrada which is replete with details. Mere denial by an
accused, particularly when not properly corroborated or substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, cannot prevail over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters. Denial, being in the nature of negative and self-serving evidence, is seldom given
weight in law. Positive and forthright declarations of witnesses are often held to be worthier of
credence than the self-serving denial of the accused. [People v. Quilang, 312 SCRA, 328, 329]

Neither can We give more weight to the claim of the Defense that the purchase of Belle Shares
was a perfectly valid transaction even as it pointed to the following portions of Arellano’s
testimony:
 1. That the purchase of Belle Shares was a routine transaction in the regular course
of business, for SSS had previously purchased Belle Shares at profit;
2. What was told by FPres. Estrada to Arellano was simply to initiate the acquisition
of Belle Shares. How many shares he was ordered to buy and at how much price
per share, was never dealt with in the phone conversation;
3. The above notwithstanding, Arellano proceeded on his own volition with the
acquisition of the 249 Million Belle Shares.
4. The Decision to purchase was exclusively his and the policy making body of SSS.
[Ibid. 193-194, citing TSN, November 8, 2001, pp. 63, 73-74, 75-76]

for prefatory to these actions of the SSS were the instructions given by FPres. Estrada to
Arellano and the compliance with said instructions by Arellano. While it is true that the SSS had
previously granted authority for additional investment by SSS in Belle Shares prior to and up to
1999, it was only in the 1999 purchases that there was an instruction coming from FPres. Estrada
through Arellano to purchase Belle Shares.

The evidence of the Defense show that the 1st Indorsement dated September 29, 1999 re:
proposal to increase by P450,000,000.00 the investment allocation for Belle to total
P1,300,000,000.00 was not signed by Arellano (Exh. 242), contrary to the assertion of the
Defense. [In its formal offer of Evidence on p. 45, Defense claimed that Exh. 247 was executed
by Arellano. Exh. 247 is the same as Exh. 242]

Neither was there any documentary evidence submitted showing the approval by the
Commission of the proposal increasing by 450,000,000 the investment allocation for Belle to
total P1,300,000,000.00.

Likewise, the testimony of Capulong - that he examined and audited all the acquisition papers
and the various confirmation slips and official receipts covering the acquisition and found them
to be in order and hence, he had no objection to, but on the contrary approved the payment of the
said acquisition; that as far as he was concerned, there was nothing illegal or irregular or
anomalous in the SSS purchase of Belle Shares in October 21, 1999 and that it was a legal
investment and a valid investment that is in the list of investment of SSS; that it is not an
irregular investment and it is said that it might be somewhat not ordinary in the sense that in this
case there was a call [Defense Memorandum, p.198, citing TSN, November 14, 2001, p. 53], in
fact corroborates Arellano’s statement that indeed there was a call from FPres. Estrada
instructing the purchase of Belle Shares.

Moreover, Capulong, in his testimony, stated that Belle Corporation Shares were no longer
qualified stocks since Belle had not declared dividends whether in cash or stock in 1997, 1998
and 1999. [TSN, February 14, 2005, p. 75]

He likewise testified that it was former President and Chairman Carlos A. Arellano who directly
gave the orders to the brokers to purchase Belle Shares in behalf of the SSS and he (Capulong)
had nothing to do directly insofar as the acquisition was concerned since his participation is
merely limited to recommend the increase of the funding for the acquisition of the shares. [TSN,
February 11, 2002, p. 11]
Capulong further testified that for the month of October, 1999, the SSS bought 389,855,000
shares with a value of P1,031,126,400.00. [Ibid. p. 38] In his subsequent testimony, Capulong
testified that on October 21, 1999, the SSS bought 249,679,000 shares at the value of
P784,551,150.00 at an average price of P3.14/share. [TSN, February 14, 2005, p. 78] After
October 21, 1999, Belle Shares was on a downward trend going down to the P1.00 level by the
year 2000. By October 23, 2001, it went below P1.00, then it went down to 70 centavos by
February 15, 2001. As of February 11, 2002, it was being traded at 40 to 50 cents. [Ibid. pp. 92-
93]

Capulong further testified that out of the 249,679,000 shares which SSS bought on October 21,
1999 for P784,551,150.00, a total of 96,366,000 shares were sold at an average selling price of
P1.7736/share resulting in a loss amounting to P127,464,710.00. [TSN, February 18, 2002, pp.
94-95]

The Defense argues that the reason why Arellano testified in the manner he did and executed an
affidavit implicating FPres. Estrada in the instant plunder case notwithstanding that there was
nothing irregular, illegal or anomalous in the October 21, 1999 acquisition of Belle Shares was
because his testimonies and affidavit are his last ditch effort to exculpate himself from possible
plunder charges where he may be detained without bail considering that plunder is a capital
offense. [Defense Memorandum, p. 197]

This argument of the Defense are mere allegations and extracted from FPres. Estrada’s testimony
that Arellano called him up and explained the circumstances behind Arellano’s execution of his
Affidavit which are however, uncorroborated.

Neither do we find that the presence of the instruction from FPres. Estrada is negated by the
argument of the Defense that the acquisition by GSIS of Belle Shares, was in accordance with
investment policy and rules.

The Defense sought to establish that the Belle Shares were qualified under GSIS policy and
charter and GSIS may by itself and in accordance with its rules, purchase Belle Shares without
the need of any order or compulsion from anybody as shown by the testimony of Pascual, the
President of GSIS when he admitted that even way back in 1993, GSIS had been purchasing or
dealing with Belle Shares and had already made profits at the extent of around P145,000,000.00
since 1993 up to the present prior to his coming in as the new General Manager of GSIS. [TSN,
November 22, 2001, pp. 61 to 62] That the purchase was in accordance with the GSIS policy was
established by Pascual’s testimony that the trading department under the Corporate Finance
Group investigated and made further inquiries in connection with the shares and concluded that
there would be no violation that could have been committed by GSIS in the purchase of the
shares. [TSN, December 3, 2001, pp. 14 and 15] Pascual further testified that the average price
of P3.14 per share was the worth of the shares around the time it was purchased [TSN,
November 22, 2001, pp. 89-90] and it was reported to him by his people that the reason why they
bought so much was because there was a history of profitability and that they already had a
P1,000,000,000.00 turnover plus and he felt that it was "a good buying afterwards." (sic) [TSN,
November 28, 2001, p. 55]
Nowhere in the argument of the Defense does it establish the absence of the instruction of FPres.
Estrada to Pascual, other than the self-serving denial of FPres. Estrada.

Moreover, as Pascual testified, the GSIS profits in 1999 did not come from Belle Shares.
Furthermore, the fact that GSIS made profits to the extent of around P145,000,000.00 since 1993
did not mean that it made profits from the Belle Shares purchased in 1999. As testified by
Pascual, the actual profit of the GSIS in 1999 did not come from Belle Shares but from other
stocks and there was no contribution to the profit of GSIS from the Belle Shares acquisition
because up to the present they are still holding on to the Belle Shares. [TSN, November 22,
2001, p. 81] Even the evidence of the Defense shows that as of December 29, 2000, the value of
Belle Shares had gone down to P0.69/share from the average purchase price of P3.14/share and
an allowance for probable loss of P374,052,750.00 had been set up (Exh. 250, J-12).

FPres. Estrada’s testimony that he called Pascual to inquire about delayed GSIS benefits is
negated by the fact that after the call to Pascual, the latter gave instructions to buy Belle Shares.
If benefits were being delayed, why would GSIS spend billions of pesos to buy Belle Shares
instead of setting aside these monies to avoid delay in GSIS benefits?

Defense argued that assuming arguendo that there was an instruction from FPres. Estrada for
such purchase, such instruction was not too compelling or irresistible to directly cause the
execution of the purchase suggestion and that such instruction was immaterial because the GSIS
Board which approved the transaction did not receive the alleged instruction of the President and
that in the same vein, the GSIS decided on the purchase independently, free from any
compulsion by an outsider as the instruction given by Pascual was to the effect that a study be
conducted and if the Belle Shares are qualified, to buy within the range of their authority.
[Defense Memorandum, pp. 205-206]

Pascual’s testimony that when he talked to FPres. Estrada and the latter asked him why he had
not bought Belle Shares in an agitated tone; that he did not mention the instruction of FPres.
Estrada to others because the instruction was specific to him; that on October 9, 1999 after his
telephone conversation with FPres. Estrada, he gave the instruction to GSIS to buy Belle Shares
should be afforded stronger weight and more probative value than the arguments of the Defense.
As stated earlier, the Prosecution has established that it was the instructions of FPres. Estrada
that triggered the instructions of Pascual and Arellano to GSIS and SSS respectively which
caused these agencies, in turn to follow the usual procedures established for the purchase of the
shares which finally culminated in the purchase of the Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.

As to Pascual’s testimony that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him for the purchase of a
(sic) particular shares, the Defense pointed out that as per admission of Pascual, what he meant
by unusual was that FPres. Estrada called him when he was out of the country. Defense pointed
out however, that as testified by FPres. Estrada, the latter did not know that Pascual was out of
the country when he called. [Ibid. p. 209] Defense pointed out that, by Pascual’s admission, the
GSIS Board was not pressured into finding that the Belle Shares were okay, above board, and
that they were not pressured by anybody into concluding the purchase. [Ibid. p. 214, citing TSN,
December 3, 2001, p. 93]
We fail to see how the admission of Pascual that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him to
inquire about why GSIS had not purchased Belle Shares in an agitated tone and the statement of
FPres. Estrada that he did not know that Pascual was out of the country at the time he called
Pascual could lead to the conclusion that the GSIS Board was not pressured into finding that the
Belle Shares were "okay," "above board" and that they were not pressured by anybody into
concluding the purchase. The issue was not whether the GSIS Board was pressured into finding
that the Belle Shares purchase was "okay" or "above board," but whether FPres. Estrada
pressured Pascual into ordering GSIS to buy Belle Shares.

The testimonies of defense witnesses, Justice Hermogenes D. Concepcion, Jr., the former
Chairman of GSIS, and Reynaldo Palmiery, Executive Vice-President of GSIS, did not disprove
that FPres. Estrada gave instructions to Pascual for GSIS to buy Belle Shares since, as admitted
by them, they were not aware of such instructions. Nowhere in the testimony of Pascual did he
state that he informed these people of the instructions of FPres. Estrada because, as stated by
Pascual, the instructions were specific to him so he didn’t want to involve his management
anymore. [TSN, November 28, 2001, pp. 9- 10]

The P189,700,000.00 Check No. 6000159271 payable to cash, drawn on

International Exchange Bank with Eastern Securities Corporation as drawer [Exh.
R-R-4]

After the purchase by GSIS and SSS of the Belle Shares, Ocier caused the preparation of a check
by Eastern Securities Development Corporation in the amount of P189,700,000.00 representing
the profit commission to be paid from the sale. [TSN, January 14, 2002, p. 33-36]

Ocier identified International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5,
1999, payable to cashin the amount of P189,700,000.00 with Eastern Securities Corporation as
Drawer. Ocier testified that the check was prepared so that he can hand carry and deliver it to
Dichaves as per their agreement when he agreed to pay P 200,000,000.00 commission. [TSN,
January 7, 2002, p. 49] When asked who was supposed to get the commission, Ocier answered
that according to Jaime Dichaves, President Estrada was supposed to get the commission. [Ibid.
p. 55]

Ocier testified that he delivered the check to the residence of Dichaves in No. 19 Corinthian
Gardens, Quezon City [TSN, January 9, 2002, p. 13] and he delivered the check because he had a
pre-arranged appointment with Dichaves wherein he was supposed to hand the check to
Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 15] Mr. Dichaves arranged the appointment because he wanted Ocier to
explain in person why the check amount is P189,700,000.00 when the pre-agreed amount was
P200,000,000.00. [Ibid. p. 18] Ocier explained that he deducted transaction taxes and brokers’
commissions from the amount of P200,000,000.00 and rounded the figure to P189,700,000 of
(sic) which Dichaves agreed. Ocier learned later on that the check he delivered to Dichaves was
deposited at Far East Bank to the account which he believes belonged to Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 60]

On cross-examination, Ocier admitted that FPres. Estrada was not present when he had his
conversation with Dichaves on the Belle shares on July 20, 1999. [TSN, January 14, 2002, pp.
20-29] Neither did he talk to FPres. Estrada after the check for P189,700,000.00 (Exh. R) was
issued and cleared nor did he inquire from FPres. Estrada whether he received or was credited in
any of his account with the amount stated in the check. [Ibid. pp. 39-40] Ocier likewise testified
that he did not have the opportunity to discuss the profit commission, nor the receipt of the profit
commission nor the Velarde account with FPres. Estrada despite the fact that he had constant
meetings with FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 60-61]

When Ocier was asked if he could say that Dichaves was instructed by FPres. Estrada regarding
the profit commission, Ocier answered that he trusts his cousin Dichaves and whatever the latter
tells him he would normally believe. Ocier also testified that the totality of what he stated in his
affidavit about the instruction, or the representation made by Dichaves was not corroborated or
confirmed by FPres. Estrada or anybody else representing him because it was just between him
and Dichaves. [Ibid. pp. 39-45]

Citing Ocier’s testimony, Defense argues that such testimony on the subject sales and
commission are purely hearsay and does not bind FPres. Estrada. What is clear on the record is
that the commission went to Dichaves as gleaned from Ocier’s testimony. [Defense
Memorandum, p. 221-222]

In an attempt to establish that there was no evidence that FPres. Estrada received any percentage
or commission from the sale of Belle Shares, the Defense pointed out that Capulong’s testimony
indicated that while there was a broker’s commission, which was paid to brokers like Abacus
Securities Corporation. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 215-216, citing TSN, February 11, 2002, pp.
13-16] In the case of the 389,855,000 Belle Shares bought by SSS for P1,031,126,400.00, the
payments went from SSS to the brokers, the buying brokers. [TSN, February 11, 2002, p. 38[

The Court finds that International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5,
1999, payable to cash in the amount of P189,700,000.00 with Eastern Securities Corporation as
Drawer (Exh. R), was paid as commission in consideration of the purchase of Belle Shares by
SSS and GSIS. While the testimony of Ocier to the effect that Dichaves told him that it was
FPres. Estrada who imposed the condition for the payment of commission is hearsay insofar as
FPres. Estrada is concerned, the said testimony is admissible as proof that such statement was
made by Dichaves to Ocier. Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay.
It is admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was true, but that it was in fact made.
If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused.
[Bon vs. People, 419 SCRA 103]

As regards the argument that Capulong’s testimony indicated that while there was a broker’s
commission, this was paid to brokers such as Abacus Securities Corporation and that the
purchase price of P 1,031,126,400.00 for 389,855,000 Belle Shares went from SSS to the buying
brokers, again, we find this argument of the Defense to be unavailing. The issue is not whether
FPres. Estrada received Broker’s commission or received the payment from SSS, but whether he
received the commission mentioned by Dichaves to Ocier as consideration for the purchase of
Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.
Having found that a commission was paid in consideration of the purchase of Belle Shares by
SSS and GSIS, the next issue that this Court must determine is whether the commission went to
FPres. Estrada or Dichaves.

The paper trail for International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271

First: Far East Bank and Trust Co. (Cubao-Araneta Branch)

In tracking the check (Exh. R), Prosecution presented Ms. Yolanda de Leon, (De Leon), Senior
Manager of BPI (Cubao-Araneta Branch) formerly Far East Bank and Trust Co. [BPI merged
with Far East Bank sometime in 2000] De Leon testified that Dichaves was one of the valued
clients of the Bank and that Jaime Dichaves and Abby Dichavez had joint current and savings
accounts with then Far East Bank and Trust Company in 1999. The Current Account had the No.
0007-05558-7 and the Savings Account had the No. 0107-38639-9 (C/A No. 0007-05558-7 and
S/A No. 0107-38639-9). [TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 23-24; (Exhs. BB and Z)] She identified
the microfilm copy of International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 [Ibid. p. 39-41;
Exh. DD] dated November 5, 1999 in the amount of P189,700,000.00 as the check that was
deposited to the savings account of Dichaves on November 5, 1999 as evidenced by the
microfilm of the deposit slip [Ibid. pp. 42-44; Exh. EE] and the bank statement of account for
S/A No. 0107-38639-9 dated November 30, 1999. [Ibid. pp. 48-49; Exh. FF, FF-1]

She testified that on November 9, 1999, the amount of P189,700,000.00 was auto- transferred
from S/A No.0107-38639-9 to C/A No.0007-05558-7 as appearing in the Statement of Accounts
for S/A No. 0107-38639-9 and C/A No. 0007-05558-7. [Id.; Exh. FF-2; Exh. GG, GG-1] She
also testified that Jaime Dichaves drew a check against C/A No. 0007-05558-7 in the amount of
P189,700,000.00 as evidenced by Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 3165579, a
microfilm copy of which she identified. [Ibid. p. 52-53; Exh. HH] She testified that at the dorsal
portion of the microfilm copy of Check No. 3165579, there appears an account number 160-
625015 [Ibid. p. 56; Exh. HH-4] but she could not identify the bank that the account belongs
because the bank indorsement of the other bank was not clearly visible. She further testified that
both C/A No. 0007-05558-7 and S/A No. 0107-38639-9 were closed as of February 29, 2000 and
March 31, 2000 respectively. [Ibid. p. 57; Exhs. II and JJ]

On cross-examination, De Leon testified that she had no hand in the preparation of the Statement
of Accounts marked as Exhs. FF, ZZ, II and JJ. [Ibid. p. 84]

The Court finds that International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November 5,
1999 was deposited to Far East Bank and Trust Co. S/A No. 0107-38639-9 of Jaime
Dichaves and auto-transferred to C/A No.0007-05558-7 of Jaime Dichaves who drew from the
latter account, Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 3165579 for P189,700,000.00.

Second: EPCIB Greenhills-Ortigas Branch to EPCIB Binondo Branch S/A 0160-

62501-5 with the Account Name Jose Velarde

The prosecution’s evidence on the deposit of Far East Bank Araneta Check No.
3165579 which was the subject of an inter-bank deposit from EPCIB Greenhills Ortigas Branch
to EPCIB Binondo Branch Account No. 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde consisted in
the testimony of Ms. Glyzelyn Bejec, the Teller who processed the Deposit Receipt marked as
Exhibit I5. She testified that as of November 8, 1999, she was assigned to the EPCI Bank
Greenhills Ortigas Branch as Customer Service Assistant Teller with Teller Identification No. 8.
Her basis for indicating the number "0160-62501-5" in the Deposit Receipt was the Account
Information Slip which is filled in by the depositor or the representative of the depositor. [TSN,
May 6, 2002, pp. 46-47; 61]

After she was given the Account Information Slip together with the four checks, she first verified
the face of the check as to the date, the amount in words and figures, after which she stamped the
non-negotiable endorsement at the back of each check, and also, she wrote down the account
number indicated on the Account Information Slip given to her. She wrote down the account no.
0160-62501-5 at the dorsal portion of the check after which she deposited the checks to the
Account No. indicated in the Account Information Slip. [Ibid. p. 65; 68]

She explained that the deposit process involved first, encoding the account number given in the
Account Information Slip, after which she swiped each check on the check reader and encoded
the amount on each check and after that a deposit receipt was generated. After she had encoded
the account number and the amounts of the four (4) checks that she processed for deposit the
account name that reflected in the computer was "Jose Velarde." [Ibid. p. 69-70]

The checks that she processed for deposit were forwarded to their distributing for safekeeping
and microfilming the next day. When she was shown the certified copy of Far East Bank
Check No. 3165579 in the amount of P189,700,000.00 from the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation, she testified that this was the same check she processed and she identified the
dorsal portion where she wrote Account No. 160-625-015 (sic). Her other means of identifying
the check was her Teller ID no.8 which appears at the check (Exh U4-1) and she identified the
account holder of the check as Jaime C. Dichaves or Abe (sic) C. Dichaves and she attested that
the check is payable to cash. She testified that the Bank accepts checks even if not endorsed by
the depositor she accepted the check even without endorsement because it was given to her by
the Branch Manger for deposit. [Ibid. p. 72-84]

On cross-examination she testified that she threw away the Account Information Slip because the
deposit receipt had been generated or the transaction has been validated in the deposit receipt.
[Ibid, p. 89]

To corroborate the testimony of Ms. Bejec, the prosecution presented Ms. Teresa Barcelona, the
Branch Manager of the EPCIB Greenhills-Ortigas Branch during the period November, 1999.
She identified inter-bank deposit receipt dated 8 November 1999 which was previously marked
as Exh. I5 issued by the EPCIB Greenhills-Ortigas Branch for deposit to account number 0160-
62501-5 with the account name Jose Velarde. The transaction is an inter-bank deposit of four (4)
checks to the account of Jose Velarde maintained at the Binondo Branch. [TSN, May 15, 2002,
p. 80] The total amount of the four (4) checks is P263,292,303.65 of which one check is issued
by Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch with Check No. 3165579 amounting to
P189,700,000.00. [Ibid. p. 81; Exh. U4-1]
The person who transacted the inter-bank deposit with the EPCIB Greenhills Ortigas Branch was
Ms. Baby Ortaliza who transacted personally with the witness and it was Ms. Baby Ortaliza who
received the third copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder. [Ibid. p. 82] This transaction
was processed by Teller Glezelyn Bejec as her Teller ID appears in the deposit receipt. [Id.]

The Defense argued that Bejec stated that the checks were handed to her by the Branch Manager,
Teresa Barcelona and not by the person who made the deposit, and that the depositor did not
appear before her. Not one of the bank personnel or any other witness presented by the
prosecution testified that FPres. Estrada had any participation in the opening of Current Account
No.000110-525495-4 (sic) and Savings Account No. 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde,
nor its closing. Not one of the prosecution witnesses testified as to the source of the funds
deposited in the said accounts. Nor was there any witness who could identify any of the persons
who issued the checks deposited under the said account and under what circumstances the same
were issued. In short, there is no proof that FPres. Estrada "willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amassed, accumulated and acquired ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P 3.2 Million (sic)."
Neither is there proof that this money came from "commissions, gifts, percentages, kickbacks or
any form of pecuniary benefits given to him" as the source of said money have not been
identified or traced. There is no evidence to show that he had enriched himself at the expense of
the Filipino people. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 242-243]

At any rate, Defense argues that the documents submitted as exhibits by the prosecution only
tend to prove what checks were deposited to the said Account No.0160-62501-5 of Equitable
PCI Bank in the name of Jose Velarde. [Ibid. p. 242]

The Court finds that the Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch Check No.
3165579 amounting to P189,700,000.00 drawn by Dichaves was deposited to EPCIB S/A No.
0160-62501-5 account of Jose Velarde as part of the deposit to said account totaling
P263,292,303.65 (Exh. I5; U4-1; 127-L).

The link between FPres. Estrada and the Jose Velarde Account

In discharging its burden of proof to establish that the Jose Velarde Account belong to FPres.
Estrada, the prosecution relied on the following:

1. The testimony of Clarissa Ocampo that she saw Fpres. Estrada signed
"Jose Velarde" on the Debit-Credit instruction for S/A 0160-62501-5
(Exh. E5);
2. The admission of FPres. Estrada [TSN, May 24, 2006, p. 23] that he
signed "Jose Velarde" on Exh. E5;
3. The many bank transactions of Baby Ortaliza involving the personal
accounts of FPres. Estrada and his family, the personal account of Loi
Estrada and the Jose Velarde Account;
4. The use of the Jose Velarde Current Account for the purchase of the
Boracay Mansion;
5. The funding that the Jose Velarde Account received from the Urban Bank
Special Trust Account of FPres. Estrada’s son, Jose Victor Ejercito; and
 6. The customary signing of FPres. Estrada as "Jose."

The signatures of FPres. Estrada as "Jose Velarde" in the Investment Management

Agreement (IMA), Signature Cards, Investment Guidelines, Directional Letters, and
Debit-Credit Authority for EPCIB CA/SA 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde

Clarissa Ocampo testified that after explaining the documents being presented for his signature,
she and Atty. Curato saw FPres. Estrada signed as "Jose Velarde" on the three (3) copies of the
Investment Management Agreement (IMA) [Exh. W4 to Y4 ; TSN November 13, 2002, pp. 70 -
73], two (2) signature cards (Exh. Z4; A5) which he signed three (3) times [TSN, November 13,
2002, pp. 78-80], one (1) copy of the Investment Guidelines (Exh. B5; Ibid. pp. 82-84), two (2)
copies of the Directional Letters (Exh. C5 to D5; Ibid. pp. 87-89), and one (1) copy of the Debit-
Credit Authority (Exh. E5). [Ibid. pp. 92-93] Her testimony regarding the Debit-Credit Authority
in particular was as follows:

OMB. MARCELO

Q After these two exhibits marked as Exhibit C to the 5th power and D to the
th
5 power were signed by the former President and handed by you to Atty. Curato what
happened next?

A I was preparing to go and then I recalled that there was an envelope that was given
to me by the banking side which contained the funding medium and so I looked at it, I
pulled out the document inside the envelope, I read it and then I gave it to the President
for signing.

Q After giving it to the President what happened next?

A Actually, I explained to him that the letter of instruction which is a debit/credit

authority, I told him that the banking side gave it to me which authorizes the bank to
actually debit or draw 500 Million from his account so I was pointing at the account
number in the debit/credit authority so debit his account draw 500 Million and credit the
same amount to trust for funding of his loan to Wellex sir.

Q What was his reaction to your explanation?

A He was nodding his head sir.

Q After he nodded his head what happened?

A He signed the document and I saw him signed.

OMB. MARCELO

Q What was the signature affixed by the former President?

 A He signed as Jose Velarde.

Q After the former President signed this document as Jose Velarde what happened, if
any?

A I got the document and then I looked at it and I passed it on to Atty. Curato." [TSN,
November 13, 2002, pp. 92-93]

On May 24, 2006, FPres. Estrada testified as follows:

Q Ms. Ocampo and Atty. Curato testified before this court that you signed as
Jose Velarde in the documents that you have just identified awhile ago and you
signed as Jose Velarde, what can you say as to that testimony?

A THAT IS TRUE. "PINIRMAHAN KO PO IYAN DAHIL PO SA PAKIUSAP

NI MR. JAIME DE CHAVES (SIC) NA OKAY NA RAW PO YONG INTERNAL
ARRANGEMENT SA BANGKO AT PARA PALABASIN NA AKO ANG MAY
ARI NG JOSE VELARDE ACCOUNT PARA MASIGURO PO NA YONG
KANILANG PINAUTANG, IPAUUTANG SA WELLEX GROUP OF
COMPANIES NI MR. WILLIAM GATCHALIAN AY SIGURADONG
BABAYARAN. AYAW PO NILA SANANG PAUTANGIN SI MR.GATCHALIAN
BAKA HINDI DAW PO MAKABAYAD SA TAKDANG PANAHON. [TSN, May
24, 2006, p. 23; Emphasis Supplied]

William Gatchalian is a big businessman. isang malaking negosyante at siya po ay may

ari ng Wellex group of companies at siya rin po ay isa sa tumulong sa aming partido
noong nakaraang 1998 presidential election. [Ibid, p. 25]

Q Now, you were requested by Mr. Jaime de Chaves (sic) to make it appear that you
own the Jose Velarde account and that there was an internal arrangement between you
and Mr. de Chaves (sic) I ask you now Mr. President, when did you agree to such request
and arrangement?

A Hindi lang po dahil doon sa internal arrangement. Hindi lang po dahil gusto kong
tulungan si Mr. William Gatchalian kundi higit po sa lahat ay nakita ko ang kapakanan
noong mahigit na tatlong libong (3000) empleyado na kung sakaling hindi mapapautang
si Mr. William Gatchalian, maaring magsara ang kanyang mga kumpanya at yong mga
taong, mahigit tatlong libong (3,000) empleyado kasama na yong kanilang mga pamilya
ay mawawalan ng trabaho. AT INISIP KO RING NA WALA NAMING (SIC)
GOVERNMENT FUNDS NA INVOLVE KAYA HINDI NA PO AKO
NAGDALAWANG ISIP NA PIRMAHAN KO." [Ibid. p. 26-27; Emphasis Supplied]

In the Debit-Credit Authority signed by FPres. Estrada as Jose Velarde for EPCIB S/A No. 0160-
62501-5, the following words expressly appear:
 . . . my SA/CA No.0160-62501-5 maintained with your branch in the amount of
P500,000,000.00 and credit my Trust Account No. 101-78056-1 representing my initial
contribution (Exh. E5-3). [Emphasis Supplied]

Lucena "Baby" Ortaliza and the bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and the Jose
Velarde Account

To establish the close relationship and trust of FPres. Estrada and his family on Lucena "Baby"
Ortaliza, the prosecution presented REMEDIOS AXALAN AGUILA, Personnel officer of the
Office of the Vice- President (OVP).

She testified that Ortaliza was appointed VP Staff Officer II from January 2, 1996 to June 30,
1998 by FPres. Estrada. Being in the immediate staff of the Vice-President, she has the trust and
confidence of the Vice-President and she can report anywhere, anytime as may be directed by the
Vice-President. [TSN, May 22, 2002, pp. 21-24]

Likewise, the Prosecution presented Linda P. Sison, Presidential Officer VI, Chief Personnel
Data Bank, Office of the President. She testified that Ortaliza was employed in the office of the
President on July 1, 1998 and appointed Presidential Staff Officer VI by FPres. Estrada. She was
assigned to the internal house affairs office which normally attends to the needs of the President
and members of the family. She resigned effective September 30, 2000 as "Private Secretary VI"
in a letter of resignation dated October 4, 2000. [Ibid. pp. 47-48]

To establish that Baby Ortaliza transacted for the bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and his family
the Prosecution presented Salvador Serrano, Vice-President, Centralized Operations and Control
Division of Security Banking Corporation. He identified the Investment Savings Account
Agreement of FPres. Estrada [Exh. C14-C14-8] in the amount of P10,000,000.00 with Security
Bank San Juan Branch where, above the typewritten name "Joseph E. Estrada" under the word
"Conforme" appears the signature of Baby Ortaliza and he was told by the New Accounts Clerk
of the San Juan Branch that Baby Ortaliza is the representative of FPres. Estrada. [TSN, May 8,
2002, pp. 79-81; 87-90; 128-129]

The witness also identified the purchase of T-Bills by FPres. Estrada evidenced by Confirmation
Sale No. 81046 (Exh. C14-9 to C14-16) value date April 10, 1997 where there appears the
signature of Baby Ortaliza above TS No. 96848. [TSN, May 8, 2002, p. 114]

The Prosecution also presented Ms. Pamela Moran who testified that Ms. Ortaliza was the only
one person transacting the accounts of FPres. Estrada when she was in charge of the New
Accounts Section of the Security Bank San Juan Branch. [TSN, May 15, 2002, p. 146; pp.149-
152]

The Prosecution further presented Patrick Dee Cheng of Citibank who testified that in the Hold-
All-Mail Agreement signed by Ms. Luisa P. Ejercito, her designated representative was Ms.
Lucena "Baby" Ortaliza. [TSN, October 7, 2002; pp. 80-83; Exhs. B11; C11 and sub-markings]
The Prosecution presented Ms. Marie Rose Ancheta Claudio who was Branch Manager of Urban
Bank Greenhills Branch from 1998. [TSN, March 26, 2003, p. 92] She identified the Letter of
Authority dated November 23, 1999 addressed to Urban Bank Greenhills Branch (Exh. I19) for
issuance of three (3) Managers’ Checks in the amounts of P42,716,554.22, P10,875,749.43 and P
54,161,496.52, where the words "Received By: Baby Ortaliza" appeared. As per the witness,
however, it was not Baby Ortaliza who received the check as she herself gave the Manager’s
Checks directly to the client, Joseph Victor G. Ejercito. [TSN, March 26, 2003, p. 168]

Having presented evidence that Baby Ortaliza transacted for FPres. Estrada and family with the
Banks where FPres. Estrada and Family had accounts, the prosecution then presented evidence
of the transactions by Ortaliza in relation to the Jose Velarde Account to establish that FPres.
Estrada owns the Jose Velarde accounts.

Thus, the prosecution presented Teresa A. Barcelona who testified that Baby Ortaliza transacted
with her personally for the deposit of P 143,000,000.00 (Exh. M5 and submarkings) into the Jose
Velarde S/A No. 0160- 62501-5 account and it was Baby Ortaliza who received the copy of the
deposit receipt for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 76-80]

Likewise, Baby Ortaliza transacted with her personally for the deposit of the amount of
P263,292,303.65 [Exh. I5and submarkings] to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it
was Baby Ortaliza who received the copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder. [TSN,
May 15, 2002, pp. 80-82] Baby Ortaliza also transacted with her for the deposit of the amount of
P40,000,000.00 (Exh. N5 and submarkings) to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it
was Baby Ortaliza who received the copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder. [TSN,
May 15, 2002, pp. 83-85] Baby Ortaliza transacted with her for the deposit of P163,500,000.00
(Exh.Q5 and submarkings) to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it was Baby
Ortaliza who received the copy intended for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 89-92]

The prosecution further presented Melissa P. Pascual former bank Teller of EPCIB Virra Mall
Branch who testified that she personally processed various checks (Exhs. V15; W15; X15; Y15;
A16, inclusive of submarkings) deposited by Ms. Ortaliza to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5.

She was sure it was Baby Ortaliza who deposited these checks because their branch is so small
that everytime she comes to their branch, her voice is too loud so she would catch her attention.
She would see Ortaliza give the checks to her officer which the officer would give to her for
validation, for processing. [TSN, December 9, 2002, pp. 21-23; 35; 37-39]

The purchase of the "Boracay Mansion" for P142 Million from money which came
from the EPCIB C/A-0110- 25495-4 of Jose Velarde

The prosecution presented evidence to show that the purchase of the Boracay Mansion was
initiated by a check No. 0110-714951 dated October 5, 1999 issued by Jose Velarde from his
EPCIB C/A No. 0110-25495-4 in the amount of P 142,000,000.00 payable to Jose Luis J. Yulo
(hereafter Yulo) (Exh. G16) who deposited the same to his BPI C/A No. 0383-0748-27 which
was a joint account with Ma. Carmen L. Yulo. [TSN, December 9, 2002, p. 114-125; Exh. F16]
Subsequently, on October 8, 1999, Yulo issued BPI Check No. 0002129 (Exh. U16; T16) from his
BPI Current Account which was deposited to the account of St. Peter Holdings Corporation
which, in turn, the latter used to buy three Managers’ Checks, one for P86,766,960.00 payable to
Vicente AS Madrigal and/or Gerardo Madrigal as sellers of the Boracay Property (Exh. V16;
W16); another for P53,931,535.60 payable to Mercedes A. Reyes (broker) (Exh. X16) and the
third for P1,301,504.40 payable to Vicente AS Madrigal and/or Gerardo AS Madrigal for
payment of documentary stamps (Exh. Y16). [TSN December 16, 2002, pp. 29-51] To establish
that the Boracay Property was, in reality, owned by FPres. Estrada, Prosecution presented a tag
in the carpet indicating the name: "Pres. J. Estrada" (Exh. H19-H-2) [TSN, March 19, 2003]; a
"Locator Slip" which bears the words "Approved By; MS.LAARNI N. ENRIQUEZ," (Exh. H19)
a school correspondence for FPres. Estrada’s child with Laarni Enriquez, namely: Ejercito, Ma.
Jerika Larize (Exh. H19-a), and portion of the testimony of Chavit Singson where he mentioned
that FPres. Estrada’s new house in New Manila was called Boracay. [TSN, July 24, 2002, pp.
129-134] However, Jose Luis Yulo, whom the prosecution portrayed as the dummy of FPres.
Estrada in the purchase of the Boracay Mansion was not charged as an accused in this case
which presented a legal issue as to the propriety of attachment covering the said property during
the pendency of this criminal case.

The funding of the Jose Velarde Account from the Urban Bank Account of Jose
Victor Ejercito

The prosecution presented Marie Rose Ancheta Claudio who testified that JV Ejercito was the
owner of Special Account No. (SPAN) 858 with Urban Bank pursuant to a Trust Agreement
executed between JV Ejercito and Urban Bank Trust Dept. [TSN, March 26, 2003, pp. 98-99]
Ma. Aileen C. Tiongson testified that Urban Bank Manager’s Check No. 43222 (Exh. W19) for
P75, 000,000.00 came from a pre-terminated placement of SPAN 858. [TSN, April 2, 2003, pp.
20-21] This Urban Bank Manager’s Check No. 43222 was subsequently replaced by four (4)
Manager’s Checks Nos. 39975, 39976, 39977 and 39978 (Exhs. B 15-2, B15-4, B15-6 and B15-8)
in the respective amounts of P70,000,000, P2,000,000.00, P2,000,000.00 and P1,000,000.00
(Exhs. B15-2-9).

Subsequently, on January 24, 2000, these four (4) checks were deposited to EPCIB S/A No.
0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde (Exh. B 15; Exh. 127-N).

Likewise, as mentioned earlier, three (3) Urban Bank Manager’s Checks for the amounts of
P10,875,749.43, P42,716,554.22 and P54,161,496.52 (Exh. I5-17, I5-18 and O5-2), received by
JV Ejercito were deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde (Exh. I5).

Prosecution’s Evidence to show that it was customary for FPres. Estrada to sign as
"Jose"

Prosecution presented Marianito M. Dimaandal who identified various official documents which
showed the signature of FPres. Estrada as reading "Jose" instead of "Joseph" (Exhs. X19 to
R20 ). [TSN March 31, 2003, pp.40-47]

Based on the forgoing testimonial and documentary evidence, it is the contention of the
Prosecution that it has established that FPres. Estrada is the real and beneficial owner of EPCIB
Savings Account No. 0160-62501-5 and Current Account No. 0110-25495-4 in the name of Jose
Velarde.

The theory of the defense on the Jose Velarde Account

In attempting to prove that the Jose Velarde account was owned by Jaime Dichaves and not by
FPres. Estrada, the defense presented Romuald Dy Tang and Beatriz Bagsit as their witnesses in
addition to FPres. Estrada.

Romuald Dy Tang testified that in 1999, he was connected with EPCI Bank as its SVP and
Treasurer. The Chairman, Mr. George L. Go referred Mr. Dichaves to him because Go told him
that Dichaves wanted to open a current account under an alias instead of his name. Mr. Dichaves
also called him up and told him the same. He knows Mr. Dichaves because the wife of Jaime
Dichaves is the sister of his sister-in-law. In effect, the wife of his brother and Jaime’s wife are
sisters. What he knows is Dichaves has a lot of business, substantial business and one of his
major businesses is plaster glass. [TSN, May 4, 2005, pp.11,15, 17, 18]

When he was called by Dichaves over the phone, the latter told him that Mr. Go referred him to
Dy Tang to open an alias account for him. Based on that, Dy Tang told Dichaves to prepare a
letter for records indicating his intention and Dichaves sent him a letter saying that he is opening
an account under the name Jose Velarde and everything should be so…for safekeeping. [Ibid. p.
20] Dy Tang identified the letter dated August 25, 1999(Exh. 127 to 127 B-1). [Ibid. pp. 20-21]
The letter was given to him on the day Dichaves went to his office to get the signature cards.
[Id.] He gave the signature card personally to Dichaves and he did not see Dichaves sign the
signature card because he was late for an appointment and both of them had prepared for such
appointment and so Dy Tang gave the signature card to Dichaves and told him to return the
same. [Ibid, p.22] He opened two accounts one savings and one current. It was a combo account.
The signature card was returned after about a month or so, after a follow up with him and after
he followed several procedures. [Id.] Both he and Betty Bagsit were jointly assisting Mr.
Dichaves. Ms. Bagsit had to assist because if he will be the only one and he travels quite often,
Mr. Dichaves will not have anybody to attend to his account. At that time Betty Bagsit was based
in the Pacific Star branch in Makati and the Jose Velarde Account was a Binondo Account where
the ledgers of the Velarde Account were kept. [Ibid., pp. 26-28] He testified that all the fixed
(time) deposits of Dichaves were moved in the branch of Bagsit in Pacific Star. [Id.]

In his sworn statement with the Ombudsman on March 23, 2001 (Exh. 327-327-C), Dy Tang
stated that he received a letter from Dichaves advising them that all transaction for the Jose
Velarde account should be coursed through him. He instructed Mr. Ceferino Ang, Vice President
and Manager of Binondo Branch to cause the opening of the account. He knows Mr. Dichaves
personally because he was referred by Mr. George Go to him and because he is the brother-in-
law of Dy Tang’s brother. He went to the office to pick up the forms for the opening of the
account sometime in late August 1999. Mr. Jaime Dichaves opened the account but Dy Tang
does not know if he opened it for himself or another person. He gave the signature cards for
Dichaves to fill up. The accomplished signature cards were given to him by Mr. Go. He was
not present when the depositor affixed his specimen signature in the said signature card as
it was given to him accomplished by Mr. Go.
Beatriz L. Bagsit came into Equitable Bank as head of Pacific Star branch with rank of AVP and
when they acquired PCI Bank in 1999, she was promoted to 1st VP and the division head who
handled the Makati area. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 63]

She retired from the bank because of politics in the bank and the Jose Velarde case was coming
up. She was the one handling the Jose Velarde account which was being handled also by Mr.
Jaime Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 65] The Jose Velarde account started at Binondo Branch. It was opened
there and when her superiors transferred to Makati, they called her to handle the account of Jose
Velarde and she was introduced to Mr. Dichaves by their Executive Vice-President, Romy Dy
Tang for her to handle the account personally. [Ibid. p. 66]

There is no Jose Velarde who owns an account with their bank. Her basis for saying that Jose
Velarde account belongs to Mr. Jaime Dichaves is that there was a letter that was given to her
that came from Mr. Dichaves when the account was opened in Binondo. When the account was
opened in Binondo, she was not handling the management of the same. The Jose Velarde
account was never transferred to Makati. It was just the handling that was transferred sometime
in November, 1999. [Ibid, pp. 68-70]

Based on the letter (Exh. 127) it would appear that the Jose Velarde account belonged to Jaime
Dichaves because it was Mr. Jaime Dichaves who issued the letter stating that all banking
transaction of Jose Velarde should be coursed to him. The letter was shown to her by Mr. Dy
Tang in November, 1999. She does not remember the exact date when she was told by Dy Tang
to handle the account of Mr. Dichaves in the name Jose Velarde. She was first informed about it
in Dy Tang’s office and after that there was a time when Dichaves went to Dy Tang’s office and
that was the time she was introduced to Dichaves. She first met Mr. Dichaves in January, 2000.
After she was introduced to Dichaves, there were times when he would call her for a transaction
and there were times he went to her office. Sometimes Dichaves will tell her that he will be
sending somebody to get the MC which he wants her to prepare and sometimes he would ask for
the balance. [Ibid, pp. 72-96] Mr. Dichaves came to her office twice or thrice only. One is when
he visited Mr. Dy Tang, the other one is when he just passed by, just to check the account of Jose
Velarde and he gave her instruction that he will be sending representative to prepare an MC for
him that was after the February 4, 2000 transaction. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 59]

She does not know if Dichaves has an account in her area, she thinks there is none but she does
not know with other branches. The records she had access to regarding the Jose Velarde Account
were the signature card and the copy of the letter. The name "Dichaves" does not appear in the
signature card. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 76-84]

She saw the debit-credit authorization on her table and she kept it and did not give it to anybody.
[Ibid. p. 116] After Clarissa Ocampo was presented at the impeachment proceedings, Clarissa
called her and she told Clarissa "Kissa, hindi sa akin galing yong debit/credit" because Clarissa
was asking her if she was at the bank working and she told Clarissa that the bank was really
bleeding and she took the opportunity to tell her "Kissa, hindi sa akin galing yon. Saan ba galing
yon?". [Ibid. p. 118] She testified that Clarissa was just surprised and asked her "saan ba galing
yon?". Where did it come from? She answered she didn’t know but it didn’t come from her.
That’s all she told Clarissa. After that there was a follow-up from Atty. Curato asking her if she
did not really issue the authorization and she told him "No talaga eh. Sabi ko, hanapin natin kung
saan talaga galing." She testified that later on, it was confirmed that it came from the Trust
Department. [Ibid. p. 118-119] She testified that the Prefix Number for a Binondo Account was
0110 but she could not remember the Prefix Number for the Pacific Star Branch. [Ibid. p. 93] In
her computation, the credits to the EPCIB Jose Velarde S/A No.0160-62501-5 totaled
P2,168,523,085.00 excluding centavos and credit memos. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 98]

The Court finds that the FPres. Estrada is the real and beneficial owner of EPCIB combo account
C/A No. 0110-25495-4 and S/A No. 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde.

The eyewitness account of Prosecution witness Clarissa Ocampo that she saw FPres. Estrada
signed the name Jose Velarde in the various documents presented to him and explained to him
was undisputed by FPres. Estrada and constitutes direct evidence that FPres. Estrada signed as
Jose Velarde.

Another direct evidence that FPres. Estrada is Jose Velarde is the admission of FPres. Estrada
that he signed as Jose Velarde in the documents presented to him by Clarissa Ocampo. One of
such documents was the Debit-Credit Authority (Exh. E5) which read: "...my SA/CA No.0160-
62501-5 maintained with your branch in the amount of P500,000,000.00 and credit my Trust
Account No. 101-78056-1 representing my initial contribution." Such admission constitutes an
admission that he and Jose Velarde are one and the same person. Being a judicial admission, no
proof is required and may be given in evidence against him (Rule 129, SEC.4; Rule 130, SEC.
26).Being an admission against interest, it is the best evidence which affords the greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no
man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to
presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not. [Rufina
Patis Factory vs Alusitain, 434 SCRA 429]

The evidence of the Prosecution which showed that Baby Ortaliza - a trusted person of FPres.
Estrada and who enjoyed the confidence of FPres. Estrada and Loi Ejercito - transacted the
various personal bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and Loi Ejercito as well as the Jose Velarde
accounts, also constitutes corroborative evidence that the Jose Velarde Accounts are owned by
FPres. Estrada and not by Dichaves, since Baby Ortaliza has been entrusted by FPres. Estrada to
handle his own personal bank accounts and there is no evidence that Dichaves and Baby Ortaliza
are related in any way to each other.

The evidence of the Prosecution that the Boracay Mansion was purchased from funds coming
from the Jose Velarde accounts is yet another corroborative evidence that proved that the Jose
Velarde accounts are owned by FPres. Estrada. The documents found in the Boracay Mansion
show that the beneficial owner of the Boracay Mansion is FPres. Estrada and is used by Laarni
Enriquez whose relation to FPres. Estrada was never denied.

Likewise, the evidence of the Prosecution which showed that three (3) Urban Bank Manager’s
Checks for the amounts of P10,875,749.43, P42,716,554.22 and P54,161,496.52 (Exh. I5-17, I5-
18 and O5-2), received by JV Ejercito as well as the four (4) Urban Bank Manager’s Checks
totaling P75,000,000.00 (Exhs. B 15-2, B15-4, B15-6 and B-15-8) were deposited to EPCIB S/A
No. 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde constitutes corroborative evidence that, as between FPres.
Estrada and Dichaves, it can be inferred that JV Ejercito, being the son of FPres. Estrada, would
contribute to the account of his father but not if the account were owned by Dichaves in the
absence of proof that JV Ejercito was under obligation to deposit to the said account if the same
was owned by Dichaves.

The evidence of the Prosecution that it was customary for FPres. Estrada to sign as "Jose" shows
that FPres. Estrada would sign as "Jose" and further shows that, to the naked eye, the signature of
FPres. Estrada as "Jose" appearing in the various official documents signed by FPres. Estrada is
similar to the signature of "Jose" appearing in "Jose Velarde."

As to the reliance of the Defense on the testimonies of Dy Tang and Bagsit to prove that the Jose
Velarde accounts belong to Jaime Dichaves, We find that such reliance is misplaced.

Dy Tang testified that after Mr. George Go referred Dichaves to him, he told Dichaves to prepare
a letter for records indicating his intention and Dichaves sent him a letter saying that he is
opening an account under the name Jose Velarde and everything should be so…for safekeeping.
[TSN, May 4, 2005, p. 20] Dy Tang identified the letter dated August 25, 1999. [Ibid. pp. 20-21;
Exh. 127 to 127 B-1]

The Letter of Dichaves dated August 25, 1999 reads as follows:

Dear Romy,

May I request that a savings account and a current account be opened with your Juan
Luna branch for Jose Velarde c/o the undersigned.

All other banking transactions of Jose Velarde shall be coursed through the undersigned.

Very truly yours,

(sgd)

Jaime Dichaves

The Letter of Dichaves does not prove that he is the owner of the Jose Velarde
Account. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the Jose Velarde Account is owned by Dichaves,
why did he not deposit the International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated
November 5, 1999, payable to cash in the amount of P189,700,000.00 drawn by Eastern
Securities Corporation directly to the Jose Velarde Account? If Dichaves owned the Jose Velarde
Account, why did he take the circuitous route of depositing the International Exchange Bank into
his Far East Bank Savings Account, then auto transfer the amount to his Current Account, then
issue his personal check payable to cash for P189,700,000.00 which was ultimately deposited to
the Jose Velarde Account?
It could not be because he did not want evidence to prove that the International Exchange Bank
check was deposited to his account because he, in fact, deposited that check to his personal
account.

The only logical conclusion is that Dichaves did not want evidence to show that the International
Exchange Bank check of Eastern Securities Corporation was deposited to the Jose Velarde
Account because such deposit would confirm that FPres. Estrada, once proven to own the Jose
Velarde Account, received the P189,700,000.00 commission arising from the purchase by SSS
and GSIS of Belle Shares.

Dichaves’ act of covering the paper trail of the International Exchange Bank check of Eastern
Securities Corporation, albeit unsuccessfully, militates against the claim of the Defense that
Dichaves owns the Jose Velarde Account.

In his Sworn Statement dated March 23, 2001 (Exh. 327), Dy Tang stated that Jaime Dichaves
opened the account but Dy Tang does not know if he opened it for himself or another person. He
gave the signature card for Dichaves to fill up. The signature card was returned after about a
month or so, after a follow up with him and after he followed several procedures. [TSN dated
May 4, 2005, p. 22] The signature card was given to him by George L. Go already accomplished.
He was not present when the depositor affixed his specimen signature in the said signature card
as it was given to him accomplished by George L. Go.

In the signature card, it appears that it was opened on August 26, 1999 but it was received only
on October 7, 1999. Likewise, the signature card bore the signature "Jose Velarde" three times
(Exh. G19, G19-6).

In his testimony, Dy Tang testified that he doesn’t think that it would be Dichaves signing as
Jose Velarde because when Mr. Dichaves called him about his discussion with Mr. Go to open
an account, Dichaves told him that he was going to open an account under an alias account.
[TSN, May 4, 2005, p. 44] Nowhere did Dy Tang testify that Dichaves is the owner of the Jose
Velarde account.

As appears in the signature card, the signature of Jose Velarde is almost identical to the signature
of Jose Velarde appearing on the three (3) copies of the Investment Management Agreement
[Exh. W4 to Y4; TSN November 13, 2002, pp. 70-73], two (2) signature cards (Exh. Z4 to A5)
which he signed three (3) times [TSN, November 13, 2002, pp. 78-80] one (1) copy of the
Investment Guidelines [Exh. B5; Ibid. pp. 82-84]; two (2) copies of the Directional Letters [Exh.
C5 to D5; Ibid. pp. 87-89], and one (1) copy of the debit-credit authority [Exh. E5; Ibid. pp. 92-
93], which FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde as testified by Clarissa Ocampo and as
admitted by him. Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court is authorized, by
itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. [Cogtong vs. Kyoritsu International Et. Al., GR No. 160729, July 27,
2007]
As regards the testimony of Beatriz Bagsit, her basis for saying that Jose Velarde accounts
belongs to Mr. Jaime Dichaves is that there was a letter that was given to her that came from Mr.
Dichaves when the accounts were opened in Binondo. When the accounts were opened in
Binondo, she was not handling the management of the same. Based on the letter, she testified
that it would appear that the Jose Velarde accounts belonged to Jaime Dichaves because it was
Mr. Jaime Dichaves who issued the letter stating that all banking transaction of Jose Velarde
should be coursed to him. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 68-72]

The testimony of Bagsit does not establish that it is Dichaves who owns the Jose Velarde
accounts as her opinion was based simply on the letter issued by Dichaves. As against the
inference that Dichaves owned the Jose Velarde accounts based on the letter of Dichaves, the
Prosecution’s evidence showing that FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde in the various
documents given to him for signature must be given more weight to establish the fact that the
Jose Velarde accounts belong to FPres. Estrada.

Moreover, there was a glaring inconsistency in the testimonies of Defense witness Dy Tang and
Bagsit when Dy Tang testified that all the fixed (time) deposits of Dichaves were moved in the
branch of Bagsit in Pacific Star, while Bagsit testified that she does not know if Dichaves has an
account in her area, she thinks there is none but she does not know with other branches. [TSN,
May 4, 2005. pp. 26-28; TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 76]

As regards the statement of Bagsit that the Debit-Credit authority did not come form her and that
later, it was found to have come from the Trust Department, We find the testimony of Clarissa
Ocampo that the Debit-Credit Authority came from Bagsit as being more credible. First, because
the debit-credit authority deals with S/A 0160-62501-5 which is under the Banking Department
and not the Trust Department; and Second, because as testified by Bagsit, she found the Debit-
Credit Authority on her table after it was signed but she kept it and did not give it to anybody.
The Court likewise notes that Bagsit was not involved with the EPCIB Binondo Branch but she
remembers the prefix for Binondo accounts as No. 0110, yet, she could not remember the prefix
for accounts with the Pacific Star Branch of EPCIB which she headed since 1999.

In the attempt to downplay the effect of FPres. Estrada signing as Jose Velarde in the Debit-
Credit Authority, the defense argued that the said debit-credit authority was not implemented
"precisely because the signature of accused Estrada did not match with that of the real Jose
Velarde (who turned out to be Jaime Dichaves) [Defense Memorandum, p. 251] and "probably
because the bank officers got to realize that accused President Estrada was not really the owner
of the account." [Ibid., p. 263]

Besides being speculative, the arguments of the Defense are mere allegations which are not
supported by its own evidence.

The evidence of the Defense shows that prior to February 4, 2000, the account balance of S/A
0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde was P142,763,773.67. (Exh. 127-O) There was therefore not
enough funds in the account to transfer to the Trust Account. Thus, the Debit-Credit Authority
could not be implemented.
Subsequently, a credit memo for P506,416,666.66 was issued in favor of the said Jose Velarde
S/A 0160-62501-5 account. As per the testimony of defense witness, Beatriz Bagsit, the amount
of P 506,416,666.66 represented the principal and interest of a preterminated placement of S/A
0160-62501-5. The placement was not in the name of Dichaves but in the name of an account
number, i.e. Account No. 0160-62501-5 and behind that account is Jose Velarde. [TSN, April 18,
2005, p. 37] Eventually the P500,000,000.00 was withdrawn from the savings account in
exchange for an MC payable to trust. [Ibid. pp. 30, 31]

Consequently, while the funding for the P500,000,000.00 did not come via the debit-credit
authority, nonetheless, the funding of the P500,000,000.00 came from S/A 0160-62501-5 of Jose
Velarde.

Moreover, the debit-credit authority was not implemented because Bagsit kept the debit-credit
authority and did not give it to anybody. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 116]

Neither does the non-implementation of the Debit-Credit Authority which FPres. Estrada signed
as Jose Velarde disprove the fact that FPres. Estrada admitted that S/A 0160-62501-5 in the
name of Jose Velarde is his account when he admitted affixing his signature on the Debit-Credit
Authority as Jose Velarde.

The so-called "internal arrangements" with the bank, involved the use of S/A 0160-62501-5
which had been in existence since August 26, 1999 as the funding source of the P500,000,000.00
to be placed in the Trust account for lending to Gatchalian. The fact that the P500,000,000.00
funding was not effected by a debit-credit transaction but by a withdrawal of P500,000,000.00
from the said S/A 0160-62501-5 proves that the money lent to Gatchalian was the personal
money of FPres. Estrada through the Jose Velarde account of which he is the owner. As
explained by FPres. Estrada, "William Gatchalian is a big businessman. Isang malaking
negosyante at siya po ay may ari ng Wellex group of companies at siya rin po ay isa sa tumulong
sa aming partido noong nakaraang 1998 presidential election." [TSN, May 24, 2006, p. 23]

FPres. Estrada further testified: "Hindi lang po dahil doon sa internal arrangement. Hindi lang po
dahil gusto kong tulungan si Mr. William Gatchalian kundi higit po sa lahat ay nakita ko ang
kapakanan noong mahigit na tatlong libong (3000) empleyado na kung sakaling hindi
mapapautang si Mr. William Gatchalian, maaring magsara ang kanyang mga kumpanya at yong
mga taong, mahigit tatlong libong (3,000) empleyado kasama na yong kanilang mga pamilya ay
mawawalan ng trabaho. AT INISIP KO RING NA WALA NAMING (SIC) GOVERNMENT
FUNDS NA INVOLVE KAYA HINDI NA PO AKO NAGDALAWANG ISIP NA
PIRMAHAN KO." [Ibid. p. 26-27; Emphasis Supplied]

Moreover, as pointed out by the Prosecution, there was no need for the internal arrangement
since the loan to Gatchalian could have been extended by EPCIB directly considering that
Gatchalian had put up sufficient collateral for the loan.

From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion is that the so-called internal arrangement which
allegedly prompted FPres. Estrada to sign the various documents presented to him by Clarissa
Ocampo is a futile attempt to escape the consequence of his admission that he signed as Jose
Velarde which leads to the legal and indisputable conclusion that FPres. Estrada is the owner of
the Jose Velarde Accounts.

THE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE TO THE FILIPINO PEOPLE

As stated earlier, SSS and GSIS used the funds belonging to its millions of members to buy Belle
Shares upon instruction of FPres. Estrada who benefited for his personal gain from the
P189,700,000.00 commission paid in consideration of the purchase of the Belle shares by SSS
and GSIS . The money paid by GSIS and SSS for the Belle Shares are public funds which belong
to the millions of GSIS and SSS members. The amount of P189,700,000.00 deposited to the Jose
Velarde account of FPres. Estrada are public funds which came from the proceeds of the sale
received by SSI Management through Eastern Securities from GSIS and SSS. The Billions of
Pesos that could have otherwise been used to pay benefits to SSS and GSIS members were
diverted to buying Belle Shares to comply with FPres. Estrada’s instructions in order that FPres.
Estrada could receive his P187,900,000.00 commission to the damage and prejudice of the
millions of GSIS and SSS members who were deprived of the use of such funds and worse, who
now stand to suffer the loss amounting to millions of pesos since the Belle shares are presently
priced less than their acquisition cost. [From an average price of P3.14 per share to P0.69 per
share as of December 29, 2000 (Exh. 250-J-2) and between P0.40 to P 0.50 per share as of
February 11, 2002]

The Court finds that FPres. Estrada took advantage of his official position, authority,
relationship, connection and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines: a) by
instructing, directing and ordering, for his personal gain and benefit, by way of receiving
commission, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) through its President Mr.
Federico Pascual and the Social Security System (SSS) through its President, Mr. Carlos
Arellano, to purchase shares of stock Belle Corporation, as a consequence of which, during the
period October 13 to 21, 1999 GSIS bought 351,878,000 shares of Belle Corporation and paid
One Billion One Hundred Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Six Hundred Seven
Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,102,965,607.50) while SSS, on October 21, 1999, bought
249,679,000 shares at the value of P784,551,150.00 at an average price of P3.14/share [TSN,
February 14, 2005, p.78] or a combined total of at least One Billion Eight Hundred Eight Seven
Million Five Hundred Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos
(P1,887,516,757.50); b) by accepting and receiving, a commission in the amount of One
Hundred Eighty Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos [P189,700,000.00] as
consideration for the purchase by GSIS and SSS of the shares of stock of Belle Corporation
pursuant to his instructions which amount was deposited in the Equitable-PCI Bank S/A 0160-
62501-5 under the account name "Jose Velarde" of which FPres. Estrada is the real and
beneficial owner; c) by depriving the millions of members of GSIS and SSS of the use of public
funds in the amount of at least One Billion Eight Hundred Eight Seven Million Five Hundred
Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,887,516,757.50)
for payment of their benefits in order that he can receive his commission of One Hundred Eighty
Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P189,700,000.00) which likewise constitute
public funds for his personal benefit and enrichment thus causing damage and prejudice to the
Filipino people and the Government.
RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH D OF THE
AMENDED INFORMATION
_____________________________

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,

PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND AND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT
NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses to prove the enormous amounts of deposits to
the Jose Velarde Account and the person who transacted with the bank in relation thereto.

TERESA ARRASTIA BARCELONA was the Manager of Equitable PCI Bank in Greenhills-
Ortigas Branch specifically located at the Ground Floor of the Equitable Building along Ortigas
Avenue corner Roosevelt, San Juan, Metro Manila, which was within the vicinity of the business
and commercial areas of Greenhills.

Witness Barcelona then related and identified twelve (12) Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipts
(Exhs. I5 and M5 to W5) dated as follows:

1. October 20, 1999;

2. November 8, 1999;

3. November 22, 1999;

4. November 24, 1999;

5. November 25, 1999;

6. December 20, 1999;

7. December 21, 1999;

8. December 29, 1999;

9. January 4, 2000;

10. May 10, 2000;

11. June 6, 2000; and

 12. July 25, 2000.

These deposit receipts allegedly show various deposits made to Account No. 0160-62501-5
under the Account Name Jose Velarde maintained at the Equitable PCI Bank Binondo Branch.
The transactions to the said account were allegedly inter-branch deposits or deposits made from
one branch of Equitable PCI Bank for an account maintained at another branch of the said bank.
The aforementioned deposit receipts show that the deposits to the adverted account were
transacted at the Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas Branch.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated October 20, 1999, there were allegedly nine (9)
checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. The total amount of the checks deposited was
P143,000,000.00. The teller who processed the checks was Glyzelyn Bejec.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 8, 1999, four (4) checks were
deposited to the Jose Velarde Account in the total amount of P263,292,303.65. The checks
deposited were as follows: a Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch Check with Check No.
3165579 amounting to P189,700,000.00; an HSBC Head Office Check with Check No. 0022012
amounting to P20,000,000.00; a Union Bank Head Office Check with Check No. 034181
amounting to P10,875,749.43; and another Union Bank Head Office Check with Check No.
034182 amounting to P42,716,554.22. These checks were likewise processed by Glyzelyn Bejec
on November 8, 1999 at 4:01 p.m.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 22, 1999, three (3) checks for the
total amount of P40 Million were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were
processed by the bank’s teller Joan Mok.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 24, 1999, a check of
P54,161,496.52 was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. The check was processed by the
bank’s teller Leonora Royo on November 24, 1999 at 9:26 a.m.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 25, 1999, three (3) checks for the
total amount of P20,000,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were
processed by the bank’s teller Glyzelyn Bejec.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 20, 1999, three (3) checks for the
total amount of P163,500,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks
were processed by the bank’s teller Lagrimas Claveria on December 20, 1999 at 4:12 p.m.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 21, 1999, a check of P5,000,000.00
was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. The check was processed by the bank’s teller
Glyzelyn Bejec.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 29, 1999, two (2) checks for the
total amount of P2,500,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were
processed by the bank’s teller Glyzelyn Bejec.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated January 4, 2000, seven (7) checks for the total
amount of P70,500,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were
processed by the bank’s teller Joan Mok on January 4, 2000 at 2:31 p.m.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated May 10, 2000, four (4) checks for the total
amount of P23,000,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were
processed by the bank’s teller Joan Mok on May 10, 2000 at 4:30 p.m.

In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated June 6, 2000, two (2) checks for the total
amount of P42,945,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks were
processed by the bank’s teller Joan Mok on June 6, 2000 at 3:39 p.m.

Lastly, in the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated July 25, 2000, a check of
P40,000,000.00 was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. This check was processed by the
bank’s teller Glyzelyn Bejec on July 25, 2000 at 11:43 a.m.

It was Baby Ortaliza who personally transacted the above-mentioned checks with Barcelona
whom she identified in a photograph (Exh. X5). Barcelona related that Baby Ortaliza would hand
over the checks to be deposited together with the account information slip or passbook of Jose
Velarde to her and that, after the validation, Barcelona would hand over a copy of the deposit
receipt to Baby Ortaliza. [TSN dated May 13, 2002 and TSN dated May 15, 2002]

JOANNE GENEVIE RANIAGA MOK was a Customer Service Assistant Teller of Equitable
PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas Branch since July 1997. She received deposits and processed
withdrawals made with the bank.

Mok related and identified four (4) Equitable PCI Bank deposit receipts which pertained to
various checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-62501-5: Deposit
Receipt dated November 22, 1999 (Exh. N5); Deposit Receipt dated January 4, 2000 (Exh. T5);
Deposit Receipt (Exhibit U5) dated May 10, 2000; and Deposit Receipt (Exhibit V5) dated June
6, 2000. Mok testified that she personally processed the checks deposited to the said account.

In the Deposit Receipt dated November 22, 1999, there were three (3) checks deposited with the
total amount of P40 Million. In the Deposit Receipt dated January 4, 2000, there were seven (7)
checks deposited with the total amount of P70,500,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated May 10,
2000, there were four (4) checks deposited with the total amount of P23,000,000.00. Lastly, in
the Deposit Receipt dated June 6, 2000, there were two (2) checks deposited with the total
amount of P44,945,000.00

Mok further related that she prepared 3 copies of the deposit receipts and that after processing
the deposit receipts she threw away the Account Information slip. [TSN dated May 20, 2002 and
TSN dated October 28, 2002]

GLYZELYN HERMOZURA BEJEC was a Customer Service Assistant Teller of Equitable

PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas Branch. She processed deposit and withdrawal transactions of the
bank.
Bejec related and identified the deposit receipts of Equitable PCI Bank (Exhs. I5, M5, P5, R5,
S5 and W5) which pertained to various checks she personally processed and credited to the Jose
Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-62501-5. In the Deposit Receipt dated November 8,
1999, the total amount of deposit was P263,292,303.65. In the Deposit Receipt dated October 20,
1999, there were nine (9) checks deposited in the total amount of P163,000,000.00. In the
Deposit Receipt dated November 25, 1999, there were three (3) checks deposited in the total
amount of P20,000,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated December 21, 1999, the total amount of
deposit was P5,000,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated December 29, 1999, there were two (2)
checks deposited in the total amount of P2,500,000.00. Lastly, in the Deposit Receipt dated July
25, 2000, a check was deposited in the amount of P40,000,000.00.

On cross examination, Bejec testified that there were Account Information Slips when the checks
were presented but she already threw away the said slips. It was the policy of the bank to throw
away the Account Information Slips when the deposit receipt had been generated. [TSN dated
May 6, 13, and 20, 2002]

LEONORA BACSAFRA ROYO was the Customer Service Assistant for new accounts of
Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas Branch since March of 1993. She testified that she was
the teller who processed the Deposit Receipt (Exh. O5) dated November 24, 1999 and that she
prepared three (3) copies of the same since it was an inter-branch check deposit transaction. The
deposit receipt shows that an Urban Bank Head Office Branch Manager’s Check No.
0000037661 dated November 23, 1999 amounting to P54,161,496.52 was deposited to the Jose
Velarde Account No. 0160-62501-5 maintained at the Equitable PCI Bank Binondo Branch.
Teresa Barcelona, the branch manager, handed to Royo for processing the Urban Bank
Manager’s Check as well as the accomplished account information slip. [TSN dated October 30,
2002]

ANTONIO MARTIN SAGRITALO FORTUNO was the Bank Operations Officer of

Equitable PCI Bank, Pacific Star Branch since January 28, 2002. The witness averred that he
handled the opening of accounts; supervised the investment section; the foreign telegraphic
transfer as well as the domestic telegraphic transfer and the safekeeping of the records of
deposits; and the transactions which transpired in their branch. Witness Fortuno brought with
him to Court the documents contained in the subpoena which he requested from the PCHC.
These documents were the seventeen (17) microfilm copies of the checks that were deposited to
the Jose Velarde account from the PCHC; the nine (9) deposit slips or deposit receipts that were
deposited to the account of Jose Velarde together with the five (5) cash deposits; and the detailed
report of transfers and debit, credit memos or the DRTM from October 19, 1999 to January 24,
2000.

Fortuno related and identified the seventeen (17) microfilm copies of checks that were deposited
to the Jose Velarde account from various banks as well as the deposit receipts and the DRTMs.

The original of the checks were allegedly returned to the issuing bank after having been
negotiated. The first check deposited to the Jose Velarde account was a cashier’s check from PS
Bank Head Office with Check No. 000031436 amounting to P20,000,000.00 and dated October
18, 1999 (Exhs. R14; R14-1; and R14-2). Fortuno narrated that this check was presented to the
teller of the bank and then the teller validated the deposit slip which was attached to the check.
The amount of the check was consequently credited to the Jose Velarde account with an Account
No. 0160-62501-5. The witness, however, cannot tell who purchased this cashier’s check. The
second check deposited to the Jose Velarde account was also a cashier’s check from PS Bank
Head Office with Check No. 000031437 amounting to P20 Million and dated October 18, 1999
(Exhs. S14; S14-1; S14-2; S14-3; and S14-4). This check allegedly passed the same procedure as the
first check before the amount of the check was credited to the Jose Velarde account. The witness
further related that the Jose Velarde account was maintained at the Binondo Juan Luna branch
and that the deposits were made in the Pacific Star.

The first deposit receipt (Exhs. T14; T14-1; T14-2; T14-3; and T14-4) was dated October 19, 1999.
This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde
Account for the total amount of P30,000,000.00, one for P20 Million and the other for P10
Million. The witness specified that this deposit receipt indicated the account name Jose Velarde;
the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of
deposit which was on October 19, 1999 at 12:55 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited
which were from the Security Bank Corporation Main Office with Check No. 000363859 for
P20,000,000.00 and Check No. 000363858 for P10,000,000.00. He added that the checks were
dated October 18, 1999.

The second deposit receipt (Exhs. U14; U14-1; U14-2; U14-3; and U14-4) was also dated October
19, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the
Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P30,000,000.00, one for P20,000,000.00 and the
other for P10,000,000.00. The witness specified that this deposit receipt contained the account
name Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5;
the date and time of deposit which was on October 19, 1999 at 12:53 in the afternoon; and the
checks deposited, the first check was from the Security Bank Corporation Main Office with
Check No. 000363857 for P20,000,000.00, and the other check was from PSB Head Office with
Check No. 0000031438 for P10,000,000.00. These checks were dated October 18, 1999.

The third deposit receipt (Exhibits V14; V14-1; V14-2; V14-3; and V14-4) was likewise dated
October 19, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited
to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P50,000,000.00, one for P20,000,000.00 and
the other for P30,000,000.00. Witness Fortuno identified the account name as Jose Velarde; the
branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of
deposit which was on October 19, 1999 at 12:49 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited, the
first check was from the Global Bank Head Office with Check No. 0000107383 for
P30,000,000.00, and the other check was also from the Global Bank Head Office with Check No.
00017385 for P20,000,000.00. These checks were both dated October 18, 1999.

The fourth deposit receipt (Exhibits W14; W14-1; and W14-2) was dated November 3, 1999. This
deposit receipt allegedly shows that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde Account for
P5,000,000.00. Witness Fortuno identified the account name as Jose Velarde; the branch name as
Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was
on November 3, 1999 at 11:03 in the morning; and the check deposited which was from
Westmont Bank in Ayala Avenue with Check No. 000187472 for P5,000,000.00. The said check
was dated October 26, 1999.

The fifth deposit receipt (Exhibits X14; X14-1; and X14-2) was also dated November 3, 1999. This
deposit receipt allegedly shows that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde Account for
P5,000,000.00. The particulars of this deposit receipt were the same as the fourth deposit receipt
except for the time of deposit, which was at 11:04 in the morning, and the check deposited which
was from Westmont Bank in Ayala Avenue with Check No. 000187471 for P5,000,000.00. The
said check was likewise dated October 26, 1999.

The sixth deposit receipt (Exhs. Y14; Y14-1; and Y14-2) was dated December 17, 1999. This
deposit receipt allegedly shows that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde Account for
P50,000,000.00. The check deposited was allegedly from Equitable PCI Bank in Divisoria - M.
De Santos branch with Check No. 0783236 for P50,000,000.00.

The seventh deposit receipt (Exhs. Z14; Z14-1; Z14-2; Z14-3; and Z14-4) was dated January 11,
2000. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the Jose
Velarde Account for the total amount of P26,325,055.65, one for P20,000,000.00 and the other
for P6,325,055.65. Witness Fortuno identified the account name as Jose Velarde; the branch
name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit
which was on January 11, 2000 at 12:39 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited, the first
check was from Equitable PCI Bank in Divisoria – M. De Santos branch with Check No. 0111-
795-117 for P20 Million, and the other check was from Bank of Commerce in Port Area with
Check No. 0030474 for P6,325,055.65. The Equitable PCI Bank check was dated January 6,
2000 while the Bank of Commerce check was dated January 11, 2000.

The eight deposit receipt (Exh. A15) was dated January 19, 2000. This deposit receipt with an
account information slip (Exh. A15-1) allegedly shows that a cash deposit of P25,000,000.00 was
made to the Jose Velarde Account. Witness Fortuno testified that the account name Jose Velarde
as well as the account number were specified in the account information slip.

Last for the deposit receipt (Exh. B15) was dated January 24, 2000. This deposit receipt allegedly
shows that there were four (4) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount
of P75,000,000.00. The account name Jose Velarde as well as the account number were specified
in an account information slip (Exh. B15-1) for this deposit receipt. The four (4) checks deposited
(Exhs. B15-2; B15-3; B15-4; B15-5; B15-6; B15-7; B15-8; and B15-9) were allegedly manager’s
checks from the head office of Urban Bank and all dated January 18, 2000. Witness Fortuno
testified that the first check with Check No. 00039976 was for P2,000,000.00; the second check
with Check No. 00039975 was for P70,000,000.00; the third check with Check No. 00039978
was for P1,000,000.00; and the fourth check with Check No. 00039977 was for P2,000,000.00.

Fortuno continued on his direct-examination and testified as to the Detailed Report of Transfers
and Credit Memorandums (DRTM) dated October 19, 1999; DRTM dated November 3, 1999;
DRTM dated December 15, 1999; DRTM dated December 17, 1999; DRTM dated January 11,
2000; DRTM dated January 19, 2000; and DRTM dated January 24, 2000. The witness
explained that these DRTM reflects the inter-branch transactions which were done at the
Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star branch. These DRTM allegedly show the summary of the
transactions made particularly to the Jose Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-62501-5.

The witness testified that the DRTM dated December 15, 1999 (Exhs. C15 and C15-1) reflects the
summary of four (4) cash deposits to the Jose Velarde Account. The first cash deposit was for
P25,900,000.00; the second cash deposit was for P37,126,467.83; the third cash deposit was for
P38,325,629.67; and the fourth cash deposit was for P43,647,902.50. The DRTM dated October
19, 1999 (Exhs. D15 and D15-1) reflects the summary of four (4) deposits to the Jose Velarde
Account. The first deposit was for P30,000,000.00; the second deposit was for P30,000,000.00;
the third deposit was for P40,000,000.00; and the fourth deposit was for P50,000,000.00. The
total amount of deposits for October 19, 1999 was P150,000,000.00. The DRTM dated
November 3, 1999 (Exhs. E15and E15-1) reflects the summary of two (2) check deposits to the
Jose Velarde Account. Each of these check deposits was for P5,000,000.00 for the total amount
of P10,000,000.00. The DRTM dated December 17, 1999 (Exhs. F15 and F15-1) reflects a deposit
to the Jose Verlarde Account for P50,000,000.00. The DRTM dated January 11, 2000 (Exhs.
G15 and G15-1) reflects the summary of two (2) deposits to the Jose Velarde account for the total
amount of P26,325,055.65. The first deposit was for P20,000,000.00 and the second deposit was
for P6,325,055.65. The DRTM dated January 19, 2000 (Exhs. H15 and H15-1) shows a cash
deposit to the Jose Velarde Account for P25,000,000.00. Lastly, the DRTM dated January 24,
2000 (Exhs. I15 and I15-1) reflects a check deposit to the Jose Velarde Account for
P75,000,000.00.

Fortuno claimed that the head of the branch of the bank at the time the foregoing deposits were
made was Beatriz Bagsit. He added that the total amount of cash and check deposits for the
period of October 19, 1999 to January 24, 2000 aggregated to P481,325,055.65.

On cross examination, Fortuno clarified that the Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star branch had no
specimen signatures of Jose Velarde. He also admitted that he had no personal knowledge on any
matter relating to the Jose Verlade Account nor does he know the persons who made the cash
and check deposits. He testified that none of the names of FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada
appear in the deposit slips or checks he exhibited and identified. [TSN dated November 25, 2002
and TSN dated November 27, 2002]

MICHELLETTE SOLIDUM LEGASPI was the Branch Head of Equitable PCI Bank
Greenhills-Virra Mall Branch on December 19, 1997 until July 26, 2002. The branch was near
North Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan. It was less than 100 meters away from the Buchanan
gate or perpendicular to Eisenhower Street of the subdivision. Polk Street was one of the streets
of North Greenhills where the residence of former President Estrada was located. [TSN dated
December 2, 2002, pp. 39-48]

The Virra Mall Branch was merged with the Greenhills Shopping Center Branch on July 26,
2002. All the bank records and documents of the branch were forwarded to the warehouse of the
head office.

Legaspi brought a Certification (Exhibit T15) dated November 27, 2002, accomplished and
executed by Judy L. Go, Vice-President and Branch Head, Juan Luna Binondo Center, Equitable
PCI Bank which certified that Savings Account No. 016062501-5 and Current Account No.
011025495-4 were both under the name of Jose Velarde. [Ibid, pp. 49-56]

Legaspi then identified seven (7) Electronic Clearing Systems Reports with attached documents
which were microfilm copies of certain checks. She explained that the Electronic Clearing
systems Report was the summary of all checks received and processed at Greenhills-Virra Mall
Branch and then sent to PCHC for clearing. The microfilm copies of the checks supported the
summary of the Electronic Clearing systems Report. The documents were handed over to
Legaspi by their Legal Department.

The Electronic Clearing Systems Report showed the batch sent by the branch to PCHC for
clearing. The report bore the routing number of the branch and the identification of the checks
that were sent to the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).

For the September 10, 1999 Report (Exhibit U15, with sub markings), ten (10) checks were
processed by the branch. The microfilm copies of the checks bore the Account No. 016062501-5
which meant that the checks were deposited to the said account. Legaspi explained that the
account number was found at the back of the checks. The back of the microfilm checks also bore
a certification from the PCHC that the item was a photocopy of the original clearing document
processed by PCHC.

The following microfilm copies were presented: Allied Bank Check No. 00080546 for
P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080566 for P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080548 for
P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080542 for P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080543 for
P10,000,000.00; Check No 0084547 for P5,000,000.00; Check No. 0080544 for P5,000,000.00;
Westmont bank Ayala Branch Check No. 000181135 for P5,000,000.00; Metrobank Check No.
0091780568 for P5,000,000.00; Far East Bank Check No. 3165562 for P20,000,000.00 with
Jaime Dichavez or Abbie Dichavez as account holder.

Attached to the report was a document entitled Detailed Report of Transfer and/or Credit and
Debit memo (U15-12) of Greenhills, Virra Mall Branch as of September 10, 1999. On the report,
an inter-branch transaction on September 10, 1999 was made for Account No 016062501-5 for
P90,000,000.00. The report was secured by the bank’s Legal Department pursuant to the
subpoena.

For the September 30, 1999 Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit V15, with
submarkings), two checks were deposited to Account No 016062501-1. These were Equitable
Bank Binondo Branch Check No. 0811277 for P8,300,000.00 and Allied Bank Check No.
0080550 for P20,000,000.00. The dorsal side of the Equitable check bore the account name Jose
Velarde and Account No. 016062501-1.

Another attached document was the transaction journal log report (Exhibit V15-4) which showed
the two deposits. Reflected on the journal log was the amount P995,371.66 indicating the last
balance of the Account as of September 29, 1999. A late Deposit Transactions Report of the
Branch as of September 30, 1999 reflected that the two checks deposited were late deposit
transactions so that they were considered the following day transactions. A Detailed Report of
Transfer and/or Memo of Greenhills, Virra Mall dated September 30, 1999 also reflected the two
checks.

The third Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit W15, with sub markings) presented was
dated October 6, 1999. The details contained the following: Equitable Bank Manager’s check in
the amount of P300,000,000.00 deposited to Account No. 016062501-5. The journal log reported
the P300,000,000.00 deposit on October 5, 1999. A detailed report of Transfer Memo (Exhibit
W15-4) of the branch dated October 6, 1999 showed that a P300,000,000.00 check deposit to
Account No. 016062501-5.

The next Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit X15, with sub markings) was dated
November 26, 1999 and showed that three checks were processed by the branch. These checks
were: Equitable Bank Check No. 0811579 for P20,000,000.00, Check No. 0811580 for
P20,000,000.00 and Check No. 0811582 for P60,000,000.00. The dorsal portions of the checks
bore the account number 01602501-5 where the checks were deposited. The Detailed Report of
Transaction Memo (Exhibit X15-5) dated November 26, 1999 also showed these three
transactions. Since the checks were deposited beyond the clearing cut-off time, the late deposit
transactions report ( Exhibit X15-6) was also presented.

The Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit Y15, with sub markings) dated November 29,
1999 showed a Westmont Bank check No. 0000187474 deposit for P25 Million which against
bore the account No. 016062501-5. A detailed Report Transfer Memo (Exhibit Y15-3) was
presented to show this interbranch transaction. The late transaction report dated November 29 for
the P25,000,000.00 check deposit was also presented. [Ibid, pp. 51-137]

Electronic Clearing System Report (Exhibit Z15, with sub markings) dated December 1, 1999
showed a Metrobank Magdalena Center Check No. 035400 for P53,000,000.00. The detailed
report transfer (Exhibit Z15-3) reflected that the P53,000,000.00 check was deposited to Account
No. 016062501-5.

The last Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit A16, with sub markings) dated December 2,
1999 showed that Equitable PCI Binondo Branch Check No. 0811596 for P50,000,000.00,
Check No. 0811597 for P50,000,000.00 and Allied bank Check No. 0176625 for P20,000,000.00
were processed. Attached were two transaction journals (Exhibit A16-5) dated December 1, 1999
showing these inter-branch transactions.

Legaspi explained that they were unable to produce the deposit slips representing the inter-
branch deposits made to the account of Jose Velarde because all the documents pertaining to the
Virra Mall branch were forwarded to the warehouse. They were still in the process of retrieving
the other documents pertaining to the deposit slips. [TSN dated December 4, 2000, pp. 11-23]

Legaspi testified that the transactions were made by Baby Ortaliza whom she identified in a
photograph (Exht X5). [Ibid, pp. 24-30]
On cross examination, Legaspi testified that she was certain that the deposit receipts were
actually accomplished and saw Baby Ortaliza several times transacting at the branch. [Ibid, pp.
31-34]

MELISSA PORTO PASCUAL was a bank teller of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills Virra Mall
Branch from April 1, 1999 to January of 2002. She processed cash deposits, check deposit
deposits, withdrawals and encashment during that time.

The witness then related and identified microfilm copies of checks which she claimed that she
personally processed for inter-branch deposits. These checks were: Equitable PCI Bank Check
(Exh. V15-2 and submarkings) No. 0811277 dated September 26, 1999 with the amount of
P80,300,000.00; Allied Bank Check (Exh. V15-3 and submarkings) No. 0080550 dated
September 15, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. W15-2
and submarkings) No. 0241001331 dated September 13, 1999 with the amount of
P300,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X15-2 and submarkings) No. 0811579 dated
November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X15-3
and submarkings) No. 0811580 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00;
Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X15-4 and submarkings) No. 0811582 dated November 23,
1999 with the amount of P60,000,000.00; Westmont Bank Check (Exh. Y15-2 and submarkings)
No. 0000187474 dated November 27, 1999 with the amount of P25,000,000.00; and Allied Bank
Check (Exh. A16-4 and submarkings) No. 0176625 dated December 1, 1999 with the amount of
P20,000,000.00.

The foregoing checks were deposited by Baby Ortaliza to the Jose Velarde Account with
Account No. 0160-62501-5 which was maintained at Equitable PCI Bank Binondo Branch.
Pascual described the physical appearance of Baby Ortaliza and identified her in a photograph
(Exh. X5).

To corroborate her claim that she personally processed the aforementioned checks, witness
Pascual further related and identified the Electronic Clearing System Report (Exhs. U15 to Z15-3)
dated November 26, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated October 6, 1999; the
Journal Report dated October 5, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated September
30, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated November 29, 1999; the Electronic
Clearing System Report dated December 2, 1999; and the Journal Report dated December 1,
1999. [TSN dated December 9, 2002]

LAMBERTO BAJACAN DEL FONSO (Del Fonso) was the Assistant Vice President and
Department Head of the Branch Monitoring and Administration Department of Equitable PCI
Bank since 1997.

Del Fonso identified the bank statements relative to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-
62501-5 for the period beginning August 1, 1999 to November 30, 2000 (Exhs. D19 to D19-13,
inclusive of submarkings) and to Current Account No. 0110-25495-4 for the period beginning
August 1, 1999 to October 31, 2000 (Exhs. E19 to E19-14). As to Savings Account No. 0160-
62501-5, he testified that the account was closed on November 13, 2000 (Exh. D19-13). As to
Current Account No. 0110-25495-4, witness Del Fonso identified a transaction for October 6,
1999 (Exh. E19-2) for an automatic transfer of the amount of P29,304,219.69 from the savings
account. On the same day, there was an Inward Check deposit amounting to P142 million. For
the other months, there were either minimal transactions or none at all.

With respect to the account holder – Jose Velarde, Del Fonso testified that he had no address
indicated in the accounts as the same were simply "c/o EBC" or "care of Equitable Banking
Corporation" through its Head Office in Binondo, Manila. He clarified that this was allowed as a
special arrangement, although he did not know and neither had he met Jose Velarde. [TSN dated
January 22, 2003]

RENE COLIN DACIO GRAY was head of the Cash Department of Urban Bank sometime on
January 2000. He presented and identified a Manager’s Check No. 43222 dated January 17, 2000
(Exh. W19) issued by Urban Bank Greenhills Branch which totalled Seventy Five Million Pesos
(P75,000,000.00). Gray related that the Chairman of Urban Bank, Arsenio Bartolome, asked him
to divide this check into four (4) checks - Urban Bank Check Nos. 39975, 39976, 39977 and
39978 (Exhs. B15-2, B15-4 B15-6 B15-8) all dated January 18, 2000. [TSN, March 31, 2003, pp. 8-
31]

AURORA CHUMACERA BALDOZ (Baldoz) was the Vice-President of the Receivership and
Liquidation Group 2 of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) since March 24,
1994. As such, she actually administered the receivership, take-over and liquidation of banks that
the Monetary Board orders for closure. She testified that she became familiar with Urban Bank
because it was her group that implemented the take-over of the said bank on April 26, 2000.

Baldoz presented and identified documents relative to Account No. 858 (Exh. M19) of the Urban
Bank, particularly, the Letter of Authority dated November 23, 1999 (Exh. I19); Letter of
Authority dated January 29, 2000 (Exh. J19); Letter of Authority dated April 24, 2000 (Exh. K19);
as well as Urban Bank Check No. 052093 dated April 24, 2000 in the amount of
P107,191,780.85, and a Signature Card of Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 (Exh. L19).
Baldoz further identified a Certification (Exh. N19) that she issued to the fact that as receiver of
Urban Bank, PDIC found no bank records showing any account under the name of Jose Velarde,
Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Rowena Lopez, Peachy Osorio, Joy
Melendrez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747, 757, and 777. She further certified (Exh.
N19–2) that Accounts "A/C 858" and "T/A 858" did not appear in the Registry of Deposits of
Urban Bank and were not part of the deposit liabilities of the said bank. [TSN dated March 24,
2003]

MARIE ROSE ANCHETA CLAUDIO (Claudio) was the Vice-President of Urban Bank and
the Manager of Urban Bank San Juan Branch. She was part of the senior management of Urban
Bank, particularly its business development committee which handled the business aspect of the
bank. As area manager, she was in-charge of supervising four (4) branches of Urban Bank. On
the other hand, as branch manager, she handled the accounts of the Greenhills branch clients in
terms of deposits, loans and other products and it was in the course of her duties as such that she
became familiar with Trust Account No. 858 or Special Private Account No. (SPAN) 858.
Claudio testified that it was Arsenio Bartolome, then the Chairman of Urban Bank, who asked
her to open Trust Account No. 858 and to accept a deposit of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00). The deposit was accordingly processed based on Trading Order No. 776313
(Exh. Q19) dated January 6, 1999. She came to know that the owner of the account was Joseph
Victor Ejercito when she was asked to take hold of a Trust Agreement (Exh. R19) from the Head
Office about two (2) to three (3) weeks after she accepted the cash. Claudio further testified that
the Head Office gave it to her to be given in turn to the client for signature. She added that she
personally delivered the document along with a signature card to the office of Joseph Victor
Ejercito. A few weeks after she left the documents it in his office, she came back and picked
them up and gave them back tot her Head Office. She also testified that she was familiar with the
signature of Joseph Victor Ejercito because he was a client of the bank.

Also in connection with Trust Account No. 858, Claudio handled the acceptance of all deposits
to the said account through Trading Orders. Thus, she became familiar with Trading Order No.
035006-A (Exh. S19) dated January 27, 1999 in the amount of Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00). For effecting withdrawals from the said account, Claudio explained that
trading orders, manager’s checks and letters of authorities were required. She added that she was
familiar with some withdrawals, particularly those covered by Trading Order No. 060851 (Exh.
T19) dated September 30, 1999 in the amount of Forty Two Million Pesos Three Hundred Sixty
Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P42,360,899.17) and with
maturity value of Forty Million Seven Hundred Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Four
Pesos and Twenty Two Centavos (P42,716,554.22) (Exh. T19-2), which she approved and which
was covered by Manager’s Check No. 0000034182 dated November 8, 1999 (Exh. I5-18).

Claudio also identified a withdrawal from the account through Trading Order No. 804490 (Exh.
U19) with deal date November 5, 1999 with a maturity value of Ten Million Eight Hundred
Seventy Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Nine Pesos and Forty Three Centavos
(P10,875,749.43) covered by Urban Bank Manager’s Check No. 34181 (Exh. I5-17) that was
processed by branch accountant Aileen Tiongson and which she approved. Lastly, Claudio
identified Trading Order No. 808554 (Exh. V19) with a net maturity value of Fifty Four Million
One Hundred Sixty One Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos and Fifty Two Centavos
covered by Urban Bank Manager’s Check No. 0000037661 (Exh. O5 with submarkings).
Witness Claudio verified that she gave the three (3) manager’s checks for withdrawals to Joseph
Victor Ejercito. [TSN dated March 26, 2003]

MA. AILEEN CANDELARIA TIONGSON (Tiongson) was the Branch Accountant of Urban
Bank San Juan Branch from December 18, 1999 to March, 2000. Among her duties was to
ensure that all transactions of the bank and all policies in the branch were properly implemented.
Her duties also included checking trading orders prepared by the account officer for traditional
and non-traditional products, facilitating the issuance of certificates of deposits, and processing
the issuance of manager’s checks for withdrawal transactions. Tiongson clarified that non-
traditional products included trust products or investment placements under trust agreements.

Tiongson testified that she was familiar with Account No. 858 because she processed some of
the transactions of the client like the issuance of manager’s check. She added that she was
familiar with Manager’s Check Bearing No. 43222 (Exh. W19) dated January 17, 2000 in the
amount of P75 Million payable to cash. She added that the source of the manager’s check was
the pre-terminated placement of Account No. 858. With respect to the said check, Tiongson
testified that the placing of "payable to cash" in a manager’s check is not a regular procedure in
the bank because a manager’s check should be payable to a specified person. [TSN dated April 2,
2003]

GUILLERMO ARAZA BRIONES (Briones) was the Deputy Receiver / Liquidator of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) assigned to Urban Bank at the time it was
under receivership.

Briones testified that as Deputy Receiver, he took charge of all the assets and affairs of the bank
and also acted as custodian of the said records. In such capacity, he came across Account No.
858 as he was instructed by PDIC Vice President Aurora Baldoz to look for documents
pertaining thereto. He collated the documents and consequently prepared an inventory list (Exh.
V20 – V20-4). Briones identified and verified the following entries therein: (1) entry A-2 as
referring to Trading Order No. 020385 (Exh. T19) dated January 29, 1999; (2) entry A-21
referring to Manager’s Check No. 43222 dated January 17, 2000 in the amount of seventy-five
million pesos (P75,000,000.00) (Exh. W19); (3) entry B-3 referring to Trading Order No. 035006
dated January 27, 1999 (Exh. S19); (4) entry B-25 referring to Trading Order No. 808554 dated
November 22, 1999 (Exh. V19); (5) entry C-22 and C-23 referring to Trading Order No. 060851
dated September 30, 1991 (Exh. P19); (6) entry D-34 referring to Trading Order No. 804490
dated November 5, 1999 (Exh. B20-3); and entries E-3, E-4, and E-5 referring to letters of
authority dated November 23, 1999 (Exh. I19), January 17, 2000 (Exh. J19), and April 24, 2000
(Exh. K19). After collating the documents, he submitted them to Aurora Baldoz. [TSN dated
April 9, 2003]

EMMANUEL ENRIQUEZ BARCENA was the Assistant Vice President for Operations of the
PCHC during the time material in these cases. He assisted the Vice President for Operations,
Arturo M. De Castro, in supervising the check processing operations of the corporation; he made
sure that the checks delivered by the banks were credited to the clearing account with the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and correspondingly debited to the accounts of the drawee banks; and
he was also responsible for the accuracy of the reports generated and furnished to the "clearing
participants" and BSP to the delivery of checks by the banks. The witness related that the
clearing participants are the commercial and thrift bank members of the corporation with
authority from the BSP to accept demand deposits and participate in the clearing operations.
These banks send local checks to the clearing house by batches and the clearing house receive
these checks and feed the same in a reader sorter which capture the drawee bank’s information.
Thereafter, the checks are "sprayed with a tracer bond" and "microfilmed" to identify the source
of the check. The checks are then tallied against the batch control ticket and the net results,
known as the "clearing summary report", are reported to the BSP to serve as basis "for debiting
or crediting the clearing account" of the bank concerned.

The witness then related and identified several checks which were sent to PCHC and undergone
the clearing process. He was particular with the signatures of Arturo De Castro, the Vice
President of PCHC, Francisco Gementiza, the Microfilm Custodian of PCHC, and Edgar
Gamboa, the Assistant of the Microfilm Custodian of PCHC. These checks were Allied Bank
Check No. 0176610 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176611 with the
amount of P10 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0187473 with the amount of P25 Million;
Urban Bank Check No. 037661 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P54,161,496.52;
Far East Bank Gift Check with the amount of P500,000.00; Allied Bank Check No. 0176621
with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176620 dated December 20, 1999 with
the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176622 dated December 20, 1999 with the
amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176619 dated December 20, 1999 with the
amount of P5 Million; UCPB Check No. 018706 dated December 28, 1999 with the amount of
P20 Million; UCPB Check No. 018707 dated December 28, 1999 with the amount of P20
Million; FEBTC Check No. 0580312 dated May 8, 2000 with the amount of P3 Million; Allied
Bank Check No. 0209702 dated May 2, 2000 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank
Check No. 0209706 dated May 2, 2000 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No.
0209703 dated May 2, 2000 with the amount of P5 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0830000304
dated June 3, 2000 with the amount of P22,945,000.00; Metrobank Check No. 3010003358 dated
June 6, 2000 with the amount of P20 Million; Asian Bank Check No. 0022012 dated November
5, 1999 with the amount of 20 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 034181 dated November 8, 1999
with the amount of P10,875,749.43; Urban Bank Check No. 034182 dated November 8, 1999
with the amount of P42,716,554.22; Allied Bank Check No. 0176604 dated September 30, 1999
with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176601 dated September 30, 1999
with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176602 dated September 30, 1999
with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176605 dated September 30, 1999
with the amount of P10 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0660139670 dated October 18, 1999 with
the amount of P30 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0660139681 dated October 18, 1999 with the
amount of P13 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0732114979 dated October 15, 1999 with the
amount of P10 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107387 dated October 18, 1999 with the
amount of P25 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107388 dated October 18, 1999 with the
amount of P25 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385384 dated November 24, 1999 with the
amount of P10 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385385 dated November 24, 1999 with the
amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176615 dated November 24, 1999 with the
amount of P5 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0783278 dated December 17, 1999 with
the amount of P160 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0783284 dated December 20, 1999
with the amount of P2 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0783282 dated December 20,
1999 with the amount of P1.5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 080519 dated December 20, 1999
with the amount of P5 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 006975 dated December 24, 1999
with the amount of P1.5 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0189619 dated December 23, 1999;
PS Bank Check No. 031436 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; PS Bank
Check No. 031437 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Security Bank
Check No. 0363859 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Security Bank
Check No. 0363858 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Security Bank
Check No. 0363857 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; PS Bank Check
No. 031438 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Global Bank Check No.
0107385 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Global Bank Check No.
0107383 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P30 Million; Westmont Bank Check No.
0187472 dated October 26, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Westmont Bank Check No.
0187471 dated October 26, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million.
Witness Barcena then related and identified in the foregoing manner Equitable PCI Bank Check
No. 0783236 dated December 17, 1999 with the amount of P50 Million; Equitable PCI Bank
Check No. 0111-795117 dated January 6, 2000 with the amount of P20 Million; Bank of
Commerce Check No. 0030474 dated January 10, 2000 with the amount of P6,925,055.65;
Urban Bank Check No. 039975 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P70 Million; Urban
Bank Check No. 039976 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P2 Million; Urban Bank
Check No. 039977 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P2 Million; Urban Bank Check
No. 039978 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P1 Million; Allied Bank Check No.
0080566 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No.
0080454 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No.
0080548 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No.
0080542 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No.
0080543 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No.
0080547 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080544
dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 00181135
dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0091780568 dated
September 1, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; and FBTC Check No. 3165582 dated
September 8, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million.

In another set of documentary evidence for the prosecution, the witness similarly related and
identified Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811277 dated September 26, 1999 with the amount of
P8,300,000.00; Allied Bank Check No. 0080550 dated September 15, 1999 with the amount of
P20 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 001331 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount
of P300 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811579 dated November 23, 1999 with the
amount of P20 Million; Equitable Bank Check No. 0811580 dated November 23, 1999 with the
amount of P20 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811582 dated November 23, 1999 with
the amount of P60 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0187474 dated November 27, 1999 with
the amount of P25 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385400 dated November 29, 1999 with the
amount of P53 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811596 dated December 15, 1999 with
the amount of P50 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811597 dated December 1, 1999
with the amount of P50 Million; and Allied Bank Check No. 0176625 dated December 1, 1999
with the amount of P20 Million.

Witness Barcena continued on his direct examination and related and identified FEBTC Check
No. 3165579 dated November 8, 1999 with the amount of P189,700,000.00; BPI Family Bank
Check No. 0006623 dated July 25, 2000 with the amount of P40 Million; Equitable PCI Bank
Check No. 0742099 dated August 15, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Metrobank Check
No. 0091780523 dated August 15, 1999 with the amount of P31 Million; Metrobank Check No.
0385379 dated August 19, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Metrobank Check No.
0830416015 dated July 29, 2000 with the amount of P22 Million; and Allied Bank Check No.
0080549 dated August 25, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million.

Lastly, the witness then presented and identified a Detail List dated November 9, 1999 of PCHC
which contained a listing of incoming checks of the participating bank in Greater Manila Area.
On cross examination, witness Barcena clarified that the checks forwarded to PCHC pertained to
checks that were not yet acted by the drawee bank as to whether the same were honored or
dishonored. [TSN dated January 13, 2003; TSN dated January 15, 2003; and TSN dated January
20, 2003]

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

The defense presented BEATRIZ LEGASPI BAGSIT, the Vice President and Division Head in
the Makati Area of Equitable PCI Bank, and ROMUALD DY TANG, Treasurer and Executive
Vice President of Equitable PCI Bank. The gists of their testimonies were already discussed in
relation to sub-paragraph (c) above. FPres. Estrada also denied on the witness stand that he
owned the Jose Velarde account.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Re: Sub-paragraph (d) of the Amended Information

To reiterate, the crime of plunder is committed through a combination or series of overt or

criminal acts [or "predicate acts"] described in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 as amended. The
prosecution presented overwhelming evidence that there were numerous deposits of astoundingly
large sums of money into the Jose Velarde account. However, the prosecution failed to prove the
predicate act/s as defined under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 through which the said deposits
could have been acquired or amassed, except for the amount of P189,700,000.00, representing
illegal commissions from the sales of Belle shares and the money collected from illegal
gambling. It is not per se the accumulation of wealth which is proscribed by the Anti-Plunder
Law. The acquisition of wealth of not less than P50,000,000.00 must be linked to the
commission of overt or criminal acts falling within the ambit of the said law. All that the
prosecution has succeeded in showing is that the Jose Velarde account is the repository or
receptacle of vast wealth belonging to FPres. Estrada.

RULING OF THE COURT

ON THE CHARGE OF PLUNDER

Elements of the Offense of Plunder

Having reached the foregoing Findings of Fact after a meticulous and laborious study of the
voluminous testimonial and documentary evidence of both the prosecution and the defense on
the four (4) sub-paragraphs of the Amended Information, the Court is now called upon to apply
the Anti-Plunder Law to the facts of this case. The accused are charged with plunder as defined
and penalized under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended, entitled "An Act Defining And
Penalizing The Crime Of Plunder, As Amended" (July 12, 1991). Particularly, Section 2 of the
said law provides as follows:

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties.- Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates
 or acquires ill gotten-wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty
Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said
public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided
by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The Court shall declare any
and ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and share of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
the favor of the State. (As to the penalty, this section is amended by Republic Act No.
9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. RA 9346 was
signed into law on June 24, 2006. In view of its provisions, the penalty for the crime of
plunder is now reclusion perpetua pursuant to Section 2 (a) of RA 9346. In addition, the
convicted person shall be eligible for parole under Act. No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.)

Section 1 (d) of the same statute cited in Section 2 above reads:

d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession
of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
in directly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates
by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversation, mis-use, or malversation of public

funds or raids on the public treasury;

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,

kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/ or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of asset belonging to the

National Government or any of its subdivision, agencies or instrumentalities or
government-owned or –controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,

equity or any other form of interest or participation including promises of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other

combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,

connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense
 and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.

RA No. 7080, as amended, enunciates a rule of evidence in Section 4 thereof which is quoted
hereunder:

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. – For purpose of establishing the crime of plunder, it

shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The case of Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, promulgated
November 19, 2001), which upheld this Court’s Resolution dated July 9, 2001 denying accused
Former President Estrada’s Motion to Quash the information in this case, enumerates the
elements of the crime of plunder, as follows:

(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;

(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or

series of the following overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080
as amended; and

(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

The terms "Combination" and "Series" were likewise defined in the above-cited case as follows:

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least

two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1,
par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec.1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and
fraudulent conveyance of assets belongings to the National Government under
Sec.1, par. (d), subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a "series", there must be two (2) or more overt or
criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par.
(d), say, misappropriation , malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of
which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have
taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. (emphasis supplied)

The Charges in the Amended Information

in Relation to Accused
The import of the charges in the Amended Information was carefully discussed by the Honorable
Supreme Court in the case of Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 148965,
February 26, 2003, 377 SCRA 538, 553-556], as penned by now the Honorable Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, in this wise:

For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended
Information vis-à-vis the provisions of R.A. No. 7080.

The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other
co-accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while
the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was committed and lays down
most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail
the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-
conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts
alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in
Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving,
on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who
conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act
corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of
R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or
misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of
Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1
(d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other
conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that
of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security
System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or
receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became
part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two
predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was
allegedly committed by the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane
Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former President
unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John
Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at
the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the
enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.

From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the
accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with
former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is
worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-
gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the
conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the
second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d).
We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly
committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were
allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-
gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.

We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for
including the predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended
Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A.
No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing
multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law wasenacted in the aftermath of the Marcos
regimewhere charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and
his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with he
multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President to
acquire illegal wealth.They also found out that under the then existing laws such as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the
acts involved different transactions, different time and different personalities.Every
transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all
conspiracyhad to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation
of multiple Informations was a legl nightmarebut eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and
independent cases were filed against practically the same accused before the
Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti Plunder Law was enacted precisely to address
this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No.
733…

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a
commonality—to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different
participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy
charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from
illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each
accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive
commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions,
gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.

In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies

commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in
which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or more
other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving
the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then
retailer and consumer.
 From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel"
conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and
the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

Throughout the trial before this Court, the prosecution’s task was to establish, with the required
burden of proof, the commission of the crime of plunder by the principal accused former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada in conspiracy with his co-accused "during the period from
June, 1998 to January, 2001" by " willfully, unlawfully and criminally" amassing, accumulating
and acquiring by himself directly or indirectly ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of Four
Billion Ninety Seven Million Eight Hundred Four Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Three Pesos
and Seventeen Centavos ( P4,097,804,173.17), more or less and thereby unjustly enriching
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines, through "ANY OR A COMBINATION OR A SERIES OF OVERT
CRIMINAL ACTS, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS" described in paragraphs (a) to (d)
in the Amended Information.

After a thorough evaluation of the established facts, we hold that the prosecution has proven
beyond reasonable doubt the elements of plunder as follows:

(a) The principal accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, at the time of the commission of the
acts charged in the Amended Information was the President of the Republic of the
Philippines;

(b) He acted in connivance with then Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, who was granted
immunity from suit by the Office of the Ombudsman, and with the participation of other
persons named by prosecution witnesses in the course of the trial of this case, in
amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-gotten wealth as follows:

(i) by a series of acts of receiving bi-monthly collections from "jueteng", a form

of illegal gambling, during the period beginning November 1998 to August 2000
in the aggregate amount of Five Hundred Forty Five Millionh Two Hundred
Ninety One Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00), Two Hundred Million Pesos
(P200,000,000.00) of which was deposited in the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation;
and

(ii) by a series consisting of two (2) acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to
purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation and collecting or receiving
commission from the sales of Belle Shares in the amount of One Hundred Eighty
Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P189,700,000.00) which was
deposited in the Jose Velarde account.

In Jose "Jinggoy" E. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377
SCRA 538, 549) the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
 Contrary to petitioner’s posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money
from illegal gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on several instances" means
the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended
Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite
the phrase "several instances" is to indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.

In the same case (Jose "Jinggoy" E. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra.), it was held:

…Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts—that of ordering the Government

Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase
shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such
purchase from Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde"
account at the Equitable PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and
[3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former
President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. (emphasis supplied)

This Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, who among the
accused benefited from the misappropriation of the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur and in what
amounts, as charged sub-paragraph b. The prosecution likewise failed to offer evidence on the
alleged illegal sources of the numerous deposits in the Jose Velarde account which belongs to
FPres. Estrada, except for the commission received from the sale of Belle shares to GSIS and
SSS and the money collected from illegal gambling. The Anti-Plunder Law requires the
prosecution to prove the series or combination of overt or criminal acts through which ill-gotten
wealth deposited in the Jose Velarde account was amassed, accumulated or acquired. The
prosecution failed to discharge this burden of proof.

However, the two different series of predicate acts outlined above (particularly, first, the regular
and methodical acquisition of ill-gotten wealth through collections from illegal gambling and
second, the receipt of unlawful commissions from the sales of Belle shares twice), whether taken
separately or independently of the other or in combination with each other, unquestionably
constitute the crime of plunder as defined by Section 2, in relation to Section 1(d) of RA 7080 as
amended.

The case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001) ruled:

xxx As Senate President Salonga explained, of there are 150 constitutive crimes charged,
it is not necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt all of them. If a pattern can be
shown by proving for example, 10 criminal acts, then that would be sufficient to secure
conviction.

The State is thereby enabled by this device to deal with several acts constituting separate
crimes as just one crime of plunder by allowing their prosecution by means of a single
information because there is a common purpose for committing them, namely, that of
"amassing, accumulating or acquiring wealth through such overt or criminal acts." The
pattern is the organizing principle that defines what otherwise would be discreet criminal
acts into the single crime of plunder. (369 SCRA 394, 475-476)
A pattern was established by the carefully planned system of jueteng money collection on a
regular bi-monthly basis from the dfferent provinces nationwide to enrich FPres. Estrada with the
connivance and/or participation of Gov. Singson, Yolanda Ricaforte, Emma Lim, Carmencita
Itchon, SPO2 Artates, Jamis Singson and other jueteng collectors referred to in the Amended
Information as "John Does" and "Jane Does." The Court notes that Gov. Singson in the course of
his testimony mentioned certain persons who collected jueteng money aside from himself and his
employees; namely, Anton Prieto, Bonito Singson, Bong Pineda, Charing Magbuhos, Celso de
los Angeles, Jesse Viceo, Romy Pamatmat and a certain Sanchez of Batangas. As proven, the
collections in "several instances" from illegal gambling money went way beyond the minimum
of P50,000,000.00 set by the Anti-Plunder Law. These repeated collections of jueteng money
from November 1998 to August 2000 would fall within the purview of a "series" of illegal acts
constituting plunder. The said series of acts, on its own, would have been sufficient to convict
the principal accused, FPres. Estrada. However, this Court also finds that FPres. Estrada is
criminally liable for plunder for receiving commissions from the purchase of Belle Shares by the
GSIS and by the SSS in grave abuse of his power on two (2) separate occasions as charged in
sub-paragraph (b) of the Amended Information. Clearly, the receipt of these commissions on two
(2) occasions likewise meets the definition of a series of two (2) similar unlawful acts employing
the same scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth.

It is unnecessary to indulge in an exposition of whether the two series of acts falling under sub-
paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Amended Information, proven in the course of the trial could have
amounted to two (2) counts of plunder. It would be a purely academic exercise, as the accused
cannot be convicted of two offenses or two counts of plunder on the basis of a single
Information, clearly charging him of only one count of plunder, because that would violate his
constitutional rights to due process, given the severity of the crime charged in this case.

The predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Amended Information, which
formed two (2) separate series of acts of a different nature, were linked by the fact that they were
plainly geared towards a common goal which was the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth for
FPres. Estrada and that they shared a pattern or a common method of commission which was the
abuse or misuse of the high authority or power of the Presidency. (U.S. v. Hiverly, 437 F3d 752)

In sum, the Court finds that prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the commission by
the principal accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada of the crime of plunder but not so
in the case of former Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada and Atty. Edward Serapio.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No.
26558 finding the accused, Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of PLUNDERdefined in and penalized by Republic Act No. 7080,
as amended. On the other hand, for failure of the prosecution to prove and establish their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward
S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and accordingly, the Court hereby orders
their ACQUITTAL.

The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in accordance with Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.

The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under
detention shall be credited to him in full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, the Court hereby declares the forfeiture in favor of the government of the following:

(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty Two Million Seven Hundred Ninety One
Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00), with interest and income earned, inclusive of the
amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00), deposited in the name and
account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.

(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Million Pesos (P189,000,000.00), inclusive
of interests and income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account.

(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as "Boracay Mansion" located
at #100 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.

The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio are
hereby ordered cancelled and released to the said accused or their duly authorized representatives
upon presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof and subject to the usual
accounting and auditing procedures. Likewise, the hold-departure orders issued against the said
accused are hereby recalled and declared functus oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158754 August 10, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Division) and JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA, Respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set
aside the Resolution1of herein respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) issued on March 6,
2003 in Criminal Case No. 26558, granting bail to private respondent Senator Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada (hereafter "Jinggoy" for brevity), as effectively reiterated in its Resolution2 of May 30,
2003, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents which gave rise to this proceeding are set forth in the Court’s
Decision3 of February 26, 2002, in G.R. No. 148965, to wit:

In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito

Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the
former President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed
with the … Office of the Ombudsman.

On April 4, 2001, the … Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause
warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former
President and the other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder
under Republic Act [RA] No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.

The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No.
26558, the case was assigned to [the] respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. xxx.
(Emphasis added.)

The amended information referred to, like the original, charged respondent Jinggoy, together
with the former President and several others, with plunder, defined and penalized under RA No.
7080, as amended by Section 12 of RA No. 7659, allegedly committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC
OFFICER, …, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and
there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR
TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR
A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL

INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT
OF… (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE
FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused …
Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, …, [and] JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF
TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
 (b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds … [P130,000,000.00], more or less,
representing a portion of the … [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT,
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000
SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System
(SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS
… [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS
… [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES,COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT
… [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM

COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS,OR ANY FORM
OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS … [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING
THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.4

What transpired next are narrated in the same February 26, 2002 Decision in G.R. No. 148965,
thus:

On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for [Jinggoy] and his co-
accused. On its basis, [Jinggoy] and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.

On April 30, 2001, [Jinggoy] filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: (1) no
probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was
only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or
criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
[He] prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information …. In the alternative, [he] also
prayed that he be allowed to post bail …..

On June 28, 2001, [he] filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Motion To
Fix Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its
Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To
Him."

xxx xxx xxx

On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying [Jinggoy’s] "Motion to

Quash and Suspend" and "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion." [His] alternative prayer to post bail
was set for hearing after arraignment of all accused. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

The following day, July 10, 2001, [Jinggoy] moved for reconsideration of the Resolution.
Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign [him]. [He] refused to make his
plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.5 (Emphasis and words in
brackets added)

From the denial action of the Sandiganbayan immediately adverted to, Jinggoy interposed a
petition for certiorari before this Court claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in, inter alia, (a) sustaining the charge against him for alleged offenses
and with alleged conspirators with whom he is not even connected, and (b) in not fixing bail for
him. Pending resolution of this petition, docketed as G.R. No. 148965, Jinggoy filed with the
Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons." The Ombudsman
opposed the motion. For three (3) days in September 2001, the Sandiganbayan conducted
hearings on the motion for bail, with one Dr. Roberto Anastacio of the Makati Medical Center
appearing as sole witness for Jinggoy.6

On December 18, 2001, Jinggoy filed with the Court an Urgent Motion praying for early
resolution of his Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." He reiterated his
earlier plea for bail filed with the Sandiganbayan. On the same day, the Court referred the motion
to the Sandiganbayan for resolution and directed said court to make a report, not later than 8:30
in the morning of December 21, 2001.7

The report was submitted as directed. Attached to the Report was a copy of the Sandiganbayan’s
Resolution dated December 20, 2001 denying Jinggoy’s motion for bail for "lack of factual
basis." According to the graft court, basing its findings on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio,
Jinggoy "failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of
the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post
bail." 8

On February 26, 2002, the Court dismissed Jinggoy’s petition in G.R. No. 148965, on the
following rationale:

The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the
issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial
court conduct bail hearings xxx. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong
evidence of guilt.
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to [Jinggoy] as the matter requires evidentiary hearing
that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based
its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which
evidence was given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that evidence
on petitioner’s guilt was presented before the lower court.

Upon proper motion of [Jinggoy], respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to

determine if the evidence of [Jinggoy’s] guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to
[him].9 (Underscoring and words in brackets added).

On April 17, 2002, Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for
Bail 10 against which the prosecution filed its comment and opposition. Bail hearings were then
conducted, followed by the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda.

In the herein assailed Resolution11 of March 6, 2003, respondent Sandiganbayan (Special

Division) granted the omnibus application for bail, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the facts and applicable law and jurisprudence, JOSE "JINGGOY"
ESTRADA’s "OMNIBUS APPLICATION FOR BAIL" dated April 16, 2002 is GRANTED.
Bail for accused-movant is fixed at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00) to be paid in
cash and his release is ordered upon the posting thereof and its approval, unless movant is being
held for some other legal cause.

This resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereto which the respondent court denied via the
herein equally assailed May 30, 2003 Resolution,12 the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the prosecution’s "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

[RE: GRANT OF JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA’S PETITION FOR BAIL] dated 13 March
2003 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present petition on the submission13 that respondent Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction -

I.

IN GRANTING BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA,…[CONSIDERING]

THE WELL-ESTABLISHED THEORY OF OVERLAPPING CONSPIRACIES AND,
THUS, GRIEVOUSLY DISREGARDED THE APPLICATION OF ACCEPTED
CRIMINAL LAW PRECEPTS AND THEREBY SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT.
 II.

xxx WHEN IT GRANTED BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA WHEN IT

FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CONDUCT OF RESPONDENT JINGGOY
ESTRADA POINTED TO A CONCURRENCE OF SENTIMENT OR CRIMINAL
DESIGN INDICATING THE EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
ACCUSED JOSEPH ESTRADA AND JINGGOY ESTRADA.

III.

xxx WHEN IT GRANTED BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA

CONSIDERING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACT CLEARLY EVIDENCES THAT
RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA, EVEN WITHOUT A FINDING OF
CONSPIRACY, IS EQUALLY GUILTY AND LIABLE AS ACCUSED JOSEPH
ESTRADA HIMSELF BY HIS INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION AND/OR DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.

IV.

xxx WHEN IT LIMITED THE CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE, AS WELL

AS THE POTENTIAL [LIABILITY] OF RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA, TO
SUBPARAGRAPH "A" OF THE AMENDED INFORMATION.

The imputation of grave abuse of discretion to the public respondent is untenable.

To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution mandates:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.

Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great.14 Here, ever since
the promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does
not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk. We quote with approval what the
graft court wrote in this regard:

It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy] has, in general, been consistently
respectful of the Court and its processes. He has not ominously shown, by word or by deed, that
he is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his continued incarceration. Bearing in mind his
conduct, social standing and his other personal circumstances, the possibility of his escape in this
case seems remote if not nil.15

The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now almost nil, given his election
on May 10, 2004, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court takes stock of the fact
that those who usually jump bail are shadowy characters mindless of their reputation in the eyes
of the people for as long as they can flee from the retribution of justice. On the other hand, those
with a reputation and a respectable name to protect and preserve are very unlikely to jump bail.
The Court, to be sure, cannot accept any suggestion that someone who has a popular mandate to
serve as Senator is harboring any plan to give up his Senate seat in exchange for becoming a
fugitive from justice.

Petitioner’s first argument denigrates as grave abuse of discretion the public respondent’s
rejection of the theory of overlapping conspiracies, which, in the abstract, depicts a picture of a
conspirator in the first level of conspiracy performing acts which implement, or in furtherance of,
another conspiracy in the next level of which the actor is not an active party. As the petitioner’s
logic goes following this theory, respondent Jinggoy is not only liable for conspiring with former
President Estrada in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth from "jueteng" under par. (a) of the
amended information. He has also a culpable connection with the conspiracy, under par. (b), in
the diversion of the tobacco excise tax and in receiving commissions and kickbacks from the
purchase by the SSS and GSIS of Belle Corporation shares and other illegal sources under par.
(c) and (d), albeit, he is not so named in the last three paragraphs. And since the central figure in
the overlapping conspiracies, i.e., President Estrada, is charged with a capital offense, all those
within the conspiracy loop would be considered charged with the same kind of non-bailable
offense.

Explaining its point, petitioner cites People v. Castelo16 which, as here, also involves multiple
levels of conspiracies. Just like in the present case where the lead accused is a former President
no less, the prime suspect in Castelo was also a powerful high-ranking government official – a
former Judge who later rose to hold, in a concurrent capacity, the positions of Secretary of
Justice and Secretary of National Defense, to be precise. In Castelo, charges and countercharges
were initially hurled by and between Castelo and Senator Claro Recto, who was then planning to
present Manuel Monroy as star witness against Castelo in a scandal case. Castelo left the
Philippines for Korea. While away, someone shot Monroy dead. Evidence pointed to a
conspiracy led by a certain "Ben Ulo" (who appears to be the mastermind) and a group of
confidential agents of the Department of National Defense, one of whom was the triggerman.
Coincidentally, Ben Ulo was a close bodyguard of Castelo. In the end, the Solicitor General
tagged Ben Ulo (not Castelo) as the central figure in the conspiracy. This notwithstanding, the
Court held Castelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for murder, because only he had a motive for
desiring Monroy’s demise. The conspiracy between Castelo and Ben Ulo was then determined to
be overlapping with the conspiracy between Ben Ulo and the confidential agents, one of whom
was the triggerman.

Further explaining the theory of overlapping conspiracies, petitioner cites the ruling in People v.
Ty Sui Wong,17featuring a love triangle involving a certain Victor and Mariano, each out to win
the heart of Ruby. Victor left Manila for Mindanao. While Victor was away, the dead body of
Mariano was found with multiple stab wounds in a dark alley in Pasay. Evidence pointed to a
conspiracy among "Sampaloc hoodlums" who had no direct link with Victor. However, one of
the neighbors of the "Sampaloc hoodlums" was a classmate of Victor. In the end, on the basis of
interlocking confessions, the Court found Victor and his classmate together with all the
"Sampaloc hoodlums" guilty of murder.
Positing the applicability of Castelo and Ty Sui Wong under the premises, petitioner presently
argues:

It should be noted that this is the same scenario of accused Joseph Estrada conspiring with
former Gov. Singson for the collection and receipt of bribes (jueteng protection money); and of
former Gov. Singson involving respondent Jinggoy Estrada in yet another level of conspiracy in
pursuit of the first, i.e., the regular collection of jueteng protection money for accused Joseph
Estrada; and, respondent Jinggoy Estrada, aware of the details of the conspiracy between accused
Joseph Estrada and Gov. Singson, agreeing to remit the greater part of his collection of bribes to
accused Joseph Estrada as its ultimate beneficiary. Thus, respondent Jinggoy Estrada reached an
agreement with former Gov. Singson, executed the plan and participated in furtherance of the
conspiracy for the receipt and collection of jueteng protection money, i.e., collecting P3 Million
in jueteng protection money every month; remitting P2 Million thereof to former Gov. Singson
for delivery to accused Joseph Estrada and retaining P1 Million thereof for himself.

Similarly, therefore, respondent Jinggoy Estrada should have been denied bail since he is as
guilty and liable as accused Joseph Estrada for the non-bailable offense of Plunder.18

As we see it, the rulings in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not on all-fours applicable to and of
governing sway to the issue of the propriety of revoking Jinggoy’s release on bail.

As it were, the petitioner erroneously equates the provisional grant of bail to respondent Jinggoy
to his virtual acquittal in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner is wrong. Castelo and Ty Sui
Wong contextually dealt with the guilt of culprits therein for the crimes of murder after all the
evidence had been adduced. Unlike in this proceeding, the propriety of a grant of bail, given the
evidence for or against the bail application, was not an issue in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong. And in
the present case, respondent Sandiganbayan is still in the process of determining the facts and
merits of the main case. In the words of the public respondent:

As a cautionary parting word, it must be categorically stated herein that in making the above
pronouncements, this Court [Sandiganbayan] is not making any judgment as to the final outcome
of this case either with respect to movant [Jinggoy] or with respect to accused Estrada. This
Court [Sandiganbayan] is simply called to determine whether, at this stage, the evidence of
movant's guilt is strong as to warrant his temporary release on bail. xxx.19

Revoking the bail thus granted to respondent Jinggoy, as the petitioner urges, which necessarily
implies that the evidence of his guilt is strong, would be tantamount to pre-empting the
Sandiganbayan’s ongoing determination of the facts and merits of the main case.

Petitioner’s second and third arguments focus on the possible degrees of participation of Jinggoy
in the crime of Plunder. Noticeably, both arguments, if pursued to their respective logical
conclusions, tend to cancel each other out, one leading as it were to a direction quite the opposite
of the other. For while the second argument attempts to establish an "implied conspiracy"
between Jinggoy and his father - hence, the guilt of one is the guilt of the other - the third
argument eschews the idea of conspiracy, but respondent Jinggoy is nonetheless "equally guilty"
as President Estrada because of his indispensable cooperation and/or direct participation in the
crime of Plunder.

By statutory definition, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.20 Venturing into the gray areas
of the concept of conspiracy, petitioner cites the following obiter defining "implied conspiracy,"
thus:

When by their acts, two or more persons proceed toward the accomplishment of the same
felonious object, with each doing his act, so that their acts though seemingly independent were in
fact connected, showing a closeness of formal association and concurrence of sentiment,
conspiracy may be inferred.21

Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is
planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence
of the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts
and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some
complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no
actual meeting among them to concert is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.22

From the above pronouncements, petitioner then proceeds to present voluminous documents and
transcripts of stenographic notes purporting to prove that Jinggoy had been deep inside the web
of "implied conspiracy" under the second argument of this petition. From the "implied
conspiracy" theory, it then shifts gears to embrace the "equally guilty" hypothesis under the fall-
back third argument.

Regardless, however, of whatever legal strategy petitioner may have in mind, the fundamental
principle that the Court is not a trier of facts remains.1avvphi1 Petitioner’s second and third
arguments are to be sure relevant to the proceedings for the grant or denial of bail that were
pending before in the Sandiganbayan. They are of little moment here where the only issue now is
whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting
bail to the private respondent.

With the view we take of this case, the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its assailed resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is predicated only
on its preliminary appreciation of the evidence adduced in the bail hearing to determine whether
or not deprivation of the right to bail is warranted. Needless to stress, a grant of bail does not
prevent the trier of facts, the same Anti-Graft Court, from making a final assessment of the
evidence after full trial on the merits. As jurisprudence teaches:

xxx Such appreciation [of evidence] is at best preliminary and should not prevent the trial judge
from making a final assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is not an uncommon
occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course. 23
Petitioner’s last argument is, at bottom, an attempt to have the Court reverse in this case its
earlier holding in another case - G.R. No. 148965 - where we stated:

The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner [Jinggoy] and his other
co-accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the
second paragraph describes in general how plunder was committed and lays down most of the
elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts
that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former President
Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs
correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged
the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner
[Jinggoy] as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the
offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration
in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting,
receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province
of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of
the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of
the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts – that of ordering the …
(GSIS) and the … (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or
receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became part of the
deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall
under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by
the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d)
alleged the predicate act that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions,
gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his
account name "Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense
under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.

From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused
named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President
Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth …. As the
Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass the
subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the
conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the second
paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that
petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts [illegal gambling] he allegedly
committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly
done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth
amounting to more than P4 billion.24 (Emphasis added.)1avvphi1

Obviously hoping to maneuver around the above ruling so as to implicate individual respondent
for predicate acts described in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the Amended Information,
petitioner now argues:
It should be emphasized that in the course of the proceedings in the instant case, respondent
Jinggoy Estrada waived the benefit of the said ruling and opted, instead, to participate, as he did
participate and later proceeded to cross-examine witnesses whose testimonies were clearly
offered to prove the other constitutive acts of Plunder alleged in the Amended Information under
sub-paragraphs "b", "c" and "d".25

We disagree.

At bottom, the petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded "benefits" to respondent Jinggoy that
were inexistent at the start of that case. But no such benefits were extended, as the Court did not
read into the Amended Information, as couched, something not there in the first place.
Respondent Jinggoy’s participation, if that be the case, in the proceedings involving sub-
paragraphs "b," "c" and "d," did not change the legal situation set forth in the aforequoted portion
of the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 148965. For when it passed, in G.R. No. 148965, upon the
inculpatory acts envisaged and ascribed in the Amended Information against Jinggoy, the Court
merely defined what he was indicted and can be penalized for. In legal jargon, the Court
informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right guaranteed an
accused under the Constitution.26 In fine, all that the Court contextually did in G.R. No. 148965
was no more than to implement his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation in the
light of the filing of the Amended Information as worded. If at all, the Court’s holding in G.R.
No. 148965 freed individual respondent from the ill effects of a wrong interpretation that might
be given to the Amended Information.

In all, the Court rules that public respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when, after conducting numerous bail hearings and evaluating the
weight of the prosecution’s evidence, it determined that the evidence against individual
respondent was not strong and, on the basis of that determination, resolved to grant him bail.

As a final consideration, the Court notes a statement made by the respondent court which adds an
appropriate dimension to its resolve to grant bail subject of this recourse. Wrote that court in its
assailed resolution of March 6, 2003:

xxx Corollarily, it is not amiss to state that, at this time, there looms the possibility that, in case
of conviction, [respondent Jinggoy’s] criminal liability would probably not warrant the death
penalty or reclusion perpetua. (Underscoring in the original; Words in bracket added).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015 - JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES,
AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondents.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO

M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ
OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the “petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the Court En Banc to act on the
petition; (b) to expedite the proceedings and to set the case for oral arguments; and (c) to issue a
temporary restraining order to the respondents from holding a pre-trial and further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238”1 filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile)
challenging the July 11, 2014 resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan.

I.

THE ANTECEDENTS

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information3 for plunder against Enrile,
Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before
the Sandiganbayan.

The Information reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

xxxx

In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction,
above-named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G.
REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers, committing the
offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM
NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and
others, kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or
after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a
percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through
REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government
organizations which became the recipients and/or target implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF
projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
(b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus motion (motion to
dismiss for lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for
bail),4 and (2) a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
Information,5 on June 10, 2014, and June 16, 2014, respectively. The Sandiganbayan heard both
motions on June 20, 2014.

On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to both motions.

On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motions and ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest on the plunder case against the accused.6redarclaw

On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing7 informing him that his arraignment would
be held before the Sandiganbayan’s Third Division on July 11, 2014.

On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars8 before the Sandiganbayan. On
the same date, he filed a motion for deferment of arraignment9 since he was to undergo medical
examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).

On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the Sandiganbayan’s
order and his motion for bill of particulars was called for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty.
Mendoza), Enrile’s counsel, argued the motion orally. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan Presiding
Justice (PJ) Amparo Cabotaje-Tang (Cabotaje-Tang), declared a “10-minute recess” to
deliberate on the motion.

When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Court’s denial of
Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars essentially on the following grounds:
(1) the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the arguments he raised in
his supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information; and
(2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.

Atty. Mendoza asked for time to file a motion for reconsideration, stating that he would orally
move to reconsider the Sandiganbayan’s denial if he would not be given time to seek a
reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan then directed Atty. Mendoza to immediately proceed with
his motion for reconsideration.

Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the reconsideration of the denial of
Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars. The Sandiganbayan again declared a recess to deliberate
on the motion. After five (5) minutes, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Sandiganbayan’s denial
of the motion for reconsideration.10redarclaw

The Sandiganbayan reduced its rulings into writing on Enrile’s written and oral motions. The
pertinent portion of this ruling reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx

In today’s consideration of accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion for Bill of Particulars, the Court
heard the parties on oral arguments in relation thereto. Thereafter, it declared a ten-minute recess
to deliberate thereon. After deliberating on the said motion as well as the arguments of the
parties, the Court resolves to DENY as it hereby DENIES the same motion for bill of particulars
for the following reasons: (1) the details desired in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the said motion are
substantially reiterations of the arguments raised by accused Enrile in his Supplemental
Opposition to Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and for Dismissal of Information dated June 16,
2014 x x x.

The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging accused
Enrile, among other persons, with the crime of plunder in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It
finds no cogent reasons to reconsider the said ruling.

Moreover, the “desired details” that accused Enrile would like the prosecution to provide are
evidentiary in nature, which need not be alleged in the Information. They are best ventilated
during the trial of the case.

Counsel for accused Juan Ponce Enrile orally sought a reconsideration of the denial of his
motion for bill of particulars which was opposed by the prosecution. The Court then declared
another ten-minute recess to deliberate on the said motion for reconsideration. After deliberation
thereon, the Court likewise resolved to DENY as it hereby DENIES accused Juan Ponce
Enrile’s motion for reconsideration there being no new or substantial grounds raised to warrant
the grant thereof.

ACCORDINGLY, the scheduled arraignment of accused Juan Ponce Enrile shall now proceed as
previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.11
Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enrile’s arraignment. The
Sandiganbayan responded by directing the doctors present to determine whether he was
physically fit to be arraigned. After he was declared fit, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with
Enrile’s arraignment. Enrile entered a “no plea,” prompting the Sandiganbayan to enter a “not
guilty” plea on his behalf.

II.

THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of
particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed against him. Enrile
maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific participation in the crime
of plunder had been. He posits that the Information should have stated the details of the
particular acts that allegedly constituted the imputed series or combination of overt acts that led
to the charge of plunder. Enrile essentially reiterates the “details desired” that he sought in his
motion for bill of particulars, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Allegations of Information Details Desired

“x x x accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, a. Who among the accused acquired the alleged
then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA “ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE
LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT
Senator Enrile’s Office, both public HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
officers, committing the offense in relation HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)”? One
to their respective offices, conspiring with of them, two of them or all of them? Kindly
one another and with JANET LIM specify.
NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and
JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten
wealth amounting to at least ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php172,834,500.00) through a
combination or series of overt acts, x x x.”
b. The allegation “through a combination or series
of overt criminal acts” is a conclusion of fact or of
law. What are the particular overt acts which
constitute the “combination”? What are the

x x x by repeatedly receiving from
NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM,
DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following
circumstances: before, during and/or after
the project identification, NAPOLES gave,
and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a
percentage of the cost of a project to be
funded from ENRILE’S Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in
consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement,
directly or through REYES, to the
appropriate government agencies, of
NAPOLES’ non-government organizations
which became the recipients and/or target
implementers of ENRILE’S PDAF projects,
which duly-funded projects turned out to be
ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF
proceeds for her personal gain;
particular overt acts which constitute the “series”?
Who committed those acts?
a. What was “repeatedly” received? If sums of
money, the particular amount. If on several
occasions and in different amounts, specify the
amount on each occasion and the corresponding
date of receipt.
b. Name the specific person(s) who delivered the
amount of Php172,834,500.00 and the specific
person(s) who received the amount; or if not in
lump sum, the various amounts totaling
Php172,834,500.00. x x x Specify particularly the
person who delivered the amount, Napoles or Lim
or De Asis, and who particularly are “the others.”
c. To whom was the money given? To Enrile or
Reyes? State the amount given on each occasion,
the date when and the place where the amount
was given.
d. x x x Describe each project allegedly
identified, how, and by whomwas the project
identified, the nature of each project, where it is
located and the cost of each project.
e. For each of the years 2004-2010, under what
law or official documentis a portion of the
“Priority Development Assistance Fund”
identified as that of a member of Congress, in this
instance, as ENRILE’s, to be found? In
what amount for each year is ENRILE’s Priority
Development Assistance Fund? When, and to
whom, did Enrile endorse the projects in favor of

x x x by taking undue advantage, on several
occasions of their official positions,
authority, relationships, connections, and
influence to unjustly enrich themselves at
the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
“Napoles non-government organizations which
became the recipients and/or target implementers
of ENRILE’s PDAF projects?” NameNapoles
non-government organizations which became the
recipients and/or target implementers of
ENRILE’s PDAF projects. Who
paidNapoles, from whom did Napoles collect the
fund for the projects which turned out to be ghosts
or fictitious? Who authorized the payments for
each project?
f. x x x what COA audits or field investigations
were conducted which validated the findings that
each of Enrile’s PDAF projects in the years 2004-
2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
a. Provide the details of how Enrile took undue
advantage, on several occasions, of his official
positions, authority, relationships, connections,
and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines. Was this because
he received any money from the
government? From whom and for what reason did
he receive any money or property from the
government through which he “unjustly enriched
himself”? State the details from whom
each amount was received, the place and the time.

Enrile posits that his ‘desired details’ are not evidentiary in nature; they are material facts that
should be clearly alleged in the Information so that he may be fully informed of the charges
against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.

Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of particulars are cited in a context
different from his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the
resolution of the probable cause issue was interlocutory and did “not bar the submission of the
same issue in subsequent proceedings especially in the context of a different proceeding.”

Enrile thus prays that: “(a) the Court en banc act on the present petition; (b) by way of an interim
measure, the Court issue a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from holding the pre-trial and subsequent proceedings against him in Criminal Case No. SB-14-
CRM-0238 during the pendency of the present petition; (c) the Court expedite the proceedings
and set the case for oral arguments; and (d) at the conclusion of the proceedings, the Court annul
and set aside the Sandiganbayan’s July 11, 2014 resolution and his arraignment.”

A. The People’s Comment

In its Comment,12 the People of the Philippines13 counters that the Sandiganbayan did not
exercise its discretionary power in an arbitrary or despotic manner. Even assuming that the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars was erroneous, the error did not
amount to lack or excess or jurisdiction. It further maintains that the assailed Sandiganbayan
rulings were arrived at based on the procedures prescribed under Section 2, Rule VII of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan.

The People also argues that the Information already contained the ultimate facts; matters of
evidence do not need to be averred.

B. Enrile’s Reply

In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to move for a bill of particulars is “ancillary
to and in implementation” of an accused’s rights to due process, to be heard, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He maintains that the Sandiganbayan’s
denial of his motion for bill of particulars is not “a mere denial of a procedural right under the
Rules of Court, but of rights vested in an accused under the Constitution to ensure fairness in the
trial of the offense charged.” Enrile also adds that there could only be a fair trial if he could
properly plead to the Information and prepare for trial.

Enrile further argues that the People’s Comment did not dispute the relevance of the details
sought in the motion for bill of particulars. He likewise claims that the “desired details” could
not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution during the preliminary
conference. Finally, Enrile maintains that his motion for bill of particulars was not dilatory.

III.

THE COURT’S RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the petition under the terms
outlined below.

A. The constitutional right of the accused to be informed

Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.14 This right has long been
established in English law, and is the same right expressly guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution.
This right requires that the offense charged be stated with clarity and with certainty to inform the
accused of the crime he is facing in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his
defense.15redarclaw

In the 1904 case of United States v. Karelsen,16 the Court explained the purpose of informing an
accused in writing of the charges against him from the perspective of his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The object of this written accusation was – First. To furnish the accused with such a description
of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of
his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in
law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In
order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law.
Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstances necessary
to constitute the crime charged. x x x.17[Emphasis supplied.]
The objective, in short, is to describe the act with sufficient certainty to fully appraise the
accused of the nature of the charge against him and to avoid possible surprises that may lead to
injustice. Otherwise, the accused would be left speculating on why he has been charged at
all.18redarclaw

In People v. Hon. Mencias, et al.,19 the Court further explained that a person’s constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him signifies that an
accused should be given the necessary data on why he is the subject of a criminal proceeding.
The Court added that the act or conduct imputed to a person must be described with sufficient
particularity to enable the accused to defend himself properly.

The general grant and recognition of a protected right emanates from Section 1, Article III of the
1987 Constitution which states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty, and property of individuals; to secure the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles
of private rights and distributive justice x x x; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial
justice and the benefit of the general law.20redarclaw

Separately from Section 1, Article III is the specific and direct underlying root of the right to
information in criminal proceedings – Section 14(1), Article III – which provides that “No
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.” Thus, no
doubt exists that the right to be informed of the cause of the accusation in a criminal case has
deep constitutional roots that, rather than being cavalierly disregarded, should be carefully
protected.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),21 the Court, in sustaining the
Sandiganbayan’s grant of the motion for bill of particulars of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., held that
“the facile verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government flaunted the accusation of
excesses against the Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of
particulars, so that respondent can properly prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and so that
trial in this case will proceed as expeditiously as possible.”22 The Court additionally stated
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude of discretion in setting
aside default orders justified under the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands and
the law requires no less that defendants must know what the complaint against them is all about.

x x x In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the impression in the individual respondents'
minds that they are being railroaded out of their rights and properties without due process of
law.23
B. Procedural Sufficiency of the Information

An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, signed by the

prosecutor and filed with the court.24 The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing
the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, specifically require certain matters to be stated in the Information for its
sufficiency. The requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense
since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense
charged.25redarclaw

To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.26redarclaw

If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of
the statute penalizing it. The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances alleged must be stated in ordinary and concise language; they do not
necessarily need to be in the language of the statute, and should be in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is charged and what qualifying and
aggravating circumstances are alleged, so that the court can pronounce judgment.27 The Rules do
not require the Information to exactly allege the date and place of the commission of the offense,
unless the date and the place are material ingredients or essential elements of the offense, or are
necessary for its identification.

B.1. Ultimate facts versus Evidentiary facts

An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the evidentiary and
other details (i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during the
trial.28redarclaw

Ultimate facts is defined as “those facts which the expected evidence will support. The term
does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material
elements are to be established.” It refers to the facts that the evidence will prove at the
trial.29redarclaw

Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal, determinative, and constitutive facts on
whose existence the cause of action rests;30 they are also the essential and determining facts on
which the court's conclusion rests and without which the judgment would lack support in
essential particulars.31redarclaw

Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they
are the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion.32They are facts supporting the
existence of some other alleged and unproven fact.33redarclaw
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court explained these two concepts in relation to a
particular criminal case, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is
analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil
cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the
primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish
said ultimate facts. x x x.35 [Emphasis supplied.]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information,
matters of evidence – as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense – do
not need to be alleged. Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be
determined based on the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes.36redarclaw

C. Arraignment

The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned so
that he may be fully informed as to why he was charged and what penal offense he has to face,
to be convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full
opportunity to disprove the evidence against him.37 During arraignment, the accused is granted
the opportunity to fully know the precise charge that confronts him and made fully aware
of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to
him.38redarclaw

An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime
imputed to him in the Information and the circumstances under which it is allegedly
committed.39 It is likewise at this stage of the proceedings when the accused enters his plea,40 or
enters a plea of not guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged.41redarclaw

A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that the Information should provide
the accused with fair notice of the accusations made against him, so that he will be able to make
an intelligent plea and prepare a defense.42Moreover, the Information must provide some
means of ensuring that the crime for which the accused is brought to trial is in fact one for
which he was charged, rather than some alternative crime seized upon by the prosecution
in light of subsequently discovered evidence.43Likewise, it must indicate just what crime or
crimes an accused is being tried for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts to retry him for
the same crime or crimes.44 In other words, the Information must permit the accused to prepare
his defense, ensure that he is prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented, enable him to plead
jeopardy against a later prosecution, and inform the court of the facts alleged so that it can
determine the sufficiency of the charge.

Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the material elements of the crime
charged. If the Information fails to comply with this basic standard, it would be quashed on the
ground that it fails to charge an offense.45Of course, an Information may be sufficient to
withstand a motion to quash, and yet insufficiently inform the accused of the specific
details of the alleged offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court allow the accused to
move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for
trial.46redarclaw

C.1. Bill of Particulars

In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an

action, which an accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to
properly plead and prepare for trial. In civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has been defined
as a complementary procedural document consisting of an amplification or more particularized
outline of a pleading, and is in the nature of a more specific allegation of the facts recited in the
pleading.47 The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in civil cases is to enable a party
to prepare his responsive pleading properly.

In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the
Information but nonetheless pertain to or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is to
enable an accused: to know the theory of the government’s case;48 to prepare his defense and to
avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for
the same offense; and to compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering
evidence.49redarclaw

In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is governed by Section 9 of Rule 116
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of
particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the
alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise
the accused of the crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The
particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what
the Information means.50redarclaw

The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard
against surprises during trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the
evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of
particulars matters of evidence relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the
offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of factual information included in
the bill of particulars.51redarclaw

C.2. Origin of bill of particulars in criminal cases52redarclaw

Even before the promulgation of the 1964 Rules of Court, when the applicable rules for criminal
procedure was still General Order No. 58,53 the Court had already recognized the need for a bill
of particulars in criminal cases. This recognition came despite the lack of any specific provision
in General Order No. 58 setting out the rules for a bill of particulars in criminal cases.

In U.S. v. Schneer,54 the issue presented was whether a bill of particulars was available in a
criminal case for estafa after the accused had already been arraigned. The Court essentially ruled
that there was no specific provision of law expressly authorizing the filing of specifications or
bills of particulars in criminal cases, and held that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We know of no provision either in General Orders, No. 58, or in the laws existing prior thereto
which requires the Government to furnish such a bill of particulars, and we accordingly hold that
it was not error on the part of the court below to refuse to do so.
In U.S. v. Cernias,55 however, the Court formally recognized the existence and applicability of a
bill of particulars in criminal cases. In this case, the prosecution filed an information charging
Basilio Cernias with several counts of brigandage before the Court of First Instance of Leyte. In
overruling the accused’s objection, the Court declared that the prosecution’s act of specifying
certain acts done by the conspirators in the Information “did no more than to furnish the
defendant with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to prove at the trial x x
x.”56redarclaw

In sum, the Court essentially held that a detailed complaint or information is not objectionable,
and that the details it contains may be properly considered as specifications or bill of
particulars.57redarclaw

In People v. Abad Santos,58 the court first recognized a bill of particulars, as a right that the
accused may ask for from the court. In this case, the prosecution charged respondent Joseph
Arcache with the crime of treason before the People’s Court. The Information filed against the
accused contained, in counts 2 and 3, the phrase “and other similar equipment.”

The counsel for the accused verbally petitioned the People’s court to order the prosecution to
“make more specific [the] phrase ‘and other similar equipment,’” which request the People’s
Court granted. The People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari, but the Court
dismissed this petition.

In upholding the order of the People’s Court, the Court ruled that “in the absence of specific
provisions of law prohibiting the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases,
their submission may be permitted, as they cannot prejudice any substantial rights of the accused.
On the contrary, they will serve to apprise the accused clearly of the charges filed against them,
and thus enable them to prepare intelligently whatever defense or defenses they might
have.59redarclaw

Notably, Abad Santos emphasized the importance of a bill of particulars in criminal cases, stating
that “x x x inasmuch as in criminal cases not only the liberty but even the life of the accused may
be at stake, it is always wise and proper that the accused should be fully apprised of the true
charges against them, and thus avoid all and any possible surprise, which might be detrimental to
their rights and interests; and ambiguous phrases should not, therefore, be permitted in criminal
complaints or informations; and if any such phrase has been included therein, on motion of the
defense, before the commencement of the trial, the court should order either its elimination as
surplusage or the filing of the necessary specification, which is but an amendment in mere
matters of form.”60redarclaw

In these cited cases, the Courts did not rely on the Rules of Court to provide for a bill of
particulars in criminal cases. A specific provision granting the accused the right “to move for or
demand a more definite statement or a bill of particulars” was not incorporated as a formal rule
until the 1964 Rules of Court,61under its Section 6, Rule 116. This initial provision later became
Section 10 of Rule 116 under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure62and Section 9 of Rule 116
under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.63redarclaw

C.3. The Distinctive Role of a Bill of Particulars

When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a
motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.

The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or
information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid
Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague
terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill of particulars may supply are only formal
amendments to the complaint or Information.

In Virata v. Sandiganbayan,64 the Court expounded on the purpose of a bill of particulars as

follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
It is the office or function, as well as the object or purpose, of a bill of particulars to amplify or
limit a pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded in
general terms, give information, not contained in the pleading, to the opposite party and the court
as to the precise nature, character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or defense relied on by
the pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to the end that the
proof at the trial may be limited to the matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and
needless preparation for, the trial may be avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in
framing his answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has also been stated that it is the
function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize, and limit or
circumscribe the issues in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general
function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case
when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a bill.65redarclaw

x x x x [Emphasis ours.]
Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the specification of the details desired deprives
him of the right to object to evidencethat could be introduced and admitted under an
Information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with a
definite crime.66redarclaw

Although the application for the bill of particulars is one addressed to the sound discretion of the
court67 it should nonetheless exercise its discretion within the context of the facts and the
nature of the crime charged in each case and the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him. As articulated in the case of People v. Iannone:68
It is beyond cavil that a defendant has a basic and fundamental right to be informed of the
charges against him so that he will be able to prepare a defense. Hence the courts must exercise
careful surveillance to ensure that a defendant is not deprived of this right by an overzealous
prosecutor attempting to protect his case or his witnesses. Any effort to leave a defendant in
ignorance of the substance of the accusation until the time of trial must be firmly rebuffed. This
is especially so where the indictment itself provides a paucity of information. In such cases, the
court must be vigilant in safeguarding the defendant's rights to a bill of particulars and to
effective discovery. Should the prosecutor decide to use an indictment which, although
technically sufficient, does not adequately allow a defendant to properly prepare for trial, he may
well run afoul of the defendant's right to be informed of the accusations against him.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its
granting69 and order the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill70 to give full meaning to the accused’s
Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing certain overt acts
through the Information and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends
to prove at the trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid.71The
accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict.

This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime charged carries with it the
severe penalty of capital punishment and entails the commission of several predicate criminal
acts involving a great number of transactions spread over a considerable period of time.

C.4. Motion to Quash vs. Motion for Bill of Particulars

A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information while a motion to quash is a jurisdictional

defect on account that the facts charged in the Information does not constitute an
offense.72redarclaw

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent, avers that the allegations in the information are not
vague because the Information needs only allege the ultimate facts constituting the offense for
which the accused stands charged, not the finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged
were committed. In support of his position, Justice Carpio cited the cases of Miguel v.
Sandiganbayan,73Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,74 and People v. Romualdez,75 among others,
to support the superfluity of the details requested by Enrile.

Justice Carpio’s reliance on these cases is misplaced for they involve the issue of quashal of an
information on the ground that the facts charge do not constitute an offense, rather than a
request for bill of particulars. That is, these cited cases involve the critical issue of the validity of
an information, and not a request for specificity with request to an offense charged in an
information.

On the other hand, the cases of People v. Sanico,76People v. Banzuela,77Pielago v.

People,78People v. Rayon, Sr.,79People v. Subesa,80People v. Anguac,81 and Los Baños v.
Pedro,82 which were likewise cited by Justice Carpio, involve the issue that an Information only
need to allege the ultimate facts, and not the specificity of the allegations contained in the
information as to allow the accused to prepare for trial and make an intelligent plea.83redarclaw

Notably, in Miguel,84 to which Justice Carpio concurred, this Court mentioned that the
proper remedy, if at all, to a supposed ambiguity in an otherwise valid Information, is
merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information which
sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged.85redarclaw

Clearly then, a bill of particulars does not presuppose an invalid information for it merely
fills in the details on an otherwise valid information to enable an accused to make an
intelligent plea and prepare for his defense.

I stress, however, that the issue in the present case involves abuse of discretion for denying
Enrile’s request for a bill of particulars, and not a motion to quash.

If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order.86redarclaw

But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused
cannot prepare to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the
proper remedy.87redarclaw

Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars are distinct and separate
remedies, the latter presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an
offense.88redarclaw

D. The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue

The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the
Information is filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be
reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave
abuse of discretion is shown.89redarclaw

Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that
amounts or is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law such as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.90 For the extraordinary writ
of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of power.

It will be recalled that the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars on two
grounds, namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the details sought were evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial; and

(2) his desired details were reiterations of the details he sought in his supplemental
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
We shall separately examine these grounds in determining whether the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied Enrile’s motion for a bill of particulars and
his subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Sandiganbayan Ground #1:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

The details sought were evidentiary in nature
D.1. The Law of Plunder

A determination of whether the details that Enrile sought were evidentiary requires an
examination of the elements of the offense he is charged with, i.e., plunder under Republic Act
No. 7080.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public officer who, by himself
or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d)
hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of
an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [Emphasis supplied.]
Based on this definition, the elements of plunder are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other
persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of the following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids
on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback
or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection
with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer concerned;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
government-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or
any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment
in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
 acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. [Emphasis supplied.]
D.1.a. The Conspiracy Element and its Requested Details

Taking these elements into account, we hold that Enrile’s requested details on Who among the
accused acquired the alleged “ill-gotten wealth” are not proper subjects for a bill of particulars.

The allegation of the Information that the accused and Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, “conspiring with
one another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis x x x”
expressly charges conspiracy.

The law on plunder provides that it is committed by “a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with x x x.” The term “connivance” suggests an agreement or consent to commit an
unlawful act or deed with another; to connive is to cooperate or take part secretly with
another.91It implies both knowledge and assent that may either be active or passive.92redarclaw

Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with other persons, and
the Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one
another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it is
unnecessary to specify, as an essential element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had been acquired by one, by two or by all of the
accused. In the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each accused in
a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated
is at least P50 million.

We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as a crime by itself but only as the
mode of committing the crime. Thus, there is no absolute necessity of reciting its particulars in
the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged.

It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the

following manner: (1) by use of the word “conspire,” or its derivatives or synonyms, such as
confederate, connive, collude; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a
manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such
precision as the nature of the crime charged will admit, to enable the accused to competently
enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.93redarclaw

Our ruling on this point in People v. Quitlong94 is particularly instructive:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all
the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web
of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment
contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and
concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that
can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision
that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the
same facts. x x x95
D.1.b. The Requested Details of Enrile’s PDAF

We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought
under the questions –
For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official document is a portion of the
“Priority Development Assistance Fund” identified as that of a member of Congress, in this
instance, as ENRILE’s, to be found? In what amount for each year is ENRILE’s Priority
Development Assistance Fund?

and

x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted which validated the findings that
each of Enrile’s PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
These matters will simply establish and support the ultimate fact that Enrile’s PDAF was used to
fund fictitious or nonexistent projects. Whether a discretionary fund (in the form of PDAF) had
indeed been made available to Enrile as a member of the Philippine Congress and in what
amounts are evidentiary matters that do not need to be reflected with particularity in the
Information, and may be passed upon at the full-blown trial on the merits of the case.

D.1.b(i) The yearly PDAF Allocations

Specifically, we believe that the exact amounts of Enrile’s yearly PDAF allocations, if any, from
2004 to 2010 need not be pleaded with specific particularity to enable him to properly plead and
prepare for his defense. In fact, Enrile may be in a better position to know these details than the
prosecution and thus cannot claim that he would be taken by surprise during trial by the omission
in the Information of his annual PDAF allocations.

Thus, whether the amounts of Enrile’s PDAF allocations have been specified or not, Enrile has
been sufficiently informed that he stands charged of endorsing Napoles’ non-government
organizations to implement spurious or fictitious projects, in exchange for a percentage of his
PDAF.

D.1.b(ii) The details of the COA Audits

The details of the “COA audits or field investigations” only support the ultimate fact that the
projects implemented by Napoles’ NGOs, and funded by Enrile’s PDAF, were nonexisting or
fictitious. Thus, they are evidentiary in nature and do not need to be spelled out with particularity
in the Information.

To require more details on these matters from the prosecution would amount to asking for
evidentiary information that the latter intends to present at the trial; it would be a compulsion on
the prosecution to disclose in advance of the trial the evidence it will use in proving the charges
alleged in the indictment.

D.1.c. Other Sources of Kickbacks and Commissions

We also deny Enrile’s plea for details on who “the others” were (aside from Napoles, Lim and
De Asis) from whom he allegedly received kickbacks and commissions. These other persons do
not stand charged of conspiring with Enrile and need not therefore be stated with particularly,
either as specific individuals or as John Does. The Court cannot second-guess the prosecution’s
reason for not divulging the identity of these “others” who may potentially be witnesses for the
prosecution.

What the Constitution guarantees the accused is simply the right to meet and examine the
prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has the prerogative to call witnesses other than those
named in the complaint or information, subject to the defense’s right to cross-examine
them.96Making these “others” known would in fact be equivalent to the prosecution’s premature
disclosure of its evidence. We stress, to the point of repetition, that a bill of particulars is not
meant to compel the prosecution to prematurely disclose evidentiary matters supporting its case.

D.2. The Overt Acts constituting the “Combination” or “Series” under the Plunder Law

We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the following
questions –
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the “combination”? What are the
particular overt acts which constitute the “series”? Who committed those acts? [Emphasis
ours.]
D.2.a. Reason for Requirement for Particulars of Overt Acts

Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth involving at least P50
million by means of a combination or series of overt acts.97 Under these terms, it is not sufficient
to simply allege that the amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million;
the manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth – whether through a combination or series of overt
acts under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080– is an important element that must be alleged.

When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it refers to at least two (2) acts falling
under different categories listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids
on the public treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Section 1, paragraph (d),
subparagraph (3)].

On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts
falling under the same category of enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d) [for example,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Section 1,
paragraph (d), subparagraph (1)].98redarclaw

With respect to paragraph (a) of the Information –

[(i.e., by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and
others, kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after
the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of
the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the
appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government organizations which became
the recipients and/or target implementers of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the
PDAF proceeds for her personal gain x x x)] –
we hold that the prosecution employed a generalized or shotgun approach in alleging the
criminal overt acts allegedly committed by Enrile. This approach rendered the allegations of the
paragraph uncertain to the point of ambiguity for purposes of enabling Enrile to respond and
prepare for his defense. These points are explained in greater detail below.

The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase “combination or series of overt or criminal acts.”
Hence, even if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act. This
interpretation of the Plunder Law is very clear from the congressional deliberations.99redarclaw

Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder,
the various overt acts that constitute the “combination” and “series” the Information alleged, are
material facts that should not only be alleged, but must be stated with sufficient definiteness so
that the accused would know what he is specifically charged of and why he stands charged, so
that he could properly defend himself against the charge.

Thus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy
must not be generally stated; they should be stated with enough particularity for Enrile (and his
co-accused) to be able to prepare the corresponding refuting evidence to meet these alleged overt
acts.

It is insufficient, too, to merely allege that a set of acts had been repeatedly done (although this
may constitute a series if averred with sufficient definiteness), and aver that these acts resulted in
the accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00, as in
this case. The Information should reflect with particularity the predicate acts that underlie the
crime of plunder, based on the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080.

A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present case shows that the prosecution
made little or no effort to particularize the transactions that would constitute the required
series or combination of overt acts.

In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its recital of the manner Enrile
and his co-accused allegedly operated, thus describing its general view of the series or
combination of overt criminal acts that constituted the crime of plunder.

Without any specification of the basic transactions where kickbacks or commissions amounting
to at least P172,834,500.00 had been allegedly received, Enrile’s preparation for trial is
obviously hampered. This defect is not cured by mere reference to the prosecution’s attachment,
as Enrile already stated in his Reply that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle
of documents marked by the prosecution, which documents are not integral parts of the
Information. Hence, the prosecution does not discharge its burden of informing Enrile what
these overt acts were by simply pointing to these documents.
In providing the particulars of the overt acts that constitute the “combination” or “series” of
transactions constituting plunder, it stands to reason that the amounts involved, or at their ball
park figures, should be stated; these transactions are not necessarily uniform in amount, and
cannot simply collectively be described as amounting to P172,834,500.00 without hampering
Enrile’s right to respond after receiving the right information.

To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park figure but a very specific sum based on a
number of different acts and hence must have a breakdown. Providing this breakdown
reinforces the required specificity in describing the different overt acts.

Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the particulars and is later given the chance to object to
unalleged details, he stands to be surprised at the trial at the same time that the prosecution is
given the opportunity to play fast and loose with its evidence to satisfy the more than P50
Million requirement of law.

D.2.b. Approximate Dates of Commissions or Kickbacks

Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at least, of the receipt of the kickbacks and
commissions, so that he could prepare the necessary pieces of evidence, documentary or
otherwise, to disprove the allegations against him. We point out that the period covered by the
indictment extends from “2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of which, we again stress that different
overt acts constituting of the elements of Plunder took place during this period.

Undoubtedly, the length of time involved – six years – will pose difficulties to Enrile in the
preparation of his defense and will render him susceptible to surprises. Enrile should not be left
guessing and speculating which one/s from among the numerous transactions involving his
discretionary PDAF funds from 2004 to 2010, are covered by the indictment.

D.2.c. The Projects Funded and NGOs Involved

Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that Enrile allegedly funded coupled
with the name of Napoles’ NGO (e.g., Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to sufficiently inform
Enrile of the particular transactions referred to.100redarclaw

Be it remembered that the core of the indictment is:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) the funding of nonexisting projects using Enrile’s PDAF;

(2) Enrile’s endorsement of Napoles’ NGOs to the government agencies to implement these
projects; and

(3) Enrile’s receipt of kickbacks or commissions in exchange for his endorsement.

Under the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed by Enrile and his co-accused,
the project identification was what started the totality of acts constituting plunder: only after a
project has been identified could Enrile have endorsed Napoles’ NGO to the appropriate
government agency that, in turn, would implement the supposed project using Enrile’s PDAF.
Note that without the project identification, no justification existed to release Enrile’s PDAF to
Napoles’ allegedly bogus NGO.

In these lights, the “identified project” and “Napoles’ NGO” are material facts that should be
clearly and definitely stated in the Information to allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense
evidence on the specific transaction pointed to. The omission of these details will necessarily
leave Enrile guessing on what transaction/s he will have to defend against, since he may have
funded other projects with his PDAF. Specification will also allow him to object to evidence not
referred to or covered by the Information’s ultimate facts.

D.2.d. The Government Agencies Serving as Conduits

The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles’ NGOs are also material facts that
must be specified, since they served a necessary role in the crime charged – the alleged
conduits between Enrile and Napoles’ NGOs. They were indispensable participants in the
elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed.

The particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions, need not
anymore be named in the Information, as these are already evidentiary matters. The
identification of the particular agency vis-à-vis Napoles’ NGO and the identified project, will
already inform Enrile of the transaction referred to.

In Tantuico v. Republic,101 the Republic filed a case for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan against former President Ferdinand Marcos,
Imelda Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez, and Francisco Tantuico, Jr. Tantuico filed a motion for
bill of particulars essentially alleging that the complaint was couched in general terms and did
not have the particulars that would inform him of the alleged factual and legal bases. The
Sandiganbayan denied his motion on the ground that the particulars sought are evidentiary in
nature. Tantuico moved to reconsider this decision, but the Sandiganbayan again denied his
motion.

The Court overturned the Sandiganbayan’s ruling and directed the prosecution to prepare and file
a bill of particulars. Significantly, the Court held that the particulars prayed for, such as:
names of persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of
property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and
disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions
and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. The Court explained that those
particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint so that
the defendant may be fairly informed of the claims made against him and be prepared to meet the
issues at the trial.

To be sure, the differences between ultimate and evidentiary matters are not easy to distinguish.
While Tantuico was a civil case and did not involve the crime of plunder, the Court’s ruling
nonetheless serves as a useful guide in the determination of what matters are indispensable and
what matters may be omitted in the Information, in relation with the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

In the present case, the particulars on the:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) projects involved;

(2) Napoles’ participating NGOs; and

(3) the government agency involved in each transaction

will undoubtedly provide Enrile with sufficient data to know the specific transactions involved,
and thus enable him to prepare adequately and intelligently whatever defense or defenses he may
have.

We reiterate that the purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in the Information that
are indefinite, vague, or are conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and
prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of which he stands accused. Verily, an
accused cannot intelligently respond to the charge laid if the allegations are incomplete or are
unclear to him.

We are aware that in a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the
commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the
language of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.102redarclaw

The term “overall unlawful scheme” indicates a general plan of action or method that the
principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve their
common criminal goal. In the alternative, if no overall scheme can be found or where the
schemes or methods used by the multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part
of a conspiracy to attain a common criminal goal.103redarclaw

Lest Section 4 be misunderstood as allowing the prosecution to allege that a set of acts has
been repeatedly done (thereby showing a ‘pattern’ of overt criminal acts), as has been done in
the present case, we point out that this section does not dispense with the requirement of stating
the essential or material facts of each component or predicate act of plunder; it merely prescribes
a rule of procedure for the prosecution of plunder.

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,104 we construed this procedural rule to mean that [w]hat the
prosecution needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt was only the number of acts sufficient to
form a combination or series that would constitute a pattern involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There was no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information
to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.105redarclaw

If, for example, the accused is charged in the Information of malversing public funds on twenty
different (20) occasions, the prosecution does not need to prove all 20 transactions; it suffices if a
number of these acts of malversation can be proven with moral certainty, provided only that the
series or combination of transaction would amount to at least P50,000,000.00. Nonetheless, each
of the twenty transactions should be averred with particularity, more so if the circumstances
surrounding each transaction are not the same. This is the only way that the accused can
properly prepare for his defense during trial.

D.3. Paragraph (b) of the Information

As his last requested point, Enrile wants the prosecution to provide the details of the allegation
under paragraph (b) of the Information (i.e., x x x by taking undue advantage, on several
occasions, of their official position, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines) in the following manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on several occasions, of his official
positions, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines. Was this because he received any money from the government? From whom and for
what reason did he receive any money or property from the government through which he
“unjustly enriched himself”? State the details from whom each amount was received,
the place and the time.
Our ruling on Enrile’s desired details – specifically, the particular overt act/s alleged to constitute
the “combination” and “series” charged in the Information; a breakdown of the amounts of the
kickbacks and commissions allegedly received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was
arrived at; a brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks and commissions were
received; the approximate dates of receipt of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the
identified projects; the name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the
alleged “recipients and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects;” and the government
agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs – renders it unnecessary to
require the prosecution to submit further particulars on the allegations contained under
paragraph (b) of the Information.

Simply put, the particular overt acts alleged to constitute the combination or series required by
the crime of plunder, coupled with a specification of the other non-evidentiary details stated
above, already answer the question of how Enrile took undue advantage of his position,
authority, relationships, connections and influence as Senator to unjustly enrich himself.

We also point out that the PDAF is a discretionary fund intended solely for public purposes.
Since the Information stated that Enrile, as “Philippine Senator,” committed the offense “in
relation to his office,” by “repeatedly receiving kickbacks or commissions” from Napoles and/or
her representatives through projects funded by his (Enrile’s) PDAF, then it already alleged how
undue advantage had been taken and how the Filipino people and the Republic had been
prejudiced. These points are fairly deducible from the allegations in the Information as
supplemented by the required particulars.

E. The Grave Abuse of Discretion

In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the
petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized
or specified are all evidentiary – without any explanation supporting this conclusion –
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts that must be alleged to enable
the petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have
diligently sifted through each detail sought to be specified, and made the necessary determination
of whether each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his
Reply that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the
prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the presence of these
desired details; neither can we put on him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous
documents what the desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made
available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond and make an intelligent
defense.

Justice Carpio’s reference to the voluminous 144-page Ombudsman’s resolution (which found
probable cause to indict the petitioner and his co-accused not only of the crime of plunder, but
also for violations of several counts of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act) to justify his
argument that Enrile was already aware of the details he seeks in his motion for a bill of
particulars, all the more strengthens our conclusive position that the Information for plunder filed
against Enrile was ambiguous and glaringly insufficient to enable him to make a proper plea and
to prepare for trial. We reiterate, to the point of being repetitive, that the purpose of the bill of
particulars in criminal cases is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or
information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial.

Moreover, a resolution arising from a preliminary investigation does not amount to nor does it
serve the purpose of a bill of particulars.

A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting the scope
of the proof;106it limits the evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters alleged in
the Information as supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure of an accused
to move for a bill of particulars deprives him of the right to object to evidence which could be
lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more or less general terms which
sufficiently charges the defendants with a definite crime.

The record on preliminary investigation, in comparison, serves as the written account of the
inquisitorial process when the fiscal determined the existence of prima facie evidence to indict a
person for a particular crime. The record of the preliminary investigation, as a general rule, does
not even form part of the records of the case.107 These features of the record of investigation are
significantly different from the bill of particulars that serves as basis, together with the
Information, in specifying the overt acts constituting the offense that the accused pleaded to
during arraignment.

Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several predicate criminal acts. To prove

plunder, the prosecution must weave a web out of the six ways of illegally amassing wealth
and show how the various acts reveal a combination or series of means or schemes that
reveal a pattern of criminality. The interrelationship of the separate acts must be shown and be
established as a scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 million.

Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and numerous transactions and schemes
that span a period of time. Naturally, in its prosecution, the State possesses an “effective
flexibility” of proving a predicate criminal act or transaction, not originally contemplated in the
Information, but is otherwise included in the broad statutory definition, in light of subsequently
discovered evidence. The unwarranted use of the flexibility is what the bill of particulars guards
against.

Justice Carpio further argues that the ponencia transformed the nature of an action from
an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense to an initiatory pleading
alleging a cause of action.

We see nothing wrong with such treatment, for a motion for a bill of particulars in criminal cases
is designed to achieve the same purpose as the motion for a bill of particulars in civil cases. In
fact, certainty, to a reasonable extent, is an essential attribute of all pleadings, both civil and
criminal, and is more especially needed in the latter where conviction is followed by penal
consequences.108redarclaw

Thus, even if the Information employs the statutory words does not mean that it is unnecessary to
allege such facts in connection with the commission of the offense as will certainly put the
accused on full notice of what he is called upon to defend, and establish such a record as will
effectually bar a subsequent prosecution for that identical offense.109redarclaw

Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment; for this
reason, more process is due, not less. When a person’s life interest – protected by the life,
liberty, and property language recognized in the due process clause – is at stake in the
proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the protection of those fundamental rights.

As we emphasized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,110 “the administration of justice is not a matter

of guesswork. The name of the game is fair play, not foul play. We cannot allow a legal
skirmish where, from the start, one of the protagonists enters the arena with one arm tied to his
back.”

Finally, we find no significance in Justice Carpio’s argument that Atty. Estelito Mendoza did not
previously find vague the Information for plunder filed against President Joseph Estrada in 2001.

Under the amended Information111 against Estrada, et al., each overt act that constituted the
series or combination and corresponding to the predicate acts under Section 1(d) had been
averred with sufficient particularity so that there was no doubt what particular transaction
was referred to.

We point out that unlike in the Information against Enrile, the following matters had been
averred with sufficient definiteness, viz: the predicate acts that constitute the crime of plunder;
the breakdown of how the alleged amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, had been arrived
at; the participants involved in each transaction; and the specific sources of the illegal wealth
amassed.

At any rate, that Atty. Mendoza did not previously question the indictment of President
Estrada via a motion for bill of particulars does not ipso facto mean that the present Information
for plunder filed against Enrile is not vague and ambiguous.

Sandiganbayan Ground #2:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

That Enrile’s cited grounds are reiterations of the grounds previously raised

Enrile does not deny that the arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to issuance of a
warrant of arrest and for dismissal of informationand in his motion for bill of particulars were
identical. He argues, however, that the mere reiteration of these grounds should not be a ground
for the denial of his motion for bill of particulars, since “the context in which those questions
were raised was entirely different.”

While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of particulars involved
the right of an accused to due process, the enumeration of the details desired in
Enrile’s supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information and in his motion for bill of particulars are different viewed particularly from the
prism of their respective objectives.

In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did not state a crime for which he
can be convicted; thus, the Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he
already impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and
lacking in details that would allow him to properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially
alleged here a defect of form.

Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state the
nature and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the
motion for bill of particulars) are required to be specified in sufficient detail because the
allegations in the Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not
allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are made.

That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the Information does not
preclude the accused from requesting for more specific details of the various acts or omissions
he is alleged to have committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of
particulars.

Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the crime an
accused is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to
properly plead and prepare for trial.

We likewise find no complete congruence between the grounds invoked and the details sought
by Enrile in his motion for bill of particulars, and the grounds invoked in opposing the warrant
for his arrest issued, so that the Sandiganbayan’s action in one would bar Enrile from essentially
invoking the same grounds.

The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based
on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice.112 Simply put, the judge determines whether the necessity exists
to place the accused under immediate custody to avoid frustrating the ends of justice.

On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure grants the accused the remedy of a
bill of particulars to better inform himself of the specifics or particulars concerning facts or
matters that had not been averred in the Information with the necessary clarity for purposes of his
defense.

Its purpose is to better acquaint the accused of the specific acts and/or omissions in relation with
the crime charged, to limit the matters and the evidence that the prosecution may otherwise be
allowed to use against him under a more or less general averment, and to meet the charges head
on and timely object to evidence whose inadmissibility may otherwise be deemed waived.

Based on these considerations, the question of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant
of arrest against an accused, is separate and distinct from the issue of whether the allegations in
the Information have been worded with sufficient definiteness to enable the accused to properly
plead and prepare his defense. While the grounds cited for each may seemingly be the same, they
are submitted for different purposes and should be appreciated from different perspectives, so
that the insufficiency of these grounds for one does not necessarily translate to insufficiency for
the other. Thus, the resolution of the issue of probable cause should not bar Enrile from seeking a
more detailed averment of the allegations in the Information.

The Sandiganbayan grossly missed these legal points and thus gravely abused its discretion: it
used wrong and completely inapplicable considerations to support its conclusion.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and SET ASIDE the
Sandiganbayan’s resolutions dated July 11, 2014, which denied Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars and his motion for reconsideration of this denial.

b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-extendible period of

fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of
particulars containing the facts sought that we herein rule to be material and necessary. The bill
of particulars shall specifically contain the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or series of overt
criminal acts” charged in the Information.

2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions” allegedly received,

stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.

3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or commissions were

received.

4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of the alleged
kickbacks and commissions from the identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution
should state the year when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified projects
were received.

5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged
“recipients and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”

6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs. The
particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions need not be
named as a particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., Please see Dissenting Opinion.
Peralta, J., I join J. Bernabe's Opinion.
Del Castillo, J., I join the Dissent of J. Carpio.
Villarama, Jr., J., I join J. Carpio in his Dissenting Opinion.
Reyes, J., on leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
Leonen, J., I join dissent of J. Carpio. see separate opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 3-92.
2
The resolutions denied petitioner Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars and his motion for
reconsideration. Both resolutions were contained in a Minute Resolution adopted on July 11,
2014.
3
Rollo, pp. 170-171.
4
Id. at 174-226.
5
Id. at 232-261.
6
On July 24, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the Sandiganbayan’s July
3, 2014 resolution.
7
Rollo, pp. 265-267.
8
Id. at 84-92.
9
Id. at 268-273. This motion includes Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0241 to 0255 for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
10
Id. at 167-A-169; see also Annexes “B,” “B-1,” and “B-2” at 93-166.
11
Id. at 167-A-169; signed by Presiding Justice Amparo Cabotaje-Tang and Justices Samuel
Martires and Alex Quiroz.
12
Temporary rollo, unnumbered pages.
13
Represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
14
Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution; see Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No.
178429, October 23, 2009, 604 SCRA 322, 329.
15
See Dissenting Opinion of Justice (ret.) Dante O. Tinga in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, 488 Phil.
311, 340 (2004), citing 21 AM JUR 2d § 325.
16
3 Phil. 223 (1904).
17
Id. at 226.
18
See Burgos v. Sandiganbayan, 459 Phil. 794, 806 (2003).
19
150-B Phil. 78, 89-90 (1972).
20
See City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 311 (2005), citing 16 C.J.S., pp. 1150-
1151.
21
565 Phil. 172, (2007).
22
Id. at 191-192.
23
Id. at 192.
24
Section 4, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
25
People v. Ching, 563 Phil. 433, 443-444 (2007).
26
Id. at 443.
27
See Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 421, 435 (2005).
28
People v. Romualdez, et al., 581 Phil. 462, 479-480 (2008).
29
See Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 105.
30
See Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo, 531 Phil. 636, 653 (2006).
31
See Brundage v. KL House Construction Company, 396 P.2d 731 (N.M. 1964).
32
Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 428, 437,
citing Womack v. Industrial Comm., 168 Colo. 364, 451 P.2d 761, 764.
33
Id., citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 500.
34
413 Phil. 159 (2001). This case involved a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The Court
held that knowledge of insufficiency of funds is the ultimate fact, or element of the offense that
needs to be proved, while dishonor of the check presented within ninety (90) days is merely the
evidentiary fact of such knowledge.
35
Id. at 175.
36
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 288-289 (2004).
37
Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. IV (Rules 110-127), Criminal Procedure, 2007 ed., p. 591.
38
Id. at 592.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial,
the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea
of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
(Rule 116, Rules of Criminal Procedure).
42
See Russell v. United States, 369 US 749.
43
Id. See also Rule 117, Section 5.
44
Id.
45
Section 3(a), Rule 117.
46
Section 9, Rule 116.
47
Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 339 Phil. 47, 62 (1997).
48
Remmer v. United States, 9 Cir., 1953, 205 F.2d 277, 281; United States v. Caserta, 3 Cir.,
1952, 199 F.2d 905.
49
See US v. Kelly, 92 F. Supp. 672, 673 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
50
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 36.
51
US v. Kelly, supra note 49.
52
Philippine setting.
53
Criminal Procedure 1900.
54
7 Phil. 523, 525 (1907).
55
10 Phil. 682 (1908).
56
Id. at 690.
57
See People v. Abad Santos, 76 Phil. 746 (1946).
58
Id. at 745.
59
Id. at 746-747.
60
Id. at 747. See also Bill of Particulars in Criminal Cases, by Angel C. Cruz, PLJ volume 23,
Number 1-03, Notes and Comments, p. 438. plj.upd.edu.ph (http://www.plj.upd.edu.ph, last
visited on September 17, 2014), where the concept and origin of bill of particulars was discussed
more extensively. It examined, among others, the cases of Schneer, Cernias, Veluz and Abad
Santos.
61
Effective January 1, 1964.
62
Promulgated on November 22, 1984; Effective January 1, 1985.
63
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC. Effective December 1, 2000.
64
G.R. No. 106527, April 6, 1993, 221 SCRA 52.
65
Id. at 62-63.
66
See People v. Marquez, 400 Phil. 1313, 1321 (2000).
67
Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 82, 47 S.Ct. 300, 302, 71 L.Ed. 545 (1927).
68
45 N.Y. 2d 589 (1978).
69
Walsh v. United States, 371 F.2d 436 (1st Cir. 1967).
70
See United States v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457, 474 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
71
See United States v. Covelli, 210 F. Supp. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
72
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
73
G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 560.
74
619 Phil. 306 (2009).
75
581 Phil. 462 (2008).
76
G.R. No. 208469, August 13, 2014, 732 SCRA 158.
77
G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013, 712 SCRA 735.
78
G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 476.
79
G.R. No. 194236, January 30, 2014, 689 SCRA 745.
80
G.R. No. 193660, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 390.
81
606 Phil. 728 (2009).
82
604 Phil. 215 (2009).
83
Section 9, Rule 116.
84
Supra note 73.
85
Id.
86
Section 3(a), Rule 117.
87
People v. Abad Santos, supra note 57.
88
Du Bois v. People, 200 Ill, 157, 66 ARR 658 (1902); Kelly v. PeopIe, 192 Ill, 119, 61 NE
(1901), 425.
89
See Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Div.), supra note 21, at 192 (2007).
90
See Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 543, 548 (2003), citing DM Consunji, Inc. v.
Esguerra, 328 Phil. 1168, 1180 (1996).
91
See Separate Opinion of Justice (ret.) Jose C. Vitug in Atty. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan (3rd
Division), 444 Phil. 499, 507 (2003).
92
Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th edition, 1979, p. 274.
93
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 427 Phil. 820, 860 (2002).
94
354 Phil. 372 (1998).
95
Id. at 388-389.
96
See Section 1(a), Rule 116, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The last sentence reads:
The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information.
97
Boado, Leonor, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code (Books 1 and 2) and Special
Penal Laws, 2004 edition, p. 554.
98
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 351 (2001).
99
HR Committee Journal, May 7, 1991:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx

CHAIRMAN GARCIA:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

That’s series.

HON. ISIDRO:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

That is not series, it is combination.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Well, however you look at it…

HON. ISIDRO:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Because when you say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?

CHAIRMAN GARCIA:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Yeah. This distinguishes it, really, from the ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very
good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have
here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts.

xxxx

HON. ISIDRO:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

When you say combination, two different acts? Now, a series may mean repetition of the same
act?

CHAIRMAN:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Repetition.

CHAIRMAN TAÑADA:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Yes.

HON. ISIDRO:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

So, in other words … that’s it. When we say combination, we mean two different acts, it cannot
be a repetition of the same act.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

That will refer to series.

HON. ISIDRO:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

No, no supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

xxxx
See also Rufus B. Rodriguez, The Crime of Plunder in the Philippines, 1st edition, 2002.
100
Per the Reflections of Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, the year of the launching of the
PDAF project, as well the intended beneficiaries, need not anymore be stated in the Information.
101
G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 428.
102
See Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 349, 361.
103
See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 98.
104
Id. at 360-361.
105
Id.
106
Berger v. State, 179 Md. 410 (1941; Hunter v. State, 193 Md. 596 (1949).
107
Section 7 (b), Rule 112, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
108
State v. Canova, 278 Md. 483, 498-99, 365 A. 2d 988, 997-98 (1976).
109
State v. Lassotovitch, 162 Md. 147, 156, 159 A. 362, 366 (1932).
110
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), supra note 21.
111

AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a.
“ASIONG SALONGA” AND a.k.a “JOSE VELARDE”, together with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada,
Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and
John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080,
as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC
OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE
OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY
OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS, described as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN

THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’
ANG, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain benefit, public funds in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe
a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF
STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES
OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY
EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00],
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF
THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME
“JOSE VELARDE;”
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME “JOSE VELARDE” AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [Underscoring in the original.]

112
See Alfredo C. Mendoza v. People of the Philippines and Juno Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 197293,
April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 647.

DISSENTING OPINION
 CARPIO, J.:

I dissent from the ponencia which partially grants petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars
and directs the Ombudsman to file an Amended Information containing the following
particulars:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination” and “series” charged in
the Information.

2. A breakdown of the amounts of the kickbacks and commissions allegedly received,

stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.

3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks and commissions were
received.

4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of the alleged
kickbacks and commissions from the identified projects. At the very least, the
prosecution should state the year when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified
projects were received.

5. The name[s] of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged
“recipients and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”

6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs. The
particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions need not
anymore be named as a particular in the Information.1

These particulars do not refer to ultimate facts, but rather to evidentiary matters which
unduly expand the details specifically required in Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
for a sufficient Information.

Information Filed Against Petitioner Sufficient

An Information charging a person with an offense is sufficient if, among others, it states “the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense,” using “ordinary and concise
language.”2 The minimum requirement is that the allegations in the Information state the basic,
ultimate facts constituting the elements of the offense (and aggravating or qualifying
circumstances3) such that if the accused is later on prosecuted for the same offense, he can claim
prior jeopardy.4 All other details can be left out, to be supplied during the presentation of the
prosecution’s case during trial. After all, what the Constitution guarantees to the accused is that
he is informed of the “nature and cause of the accusation against him”5 and not of the “dates,
names, amounts, and other sundry details” relating to the offense charged. If “a person of
common understanding x x x [can] know what offense is being charged x x x,”6 then the
Information is free from any taint of deficiency.
Thus, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (Rules) succinctly states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (petitioner) stands charged before the Sandiganbayan’s Third
Division (Sandiganbayan) with the offense of plunder as defined under Republic Act No. 7080
(RA 7080). The elements of this offense are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) [T]he offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

(2) [H]e amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
the following overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d) of RA 7080 as amended; and

(3) [T]he aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.7
In relation to the second element, the six modes of accumulating ill-gotten wealth under Section
1(d) of RA 7080 are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;

(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer;

(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;

(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;

(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations

and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or

(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to

unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
The Information filed against petitioner provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx

In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction,
above-named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G.
REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers, committing the
offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM
NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and
others, kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after
the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage
of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’s Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’s endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the
appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government organizations which became
the recipients and/or target implementors of ENRILE’s PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the
PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;

(b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.8
By simply juxtaposing Section 1 and Section 2 of RA 7080, on the one hand, and the allegations
in the Information, on the other hand, it becomes immediately apparent that the Information filed
against petitioner complies with the requirements under the Rules and the Constitution. The
Information alleges, in ordinary and concise language, all the elements of plunder as defined in
RA 7080 by stating that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) Petitioner, an incumbent “Philippine Senator,” is a “public officer[]”;

(2) Petitioner, together with several co-accused, in conspiracy with them, “amass[ed],
accumulated and/or acquired ill-gotten wealth” by:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(a) receiving personally or through a co-accused “kickbacks or commissions” from another co-
accused (Janet Lim Napoles [Napoles]) in exchange for his endorsement to Napoles’ non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) of government projects funded by petitioner’s discretionary
funds (falling under Section 1(d)(b) of RA 7080); and

(b) taking undue advantage of his official position to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and
to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people (falling under Section 1(d)(f) of RA 7080);
and

(3) The total amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed by petitioner and his co-accused is “at least”
P172.8 million (more than triple the floor amount of P50 million required under Section 2 of RA
7080).
Allegations in the Information not Vague
The procedural remedy, in civil or criminal proceedings, to render vague allegations in the
complaint or Information more specific is the bill of particulars. The details contained in the bill
enable the respondent in the civil proceedings to “prepare his responsive pleading,”9 and the
accused in the criminal proceedings to “properly x x x plead and prepare for trial.”10redarclaw

Petitioner’s plea for a bill of particulars is grounded on his view that the allegations in the
Information filed against him are “a series or combination of conclusions of fact and of law” not
of “fact[s] and circumstance[s] x x x [constituting] the crime charged.”11 He also finds the
allegations relating to his receipt of kickbacks from projects funded by his legislative
discretionary funds “a bundle of confusing ambiguity.”12redarclaw

Petitioner prays that the prosecution provide him with details relating to the allegations in the
Information on his accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, namely, the “overt acts” constituting the
combination or series of criminal acts, the names of the persons who received the kickbacks, the
names of the persons who gave them, the breakdown of the amounts received, the dates of
receipt, the description of the nature, location and costs of the government projects funded by his
discretionary funds, the dates of launching of the projects he funded, and the names of the
beneficiary NGOs, among others.13redarclaw

The ponencia finds merit in petitioner’s theory and orders the prosecution to furnish petitioner
most of the details sought. As a consequence of its ruling, the ponencia directs an amendment of
the Information filed against petitioner.

Petitioner and the ponencia have transformed the nature of an Information from “an accusation
in writing charging a person with an offense”14 to an initiatory pleading alleging “a cause of
action.”15 Unlike a complaint in civil proceedings which must contain all the details constituting
a cause of action,16 an Information only needs to state, in ordinary and concise language, “the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense” such that the accused understands
the crime he is being charged with and that when he pleads to such charge, first jeopardy
attaches. In other words, the Information only needs to allege the ultimate facts constituting the
offense for which the accused stands charged, not the finer details of why and how the illegal
acts alleged were committed. This is a long-standing and deeply entrenched rule, applied by this
Court in an unbroken line of ever growing jurisprudence.17redarclaw

Thus, for the past decade alone, we ruled in Miguel v. Sandiganbayan,18Go v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas19 and People v. Romualdez,20 all penned by Mr. Justice Brion, that the Informations
filed in those cases did not suffer from any defect as they alleged the ultimate, material facts of
the offense for which the accused stood charged. The accused in Miguel, who stood charged with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), had argued that the Information
filed against him was defective because the allegation of “evident bad faith and manifest
partiality” within the contemplation of such provision referred to his co-accused. We rejected
such claim, noting that the allegation in question “was merely a continuation of the prior
allegation of the acts”21 of petitioner and following the rule that “[t]he test of the [I]nformation’s
sufficiency is x x x whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall
establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law.”22redarclaw
We applied the same rule to reject the claim of the accused in Go, on trial for violation of
Republic Act No. 337 (General Banking Act), that the allegations in the Information filed against
him were vague, a result of the prosecution’s “shotgun approach” in framing the
Information.23 We found the Information sufficient, as it complied with the rule that “an
Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the finer details of
why and how the illegal acts alleged amounted to undue injury or damage x x x,” adding that
“[t]he facts and circumstances necessary to be included in the Information are determined by
reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes.”24redarclaw

The accused in Romualdez, like the accused in Miguel, also questioned the sufficiency of the
allegations in the Information filed against him for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
contending that it failed to indicate how his holding of dual positions caused “undue injury” to
the government. We dismissed the claim, noting that “[t]he allegation of ‘undue injury’ in the
Information, consisting of the extent of the injury and how it was caused, is complete” and that
the details behind such element of the offense are “matters that are appropriate for the
trial.”25 We based this conclusion by reiterating that “an Information only needs to state the
ultimate facts constituting the offense.”26redarclaw

During the same decade, we applied the rule in question in People v. Sanico27 (per Reyes,
J.), People v. Banzuela28 (per Leonardo-De Castro, J.), Pielago v. People29 (per Reyes,
J.), People v. Rayon30 (per Brion, J.), People v. Subesa31 (per Mendoza, J.), People v.
Anguac32 (per Velasco, J.), Los Baños v. Pedro33 (per Brion, J.) and People v. Abello34 (per
Brion, J.) to determine the offense committed (as opposed to what is stated in the caption or
preamble of the Information). The accused in Sanico was charged with acts of lasciviousness as
penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), although the allegations in the Information
covered the elements for acts of lasciviousness as penalized under Republic Act No. 7610 (RA
7610). In sustaining the Court of Appeals’ imposition of the penalty under RA 7610, we ruled
that the failure of the prosecution to allege violation of RA 7610 is not fatal as “[t]he character of
the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the
ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.”35redarclaw

In contrast with the facts in Sanico, the accused in Banzuela stood charged with acts of
lasciviousness in violation of RA 7610 but the Information failed to allege the element under
Section 5 of that law that the victim is a “child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse.” Thus, we held that the accused can only be made to suffer the penalty provided
for acts of lasciviousness as penalized under the RPC because “the character of the crime is
determined neither by the caption or preamble of the information[,] nor by the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated x x x but by the recital of the ultimate facts
and circumstances in the information.”36 We applied the same rule in Abello to hold the accused
liable for acts of lasciviousness as penalized under the RPC even though the Information filed
against him charged him with acts of lasciviousness as penalized under RA 7610 on the ground
that the prosecution failed to allege and prove the element of coercion or intimidation as required
under Section 5(b) of the latter law.

In Pielago, we held that the amendment of the Information against the accused changing the
designation of the crime alleged from “acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of RA
7610” to “the crime of rape by sexual assault penalized under Article 266-A(2)”37 of the RPC is
not prejudicial to the accused because the original Information already alleged the elements of
the latter felony and the “character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.”38 We
arrived at the same conclusion in Subesa where the accused was charged with acts of
lasciviousness under RA 7610 but was held liable for rape under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC.

The Court again applied the rule in question in Rayon which presented a variance between the
crime designated and the acts alleged in the Information. In that case, the accused was charged
with violation of Section 10(1), Article VI of RA 7610 (penalizing, among others, other acts of
abuse) but the allegations in the Information made out a violation of Section 5(b) of the same law
(penalizing sexual abuse of children). In holding the accused liable for the latter crime, we
reiterated the rule that “the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of
the information x x x but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint
or information.”39redarclaw

Anguac, on the other hand, involved an accused who was charged with violation of Section 5(1)
of RA 7610 (penalizing acts relating to child prostitution) but the acts alleged in the Information
and the evidence presented during trial made out a case for violation of Section 5(b) of that law
(penalizing sexual abuse of children). In holding the accused liable for the latter offense, we
again held that “the character of the crime is determined neither by the caption or preamble of
the information x x x but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
information.”40redarclaw

Lastly, in Los Baños, which involved an accused who was charged with violation of Section
261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code and not with violation of its amendatory law, Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 7166, we considered such omission non-consequential because both provisions
punish the same act of “carrying of firearms in public places during the election period without
the authority of the COMELEC,”41 reiterating at the same time the rule that “the character of the
crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information x x x [but] by the recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.”42redarclaw

The Information filed against petitioner in the case at bar complies with the foregoing rule. It
alleged that petitioner, a public official, conspiring with his co-accused Napoles, received from
the latter, on several occasions, kickbacks of more than P50 million from fictitious projects he
funded with his legislative discretionary fund through conduit NGOs controlled by Napoles,
unjustly enriching himself. These allegations state the basic, ultimate facts constituting the
elements of plunder as defined under RA 7080.As aptly observed by the
Sandiganbayan:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
An objective and judicious reading of the x x x Information shows that there is nothing
ambiguous or confusing in the allegations therein. The Information clearly alleges that accused
Enrile and Reyes committed the offense in relation to their respective public offices and that they
conspired with each other and with accused Napoles, Lim and De Asis, to amass, accumulate,
and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least PhP172,834,500.00. The combination or
series of overt criminal acts that the said accused performed include the following
circumstances: before, during and/or after the project identification, Napoles gave, and accused
Enrile and/or Reyes received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from Enrile’s
PDAF, in consideration of Enrile’s endorsement, directly or through Reyes, to the appropriate
government agencies, of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs). These NGOs became
the recipients and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects, which duly-funded projects
turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling Napoles to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds
for her personal gain. Sub-paragraph (b), on the other hand, alleges the predicate act that said
accused Enrile and Reyes took undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions,
authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense
and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

The Court finds that the allegations in the subject Information sufficiently comply with the
requirements of Sections 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. These allegations adequately apprise the herein accused of the nature and cause of
the accusations against them.43 (Emphasis supplied)
Interestingly, the lack of allegations in an Information for plunder through receipt of kickbacks
(among others) on the (1) the breakdown of the total amount of kickbacks received; (2) dates of
receipt of such; (3) the names of the persons who gave the kickbacks; (4) the names of the
persons who received them; and (5) the combination or series of acts involving the receipt of
such kickbacks, did not elicit any complaint of vagueness from an accused whom petitioner’s
counsel also represented in the Sandiganbayan. The Information for plunder filed against former
President Joseph Estrada in 2001, then represented by Atty. Estelito Mendoza as lead counsel,
alleged that the former received kickbacks breaching the plunder threshold of P50
million without stating the details in question. The Information reads in relevant
parts:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then a public officer, being
then the President of the Republic of the Philippines, by himself and/or in connivance/conspiracy
with his co-accused, who are members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue advantage of his official
position, x x x did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire by himself, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value
of four billion ninety seven million eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos
and seventeen centavos [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, thereby unjustly enriching himself
or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar
schemes or means, described as follows:

(a) by receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the

aggregate amount of five hundred forty-five million pesos (P545,000,000.00), more or less,
from illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie “Atong” Ang, Jose
“Jinggoy” Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John Does and Jane Does, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling;
xxxx

(d) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares, percentages, kickbacks, or
any form of pecuniary benefits, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, in the amount
of more or less three billion two hundred thirty three million one hundred four thousand one
hundred seventy three pesos and seventeen centavos [P3,233,104,173.17] and depositing the
same under his account name “Jose Velarde” at the Equitable-PCI Bank.44 (Emphasis
supplied)
That this Court had no occasion to review the clarity of the allegations in the Estrada
Information45 for purposes of issuing a bill of particulars is no argument to ignore the import of
such allegations to resolve the case at bar. On the contrary, Estrada’s decision not to seek a bill
of particulars can only mean that he considered such allegations clear enough to allow him, with
the aid of his counsel, now petitioner’s counsel, to “properly x x x plead and prepare for
trial.”46redarclaw

Information Considered Together With the Preliminary Investigation Resolution

The basis of petitioner’s indictment before the Sandiganbayan is a 144-page Resolution, dated 28
March 2014, of the Office of the Ombudsman (Resolution, see Annex “A”), attached to the
Information and furnished to petitioner, finding probable cause to charge him for the offense of
plunder.47The Resolution contains all the details petitioner sought in his motion for a bill of
particulars and which the ponencia grants (see comparative table in Annex “B”). Thus, the
“combination” or “series” of acts committed by petitioner and his co-accused constituting the
offense of plunder, the form of kickbacks received by petitioner, the breakdown of the total
amount of kickbacks petitioner received, the names of persons who gave and received the
kickbacks, the names of the projects funded by petitioner’s pork barrel funds, their description,
beneficiaries, costs, implementing agencies and partner organizations controlled by petitioner’s
co-accused Janet Napoles, and the names of the government agencies to which such projects
were endorsed are all found and discussed in the Resolution.48 Petitioner also had access to the
documents supporting the Resolution.49redarclaw

The Resolution, already in petitioner’s possession, taken together with the allegations in the
Information, provide petitioner with the details and information he needs to “enable him
properly to plead and prepare for trial.” As an inseparable complement to the Information, the
Resolution must be read together with the allegations in the Information to determine whether
the allegations in the Information are vague. It is only when the allegations in the
Information, taken together with the Resolution, leave ambiguities in the basic facts
constituting the elements of the offense of plunder that a bill of particulars should issue. If, as
here, the allegations in the Information, taken together with the Resolution, clearly make out the
ultimate facts constituting the elements of plunder, a bill of particulars is not only unnecessary
but also improper.

It will not do for petitioner to feign ignorance of the fact that the Resolution contains the details
he seeks from the prosecution in his motion for a bill of particulars. The Resolution is based on
the affidavits of witnesses and other public documents which petitioner thoroughly parsed and
attacked in his Omnibus Motion, dated 10 June 2014, filed before the Sandiganbayan, to dismiss
the case against him.50 For the same reason, petitioner’s demonstrated familiarity with the details
relating to the allegations in the Information filed against him overcomes the presumption that he
has no “independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense”51 of which he is charged.

Considering the ultimate facts alleged in the Information together with the relevant facts alleged
in the Resolution indisputably involves a procedural matter, which does not encompass any
constitutional right of an accused. It is an act which every accused expectedly undertakes in
order to inform himself of the charges against him and intelligently prepare his defense. In short,
it deals precisely with how the accused should defend himself.

Since reading the Information together with the Resolution concerns a procedural rule, and in
fact is actually practiced at all times by every accused, there is no basis to require such practice
to be conducted prospectively, that is, only after the promulgation of the decision in the case at
bar, absent any clear showing of impairment of substantive rights.52redarclaw

Generally, rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. “It is axiomatic that the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general
rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.”53redarclaw

Further, requiring the accused to consider the allegations in the Information together with the
allegations in the Resolution does not in any way prejudice any constitutional or substantive
rights of the accused. On the contrary, such act benefits immensely the accused insofar as it
adequately apprises him of the charges against him and clarifies the allegations in the
Information.

Jurisprudence Cited by the Ponencia Inapplicable

The cases invoked by the ponencia as precedents for granting a bill of particulars to petitioner –
Republic v. Sandiganbayan,54Tantuico v. Republic55 and Virata v. Sandiganbayan,56 among
others – are not in point because none of them involved an accused who, like petitioner,
underwent preliminary investigation where he was afforded access to documents supporting the
charge against him. All those cases involved civil proceedings for the forfeiture of ill-gotten
wealth where the respondents had no way of knowing the details of the government’s case
against them until after they were served a copy of the forfeiture complaints. The ambiguities in
the allegations of the complaints filed against the respondents in those cases cannot be clarified
by reference to other documents akin to a preliminary investigation resolution. They were left
with no other recourse but to seek clarification through a bill of particulars in order to adequately
prepare their responsive pleadings.

Plunder Charge Not Unique

According to the ponencia, “conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital
punishment, for this reason, more process is due, not less.”57 The ponencia seeks to impress that
those accused of the crime of plunder must be extended special treatment, requiring evidentiary
matters to be alleged in the Information, in view of the penalty involved, which is reclusion
perpetua.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua is not imposable exclusively to those accused and found guilty
of plunder. This punishment likewise attaches to the crimes of murder,58 serious illegal
detention,59 and rape,60 among others. Meanwhile, syndicated estafa,61 qualified trafficking in
persons,62 possession of prohibited drugs63 and illegal recruitment in large scale64 carry with it
the penalty of life imprisonment, which is a penalty harsher than reclusion perpetua.

The ponencia gravely implies that a plunder charge uniquely places an accused in a more
protective mantle, by requiring the prosecution to allege in the Information very specific details
of evidentiary nature, due to the stiff penalty involved. In contrast, the Informations for other
crimes, which do not even involve pilfering of public funds but likewise carry the penalty
of reclusion perpetua or even, life imprisonment, are merely required to contain allegations of
ultimate facts.

The ponencia exaggerates the crime of plunder by implying that it is a very complex crime
involving “intricate predicate criminal acts and numerous transactions and schemes that span a
period of time.”65The ponencia unreasonably classifies plunder as a crime more complicated to
commit than other crimes similarly punishable with reclusion perpetua or with the more severe
penalty of life imprisonment. As a consequence, the ponencia unjustifiably treats those accused
of plunder extraordinarily. There is plainly no basis for such special treatment.

Suffice it to state, plunder is no more complex than murder or syndicated estafa, or any other
crime. For instance, there is plunder if the accused public officer acquired ill-gotten wealth by
committing two acts of malversation of public funds with a total amount of at least P50,000,000.
Murder, on the other hand, involves killing another person attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Meanwhile, syndicated estafa is
committed by five or more persons formed with the intention of defrauding members of
associations and misappropriating the latter's money. Simply put, the rule requiring merely the
ultimate facts to be alleged in the Information applies equally to all types of crimes or offenses,
regardless of the nature thereof. Otherwise, to accord those accused with plunder an exceptional
treatment, by requiring the prosecution to allege in the Information all the unnecessary finer
details in the commission of plunder, denies those charged with similarly serious or more serious
crimes the equal protection of the law.

Pernicious Consequences in Granting the Petition

The ponencia’s disposition of this case to (1) set aside the ruling of the Sandiganbayan as having
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion even though the Sandiganbayan merely followed
existing law in the proper exercise of its discretion; (2) order the prosecution to provide
petitioner with most of the details listed in his motion for a bill of particulars even though
petitioner had access to and possess such details; and (3) direct the prosecution to amend the
Information filed against petitioner in light of its finding that the allegations in the Information
are vague even though they are clear, throws in disarray the orderly application of remedial rules
in criminal proceedings. The ponencia turns on its head the purpose of remedial rules of
“securing a just x x x disposition of every action x x x.”66redarclaw

More alarmingly, the ruling unwittingly opens the door for persons presently facing prosecution
to seek re-arraignment and new trial. By mutating the nature of an Information to require
allegation not only of the ultimate facts constituting the elements of the offense charged but
also all the details substantiating them, ostensibly to satisfy the procedural due process right of
the accused, the ponencia not only repeals Rules of Court provisions on the nature and content of
an Information,67 but also vastly expands the breadth of the procedural due process right of the
accused to a degree unheard of since the advent of criminal procedure in this jurisdiction. As a
new doctrine favoring the accused, the ruling hands to any person facing criminal prosecution
today a new doctrinal basis to demand re-arraignment and re-trial on the ground of denial of due
process. The Informations filed against these persons alleged only the ultimate facts, devoid of
supporting details, following the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence.

The Court foresaw and prevented a similar scenario from unfolding in the recent case of Estrada
v. Ombudsman68 where the petitioner, also a public official undergoing prosecution for plunder,
sought to redefine the nature of preliminary investigation to make it comparable to
administrative proceedings. We rejected such theory, cognizant of the nightmarish chaos it
would unleash on the country’s criminal justice system:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
[T]o x x x declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and
essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary
investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for
reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout the country. No
preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer, outside of the
prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final
judgment would have to be released from prison because their conviction violated constitutional
due process.69 (Emphasis supplied)
Estrada is a cautionary tale against tinkering with settled rules of criminal procedure in the guise
of affording the accused his constitutional due process right.

On the other hand, the pernicious practical implications of the ponencia are: (1) the discretion of
trial court judges, so vital in the performance of their day-to-day functions, will be hamstrung by
this Court’s loose application of the heightened certiorari standard of review of grave, not
simple, abuse of discretion; (2) the remedy of a bill of particulars will become a de riguer tool
for the accused awaiting arraignment to delay proceedings by simply claiming that the
allegations in the Information filed against him are vague even though, taken together with the
preliminary investigation resolution, they clearly state the ultimate facts constituting the elements
of the offense charged; and (3) the prosecutorial arm of the government, already hampered with
inadequate resources, will be further burdened with the task of collating for the accused the
details on the allegations in the Information filed against him even though such are found in the
preliminary investigation resolution.

The entire rubric of the rules of criminal procedure rests on the guarantee afforded by the
Constitution that “no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.”70 The “due process of law” contemplated in this guarantee, however, means procedure
bounded by reason. It does not envision procedure defying law, logic and common sense.

Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division).
Endnotes:

1
Ponencia, pp. 38-39.
2
Section 9, Rule 110, Rules.
3
Section 9, Rule 110, Rules; Serapio v. People, 444 Phil. 499 (2003).
4
Serapio v. People, 444 Phil. 499, 561 (2003) (Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., dissenting) citing Battle v.
State, 365 So. 2d 1035, 1037 (1979).
5
Section 14, Article III, Constitution.
6
Section 9, Rule 110, Rules.
7
See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 343-344 (2001).
8
Rollo, pp. 170-171.
9
Section 1, Rule 12, Rules.
10
Section 9, Rule 116, Rules.
11
Rollo, p. 69.
12
Id. at 66.
13
Id. at 66-67.
14
Section 4, Rule 110, Rules.
15
Section 3, Rule 6, Rules.
16
Under Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules, “Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and
logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts. x x x.”
17
Miguel v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, 4 July 2012, 675 SCRA 560; Go v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, 619 Phil. 306 (2009); Lazarte, Jr. v Sandiganbayan, 600 Phil. 475
(2009); People v. Romualdez, 581 Phil. 462 (2008); People v. Batin, 564 Phil. 249
(2007); Caballero v. Sandiganbayan, 560 Phil. 302 (2007); Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, 504 Phil.
321 (2005); Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, 379 Phil. 708 (2000); Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324
Phil. 151 (1996); Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, 201 Phil. 379 (1982). For the application of the rule
to determine the crime charged, see People v. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469, 13 August 2014, 733
SCRA 158; People v. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, 11 December 2013, 712 SCRA 735; Pielago
v. People, G.R. No. 202020, 13 March 2013, 693 SCRA 476; People v. Rayon, G.R. No. 194236,
30 January 2013, 689 SCRA 745; People v. Subesa, G.R. No. 193660, 16 November 2011, 660
SCRA 390; Flordeliz v. People, 628 Phil. 124 (2010); People v. Sumingwa, 618 Phil. 650
(2009); People v. Anguac, 606 Phil. 728 (2009); Los Baños v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215
(2009); People v. Abello, 601 Phil. 373 (2009); Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 421
(2005); Malto v. People, 560 Phil. 119 (2007); Reyes v. Camilon, G.R. No. 46198, 20 December
1990, 192 SCRA 445; People v. Mendoza, 256 Phil. 1136 (1989).
18
G.R. No. 172035, 4 July 2012, 675 SCRA 560.
19
619 Phil. 306 (2009).
20
581 Phil. 462 (2008).
21
Supra at 570.
22
Supra at 570. Emphasis supplied.
23
Supra at 313, 315.
24
Supra at 317. Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied.
25
Supra at 484.
26
Supra at 484.
27
G.R. No. 208469, 13 August 2014.
28
G.R. No. 202060, 11 December 2013, 712 SCRA 735.
29
G.R. No. 202020, 13 March 2013, 693 SCRA 476.
30
G.R. No. 194236, 30 January 2013, 689 SCRA 745.
31
G.R. No. 193660, 16 November 2011, 660 SCRA 390.
32
606 Phil. 728 (2009).
33
604 Phil. 215 (2009).
34
601 Phil. 373 (2009).
35
Supra. Emphasis supplied.
36
Supra at 762. Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied.
37
Supra at 487.
38
Supra at 488. Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied.
39
Supra at 759-760. Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied.
40
Supra at 739. Internal citation omitted.
41
Supra at 236.
42
Supra at 236. Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied.
43
Resolution dated 3 July 2014 (denying motion to dismiss); Comment, p. 9. In its Resolution
dated 11 July 2014, denying petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars, the Sandiganbayan
reiterated the observation it made in its Resolution of 3 July 2014 on the sufficiency of the
allegations in the Information filed against petitioner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging accused
Enrile, among other persons, with the crime of plunder in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It
finds no cogent reason to reconsider its ruling.

Moreover, the “desired details” that accused Enrile would like the prosecution to provide are
evidentiary in nature, which need not be alleged in the Information. x x x. (Rollo, pp. 166, 168;
emphasis supplied)
44
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 7, at 423-425 (2001).
45
Estrada went to this Court to assail the constitutionality of the plunder law (see Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, id.). It is of interest, however, that in dismissing Estrada’s petition, the Court
observed that the Information filed against him contains “nothing x x x that is vague or
ambiguous x x x that will confuse petitioner in his defense.” Id. at 347.
46
The Informations filed against Estrada’s co-accused were substantially identical to that filed
against him; none of them sought a bill of particulars.
47
Rollo, pp. 19-20; Petition, pp. 13-14.
48
Resolution, pp. 11-24, 28, 62-68, 83-103, 124-136.
49
Rollo, pp. 19-20.
50
Id. at 172-226. Petitioner assailed the contents of the affidavits and other public documents in
question not because they lacked the details substantiating the charge filed against him but
because he considered them either hearsay or without probative value.
51
Balitaan v. CFI of Batangas, 201 Phil. 311, 323 (1982).
52
See Section 5 (5), Article VIII, Constitution. This provision reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
“SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.”
53
Cheng v. Spouses Sy, 609 Phil. 617, 626 (2009), citing Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil.
556, 559 (2002).
54
565 Phil. 172 (2007).
55
G.R. No. 89114, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 428.
56
G.R. No. 106527, 6 April 1993, 221 SCRA 52.
57
Ponencia, p. 34.
58
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Art. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

xxxx
59
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

xxxx
60
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code pertinently
provide:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Article 266-A. Rape, When And How Committed. – Rape is committed:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx

Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
61
Presidential Decree No. 1689, dated 6 April 1980, increased the penalty for certain forms of
swindling or estafa. Section 1 thereof provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined
in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life
imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or
more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of money contributed
by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, samahang nayon(s), or farmers
associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.

xxxx
62
Republic Act No. 10364, or the “Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012” amended
Sections 6 and 10 of Republic Act No. 9208 to pertinently read as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Section 9. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as

follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
“SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – Violations of Section 4 of this Act shall be
considered as qualified trafficking:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

“x x x

“(d) When the offender is a spouse, an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who
exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public
officer or employee;

“x x x

“(f) When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies;
“(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies,
becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or
the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS);

“(h) When the offender commits one or more violations of Section 4 over a period of sixty (60)
or more days, whether those days are continuous or not; and

“(i) When the offender directs or through another manages the trafficking victim in carrying out
the exploitative purpose of trafficking.”

Section 12. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

“x x x x

(e) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more
than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00);

x x x x”
63
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
pertinently provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

xxxx
64
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022, pertinently provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx

(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) nor more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined therein.
Section 5(m) of the same law states that: “Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or
in large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage.”
65
Ponencia, p. 34.
66
Section 6, Rule 1, Rules.
67
Rule 110, Section 4 on the definition of an Information provides: “An Information is an
accusation in writing charging a person with an offense x x x.” Rule 110, Section 6 states the rule
on the sufficiency of an Information: “A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
68
G.R. Nos. 212140-41, 21 January 2015.
69
Id. at 34.
70
Section 14(1), Article III, Constitution.

COMPARATIVE TABLE ON THE DETAILS SOUGHT IN PETITIONER’S MOTION

FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS WHICH THE PONENCIA GRANTS, THE CONTENTS
OF THE OMBUDSMAN RESOLUTION DATED 28 MARCH 2014 AND THE DISSENT
OF CARPIO, J.

Petitioner’s Motion for Bill of
Particulars
What are the particular overt
acts which constitute the
“combination”? What are the
particular overt acts which
constitute the “series”? Who
committed these acts?
If [the kickbacks were
received] on several
occasions and in different
amounts, specify the amount
on each occasion and the
corresponding date of receipt.
Ombudsman Resolution of 28
Ponencia of Brion, J. March 2014 (Resolution) and
Dissent of Carpio, J.
GRANTED. x x x x [T]he The details sought and granted
various overt acts that are discussed on pp. 11-24, 62-68
constitute the “combination” of the Resolution.1
and “series” the Information
alleged, are material facts
that should not only be
alleged, but be stated with
sufficient definiteness so
that the accused would
know what he is specifically
charged of and why he
stands charged, so he can
properly defend himself x x
x. (p. 27)
GRANTED. [T]he amounts The details sought and granted
involved x x x should be are found on p. 28 of the
stated; these transactions are Resolution. (Indicating the
not necessarily uniform in breakdown of kickbacks
amount and cannot simply petitioner indirectly received
collectively be described as from Napoles annually during the
amounting to P172,834,500 period 2004-2010, totaling
without hampering Enrile’s P172,834,5002).
 right to respond x x x. (p.
28)
Enrile should likewise know
the approximate dates at
least of the receipt of the
kickbacks and commissions,
so that he could prepare the
necessary pieces of evidence
x x x to disprove the
allegations against him. (p.
28)
Describe each project GRANTED. x x x [T]he The details sought and granted
identified, how and by whom “identified project” and are found on pp. 14-16 of the
identified, the nature, location “Napoles' NGO” are Resolution. (The list of the
and cost of each project. material facts that should be Napoles NGOs is found on pp.
clearly and definitely stated 14, 653 while a tabular list of the
in the Information to allow projects in question, their
Enrile to adequately prepare respective beneficiaries, costs,
his defense evidence on the implementing agencies and
specific transaction pointed partner Napoles NGOs is found
to. (p. 29) on pp. 15-16.4)
When and to whom did GRANTED. The The details sought and granted
Enrile endorse the projects in government agencies to are found on pp. 11, 14 of the
favor of “Napoles [NGOs]” whom Enrile endorsed Resolution.5redarclaw
which became the recipients Napoles’ NGOs are also
and/or target implementors of material facts that must be The other details sought by
Enrile’s PDAF Projects? specified, since they served petitioner are found on pp. 15-16
Name the Napoles NGOs a necessary role in the crime of the Resolution. (see note 6)
which became the charged – the alleged
recipients/target conduits between Enrile and
implementors of Enrile’s Napoles’ NGOs x x x. (p.
PDAF Projects. Who paid 29)
Napoles, and from whom did
Napoles collect the funds for
the projects which turned out
to be ghosts or fictitious?
Who authorized the payments
for each project?

Endnotes:

1
In its Resolution, the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) found that the accused’s modus
operandi, encompassing the series or combination of acts within the meaning of the Plunder
Law, consists of petitioner’s staff, either through Atty. Jessica Reyes (Reyes) or Atty. Jose
Antonio Evangelista II, tipping the camp of his co-accused Janet Napoles (Napoles) of available
pork barrel funds for use in a pre-agreed scheme to funnel such funds to Napoles’ private
organizations (NGOs) to finance ghost projects concocted by Napoles in exchange for kickbacks
or commissions indirectly paid to petitioner and his co-accused, with Napoles and other public
officials also receiving their share of “commissions.” This modus operandi, the Ombudsman
stated, was followed in nine projects funded by petitioner’s pork barrel funds for which
petitioner received a total kickback of at least P172,834,500.
2
Namely, P1,500,000 in 2004; P14,662,000 in 2005; P13,300,000 in 2006; P27,112,500 in 2007;
P62,550,000 in 2008; P23,750,000 in 2009 and P30,000,000 in 2010. The Resolution stated (p.
28) that these figures were based on the entries in the ledger kept by Benhur Luy (Luy), a key
prosecution witness. Such entries are evidentiary matters which are properly disclosed during
trial and need not be alleged in the Information.
3
The Resolution identified these NGOs as Agri and Economic Program for Farmers Foundation,
Inc. (AEPPF); Agricultura Para sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc. (APMFI); Countrywide Agri
and Rural Economic Development Foundation, Inc. (CARED); Masaganang Ani Para sa
Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. (MAMFI); People’s Organization for Progress and Development
Foundation, Inc. (POPDFI); and Social Development Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc.
(SDPFFI).
4
The Resolution listed nine (9) projects.
5
The Resolution stated that the relevant implementing agencies are the National Agribusiness
Corporation (NABCOR), National Livelihood Development Corporation (NLDC) and
Technology Resource Center (TRC).

Republic of the Philippines

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
OMBUDSMAN BLDG., AGHAM ROAD, NORTH TRIANGLE, DILIMAN, QUEZON CITY
-------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL BUREAU OF OMB-C-C-13-0318

INVESTIGATION (NBI) FOR: VIOLATION OF RA 7080
REP. BY: Asst. Dir. MEDARDO (PLUNDER)
DE LEMOS (Criminal Case)

ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD

Complainants,

- versus -
 JUAN PONCE ENRILE
Senator
Senate of the Philippines

JESSICA LUCILA GONZALES REYES

Former Chief of Staff
Office of Senator Enrile

JOSE ANTONIO EVANGELISTA II

Deputy Chief of Staff
Office of Senator Enrile

ALAN A. JAVELLANA
President
National Agribusiness Corporation

GONDELINA G. AMATA
President
National Livelihood Development Corporation

ANTONIO Y. ORTIZ
Director General
Technology Resource Center

DENNIS LACSON CUNANAN

Deputy Director General
Technology Resource Center

VICTOR ROMAN COJAMCO CACAL

Paralegal
National Agribusiness Corporation

ROMULO M. RELEVO
General Services Unit Head
National Agribusiness Corporation

MARIA NINEZ P. GUAÑIZO

Bookkeeper/OIC-Accouting Division
National Agribusiness Corporation

MA. JULIE A. VILLARALVO-JOHNSON

Former Chief Accountant
National Agribusiness Corporation

RHODORA BULATAD MENDOZA

Former Director for Financial Management Services/
 Former Vice President for Administration and Finance
National Agribusiness Corporation

GREGORIA G. BUENAVENTURA
Division Chief, Asset Management Division
National Livelihood Development Corporation

EMMANUEL ALEXIS G. SEVIDAL

Director IV
National Livelihood Development Corporation

SOFIA D. CRUZ
Chief Financial Specialist/Project Management Assistant IV
National Livelihood Development Corporation

CHITA C. JALANDONI
Department Manager III
National Livelihood Development Corporation

FRANCISCO B. FIGURA
MARIVIC V. JOVER
Both of the Technology Resource Center

MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS
Undersecretary for Operations
Department of Budget and Management (DBM)

LEAH
LALAINE
MALOU1
Office of the Undersecretary for Operations
All of the Department of Budget and Management

JANET LIM NAPOLES

RUBY TUASON
JOCELYN DITCHON PIORATO
MYLENE T. ENCARNACION
JOHN RAYMOND (RAYMUND) DE ASIS
EVELYN D. DE LEON
JOHN/JANE DOES
Private Respondents

Respondents.

x----------------------------------x
 FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE OMB-C-C-13-0396
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 3 (e)
RA 3019, RA 7080 (PLUNDER)
Complainant, (Criminal Case)

- versus -

JUAN PONCE ENRILE

Senator
Senate of the Philippines

JESSICA LUCILA GONZALES REYES

Former Chief of Staff
JOSE ANTONIO VALERA EVANGELISTA II
Former Director IV/ Deputy Chief of Staff
Both of the Office of Senator Enrile

ALAN ALUNAN JAVELLANA

President
RHODORA BULATAD MENDOZA
Former Director for Financial Management Service/
Former Vice President for Administration and Finance
VICTOR ROMAN COJAMCO CACAL
Paralegal
MARIA NINEZ PAREDES GUAÑIZO
Bookkeeper/OIC-Accouting Division
ENCARNITA CRISTINA POTIAN MUNSOD
Former Human Resources Supervisor/Manager
MA. JULIE ASOR VILLARALVO-JOHNSON
Former Chief Accountant
SHYR ANN MONTUYA
Accounting Staff/Assistant
All of the National Agribusiness Corporation

GONDELINA GUADALUPE AMATA

President (Non-elective)
CHITA CHUA JALANDONI
Department Manager III
EMMANUEL ALEXIS SEVIDAL
Director IV
OFELIA ELENTO ORDOÑEZ
Cashier IV
FILIPINA TOLENTINO RODRIGUEZ
Budget Officer IV
SOFIA DAING CRUZ
Project Development Assistant IV
All of the the National Livelihood Development Corporation

ANTONIO YRIGON ORTIZ

Former Director General
DENNIS LACSON CUNANAN
Director General

MARIA ROSALINDA MASONGSONG LACSAMANA

Former Group Manager

CONSUELO LILIAN REYES ESPIRITU

Budget Officer IV
FRANCISCO BALDOZA FIGURA
Department Manager III
MARIVIC VILLALUZ JOVER
Chief Accountant
All of the Technology Resource Center

JANET LIM NAPOLES

RUBY TUASON/TUAZON
JO CHRISTINE LIM NAPOLES
JAMES CHRISTOPHER LIM NAPOLES
EULOGIO DIMAILIG RODRIGUEZ
EVELYN DITCHON DE LEON
RONALD JOHN LIM
FERNANDO RAMIREZ
NITZ CABILAO
MARK S. OLIVEROS
EDITHA P. TALABOC
DELFIN AGCAOILI, JR.
DANIEL BALANOBA
LUCILA M. LAWAS-YUTOK
ANTONIO M. SANTOS
SUSAN R. VICTORINO
LUCITA SOLOMON
WILBERTO P. DE GUZMAN (Deceased)
JOHN DOE
JOHN (MMRC TRADING) DOE
MYLA OGERIO
MARGARITA E. GUADINEZ
JOCELYN DITCHON PIORATO
DORILYN AGBAY FABIAN
HERNANI DITCHON
RODRIGO B. GALAY
LAARNI A. UY
AMPARO L. FERNANDO
 AILEEN PALALON PALAMA
JOHN RAYMOND (RAYMUND) DE ASIS
MYLENE TAGAYON ENCARNACION
RENATO SOSON ORNOPIA
JESUS BARGOLA CASTILLO
NOEL V. MACHA
Private Respondents

Respondents.

x------------------------------------x

JOINT RESOLUTION

For resolution by the Special Panel of Investigators2 constituted on 20 September 2013 by the
Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation on: 1) the complaint filed on September 16,
2013 with this Office by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Atty. Levito Baligod
(The NBI Complaint), for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), and 2) the complaint filed on November 18, 2013 by the Field
Investigation Office (FIO), Office of the Ombudsman, for violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
(The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Plunder, in connection with the alleged
anomalous utilization of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) from 2004 to 2010.

The NBI Complaint for Plunder, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0318, charges the following
respondents:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Name Position/Agency
Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) Senator
Jessica Lucila Gonzales
Chief of Staff /Office of Senator Enrile
Reyes (Reyes)
Jose Antonio Valera
Former Director V/Deputy Chief of Staff / Office of Senator Enrile
Evangelista II (Evangelista)
Janet Lim Napoles
Private respondent
(Napoles)
Ruby Tuason (Tuason) Private respondent
Alan A. Javellana Former President
(Javellana) National Agribusiness Corporation
Gondelina Guadalupe President
Amata (Amata) National Livelihood Development Corp.
Antonio Yrigon Ortiz Director General
(Ortiz) Technology Resource Center
Jocelyn Ditchon Piorato
Agricultura Para Sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc. (APMFI)
(Piorato)
Nemesio Pablo, Jr. (Pablo) Private respondent
Mylene Tagayon Private respondent
Encarnacion (Encarnacion)
John Raymond Sales De Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development Foundation,
Asis (De Asis) Inc.
Evelyn Ditchon De Leon
Private respondent
(De Leon)
Dennis Lacson Cunanan Deputy Director General
(Cunanan) Technology Resource Center
Victor Roman Cacal Paralegal
(Cacal) National Agribusiness Corporation
Romulo M. Relevo
National Agribusiness Corporation
(Relevo)
Maria Ninez Guañizo Bookkeeper/OIC Accounting Division
(Guañizo) National Agribusiness Corporation
Ma. Julie Asor Villaralvo-
Former Chief Accountant/National Agribusiness Corporation
Johnson (Johnson)
Rhodora Bulatad Mendoza Former Director for Financial Management Services and Former
(Mendoza) Vice President for Administration and Finance/National Agribusines
Corporation
Gregoria G. Buenaventura
National Livelihood Development Corporation
(Buenaventura)
Emmanuel Alexis Gagni Director IV
Sevidal (Sevidal) National Livelihood Development Corporation
Sofia Daing Cruz (Cruz) Chief Financial Specialist/Project Development Assistant
IV/National Livelihood Development Corporation
Chita Chua Jalandoni Department Manager III
(Jalandoni) National Livelihood Development Corporation
Francisco Baldoza Figura Department Manager III
(Figura) Technology Resource Center
Marivic Villaluz Jover
Chief Accountant/ Technology Resource Center
(Jover)
Mario L. Relampagos Undersecretary for Operations/Department of Budget and
(Relampagos) Management (DBM)
Office of the Undersecretary for Operations/Department of Budget
Leah3
and Management (DBM)
Office of the Undersecretary for Operations/Department of Budget
Lalaine4
and Management (DBM)
Office of the Undersecretary for Operations/Department of Budget
Malou5
and Management (DBM)
JOHN and JANE DOES
The FIO complaint,6 on the other hand, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0396, charges the following
individuals with Plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Name Position/Agency
Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile)
Jessica Lucila Gonzales Reyes
(Reyes)
Jose Antonio Valera Evangelista
II (Evangelista)
Alan Alunan Javellana
(Javellana)
Former Director for Financial Management Services and
Rhodora Bulatad Mendoza
Former Vice President for Administration and Finance
(Mendoza)
Victor Roman Cacal (Cacal)
Maria Ninez Paredes Guañizo
(Guañizo)
Former Manager of Human Resources Administrative Service
Encarnita Cristina Potian
Munsod (Munsod)
Ma. Julie Asor Villaralvo-
Johnson (Johnson)
Shyr Ann Montuya (Montuya)
Gondelina Guadalupe Amata
(Amata)
Chita Chua Jalandoni
(Jalandoni)
Emmanuel Alexis Gagni Sevidal
(Sevidal)
Ofelia Olento Ordoñez
(Ordoñez)
Filipina Tolentino Rodriguez
(Rodriguez)
Chief Financial Specialist/Project Development Assistant IV
Sofia Daing Cruz (Cruz)
Antonio Yrigon Ortiz (Ortiz)
Dennis Lacson Cunanan
(Cunanan)
Maria Rosalinda Masongsong
Lacsamana (Lacsamana)
Consuelo Lilian Reyes Espiritu
(Espiritu)
Francisco Baldoza Figura
(Figura)
Senator
Chief of Staff /Office of Senator Enrile
Former Director V/Deputy Chief of Staff
Office of Senator Enrile
Former President
National Agribusiness Corporation
National Agribusiness Corporation
Paralegal
National Agribusiness Corporation
Bookkeeper/OIC Accounting Division
National Agribusiness Corporation
Division
National Agribusiness Corporation
Former Chief Accountant
National Agribusiness Corporation
Accounting Assistant
National Agribusiness Corporation
President
National Livelihood Development Corporation
Department Manager III
National Livelihood Development Corporation
Director IV
National Livelihood Development Corporation
Cashier IV
National Livelihood Development Corporation
Budget Officer IV
National Livelihood Development Corporation
National Livelihood Development Corporation
Director General
Technology Resource Center
Deputy Director General
Technology Resource Center
Former Group Manager
Technology Resource Center
Budget Officer IV
Technology Resource Center
Department Manager III
Technology Resource Center
 Chief Accountant
Marivic Villaluz Jover (Jover)
Technology Resource Center
Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) Private respondent
Ruby Tuason/Ruby Tuazon
Private respondent
(Tuason)
Jo Christine Lim Napoles (Jo
Private respondent
Christine)
James Christopher Lim Napoles
Private respondent
(James Christopher)
Eulogio Dimailig Rodriguez
Private respondent
(Rodriquez)
Evelyn Ditchon De Leon (De
Private respondent
Leon)
Ronald John Lim (Lim) Private respondent
Fernando Ramirez (Ramirez) Private respondent
Nitz Cabilao (Cabilao) Private respondent
Atty. Mark S. Oliveros
Notary Public
(Oliveros)
Atty. Editha P. Talaboc
Notary Public
(Talaboc)
Atty. Delfin Agcaoili, Jr.
Notary Public
(Agcaoili)
Atty Daniel Balanoba
Notary Public
(Balanoba)
Atty. Lucila M. Lawas-Yutoc
Notary Public
(Yutoc)
Atty. Antonio M. Santos
Notary Public
(Santos)
Susan R. Victorino (Victorino) Certified Public Accountant
Lucita P. Solomon (Solomon) Certified Public Accountant
Wilberto P. De Guzman (De
Certified Public Accountant
Guzman)
John Doe Proprietor of Nutrigrowth Philippines
John Doe Proprietor of MMRC Trading
Myla Ogerio (Ogerio) Agri and Economic Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc.
Margarita A. Guadinez
Agri and Economic Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc.
(Guadinez)
Jocelyn Ditchon Piorato
Agricultura Para Sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc.
(Piorato)
Dorilyn Agbay Fabian (Fabian) Agricultura Para Sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc.
Hernani Ditchon (Ditchon) Agricultura Para Sa Magbubukid Inc.
Rodrigo B. Galay (Galay) Employee/Agricultura Para sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc.
Laarni A. Uy (Uy) Employee/Agricultura Para sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc.

Amparo L. Fernando (Fernando)
Aileen Palalon Palama (Palama)
John Raymond Sales De Asis
(De Asis)
Mylene Tagayon Encarnacion
(Encarnacion)
Renato Soson Ornopia (Ornopia)
Jesus Bargola Castillo (Castillo)
Noel V. Macha (Macha)
Having arisen from the same or similar facts and transactions, these cases are resolved jointly.
Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development
Foundation, Inc.
Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development
Foundation, Inc.
Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development
Foundation, Inc.
Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development
Foundation, Inc.
Masaganang Ani Para Sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc.
People’s Organization for Progress and Development
Foundation, Inc.
Employee/Social Development Program for Farmers
Foundation, Inc.

I. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 22, 2013, agents of the NBI, acting on a complaint from the parents of Benhur Luy
(Luy) that Luy had been illegally detained, swooped down on the South Wing Gardens of the
Pacific Plaza Tower in Bonifacio Global City, Taguig City and rescued Luy. A criminal case for
Serious Illegal Detention was soon after filed against Reynald Lim7 and his sister, Janet Lim
Napoles8 (Napoles), before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City where it remains pending.

Before the NBI, Luy claimed that he was detained in connection with the discharge of his
responsibilities as the “lead employee” of the JANET LIM NAPOLES Corporation (JLN) which,
by his account, had been involved in overseeing anomalous implementation of several
government-funded projects sourced from, among others, the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) of several congressmen and senators of the Republic. The NBI thus focused on
what appeared to be misuse and irregularities attending the utilization and implementation of the
PDAF of certain lawmakers, in connivance with other government employees, private
individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which had been set up by JLN
employees, upon the instructions of Napoles.

In the course of the NBI investigation which included conduct of interviews and taking of sworn
statements of Luy along with several other JLN employees including Marina Sula (Sula) and
Merlina Suñas (Suñas)9 (the whistleblowers), the NBI uncovered the “scheme” employed in
what has now been commonly referred to as the PDAF or Pork Barrel Scam, outlined in general
as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1. Either the lawmaker or Napoles would commence negotiations on

the utilization of the lawmaker's
PDAF;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2. The lawmaker and Napoles then discuss, and later approve, the list
of projects chosen by the lawmaker, the corresponding
Implementing Agency (IA), namely the National Agribusiness
 Corporation (NABCOR), the National Livelihood Development
Corporation (NLDC), and the Technology Resource Center (TRC
[formerly Technology and Livelihood Resource Center]), through
which the projects would be coursed, and the project cost, as well
as the lawmaker's "commission" which would range between 40%-
60% of either the project cost or the amount stated in the Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO);chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

3. After the negotiations and upon instructions from Napoles, Luy

prepares the so-called “listing” which contains the list of projects
allocated by the lawmaker to Napoles and her NGOs, the name of
the IA, and the project cost;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

4. The lawmaker would then adopt the “listing” and write to the
Senate President and the Finance Committee Chairperson, in the
case of a Senator, and to the House Speaker and Chair of the
Appropriations Committee, in the case of a Congressman,
requesting Budget and Management
(DBM);chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

5. The DBM soon issues a SARO addressed to the chosen IA

indicating the amount deducted from the lawmaker’s PDAF
allocation, and later issues a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) to
the IA which would thereafter issue a check to the Napoles-
controlled NGO listed in the lawmaker’s
endorsement;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

6. Napoles, who recommends to the lawmaker the NGO which would

implement the project, directs her employee to prepare a letter for
the lawmaker’s signature endorsing the selected NGO to the IA.
The IA later prepares a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
covering the project to be executed by the lawmaker or his/her
authorized staff member, the IA and the chosen
NGO;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

7. The Head of the IA, in exchange for a 10% share in the project
cost, subsequently releases the check/s to the Napoles-controlled
NGO from whose bank accounts Napoles withdraws the proceeds
thereof;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

8. Succeeding tranche payments are released by the IA upon

compliance and submission by the NGO of the required
documents.

From 2004 to 2010, Senator Enrile, then and presently a senator of the Republic of the
Philippines,10continuously indorsed the implementation of his PDAF-funded livelihood and
agricultural production projects in different parts of the country to NGOs associated with, or
controlled by, private respondent Napoles.

From 2007 to 2009, a total of Php345,000,000.00 covered by nine (9) SAROs was taken from his
PDAF, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. ROCS-07-04618 dated 06 March 2007;11redarclaw

2. ROCS-08-01347 dated 31 January 2008;12redarclaw

3. ROCS-08-05216 dated 11 June 2008;13redarclaw

4. ROCS-08-07211 dated 3 October 2008;14redarclaw

5. ROCS-09-00804 dated 13 February 2009;15redarclaw

6. ROCS-09-00847 dated 12 February 2009;16redarclaw

7. ROCS-09-04952 dated 09 July 2009;17redarclaw

8. ROCS-09-04996 dated 10 July 2009;18redarclaw

9. G-09-07112 dated 25 September 2009.19

After the SAROs were released by the DBM, Senator Enrile, through his Chief of Staff
respondent Reyes,20 identified the following Government-Owned and-Controlled Corporations
(GOCCs) as the IAs of the projects to be funded by his PDAF: a) NABCOR, b) NLDC, and c)
the TRC.

Senator Enrile, through Reyes, authorized respondent Evangelista to act for him, deal with the
parties involved in the process, and sign documents necessary for the immediate and timely
implementation of his PDAF-funded projects.

Through Evangelista, the Senator also designated21 the following NGOs as “project partners” in
the implementation of the livelihood projects financed by his PDAF, viz:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

a. Agri and Economic Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc.

(AEPFFI) of which respondent Nemesio C. Pablo, Jr. was
President;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

b. Agricultura Para sa Magbubukid Foundation, Inc. (APMFI) of

which respondent Jocelyn D. Piorato was
President;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

c. Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development Foundation,

Inc. (CARED) of which Simonette Briones was
President;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 d. Masaganang Ani Para sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. (MAMFI) of
which witness Marina Sula was
President;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

e. People’s Organization for Progress and Development Foundation,

Inc., (POPDFI) of which witness Merlina Suñas was President; and

f. Social Development Program for Farmer’s Foundation, Inc.

(SDPFFI) of which witness Benhur Luy was President.

The following table discloses the details of Senator Enrile’s utilization of his Php345,000,000.00
PDAF:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Total Pojects/
SARO NO. & Project
Beneficiaries/ Activities Implementing
Amount (in Projects/ Activities Partners
LGUs Costs (in Agency
Php) /NGOs
PHP)
1. ROCS-07- Financial Assistance Bacuag, Surigao 4,800,000.00
04618 Grants/Subsidies for del Norte for each
Tools and Implements municipality
Guigaguit,
Php20,000,000 Surigao del Norte
Technical Assistance San Benito,
Technology Transfer Surigao del Norte TRC/TLRC CARED
50,000.00 for
through Video courses
each
(VCDs) and Printed
municipality
Materials provided by
TLRC
San Agustin,
Surigao del Norte
Service Fee (3%) by 150,000.00
TLRC for each
municipality
2. ROCS-08- Vegetable Seeds, Hand Passi City, Iloilo
01347 Tools, Gloves, Masks, Sta. Maria,
Vest, Cap, Garden, Bulacan Doña
Tools, and Knapsack Remedios
5,000,000 for
Php25,000,000 Sprayer Trinidad, Bulacan
each NABCOR POPFDI
Mabuhay,
municipality
Zamboanga
Sibugay Dinas,
Zamboanga del
Sur
3. ROCS-08- 1,294 sets of Fertilizer, Don Marcelino,
05216 Gardening Packages, Davao del Sur 20,000,000 NABCOR MAMFI
and Knapsack sprayer Banaybanay,
 Davao Oriental
Php50,000,000 Manukan,
Zamboanga del
Norte Magpet,
North Cotabato
General Tinio,
Nueva Ecija
Tuamuini, Isabela
La Trinidad,
30,000,000 NABCOR SDPFFI
Benguet San
Juan, Batangas
Boac,
Marinduque
4. ROCS-08- Agricultural Production Kibungan,
07211 Package (knapsack Benguet San
sprayer, fertilizer, and Gabriel, La Union
gardening tools) Luna, La Union 25,000,000 NABCOR MAMFI
Php50,000,000 Natividad,
Pangasinan Passi
City, Iloilo
Glan, Saranggani
Maitum
Saranggani
Cagwait, Surigao 25,000,000 NABCOR SDPFFI
del Sur
Carrasacal,
Surigao del Sur
5. ROCS-09- Agricultural Production Lagangilang,
00804 Packages (farm inputs) Abra Tuba,
Benguet 15,000,000 NABCOR MAMFI
Bacnotan, La
Php25,000,000 Union
Malungan,
Sarangani
10,000,000 NABCOR SDPFFI
Marihatag,
Surigao del Sur
6. ROCS-09- Agricultural Livelihood Umingan,
00847 Assistance Packages Pangasinan
(vegetable seeds, Rosales,
production tools and Pangasinan San
Php25,000,000 accessories like Agustin, Surigao
25,000,000 TLRC/TRC APMFI
planting materials, del Sur San Luis,
various tools for Surigao del Sur
backyard gardening, San Juan, La
sprayers, and Union
agricultural chemicals)
7. ROCS-09- 604 Agricultural Hingyon, Ifugao
04952 Improvement Divilacan, Isabela
Livelihood Packages Umingan,
(sprayers, bottles of Pangasinan Doña 25,000,000 NLDC AEPFFI
Php50,000,000 fertilizers, rake and Remedios
pick mattock) Trinidad, Bulacan
Oas, Albay
Alubijid, Misamis
Oriental Llorente,
Eastern Samar
Bansalan, Davao
del Sur 25,000,000 NLDC APMFI
Montevista,
Compostela
Valley Tupi,
South Cotabato
8. ROCS-09- 1,159 sets of Small Balaoan, La
04996 Scale Agri Package Union Sta. Maria,
Pangasinan Boac,
Marinduque 40,000,000 NLDC CARED
Php60,000,000 Pantukan,
Compostela
Valley
Sablan, Benguet
& Sta. Maria, 20,000,000 NLDC MAMFI
Bulacan
9. G-09- 07112 Bacnotan, La
Union Supiden,
La Union San
40,000,000 NLDC CARED
Php40,000,000 Juan, La Union
San Gabriel, La
Union

The funds representing the activities costs were transferred from the IAs to the NGOs/project
partners pursuant to several MOAs signed by the following individuals:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Signatories to the MOA
SARO No. & No.
Office of Senator Implementing NGO/Project Notary Public
of MOAs
Enrile Agencies Partner
1. ROCS-07-04618
CARED-
Evangelista TRC-Ortiz Atty. Talaboc
22 Encarnacion
4 MOAs
2. ROCS- 08-01347
NABCOR-
POPDFI-Suñas Atty. Balanoba
23 Javellana
1 MOA
3. ROCS-08-05216 NABCOR-Javellana MAMFI-Sula Atty. Lawas-
 Yutoc
NABCOR-Javellana SDPFFI-Luy
2 MOAs24
NABCOR-
4. ROCS-08-07211 MAMFI-Sula
Javellana
Evangelista Atty. Agcaoili
25 NABCOR-
2 MOAs SDPFFI-Luy
Javellana
NABCOR-
5. ROCS-09-00804 MAMFI-Sula
Javellana
Evangelista Atty. Agcaoili
NABCOR-
2MOAs26 SDPFFI-Luy
Javellana
6. ROCS-09-
008475
Evangelista TRC-Ortiz APMFI-Piorato Atty. Talaboc
MOAs27
7. ROCS-09-04952 NLDC-Amata AEPFFI- Pablo. Jr.
Evangelista Atty. Santos
NLDC-Amata APMFI- Piorato
2 MOAs28
8. ROCS-09-04996 NLDC-Amata CARED-Briones
Evangelista Atty. Santos
29 NLDC-Amata MAMFI-Sula
2 MOAs
9. G-09-07112
Evangelista NLDC-Amata CARED-Briones Atty. Santos
1 MOA30
After the execution of the MOAs, the agricultural and livelihood assistance kits/packages were
supposed to be delivered by the NGOs to identified beneficiaries/municipalities in different parts
of the country, but, as will be stated later, no deliveries were made.

The NGOs/project partners were later paid in full by the IAs upon the NGOs’ submission of
Disbursement, Progress, Accomplishment, Fund Utilization, Inspection, and Delivery Reports, as
well as the Certificates of Acceptance. The details of payments to the NGOs/project partners are
reflected in the table below:
Amount of
Paying
Disbursement Date of DV
SARO No. Check No. Agency/Claimant or
Voucher (DV) No. DV
Payee
(PhP)
ROCS-07-
01-2007-040671 Undated 5,000,000 850457 (LBP) TRC-CARED
04618
01-2007 -040672 Undated 5,000,000 860458 (LBP) TRC-CARED
01-2007 -040669 Undated 5,000,000 850460 (LBP) TRC-CARED
01-2007-040670 Undated 5,000,000 850462 (LBP) TRC-CARED
ROCS-08- 11-Apr- 0000416657
08-04-01201 21,825,000 NABCOR- POPDFI
01347 08 (UCPB)
0000417294
08-07-02312 09-Jul-08 2,425,000 NABCOR-POPDFI
(UCPB)
ROCS-08- 23-Sep- 437227
08-09-03575 17,460,000 NABCOR-MAMFI
05216 08 (UCPB)
19-May-
09-04-1622 1,940,000 46937 (UCPB) NABCOR-MAMFI
09
ROCS-08- 23-Sep- 437226
08-09-03572 26,190,000 NABCOR-SDPFFI
05216 08 (UCPB)
25-May- 455997
09-05-1751 2,910,000 NABCOR-SDPFFI
09 (UCPB)
ROCS-08- 27-May- 462921
09-05-1773 3,637,500 NABCOR-MAMFI
07211 09 (UCPB)
15-Jun- 462940
09-06-2025 20,612,500 NABCOR-MAMFI
09 (UCPB)
ROCS-08- 27-May- 462922
09-05-1774 3,637,500 NABCOR- SDPFFI
07211 09 (UCPB)
15-Jun- 462938
09-06-2022 20,612,500 NABCOR- SDPFFI
09 (UCPB)
ROCS-09- 27-May- 462919
09-05-1767 2,182,500 NABCOR- MAMFI
00804 09 (UCPB)
15–Jun- 462939
09-06-2028 12,367,500 NABCOR- MAMFI
09 (UCPB)
ROCS-09- 01-Jun- 462926
09-06-1825 1,455,000 NABCOR- SDPFFI
00804 09 (UCPB)
15-Jun- 462939
09-06-2027 8,245,000 NABCOR- SDPFFI
09 (UCPB)
ROCS-09-
01-2009-040929 Undated 20,000,000 890099 (LBP) TLRC-APMFI
00847
04-Jun-
01-2009-051300 2,500,000 917019 (BP) TLRC-APMFI
09
26-Oct-
09-10-1530 8,000,000 244589 (LBP) CARED-NLDC
09
ROCS-09- 23-Sept-
09-09-1355 6,000,000 244554 (LBP) MAMFI-NLDC
04996 09
12-Oct-
09-10-1443 10,000,000 244570 (LBP) MAMFI-NLDC
09
26-Oct-
09-10-1534 4,000,000 244585 (LBP) MAMFI-NLDC
09
G-09- 16-Dec-
09-12-1834 12,000,000 244622 (LBP) CARED-NLDC
07112 09
07-Jan-
10-01-0004 20,000,000 244632 (LBP) CARED-NLDC
10
25-Jan-
10-01-0118 8,000,000 244649 (LBP) CARED-NLDC
10
06-May-
10-05-0747 4,000,000 260944 (LBP) CARED-NLDC
10
ROCS-09- 18 -Sep-
09-09-1353 7,500,000 244552 (LBP) NLDC-AEPFFI
04952 09
12-0ct-
09-10-1444 12,500,000 244571 (LBP) NLDC-AEPFFI
09
26-0ct-
09-10-1540 5,000,000 244590 (LBP) NLDC-AEPFFI
09
ROCS-09- 23-Sep-
09-09-1358 7,500,000 244557 (LBP) NLDC-APMFI
04952 09
12-0ct-
09-10-1449 12,500,000 244576 (LBP) NLDC-APMFI
09
26-0ct-
09-10-1535 5,000,000 244592 (LBP) NLDC-APMFI
09
ROCS-09- 23-Sep-
09-09-1354 12,000,000 244553 (LBP) NLDC-CARED
04996 09
23-Sep-
09-10-1447 20,000,000 244574 (LBP) NLDC-CARED
09
Signatories to all the Disbursement Vouchers (DVs) covering payment by the IAs for the
agricultural and livelihood projects, who are respondents herein, are indicated in the table
below:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Signatories of the DV
BOX A BOX B
BOX C
Supporting Certified
Disbursement (Expenses/Advances Documents Complete by/supporting
SARO
Voucher No. necessary, lawful, and Proper/Budget documents (Approved
and incurred under Utilization/Verification attached for
my direct /Certification as to Payment)
supervision Cash/Fund Availability
ROCS-07- 01-2007-
Figura Allen T. Baysa Jover Ortiz
04618 04057131
01-2007-
Figura Allen T. Baysa Jover Ortiz
04067232
01-2007-
Figura Allen T. Baysa Jover Ortiz
04066933
01-2007-
Figura Allen T. Baysa Jover Ortiz
04067034
ROCS-08-
08-04-0120135 Munsod Johnson Javellana
01347
08-07-0231236 Relevo Johnson Javellana
ROCS-08-
08-09-0357537 Cacal Guañizo Javellana
05216
09-04-162238 Cacal Guañizo Javellana
39
08-09-03572 Cacal Guañizo Javellana
40
09-05-1751 Cacal Guañizo Javellana
ROCS-08-
09-05-177341 Cacal Guañizo Javellana
07211
09-06-202542 Cacal Guañizo Javellana
ROCS-08-
09-05-177343 Cacal Guañizo Javellana
07211
09-06-2022 Cacal Guañizo Javellana
ROCS-09-
09-05-176744 Cacal Guañizo Javellana
00804
09-06-202845 Cacal Guañizo Javellana
46
09-06-1825 Cacal Guañizo Javellana
47
09-06-2027 Cacal Guañizo Javellana
ROCS-09- 01-2009- Consuelo Lilian
Cunanan Jover Ortiz
00847 04092948 Espiritu
01-2009- Consuelo Lilian
Cunanan Jover Ortiz
05130049 Espiritu
ROCS-09-
09-09-135350 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
04952
09-10-144451 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
52
09-10-1540 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
ROCS-09-
09-09-135853 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
04952
09-10-144954 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
55
09-10-1535 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
ROCS-09-
09-09-135456 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
04996
09-10144757 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
58
09-101530 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
59
09-09-1355 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
60
09-10-1443 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
61
09-10-1534 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
G-09-
09-12-183462 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
07112
10-01-000463 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
10-01-011864 Sevidal Ordoñez Cruz Amata
65
10-05-0747 Sevidal Rodriguez Cruz Amata
Details of the checks issued by the IAs in payment of the projects, and the signatories thereto are
indicated in the following table:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Net Amount
(Php) Implementing Received
Official
SARO Disbursement Agency/ies & Payment
Check No. Receipt
No. Voucher No. (After Signatories of
Issued
deducting the Check (see DV)
3%
 management
fee)
TLRC/TRC
CARED
01-2007- LBP
4,800,000 Encarnacion
040671 85045766 Figura and
OR 023
Ortiz
TLRC/TRC
CARED
01-2007- LBP
4,800,000 Encarnacion
040672 85045867 Figura and
OR 022
ROCS- Ortiz
07-04618 TLRC/TRC
CARED
01-2007- LBP
4,800,000 Encarnacion
040669 85046068 Figura and
OR 025
Ortiz
TLRC/TRC
CARED
01-2007- LBP
4,800,000 Encarnacion
040670 85046269 Figura and
OR 021
Ortiz
NABCOR POPDFI
UCPB
08-04-01201 21,825,000 Suñas
000041665770 Mendoza OR
ROCS- and Javellana 001426
08-01347 NABCOR
POPDFI
UCPB
08-07-02312 2,425,000 Suñas
000041729471 Mendoza
OR 3765
and Javellana
NABCOR
MAMFI
UCPB
08-09-03575 17,460,000 Sula
43722772 Mendoza
OR 3615
ROCS- and Javellana
08-05216 NABCOR
MAMFI
UCPB
09-04-1622 1,940,000 Rodriguez
45591373 Mendoza
OR 3625
and Javellana
NABCOR
SDPFFI
UCPB
08-09-03572 26,190,000 Luy
43722674 Mendoza
OR 214
ROCS- and Javellana
08-05216 NABCOR
SDPFFI
UCPB
09-05-1751 2,910,000 Rodriguez
45599775 Mendoza
OR 269
and Javellana
NABCOR MAMFI
ROCS- UCPB
09-05-1773 3,637,500 Sula
08-07211 46292176
Mendoza OR 3628
 and Javellana
NABCOR
UCPB
09-06-2025 20,612,500 OR 3574 de Asis
46294077 Mendoza
and Javellana
SDPFFI
UCPB
09-05-1774 3,637,500.00 de Asis
46292278
ROCS- OR 267
08-07211 SDPFFI
UCPB
09-06-2022 20,612,500 Luy
46293879
OR 301
MAMFI
UCPB
09-05-1767 2,182,500 Sula
46291980
OR 3627
ROCS-
NABCOR
09-00804 OR
UCPB
09-06-2028 12,367,500 de Asis
462937 Mendoza
3573
and Javellana
NABCOR
OR
UCPB
09-06-1825 1,455,000 Luy
46292681 Mendoza
273
ROCS- and Javellana
09-00804 NABCOR
OR
UCPB
09-06-2027 8,245,000 Luy
46293982 Mendoza
303
and Javellana
TLRC/TRC
OR
01-2009- LBP Rodrigo B.
20,000,000
040929 89009983 Ortiz and Calay
204
ROCS- Figura
09-00847 TLRC/TRC
01-2009- LBP Rodrigo B.
2,500,000 OR
051300 91701984 Ortiz and Calay
Figura
NLDC
AEPFFI
LBP
09-09-1353 6,750,000 Suñas
000024455285 Jalandoni
OR 0255
and Amata
NLDC
ROCS- AEPFFI
LBP
09-04952 09-10-1444 12,500,000 Suñas
24457186 Jalandoni
OR 0256
and Amata
NLDC AEPFFI
LBP
09-10-1540 5,000,000 Suñas
24459087
Jalandoni OR 0257
 and Amata
NLDC APMFI
LBP Laarni A.
09-09-1358 6,750,000
24455788 Jalandoni OR Uy
and Amata 411
NLDC
APMFI
ROCS- LBP Laarni A.
09-10-1449 12,500,000
09-04952 24457689 Jalandoni Uy
OR 412
and Amata
NLDC
APMFI
LBP Laarni A.
09-10-1535 5,000,000
24459290 Jalandoni Uy
OR 415
and Amata
NLDC
CARED
LBP
09-09-1354 10,800,000 de Asis
24455391 Jalandoni
OR 147
and Amata
NLDC
CARED
ROCS- LBP
09-101447 20,000,000 de Asis
09-04996 24457492 Jalandoni
OR 149
and Amata
NLDC
CARED
LBP
09-101530 8,000,000 de Asis
24458993 Jalandoni
OR 153
and Amata
NLDC
MAMFI
LBP
09-09-1355 5,400,000 Rodriguez
24455494 Jalandoni
OR 3596
and Amata
NLDC
ROCS- MAMFI
LBP
09- 09-10-1443 10,000,000 Rodriguez
24457095 Jalandoni
04996 OR 3598
and Amata
NLDC
MAMFI
LBP
09-10-1534 4,000,000 Rodriguez
24458596 Jalandoni
OR 3652
and Amata
NLDC
CARED
LBP
09-12-1834 10,800,000 de Asis
24462297 Jalandoni
OR 155
G-09- and Amata
07112 NLDC
CARED
LBP
10-01-0004 20,000,000 de Asis
24463298 Jalandoni
OR 156
and Amata
 NLDC
CARED
LBP
10-01-0118 4,000,000 de Asis
24464999 Jalandoni
OR 157
and Amata
NLDC
LBP
10-05-0747 4,000,000 de Asis
260944100 Jalandoni
and Amata
Field verifications conducted by complainant FIO revealed that the Php345,000,000.00 PDAF of
Senator Enrile was never used for the intended projects. It appears that the documents submitted
by the NGOs/project partners to the IAs such as Disbursement, Progress, Accomplishment, Fund
Utilization, Inspection, and Delivery Reports, as well as Certificates of Acceptance, were all
fabricated.

The livelihood and agricultural production kits/packages never reached the intended
beneficiaries, i.e., either there were no projects or goods were never delivered. The mayors and
the municipal agriculturists, who had reportedly received the livelihood assistance kits/packages
for their respective municipalities, never received anything from the Office of Senator Enrile, the
IA, or any of the project partners. None of the mayors or municipal agriculturists were even
aware of the projects.

As reflected above, the signatures on the Certificates of Acceptance or Delivery Reports were
forged, and the farmer- recipients enumerated on the lists of purported beneficiaries denied
having received any livelihood assistance kits/packages. In fact, many of the names appearing on
the lists as farmer-recipients were neither residents nor registered voters of the place where they
were listed as beneficiaries, were fictitious, or had jumbled surnames while others were already
deceased. In other words, these livelihood projects were “ghost projects.”

The Commission on Audit (COA), through its Special Audits Office, conducted an audit of the
PDAF allocations and disbursements covering the period 2007-2009 subject of these complaints,
its findings of which are found in the COA Special Audits Office Report101 (the “2007-2009
COA Report”).

Among the observations of the COA were: (a) the implementing agencies, including NABCOR,
NLDC and TRC, did not actually implement the PDAF-funded projects; instead, the agencies
released the funds to the NGOs, albeit charging a "management fee" therefor; (b) the direct
releases of PDAF disbursements to NGOs contravened the DBM's regulations considering that
the same were not preceded by endorsements from the executive departments exercising
supervisory powers over the IAs; (c) worse, the releases were made essentially at the behest of
the sponsoring legislator; (d) almost all of the NGOs that received PDAF releases did not have a
track record on the implementation of government projects, and their addresses were dubious; (e)
the selection of the NGOs, as well as the procurement of the goods for distribution to the
beneficiaries, did not undergo public bidding; and (f) some of the suppliers who allegedly
provided the goods to the NGOs denied ever having dealt with these NGOs, contrary to the
NGOs’ claims.
The COA also found that the selections of the NGO were not compliant with the provisions of
COA Circular No. 2007- 001 and GPPB Resolution No. 12-2007; the suppliers and reported
beneficiaries were unknown or cannot be located at their given address; the NGOs had provided
non-existent addresses or their addresses were traced to mere shanties or high-end residential
units without any signage; and the NGOs submitted questionable documents, or failed to
liquidate or fully document the ultilization of funds.

Verily, the findings in the 2007-2009 COA Report jibe with the whistle blowers testimonies and
are validated by the results of the FIO’s on-site field verification.

IN FINE, the PDAF-funded projects of Senator Enrile were “ghost” or inexistent.

Complainants contend that the amount of Php345,000,000.00 allotted for livelihood and
agricultural production projects was instead misappropriated and converted to the personal use
and benefit of Senator Enrile in conspiracy with Napoles and the rest of respondents.

Witnesses Luy, Sula, and Suñas claim that the six foundation-NGOs endorsed by Senator Enrile
were all dummies of Napoles, who operated them from her JLN office at Unit 2502, Discovery
Center Suites, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, and were created for the purpose of funnelling the
PDAF through NABCOR, NLDC, and TRC/TLRC; the majority of the incorporators, officers,
and members of these NGOs are household helpers, relatives, employees and friends of Napoles;
some incorporators/corporators of the NGOs were aware of their involvement in the creation
thereof while others were not; and the signatures in the Articles of Incorporation of the NGOs of
those unaware of their involvement were forged.

Luy, Sula and Suñas add that the pre-selected President of each of the pre-selected NGOs, in
addition to being required to furnish the names of at least 5 persons to complete the list of
incorporators, were obliged to sign an application for opening bank accounts in the name of the
NGO, and to pre-sign blank withdrawal slips; these NGOs maintained bank accounts with either
METROBANK Magdalena Branch or LANDBANK EDSA-Greenhills Branch, from which
Napoles would withdraw and/or cause the withdrawal of the proceeds of checks paid by the IAs
to the NGOs involved.

Per Luy’s records, Senator Enrile received, through respondents Reyes and Tuason, total
commissions, rebates, or kickbacks amounting to at least Php172,834,500.00 from his PDAF-
funded projects from 2004 to 2010: Php1,500,000.00 for 2004; Php14,622,000.00 for 2005;
Php13,300,000.00 for 2006; Php27,112,500.00 for 2007; Php62,550,000.00 for 2008;
Php23,750,000.00 for 2009; and Php30,000,000.00 for 2010. The “payoffs” usually took place at
the JLN office in Ortigas. In fact, Luy, Sula and Suñas often heard Napoles refer to Senator
Enrile by his code name “Tanda” and saw Napoles hand over the money meant for the Senator to
Tuason at the premises of JLN. The cash would come either from Luy’s vault or from Napoles
herself.

On the other hand, Napoles’ share of the money from Senator Enrile’s PDAF was by the claim of
witnesses Luy, Sula, Suñas, delivered in cash by them, along with respondents Encarnacion and
De Asis, either at the JLN office or at Napoles’ residence at 18B, 18th Floor, North Wing Pacific
Plaza Tower Condominium, Taguig City. In the event of space constraints at her residence,
Napoles would deposit some of the cash to the bank accounts of the following companies which
she owned:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Registered Owner of the Account Bank Account Number
JO-CHRIS Trading Metrobank 7255-50955-8
007-026-51152-2
JO-CHRIS Trading Metrobank
(Checking Account)
JO-CHRIS Trading Metrobank 3600024885
JLN Corporation Metrobank 073-3-07352390-8
007-073-50928-5
JLN Corporation Metrobank
(Checking Account)
JCLN Global Properties Development
Metrobank 007-035-52543-9
Corporation
II. THE CHARGES

The NBI thus charges Senator Enrile with PLUNDER for acquiring/receiving on various
occasions, in conspiracy with his co-respondents, commissions, kickbacks, or rebates, in the total
amount of at least Php172,834,500.00 from the “projects” financed by his PDAF from 2004 to
2010.

The FIO, on the other hand, charges Senator Enrile and the rest of respondents with
violating SECTION 3(E) of RA 3019 as amended, for giving unwarranted benefits to private
respondent Napoles and SDFFI, APMFI, CARED, MAMFI, POPFDI and APMFI in the
implementation of his PDAF-funded “projects,” thus, causing undue injury to the government in
the amount of Php345,000,000.00.

By Orders dated 19 and 29 November 2013, this Office directed respondents to file their
respective counter-affidavits in these cases. Despite receipt of said Orders, respondents Ortiz,
Jalandoni, De Leon, Piorato, Ornopia, Lim, Ramirez, Rodriguez, Napoles, Lawas-Yutok,
Guadinez, and Cabilao failed to file any counter-affidavits, prompting this Office to consider
them having waived their right to file the same.

Despite earnest efforts, copies of the same Orders could not be served on respondents Lacsamana
and Santos, Proprietors of Nutrigrowth Philippines and MMRC Trading, respectively, Hernani
Ditchon, Uy, Galay, Macha, Talaboc, Castillo, Balanoba, Oliveros, Ogerio, Fabian, and
Fernando, they being said to be unknown at their last or given addresses, or had moved out and
left no forwarding address, or were non- existent.

II. RESPONDENTS’ COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS

In his Counter-Affidavit dated 20 December 2013,102SENATOR ENRILE decries the

accusations against him, alleging that it was unfortunate that, “in the twilight years of (his)
government service, … (he) stand(s) accused of trumped up charges of corruption” as he has
never been charged with any administrative or criminal offense in his more than 40 years in the
civil service; at the time material to the charges, the PDAF was a legitimate source of funds for
projects sponsored by legislators; the implementation of PDAF-related projects “is the exclusive
function and responsibility of the executive department” such that the IAs and the DBM should
have strictly complied with laws and rules on government expenditures to prevent possible
misuse or irregularities; IAs were responsible for ensuring that the NGOs tasked to implement
the projects were legitimate; and his only involvement in the utilization of the PDAF was to
endorse specific projects for local government units.

He maintains that he did not persuade, influence or induce any official or employee of the IAs
concerned to violate existing procurement or audit laws and rules; as a member of the legislative
branch, he has no power of control or supervision over IAs, which are part of the executive
branch; he did not endorse any NGO as conduit for the implementation of the PDAF projects; it
was Napoles and her cohorts “who persuaded and influenced the implementing agencies to
violate their duties and functions;” complainants’ witnesses never

categorically identified him as one of those who received kickbacks arising from PDAF
transactions and neither was he mentioned as among those public officers who visited Napoles’
offices; he never authorized anyone to transact with, much less receive commissions, kickbacks
or rebates “from the Napoles group;” he never had personal dealings related to the PDAF with
Tuason; all authorizations he issued to Reyes and Evangelista were limited to lawful acts; and
evidence allegedly showing that he personally benefitted from the PDAF anomaly is hearsay.

For her part, REYES alleges in her Consolidated Counter-Affidavit dated 26 December
2013,103 that the averments in the complaints are hearsay as they are not based on personal
knowledge of complainants’ agents or their witnesses; their statements are inadmissible based on
the res inter alios acta rule; she did not commit any illegal or prohibited act in relation to the
PDAF projects; and her signatures in eight letters and two liquidation reports pertaining to the
PDAF transactions, and which contain the names of the IAs and NGOs allegedly tasked to
implement the projects, were forgeries; she did not receive any amount from the PDAF nor
connive with any of her co-respondents to acquire, amass or accumulate ill-gotten wealth; and
none of the “overt or criminal acts” constitutive of Plunder has been shown to be present.

EVANGELISTA, in his Joint Counter-Affidavit dated 20 December 2013, asserts that the
complaints failed to specify the acts or omissions committed by him which constitute the
offense/s charged and that most, if not all, statements of complainants’ witnesses are hearsay; he
was impleaded because of his association with Senator Enrile, his former superior; during his
tenure of office, “all that the office of Senator Enrile has done, or may do, was to identify,
endorse or recommend particular projects;” it was the DBM and the IAs which handled the
actual release of the PDAF; and Senator Enrile’s office “did not have any say in the actual
implementation of any project.” He insists that his signatures in letters addressed to the IAs as
well as in MOAs pertaining to PDAF projects were “immaterial – funds would still have been
released, the projects implemented, and the PDAF diverted, whether or not (he) signed those
documents;” some of the signatures appearing in the PDAF documents are forgeries; he was not
among those identified by witnesses Luy and Suñas as a recipient of PDAF-related kickbacks;
and he did not personally know Tuason or Napoles and neither has he met with them.
In her Counter-Affidavit dated 21 February 2014,104TUASON admits personally knowing
Napoles, having met her in 2004. She claims that because of her (Tuason) association with
former President Joseph E. Estrada, she was requested by Napoles to refer her (Napoles) to
politicians; and to accommodate Napoles, she (Tuason) approached and informed Reyes that
Napoles wished to transact with Senator Enrile in relation to the latter’s PDAF, to which request
Reyes agreed.

She “believed that Atty. Gigi Reyes had the full authority to act for and on behalf of Senator
Enrile with respect to his PDAF allocations;” she (Tuason) acted as the “go-between” of
Napoles and Senator Enrile’s PDAF-related arrangements; after Reyes or Evangelista informed
her (Tuason) that a budget from the PDAF was available, she would relay the information to
Napoles or Luy who would then prepare a listing of projects available, indicating the IAs, which
would be sent to Reyes; Reyes would, thereafter, endorse said list to the DBM, and after the
listing was released by Senator Enrile’s office to the DBM, Napoles would give her (Tuason) a
partial payment of the commission due her, which was usually delivered by Luy or other Napoles
employees; and she relied on records kept by Luy on the amounts received because she did not
keep her own records.

She admits having received amounts corresponding to Senator Enrile’s kickbacks from the
PDAF projects which she personally delivered to Reyes. To her knowledge, her commissions
represented 5% of the transaction/project amount involved, while Senator Enrile’s share was
40%. She adds that there were times when Napoles would withhold the release of her (Tuason)
commissions, without clear justification.

NATIONAL LIVELIHOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (NLDC)

RESPONDENTS

Denying any involvement in the misuse of the PDAF or of having profited from it, AMATA,
NLDC’s President, avers in her 20 January 2014 Counter-Affidavit105 that, cognizant of the
possibility of political pressure, she had at the outset “manifested…her discomfort from (sic) the
designation of NLDC as one of the Implementing Agencies for PDAF” and “did not want to be
involved in the distribution of PDAF,” “kept a distance from the solons and the NGOs” involved
in PDAF- related transactions, and had repeatedly requested in writing the DBM to exclude her
agency from those authorized to implement PDAF-related projects; save for these instant
complaints, she has not been formally charged with any administrative or criminal case in her
more than 25 years in the civil service; and to ensure transparency, she “caused the preparation
of standard Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for PDAF transactions providing the safety nets
for NLDC, as well as a Process Flow Chart to clearly identify the responsibilities and
accountabilities of the [s]olons, the NGOs and the NLDC PDAF internal processors for easy
tracking of liabilities and irregularities that may be committed.”

BUENAVENTURA, then a regular employee of the NLDC, avers in her Counter-Affidavit

dated 20 January 2014106 that in her processing of documents relating to PDAF projects, she “did
not do anything illegal or violate the instructions of (her) immediate superior”; in accordance
with her functions, she “checked and verified the endorsement letters of Senator Enrile, which
designated the NGOs that would implement his PDAF projects and found them to be valid and
authentic”; and she also confirmed the authenticity of the authorization given by Senator Enrile
to his subordinates regarding the monitoring, supervision and implementation of PDAF projects.

Denying any participation in the implementation of PDAF projects or having received any
personal benefit in relation to PDAF projects, she maintains that her evaluation and verification
reports were accurate, and she was never a party to the purported anomalies arising from PDAF-
related transactions.

In her Counter-Affidavit dated 27 January 2014,107ORDOÑEZ, NLDC Cashier IV, argues that
her participation in the PDAF projects implemented by her office was limited to having certified
that “budgets and funds were available” in the corresponding Disbursement Vouchers; the filing
of the complaints “may be premature because of failure to observe provisions of the 2009 COA
Rules of Procedure,” considering that the COA has not yet disallowed the PDAF-related
expenditures; and she never misappropriated, converted, misused, or malversed public funds
drawn from the PDAF nor did she take advantage of her position to process the release of PDAF
sums, let alone personally benefit from these releases.

Claiming to have never met respondents Napoles or Enrile let alone conspire with them, Ordoñez
claims that as far as she is concerned, “the PDAF transaction was known to the NLDC Board of
Trustees and top management;” she and her co-respondents, “lowly Government employees who
were dictated upon,” were mere victims “bullied into submission by the lawmakers;” despite
their pleas, the DBM refused to help in getting the NLDC removed from the list of agencies
authorized to implement PDAF projects; and she performed her duties in good faith and was “not
in a position to negate or defy these actions of the Lawmakers, DBM and the NLDC Board of
Trustees.”

In his Counter-Affidavits dated 15 and 24108 February 2014, SEVIDAL, NLDC Director IV,
denies having committed the offenses charged. He alleges that complainant FIO submitted a
false certificate of non-forum shopping, the NBI having already filed an earlier criminal
complaint against him arising from the same set of facts averred in the FIO’s criminal complaint;
the filing of the criminal charges was premature because the disallowances issued by the COA
are not yet final and executory; he was not among those NLDC employees identified by
complainants’ witnesses who supposedly planned and implemented PDAF-funded projects
and points to Senator Enrile and Napoles, not NLDC employees, as the parties responsible for
the misuse of the PDAF. He insists that Senator Enrile, through Reyes and Evangelista, were
responsible for "identifying the projects, determining the project costs and choosing the NGOs”
which was “ manifested in the letters of Senator ENRILE”; he and other NLDC employees were
merely victims of the “political climate” and “bullied into submission by the lawmakers; and he
never derived any personal benefit from the purported misuse of the PDAF.

NATIONAL AGRIBUSINESS CORPORATION (NABCOR) RESPONDENTS

Denying the charges against him in his Counter-Affidavit dated 6 February

2014,109JAVELLANA, NABCOR President, states in essence that he did not personally prepare
the checks, vouchers, memoranda of agreement and other similar documents pertaining to
NABCOR-implemented projects funded by PDAF as he merely signed and approved the PDAF
documents in good faith, after his subordinates had signed the same and recommended their
approval to him; and he did not conspire with anyone to defraud the government.

MENDOZA, in her Counter-Affidavit dated 6 March 2014, alleges that being a mere employee
of NABCOR, she “acted only upon stern instructions and undue pressure exerted upon us by our
agency heads;” she signed checks relating to PDAF disbursements, specifically those covered by
SARO Nos. ROCS 08-01347, 08-05216, 08-07211, 09-00804, because she was “designated and
authorized to sign” by respondent Javellana, and these checks “were already signed by NABCOR
President…JAVELLANA prior to the signing of the herein Respondent …. and checks were
released upon the instruction of…JAVELLANA;” she “was given instruction to process payments
to suppliers and NGOs, without proper bidding and without complete documentary
requirements;” sometime in 2011, Javellana terminated her services from NABCOR “due to her
knowledge of irregularities in NABCOR;” and she denies having obtained any personal benefit
from the alleged misuse of the PDAF.

In his Counter-Affidavit110and Supplemental Counter-Affidavit dated 11 December 2013 and 22

January 2014, respectively, CACAL, NABCOR Paralegal, refutes the charges against him,
which to him are unsupported by the evidence. He claims that he signed Box “A” of the DVs
relating to SARO Nos. ROCS-08-01347, ROCS-08-05216, ROCS-08-07211 and ROCS-09-
00804 in compliance with his official functions and pursuant to the stern directives of his
superiors, namely, Javellana and Mendoza; by the time the vouchers are presented to him for
signature, Javellana and Mendoza have already signed Boxes "B" and "C" therein and they have
"already prepared and signed" the corresponding checks drawn from PDAF funds, which is
”indicative of their interest to fast track the transaction;” he never met with either the legislators
or Napoles, his interaction in relation to PDAF- related projects having been limited to Luy; he
always examined the voucher’s supporting documents before issuing the aforementioned
certification; he previously recommended to his superiors that the agency observe COA
Memorandum Circular No. 2007-001 and revise the draft MOA used in PDAF-related
transactions but was yelled at and berated by Javellana whenever he would question some of the
apparent irregularities in the PDAF documents. He maintains that he did not personally benefit
from the implementation of PDAF projects.

In her 02 January 2014 Counter-Affidavit,111CRUZ, NLDC Chief Financial Specialist/Project

Management Assistant IV, denies the charges, claiming that she only certified the existence, not
the authenticity of PDAF documents in the exercise of her duties; she did not conspire with
anyone to commit the offenses charged nor did she receive anything in relation to the PDAF
projects implemented by her office; and she is unaware whether the PDAF was abused by any or
all of her co-respondents.

In her March 14, 2014 Counter-Affidavit,112JOHNSON, NABCOR former Chief Accountant,

points out that there is nothing in the complaint “that would show, or even minutely imply that
(she) was part of an express conspiracy” to commit the offenses charged; the complaints do not
specifically allege the wrongful acts or omissions she committed as her participation in the
PDAF transactions was merely ministerial in nature, limited to a verification of “whether or not
the documents enumerated on the face of the disbursement voucher were attached to that
disbursement voucher;” and that her job did not include examining the authenticity of the
vouchers or the signatures thereon.

MUNSOD, former Human Resources Supervisor/Manager, in her Counter-Affidavit dated 27

December 2013,113 contends that she was impleaded for having signed DV No. 08-04-0129 in
2008 pertaining to a PDAF-related project implemented by POPDFI; her certification therein that
the expense was necessary and lawful was a purely ministerial function, and was issued only
after examining the voucher and the supporting documents because she “did NOT find any
irregularity on the face thereof that would create in my mind any doubt as to the legality and
integrity of the said Voucher;” and she had no knowledge of “any agreement or arrangement on
the disbursement of the funds mentioned in the Voucher.”

Claiming to have been unfairly used or exploited by those involved in the misuse of the
PDAF, MONTUYA, NABCOR Accounting Staff Assistant, avers in her Counter-Affidavit
dated 18 February 2014,114 that she was impleaded in relation to the inspection reports she signed
in relation to the project covered by SARO No. ROCS-08-07211 and 09-08804; she was under
the direct supervision of respondent Mendoza and part of her duties was to comply with
directives issued by Mendoza, including the processing of the release of sums drawn from
Enrile’s PDAF; and the inspection reports relating to PDAF-related projects were merely pro-
forma and stored in NABCOR computers. Montuya relates that she once accompanied Mendoza
in inspecting fertilizers stored in a warehouse in Pandi, Bulacan and even took pictures of these
kits; only after the criminal complaints were filed did she find out from witness Sula that these
fertilizers were owned by Napoles; she could have inspected other items for distribution in the
PDAF- related projects but Mendoza refused to authorize her and NABCOR did not offer to
defray the expenses for such inspections; she has never met Enrile or Napoles, let alone conspire
with them to defraud the government; and did not benefit from any of these projects.

Refuting the charges against her in her Counter-Affidavit filed on 28 January 2014, GUAÑIZO,
NABCOR Bookkeeper/OIC Accounting Division, claims that the complaints did not specify the
extent of her participation in the assailed scheme; no substantial evidence exists to support the
charges, hence, the lack of probable cause; and she still has remedies within the COA Rules to
question the COA report.

TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE CENTER (TRC) RESPONDENTS

In his Counter-Affidavits dated 20 and 24 February 2014,115CUNANAN, Deputy Director

General of the TRC at the time material to the complaints, refutes the accusations against him,
stating that to his recollection, TRC began receiving PDAF-related disbursements sometime in
2005; it was his previous superior, then TRC Director General Ortiz, “who directly dealt with
and supervised the processing of all PDAF[-]related projects of the TRC;” Lacsamana, then
TRC Group Manager, assisted Ortiz in the implementation of PDAF projects and “reported
directly to Director General Ortiz’s Office in this regard;” he and other colleagues from TRC
“assumed PDAF[-]funded projects to be regular and legitimate projects;” because of measures
instituted by Ortiz, he (Cunanan), then Deputy Director General, “did not participate in the
processing of said projects except in the performance of (his) ministerial duty as a co-
signatory of vouchers, checks and other financial documents of TRC;” and Ortiz, Lacsamana and
Figura, TRC Department Manager III, were “the ones who actually dealt with the Offices of the
Legislators concerned as well as the NGOs, which supposedly implemented the projects;”

Cunanan further relates that sometime in 2006 or 2007, he met Napoles who “introduced herself
as the representative of certain legislators who supposedly picked TRC as a conduit for PDAF-
funded projects;” at the same occasion, Napoles told him that “her principals were then Senate
President Juan Ponce Enrile, Senators Ramon “Bong” Revilla, Jr., Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito
Estrada;” in the course of his duties, he “often ended up taking and/or making telephone
verifications and follow-ups and receiving legislators or their staff members;” during
his telephone verifications, he was able to speak with Reyes, who was acting in behalf of her
superior, Senator Enrile; Reyes confirmed to him that she and Evangelista “were duly authorized
by respondent Enrile” to facilitate his PDAF projects and she also affirmed to him that the
signatures appearing in communications sent to TRC were, indeed, hers and Evangelista’s; he
occasionally met with Luy, who pressured him to expedite the release of the funds by calling the
offices of the legislators; and that after he was appointed as TRC’s Director General in 2010, he
exerted all efforts to have his agency removed from the list of agencies authorized to implement
PDAF projects. He maintains he did not benefit from the alleged misuse of the PDAF.

In his Counter-Affidavit dated 8 January 2014,116FIGURA, TRC Department Manager III,

denies the charges against him, stating that he does not personally know Napoles or the
legislators “who had their PDAF’s (sic) coursed through TRC as implementing agency;” he
“talked to him (witness Luy) once over the telephone .. and vividly remember [being berated by]
him as he was name-dropping people from DBM and Malacañang just to compel me to release
from the Legal Department the MOA of his foundation which was being reviewed by my office;”
when TRC began implementing PDAF projects in 2007, he and other TRC colleagues welcomed
this development because “it would potentially generate income for TRC which does not receive
any subsidy from the National Government” but the service fee of 1% earned by TRC from
implementing PDAF projects “was too negligible;” he was told by TRC’s management that
“legislators highly recommended certain NGO’s(sic)/Foundations as conduit implementors and
since PDAF’s (sic) are their discretionary funds, they have the prerogative to choose their
NGO’s (sic);” TRC’s management also warned him that “if TRC would disregard it (choice of
NGO), they (legislators) would feel insulted and would simply take away their PDAF from TRC,
and TRC losses (sic) the chance to earn service fees;” and Cunanan was among those who
objected to his (Figura) proposal that TRC increase its service fee from 1% to 10%, claiming that
“if we imposed a 10% service fee, we would totally drive away the legislators and their PDAF’s
(sic).”

Figura adds that Ortiz issued Office Circular 000P0099, directing him (Figura) to sign checks
representing PDAF releases sometime in 2007; Ortiz, however, subsequently issued Office
Circular 000P0100, which increased TRC’s service fee to 5% but limited his (Figura) office’s
participation in PDAF projects to reviewing MOA; his having signed checks and other PDAF
documents were in good faith and in compliance with his designated tasks; he did not personally
benefit from the TRC’s implementation of PDAF projects; he is uncertain if Cunanan or Ortiz
benefitted from the projects but to his recollection, they repeatedly expressed undue interest in
the transactions; Cu nanan “would frequently personally follow up in my office the review of the
MOA or my signature on the checks,” even name-dropping then First Gentleman Jose Miguel
Arroyo whenever “he requested me to fast track processing of the PDAF documents;” as regards
Ortiz, “his office would sometimes inquire on the status of a particular PDAF;” he tried his best
to resist the pressure exerted on him and did his best to perform his duties faithfully; and he and
other low- ranking TRC officials had no power to “simply disregard the wishes of Senator
Enrile,” especially on the matter of public bidding for the PDAF projects.

JOVER, TRC Chief Accountant, alleges in her Counter-Affidavit dated 12 December

2013,117 that she was implicated in the instant complaints for “having certified in the
Disbursement Vouchers for the aforestated project x x x that adequate funds/budgetary allotment
of the amount is properly certified, supported by documents;” her issuance of such certification
was ministerial in nature, considering other TRC officials already certified, in the same vouchers,
that “expenses/cash advance is necessary, lawful and incurred under direct supervision” and
“expenses/cash advance is within budget” when these documents were referred to her; her duty
was limited to verifying if the voucher was supported by the requisite documents; it was “beyond
(her) duty to personally have an actual field validation and confirmed (sic) deliveries to
beneficiaries or to go on the details of the delivered items or make a rigid inspection of the
PDAF project;” she signed the vouchers “for no dishonest purpose, nor being bias and no intent
on any negligence;” and she had nothing to do with “non-delivery or under delivery of PDAF
project.”

ESPIRITU, TRC Budget Officer IV, in her Counter-Affidavit dated 10 January 2014,118 denies
the charges against her and asserts that her participation in the PDAF-related transactions
covered by SARO No. ROCS-07-07221, ROCS-08-03024 and D-0900847 was limited to having
certified in the corresponding DVs that “the amount is certified within budget, supported by
documents;” she issued the certifications in accordance with her ministerial functions as a budget
officer and because the vouchers were, indeed, within the budget provided to her agency and
supported by documentation; and the certification was issued only after her superiors, TRC’s
Director General and Deputy Director General, certified in the same vouchers that the expenses
were lawful, necessary and incurred under their direct supervision.

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM) RESPONDENTS

In their Joint Counter-Affidavit dated 2 December 2013, Rosario NUÑEZ, Lalaine PAULE, and
Marilou BARE,119 admitting that they are the DBM personnel being alluded to as Leah, Lalaine
and Malou, respectively, and named as such in the caption of the NBI and Baligod Complaint,
state that their names are not specifically mentioned in the NBI’s complaint as among those who
allegedly participated in or abated the misuse of the PDAF; and that no probable cause exists to
indict them for the offenses charged.

RELAMPAGOS, DBM Undersecretary for Operations, in his Counter-Affidavit dated 13

December 2013, contends that the complaint “is insufficient in form and substance;” there is
neither factual nor legal basis to indict him for Plunder as the complaint and sworn statements of
witnesses do not mention his name as among those who supposedly misused the PDAF; and he
performed his duties in good faith.

OTHER RESPONDENTS
In his 15 January 2014 Counter-Affidavit,120 DE ASIS admits having been an employee of the
JLN Group of Companies from 2006-2010 in various capacities as either driver, bodyguard or
messenger, and that he received a salary of P10,000/month for serving as the driver and “errand
boy” of Napoles. He alleges that he picked up checks for Napoles- affiliated NGOs but only
because he was instructed to do so; he has no knowledge in setting up or managing corporations
such as CARED, which he allegedly helped incorporate; and he did not personally benefit from
the alleged misuse of the PDAF.

In her 16 January 2014 Counter-Affidavit,121ENCARNACION denies the charges imputed

against her, insisting that she was an employee (personal assistant) of JLN Group of Companies
from 2004-2008 where she received a salary of P12,000/month for overseeing the schedule and
serving as “errand girl” of Napoles; she has no knowledge in setting up or managing
corporations; she signed the corporate papers of Napoles-affiliated NGOs because her superiors
instructed her to do so; and she derived no personal benefit from the scheme.

Denying any involvement in the irregularities arising from PDAF-related

transactions, SOLOMON asserts in her 27 January 2014 Counter-Affidavit122 that she has never
met any of her co-respondents; in 2006, she performed auditing work for a number of clients, she
being a certified public accountant; POPDFI, one of the NGOs allegedly affiliated with Napoles’
group, was not among her clients; the signatures allegedly belonging to her and appearing in the
PDAF documents are markedly different from her actual signature; and to clear her name, she is
prepared to “submit (herself) willingful[ly] to a forensic examination of (her) signature with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).”

Denying any involvement in the alleged misuse of the PDAF, AGCAOILI, a Notary Public,
alleges in his 10 December 2013 Counter-Affidavit,123 that he never met the signatories to the
MOA, reports of disbursement, board resolutions and other PDAF documents that he allegedly
notarized; these PDAF documents were not reflected in the notarial reports he submitted to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; he cannot attest to the genuineness of these records
because “he has not seen them before, nor had prior knowledge about them;” and there are
discrepancies between his actual signature and the signature appearing in the PDAF documents
that allegedly belong to him.

In their Joint Counter-Affidavit124dated 21 February 2014, Jo Christine and James Christopher

Napoles, children of Janet Napoles, cite the FIO complaint‘s insufficiency in form and substance
for failing to specify the acts or omissions committed by them which constitute the offenses
charged, thereby failing to allege and substantiate the elements of Plunder and violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019; and the affidavits of complainant’s witnesses contain nothing more
than hearsay, self-serving statements which are “not worthy of credence.”

IV. DISCUSSION

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Respondents Relampagos, Bare, Nuñez and Paule were properly impleaded

Relampagos, Bare, Nuñez and Paule all insist that they should be dropped from these
proceedings because they were never specifically named as respondents in the criminal
complaints filed by the NBI and the FIO.

This Office disagrees.

Among the documents attached to and made an integral part of the NBI’s complaint is witness
Luy’s Affidavit dated 12

September 2013,125 in which he identified Relampagos, Bare, Nuñez and Paule as Janet Napoles’
“contacts” within the DBM who helped expedite the release of SAROs and NCAs relating to the
PDAF:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
82: T: Mapunta naman tayo sa pagproseso ng transaction ni JANET LIM NAPOLES sa mga
government projects, gaano naman katagal magpropeso ng mga ito?
S: Mabilis lang po kung ikukumpara natin sa normal na transaction sa mga government
agencies.
83. T: Alam mo ba kung paano naman ito nagagawang mapabilis ni JANET LIM
NAPOLES?
S: Opo, may mga contact persons na siya kasi sa DBM. Inuutusan po kami ni Madame
JANET LIM NAPOLES na i- follow up sa kanila iyong mga dokumento para mapabilis ang
pagpoproseso nito.
84. T: Kilala mo ba kung sinu-sino naman itong mga contact persons ni JANET LIM
NAPOLES sa DBM?
S: Sa DBM po ay sa opisina ni Usec MARIO RELAMPAGOS kami pinagpa-follow up ni
Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES. Ang mga tinatawagan po namin ay sina LEA, MALOU
at LALAINE na naka-assign sa office ni USEC RELAMPAGOS.
85. T: Bakit doon kayo nagfo-follow up sa office ni USEC RELAMPAGOS?
S: Sa pagkaka-alam ko po, doon ginagawa ang SARO. (emphasis, italics and
understanding supplied)
In other words, complainants’ witness Luy underscores that Relampagos, Bare, Nuñez and
Paule’s participation in the misuse or diversion of the PDAF pertains to their expedited
preparation and release of the SAROs covering PDAF projects, albeit due to ministrations of
Napoles and her staff. It was for this reason that this Office ordered said public respondents to
submit their counter-affidavits so that they may shed light on their supposed involvement in the
so-called PDAF scam. After all, preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often
the only means of discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a crime, and to
enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information.126redarclaw

Notably, respondents Relampagos, Bare, Nuñez and Paule did not categorically deny witness
Luy’s claims of follow-ups made with the DBM. Instead, they simply deny, in general terms,
having committed the offenses charged.

The FIO did not submit a false certificate of non-forum shopping

Sevidal claims that the FIO submitted a false certificate of non-forum shopping in OMB-C-C-13-
0396. According to him, the FIO failed to disclose, in said certificate, that the NBI earlier filed a
criminal complaint for Plunder against him and his co-respondents, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-
0318, and the charges alleged therein arose from the same set of facts set forth in the FIO’s
complaint.

His contention fails to persuade.

Rule 7, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, which suppletorily applies to these

proceedings,127 requires the complainant’s submission of a valid, duly-accomplished certificate
of non-forum shopping:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
Based on the above provision, the complainant or initiating party is duty-bound only to disclose
the existence of an earlier action or claim filed by him or her, and which involves the same
issues. He or she is not required to disclose the existence of pending suits or complaints
previously filed by another party.

In this case, the FIO had no obligation to disclose the existence of OMB-C-C-13-0318 for the
simple reason that it was not the initiating party of this complaint. Rather, as Sevidal himself
admits, the NBI, and not the FIO, is the complainant in OMB-C-C-13-0318. The FIO is not even
a party to OMB-C-C-13-0318. Thus, this Office fails to see why the FIO should be faulted for
not mentioning the existence of this particular complaint.

The filing of the complaints was not premature

Sevidal and Ordoñez proceed to argue that the filing of the criminal charges against them and
their co-respondents is premature because the COA had yet to issue notices of disallowances
(NDs) on disbursements drawn from the PDAF.

The above contention, however, has been rendered moot by the well-publicized fact that the
COA had already issued several NDs covering disbursements relating to PDAF-funded projects
of respondent Enrile, among other persons, from the period 2007 to 2009.128redarclaw

They, however, insist that the filing of the complaint remains premature even if the COA did
issue NDs. According to them, the NDs are still appealable under the 2009 Revised Rules of
Procedure (the 2009 COA Rules) and no administrative or criminal complaint arising from the
NDs may be instituted until and unless the issuances have become final and executory. In other
words, Sevidal and Ordoñez assume that the NDs, at the very least, give rise to a prejudicial
question warranting the suspension of the instant preliminary investigation.
This argument cannot be sustained.

Under Rule 111, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question exists when the following
elements are present:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil actioninvolves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
(underscoring supplied)
As reflected in the above elements, the concept of a prejudicial question involves both a civil and
a criminal case. There can be no prejudicial question to speak of if, technically, no civil case is
pending.129redarclaw

Proceedings under the 2009 COA Rules, including those pertaining to the NDs,
are administrative in nature. Consequently, any appeal or review sought by any of herein
respondents with the COA in relation to the NDs will not give rise to a prejudicial question.

Significantly, Reyna and Soria v. Commission on Audit130 teaches that an administrative

proceeding pertaining to a COA disallowance is distinct and separate from a preliminary
investigation in a criminal case which may have arisen from the same set of facts. Both
proceedings may proceed independently of each another. Thus, Reyna and
Soria declares:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
On a final note, it bears to point out that a cursory reading of the Ombudsman's resolution will
show that the complaint against petitioners was dismissed not because of a finding of good faith
but because of a finding of lack of sufficient evidence. While the evidence presented before the
Ombudsman may not have been sufficient to overcome the burden in criminal cases of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, it does not, however, necessarily follow, that the administrative
proceedings will suffer the same fate as only substantial evidence is required, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

An absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice

versa. The criminal case filed before the Office of the Ombudsman is distinct and separate
from the proceedings on the disallowance before the COA. So also, the dismissal by Margarito
P. Gervacio, Jr., Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, of the criminal charges against petitioners
does not necessarily foreclose the matter of their possible liability as warranted by the findings of
the COA. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, nothing in existing laws or rules expressly state that a disallowance by the COA is a
pre-requisite for the filing of a criminal complaint for Plunder,131 Malversation132 or violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. In fact, an audit disallowance is not even an element of any of these
offenses.

Sevidal and Ordoñez’s reference to Rule XIII, Section 6 of the 2009 COA Rules also fails to
impress. This provision reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Referral to the Ombudsman. - The Auditor shall report to his Director all instances of failure or
refusal to comply with the decisions or orders of the Commission contemplated in the preceding
sections. The COA Director shall see to it that the report is supported by the sworn statement of
the Auditor concerned, identifying among others, the persons liable and describing the
participation of each. He shall then refer the matter to the Legal Service Sector who shall refer
the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman or other appropriate office for the possible filing of
appropriate administrative or criminal action. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Evidently, this immediately-quoted COA Rule pertains to the possible filing of administrative or
criminal action in relation to audit disallowance. Note that the tenor of the provision is
permissive, not mandatory. As such, an audit disallowance may not necessarily result in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions or criminal prosecution of the responsible persons.
Conversely, therefore, an administrative or criminal case may prosper even without an audit
disallowance. Verily, Rule XIII, Section 6 is consistent with the ruling in Reyna and Soria that a
proceeding involving an audit disallowance is distinct and separate from a preliminary
investigation or a disciplinary complaint.

AT ALL EVENTS, Rule XIII, Section 6 pertains to the COA’s filing of administrative and/or
criminal cases against the concerned parties. It has no bearing on any legal action taken by other
agencies not subject of the 2009 COA Rules, such as the NBI or the FIO.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

The diversion or misuse of the PDAF was coursed through a complex scheme involving
participants from the legislator’s office, the DBM, IAs and NGOs controlled by respondent
Janet Napoles.

Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, the widespread misuse of the
subject PDAF allotted to a legislator was coursed through a complex scheme basically involving
projects supposed to have been funded by said PDAF which turned out to be inexistent or
“ghost” projects. The funds intended for the implementation of the PDAF-funded project are,
with the imprimatur of the legislator, the IAs and NGOs, diverted to the possession and control
of Napoles and her cohorts.

The Modus Operandi

Basically, the scheme commences when Napoles first meets with a legislator and offers to
“acquire” his or her PDAF allocation in exchange for a “commission” or kickback amounting to
a certain percentage of the PDAF.

Once an agreement is reached, Napoles would then advance to the legislator a down payment
representing a portion of his or her kickback. The legislator would then request the Senate
President or the House Speaker as the case may be for the immediate release of his or her PDAF.
The Senate President or Speaker would then indorse the request to the DBM.133 This initial
letter-request to the DBM contains a program or list of IAs and the amount of PDAF to be
released in order to guide the DBM in its preparation and release of the corresponding SARO.

The kickbacks, around 50% of the PDAF amount involved, are received by legislators personally
or through their representatives, in the form of cash, fund transfer, manager’s check or personal
check issued by Napoles.134redarclaw
After the DBM issues the SARO representing the legislator’s PDAF allocation, the legislator
would forward a copy of said issuance to Napoles. She, in turn, would remit the remaining
portion of the kickback due the legislator.135redarclaw

The legislator would then write another letter addressed to the IAs which would identify his or
her preferred NGO to undertake the PDAF-funded project. However, the NGO chosen by the
legislator would be one of those organized and controlled by Napoles. These NGOs were, in fact,
specifically set up by Napoles for the purpose.136redarclaw

Upon receipt of the SARO, Napoles would direct her staff, at the time material to the cases,
including witnesses Luy, Sula and Suñas, to prepare the PDAF documents for the approval of the
legislator. These documents reflect, among other things, the preferred NGO to implement the
undertaking, the project proposals by the identified NGO/s, and indorsement letters to be signed
by the legislator and/or his staff. Once signed by the legislator or his/her authorized staff, the
PDAF documents are transmitted to the IA, which, in turn, handles the preparation of the MOA
relating to the project to be executed by the legislator’s office, the IA and the chosen NGO.

The projects are authorized as eligible under the DBM's menu for pork barrel allocations. Note
that the NGO is directly selected by the legislator. No public bidding or negotiated procurement
takes place, in violation of RA 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act.

Napoles, through her employees, would then follow up the release of the NCA with the
DBM.137redarclaw

After the DBM releases the NCA to the IA concerned, the IA would expedite the processing of
the transaction and the release of the corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement.
Among those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit them to bank accounts in the
name of the NGO concerned were witnesses Luy and Suñas as well as respondents De Leon and
De Asis.138redarclaw

Once the funds are deposited in the NGO's account, Napoles would then call the bank to
facilitate the withdrawal thereof. Her staff would then withdraw the funds and remit the same to
her, thereby placing said amount under Napoles’ full control and possession.139redarclaw

To liquidate the disbursements, Napoles and her staff would then manufacture fictitious lists of
beneficiaries, liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity reports and similar
documents that would make it appear that the PDAF-related project was implemented.

The PDAF allocation of Senator Enrile

Based on the records, the repeated diversions of the PDAF allocated to Senator Enrile during the
period 2004 to 2010 were coursed via the above-described scheme.

In the case of Senator Enrile’s PDAF, the NGOs affiliated and/or controlled by Napoles that
undertook to implement the projects to be funded by the PDAF were MAMFI, POPDFI, PSDFI,
AMFI, CARED, PASEDFI, SDPFFI, AEPPF and KPMFI.140 These organizations transacted
through persons known to be employees, associates or relatives of Napoles, including witnesses
Luy, Sula and Suñas, as well as respondents Jo Napoles, James Napoles, De Leon, Pioranto,
Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio, Fabian, Ditchon, Galay, Uy, Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion,
Palama, Ornopia, Castillo and Macha.

Napoles, through respondent Tuason, initially approached respondent Reyes regarding a

“business proposition” relating to Senator Enrile’s PDAF. Tuason, in her Counter-Affidavit,
declared that Reyes, who had Senator Enrile’s full trust and confidence, accepted Napoles’
proposition:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
6. Since I was close to then President Estrada, Janet Napoles wanted me to refer politicians to her
so I approached my friend Atty. Jessica “Gigi” Reyes, who was the Chief-of-Staff of Senator
Enrile.

7. When I told her about the business proposition of Janet Napoles, Atty. Gigi Reyes agreed to
transact the PDAF of Senator Enrile with Janet Napoles. I believed that Atty. Gigi Reyes had
the full authority to act for and on behalf of Senator Enrile with respect to his PDAF
allocations x x x (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Once a PDAF allocation becomes available to Senator Enrile, his staff, either Reyes or
Evangelista, would inform Tuason of this development. Tuason, in turn, would relay the
information to either Napoles or Luy.141redarclaw

Tuason, who admitted having acted as a liaison between Napoles and the office of Senator
Enrile, confirmed that the modus operandi described by witnesses Luy, Sula and Suñas, indeed,
applied to the disbursements drawn from Senator Enrile’s PDAF. Tuason’s verified statements
corroborate the modus operandi in carrying out the transactions and described by witnesses Luy,
Sula and Suñas in their respective affidavits in support of the complaints:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
11. It starts with a call or advise from Atty. Gigi Reyes or Mr. Jose Antonio Evangelista (also
from the Office of Senator Enrile) informing me that a budget from Senator Enrile’s PDAF is
available. I would then relay this information to Janet Napoles/Benhur Luy.

12. Janet Napoles/Benhur Luy would then prepare a listing of the projects available indicating
the implementing agencies. This listing would be sent to Atty. Gigi Reyes who will endorse the
same to the DBM under her authority as Chief-of- Staff of Senator Enrile.

13. After the listing is released by the Office of Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would
give me a down payment for delivery for the share of Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes.

14. After the SARO and/or NCA is released, Janet Napoles would give me the full payment for
delivery to Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes.

15. Sometimes Janet Napoles would have the money for Senator Enrile delivered to my house by
her employees. At other times, I would get it from her condominium in Pacific Plaza or from
Benhur Luy in Discovery Suites. When Benhur Luy gives me the money, he would make me
scribble on some of their vouchers of even sign under the name “Andrea Reyes,” Napoles’
codename for me. This is the money that I would deliver to Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi
Reyes.

16. I don’t count the money I receive for delivery to Senator Enrile. I just receive whatever was
given to me. The money was all wrapped and ready for delivery when I get it from Janet Napoles
or Benhur Luy. For purposes of recording the transactions, I rely on the accounting records of
Benhur Luy for the PDAF of Senator Enrile, which indicates the date, description and amount of
money I received for delivery to Senator Enrile.

xxx

18. As I have mentioned above, I personally received the share of Senator Enrile from Janet
Napoles and Benhur Luy and I personally delivered it to Senator Enrile’s Chief-of-Staff, Atty.
Gigi Reyes…..There were occasions when Senator Enrile (sic) would join us for a cup of coffee
when he would pick her up. For me, his presence was a sign that whatever Atty. Gigi Reyes was
doing was with Senator Enrile’s blessing.
Aside from Tuason’s statement, the following set of documentary evidence supports the modus
operandidescribed by witnesses Luy, Sula and Suñas: (a) the business ledgers prepared by
witness Luy, showing the amounts received by Senator Enrile, through Tuason and Reyes, as his
“commission” from the so-called PDAF scam;142 (b) the 2007- 2009 COA Report documenting
the results of the special audit undertaken on PDAF disbursements - that there were serious
irregularities relating to the implementation of PDAF-funded projects, including those endorsed
by Senator Enrile;143 and (c) the reports on the independent field verification conducted in 2013
by the investigators of the FIO which secured sworn statements of local government officials and
purported beneficiaries of the supposed projects which turned out to be inexistent.144redarclaw

A violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 was committed.

Under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, a person becomes criminally liable if three (3) elements are
satisfied, viz.:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1. He or she must be a officer discharging administrative, judicial or

official functions;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2. He or she must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad

faith or inexcusable negligence; and

3. His or her action: (a) caused any undue injury to any party,
including the Government; or (b) gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his or her functions.145

The presence of the foregoing is evident from the records.

First, respondents Senator Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañizo,
Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover, Munsod, Relevo, Mendoza, Amata, Buenaventura, Sevidal, Jalandoni,
Guañizo, Ordoñez, Cruz, Espiritu, Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare and Lacsamana were all
public officers at the time material to the charges. Their respective roles in the processing and
release of PDAF disbursements were in the exercise of their administrative and/or official
functions.

Senator Enrile himself indorsed, in writing, the Napoles- affiliated NGO to implement projects
funded by his PDAF. His trusted authorized staff, respondents Reyes and Evangelista, then
prepared indorsement letters and other communications relating to the PDAF disbursements
addressed to the DBM and the IAs (NABCOR, TRC and NLDC). These trusted staff also
participated in the preparation and execution of MOAs with the NGOs and the IAs, inspection
and acceptance reports, disbursement reports and other PDAF documents.

The DBM, through respondents Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule and Bare, then processed with undue
haste the SAROs and NCAs pertaining to Senator Enrile’s PDAF projects.

In turn, the heads of the IAs, NABCOR, NLDC and TRC, as well as their respective staff
participated in the preparation and execution of MOAs governing the implementation of the
projects. They also facilitated, processed and approved the PDAF disbursements to the
questionable NGOs. The table below indicates the participation of the IA officials/employees-
respondents:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
NABCOR
RESPONDENT PARTICIPATION
Alan A. Javellana Signatory to MOAs with CARED, POPDFI, MAMFI and SDPFFI;
approved disbursement vouchers relating to PDAF disbursements; and
co-signed the corresponding checks issued to the NGOs.
Rhodora B. Mendoza Co-signatory to checks issued to the NGOs; and attended inspection of
livelihood kits.
Victor Roman Cacal Assisted in the preparation/review of memoranda of agreement with
NGOs; and certified in disbursement vouchers that the PDAF releases
were necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision.
Encarnita Cristina P. Certified in disbursement vouchers that the PDAF releases were
Munsod necessary, lawful and incurred under her direct supervision.
Romulo M. Relevo Certified in disbursement vouchers that the PDAF releases were
necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision.
Ma. Ninez P. Guañizo Certified in disbursement vouchers that funds were available and
supporting documents were complete and proper.
Ma. Julie V. Johnson Certified in disbursement vouchers that funds were available and
supporting documents were complete and proper.

NLDC
RESPONDENT PARTICIPATION
Gondelina G. Amata Signatory to MOAs with APMFI, CARED and MAMFI; approved
disbursement vouchers relating to PDAF disbursements; and co-signed
the corresponding checks issued to the NGOs.
Chita C. Jalandoni Co-signed the corresponding checks issued to the NGOs.
Emmanuel Alexis G. Certified in disbursement vouchers that the PDAF releases were
 Sevidal necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision.
Ofelia E. Ordoñez Certified in disbursement vouchers that funds were available.
Sofia D. Cruz Certified in disbursement vouchers that supporting documents were
complete and proper.
Gregoria Buenaventura Checked and verified the endorsement letters of respondent Enrile;
confirmed the authenticity of the authorization given by respondent
Enrile to his subordinates regarding the monitoring, supervision and
implementation of PDAF projects; and prepared evaluation and
verification reports.
Filipina T. Rodriguez Certified in disbursement vouchers that funds were available.

TRC
RESPONDENT PARTICIPATION
Antonio Y. Ortiz Signatory to MOAs with CARED and APMFI; approved disbursement
vouchers relating to PDAF disbursements; and co-signed the
corresponding checks issued to the NGOs.
Dennis L. Cunanan Certified in disbursement vouchers that the PDAF releases were
necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision.
Francisco B. Figura Assisted in the preparation/review of memoranda of agreement with
NGOs; certified in disbursement vouchers that the PDAF releases were
necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision; and co-
signed the corresponding checks issued to the NGOs.
Marivic Jover Certified in disbursement vouchers that funds were available and
supporting documents were complete and proper.
Ma. Rosalinda Oversaw the processing of PDAF releases to NGOs; and assisted in the
Lacsamana preparation/review of memoranda of agreement with NGOs.
Consuelo Lilian
Certified in disbursement vouchers that funds were available.
Espiritu
On the other hand, private respondents in these cases acted in concert with their co-respondents.

From the accounts of witnesses Luy, Sula, Suñas and respondent Tuason, Napoles made a
business proposal to Reyes regarding the Senator’s PDAF. Senator Enrile later indorsed NGOs
affiliated with/controlled by Napoles to implement his PDAF-funded projects. Respondents Jo
Napoles, James Napoles, De Leon, Piorato, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio, Fabian, Ditchon,
Galay, Uy, Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion, Palama, Ornopia, Castillo and Macha were all
working for Napoles and served as officers of her NGOs which were selected and endorsed by
Senator Enrile to implement his projects. They executed MOAs relative to these undertakings in
behalf of the organizations and acknowledged receipt of the checks issued by NLDC, NABCOR
and TRC representing the PDAF releases.

Second, Senator Enrile and respondent-public officers of the IAs were manifestly partial to
Napoles, her staff and the affiliated NGOs she controlled.

Sison v. People146 teaches that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

“Partiality” is synonymous with “bias,” which “excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are.”
To be actionable under Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, partiality must
be manifest. There must be a clear, notorious and plain inclination or predilection to favor one
side rather than the other. Simply put, the public officer or employee’s predisposition towards a
particular person should be intentional and evident.

That Napoles and the NGOs affiliated with/controlled by her were extended undue favor is
manifest.

Senator Enrile repeatedly and directly indorsed the NGOs headed or controlled by Napoles and
her cohorts to implement his projects without the benefit of a public bidding.

As correctly pointed out by the FIO, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9184 states
that an NGO may be contracted only when so authorized by an appropriation law or
ordinance:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
53.11. NGO Participation. When an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be
specifically contracted out to Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), the procuring entity
may enter into a Memorandum of Agreement in the NGO, subject to guidelines to be issued by
the GPPB.
National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 476,147 as amended by NBC No. 479, provides that PDAF
allocations should be directly released only to those government agencies identified in the
project menu of the pertinent General Appropriations Act (GAAs). The GAAs in effect at the
time material to the charges, however, did not authorize the direct release of funds to NGOs, let
alone the direct contracting of NGOs to implement government projects. This, however, did not
appear to have impeded Senator Enrile’s direct selection of the Napoles-affiliated or controlled
NGOs, and which choice was accepted in toto by the IAs.

Even assuming arguendo that the GAAs allowed the engagement of NGOs to implement PDAF-
funded projects, such engagements remain subject to public bidding requirements. Consider
GPPB Resolution No. 012-2007:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
4.1 When an appropriation law or ordinance specifically earmarks an amount for projects to be
specifically contracted out to NGOs, the procuring entity may select an NGO
through competitive bidding or negotiated procurement under Section 53.11 of the IRR.
(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The aforementioned laws and rules, however, were disregarded by public respondents, Senator
Enrile having just chosen the Napoles-founded NGOs. Such blatant disregard of public bidding
requirements is highly suspect, especially in light of the ruling in Alvarez v. People:148
The essence of competition in public bidding is that the bidders are placed on equal footing. In
the award of government contracts, the law requires a competitive public bidding. This is
reasonable because “[a] competitive public bidding aims to protect the public interest by giving
the public the best possible advantages thru open competition.” It is a mechanism that enables
the government agency to avoid or preclude anomalies in the execution of public contracts.
(underlining supplied)
Notatu dignum is the extraordinary speed attendant to the examination, processing and approval
by the concerned NABCOR, NLDC and TRC officers of the PDAF releases to the Napoles-
affiliated or controlled NGOs. In most instances, the DVs were accomplished, signed and
approved on the same day. Certainly, the required careful examination of the transactions’
supporting documents could not have taken place if the DV was processed and approved in one
day.

Javellana, Mendoza and Cunanan of the TRC were categorically identified by their subordinates
co-respondents as those who consistently pressed for the immediate processing of PDAF
releases.

Cacal pointed to Javellana and Mendoza as having pressured him to expedite the processing of
the DVs:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
15. In most instances, Boxes “B” and “C” were already signed wherein the herein Respondent
was required to sing (sic) Box “A” of the Disbursement Vouchers. Most of the times the Box
“B” and/or Box “C” of the Disbursemen t Vouchers were already signed ahead by Niñez
Guanizo and/or Rhodora B. Mendoza and ALAN A. JAVELLANArespectively.

16. In other instances, the checks for PDAF releases were already prepared and signed by
NABCOR President ALAN A. JAVELLANA and VP for Finance RHODORA B.
MENDOZA attached to the Disbursement Voucher before the herein Respond ent were made
sig ns Box “A” of the s aid Disbursement Vouchers. This is indicative of the target5 (sic)
Municipalities and immediately stern instructions of herein Respondent’s superiors to sign the
Disbursement Voucher immediately for reasons that it is being followed up by the concerned
NGO. Furthermore, the herein Respondent relied on the duly executed Memorandum of
Agreement by and between NABCOR, NGO and the Office of the Legislator. According to the
said MOA, initial release of funds will be undertaken by NABCOR upon signing thereof. Hence,
payment and/or release of fund to the NGO became a lawful obligation of NABCOR.

xxx

18. On many instances, sternly ordered [sic] the NABCOR VP for Admin. and Finance
RHODORA B. MENDOZA to herein Respondent to immediately sign Box “A” of the
Disbursement Voucher even if the NGOs have not yet complied with the other documentary
requirements to be attached to the said Disbursement Voucher on the basis on [sic] the
commitment of the NGO to submit the other required documents (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
In his Counter-Affidavit, respondent Figura claimed that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxx

b) In the course of my review of PDAF documents, DDG Dennis L. Cunanan would frequently
personally follow up in my office the review of the MOA or my signature on the checks. He
would come down to my office in the third floor and tell me that he had a dinner meeting with
the First Gentleman and some legislators so much that he requested me to fast track processing
of the PDAF papers. Though I hate name- dropping, I did not show any disrespect to him but
instead told him that if the papers are in order, I would release them before the end of working
hours of the same day. This was done by DDG many times, but I stood my ground when the
papers on PDAF he’s following up had deficiencies …. (emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
Worth noting too is the extraordinary speed Relampagos and his co-respondents from the DBM
processed the documents required for the release of the PDAF as witnesses Luy and Suñas
positively attest to, viz: the DBM’s expedited processing of the requisite SAROs and NCAs was
made possible through the assistance provided by Nuñez, Paule and Bare. Relampagos being
their immediate superior, they could not have been unaware of the follow-ups made by Napoles’
staff with regard to the SARO and NCA.

The concerned officials of NABCOR, NLDC and TRC did not even bother to conduct a due
diligence audit on the selected NGOs and the suppliers chosen by the NGO to provide the
livelihood kits, which supply thereof was, it bears reiteration, carried out without the benefit of
public bidding, in contravention of existing procurement laws and regulations.

In addition to the presence of manifest partiality on the part of respondent public officers, evident
bad faith is present.

Evident bad faith connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill
will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self- interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.149redarclaw

That several respondent public officers unduly benefited from the diversion of the PDAF is
borne by the records.

As earlier mentioned, Tuason claimed that she regularly remitted significant portions (around
50%) of the diverted sums to Reyes, which portions represented Senator Enrile’s “share” or
“commission” in the scheme, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
14. After the SARO and/or NCA is released, Janet Napoles would give me the full payment for
delivery to Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes.

xxx

16. I don’t count the money I receive for delivery to Senator Enrile. I just receive whatever was
given to me. The money was all wrapped and ready for delivery when I get it from Janet Napoles
or Benhur Luy. For purposes of recording the transactions, I rely on the accounting records of
Benhur Luy for the PDAF of Senator Enrile, which indicates the date, description and amount of
money I received for delivery to Senator Enrile. (underlining supplied)
Notably, Tuason admits having received a 5% commission for acting as liaison between Napoles
and respondents Enrile and Reyes.

Aside from Enrile and Reyes, respondents Javellana, Cunanan, Ortiz and Sevidal were identified
by witness Luy as among those who received portions of the diverted amounts:150
126. T: May nabanggit ka na may 10% na napupunta sa president o head ng agency, sino itong
tinutokoy mo?
S: Ang alam ko nakita kong tumanggap ay sila ALLAN JAVELLANA ng
NABCOR, DENNIS CUNANAN at ANTONIO Y. ORTIZ ng TRC…. Nasabi din sa akin
ni EVELYN DE LEON na may inaabot din kina GIGI BUENAVENTURA at ALEXIS
 SEVIDAL ng NLDC. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Witness Sula, in her Affidavit dated 12 September 2013,151 also identified Amata as among those
who benefited from the PDAF disbursements:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
k) Ms. GONDELINA AMATA (NLDC) – Nakilala ko siya noong may sakit ang kanyang asawa
na nagpapagamot sa NKTI Hospital. Silang mag-asawa ay nagpunta din sa office sa 2502
Discovery Center, Ortigas. Ako rin ang nagdala ng pera para sa pambayad ng gamot. May
tatlong (3) beses ko po silang dinalhan ng pera sa hospital. (underlining supplied)
Indubitably, repeatedly receiving portions of sums of money wrongfully diverted from public
coffers constitutes evident bad faith.

Third, the assailed PDAF-related transactions caused undue injury to the Government in the
amount of Php345,000,000.00.

Based on the 2007-2009 COA Report as well as the independent field verifications conducted by
the FIO, the projects supposedly funded by Senator Enrile’s PDAF were “ghost” or
inexistent. There were no livelihood kits distributed to beneficiaries. Witnesses Luy, Sula and
Suñas declared that, per directive given by Napoles, they made up lists of fictitious beneficiaries
to make it appear that the projects were implemented, albeit none took place.

Instead of using the PDAnF disbursements received by them to implement the livelihood
projects, respondents Jo Napoles, James Napoles, De Leon, Piorato, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao,
Ogerio, Fabian, Ditchon, Galay, Uy, Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion, Palama, Ornopia, Castillo
and Macha, as well as witnesses Luy, Sula and Suñas, all acting for Napoles, continuously
diverted these sums amounting to Php345,000,000.00 to Napoles’ control.

Certainly, these repeated, illegal transfers of public funds to Napoles’ control, purportedly for
projects which did not, however, exist, and just as repeated irregular disbursements thereof,
represent quantifiable, pecuniary losses to the Government constituting undue injury within the
context of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.152redarclaw

Fourth, respondents Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañizo, Ortiz,
Cunanan, Jover, Munsod, Relovo, Mendoza, Amata, Buenaventura, Sevidal, Jalandoni, Guañizo,
Ordoñez, Cruz, Espiritu, Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare and Lacsamana, granted respondents
Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles, De Leon, Piorato, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio,
Fabian, Ditchon, Galay, Uy, Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion, Palama, Ornopia, Castillo and
Macha unwarranted benefits.

Jurisprudence teaches that unwarranted benefits or privileges refer to those accommodations,

gains or perquisites that are granted to private parties without proper authorization or reasonable
justification.153redarclaw

In order to be found liable under the second mode of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019, it
suffices that the offender has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his
official, administrative or judicial functions.154 Respondents Senator Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista,
Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañizo, Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover, Munsod, Relevo, Mendoza, Amata,
Buenaventura, Sevidal, Jalandoni, Guañizo, Ordoñez, Cruz, Espiritu, Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule,
Bare and Lacsamana, did just that. That they repeatedly failed to observe the requirements of RA
9184, its implementing rules and regulations, GPPB regulations as well as national budget
circulars, shows that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given to private
respondents. The NGOs represented by them were chosen to undertake the implementation of
PDAF projects without the benefit of a fair system in determining the best possible offer for the
Government. Napoles, who controlled the NGOs personally chosen by Senator Enrile, was able
to unduly profit from the fictitious transactions.

Moreover, the NGOs selected by Senator Enrile did not appear to have the capacity to implement
the undertakings to begin with. At the time material to the charges, these entities did not possess
the required accreditation to transact with the Government, let alone possess a track record in
project implementation to speak of.

In spite of the aforesaid irregularities, respondents Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañizo, Ortiz,
Cunanan, Jover, Munsod, Relevo, Mendoza, Amata, Buenaventura, Rodriguez, Sevidal,
Jalandoni, Guañizo, Ordoñez, Cruz, Espiritu, Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare and Lacsamana,
with indecent haste, processed the SAROs and NCAs needed to facilitate the release of the
funds, as well as expedited the release of the PDAF disbursements to the NGOs affiliated with or
controlled by Napoles. These efforts to accommodate her NGOs and allow her to repeatedly
receive unwarranted benefits from the inexistent projects are too obvious to be glossed over.

ALL TOLD, there is probable cause to indict the following respondents named in the table
below, for 15 counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the material details of which are
indicated also in the table:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
IMPLEMENTING DISBURSEMENT TOTAL
RESPONDENTS
AGENCY/NGOs VOUCHERS NO. AMOUNT
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
01-2007-040669, 01- Ortiz, Cunanan, Figura, Lacsamana,
2007-040670, 01-2007- Espiritu, Jover, Janet Napoles, Jo
TRC-CARED 20,000,000
040671, 01-2007- Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio
040672 Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim, Ramirez,
Cabilao, Fernando, Palama, De Asis
and Encarnacion.
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
Ortiz, Cunanan, Figura, Lacsamana,
01-2009-040929, 01- Espiritu, Jover, Janet Napoles, Jo
TRC-APMFI 22,500,000
2009-051300 Napoles, James Napoles, Eulogio
Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim, Ramirez,
Cabilao, Pioranto, Fabian, Ditchon,
Galay and Uy.
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
08-04-01201, 08-07- Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
NABCOR-POPDFI 24,250,000
02312 Javellana, Mendoza, Munsod, Relevo,
Johnson, Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles,
 James Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez,
De Leon, Lim, Ramirez and Cabilao.
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañizo,
08-09-3575, 09-04-
NABCOR-MAMFI 19,400,000 Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James
1622
Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De
Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao and
Ornopia.
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañizo,
08-09-3572, 09-05-
NABCOR-SDPFFI 29,100,000 Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James
1751
Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De
Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao and
Macha.
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañizo,
09-05-1773, 09-06-
NABCOR-MAMFI 24,250,000 Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James
2025
Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De
Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao and
Ornopia.
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañizo,
09-05-1774, 09-06-
NABCOR-SDPFFI 24,250,000 Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James
2022
Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De
Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao and
Macha.
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañizo,
09-05-1767, 09-06-
NABCOR-MAMFI 14,550,000 Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James
2028
Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De
Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao and
Ornopia.
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañizo,
09-06-1825, 09-06-
NABCOR-SDPFFI 9,700,000 Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles, James
2027
Napoles, Eulogio Rodriguez, De
Leon, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao and
Macha.
NLDC-CARED 09-10-1530 8,000,000 Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
 Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
Amata, Sevidal, Ordoñez, Filipina
Rodriguez, Cruz, Jalandoni, Janet
Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles,
Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim,
Ramirez, Cabilao, Fernando, Palama,
De Asis and Encarnacion.
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
Amata, Sevidal, Ordoñez, Filipina
09-09-1355, 09-10-
NLDC-MAMFI 20,000,000 Rodriguez, Cruz, Jalandoni, Janet
1443, 09-10-1534
Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles,
Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim,
Ramirez, Cabilao and Ornopia.
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
Amata, Sevidal, Ordoñez, Filipina
09-12-1834, 10-01-
Rodriguez, Cruz, Jalandoni, Janet
NLDC-CARED 0004, 10-01-0118, 10- 44,000,000
Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles,
05-0747
Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim,
Ramirez, Cabilao, Fernando, Palama,
De Asis and Encarnacion.
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
Amata, Sevidal, Ordoñez, Filipina
09-091353, 09-10- Rodriguez, Cruz, Jalandoni, Janet
NLDC-AEPFFI 25,000,000
1444, 09-10-1540 Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles,
Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim,
Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio and
Guadinez.
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
Amata, Sevidal, Ordoñez, Filipina
09-09-1358, 09-10- Rodriguez, Cruz, Jalandoni, Janet
NLDC-APMFI 25,000,000
1449,09-10-1535 Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles,
Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim,
Ramirez, Cabilao, Pioranto, Fabian,
Ditchon, Galay and Uy.
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Tuason,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare,
Amata, Sevidal, Ordoñez, Filipina
09-09-1354, 09-10- Rodriguez, Cruz, Jalandoni, Janet
NLDC-CARED 32,000,000
1447 Napoles, Jo Napoles, James Napoles,
Eulogio Rodriguez, De Leon, Lim,
Ramirez, Cabilao, Fernando, Palama,
De Asis and Encarnacion.
Probable cause for Plunder exists.

Plunder is defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA No. 7080,155 as

amended:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d)156 hereof in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person
who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare
any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor
of the State.
As laid down in Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan,157 the elements of Plunder
are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in

connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten

wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or
criminal acts:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or

malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,

share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary
benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer;

(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets

belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries;

(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any

shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
 (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or

(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority,

relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself
or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice
of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth

amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.158
(emphasis supplied)

The presence of the foregoing elements has been sufficiently established.

First, it is undisputed that Senator Enrile was a public officer at the time material to the
charges.159redarclaw

Second, he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill- gotten wealth.

As disclosed by the evidence, he repeatedly received sums of money from Napoles for indorsing
her NGOs160 to implement the projects to be funded by his PDAF. Senator Enrile, through his
authorized representative Reyes, agreed to transact his PDAF with Napoles who acted through
Tuason.161redarclaw

As outlined by witnesses Luy, Sula and Suñas, which was corroborated by Tuason: once a PDAF
allocation becomes available to Senator Enrile, his staff, in the person of either respondent Reyes
or Evangelista, would inform Tuason of this development. Tuason, in turn, would relay the
information to either Napoles or Luy. Napoles or Luy would then prepare a listing162 of the
projects available where Luy would specifically indicate the implementing agencies. This listing
would be sent to Reyes who would then endorse it to the DBM under her authority as Chief-of-
Staff of Senator Enrile. After the listing is released by the Office of Senator Enrile to the
DBM, Janet Napoles would give Tuason a down payment for delivery to Senator Enrile
through Reyes. After the SARO and/or NCA is released, Napoles would give Tuason the full
payment for delivery to Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes.

It bears noting that money was paid and delivered to Senator Enrile even before the SARO
and/or NCA is released. Napoles would advance Senator Enrile’s down payment from her own
pockets upon the mere release by his Office of the listing of projects to the DBM, with the
remainder of the amount payable to be given after the SARO representing the legislator’s PDAF
allocation was released by the DBM and a copy of the SARO forwarded to Napoles.

Significantly, after the DBM issues the SARO, Senator Enrile, through his staff members Reyes
or Evangelista, would then write another letter addressed to the IAs which would identify and
indorseNapoles’ NGOs as his preferred NGO to undertake the PDAF-funded project,163 thereby
effectively designating in writing the Napoles-affiliated NGO to implement projects funded by
his PDAF. Along with the other PDAF documents, the indorsement letter of Senator Enrile is
transmitted to the IA, which, in turn, handles the preparation of the MOA concerning the project,
to be entered into by the Senator’s Office, the IA and the chosen NGO.

As previously discussed, such indorsements enabled Napoles to gain access164 to substantial

sums of public funds. The collective acts of Senator Enrile, Napoles, et al. allowed the illegal
diversion of public funds to their own personal use.

It cannot be gainsaid that the sums of money received by Senator Enrile amount to “kickbacks”
or “commissions” from a government project within the purview of Sec. 1 (d) (2)165 of RA 7080.
He repeatedly received commissions, percentage or kickbacks, representing his share in the
project cost allocated from his PDAF, from Napoles or her employees or cohorts in exchange for
his indorsement of Napoles’s NGOs to implement his PDAF-funded projects.

Worse, the evidence indicates that he took undue advantage of his official position, authority and
influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense, and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines, within the purview of Sec. 1 (d) (6) of RA
7080.166 He used and took undue advantage of his official position, authority and influence as a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines to access his PDAF and illegally divert the allocations
to the possession and control of Napoles and her cohorts, in exchange for commissions,
kickbacks, percentages from the PDAF allocations.

Undue pressure and influence from Senator Enrile’s Office, as well as his indorsement of
Napoles’ NGOs, were brought to bear upon the public officers and employees of the IAs.

Figura, an officer from TRC, claimed that the TRC management told him: “legislators highly
recommended certain NGOs/Foundations as conduit implementors and since PDAFs are their
discretionary funds, they have the prerogative to choose their NGO’s”; and the TRC
management warned him that “if TRC would disregard it (choice of NGO), they (legislators)
would feel insulted and would simply take away their PDAF from TRC, and TRC losses (sic) the
chance to earn service fees.” Figura claimed that he tried his best to resist the pressure
exerted on him and did his best to perform his duties faithfully; [but] he and other low-
ranking TRC officials had no power to “ simply disregard the wishes of Senator Enrile,”
especially on the matter of disregarding public bidding for the PDAF projects.167redarclaw

Cunanan,168 another public officer from the TRC, narrates that he met Napoles sometime in
2006 or 2007, who “introduced herself as the representative of certain legislators who
supposedly picked TRC as a conduit for PDAF-funded projects;” at the same occasion, Napoles
told him that “her principals were then Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, Senators Ramon
“Bong” Revilla, Jr., Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada;” in the course of his duties, he “often ended
up taking and/or making telephone verifications and follow-ups and receiving legislators or their
staff members;” during his telephone verifications, he was able to speak with Reyes, who
was acting in behalf of her superior, public respondent Enrile; Reyes confirmed to him that
she and public respondent Evangelista “were duly authorized by respondent Enrile” to
facilitate his PDAF projects and she also affirmed to him that the signatures appearing in
communications sent to TRC were, indeed, hers and Evangelista’s; and he occasionally met
with witness Luy, who pressured him into expediting the release of the funds by calling the
offices of the legislators.

NLDC’s Amata also mentioned about undue pressure surrounding the designation of NLDC as
one of the IAs for PDAF.169 Her fellow NLDC employee, Buenaventura170 adds that in
accordance with her functions, she “checked and verified the endorsement letters of Senator
Enrile, which designated the NGOs that would implement his PDAF projects and found them
to be valid and authentic;” she confirmed the authenticity of the authorization given by
Enrile to his subordinates regarding the monitoring, supervision and implementation of
PDAF projects; and her evaluation and verification reports were accurate.

Another NLDC officer, Sevidal,171 claimed that Senator Enrile and Napoles, not NLDC
employees, who were responsible for the misuse of the PDAF; Senator Enrile, through Reyes
and Evangelista, were responsible for “identifying the projects, determining the project costs
and choosing the NGOs” which were “manifested in the letters of Senator Enrile;” and that he
and other NLDC employees were victims of the “political climate,” “bullied into submission by
the lawmakers.”

NLDC’s Ordoñez172 claimed that as far as she was concerned, she and her co-respondents,
“lowly Government employees who were dictated upon,” were victims, “bullied into submission
by the lawmakers;” and she performed her duties in good faith and was “not in a position to
negate or defy these actions of the Lawmakers, DBM and the NLDC Board of Trustees.”

The corroborative evidence evinces that Senator Enrile used and took undue advantage of his
official position, authority and influence as a Senator to unjustly enrich himself at the expense
and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

The PDAF was allocated to Senator Enrile by virtue of his position, hence, he exercised control
in the selection of his priority projects and programs. He indorsed Napoles’ NGOs in
consideration for the remittance of kickbacks and commissions from Napoles. These
circumstances were compounded by the fact that the PDAF-funded projects were “ghost
projects” and that the rest of the PDAF allocation went into the pockets of Napoles and her
cohorts. Undeniably, Senator Enrile unjustly enriched himself at the expense, and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Third, the amounts received by Senator Enrile through kickbacks and commissions, amounted
to more than Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).

Witness Luy’s ledger173 shows, among others, that Senator Enrile received the following
amounts as and by way of kickbacks and commissions:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Year Sums received by Senator Enrile
2004 PhP 1,500,000.00
2005 PhP 14,622,000.00
2006 PhP 13,300,000.00
 2007 PhP 27,112,500.00
2008 PhP 62,550,000.00
2009 PhP 23,750,000.00
2010 PhP 30,000,00.00
Total: Php 172,834,500.00
The aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired
by Senator Enrile stands at PhP172,834,500.00, at the very least.174redarclaw

The sums were received by the Senator through his Chief of Staff, Reyes, as earlier discussed.

Napoles provided these kickbacks and commissions. Witnesses Luy and Suñas, and even
Tuason, stated that Napoles was assisted in delivering the kickbacks and commissions by her
employees and cohorts, namely: John Raymund de Asis,175 Ronald John Lim176 and Tuason.

Senator Enrile’s commission of the acts covered by Section 1 (d) (2) and Section 1 (d) (6) of
R.A. No. 7080 repeatedly took place over the years 2004 to 2010. This shows a pattern – a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts – directed towards a common purpose or goal
which is to enable the Senator to enrich himself illegally.

Senator Enrile, taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence as a Senator acted, in connivance with his subordinate and duly authorized
representative Reyes, to receive commissions and kickbacks for indorsing the Napoles NGOs to
implement his PDAF-funded project, and likewise, in connivance with Napoles assisted by her
employees and cohorts Tuason, John Raymund de Asis, and Ronald John Lim who delivered the
kickbacks to him. These acts are linked by the fact that they were plainly geared towards a
common goal which was to amass, acquire and accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at
least PhP172,834,500.00 for Senator Enrile.

Probable cause therefore exists to indict Senator Enrile, Reyes, Napoles, Tuason, de Asis
and Lim for Plunder under RA No. 7080.

Conspiracy is established by the evidence presented.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it.177redarclaw

Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found because criminals do not write down their lawless
plans and plots. Nevertheless, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode
and manner of the commission of the offense, or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest.178 Conspiracy exists among the
offenders when their concerted acts show the same purpose or common design, and are united in
its execution.179redarclaw

When there is conspiracy, all those who participated in the commission of the offense are liable
as principals, regardless of the extent and character of their participation because the act of one is
the act of all.180redarclaw
As extensively discussed above, the presence of conspiracy among respondents Enrile, Reyes,
Evangelista, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañizo, Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover, Munsod, Relevo,
Mendoza, Amata, Buenaventura, Rodriguez, Sevidal, Jalandoni, Guañizo, Ordoñez, Cruz,
Espiritu, Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare, Lacsamana, Tuason, Janet Napoles, Jo Napoles,
James Napoles, De Leon, Pioranto, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio, Fabian, Ditchon, Galay, Uy,
Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion, Palama, Ornopia, Castillo and Macha is manifest.

To be able to repeatedly divert substantial funds from the PDAF, access thereto must be made
available, and this was made possible by Senator Enrile who indorsed NGOs affiliated with or
controlled by Napoles to implement his PDAF-related undertakings. Reyes and Evangelista
prepared the requisite indorsement letters and similar documentation addressed to the DBM and
the IAs which were necessary to ensure that the chosen NGO would be awarded the project.

Relampagos, Paule, Bare and Nuñez, as officers of the DBM, were in regular contact with
Napoles and her staff who persistently followed up the release of the coveted SAROs and NCAs.
It was on account of their persistence that the DBM immediately released the SAROs and NCAs
to the concerned IAs. In turn, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañizo, Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover,
Munsod, Relevo, Mendoza, Amata, Buenaventura, Sevidal, Jalandoni, Guañizo, Ordoñez, Cruz,
Espiritu and Lacsamana, as officers of the IAs, prepared, reviewed and entered into the MOAs
governing the implementation of the projects. And they participated in the processing and
approval of the PDAF disbursements to the questionable NGOs. The funds in question could
not have been transferred to these NGOs if not for their certifications, approvals, and
signatures found in the corresponding DVs and checks.

Once the fund releases were successfully processed by the IAs, Jo Napoles, James Napoles, De
Leon, Pioranto, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio, Fabian, Ditchon, Galay, Uy, Fernando, De Asis,
Encarnacion, Palama, Ornopia, Castillo and Macha, in behalf of the NGOs in question and under
the direction of Janet Napoles, would pick up the corresponding checks and deposit them in
accounts under the name of the NGOs. The proceeds of the checks would later be withdrawn
from the banks and brought to the offices of Janet Napoles, who would then proceed to exercise
full control and possession over the funds.

Jo Napoles, James Napoles, De Leon, Pioranto, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio, Fabian, Ditchon,
Galay, Uy, Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion, Palama, Ornopia, Castillo and Macha, again on
orders of Janet Napoles, would prepare the fictitious beneficiaries list and other similar
documents for liquidation purposes, to make it appear that the projects were implemented.

For their participation in the above-described scheme, Senator Enrile, Javellana, Cunanan,
Amata, Buenaventura and Sevidal were rewarded with portions of the PDAF disbursements from
Napoles. Senator Enrile's share or commission was coursed by Napoles through Tuason who, in
turn, delivered the same to and received by Reyes.

ALL TOLD, there is a cohesion and interconnection in the above-named respondents’ intent and
purpose that cannot be logically interpreted other than to mean the attainment of the same end
that runs through the entire gamut of acts they perpetrated separately. The role played by each of
them was so indispensable to the success of their scheme that, without any of them, the same
would have failed.

There is no evidence showing that the signatures of respondents Enrile, Reyes or Evangelista
in the PDAF documents were forged.

Reyes and Evangelista argue that the signatures appearing in the letters, MOAs, liquidation
reports and similar PDAF documents attributed to them and Senator Enrile are mere forgeries.
They deny having signed these documents and disclaim any participation in the preparation and
execution thereof.

In support of her claim, Reyes submitted an Affidavit dated 6 December 2013 executed by
Rogelio G. Azores (Azores), who claims to be a former NBI document examiner and now works
as a freelance consultant, and who represents himself to be an expert in the examination of
documents “to determine their authenticity and the genuineness of signatures appearing
thereon.”

Azores stated that his services were engaged by Reyes to “determine whether or not the
signatures of Ms. Reyes appearing in certain documents were her true and genuine signatures;”
in the course of his engagement, he gathered samples of Reyes’ signatures appearing in several
documents she signed during her tenure as Enrile’s chief-of-staff; he compared these sample
signatures with the signatures appearing in the PDAF documents which are attributed to Reyes;
based on his examination, there were “ significant differences in habit handwriting
characteristics existing between the questioned signatures of ‘Atty. Jessica Lucila G. Reyes’ on
one hand, and the standard signatures of Atty. Jessica Lucila G. Reyes on the other hand;” and
in his opinion, the signatures allegedly belonging to Reyes and appearing in the PDAF
documents are forgeries.

Respondents Reyes and Evangelista's claim fails to convince.

Forgery is not presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the
burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.181redarclaw

It bears stressing that Senator Enrile, in his Letter dated 21 March 2012,182confirmed to the COA
that: (a) he authorized respondents Reyes and Evangelista to sign letters, MOAs and other PDAF
documents in his behalf; and (b) the signatures appearing in the PDAF documents as belonging
to respondents Reyes and Evangelista are authentic. The pertinent portion of the Senator’s letter
reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
I confirm that Atty. Jessica L. G. Reyes, Chief of Staff, Office of the Senate President, and Mr.
Jose A. V. Evangelista II, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of the Senate President, have been
authorized to sign pertinent documents to ensure the proper implementation of such livelihood
projects subjects to pertinent government accounting and auditing laws, rules and
regulations. The signatures appearing in the documents enumerated are those of my
authorized representatives. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
It bears noting at this juncture that the Senator has not disclaimed authorship of the 21 March
2012 letter. That the Senator readily authenticated Reyes and Evangelista’s signatures is not
difficult to understand, the two having been members of his confidential staff for many years.

Nonetheless, Reyes and Evangelista strongly deny having signed the PDAF documents and insist
that they did not participate in the preparation or execution thereof. Mere denial is insufficient,
however, to disprove the authenticity of their signatures appearing in the PDAF
documents.183 This holds true especially in Evangelista’s case. The MOAs bearing his questioned
signatures are notarized documents that enjoy the presumption of regularity and can be
overturned only by clear and convincing evidence.184redarclaw

Besides, respondent Evangelista, in his Letter dated 2 August 2012185 to the COA, admitted the
authenticity of his signatures appearing in the PDAF documents, save for those found in
documents relating to PDAF disbursements of another legislator. His letter reads, in
part:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
As confirmed in the letter of the Senate President dated 21 March 2012, Atty. Jessica L. G.
Reyes, Chief of Staff, Office of the Senate President, and I have been authorized to sign
pertinent documents to ensure the proper implementation of livelihood projects subject to
pertinent government accounting and auditing laws, rules and regulations.

However, please be informed that the subject signatures on the following documents submitted
regarding the livelihood projects implemented by the 3rd District of Davao City (in the total
amount of P15 Million Pesos released to the National Agribusiness Corporation on 9 July 2009
as requested by former Rep. Ruy Elias Lopez) are not my signatures:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

a) Certificate of Acceptance dated 4 May 2010 (Annex 16)

b) List of Beneficiaries by Barangay (Annex 17) (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Regarding affiant Azores’ assertion that the signatures of Reyes in the PDAF documents were
forgeries because they and Reyes’ standard signatures had “significant differences in habit
handwriting characteristics,” the same deserves scant consideration.

Mere variance of the signatures in different documents cannot be considered as conclusive proof
that one is forged. As Rivera v. Turiano186 teaches:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court has held that an allegation of forgery and a perfunctory comparison of the signatures
by themselves cannot support the claim of forgery, as forgery cannot be presumed and must be
proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies in the party
alleging forgery. Even in cases where the alleged forged signature was compared to samples of
genuine signatures to show its variance therefrom, this Court still found such evidence
insufficient. It must be stressed that the mere variance of the signatures cannot be considered
as conclusive proof that the same were forged. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, the observations of affiant Azores in his Affidavit and Examination Report dated 10
October 2013 do not meet the criteria for identification of forgery as enunciated in Ladignon v.
Court of Appeals:187
The process of identification, therefore, must include the determination of the extent, kind, and
significance of this resemblance as well as of the variation. It then becomes necessary to
determine whether the variation is due to the operation of a different personality, or is only the
expected and inevitable variation found in the genuine writing of the same writer. It is also
necessary to decide whether the resemblance is the result of a more or less skillful imitation, or is
the habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally appears in a genuine writing. When
these two questions are correctly answered the whole problem of identification is solved.
(underlining supplied)
In his Affidavit and Examination Report, affiant Azores simply concluded that the signatures in
the PDAF documents and Reyes’ sample signatures “were not written by one and the same
person.”

AT ALL EVENTS, this Office, after a prima facie comparison with the naked eyes of the
members of the Panel of Investigators between the signatures appearing in the PDAF documents
that are attributed to respondents Senator Enrile, Reyes and Evangelista and their signatures
found in their respective counter-affidavits, opines that both sets of signatures appear to have
been affixed by one and the same respective hands.188 In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence, this Office thus finds that the questioned signatures on the relevant documents belong
to respondents Enrile, Reyes and Evangelista.

The Arias doctrine is not applicable to these proceedings.

Javellana argues that he cannot be held accountable for approving the PDAF releases pertaining
to those projects assigned to NABCOR because he only issued such approval after his
subordinates, namely, respondents Mendoza, Cacal, Relevo and other NABCOR officials
involved in the processing and/or implementation of PDAF-funded projects, examined the
supporting documents, assured him of the availability of funds and recommended the approval of
the disbursements.

Similarly, Cunanan claims that he approved the PDAF releases relating to projects assigned to
TRC only after his subordinates at the agency recommended such approval.

Simply put, Javellana and Cunanan invoke the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan.189 Reliance
thereon is misplaced.

Arias squarely applies in cases where, in the performance of his official duties, the head of an
office is being held to answer for his act of relying on the acts of his
subordinate:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems -
dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain
incompetence - is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not
personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and
investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as
the final approving authority.

xxx

We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents,
received procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office
could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would
be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations. x x x There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in
such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to
the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda,
vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger
offices or departments is even more appalling.

There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to
sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.190 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The above pronouncement readily shows that the Arias doctrine does not help the cause of
Javellana and Cunanan.

First, the Arias doctrine applies only if it is undisputed that the head of the agency was the last
person to sign the vouchers, which would show that he was merely relying on the prior
certifications and recommendations of his subordinates. It will not apply if there is evidence
showing that the head of agency, before a recommendation or certification can be made by a
superior, performs any act that would signify his approval of the transaction. In other words,
the Arias doctrine is inapplicable in cases where it is the head of agency himself or herself who
influences, pressures, coerces or otherwise convinces the subordinate to sign the voucher or
recommend the approval of the transaction.

In Javellana’s case, Cacal stated in his Counter-Affidavit that he signed the disbursement
vouchers pertaining to PDAF disbursements because Javellana directed him to do so. In support
of his claim, Cacal submitted a document entitled “Authorization” issued and signed by
respondent Javellana which states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
In order to facilitate processing of payments and in the exigency of the service, MR. VICTOR
ROMAN CACAL, Paralegal, this Office is hereby authorized to sign BOX A of the
Disbursement Vouchers of all transactions related to PDAF Project.

This authorization takes effect starting August 20, 2008. (underscoring supplied)
Cacal, in his Supplemental Affidavit, also claimed that Javellana, among others, already signed
the checks and other documents even before he (Cacal) could sign Box “A” of the disbursement
vouchers:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
15. In most instances, Boxes “B” and “C” were already signed wherein the herein Respondent
was required to sing (sic) Box “A” of the Disbursement Vouchers. Most of the times the Box
“B” and/or Box “C” of the Disbursement Vouchers were already signed ahead by Niñez
Guanizo and/or Rhodora B. Mendoza and ALAN A. JAVELLANArespectively.

16. In other instances, the checks for PDAF releases were already prepared and signed by
NABCOR President ALAN A. JAVELLANA and VP for Finance RHODORA B.
MENDOZA attached to the Disbursement Voucher before the herein Respond ent were made
sig ns Box “A” of the said Disbursement Vouchers. This indicative of the target5 (sic)
Municipalities and immediately stern instructions of herein Respondent’s superiors to sign the
Disbursement Voucher immediately for reasons that it is being followed up by the concerned
NGO. Furthermore, the herein Respondent relied on the duly executed Memorandum of
Agreement by and between NABCOR, NGO and the Office of the Legislator. According to the
said MOA, initial release of funds will be undertaken by NABCOR upon signing thereof. Hence,
payment and/or release of fund to the NGO became a lawful obligation of NABCOR.

xxx

18. On many instances, sternly ordered [sic] the NABCOR VP for Admin. and Finance
RHODORA B. MENDOZA to herein Respondent to immediately sign Box “A” of the
Disbursement Voucher even if the NGOs have not yet complied with the other documentary
requirements to be attached to the said Disbursement Voucher on the basis on [sic] the
commitment of the NGO to submit the other required documents (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
Cacal added that he was constrained to sign the disbursement vouchers due to pressure exerted
by his superiors:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
19. In many instances wherein the Respondent questioned the attachments/documents in the
said vouchers regarding the disbursements of the PDAF of legislators the respondent was
herein threatened and/or coerced by his superiors. (emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
Since the subordinate himself vehemently disputes having recommended the approval of the
fund release to his superior, this Office in not inclined to apply the Arias doctrine. Note that
the Arias doctrine is only applied in cases where it is undisputed that the recommendation of the
subordinate preceded the superior’s approval, and not in situations where it is the superior who
persuades or pressures the subordinate to favorably recommend approval.

Second, the Arias doctrine, even assuming that it is applicable, does not ipso facto free the heads
of agencies from criminal, civil or administrative liability. The ruling merely holds that the head
of agency cannot be deemed to be a co- conspirator in a criminal offense simply because he
signed and/or approved a voucher or document that facilitated the release of public
funds.191redarclaw

In the present cases, the liability of Javellana and Cunanan is not based solely on their approval
of the vouchers and other papers relating to PDAF projects implemented by NABCOR and/or
TRC, but on their own overt acts showing their undue interest in the release of PDAF funds. In
short, Javellana and Cunanan’s actions indicate that they wanted the funds released as soon as
possible, regardless of whether applicable laws or rules governing the disbursements had been
observed or complied with.

As discussed above, Javellana’s own subordinate stated that the latter actually pre-signed the
checks pertaining to PDAF releases even before the DVs were duly accomplished and signed.

Figura declared in his Counter-Affidavit that Cunanan constantly followed up with him (Figura)
the expedited processing of PDAF documents:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
b) In the course of my review of PDAF documents, DDG Dennis L. Cunanan would frequently
personally follow up in my office the review of the MOA or my signature on the checks. He
would come down to my office in the third floor and tell me that he had a dinner meeting with
the First Gentleman and some legislators so much that he requested me to fast track processing
of the PDAF papers. Though I hate name- dropping, I did not show any disrespect to him but
instead told him that if the papers are in order, I would release them before the end of working
hours of the same day. This was done by DDG many times, but I stood my ground when the
papers on PDAF he’s following up had d eficiencies x x x (emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
Likewise, witness Luy in his Sworn Statement dated 12 September 2013192 stated that Javellana
and Cunanan were among those he saw receive a percentage of the diverted PDAF sums from
Napoles:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
126. T: May nabanggit ka na may 10% na napupunta sa president o head ng agency, sino itong
tinutukoy mo?
S: Ang alam ko nakita kong tumanggap ay sila Allan Javellana ng NABCOR, DENNIS
CUNANAN at ANTONIO Y. ORTIZ ng TRC .... emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
Furthermore, this Office takes note of the fact that witness Luy, during the legislative inquiry
conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) on 7 November 2014, testified that he personally knew
Javellana as among those who benefited from Napoles for his role in the PDAF
releases, viz:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Luy said he saw Napoles giving money to officials of implementing agencies at her office.

“When Ms. Napoles gives the instruction to prepare the money and their 10-percent commission,
I will so prepare it. I will type the voucher and have it checked by my seniors or by her daughter
Jo Christine,” Luy said. “I will bring the money to her office and there are instances when she
and I will meet the person and give the money contained in a paper bag.”

Luy said he saw Alan Javellana, a former president of the National Agribusiness Corp., and
Antonio Ortiz, former head of the Technology Resource Center, receive their respective
payoffs.193 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

On 6 March 2014, witness Luy again testified before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee that
Cunanan was among those who received undue benefits from the PDAF scam through kickbacks
given by Napoles:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The principal whistleblower in the pork barrel scam Benhur Luy said Thursday that Dennis
Cunanan, the former chief of the Technology Resource Center who wants to turn state witness,
personally received P960,000 in kickbacks from Janet Lim Napoles, contrary to his claims.

In the continuation of the Blue Ribbon Committee hearings on the pork barrel scam, Luy said he
personally saw Cunanan carrying a bagful of money after meeting Napoles at the JLN Corp.
office at the Discovery Suites in Ortigas, Pasig City.

Luy said he was instructed by Napoles to prepare the P960,000 intended for Cunanan,
representing his commission for the pork barrel coursed through the TRC. He then handed the
money to his co-worker, Evelyn De Leon, who was present at the meeting room with Napoles
and Cunanan.

“When Dencu (referring to Dennis Cunanan) emerged out of the conference room, I saw him
carrying the paper bag,” Luy said. Asked if he saw Cunanan receive the money, Luy answered:
“After the meeting, I saw the paper bag. He was carrying it.” (emphasis, underscoring and
italics supplied)194
The immediately-quoted chronicle of the testimonies of Luy indubitably indicates that
respondents Javellana and Cunanan did not approve the PDAF releases because they relied on
the recommendation of their subordinates; rather, they themselves wanted the funds released of
their own volition.

IN FINE, this Office holds that the Arias doctrine is not applicable to the heads of agencies
impleaded in these proceedings including Javellana and Cunanan.

There is no probable cause to indict public respondent Montuya.

Montuya, an Accounting Assistant at NABCOR, is impleaded for allegedly preparing the

inspection reports pertaining to livelihood projects funded by PDAF and covered by SARO Nos.
ROCS-08-0516,195 ROCS-08-07211196 and ROCS-08-00804.197 She, however, denies having
participated in the misuse of the PDAF and insists that she actually did conduct physical
inspections of the agricultural packages at warehouses and prepared the corresponding reports.
She alleges that she was supervised in her inspection by her superior, respondent Mendoza.

This Office finds in favor of Montuya.

The Office takes note that her inspection of the livelihood kits took place after NABCOR
released the PDAF disbursements to SDPFFI. In other words, her actions were unrelated, let
alone necessary, to NABCOR’s improper transfer of public funds to SDPFFI.

Indeed the Office finds no fault in Montuya’s actions. Her inspection reports simply reflect what
she saw during the inspection, i.e., that there were livelihood kits at the Bulacan warehouses
where Mendoza brought her. Montuya, in the course of her inspection, was not duty-bound to
inquire beyond the existence of the livelihood kits as her job was limited to conducting a
physical inspection of the items in question. Mendoza brought her to the Bulacan warehouses
and showed her (Montuya) the livelihood kits subject of the inspection. In fact, she (Mendoza)
even co-signed the inspection report in relation to the livelihood project covered by SARO Nos.
ROCS-08-0516. She was given instructions by Mendoza on how to conduct the inspections and
prepare the corresponding reports.

In any event, Montuya was under the full supervision and control of her superior Mendoza
during the inspections.

Unlike Mendoza, however, there is no evidence indicating that Montuya was unduly interested in
the PDAF releases, received any particular benefit therefrom or was involved in NABCOR’s
processing/facilitation of PDAF disbursements to SDPFFI. The criminal charges against her
must thus be dismissed.

There is no probable cause to indict private respondents Oliveros, Talaboc, Agcaoili,

Balanoba, Lawas-Yutok, Santos, Victorino and Solomon.
Respondents Oliveros, Talaboc, Agcaoili, Balanoba, Lawas- Yutok and Santos, who were
supposed to be notaries public at the time material to the charges, are impleaded in these
proceedings for having allegedly allowed Napoles and her staff to use their notarial seals in
notarizing MOAs and other similar PDAF documents. Likewise, respondents Victorino and
Solomon were impleaded because they prepared independent auditor’s reports for some of the
Napoles-affiliated NGOs which received funds drawn from Senator Enrile’s PDAF.

The criminal charges against the above-named notaries public and certified public accountants
must also be dismissed.

As notaries public, Oliveros, Talaboc, Agcaoili, Balanoba, Lawas-Yutok and Santos’ duty in
relation to the notarial act of acknowledgment of public instruments is to make sure that: (a) the
parties acknowledging the instrument personally appear before them at the time of the
notarization; and (b) said parties are personally known to them and, for this purpose, require the
presentation of competent evidence of identity.198 They are not required to inquire as to the
contents of the instrument, let alone the motives of the acknowledging parties who executed said
document. This Office cannot, therefore, assume that respondents Oliveros, Talaboc, Agcaoili,
Balanoba, Lawas-Yutok and Santos were aware of the contents of the PDAF documents when
they notarized the same.

Similarly, respondents Victorino and Solomon were implicated because they prepared the
independent auditor’s reports of some of the NGOs used in the diversion of the PDAF. The
preparation of these reports, however, is not directly related to or an act necessary to carrying out
the irregular transfer of funds from the IAs to the NGOs involved. There is no indication that
either Victorino or Solomon knew that the reports they prepared would be used for nefarious
purposes, let alone evidence showing that they were actively involved in the systematic diversion
of the PDAF.

Respecting the subject notaries public, even if they, indeed, allowed other persons to use their
notarial seals and notarize documents in their names, these acts are not indispensable to the
commission of Plunder or violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. If at all, the acts complained of
constitute violations of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.199 Similarly, any irregularity in the
public accountants’ preparation of the audit reports may render them liable for violation of RA
9298200 or other similar laws or rules.

The criminal charges against respondents Oliveros, Talaboc, Agcaoili, Balanoba, Lawas-Yutok,
Santos, Victorino and Solomon must thus be dismissed for insufficient evidence. The dismissal
of said charges, however, is without prejudice to any action that may be taken against them by
the appropriate body or office in relation to any possible violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, R.A. No. 9298, or other applicable laws or rules.

Respondents’ defenses are best left to the trial court’s consideration during trial on the merits.

Respondent public officers insist that they were motivated by good faith, and acted in accordance
with existing laws and rules, and that the disbursements from the PDAF were all regular and
above board.
During preliminary investigation, this Office does not determine if the evidence on record proves
the guilt of the person charged beyond reasonable doubt. It merely ascertains whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed; that the
respondent charged is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial; and that based on the
evidence presented, the Office believes that the respondent’s assailed act constitutes the offense
charged.201redarclaw

Public respondents’ claims of good faith and regularity in their performance of official functions
fail.

As earlier reflected, the sworn statements of witnesses, the disbursement vouchers, the
indorsed/encashed checks, the MOAs with NGOs, the written requests, liquidation reports,
confirmation letters and other evidence on record indubitably indicate that respondents Senator
Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal, Guañizo, Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover, Munsod,
Relevo, Mendoza, Amata, Buenaventura, Sevidal, Jalandoni, Guañizo, Ordoñez, Cruz, Espiritu,
Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare and Lacsamana, as well as respondents Tuason, Janet Napoles,
Jo Napoles, James Napoles, De Leon, Pioranto, Lim, Ramirez, Cabilao, Ogerio, Fabian, Ditchon,
Galay, Uy, Fernando, De Asis, Encarnacion, Palama, Ornopia, Castillo and
Macha, conspired with one another to repeatedly raid the public treasury through what appears to
be the drawing of cash advances from the PDAF allocated to respondent Enrile, albeit for
fictitious projects.

Consequently, they must be deemed to have illegally conveyed public funds in the amount of
Php345,000,000.00, more or less, to the possession and control of questionable NGOs affiliated
with Napoles, and thereafter allowed Enrile to acquire and amass ill-gotten proceeds through
kickbacks in the sum of Php172,834,500.00, which is in excess of Php50,000,000.00.

At any rate, specifically with respect to Plunder, good faith is neither and element or a defense.

AT ALL EVENTS, respondents Senator Enrile, Reyes, Evangelista, Javellana, Mendoza, Cacal,
Guañizo, Ortiz, Cunanan, Jover, Munsod, Relevo, Mendoza, Amata, Buenaventura, Sevidal,
Jalandoni, Guañizo, Ordoñez, Cruz, Rodriguez, Espiritu, Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, Bare and
Lacsamana’s claims of good faith and regularity in the performance of their duties are defenses
in violation of R.A. No. 3019 which are best raised during trial proper. As explained in Deloso v.
Desierto:202
We agree with public respondents that the existence of good faith or lack of it, as elements of
the crimes of malversation and violation of Section 3 (e), R. A. No. 3019, is evidentiary in
nature. As a matter of defense, it can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
(emphasis and italics supplied)
It bears reiterating that, indeed, preliminary investigation is a merely inquisitorial mode of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime.203 It is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence, including respondents-movants’
respective defenses.204Precisely there is a trial on the merits for this purpose.

WHEREFORE, this Office, through the undersigned:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(a) FINDS PROBABLE CAUSE to indict for:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

[PLUNDER- 1 Count]

i. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Ruby C. Tuason, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald
John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, acting in concert, for PLUNDER (Section 2 in
relation to Section 1 (d) 1, 2 and 6 of R. A. No. 7080, as amended), in relation to Enrile’s ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate sum of Php172,834,500.00, representing kickbacks or
commissions received by Enrile from Napoles in connection with Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF)-funded government projects and by reason of his office or
position;

[VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 – 15 Counts]

i. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.

Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Antonio Y. Ortiz, Dennis L.
Cunanan, Francisco B. Figura, Ma. Rosalinda Lacsamana,
Consuelo Lilian R. Espiritu, Marivic V. Jover, Janet Lim Napoles,
Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Amparo L.
Fernando, Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Aileen Palama, John
Raymund De Asis and Mylene T. Encarnacion, acting in concert,
for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in
relation to fund releases amounting to Php20,000,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through the Technology
Resource Center (TRC) and Countrywide Agri and Rural
Economic and Development Foundation, Inc. (CARED), as
reflected in Disbursement Voucers (DV) No. 01- 2007-040669, 01-
2007-040670, 01-2007-040671 and 01-2007-
040672;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ii. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.

Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Antonio Y. Ortiz, Dennis L.
Cunanan, Francisco B. Figura, Ma. Rosalinda Lacsamana,
Consuelo Lilian R. Espiritu, Marivic V. Jover, Janet Lim Napoles,
Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Amparo L.
Fernando, Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Jocelyn D. Piorato,
Dorilyn A. Fabian, Hernani Ditchon, Rodrigo B. Galay and Laarni
A. Uy, acting in concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF
R.A. NO. 3019 in relation to fund releases amounting to
Php22,500,000.00 drawn from Agricultura Para sa Magbubukid
Foundation, Inc. (APMFI), as reflected in DV No. 01-2009-040929
and 01-2009-051300;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
iii. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora
B. Mendoza, Encarnita Christina P. Munsod, Romulo Relevo,
Maria Julie A. Villaralvo-Johnson, Janet Lim Napoles, Jo Christine
L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D. Rodriguez,
Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Fernando Ramirez and Nitz
Cabilao, acting in concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E)
OF R.A. NO. 3019 in relation to fund releases amounting to
Php24,250,000.00 drawn from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through
the National Agribusiness Corporation (NABCOR) and People’s
Organization for Progress and Development Foundation, Inc.
(POPDI), as reflected in DV No. 08-04-01201 and 08-07-
02312;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

iv. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.

Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora
B. Mendoza, Victor Roman C. Cacal, Ma. Ninez P. Guañizo, Janet
Lim Napoles, Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles,
Eulogio D. Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Renato S. Ornopia, acting in
concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019
in relation to fund releases amounting to Php19,400,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through NABCOR and
Masaganang Ani Para sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. (MAMFI),
as reflected in DV No. 08-09-3575 and 09-04-
1622;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

v. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.

Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora
B. Mendoza, Victor Roman C. Cacal, Ma. Ninez P. Guañizo, Janet
Lim Napoles, Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles,
Eulogio D. Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Noel V. Macha, acting in
concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019
in relation to fund releases amounting to Php29,100,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through NABCOR and Social
Development Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc. (SDPFFI), as
reflected in DV No. 08-09-3572 and 09-05-
1751;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

vi. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.

Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora
B. Mendoza, Victor Roman C. Cacal, Ma. Ninez P. Guañizo, Janet
 Lim Napoles, Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles,
Eulogio D. Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Renato S. Ornopia, acting in
concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019
in relation to fund releases amounting to Php24,250,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through NABCOR and MAMFI,
as reflected in DV No. 09-05-1773 and 09-06-
2025;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

vii. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.

Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora
B. Mendoza, Victor Roman C. Cacal, Ma. Ninez P. Guañizo, Janet
Lim Napoles, Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles,
Eulogio D. Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Noel V. Macha, acting in
concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019
in relation to fund releases amounting to Php24,250,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through NABCOR and SDPFFI,
as reflected in DV No. 09- 05-1774 and 09-06-
2022;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

viii. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.

Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora
B. Mendoza, Victor Roman C. Cacal, Ma. Ninez P. Guañizo, Janet
Lim Napoles, Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles,
Eulogio D. Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Renato S. Ornopia, acting in
concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019
in relation to fund releases amounting to Php14,550,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through NABCOR and MAMFI,
as reflected in DV No. 09- 05-1767 and 09-06-
2028;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ix. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.

Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Alan A. Javellana, Rhodora
B. Mendoza, Victor Roman C. Cacal, Ma. Ninez P. Guañizo, Janet
Lim Napoles, Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles,
Eulogio D. Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim,
Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Noel V. Macha, acting in
concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019
in relation to fund releases amounting to Php9,700,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through NABCOR and SDPFFI,
as reflected in DV No. 09-06-1825 and 09-06-
2027;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 x. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.
Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Gondelina G. Amata,
Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, Ofelia E. Ordoñez, Filipina T.
Rodriguez, Sofia D. Cruz, Chita C. Jalandoni, Janet Lim Napoles,
Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Amparo L.
Fernando, Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Aileen Palama, John
Raymund De Asis and Mylene T. Encarnacion, acting in concert,
for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in
relation to fund releases amounting to Php8,000,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through the National Livelihood
Development Corporation (NLDC) and CARED, as reflected in
DV No. 09-10-1530;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xi. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.

Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Gondelina G. Amata,
Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, Ofelia E. Ordoñez, Filipina T.
Rodriguez, Sofia D. Cruz, Chita C. Jalandoni, Janet Lim Napoles,
Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Fernando
Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao and Renato S. Ornopia, acting in concert,
for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in
relation to fund releases amounting to Php20,000,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through NLDC and MAMFI, as
reflected in DV No. 09-09-1355, 09-10-1443 and 09-10-
1534;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xii. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.

Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Gondelina G. Amata,
Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, Ofelia E. Ordoñez, Filipina T.
Rodriguez, Sofia D. Cruz, Chita C. Jalandoni, Janet Lim Napoles,
Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Amparo L.
Fernando, Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Aileen Palama, John
Raymund De Asis and Mylene T. Encarnacion, acting in concert,
for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in
relation to fund releases amounting to PHP44,000,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through the NLDC and CARED,
as reflected in DV No. 09- 12-1834, 10-01-0004, 10-01-0118 and
10-05-0747;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xiii. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.

Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Gondelina G. Amata,
 Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, Ofelia E. Ordoñez, Filipina T.
Rodriguez, Sofia D. Cruz, Chita C. Jalandoni, Janet Lim Napoles,
Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Fernando
Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Myla Ogerio and Margarita P. Guadinez,
acting in concert, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A.
NO. 3019 in relation to fund releases amounting to
Php25,000,000.00 drawn from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through
the NLDC and Agri and Economic Program for Farmers
Foundation, Inc. (AEPFFI), as reflected in DV No. 09-091353, 09-
10-1444 and 09-10-1540;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xiv. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.

Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Gondelina G. Amata,
Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, Ofelia E. Ordoñez, Filipina T.
Rodriguez, Sofia D. Cruz, Chita C. Jalandoni, Janet Lim Napoles,
Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Amparo L.
Fernando, Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Piorato, Fabian,
Hernani Ditchon, Galay and Laarni A. Uy, acting in concert, for
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in relation to
fund releases amounting to Php25,000,000.00 drawn from Enrile’s
PDAF and coursed through the NLDC and APMFI, as reflected in
DV No. 09- 09-1358, 09-10-1449 and 09-10-
1535;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xv. Juan Ponce Enrile, Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, Jose Antonio V.

Evangelista II, Ruby C. Tuason, Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario
Nuñez, Lalaine Paule, Marilou Bare, Gondelina G. Amata,
Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, Ofelia E. Ordoñez, Filipina T.
Rodriguez, Sofia D. Cruz, Chita C. Jalandoni, Janet Lim Napoles,
Jo Christine L. Napoles, James Christopher L. Napoles, Eulogio D.
Rodriguez, Evelyn D. De Leon, Ronald John Lim, Amparo L.
Fernando, Fernando Ramirez, Nitz Cabilao, Aileen Palama, John
Raymund De Asis and Mylene T. Encarnacion, acting in concert,
for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF R.A. NO. 3019 in
relation to fund releases amounting to Php32,000,000.00 drawn
from Enrile’s PDAF and coursed through the NLDC and CARED,
as reflected in DV No. 09- 09-1354, 09-10-1447;

and accordingly RECOMMENDS the immediate filing of the corresponding Informations

against them with the Sandiganbayan;

(b) DISMISSES the criminal charges against Mark S. Oliveros, Editha P. Talaboc, Delfin
Agcaoili, Jr., Daniel Balanoba, Lucila M. Lawas-Yutok, Antonio M. Santos, Montuya for
insufficiency of evidence;
(c) FURNISHES copies of this Joint Resolution to the Anti- Money Laundering Council for its
appropriate action on the possible violations by the above-named respondents of the Anti-
Money Laundering Act, considering that Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019 are considered unlawful activities under this statute;
(d) FURNISHES copies of this Joint Resolution to the Supreme Court, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Professional Regulation Commission for appropriate action on the
alleged misconduct committed by notaries public Oliveros, Talaboc, Agcaoili, Balanoba,
Lawas- Yutok and Santos, Solomon and Victorino; and
(e) DIRECTS the Field Investigation Office to conduct further fact-finding investigation on
the possible criminal and/or administrative liability of Javellana, Mendoza, Ortiz, Cunanan,
Amata, Sevidal and other respondents who may have received commissions and/or
kickbacks from Napoles in relation to their participation in the scheme subject of these
cases.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, 28 March 2014